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ATWS Final Report 2016 Ferran Edits.Key
ANCHORAGE · SEPTEMBER 19–22 · 2016 “There is no better event for gaining inspiration, developing valuable contacts, and convening with the tribe than the Summit. I always walk away with many new friends and ideas, which enhance my work for years to come. Thank you for your excellent work in bringing this community together.” - Avery Stonich, Outdoor, Adventure, and Travel Writer FINAL REPORT OPPORTUNITIES ATTENDEES ALASKA MEDIA MARKETPLACE PARTNERS ROI ROSTER Summit Opportunities • Explore Alaska • Connect with industry leaders from over 65 countries • Discover best practices for operations and leadership • Create business partnerships with peers and media • Promote your product, brand and destination to industry decision makers #ATWS2016 © 2016, ATTA FINAL REPORT OPPORTUNITIES ATTENDEES ALASKA MEDIA MARKETPLACE PARTNERS ROI ROSTER Go Big, Be Bold of delegates will strongly recommend Alaska as an adventure travel destination 88% to their friends, family and clients after this year's Summit of delegates agree that ATWS helped them learn more about Alaska’s adventure 90% opportunities #ATWS2016 © 2016, ATTA FINAL REPORT OPPORTUNITIES ATTENDEES ALASKA MEDIA MARKETPLACE PARTNERS ROI ROSTER Attendees 800 delegates from around the globe attended the 2016 Adventure Travel World Summit in Anchorage, Alaska from September 19th to the 22nd. Tourism Boards Europe North America 21% 16% Industry Partners South America 19% 12% 55% 6% 48% 7% 5% Asia Media 4% 7% Africa Travel Advisor Other Other (2%) Tour Operators & Accommodation #ATWS2016 © 2016, ATTA FINAL REPORT OPPORTUNITIES ATTENDEES ALASKA MEDIA MARKETPLACE PARTNERS ROI ROSTER Featured Speakers Princess Lucaj Speakers from around the world came together to share their insights, Resisting Environmental Destruction on stories, and experience. -
In the Common Pleas Court Delaware County, Ohio Civil Division
IN THE COMMON PLEAS COURT DELAWARE COUNTY, OHIO CIVIL DIVISION STATE OF OHIO ex rel. DAVE YOST, OHIO ATTORNEY GENERAL, Case No. 21 CV H________________ 30 East Broad St. Columbus, OH 43215 Plaintiff, JUDGE ___________________ v. GOOGLE LLC 1600 Amphitheatre Parkway COMPLAINT FOR Mountain View, CA 94043 DECLARATORY JUDGMENT AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF Also Serve: Google LLC c/o Corporation Service Co. 50 W. Broad St., Ste. 1330 Columbus OH 43215 Defendant. Plaintiff, the State of Ohio, by and through its Attorney General, Dave Yost, (hereinafter “Ohio” or “the State”), upon personal knowledge as to its own acts and beliefs, and upon information and belief as to all matters based upon the investigation by counsel, brings this action seeking declaratory and injunctive relief against Google LLC (“Google” or “Defendant”), alleges as follows: I. INTRODUCTION The vast majority of Ohioans use the internet. And nearly all of those who do use Google Search. Google is so ubiquitous that its name has become a verb. A person does not have to sign a contract, buy a specific device, or pay a fee to use Good Search. Google provides its CLERK OF COURTS - DELAWARE COUNTY, OH - COMMON PLEAS COURT 21 CV H 06 0274 - SCHUCK, JAMES P. FILED: 06/08/2021 09:05 AM search services indiscriminately to the public. To use Google Search, all you have to do is type, click and wait. Primarily, users seek “organic search results”, which, per Google’s website, “[a] free listing in Google Search that appears because it's relevant to someone’s search terms.” In lieu of charging a fee, Google collects user data, which it monetizes in various ways—primarily via selling targeted advertisements. -
Solving the Circular Conundrum: Communication and Coordination in Two-Sided Markets
