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NB: Due to the extensive nature of this publication and the pace of reforms and judicial consideration there may be an absence of reference to a recent case or some references to legislation and its provisions which are no longer current, yet proclaimed, amended or repealed. This publication attempts to draw out the most significant points in the relevant legislation. Whilst all care has been taken to ensure that the most up to date information has been included, not all cases or aspects of the legislation have been considered. The material contained in this publication is in the nature of general comment only, and neither purports nor is intended to be advice on any particular matter. No reader should act on the basis of any matter contained in this publication without considering and, if necessary, taking appropriate professional advice upon his or her own particular circumstance. © Carter Newell Lawyers 2014 Australian Civil Liability Guide

Contributors

Paul Hopkins John Grant Michael Elliott Patrick Mead Michael Bath Grant Thomas Rebecca Stevens Peter Dovolil Danny Maxwell Michael Gapes Andrew Persijn Hannah Maher Mark Brookes Allison Bailey Nadia Stacey David Rodighiero Ryan Stehlik Alex Button-Sloan Glenn Biggs Rebecca Johns Avi Kaye Stephen White Beau Mollinger Rosalie Grace Milton Latta Cameron Rodgers Stephanie Levesque Katherine Bland

Foreword by The Honourable David A Ipp AO QC Commissioner of the NSW Independent Commission Against Corruption Formerly Justice, Court of Appeal, of New South Wales

Endorsement by The Honourable Michael Kirby AC CMG

Carter Newell Publications Brisbane • Sydney • Melbourne

Carter Newell Lawyers

FOREWORD

Carter Newell Lawyers are to be commended for their publication ‘Australian Civil Liability Guide’. The legislation that, since 2002, has reformed law in Australia has created a maze. The tangled web of statutory provisions has been made even more complex by the judgments of courts in every jurisdiction that have tried to apply and clarify the various provisions that have fallen for decision.

One of the most time-consuming problems for lawyers who have to grapple with the subtleties of the legislation involved is the difficulty in finding the relevant material. This may comprise the legislation applicable, the cases that have considered the particular issue, similar legislation in other jurisdictions, and relevant cases in those jurisdictions.

Carter Newell’s publication enables one, quickly, to undertake the desired research simply and efficiently. The material is comprehensive and well-organised. The legislation is sensibly divided into different categories annotated with cases and commentary. Each category deals separately with each State and Territory. The language used is clear and direct. The time and trouble that has been taken in the production of the guide is obvious. Its quality as a reference work speaks for itself. It is an extremely helpful tool for any tort lawyer, whether practitioner or academic, and for any person who is interested in the changes to Australian tort law that have occurred since 2002.

The Honourable Justice David A Ipp AO Court of Appeal Supreme Court of New South Wales

AUSTRALIAN CIVIL Liability Guide iii

Carter Newell Lawyers

Endorsement

Insurance law was the first area of law I knew and when I started there were no publications such as this 9th edition Australian Civil Liability Guide. The State by State break down highlighting the effects of the tort reform introduced in 2002; the cases reviewed, interpretation and assessment of heads of damage clearly demonstrate an excellent understanding of this area of law by the team at Carter Newell Lawyers. This publication is a great resource and a fine example of why I have always felt at home in the family of insurance lawyers.

The Honourable Michael Kirby AC CMG.

AUSTRALIAN CIVIL Liability Guide v

Carter Newell Lawyers

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Foreword ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� iii Endorsement ��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������v Table of Cases �������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� xiv Table of Statutes ���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� xxii

INTRODUCTION ����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 1

Background to the tort reforms in Australia ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 1 Commentary on the tort reforms ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 1 Future reform ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 2

Queensland �������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 3

Application of Statutory Reforms ����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 4

Pre-court Procedures ����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 5

Compulsory conference ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 9

The Law of – Scope of ��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 10

Standard of care ����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 10 Causation ��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 12 Obvious risk ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 13 Dangerous recreational activities ��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 17 Liability of professionals ����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 18 Liability of public authorities ����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 19 Liability of volunteers and Good Samaritans ��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 20 Food donors ����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 21 Good Samaritans ��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 22 Liability for mental harm ����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 22 Intoxication and illegal activity ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 23 Contributory negligence ����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 25 Proportionate liability ���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 27 Vicarious liability ����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 31 Non-delegable duties ��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 31 Exclusion clauses ��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 32 Expressions of regret and apologies ���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 32 Limitation periods ��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 33

Damages Awards ��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 39

General damages ��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 39 Economic loss �������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 41 Gratuitous care ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 43 Interest �������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 44 Discount rate ���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 44 Exemplary, punitive or aggravated damages ��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 44 Structured settlements ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 45 Legal costs ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 45

Practice and Procedure ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 46

Legal practitioners �������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 46 Legal advertising ���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 47

New South Wales �������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 51

Application of Statutory Reforms ��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 52

AUSTRALIAN CIVIL Liability Guide vii Carter Newell Lawyers

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Pre-court Procedures ��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 54

The Law of Negligence – Scope of Duty of Care ��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 54

Standard of care ����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 54 Causation ��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 59 Obvious risk ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 66 Dangerous recreational activities ��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 69 Liability of professionals ����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 72 Liability of public authorities ����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 73 Liability of volunteers and Good Samaritans ��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 77 Food donors ����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 77 Good Samaritans ��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 78 Liability for mental harm ����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 78 Intoxication and illegal activity ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 81 Intoxication ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 81 Illegal activity ���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 83 Contributory negligence ����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 84 Proportionate liability ���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 86 Vicarious liability ����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 90 Non-delegable duties ��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 91 Exclusion clauses ��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 92 Apology ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 93 Limitation periods ��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 93

Damages Awards ��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 94

General damages ��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 94 Economic loss �������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 96 Gratuitous care ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 97 Attendant gratuitous care ��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 98 Assisted gratuitous care ����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 98 Interest �������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 99 Discount rate ���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 99 Exemplary, punitive or aggravated damages ��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 99 Structured settlements ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 99 Legal costs ����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 100

Practice and Procedure ���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 101

Legal practitioners ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 101 Legal advertising �������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 102

Victoria ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 105

Application of Statutory Reforms ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 106

Pre-court Procedures ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 107

The Law of Negligence – Scope of Duty of Care ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 107

Standard of care ��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 107 Causation ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 108 Obvious risk ���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 109 Dangerous recreational activities ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 110 Liability of professionals ��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 110 Liability of public authorities ��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 112 Liability of volunteers and Good Samaritans ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 112 Volunteers ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 113

viii AUSTRALIAN CIVIL LIABILITY GUIDE Carter Newell Lawyers

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Food donors ��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 114 Good Samaritans ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 114 Liability for mental harm ��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 114 Intoxication and illegal activity ����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 115 Contributory negligence ��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 116 Proportionate liability �������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 118 Vicarious liability ��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 120 Non-delegable duties ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 121 Exclusion clauses ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 122 Apology ���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 122 Limitation periods ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 123

Damages Awards ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 125

General damages ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 125 Economic loss ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 126 Gratuitous care ����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 126 Gratuitous attendant care ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 126 Loss of capacity to provide care for others ���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 127 Interest ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 127 Discount rate �������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 127 Exemplary, punitive and aggravated damages ���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 128 Structured settlements ����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 128 Legal costs ����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 128

Practice and Procedure ���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 129

Legal practitioners ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 129 Legal advertising �������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 129

Australian Capital Territory ����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 131

Application of Statutory Reforms ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 132

Pre-court Procedures ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 132

The Law of Negligence – Scope of Duty of Care ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 133

Standard of care ��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 133 Causation ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 134 Obvious risk ���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 135 Dangerous recreational activities ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 135 Liability of professionals ��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 136 Liability of public authorities ��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 136 Liability of volunteers and Good Samaritans ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 137 Volunteers ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 137 Food donors ��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 138 Good Samaritans ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 138 Liability for mental harm ��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 138 Intoxication and illegal activity ����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 139 Contributory negligence ��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 140 Proportionate liability �������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 141 Vicarious liability ��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 142 Non-delegable duties ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 143 Exclusion clauses ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 143 Expressions of regret and apologies �������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 144 Limitation periods ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 144

Damages Awards ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 145

AUSTRALIAN CIVIL Liability Guide ix Carter Newell Lawyers

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General damages ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 145 Economic loss ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 145 Gratuitous care/Gratuitous services ��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 145 Interest ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 146 Discount rate ��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 146 Exemplary, punitive or aggravated damages ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 146 Structured settlements ����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 146 Legal costs ����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 147

Practice and Procedure ���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 147

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Tasmania ����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 149

Application of Statutory Reforms ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 150

Pre-court Procedures ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 150

The Law of Negligence – Scope of Duty of Care ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 151

Standard of care ��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 151 Causation ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 152 Obvious risk ���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 152 Dangerous recreational activities ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 152 Liability of professionals ��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 153 Liability of public authorities ��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 154 Liability of volunteers and Good Samaritans ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 154 Volunteers ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 154 Food donors ��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 155 Good Samaritans ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 155 Liability for mental harm ��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 155 Intoxication and illegal activity ����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 156 Contributory negligence ��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 157 Proportionate liability �������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 158 Vicarious liability ��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 159 Non-delegable duties ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 160 Exclusion clauses ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 161 Expressions of regret and apologies �������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 161 Limitation periods ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 161

Damages Awards ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 162

General damages ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 162 Economic loss ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 163 Gratuitous care ����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 163 Interest ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 163 Discount rate �������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 164 Exemplary, punitive or aggravated damages ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 164 Structured settlements ����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 164 Legal costs ����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 164

Practice and Procedure ���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 164

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x AUSTRALIAN CIVIL LIABILITY GUIDE Carter Newell Lawyers

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South Australia ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 167

Application of Statutory Reforms ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 168

Pre-court Procedures ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 168

The Law of Negligence – Scope of Duty of Care ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 169

Standard of care ��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 169 Causation ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 170 Obvious risk ���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 170 Dangerous recreational activities ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 171 Liability of professionals ��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 172 Liability of public authorities ��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 172 Liability of volunteers and Good Samaritans ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 173 Volunteers ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 173 Food donors ��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 173 Good Samaritans ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 174 Liability for mental harm ��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 174 Intoxication and illegal activity ����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 174 Contributory negligence ��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 175 Proportionate liability �������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 176 Vicarious liability ��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 177 Non-delegable duties ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 178 Exclusion clauses ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 178 Expressions of regret and apologies �������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 179 Limitation periods ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 179

Damages Awards ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 180

General damages ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 180 Economic loss ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 181 Gratuitous care ����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 181 Interest ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 182 Discount rate �������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 182 Exemplary, punitive or aggravated damages ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 182 Structured settlements ����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 182 Legal costs ����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 183

Practice and Procedure ���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 183

Legal practitioners ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 183 Legal advertising �������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 183

Western Australia �������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 185

Application of Statutory Reforms ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 186

Pre-court Procedures ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 186

The Law of Negligence – Scope of Duty of Care ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 187

Standard of care ��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 187 Causation ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 188 Obvious risk ���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 189 Dangerous recreational activities ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 190 Liability of professionals ��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 191 Liability of public authorities ��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 192 Liability of volunteers and Good Samaritans ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 193

AUSTRALIAN CIVIL Liability Guide xi Carter Newell Lawyers

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Volunteers ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 193 Food donors ��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 194 Good Samaritans ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 194 Liability for mental harm ��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 194 Intoxication and illegal activity ����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 195 Contributory negligence ��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 196 Proportionate liability �������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 198 Vicarious liability ��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 200 Non-delegable duties ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 200 Exclusion clauses ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 201 Expressions of regret and apologies �������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 201 Limitation periods ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 202

Damages Awards ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 203

General damages ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 203 Economic loss ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 204 Gratuitous care ����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 204 Interest ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 204 Discount rate �������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 205 Exemplary, punitive and aggravated damages ���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 205 Structured settlements ����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 205 Legal costs ����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 205

Practice and Procedure ���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 205

Legal practitioners ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 205 Legal advertising �������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 206

Northern Territory ����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 207

Application of Statutory Reforms ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 208

Pre-court Procedures ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 208

The Law Negligence – Scope of Duty of Care ����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 208

Standard of care ��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 208 Causation ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 209 Obvious risk ���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 209 Dangerous recreational activities ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 209 Liability of professionals ��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 209 Liability of public authorities ��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 209 Liability of volunteers and Good Samaritans ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 210 Volunteers ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 210 Food donors ��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 210 Good Samaritans ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 211 Liability for mental harm ��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 211 Intoxication and illegal activity ����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 211 Contributory negligence ��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 212 Proportionate liability �������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 213 Vicarious liability ��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 215 Non-delegable duties ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 216 Exclusion clauses ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 216 Expressions of regret and apologies �������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 217 Limitation periods ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 217

Damages Awards ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 218

xii AUSTRALIAN CIVIL LIABILITY GUIDE Carter Newell Lawyers

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General damages ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 218 Economic loss ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 219 Gratuitous care ����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 219 Interest ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 220 Discount rate �������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 220 Exemplary, punitive or aggravated damages ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 220 Structured settlements ����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 220

Practice and Procedure ���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 220

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Commonwealth ��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 223

Application of Statutory Reforms ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 224

Pre-court Procedures ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 224

The Law of Negligence – Scope of Duty of Care ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 224

Standard of care ��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 224 Causation ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 224 Obvious risk ���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 224 Dangerous recreational activities ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 224 Liability of professionals ��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 225 Liability of public authorities ��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 225 Liability of volunteers and Good Samaritans ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 225 Volunteers ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 225 Food donors ��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 225 Good Samaritans ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 226 Liability for mental harm ��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 226 Intoxication and illegal activity ����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 226 Contributory negligence ��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 226 Proportionate liability �������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 226 Vicarious liability ��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 229 Non-delegable duties ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 229 Exclusion clauses ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 230 Apology ���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 230 Limitation periods ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 230

Damages Awards ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 232

General damages ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 232 Economic loss ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 232 Gratuitous care ����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 233 Interest ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 233 Discount rate �������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 234 Exemplary, punitive and aggravated damages ���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 234 Structured settlements ����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 234 Legal costs ����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 234

Practice and Procedure ���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 234

Legal practitioners ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 234 Legal advertising �������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 235

Appendix One �������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 236 Appendix Two �������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 237

AUSTRALIAN CIVIL Liability Guide xiii Carter Newell Lawyers

Table of Cases

Ackland v Stewart [2014] ACTSC 18 ���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 68 ACQ v Cook; Aircair Moree v Cook; Cook v Country Energy; Country Energy v Cook (2008) 72 NSWLR 318 �������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 86 Aquagenics Pty Ltd v Break O’Day Council [2010] TASFC 3 ����������������������������������������������������������������������� 90 Adeels Palace Pty Ltd v Bou Najem (2009) 239 CLR 420; (2009) 260 ALR 628; (2009) 84 ALJR 19 ������������� ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 23, 55, 56, 62, 63, 189 Al-Rawahi v Niazi (2006) 203 FLR 94 ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 133 Allianz Australia Insurance Ltd v Roads and Traffic Authority of NSW; Kelly v Roads and Traffic Authority of NSW (2010) 57 MVR 80; [2010] NSWCA 328 ���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 60 Amaca Pty Ltd v Ellis, The State of South Australia v Ellis; Millennium Inorganic Chemicals Ltd v Ellis (2010) 240 CLR 111; [2010] HCA 5 ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 60 Angel v Hawkesbury City Council (2008) Aust Reports 81-955; [2008] NSWCA 130 ������������������������ 98 Arabi v Glad Cleaning Service Pty Ltd [2010] NSWCA 208 ������������������������������������������������������������������������ 58 Arndt v Horwood [2012] QSC 104 ��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 35 Australian Capital Territory v Crowley [2012] ACTCA 52 ��������������������������������������������������������������������������� 134 Avram v Gusakoski (2006) 31 WAR 400; (2006) Aust Torts Reports 81-836; [2006] WASCA 16 �������������� 197 AWB Ltd v Cole and Anor (2006) 152 FCR 382; (2006) 232 ALR 743; (2006) 91 ALD 46; [2006] FCA 571 ���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 234, 235 Ballesteros v Chidlow and Anor [2005] QSC 280 ���������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 39, 41 Becker v Queensland Investment Corporation and Ors [2009] ACTSC 134 ��������������������������������������������� 146 Belna Pty Ltd v Irwin [2009] NSWCA 46 ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 71 Benic v State of New South Wales [2010] NSWCA 1039 �������������������������������������������������������������������������� 108 Bennett v Manly Council & Sydney Water Corporation (2006) 146 LGERA 60; [2006] NSWSC 242 ����������� 74 Berkeley Challenge Pty Ltd v Howarth [2013] NSWCA 370 ������������������������������������������������������������������������ 94 Burnie Port Authority v General Jones Pty Ltd (1994) 179 CLR 520 ����� 32, 92, 122, 143, 160, 178, 201, 216 Beydoun v Burswood Nominees Ltd [2009] WADC 64 ����������������������������������������������������������������������������� 197 Black v Warwick Shire Council (2009) 182 IR 306; [2009] QSC 123 ����������������������������������������������������������� 11 Blythe v Hamblin (2009) 68 SR (WA) 20; [2009] WADC 192 ���������������������������������������������������������������������� 202 Bolam v Friern Barnet Hospital Management Committee (1957) 1 WLR 582; [1957] 2 All ER 118; [1957] 1 WLR 582 ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 191 Boral Bricks Pty Ltd v Cosmidis (No 2) [2014] NSWCA 139 ����������������������������������������������������������������������� 85 Boylan Nominees Pty Ltd v Williams Refrigeration Australia Pty Ltd (2006) 65 NSWLR 717; [2006] NSWCA 100 ����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 100 Brease v State of Queensland [2007] QSC 43 �������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 34 Brodie v Singleton Shire Council; Ghantous v Hawkesbury Shire Council (2001) 206 CLR 512; (2001) LGERA 235; (2001) 180 ALR 145; (2001) 75 ALJR 992; (2001) 22(10) Leg Rep 13; (2001) 33 MVR 289; (2001) Aust Torts Reports 81-607; [2001] HCA 29 ���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 20, 172 Brophy v Dawson and Anor [2004] QSC 372 ��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 23 Brown v Churchill (2006) 31 WAR 246 ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 204 Brown v Haureliuk (2011) 5 ACTLR 195; [2011] ACTSC 9 ������������������������������������������������������������������������ 133 Bujdoso v State of New South Wales [2006] NSWSC 896 �������������������������������������������������������������������������� 53 Bult & Anor v Lawrence (Vic) Pty Ltd (Civil Claims) [2008] VCAT 1286 �������������������������������������������������������� 117 Burnie Port Authority v General Jones Pty Ltd (1994) 179 CLR 520 ����� 32, 92, 122, 143, 160, 178, 201, 216 C G Maloney Pty Ltd v Hutton-Potts and Anor [2006] NSWCA 136 ����������������������������������������������������������� 67 CAL No 14 Pty Ltd v Motor Accidents Insurance Board (2009) 239 CLR 390; (2009) 260 ALR 606; (2009) 84 ALJR 1; (2009) 54 MVR 346; [2009] HCA 47 ��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 156 Carey v Lake Macquarie City Council (2007) Aust Torts Reports 81-874; [2007] NSWCA 4 ����������������� 15, 68 Carroll v Coomber & Anor [2006] QDC 146 ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 39, 40 Cavenett v Commonwealth [2007] VSCA 88 ��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 124 Chandley v Roberts [2005] VSCA 273 ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 110

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Chappel v Hart (1998) 195 CLR 232; (1998) 156 ALR 517; (1998) 72 ALJR 1344; [1998] 14 Leg Rep 2; (1998) Aust Torts Reports 81-492; [1998] HCA 55 ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 64 Cheetham v Shire of Manjimup [2009] WADC 169 ���������������������������������������������������������������������������� 187,188 Churchill v Brown [2004] WADC 161; (2004) 35 SR (WA) 319 �������������������������������������������������������������������� 204 Clark v Hall & Anor [2006] QSC 274 ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 40 Clement v Backo & Anor [2006] QSC 129 ����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 4, 39 Coffee v State of Queensland and Ors [2010] QSC 291 ����������������������������������������������������������������������������� 44 Cole v South Tweed Heads Rugby League Football Club Ltd (2004) 217 CLR 469; (2004) 207 ALR 52; (2004) 78 ALJR 933; (2004) 40 MVR 1; [2004] HCA 29 ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 23 Coles Myer Limited v Webster; Coles Myer Limited v Thompson [2009] NSWCA 299 ��������������������� 120, 160 Collins v Clarence Valley Council (No 3) [2013] NSWSC 1682 �������������������������������������������������������������� 16, 75 Commonwealth Bank of Australia v Witherow [2006] VSCA 45 ���������������������������������������������������������������� 119 Commonwealth v Introvigne (1982) 150 CLR 258; (1982) 41 ALR 577; (1982) 56 ALJR 749 ��������������������������� ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 32, 92, 122, 143, 160, 178, 201, 216, 230 Consolidated Broken Hill Ltd v Edwards (2005) Aust Torts Reports 81-815; [2005] NSWCA 380 �������������� 15 Cook v Bowen & Anor [2007] QDC 108 ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 40 Cook v Jennings (2007) 48 MVR 185; [2007] TASSC 40 ���������������������������������������������������������������������������� 157 Coop v Johnston (2005) 26 Qld Lawyer Reps 32; [2005] QDC 079 ������������������������������������������������������������� 39 Corbett v Toll Stevedoring Pty Ltd & Ors [2007] NSWSC 656 �������������������������������������������������������������������� 68 Council of the Law Society of New South Wales v Australian Injury Helpline Ltd (2008) 71 NSWLR 715 �����102 Cousins v Mt Isa Mines Ltd [2006] 2 Qd R 343; [2006] QCA 261 ��������������������������������������������������������������� 36 Cox v State of New South Wales (2007) Aust Torts Reports 81-888; [2007] NSWSC 471 �������������������� 63, 81 Coyle v State of New South Wales [2006] NSWCA 95 �������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 53 Cross v Moreton Bay Regional Shire Council (2011) 207 IR 197; [2011] QSC 92 ��������������������������������������� 36 Crowley v Commonwealth of Australia, Australian Capital Territory and Glen Pikethly [2011] ACTSC 89 �����134 CSR Ltd v Eddy (2005) 3 DDCR 192; (2005) 226 CLR 1; (2005) 222 ALR 1; (2005) 80 ALJR 59; (2005) Aust Torts Reports 81-808; [2005] HCA 64 ����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 5, 43, 98 Curzons v Motor Accident Commission (2011) 275 LSJS 40; [2011] SADC 103 ������������������������������ 170, 174 David Michael Wilson v Nilepac Pty Ltd t/as Vision Personal Training (Crows Nest) [2009] NSWSC 1365 ����� ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 33, 56, 59, 93, 123 Dederer v Roads and Traffic Authority and Anor(2005) Aust Torts Reports 81-792; [2005] NSWSC 185 �� 67, 109 Degiorgio v Dunn (No.2) (2005) 62 NSWLR 284; [2005] NSWSC 3 ���������������������������������������������������� 101, 102 Dighton v The Nominal Defendant [2011] SADC 187 ������������������������������������������������������������������������ 180, 182 Dobler v Kenneth Halverson and Ors; Dobler v Kurt Halverson (By His Tutor) (2007) 70 NSWLR 151; [2007] NSWSC 335 ���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 19, 72, 111, 153, 172, 191 Dodge v Snell [2011] TASSC 19 ���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 153 Doubleday & Anor v Kelly [2005] NSWCA 151 ������������������������������������������������������������������������ 54, 55, 67, 109 Dovuro Pty Ltd v Wilkins (2003) 215 CLR 317; (2003) 201 ALR 139; (2003) 77 ALJR 1706; (2003) Aust Torts Reports 81-712; [2003] HCA 51 ���������������������������������������������������� 33, 93, 123, 144, 161, 179, 202, 217, 230 Dow Jones & Co Inc v Gutnick (2002) 210 CLR 575; (2002) 194 ALR 433; (2002) 77 ALJR 255; (2002) 23(20) Leg Rep 20; (2003) AIPC 91-842; (2002) Aust Torts Reports 81-682 ��������������������������������������������������������� 49 Drinkwater and Ors v Howarth [2006] NSWCA 222 ������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 53, 57 Ducker v State of Western Australia [2006] WASCA 93 ���������������������������������������������������������������������������� 202 Dunn v Lawrence [2006] 1 Qd R 405; [2005] QSC 291 ������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 36 D’Vorak v Hiscox [2008] WADC 152 ���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 195 Eggins v Knaus [2007] ACTSC 17 ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 147 Elbourne v Gibbs [2006] NSWCA 127 ��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 64, 66 Ellis v Uniting Church in Australia Property Trust (Q) [2008] QSC 74 ����������������������������������������������������������� 26 Ellis v Uniting Church in Australia Property Trust (Q) [2008] QCA 388 ��������������������������������������������������������� 26