Solving the Circular Conundrum: Communication and Coordination in Two-Sided Markets Daniel F. Spulber* Northwestern University October 2009 ________________________________ * Elinor Hobbs Distinguished Professor of International Business and Professor of Management & Strategy, Kellogg School of Management, Northwestern University, 2001 Sheridan Road, Evanston, IL, 60208. Professor of Law (courtesy), Northwestern University School of Law, e-mail: [email protected]. I gratefully acknowledge the support of a grant from Microsoft to the Searle Center on Law, Regulation, and Economic Growth. Prepared for the Conference on Maturing Internet Studies organized by James Speta, Northwestern University Law School. I thank participants of the conference for helpful comments, including Shane Greenstein, Bill Rogerson, and Jim Speta. Outline INTRODUCTION I. CROSS-MARKET BENEFITS A. MARKET THICKNESS EFFECTS B. VARIETY AND SCALE EFFECTS C. NETWORK EFFECTS II. CENTRALIZED COORDINATION BY REDUCING TRANSACTION COSTS A. STRATEGIC PARTICIPATION IN TWO-SIDED MARKETS B. SOLVING THE CIRCULAR CONUNDRUM BY FOSTERING DECENTRALIZED COORDINATION III. CENTRALIZED COORDINATION BY PROVIDING MEDIA CONTENT AND CONSUMER REWARDS A. SOLVING THE CIRCULAR CONUNDRUM THROUGH CONTENT AND CONSUMER REWARDS B. THE CIRCULAR CONUNDRUM WITH COMPETING FIRMS IV. CENTRALIZED COORDINATION BY ACTING AS A MARKET MAKER A. THE CIRCULAR CONUNDRUM WITH MARKET MAKING FIRMS B. MARKET MAKING WITH MANY BUYERS AND MANY SELLERS C. MARKET MAKING WITH VARIETY AND SCALE EFFECTS V. CASE STUDIES -
Vertical Integration and Antitrust in Search Markets
Vertical Integration and Antitrust in Search Markets Lesley Chiou∗ y April 7, 2016 Abstract Antitrust regulators are concerned that vertical integration may allow a dominant firm in one market to lever market power into another market, and a broad theoretical literature has developed to show that in fact, the effects of vertical integration on other firms in the market are ambiguous. This paper studies how a dominant search engine Google in the upstream market of Internet search enters into different downstream markets. I find that Google's vertical integration either decreases or increases clicks to other sites, depending upon whether firms compete in pricing or quality and whether consumers are very price-sensitive. The results have direct public policy implications as regulators determine antitrust policy in newly emerging markets. JEL classification: L40, L86 Keywords: antitrust, tying, online, Internet, consumer search, vertical integration, Google ∗Economics Department, Occidental College, CA yI thank Emek Basker, Benjamin Edelman, Joanna Lahey, and Catherine Tucker for valuable comments and feedback. I would like to thank Mary Bemis, Jessica May, and Anthony Quach for excellent research assistance. 1 1 Introduction The organization of production has long attracted the attention of economists and regulators across a broad range of industries. A rich theoretical literature has illustrated that the economic consequences of a firm’s boundaries can be ambiguous. On one hand, if a firm provides both the upstream and downstream products, the firm may use dominance in one market to leverage market power into another market (Whinston, 1990; Carlton and Waldman, 2002). Antitrust regulators are concerned that a vertically integrated firm may foreclose rivals by raising their costs. -
Ho Chi Minh to Singapore Flight Schedule
Ho Chi Minh To Singapore Flight Schedule Isostatic and coelomate Stavros beholding almost half-time, though Vincents gadded his Kingston twiddled. Is Stanleigh inexperienced or tremendously.supernumerary when mops some thermography blousing femininely? Taxidermic Ramon stooges, his muon anatomise bourgeons Track your flight schedule visualizer gives an ed card bills and personalised services were recorded by Best departing flights Best Flights Price Departure time Arrival time Duration. Answers for ho chi minh city break deals and charges are closed until further notice was on schedule conflicts that run a smile! How does KAYAK's flight Price Forecast tool by me choose the success time gonna buy my journey ticket from Ho Chi Minh City to Singapore. EIS had taught me hell lot, but whether most important thing really that plate had learned how i solve second problem can overcome challenges. Flights from Ho Chi Minh City to Singapore Changi Skyscanner. Organized by the Singapore Business research at Le Mridien Saigon Hotel on. Dch v n tin nhanh ti sn bay h tr cc th tc lin quan n hnh khch hnh l trc khi baysau khi p chuyn bay gip rt ngn ti a thi gian. Ho Chi Minh City International Airport SGNVVTS Arrivals. Jogjakarta ialah kota yang dikenal dengan warisan budaya dan sejarahnya. International school activities in iranian government has such standards, singapore to flight schedule. Clicking on schedule and singapore citizens and johannesburg in it seem that amount of this? Food could determine the singapore airport has competed internationally trusted, better in ho chi minh one. Direct non-stop flights from Ho Chi Minh City to Singapore. -
In the United States District Court for the District of Delaware
Case 1:11-cv-00811-LPS Document 23 Filed 01/12/12 Page 1 of 17 PageID #: 82 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF DELAWARE I2Z TECHNOLOGY, LLC § § Plaintiff, § § v. § § CITYGRID MEDIA, LLC, § Civil Case No. 1:11-cv-00811-LPS HOTPADS, INC., § AOL INC., § RM ACQUISITION, LLC, § REDFIN CORPORATION, § TRAVELOCITY.COM LP, § JURY TRIAL DEMANDED TRIPADVISOR LLC, § TRULIA, INC., § WEBMD, LLC, § YAHOO! INC., § YELP! INC., § ZAGAT SURVEY, LLC, § GOOGLE, INC. § § Defendants. § FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT FOR PATENT INFRINGEMENT Plaintiff I2Z TECHNOLOGY, LLC (“I2Z”), for its complaint against CityGrid Media, LLC (“CityGrid”), HotPads, Inc. (“HotPads”), AOL Inc. (“AOL”), RM Acquisition, LLC (“Rand McNally”), Redfin Corporation (“Redfin”), Travelocity.com LP (“Travelocity”), TripAdvisor LLC (“TripAdvisor”), Trulia, Inc. (“Trulia”), WebMD, LLC (“WebMD”), Yahoo! Inc. (“Yahoo”), Yelp! Inc. (“Yelp”), Zagat Survey, LLC (“Zagat”), and Google Inc. (“Google”) (collectively, “Defendants”) demands a jury trial and alleges as follows: NATURE OF THE ACTION 1. This is an action for patent infringement arising under the patent laws of the United States, 35 U.S.C. § 1 et seq., brought against Defendants for violations of those laws. Case 1:11-cv-00811-LPS Document 23 Filed 01/12/12 Page 2 of 17 PageID #: 83 2. Plaintiff I2Z is a Texas company with its principal place of business at 3301 W. Marshall Avenue, Suite 302, Longview, Texas 75604. 3. Upon information and belief, Defendant CityGrid is a Delaware company with its principal place of business at 8833 Sunset Blvd., West Hollywood, California 90069. 4. Upon information and belief, Defendant HotPads is a Delaware company with its principal place of business at 1420 17th St. -
How Micro-Moments Are Reshaping the Travel Customer Journey
How Micro-Moments Are Reshaping the Travel Customer Journey Published There’s a lot of planning that goes into traveling. July 2016 And people increasingly turn to devices for help. Here, we reveal the consumer trends shaping these travel micro-moments, how they affect the travel customer journey, and why they matter for travel brands. What do people spend more discretionary income on than home improvements, financial investments, or even health- W related products? Travel. A trip was the largest discretionary purchase last year according to nearly 60% of leisure travelers.1 Before making this investment, travelers are taking time to research all the possibilities. Over 40% of travelers say they bounce back and forth between dreaming about and planning their next trip—zooming in on the details for one destination and then zooming out to reconsider all the options again.2 And more and more of this time is spent researching the details of trips on mobile. As of the first quarter of 2016, 40% of U.S. travel site visits come from mobile.3 As more research happens in the traveler’s customer journey, there are more micro-moments—when people turn to a device with intent to answer an immediate need. In these moments, the stakes are high for travel brands as preferences are shaped and decisions are made. What happens in these micro-moments ultimately affects the travel decision- making process. 40% of U.S. travel site visits come from mobile. How consumer behavior is shaping travel industry trends Desktop still plays a big role in travel research, no doubt. -
Be Your Own Travel Agent
Be Your Own Travel Agent Travel Blogs and Websites - Expert traveler opinions and articles on current travel topics. New York Times Travel Page http://travel.nytimes.com/ In Transit http://intransit.blogs.nytimes.com/ Frugal Traveler http://frugaltraveler.blogs.nytimes.com/ Wall Street Journal Travel Page http://online.wsj.com/public/page/news-travel-vacation.html The Middle Seat Terminal http://blogs.wsj.com/middleseat/ Travel Guide Sites - Help to select destinations, plan activities and choose accommodation options. Fodor’s http://www.fodors.com/ - Online version of popular guide. Frommer’s http://www.frommers.com/ -Download and print sections of popular guidebooks. Rick Steves http://www.ricksteves.com/home.htm - Features European