AUSTRALIAN CIVIL Liability Guide xv Carter Newell Lawyers

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Evans v Queanbeyan City Council (2011) 9 DDCR 541; [2011] NSWCA 230 ����������������������������������������������� 61 Fairchild v Glenhaven Funeral Services Ltd [2003] 1 AC 32 ������������������������������������������������������������������������ 63 Fallas v Mourlas (2006) 65 NSWLR 418; (2006) Aust Torts Reports 81-835; [2006] NSWCA 32 ������ 70, 189, 190 Falvo v Australian Oztag Sports Association and Anor (2006) Aust Torts Reports 81-831; [2006] NSWCA 17 �������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 70 Fanti v State of Queensland [2005] QSC 393 ���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 35 Fantis and Ors v Abi-Mosleh and Anor (2007) 97 SASR 360; (2007) 247 LSJS 451; [2007] SASC 110 ����� 171 Fegan (bnf Rozenauers) v Lane Cove House Pty Limited [2007] NSWCA 88 ���������������������������������������������� 96 Felgate v Tucker [2011] QCA 194 ���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 7, 8, 9 Fitzpatrick v Cheal [2010] NSWSC 717 ����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 102 Fitzpatrick v Robert Norman Job and Wendy Barbara Job t/as Jobs Engineering & Ors (2007) 14 ANZ Ins Cas 61-731; (2007) Aust Torts Reports 81-891; [2007] WASCA 63 ����������������������������������������������������������� 191 Freidin v St Laurent (2007) 17 VR 439; (2007) Aust Torts Reports 81-875; [2007] VSCA 16 ���������������������� 111 French v QBE Insurance (Australia) Ltd (2011) 58 MVR 214; [2011] QSC 105 �������������������������������������� 23, 26 Fuz v Carter & Ors [2006] NSWSC 771 ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 53 GEJ & MA Geldald Pty Ltd v Mobbs (No 2) [2012] 1 Qd R 120; [2011] QSC 33 ����������������������������������������� 29 GEJ & MA Geldald Pty Ltd v Mobbs (No 3) [2011] QSC 297 ���������������������������������������������������������������������� 30 Gett v Tabet (2009) 254 ALR 504; [2009] NSWCA 76 ���������������������������������������������������������������������������� 13, 66 Gibb v Beaumont & Anor [2009] QDC 36 ���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 38 Gifford v Strang Patrick Stevedoring Pty Ltd (2003) 214 CLR 269; (2003) 198 ALR 100; (2003) 77 ALJR 1205; (2003) 24(11) Leg Rep 2; (2003) Aust Torts Reports 81-702; [2003] HCA 33 ������������������������������������������ 22, 80 Gillespie v Swift Australia Pty Ltd [2009] QSC 010 ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 34 Gillespie v Swift Australia Pty Ltd [2009] QCA 316 ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 34 Godfrey Spowers (Victoria) Pty Ltd v Lincolne Scott Australia Pty Ltd & Ors [2008] VSC 90 �������������������� 119 Godfrey Spowers (Vic) Pty Ltd v Lincolne Scott Australia Pty Ltd (2008) 21 VR 84; [2008] VSCA 208 ����� 120 Gorman v Scofield [2008] WASC 78 ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 197, 198 Gray v Conroy (2005) 44 MVR 425; [2005] ACTSC 81 ������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 140 Great Lakes Shire Council v Dederer and Anor; Roads and Traffic Authority of NSW v Dederer and Anor (2006) Aust Tort Reports 81-860; [2006] NSWCA 101 �������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 69 Green v Hanson Construction Materials Pty Ltd (2007) Aust Torts Reports 81-907; [2007] QCA 260 �������� 26 Grice v State of Queensland [2006] 1 Qd R 222; [2005] QCA 272 �������������������������������������������������������������� 43 Grierson v Australian Capital Territory [2011] ACTSC 113 �������������������������������������������������������� 134, 137, 140 Griffiths v Kerkemeyer(1977) 139 CLR 161; (1977) 15 ALR 387; (1977) 51 ALJR 792 ����������������� 97, 126, 182 Gu v To [2005] QCA 480 ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 35, 36 Guiney v Australand Holdings Ltd and Ors; Castlehaven Sales No 2 Trading As Castlehaven Realtors and Ors v Guiney and Ors [2008] NSWCA 44 ���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 96 Gunnersen v Henwood [2011] VSCA 440 ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 108 Gunston v Lawley (2008) 20 VR 33; [2008] VSC 97 ����������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 120 Hagipantelis v Legal Services Commissioner of New South Wales (2010) 78 NSWLR 82; [2010] NSWCA 79 ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 102 Halech v State of South Australia (2004) 234 LSJS 1; [2004] SADC 78 ���������������������������������������������������� 174 Halverson and Ors v Dobler Halverson By His Tutor v Dobler [2006] NSWSC 1307 ����������������������������������� 72 Hargen v Kemenes [2011] QCA 251 ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 34 Harrison v Melhem (2008) Aust Torts Reports 81-951; [2008] NSWCA 67 �������������������������������������������� 97, 99 Harvey v Harvey Unreported, Sup Ct, Qld, White J, No S9790 of 1999, 10 Feb 2000 ��������������������������������� 5 Haug v Jupiters Limited t/a Conrad Treasury Brisbane [2008] 1 Qd R 276; [2007] QCA 199 ������������������������ 6 Hawira v Connolly and Anor; Connolly v Hawira and Anor [2008] QSC 4 ��������������������������������������������������� 24 Haylock v Morris and Hugh [2006] ACTSC 86 ���������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 136, 209 Heywood v Miller [2005] ACTSC 4 ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 140

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Hirst v Sydney South West Area Health Service [2011] NSWSC 664 ��������������������������������������������������������� 61 Hobbs Haulage Pty Ltd v Zupps Southside Pty Ltd [2013] QSC 319 ��������������������������������������������������� 30, 31 Hollier v Sutcliffe [2010] NSWSC 279 ��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 79 Hope v Hunter and New England Area Health Service (2009) 10 DCLR (NSW) 63 ������������������������������������� 18 Hooper v Efe [2010] VCC 880 ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 110 Hoyts Pty Ltd v Burns (2003) 201 ALR 470; (2003) 77 ALJR 1934; [2003] HCA 61 ������������������������������������� 64 Hunt & Hunt Lawyers v Mitchell Morgan Nominees Pty Ltd (2013) 247 CLR 613; (2013) 296 ALR 3; (2013) 87 ALJR 505 ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 88 Hunt v Lemura [2011] QSC 378 ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 44 Hutchinson v Fitzpatrick [2009] ACTSC 43 ����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 144 Hynes v Hynes (2007) 15 VR 475; (2007) 47 MVR 249; [2007] VSCA 7 ������������������������������������������������������ 125 Indigo Mist Pty Ltd v Palmer [2012] NSWCA 239 ��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 58 Insight Vacations Pty Ltd v Young [2011] 243 CLR 149 ������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 92 Jaber v Rockdale City Council (2008) Aust Torts Reports 81-952; [2008] NSWCA 98 �������������������� 16, 69, 71 Jaensch v Campbell [2001] NTSC 87 �������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 209 Jackson v Lithgow City Council [2008] NSWCA 312 ���������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 82 Jaspers v Prospect City Council [2012] SADC 6 ��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 181 J Blackwood & Son Ltd v Skilled Engineering Ltd [2008] NSWCA 142 ������������������������������������������������ 27, 85 Jones v Dapto Leagues Club Limited [2008] NSWCA 32 ��������������������������������������������������������������������������� 85 Jones Lang LaSalle (NSW) Pty Ltd v Taouk [2012] NSWCA 342 ����������������������������������������������������������������� 62 Jopling v Isaac [2006] NSWCA 299 ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 95 Joslyn v Berryman (2003) 214 CLR 552; (2003) 198 ALR 137; (2003) 77 ALJR 1233; (2003) 24(11) Leg Rep 35; (2003) 38 MVR 41; (2003) Aust Torts Reports 81-703; [2003] HCA 34 ������������������������������������������������������� 212 Kaye v Hoffman [2007] TASSC 31 ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 162 Kaye v Hoffman (No 2) (2008) 17 Tas R 176; [2008] TASSC 2 ������������������������������������������������������������������� 162 Kaye v Hoffman (2009) 19 Tas R 357; [2009] TASSC 5 ����������������������������������������������������������������������������� 162 Kelly v State of Queensland [2013] QSC 106 ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 14, 20 Kerslake v Shire of Northham [2009] WADC 129 ������������������������������������������������������� 188, 189, 190, 191, 192 Khan v Polyzois [2006] NSWCA 59 �������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 95 King v Parsons and Anor [2006] 2 Qd R 122; [2006] QCA 49 ����������������������������������������������������������������� 4, 39 Kirkland-Veenstra v Stuart (2008) Aust Torts Reports 81-936; [2008] VSCA 32 ����������������������������������������� 114 Kondis v State Transport Authority (1984) 154 CLR 672; (1984) 55 ALR 225; (1984) 58 ALJR 531; (1984) Aust Torts Reports 80-311 ��������������������������������������������������������������������� 32, 92, 122, 143, 160, 178, 201, 216, 230 Lederberger and Scheiner v Mediterranean Olives Financial Pty Ltd [2012] VSCA 262 ����������������������� 65, 66 Legal Practitioners Complaints Committee v Browne (2006) 42 SR (WA) 342; [2006] WASAT 201 ������������ 206 Legal Services Commissioner v Mullins [2006] LPT 012 ����������������������������������������������������������������������������� 47 Leighton v Blundell [2011] ACTSC 136 ����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 146 Lemoto v Able Technical Pty Ltd and 2 Ors (2005) 63 NSWLR 300; (2005) 2 DDCR 592 [2005] NSWCA 153 ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 101 Leyden v Caboolture Shire Council [2007] QCA 134 ��������������������������������������������������������������������������� 67,109 Lines v Workfocus Australia Pty Ltd [2009] WADC 203 ���������������������������������������������������������������������������� 189 Lithgow City Council v Jackson (2011) 244 CLR 352 ���������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 82 Livermore v Crombie & Anor [2006] QCA 169 ��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 23 Livingston v Mitchell [2007] NSWSC 1477 �������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 65 Lormine Pty Ltd & Anor v Xuereb [2006] NSWCA 200 ���������������������������� 32, 70, 92, 143, 161, 178, 201, 216 Luxton v Vines (1952) 85 CLR 352 ���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 60 Lynch v Kinney Shoes (Australia) Ltd & Ors [2004] QSC 370 ����������������������������������������������������������������������� 14 Lynch v Kinney Shoes (Australia) Ltd & Ors [2005] QCA 326 ����������������������������������������������������������������������� 14

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M v Australian Capital Territory [2012] ACTSC 20 ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 135 Mahoney v Salt [2012] QSC 43 ����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 7, 9 Malec v JC Hutton Pty Ltd (1990) 169 CLR 638; (1990) 92 ALR 545; (1990) 64 ALJR 316; (1990) Aust Torts Reports 81-022 ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 42 Manthe v BHP Billiton Iron Ore Pty Ltd (BHP) [2011] WADC 160 �������������������������������������������������������������� 195 March v Stramare (1991) 171 CLR 506 ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 134 Marien v Gardiner; Marien v HJ Heinz Company Australia Ltd (2013) 66 MVR 1; [2013] NSWCA 396 ������� 84 Markey v Scarboro Surf Life Saving Club Inc & Anor (2007) 55 SR (WA) 130; [2007] WADC 194 ���������187, 198 Marton v State of South Australia; Halech v South Australia (2004) 234 LSJS 1; [2004] SADC 78 ����������� 174 May v Competitive Foods Pty Ltd [2011] NTSC 79 ����������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 217 Mazza v Webb [2011] QSC 163 ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 18 McCracken v Melbourne Storm Rugby League Football Club [2005] NSWSC 107 ������������������������������������ 52 McGregor v Franklin (2006) 201 FLR 303 �������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 133 MD v Sydney South West Area Health Services (2009) 8 DCLR (NSW) 232; [2009] NSWDC 22 ��������������� 19 Meandarra Aerial Spraying Pty Ltd v GEJ & MA Geldard Pty Ltd as trustee for the G & M Geldard Family Trust [2013] 1 Qd R 319 ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 12, 87 Medlin v State Government Insurance Commission [1995] 182 CLR 1; (1995) 127 ALR 180; (1995) 69 ALJR 118; (1995) Aust Torts Reports 81-322; [1995] HCA 5 ��������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 59 Millard v State of Victoria [2006] VSCA 29 ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 124 Miller v Council of the Shire of Livingstone [2003] QCA 29 ������������������������������������������������������������������������� 59 Miller v Miller (2011) 242 CLR 446; (2011) 275 ALR 611; (2011) 85 ALJR 480 ����������������������������������������� 195 Moore v State of Queensland [2005] QCA 299 ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 63 Motor Accident Commission v Curzons (2012) 279 LSJS 491; (2012) 60 MVR 298 ��������������� 24, 170, 174, 175 Munzer v Johnston [2008] QSC 162 ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 40 Nair-Smith v Perisher Blue Pty Ltd [2013] NSWSC 727 ������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 92 Neindorf v Junkovic (2005) 222 ALR 631; (2005) 80 ALJR 341; (2006) Aust Torts Reports 81-820; [2005] HCA 75 �������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 170 New South Wales v Fahy (2007) 4 DDCR 459; (2007) 236 ALR 406; (2007) 81 ALJR 1021; (2007) Aust Torts Reports 81-889; [2007] HCA 20 ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 11 New South Wales v Lepore; Samin v Queensland; Rich v Queensland (2003) 212 CLR 511; (2003) 195 ALR 412; (2003) 77 ALJR 558; (2003) 24(3) Leg Rep 2; (2003) Aust Torts Reports 81-684; [2003] HCA 4 ��������������� �������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 31, 90, 120, 142, 159, 200, 215, 229 Newberry v Suncorp Metway Insurance [2006] 1 Qd R 519; [2006] QCA 48 �������������������������������������� 4, 5, 39 Nguyen v Cosmopolitan Homes [2008] NSWCA 246 ���������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 59 Nguyen v Nguyen (1990) 169 CLR 245 ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 42, 182 Nicholls v Telstra Corporation Limited & Anor [2007] QDC 340 ������������������������������������������������������������������ 46 Northern Sandblasting Pty Ltd v Harris (1997) 188 CLR 313; (1997) 146 ALR 572; (1997) 71 ALJR 1428; [1997] 14 Leg Rep 2; (1997) Aust Torts Reports 81-435; [1997] HCA 39 �������������������������������������������������������� ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 31, 91, 121, 143, 160, 178, 200, 216, 229 Nucifora v AAI Ltd [2013] QSC 338 ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 42 Oliver v Mulp Pty Ltd t/as St George Hotel & Motel [2009] QSC 340 ����������������������������������������������������������� 6 Origin Energy LPG Ltd v Bestcare Foods Ltd [2007] NSWCA 321 ������������������������������������������������������������� 88 Owners-Strata Plan 156 v Gray [2004] NSWCA 304 ����������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 95 Oyston v St Patrick’s College [2011] NSWSC 269 �������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 64 Paltidis v The State Council of the Young Men’s Christian Association of Victoria (2006) Aust Torts Reports 81-850; [2006] VSCA 122 �������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 109 Panagiotopoulos v Rajendram [2007] NSWCA 265 ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 63 Percario v Kordysz (1990) 54 SASR 259 ���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 180 Perfect v MacDonald [2012] QSC 011 �������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 42

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Perpetual Trustee Co Ltd v CTC Group Pty Ltd (No 2)[2013] NSWCA 58 �������������������������������������������� 86, 89 Perrett v Sydney Harbour Foreshore Authority [2009] NSWSC 1026 ��������������������������������������������������� 17, 71 Perry v Diverse Barrel Solutions Pty Ltd [2011] SAIRC 24 ������������������������������������������������������������������������ 181 Pickering v McArthur [2005] QCA 294 �������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 23 Pitchen v Cado Metal Design Pty Ltd and Ors (2008) 57 SR (WA) 106; [2008] WADC 16 ������������������������ 204 Podrebersek v Australian Iron & Steel Pty Ltd (1985) 59 ALJR 492 ����������������������� 26, 84, 117, 140, 157, 212 Pollard v Baulderstone Hornibrook Engineering Pty Ltd (2008) Aust Torts Reports 81-949; [2008] NSWCA 99 �������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 96 Pollard v Trude [2008] QSC 119 ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 10, 15 Pollard v Trude [2009] 2 Qd R 248 �������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 11, 15 Prentergast v Bulner [2005] SASC 426 ����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 181 Preti v Sahara Tours Pty Ltd and Anor (2008) 22 NTLR 215; [2008] NTCA 2 ��������������������������������������������� 212 Queen Elizabeth Hospital v Curtis (2008) 102 SASR 534; (2008) 259 LSJS 373; [2008] SASC 344 ��������� 170 Raciti v Wadren Pty Ltd (2006) Aust Torts Reports 81-848; [2006] VSCA 132 ������������������������������������������ 109 Raffaut v Gillard and Anor [2006] QDC 403 ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 40 Randwick City Council v Muzic [2006] NSWCA 66 ������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 73, 74 Randwick City Council v T & H Fatouros Pty Ltd [2007] NSWCA 177 �������������������������������������������������������� 73 Reardon v State of Queensland [2007] QSC 105 ���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 19 Reardon-Smith v Allianz Australia Insurance Ltd [2007] QCA 211 �������������������������������������������������������������� 42 Reinhold v New South Wales Lotteries Corporation (No 2) (2008) 82 NSWLR 762; [2008] NSWSC 187 ����� 29, 58 Richards v Cornford (2009) 8 DCLR (NSW) 353; [2009] NSWDC 60 ���������������������������������������������������������� 68 Rickard v Allianz Australia Insurance (2009) 54 MVR 214; [2009] NSWSC 1115 ����������������������������������� 59, 75 Roads & Traffic Authority of NSW v Dederer (2007) 155 LGERA 153; (2007) 238 ALR 761; (2007) 81 ALJR 1773; (2007) 48 MVR 288; [2007] HCA 42 ����������������������������������������������������������� 11, 12, 16, 54, 71, 187, 208 Roads and Traffic Authority of New SouthWales v Refrigerated Roadways Pty Ltd (2009) 77 NSWLR 360; (2009) 168 LGERA 357; (2009) 53 MVR 502; [2009] NSWCA 263 �������������������������������������������������������������� 75 Roads and Traffic Authority of New SouthWales v Refrigerated Roadways Pty Ltd (No 2) [2009] NSWCA 336 �������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 76 Roche Mining Pty Ltd v Jeffs [2011] NSWCA 184 �������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 66 Rodger v Johnson [2013] QSC 117 ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 42 Rogers v Body Corporate for the Waterloo Crest CTS 25235 and Anor [2007] QSC 369 �������������������������� 42 Rogers v Whitaker (1992) 175 CLR 479; (1992) 109 ALR 625; (1992) 67 ALJR 47; (1992) Aust Torts Reports 81-189 ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 111, 136, 191, 209 Ruddock & Ors v Taylor (2003) 58 NSWLR 269; [2003] NSWCA 262 �������������������������������������� 12, 59, 61, 189 Ruddock v Taylor (2005) 222 CLR 612; (2005) 87 ALD 264; (2005) 221 ALR 32; (2005) 79 ALJR 1534 ����� 61 Samios v Repatriation Commission [1960] WAR 219 �������������������� 32, 92, 122, 143, 160, 178, 201, 216, 230 Scott v Williamson; Picken v Williamson (2013) 63 MVR 396 ���������������������������������������������������������������������� 16 Seltsam Pty Ltd v McGuiness; James Hardie & Coy Pty Ltd v McGuiness (2000) 49 NSWLR 262; (2000) 19 NSWCCR 385; (2000) Aust Torts Reports 81-547; [2000] NSWCA 29 �������������������������������������������������������� 63 Shaw v Thomas [2010] NSWCA 169 ����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 55 Sheehan v State Rail Authority of New South Wales [2009] NSWCA 261 ��������������������������������������������������� 80 Sheldrick v State of New South Wales [2007] NSWCA 105 ������������������������������������������������������������������������ 85 Shorey v P T Ltd (2003) 197 ALR 410; (2003) 77 ALJR 1104; (2003) 24(10) Leg Rep 2; (2003) Aust Torts Reports 81-701; [2003] HCA 27 ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 59 Shrimp v Landmark Operations Limited (2007) 163 FCR 510; [2007] FCA 1468 ����������������������� 214, 215, 228 Shire of Manjimup v Cheetham [2010] WASCA 225 ��������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 188 Shoalhaven City Council v Pender [2013] NSWCA 210 ������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 58 Sibraa v Brown [2012] NSWCA 328 ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 56 Skulander v Willoughby City Council (2007) 73 NSWLR 44; [2007] NSWCA 116 ��������������������������������������� 86