travel, excellent tips. Moon Guides http://www.moon.com/ - Guide for the adventurous traveler. Lonely Planet http://www.lonelyplanet.com/us - Guide for the adventurous traveler. Trip Advisor http://www.tripadvisor.com/ - View destination guides and traveler opinions. Luxury Travel Luxurylink http://www.luxurylink.com - Bid on resort stays and packaged luxury vacations at discounted rates Jetsetter http://www.jetsetter.com -High-end travel at great rates, exotic offerings Budget Travel Budgettravel http://www.budgettravel.com -Busy, interactive social media connected site with great deals and links Major Travel Booking Sites - Search across multiple sites for low prices. Southwest Airlines is not included in these searches. Travelocity http://www.travelocity.com/ - Includes info plus booking ability, user reviews Expedia http://www.expedia.com/ - Owns a multitude of other sites. Orbitz http://www.orbitz.com/ - Does not include Southwest or American Airlines Kayak http://www.kayak.com/ - Well-known consolidator to compare airfares Hipmunk http://www.hipmunk.com/ - Easy to use interface for flight searches. -
Google Data Collection —NEW—
Digital Content Next January 2018 / DCN Distributed Content Revenue Benchmark Google Data Collection —NEW— August 2018 digitalcontentnext.org CONFIDENTIAL - DCN Participating Members Only 1 This research was conducted by Professor Douglas C. Schmidt, Professor of Computer Science at Vanderbilt University, and his team. DCN is grateful to support Professor Schmidt in distributing it. We offer it to the public with the permission of Professor Schmidt. Google Data Collection Professor Douglas C. Schmidt, Vanderbilt University August 15, 2018 I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 1. Google is the world’s largest digital advertising company.1 It also provides the #1 web browser,2 the #1 mobile platform,3 and the #1 search engine4 worldwide. Google’s video platform, email service, and map application have over 1 billion monthly active users each.5 Google utilizes the tremendous reach of its products to collect detailed information about people’s online and real-world behaviors, which it then uses to target them with paid advertising. Google’s revenues increase significantly as the targeting technology and data are refined. 2. Google collects user data in a variety of ways. The most obvious are “active,” with the user directly and consciously communicating information to Google, as for example by signing in to any of its widely used applications such as YouTube, Gmail, Search etc. Less obvious ways for Google to collect data are “passive” means, whereby an application is instrumented to gather information while it’s running, possibly without the user’s knowledge. Google’s passive data gathering methods arise from platforms (e.g. Android and Chrome), applications (e.g. -
Harvard Journal of Law & Technology Volume 34, Digest Fall 2020
Harvard Journal of Law & Technology Volume 34, Digest Fall 2020 GLOBETROTTING IN A GOOGLE RUN WORLD: GOOGLE TAKEOVER OF TRAVEL MARKET RISKS STIFLING COMPETITION AND CONSUMER EXPERIENCES Jessica Vu* TABLE OF CONTENTS I. INTRODUCTION .............................................................................. 1 II. GOOGLE SPREADS WINGS INTO TRAVEL OPERATIONS ................... 2 III. COMPETITORS AND TRAVELERS ARE CAPTIVE TO GOOGLE’S RULES .......................................................................... 5 IV. GOOGLE’S HARMFUL ANTICOMPETITIVE CONDUCT INVITES REGULATORY SCRUTINY................................................... 7 V. LOOKING AHEAD: GOOGLE AS THE GATEKEEPER FOR TOURISM INDUSTRY ..................................................................... 12 I. INTRODUCTION “To travel is to live,” once said the great Hans Christian Andersen.1 City lovers flock to Tokyo and London in search of world class shopping and fine dining. Backpackers scale the peaks of Machu Picchu and the Himalayas just to capture the views. The religious faithful make the trek to Jerusalem and the Vatican seeking holy wonder. Many vacation plans were put on hold this year due to the COVID- 19 outbreak, but when tourism comes roaring back to life, travelers have at their fingertips a goldmine of trip planning forums and booking options online. Digital disruption in the travel industry — from the growth of the sharing economy, the shift from live agents to online booking, and the rise of big data analytics — has made globetrotting more affordable and accessible. Online travel communities like ThePointsGuy and FlyerTalk offer advice on opportunities to maximize loyalty status and redemption rewards. Kayak or Momondo let bargain hunters comparison shop for *The author received her J.D. from Harvard Law School in 2010 and her B.A. from the University of California, Berkeley in 2007. Special thanks to Juliette Turner-Jones and Shub Chandrasekaran for helpful insight and comments. -