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Slaveski (by his litigation guardian Slaveska) v State of Victoria and Ors [2010] VSC 441 �������������������������� 120 Smith v Cheeky Monkeys Restaurant (2009) 9 DCLR (NSW) 241; [2009] NSWDC 257 ������������������������������ 54 Smith v Leurs (1945) 70 CLR 256 �������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 115 Smith v Perese [2006] NSWSC 288 ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 70 Smith v Zhang (2012) 60 MVR 525; [2012] NSWCA 142 ����������������������������������������������������������������������� 26, 85 Sneddon v Speaker of the Legislative Assembly (2011) 208 IR 255; [2011] NSWSC 508 ��������������������������� 59 Snell v BP Refinery (Bulwer Island) Pty Ltd [2013] QSC 284 ���������������������������������������������������������������������� 42 Southern Properties (WA) Pty Ltd v Executive Director of the Department of Conservation and Land Management [2010] WASC 45 ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 192 Starick v Starick & Edwards, Starick v Edwards (2010) 170 LSJS 209; [2010] SADC 79 ������������������ 169, 175 State of New South Wales v Bujdoso (2007) 69 NSWLR 302; (2007) Aust Torts Reports 81-876; [2007] NSWCA 44 �������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 53 State of New South Wales v Ibbett (2005) 65 NSWLR 168; [2005] NSWCA 445 ���������������������������������������� 53 State of New South Wales v Tyszyk [2008] NSWCA 107 ����������������������������������������������������������������������������� 57 State of Queensland v Allen [2012] 2 Qd R 148; [2011] QCA 311 ������������������������������������������������������������ 7, 8 State of Queensland v Kelly [2014] QCA 027 ���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 15 State of Queensland v Nudd [2012] QCA 281 ��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 13 Stingel v Clarke (2006) 226 CLR 442 ��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 132 Stojan (No 9) Pty Ltd v Kenway [2009] NSWCA 364 ����������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 56 Strong v Woolworths Ltd t/as Big W (2012) 246 CLR 182; (2012) 285 ALR 420; (2012) 86 ALJR 267 ������� 62 Stuart v Kirkland-Veenstra (2009) 237 CLR 215; (2009) 254 ALR 432; (2009) 83 ALJR 623; [2009] HCA 15 ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 115 Sullivan v Gordon (1999) 47 NSWLR 319; (1999) 30 MVR 29; (1999) Aust Torts Reports 81-524; [1999] NSWCA 338 ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 5, 43, 98, 127 Sweeney v Boylan Nominees Pty Ltd (2006) 266 CLR 161 ������������������������������������������������������������������������� 90 Sydney South West Area Health Service v MD ����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 73 T & H Fatouros Pty Ltd v Randwick City Council (2005) 142 LGERA 271; [2005] NSWSC 874 ������������������� 73 Tabet v Gett (2010) 240 CLR 537 ����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 13, 66 Tabet v Mansour [2007] NSWSC 36 ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 13 Tame v State of New South Wales; Annetts v Australian Stations Pty Ltd (2002) 211 CLR 317 NSWCCR 385; (2002) 191 ALR 449; (2002) 76 ALJR 1348; (2002) 23(15) Leg Rep 2; (2002) 36 MVR 1; (2002) Aust Torts Reports 81-672; [2002] HCA 35 ���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 22, 78, 174 Tarabay v Bechara [2010] NSWSC 202 ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 102 TC by his tutor Sabatino v The State of New South Wales [2001] NSWCA 380 ����������������������������������������� 66 Terry v Leventeris (2011) 109 SASR 358 ���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 181 The Council of the Law Society of New South Wales v Australian Injury Helpline & Ors (2008) 71 NSWLR 715; [2008] NSWSC 627 ��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 102 Thompson v Woolworths (Qld) Pty Ltd (2005) 221 CLR 234; (2005) 214 ALR 452; (2005) 79 ALJR 904; (2005) Aust Torts Reports 81-795; [2005] HCA 19 ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 14 Timbs v Shoalhaven City Council (2004) 132 LGERA 397; (2004) Aust Torts Reports 81-738; [2004] NSWCA 81 ���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 76 TNT Australia Pty Ltd v Christie & 2 Ors; Crown Equipment Pty Ltd v Christie & 2 Ors; Manpower Services (Aust) Pty Ltd v Christie & 2 Ors [2003] NSWCA 47 ����������������������� 32, 92, 122, 143, 160, 178, 201, 216, 230 Tomlins v Sheikh [2005] QDC 174 ��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 10, 41, 46 Transport Accident Commission v Estate of Ewer (2009) 54 MVR 434; [2009] VSC 488 �������������������������� 117 Traynor v Australian Capital Territory [2007] ACTSC 38 ���������������������������������������������������������������������������� 136 Trevorrow v State of South Australia (5) (2007) 98 SASR 136; [2007] SASC 285 ��������������������������������������� 169 Tyszyk v State of New South Wales [2009] HCA Trans 84 ��������������������������������������������������������������������������� 57 Ucak v Avante Developments Pty Ltd [2007] NSWSC 367 ������������������������������������������������� 87, 142, 159, 177

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Ultra Thoroughbred Racing v Those Certain Underwriters & Ors [2011] VSC 589 ����������������������������������� 108 Vale v Eggins (2006) 46 MVR 514; (2006) Aust Torts Reports 81-869; [2006] NSWCA 348 ������������������������� 82 Vairy v Wyong Shire Council (2005) 223 CLR 422 ���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 16 Van de Velde v Queensland (2011) 31 Qld Lawyer Reps 45 ����������������������������������������������������������������������� 36 Van Gervan v Fenton (1992) 175 CLR 327 ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 182 Venz v Moreton Bay Regional Council [2009] QCA 224 ������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 38 Vreman and Morris v Albury City Council [2011] NSWSC 39 ���������������������������������������������������������������������� 67 Victoria v Horvath [2002] VSCA 177 ���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 121 Wallace v Kam (2013) 297 ALR 383; (2013) 87 ALJR 648 ��������������������������������������������������������������������� 12, 65 Ward v Coomber and Allianz Australia [2005] QDC 251 ������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 46 Ward v Wiltshire Australia P/L and Anor [2008] QCA 093 ��������������������������������������������������������������������������� 37 Watkins v State of Queensland [2007] QCA 430 ����������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 7, 8, 9 Webster v Coles Myer Limited; Thompson v Coles Myer Limited (2009) 9 DCLR (NSW) 123;[2009] NSWDC 4 ���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 54, 90, 120, 160 Whitney v Whiteway & Anor [2006] QDC 163 ���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 42 Whittlesea City Council v Merie [2005] VSCA 199 ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 112 Wicks v State Rail Authority of New South Wales (2010) 241 CLR 60 ��������������������������������������������������������� 80 Wilkinson v BP Australia Pty Ltd [2008] QSC 171 ����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 5 Williams v Latrobe Council [2007] TASSC 2 ���������������������������������������������������������������������� 151, 152, 153, 154 Williams v Twynam Agricultural Group Pty Ltd [2011] NSWSC 1098 ���������������������������������������������������������� 55 Wilson v Lambkin [2010] QDC 254 �������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 17 Wilson v Nilepac Pty Ltd t/as Vision Personal Training (Crows Nest) [2011] NSWCA 63 ���������������� 33,93,123 Wilson v Tier [2008] NSWSC 92 ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 73 Withyman v State of New South Wales [2010] NSWDC 186 ����������������������������������������������������������������� 52, 91 Withyman v New South Wales [2013] NSWCA 10 �������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 52 Wolgast v Connolly’s News and Anor [2008] QSC 97 ��������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 40 Woods v De Gabriele [2007] VSC 177 ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 228 WorkCover Queensland v Amaca [2009] QCA 72 ��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 28 Wyong Shire Council v Shirt (1980) 146 CLR 40; (1980) 60 LGRA 106; (1980) 29 ALR 217; (1980) 54 ALJR 283 ������������������������������������������������������������������������ 10, 11, 12, 16, 54, 55, 57, 151, 153, 169, 187, 188, 208, 209 Young v Central Australian Aboriginal Congress Inc and Ors [2008] NTSC 47 ����������������������������������������� 209 Zakka v Elias [2013] NSWCA 119 ���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 91 Zorom Enterprises Pty Ltd (in liq) v Zabow (2007) 71 NSWLR 354; [2007] NSWCA 106 ���������������������������� 54

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QLD s 43 ������������������������������������������20 reg 4 ����������������������������������������40 s 44 ������������������������������������������20 Anti-Discrimination Act 1991 s 45 ������������������������������������23, 25 Civil Liability and Other Legislation s 209 ������������������������������������������5 s 46 ������������������������������������23, 24 Amendment Act 2010 �����4, 6, 39 s 47 ��������������������5, 23, 24, 25, 27 Australian Consumer Law s 48 ������������������������23, 24, 25, 27 Civil Liability (Good Samaritan) s 18 ����������������������������28, 86, 118 s 49 ������������������������������23, 24, 25 Amendment Bill 2007 ��������������22 s 52 ������������������������������������������44 Civil Aviation (Carriers’ Liability) s 54 ������������������������������������41, 43 Criminal Code Act 1899 Act 1964 ������������������������������������5 s 55 ������������������������������������41, 42 s 6 ��������������������������������������������25 s 56 ������������������������������������������41 Civil Liability Act 2003 s 57 ������������������������������������������44 Fair Trading Act 1989 ���������������27 s 4 ����������������������������������������4, 27 s 58 ������������������������������������������43 s 5 ������������������������������4, 5, 39, 44 s 59 ������������������������������������10, 43 Law Reform Act 1995 s 9 ��������������������������������������������10 s 59A �����������������������������������5, 43 s 13 ������������������������������������������40 s 10 ������������������������������������������10 s 59B ���������������������������������������43 s 15 ������������������������������������������20 s 11 ������������������������������������12, 13 s 59C ���������������������������������������43 s 16 ������������������������������������������20 s 12 ������������������������������������12, 13 s 60 ������������������������������������������44 s 13 ������������������������������������14, 15 s 61 ������������������������������������������39 Legal Profession Act 2007 s 14 ������������������������������������14, 15 s 62 ������������������������������������39, 47 s 1 ��������������������������������������������46 s 15 ������������������������������11, 13, 15 s 63 ������������������������������������45, 49 s 2 ��������������������������������������������46 s 16 ������������������������������������13, 15 s 64 ������������������������������������������45 s 217 ����������������������������������������46 s 17 ������������������������������������������17 s 65 ������������������������������������������45 s 233 ����������������������������������������46 s 18 ������������������������������������������17 s 66 ������������������������������������������45 s 266 ����������������������������������������46 s 19 ������������������������������������������17 s 67 ������������������������������������������45 pt 3.2, divs 1–4 ������������������������46 s 20 ������������������������������������������18 s 68 ������������������������������������������32 pt 7.6, div 6 �����������������������������46 s 21 ������������������������������������18, 19 s 69 ������������������������������������������32 s 22 ������������������������������������18, 19 s 70 ������������������������������������������32 Limitation of Actions Act 1974 s 23 ������������������������������25, 26, 27 s 71 ������������������������������������22, 32 s 11 ������������������������������������������33 s 24 ������������������������������������25, 27 s 72 ������������������������������������������32 s 30 ������������������������������������������34 s 26 ������������������������������������������22 s 72A ���������������������������������32, 33 s 31 ������������������������������������35, 36 s 27 ������������������������������������������22 s 72B ���������������������������������������32 s 28 ������������������������������������27, 28 s 72C ���������������������������������32, 33 Motor Accident Insurance Act 1994 s 29 ������������������������������������27, 28 s 72D ���������������������������������������32 s 57 ������������������������������������������37 s 30 ������������������������������27, 30, 31 s 75 ������������������������������������������45 s 31 ������������������������27, 28, 29, 30 s 82 ������������������������������������������27 Nature Conservation and Other s 32 ������������������������������27, 28, 29 ch 1, pt 2 �����������������������������������4 Legislation Amendment Act (No s 32A �������������������27, 28, 30, 237 ch 2, pt 1, div 1 �����������������������10 2) 2013 �������������������������������������20 s 32B ���������������������������������������28 ch 2, pt 1, div 2 �����������������������12 s 32C ���������������������������������������28 ch 2, pt 1, div 3 �����������������������13 Personal Injuries Proceedings Act s 32D ���������������������������������������28 ch 2, pt 1, div 4 �����������������������17 2002 s 32E ����������������������������������������28 ch 2, pt 1, div 5 �����������������������18 s 6 ������������������������������������������4, 5 s 32F ����������������������������������������28 ch 2, pt 1, div 6 �����������������������25 s 9 ����������������������������������������5, 33 s 32G ���������������������������������������28 ch 2, pt 2 ���������������������������������27 s 9A ���������������������������������������5, 6 s 32H �������������������������������������237 ch 2, pt 3 ���������������������������������19 s 10 ��������������������������������������������5 s 32I �����������������������������������������29 ch 2, pt 3, div 2 �����������������������20 s 11 ��������������������������������������������5 s 33 ������������������������������������������27 ch 2, pt 4, div 1 �����������������������23 s 12 ��������������������������������������������5 s 34 ������������������������������������������19 ch 2, pt 4, div 4 �����������������������25 s 13 ��������������������������������������������5 s 35 ������������������������������������������19 ch 3, pt 2 ���������������������������������44 s 14 ��������������������������������������������5 s 36 ������������������������������������������19 ch 3, pt 3 ���������������39, 41, 43, 44 s 15 ��������������������������������������������5 s 37 ������������������������������������19, 20 ch 3, pt 4 ���������������������������������45 s 16 ��������������������������������������������5 s 38A ���������������������������������20, 21 ch 4, pt 1 ���������������������������������32 s 17 ��������������������������������������������5 s 38B ���������������������������������������20 ch 4, pt 1A �������������������������������32 s 18 ��������������������������������������5, 36 s 38C ���������������������������������������20 sch 2 ����������������������������������������32 s 19 ��������������������������������������������5 s 39 ������������������������������������20, 21 s 20 ����������������������������������������5, 8 s 40 ������������������������������������20, 21 Civil Liability Regulation 2003 s 20A �����������������������������������������5 s 41 ������������������������������������20, 21 reg 1 ����������������������������������������39 s 20B �����������������������������������������5 s 42 ������������������������������������20, 21 reg 3 ����������������������������������������39 s 20C �����������������������������������������5

xxii AUSTRALIAN CIVIL LIABILITY GUIDE Carter Newell Lawyers

Table of statutes

s 20D �����������������������������������������5 Professional Standards Act 2004 s 60 ������������������������������������������18 s 20E ������������������������������������������5 s 3 ��������������������������������������������18 s 61 ������������������������������������������18 s 20F ������������������������������������������5 s 4 ��������������������������������������������18 s 62 ������������������������������������������18 s 20G �����������������������������������������5 s 5 ��������������������������������������������18 s 63 ������������������������������������������18 s 20H �����������������������������������������5 s 6 ��������������������������������������������18 s 64 ������������������������������������������18 s 20I �������������������������������������������5 s 7 ��������������������������������������������18 s 65 ������������������������������������������18 s 21 ��������������������������������������������5 s 8 ��������������������������������������������18 s 66 ������������������������������������������18 s 22 ��������������������������������������������5 s 9 ��������������������������������������������18 s 67 ������������������������������������������18 s 23 ��������������������������������������������5 s 10 ������������������������������������������18 s 68 ������������������������������������������18 s 24 ��������������������������������������������5 s 11 ������������������������������������������18 s 69 ������������������������������������������18 s 25 ��������������������������������������������5 s 12 ������������������������������������������18 s 70 ������������������������������������������18 s 27 ������������������������������������5, 6, 8 s 13 ������������������������������������������18 s 71 ������������������������������������������18 s 28 ��������������������������������������������5 s 14 ������������������������������������������18 s 72 ������������������������������������������18 s 29 ��������������������������������������������5 s 15 ������������������������������������������18 s 73 ������������������������������������������18 s 29A �����������������������������������������5 s 16 ������������������������������������������18 s 74 ������������������������������������������18 s 30 ������������������������������������5, 8, 9 s 17 ������������������������������������������18 s 75 ������������������������������������������18 s 31 ��������������������������������������������5 s 18 ������������������������������������������18 s 76 ������������������������������������������18 s 32 ��������������������������������������������5 s 19 ������������������������������������������18 s 77 ������������������������������������������18 s 33 ��������������������������������������������5 s 20 ������������������������������������������18 s 78 ������������������������������������������18 s 34 ��������������������������������������������5 s 21 ������������������������������������������18 s 79 ������������������������������������������18 s 35 ��������������������������������������������5 s 22 ������������������������������������������18 s 36 ����������������������������������������5, 9 s 23 ������������������������������������������18 Regional Planning Interests Act s 37 ����������������������������������5, 9, 10 s 24 ������������������������������������������18 2014 ����������������������������������������15 s 38 ����������������������������������������5, 9 s 25 ������������������������������������������18 s 39 ����������������������������������������5, 9 s 26 ������������������������������������������18 Statute Law Revision Act (No 2) s 40 ����������������������������������������5, 9 s 27 ������������������������������������������18 1995 ����������������������������������������20 s 41 ����������������������������������������5, 9 s 28 ������������������������������������������18 s 42 ����������������������������������������5, 9 s 29 ������������������������������������������18 Uniform Civil Procedure Rules s 43 ��������������������������������������5, 35 s 30 ������������������������������������������18 1999 ����������������������������10, 45, 46 s 44 ��������������������������������������������5 s 31 ������������������������������������������18 s 47 ��������������������������������������������5 s 32 ������������������������������������������18 Victims of Crime Assistance Act s 48 ��������������������������������������������5 s 33 ������������������������������������������18 2009 (Qld) ������������������������������4, 5 s 54 ������������������������������������������43 s 34 ������������������������������������������18 s 56 ������������������������������������45, 46 s 35 ������������������������������������������18 Voluntary Aid in Emergency Act s 57 ��������������������������������������������5 s 36 ������������������������������������������18 1973 ����������������������������������20, 22 s 59 ��������������������������������������������5 s 37 ������������������������������������������18 s 60 ��������������������������������������������5 s 38 ������������������������������������������18 WorkCover Queensland Act 1996 s 62 ������������������������������������������47 s 39 ������������������������������������������18 ������������������������������������������������48 s 63 ������������������������������������47, 49 s 40 ������������������������������������������18 s 64 ������������������������������������47, 48 s 41 ������������������������������������������18 Workers’ Compensation and s 65 ������������������������������������������47 s 42 ������������������������������������������18 Rehabilitation Act 2003 �����36, 41 s 66 ������������������������������������47, 49 s 43 ������������������������������������������18 s 67 ������������������������������������47, 49 s 44 ������������������������������������������18 NSW s 68 ������������������������������������������47 s 45 ������������������������������������������18 s 69 ������������������������������������������47 s 46 ������������������������������������������18 Civil Liability Act 2002 s 85 ������������������������������������������47 s 47 ������������������������������������������18 s 2 ��������������������������������������������52 pt 2 ��������������������������������������������4 s 48 ������������������������������������������18 s 3A �����������������������������������89, 90 ch 2 �����������������������������������������45 s 49 ������������������������������������������18 s 3B �����������������������������������52, 93 s 50 ������������������������������������������18 s 5B �����������������������������������������54 Personal Injuries Proceedings s 51 ������������������������������������������18 s 5C �����������������������������������������54 Regulations 2002 s 52 ������������������������������������������18 s 5D �����������������������������������������59 s 13 ������������������������������������������45 s 53 ������������������������������������������18 s 5E ������������������������������������������59 s 54 ������������������������������������������18 s 5F ������������������������������������������66 Personal Injuries Proceedings s 55 ������������������������������������������18 s 5G �����������������������������������������66 (Legal Advertising) and Other s 56 ������������������������������������������18 s 5H �����������������������������������������66 Acts Amendment Act 2006 �����48 s 57 ������������������������������������������18 s 5I �������������������������������������������66 s 58 ������������������������������������������18 s 5J ������������������������������������������69 s 59 ������������������������������������������18 s 5K �����������������������������������������69

AUSTRALIAN CIVIL Liability Guide xxiii Carter Newell Lawyers

Table of statutes

s 5L ������������������������������������������69 s 31F ����������������������������������78, 96 pt 2, div 2 ��������������������96, 97, 99 s 5M ����������������������������������������69 s 31G ���������������������������������78, 96 pt 2, div 3 ��������������������������������94 s 5N �����������������������������������69, 92 s 31H ���������������������������������78, 96 pt 2, div 4 ��������������������������������99 s 5O �����������������������������������������72 s 32 ������������������������������78, 79, 96 pt 2, div 6 ��������������������������������99 s 5P �����������������������������������������72 s 33 ������������������������������������78, 96 pt 2, div 7 ��������������������������������99 s 5Q �����������������������������������������91 s 34 ����������������������������86, 87, 141 pt 3 ������������������������������������78, 79 s 5R �����������������������������������������84 s 35 ����������������������������86, 88, 119 pt 4 ������������������������������������86, 89 s 5S �����������������������������������������84 s 35A ���������������������������������86, 89 pt 5 ������������������������������������������73 s 5T ������������������������������������������84 s 36 ������������������������������������86, 88 pt 6 ������������������������������������������81 s 12 ������������������������������������������96 s 37 ������������������������������������������86 pt 7 ������������������������������������������81 s 13 ������������������������������������������96 s 38 ������������������������������������������86 pt 8 ������������������������������������������77 s 14 ������������������������������������������96 s 39 ������������������������������������������86 pt 9 ������������������������������������������77 s 15 ������������������������������������96, 97 s 40 ������������������������������������������73 pt 10 ����������������������������������������93 s 15A ���������������������������������96, 97 s 41 ������������������������������������������73 sch 1, cl 6 ��������������������������������77 s 15B ���������������������������������96, 97 s 42 ������������������������������������������73 s 15C ���������������������������������96, 97 s 43 ������������������������������������������73 Civil Liability Regulation 2009 s 16 ������������������������������������94, 95 s 43A ���������������������������73, 74, 75 r 5 ��������������������������������������������86 s 17 ������������������������������������������94 s 44 ������������������������������������73, 74 s 17A ���������������������������������������94 s 45 ������������������������������������������73 Civil Liability Amendment s 18 ������������������������������������������99 s 46 ������������������������������������������73 (Offender Damages) Act 2004 s 21 ������������������������������������������99 s 47 ������������������������������������������81 ����������������������������������������������100 s 22 ������������������������������������������99 s 48 ����������������������������������81, 108 s 23 ������������������������������������������99 s 49 ����������������������������������81, 108 Civil Liability Amendment (Personal s 24 ������������������������������������������99 s 50 ������������������������������������������81 Responsibility) Act 2002 �����������99 s 25 ����������������������������������99, 100 s 51 ������������������������������������81, 96 s 26 ������������������������������������������99 s 52 ������������������������������������81, 96 Compensation to Relatives Act s 26A �������������������������������������100 s 53 ������������������������������������81, 96 1897 ����������������������������������������84 s 26B �������������������������������������100 s 54 ������������������������������������81, 96 s 26C �������������������������������������100 s 54A ���������������������������������������96 Environmental Planning and s 26D �������������������������������������100 s 54B ���������������������������������������81 Assessment Regulation 1994 ����73 s 26E ��������������������������������������100 s 54C ���������������������������������������81 s 26F ��������������������������������������100 s 54D ���������������������������������������81 Legal Profession Act 1987 s 26G �������������������������������������100 s 54E ����������������������������������������81 s 198D �����������������������������������100 s 26H �������������������������������������100 s 54F ����������������������������������������81 s 198J ������������������������������������101 s 26I ���������������������������������������100 s 54G ���������������������������������������81 s 26J ��������������������������������������100 s 54H ���������������������������������������81 Legal Profession Act 2004 s 26K �������������������������������������100 s 55 ������������������������������������71, 77 s 338 ��������������������������������������100 s 26L ��������������������������������������100 s 56 ������������������������������������������77 s 338B �����������������������������������100 s 26M ������������������������������������100 s 57 ������������������������������������������77 s 347 ��������������������������������������101 s 26N �������������������������������������100 s 58 ������������������������������������������77 s 348 ��������������������������������������101 s 26O �������������������������������������100 s 58A ���������������������������������������77 pt 3.2, div 9 ���������������������������100 s 26P �������������������������������������100 s 58B ���������������������������������������77 s 26Q �������������������������������������100 s 58C ���������������������������������������77 Limitation Act 1969 s 26R �������������������������������������100 s 63 ������������������������������������������77 s 14B ���������������������������������������94 s 26S �������������������������������������100 s 64 ������������������������������������������77 s 18A ���������������������������������������93 s 26T ��������������������������������������100 s 67 ������������������������������������������93 s 56A ���������������������������������������94 s 26U �������������������������������������100 s 68 ������������������������������������������93 s 58 ������������������������������������������93 s 26V ��������������������������������������100 s 69 ������������������������������������������93 s 62D ���������������������������������������94 s 26W ������������������������������������100 pt 1 ������������������������������������52, 84 div 6 �����������������������������������������93 s 27 ������������������������������������78, 96 pt 1A, div 2 ������������������������������54 s 28 ������������������������������������78, 96 pt 1A, div 3 ������������������������������59 Motor Accidents Act 1988 ������82 s 29 ������������������������������������78, 96 pt 1A, div 4 ������������������������������66 s 30 ������������������������������78, 79, 96 pt 1A, div 5 ������������������������������92 Motor Accident Compensation s 31 ������������������������78, 79, 81, 96 pt 1A, div 6 ������������������������������72 Act 1999 s 31A ���������������������������������78, 96 pt 1A, div 7 ������������������������������91 s 109 ����������������������������������������54 s 31B ���������������������������������78, 96 pt 1A, div 8 ������������������������������84 s 31C ���������������������������������78, 96 pt 2 ������������������������������������������94 Professional Standards Act 1994 s 31E ����������������������������������78, 96 pt 2A ��������������������������������������100 s 3 ��������������������������������������������73