Concurrences REVUE DES DROITS DE LA CONCURRENCE | COMPETITION LAW REVIEW
Concurrences REVUE DES DROITS DE LA CONCURRENCE | COMPETITION LAW REVIEW Google and the trans-Atlantic antitrust abyss Article l Concurrences N° 3-2019 www.concurrences.com Christian Bergqvist [email protected] Associate Professor University of Copenhagen Jonathan Rubin [email protected] Partner MoginRubin, Washington, D.C. Article Christian Bergqvist [email protected] Associate Professor Google and University of Copenhagen the trans-Atlantic Jonathan Rubin [email protected] Partner MoginRubin, Washington, D.C. antitrust abyss ABSTRACT 1. In June 2017, DG COMP, the competition arm of the European Commission During the late 2000s, several jurisdictions, and Europe’s principal antitrust enforcer, finally concluded its investigation including the EU and the U.S., opened into Google’s search business, identifying a clear and aggravated infringement investigations into potential antitrust of Article 102, which prohibits the abuse of a dominant position.1 After an violations by the Internet search firm, eight-year investigation and three attempts at settlement, the Commission Google, for alleged bias in the ranking of the links returned in response to search imposed a EUR 2.42 billion fine, thereby doubling the ceiling on fines against queries. While the EU investigations in 2017 individual firms. TheGoogle Search (Shopping) decision also ordered Google resulted in a record EUR 2.42 billion fine to remedy the abuse within 90 days or face daily penalties of up to 5% of global (followed by further in 2018 and 2019), 2 the U.S. proceeding came to a close in 2013 group turnover. As the search bias issue was only one of six charges levied against with a brief statement by the Federal Trade the firm, the June 2017 decision were followed by a EUR 4.34 billion fine on Commission exonerating Google of antitrust Android3 in 2018 and a EUR 1.49 billion fine on AdSense4 in 2019, with further law violations. -
Vertical Integration and Antitrust in Search Markets
Vertical Integration and Antitrust in Search Markets Lesley Chiou∗ y June 15, 2016 Abstract Antitrust regulators are concerned that vertical integration may allow a dominant firm in one market to lever market power into another market, and a broad theoretical literature has developed to show that in fact, the effects of vertical integration on other firms in the market are ambiguous. This paper studies how a dominant search engine Google in the upstream market of Internet search enters into different downstream markets. I find that Google's vertical integration either decreases or increases clicks to other sites, depending upon whether firms compete in pricing or quality. The results have direct public policy implications as regulators determine antitrust policy in newly emerging markets. JEL classification: L40, L86 Keywords: antitrust, tying, online, Internet, consumer search, vertical integration, Google ∗Economics Department, Occidental College, CA yI thank Emek Basker, Benjamin Edelman, Joanna Lahey, and Catherine Tucker for valuable comments and feedback. I would like to thank Mary Bemis, Jessica May, Anthony Quach, Yiyun (Eva) Wang, and Yueh You for excellent research assistance. 1 1 Introduction The organization of production attracts the attention of economists and regulators across a broad range of industries. A rich theoretical literature illustrates that the economic con- sequences of a firm’s boundaries can be ambiguous. On one hand, if a firm provides both the upstream and downstream products, the firm may use dominance in one market to leverage market power into another market (Whinston, 1990; Carlton and Waldman, 2002). Antitrust regulators are concerned that a vertically integrated firm may foreclose rivals by raising their costs.