xxiv AUSTRALIAN CIVIL LIABILITY GUIDE Carter Newell Lawyers

Table of statutes

s 5 ������������������������������������������172 Fair Trading (Amendment) Act s 14K �������������������������������������122 2003 ��������������������������������������122 s14L ���������������������������������������122 Workers Compensation Act 1987 s 24AE �����������������������������������118 ����������������������������������������������101 Fair Trading (Recreational s 24AF ������������������������������������118 Services) Regulation 2004 s 24AG ���������������������������118, 141 VIC r 5 ������������������������������������������122 s 24AH �����������������������������������118 s 24AI ���118, 119, 120, 141, 158, Accident Compensation Act 1985 Legal Profession Act 2004 ����������������������������199, 237 ����������������������������������������������125 s 3.5.2 ������������������������������������129 s 24AJ ����������������������������118, 119 s 8.1.1 ������������������������������������129 s 24AK �����������������������������������118 Australian Consumer Law (Vic) s 24AL �����������������������������������118 s 18 ����������������������������������������118 Limitation of Actions Act 1958 s 24AM ����������������������������������118 s 64 ����������������������������������������110 s 23A �������������������������������������123 s 24AN �����������������������������������118 s 27A �������������������������������������123 s 24AO �����������������������������������118 Australian Consumer Law and s 27B �������������������������������������123 s 24AP �����������������������������������118 Fair Trading Act 2012 s 27C �������������������������������������123 s 24AQ �����������������������������������118 s 22 ��������������������������������110, 122 s 27D �������������������������������������123 s 24AR �����������������������������������118 s 27E ��������������������������������������123 s 24AS �����������������������������������118 Civil Procedure Act 2010 s 27F ��������������������������������������123 s 25 ����������������������������������������116 s 1 ������������������������������������������107 s 27G �������������������������������������123 s 26 ����������������������������������������116 s 4 ������������������������������������������107 s 27H �������������������������������������123 s 27 ����������������������������������������116 s 10 ����������������������������������������107 s 27I ���������������������������������������123 s 28 ����������������������������������������116 s 11 ����������������������������������������128 s 27J ��������������������������������������123 s 28A �����������������������������116, 117 s 16 ����������������������������������������107 s 27K �������������������������������������123 s 28AA �����������������������������������116 s 17 ����������������������������������������107 s 27L ��������������������������������������123 s 28B �������������������������������������112 s 18 ����������������������������������������107 s 27M ������������������������������������123 s 28C �����������������������������106, 112 s 19 ����������������������������������������107 s 27N �������������������������������������123 s 28E ��������������������������������������112 s 20 ����������������������������������������107 pt 2, div 2 ������������������������������123 s 28F ������������������������������112, 126 s 21 ����������������������������������������107 pt 2A ��������������������������������������123 s 28G �����������������������������112, 125 s 22 ����������������������������������������107 s 28H �����������������������������112, 125 s 23 ����������������������������������������107 Limitation of Actions (Amendment) s 28HA ���������������������������112, 125 s 24 ��������������������������������107, 128 Act 2002 ��������������������������������123 s 28I �����������������������112, 125, 127 s 25 ����������������������������������������107 s 28IA ��������������������112, 125, 126 s 26 ����������������������������������������107 Mental Health Act 1986 s 28IB ����������������������������112, 125 s 28 ����������������������������������������107 s 10 ����������������������������������������115 s 28IC ����������������������������112, 125 s 29 ����������������������������������������107 s 28ID ����������������������������112, 125 s 30 ����������������������������������������107 Police Regulation Act 1958 s 28IE �����������������������������112, 125 s 54 ����������������������������������������107 s 123 ��������������������������������������121 s 28IF �����������������������������112, 125 s 55 ����������������������������������������107 s 28J ������������������������������112, 125 s 56 ����������������������������������������107 Professional Standards Act 2003 s 28K �����������������������������112, 125 s 57 ����������������������������������������107 pt 6 ����������������������������������������111 s 28L ������������������������������112, 125 s 58 ����������������������������������������107 s 28LA ���������������������������112, 125 s 59 ����������������������������������������107 Transport Accident Act 1986 s 28LAB �������������������������112, 125 s 60 ����������������������������������������107 s 40 ��������������������������������115, 116 s 28LAC �������������������������112, 125 s 61 ����������������������������������������107 s 94 ����������������������������������������125 s 28LB �����������������������������������125 s 62 ����������������������������������������107 s 28LC �����������������������������������125 s 63 ����������������������������������������107 Victoria State Emergency Service s 28LD �����������������������������������125 s 64 ����������������������������������������107 Act 2005 ��������������������������������106 s 28LE ������������������������������������125 s 65 ����������������������������������������107 s 28LF ������������������������������������125 s 66 ����������������������������������������107 Workers Compensation Act 1958 s 28M ������������������������������������128 ����������������������������������������������125 s 28N �������������������������������������128 Act 2005 ����123, 124 s 31B �������������������������������������114 Wrongs Act 1958 s 31C �������������������������������������112 Education and Training Reform s 14F ��������������������������������������115 s 31E ��������������������������������������114 Act 2006 ������������������������106, 112 s 14G �������������������������������������115 s 31F ��������������������������������������114 s 14H �������������������������������������115 s 31G �������������������������������������114 Fair Trading Act 1999 s 14I ���������������������������������������122 s 31H �������������������������������������114 s 32N �������������������������������������110 s 14J ��������������������������������������122 s 34 ����������������������������������������112

AUSTRALIAN CIVIL Liability Guide xxv Carter Newell Lawyers

Table of statutes

s 35 ����������������������������������������112 pt 10, div 6 ����������������������������121 s 52 ����������������������������������������132 s 36 ��������������������������������112, 113 pt 10, div 7 ����������������������������116 s 53 ����������������������������������������132 s 37 ��������������������������������112, 113 pt 11 ��������������������������������������114 s 54 ����������������������������������������132 s 38 ����������������������������������������112 pt 12 ��������������������������������������112 s 55 ����������������������������������������132 s 39 ����������������������������������������112 pt IV �������������������������������������������120 s 56 ����������������������������������������132 s 40 ��������������������������������112, 113 pt IVAA ������������������������118, 119 s 57 ����������������������������������������132 s 41 ����������������������������������������112 pt VIA ������������������������������� 112, 114 s 58 ����������������������������������������132 s 42 ����������������������������������������112 pt VIB ��������������������������������112 s 59 ����������������������������������������132 s 44 ����������������������������������������106 pt IX �������������������������������������������113 s 60 ��������������������������������132, 135 s 45 ��������������������������������106, 134 s 61 ��������������������������������132, 135 s 48 ��������������������������������107, 134 Wrongs (Amendment) Act 2000 s 62 ����������������������������������������132 s 49 ����������������������������������������107 ����������������������������������������������116 s 63 ����������������������������������������132 s 50 ����������������������������������������107 s 64 ����������������������������������������132 s 51 ����������������������������������������108 Wrongs and Limitation of Actions s 65 ����������������������������������������132 s 52 ��������������������������������108, 109 Acts (Insurance Reforms) Act s 66 ����������������������������������������132 s 53 ����������������������������������������109 2003 ��������������������������������������123 s 67 ����������������������������������������132 s 54 ����������������������������������������109 s 68 ����������������������������������������132 s 55 ����������������������������������������109 Wrongs and Other Acts (Law of s 69 ����������������������������������������132 s 56 ����������������������������������������109 Negligence) Act 2003 ������������126 s 70 ����������������������������������������132 s 57 ����������������������������������������110 s 71 ����������������������������������������132 s 58 ����������������������������������������110 Wrongs and Other Acts (Public s 72 ����������������������������������������132 s 59 ��������������������������������110, 111 Liability Insurance Reform) Act s 73 ����������������������������������������132 s 60 ��������������������������������110, 111 2002 ��������������125, 126, 127, 128 s 74 ����������������������������������������132 s 61 ��������������������������������121, 122 s 75 ����������������������������������������132 s 62 ����������������������������������������116 ACT s 76 ����������������������������������������132 s 63 ����������������������������������������116 s 77 ����������������������������������������132 s 67 ����������������������������������������114 Australian Consumer Law s 78 ����������������������������������������132 s 68 ����������������������������������������114 s 60 ����������������������������������������135 s 79 ����������������������������������������132 s 69 ����������������������������������������114 s 61 ����������������������������������������135 s 80 ����������������������������������������132 s 70 ����������������������������������������114 s 92 ����������������������������������������139 s 71 ����������������������������������������114 Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 2002 s 93 ��������������������������������132, 139 s 72 ����������������������������������������114 s 5 ������������������������������������������137 s 94 ����������������������������������������139 s 73 ����������������������������������������114 s 6 ������������������������������������������137 s 95 ����������������������������������������139 s 74 ����������������������������������������114 s 7 ������������������������������������������137 s 96 ����������������������������������������139 s 75 ����������������������������������������114 s 8 ������������������������������������������137 s 97 ����������������������������������������139 s 76 ����������������������������������������114 s 9 ������������������������������������������137 s 98 ����������������������������������������145 s 77 ����������������������������������������114 s 10 ����������������������������������������137 s 99 ����������������������������������������145 s 78 ����������������������������������������114 s 11 ����������������������������������������137 s 100 ������������������������������145, 146 s 79 ����������������������������������������112 s 11B �������������������������������������138 s 101 ��������������������������������������140 s 80 ����������������������������������������112 s 12 ����������������������������������������144 s 102 ��������������������������������������140 s 81 ����������������������������������������112 s 13 ����������������������������������������144 s 103 ��������������������������������������140 s 82 ����������������������������������������112 s 14 ����������������������������������������144 s 104 ��������������������������������������140 s 83 ����������������������������������������112 s 27 ����������������������������������������140 s 105 ��������������������������������������140 s 84 ����������������������������������������112 s 32 ����������������������������������������138 s 107A �����������������������������������141 s 85 ����������������������������������������112 s 33 ����������������������������������������138 s 107B �����������������������������������141 s 86 ����������������������������������������112 s 34 ����������������������������������������138 s 107C �����������������������������������141 s 87 ����������������������������������������112 s 35 ����������������������������������������138 s 107D �����������������������������������141 pt 2 ����������������������������������������122 s 36 ����������������������������������������138 s 107E ������������������������������������141 pt 2B �������������������������������������115 s 41 ����������������������������������������132 s 107F ������������������������������������141 pt 5 ����������������������������������������116 s 42 ��������������������������������133, 136 s 107G �����������������������������������141 pt 5B �������������106, 125, 126, 127 s 43 ��������������������������������133, 135 s 107H �����������������������������������141 pt 5BA �����������������������������������125 s 45 ����������������������������������������146 s 107I �������������������������������������141 pt 5C �������������������������������������128 s 46 ����������������������������������������134 s 107J ������������������������������������141 pt 10, div 1 ����������������������������106 s 47 ��������������������������������132, 140 s 107K �����������������������������������141 pt 10, div 2 ����������������������������107 s 48 ����������������������������������������132 s 108 ��������������������������������������136 pt 10, div 3 ����������������������������108 s 49 ����������������������������������������132 s 109 ��������������������������������������136 pt 10, div 4 ����������������������������109 s 50 ����������������������������������������132 s 110 ��������������������������������������136 pt 10, div 5 ����������������������������110 s 51 ����������������������������������������132 s 111 ��������������������������������������136

xxvi AUSTRALIAN CIVIL LIABILITY GUIDE Carter Newell Lawyers

Table of statutes

s 112 ��������������������������������������136 Legal Profession Amendment Act s 29 ����������������������������������������155 s 113 ��������������������������������������136 2007 ��������������������������������������147 s 30 ����������������������������������������155 s 114 ��������������������������������������136 s 31 ����������������������������������������155 s 139H �����������������������������������146 Limitation Act 1985 s 32 ����������������������������������������155 s 180 ��������������������������������������147 s 21B �������������������������������������145 s 33 ����������������������������������������155 s 181 ��������������������������������������147 s 36 ����������������������������������������144 s 34 ����������������������������������������155 s 182 ��������������������������������������147 s 35 ��������������������������������155, 163 s 183 ��������������������������������������147 Road (General) Act 1999 s 36 ����������������������������������������154 s 184 ��������������������������������������147 pt 10 ��������������������������������������141 s 37 ����������������������������������������154 s 185 ��������������������������������������147 s 38 ����������������������������������������154 s 186 ��������������������������������������147 Road Transport (General) Act s 39 ����������������������������������������154 s 187 ��������������������������������������147 1999 s 40 ����������������������������������������154 s 188 ��������������������������������������147 pt 10 ��������������������������������������137 s 41 ����������������������������������������154 s 189 ��������������������������������������147 s 42 ����������������������������������������154 s 190 ��������������������������������������147 Road Transport (Third Party s 43 ����������������������������������������154 s 224 ��������������������������������������137 Insurance) Act 2008 s 43A �������������������������������������158 ch 2, pt 2.1 ����������������������������137 ch 4 ���������������������������������������145 s 43B �������������������������������������158 ch 2, pt 2.2 ����������������������������137 s 43C �������������������������������������158 ch 2, pt 2.3 ����������������������������144 Victims of Crime (Financial s 43D �����������������������������158, 159 ch 3, pt 3.2 ����������������������������138 Assistance) Act 1983 �������������144 s 43E ��������������������������������������158 ch 4, pt 4.1 ����������������������������132 s 43G �������������������������������������158 ch 4, pt 4.2 ��������������������133, 135 Workers Compensation Act 1951 s 44 ����������������������������������������154 ch 4, pt 4.3 ����������������������������134 ����������������������133, 137, 141, 144 s 45 ����������������������������������������154 ch 5, pt 5.1 ����������������������������132 s 46 ����������������������������������������154 ch 7, pt 7.1 ����132, 139, 140, 145 TA S s 47 ��������������������������������154, 155 ch 7, pt 7.2 ����������������������������145 s 48 ����������������������������������������154 ch 7, pt 7.3 ����������������������������140 Australian Consumer Law s 49 ����������������������������������������154 ch 7A �������������������������������������141 (Tasmania) Act 2010 pt 1 ��������������������������������150, 160 ch 8 ���������������������������������������136 s 236 ��������������������������������������158 pt 2 ����������������������������������������156 ch 14, pt 14.1 ������������������������147 pt 4 ����������������������������������������161 ch 14, pt 14.2 ������������������������147 Civil Liability Act 2002 pt 5 ����������������������������������������164 sch 3 ��������������������������������������135 s 3A ���������������������������������������159 pt 6, div 2 ������������������������������151 sch 4 ��������������������������������������136 s 3B �������������������������������150, 161 pt 6, div 3 ������������������������������152 s 3C ���������������������������������������160 pt 6, div 4 ������������������������������152 Civil Law (Wrongs) (Proportionate s 4 ������������������������������������������150 pt 6, div 5 ������������������������������152 Liability and Professional s 4A ���������������������������������������156 pt 6, div 6 ������������������������������153 Standards) Amendment Act 2004 s 5 ����������������������������������156, 157 pt 6, div 7 ������������������������������157 ��������������������������������������136, 141 s 7 ������������������������������������������161 pt 7 ��������������������������������163, 164 s 8 ����������������������������������150, 164 pt 8 ��������������������������������155, 163 Civil Law (Wrongs) (Thresholds) s 11 ����������������������������������������151 pt 8A ��������������������������������������155 Amendment Bill 2003 s 12 ��������������������������������150, 151 pt 8B �������������������������������������155 s 45 ��������������������������������145, 146 s 13 ����������������������������������������152 pt 9 ����������������������������������������154 s 14 ����������������������������������������152 pt 9A ��������������������������������������158 Court Procedure Rules 2006 s 15 ����������������������������������������152 pt 10 ��������������������������������������154 pt 2.16 �����������������������������������146 s 16 ����������������������������������������152 s 17 ����������������������������������������152 Civil Liability Amendment Act Discrimination Act 1991 ��������141 s 18 ����������������������������������������152 2003 ����������������������156, 157, 160 s 19 ����������������������������������������152 Fair Trading (Australian Consumer s 20 ����������������������������������������152 Civil Liability Amendment Act Law) Amendment Act 2010 ���141 s 21 ����������������������������������������153 2004 ��������������������������������������150 s 22 ����������������������������������������153 Justice and Community Safety s 23 ����������������������������������������157 Civil Liability Amendment Act Legislation Amendment Act 2008 s 26 ����������������������������������������163 2005 ����������������������150, 153, 163 ����������������������������������������������136 s 27 ����������������������������������������162 s 28 ����������������������������������������162 Civil Liability Amendment Act Legal Practitioners Act 1970 ��147 s 28A �������������������������������������164 2008 ��������������������������������������150 s 28B �������������������������������������163 Legal Profession Act 2006 ����147 s 28C �������������������������������������163

AUSTRALIAN CIVIL Liability Guide xxvii Carter Newell Lawyers

Table of statutes

Civil Liability Amendment s 42 ����������������������������������������172 Food Act 2001 (Proportionate Liability) Act 2005 s 43 ����������������������������������������174 s 8 ������������������������������������������173 ��������������������������������������150, 158 s 44 ����������������������������������������175 s 45 ����������������������������������������175 Law Reform (Contributory Fatal Accidents Act 1934 ������163 s 46 ��������������������������������174, 175 Negligence and Apportionment s 47 ��������������������������������174, 175 of Liability) Act 2001 Justice and Related Legislation s 48 ��������������������������������174, 175 s 3 ������������������������������������������176 (Miscellaneous Amendments) Act s 49 ��������������������������������174, 175 s 6 ������������������������������������������177 2008 ��������������������������������������163 s 50 ����������������������������������������175 s 7 ������������������������������������������175 s 51 ��������������������������������168, 180 s 8 ������������������������������������������176 Legal Profession Act 1993 �����164 s 52 ����������������������������������������180 s 9 ������������������������������������������176 s 53 ��������������������������������174, 180 s 10 ����������������������������������������176 Legal Profession Act 2007 s 54 ��������������������������������180, 181 s 11 ����������������������������������������176 s 657 ��������������������������������������164 s 55 ��������������������������������180, 181 pt 3 ��������������������������������176, 177 s 66 ����������������������������������������164 s 56 ������������������������180, 181, 182 s 57 ����������������������������������������180 Law Reform (Contributory Legal Profession (Miscellaneous s 58 ��������������������������������180, 181 Negligence and Apportionment and Consequential Amendments) s 59 ����������������������������������������177 of Liability) Amendment Act 2001 Act 2007 s 70 ����������������������������������������182 s 7 ������������������������������������������175 s 3 ������������������������������������������164 s 74 ��������������������������������173, 174 s 8 ������������������������������������������176 s 4 ������������������������������������������164 s 75 ����������������������������������������179 s 9 ������������������������������������������176 pt 1 ��������������������������������168, 182 s 10 ����������������������������������������176 Limitations Act 1974 pt 6 ����������������������������������������168 s 11 ����������������������������������������176 s 5A �������������������������������161, 162 pt 6, div 1 ����������������������169, 174 s 26 ����������������������������������������162 pt 6, div 2 ������������������������������170 Law Reform (Contributory pt 6, div 3 ������������������������������170 Negligence and Apportionment of Motor Accident (Liabilities and pt 6, div 4 ������������������������������172 Liability) (Proportionate Liability) Compensation) Act 1973 pt 6, div 5 ������������������������������172 Amendment Act 2005 �����������175 pt III ���������������������������������������163 pt 6, div 6 ������������������������������174 pt 7 ����������������������������������������175 Law Reform (Ipp Proclamation under the pt 8 ��������168, 174, 180, 181, 182 Recommendations) Act 2004 Civil Liability Amendment pt 9, div 8 ������������������������������182 s 48 ����������������������������������������176 (Proportionate Liability) Act 2005 pt 9, div 11 ����������������������������173 ����������������������������������������������158 pt 9, div 12 ����������������������������179 Limitation of Actions Act 1936 s 36 ����������������������������������������179 Professional Standards Act 2005 Civil Liability (Food Donors and s 37 ����������������������������������������180 ��������������������������������������153, 154 Distributors) Amendment Act s 45 ����������������������������������������180 2008 s 45A �������������������������������������180 SA s 74A �������������������������������������173 s 48 ����������������������������������������179 div 11A ����������������������������������173 Australian Consumer Law Magistrates Court Act 1991 s 60 ����������������������������������������171 Defamation Act 2005 s 33A �������������������������������������182 s 61 ����������������������������������������171 s 37 ����������������������������������������179 Professional Standards Act 2004 Civil Liability Act 1936 Development Act 1993 ����������������������������������������������172 s 3 ����������������������������������181, 182 s 72 ����������������������������������������177 s 4 ������������������������������������������168 Recreational Services (Limitation s 31 ����������������������������������������169 District Court Act 1991 of Liability) Act 2002 s 32 ����������������������������������������169 s 38A �������������������������������������182 s 7 ������������������������������������������171 s 33 ����������������������������������������174 s 34 ��������������������������������170, 172 Dust Diseases Act 2005 Statutes Amendment (Domestic s 35 ����������������������������������������170 s 36 ����������������������������������������179 Partners) Act 2006 �����������������181 s 36 ����������������������������������������170 s 37 ����������������������������������������170 Fair Trading Act 1987 Statutes Amendment (Structured s 38 ����������������������������������������170 s 42 ��������������������������������171, 172 Settlements) Act 2002 �������������182 s 39 ��������������������������������170, 175 s 40 ����������������������������������������172 Fair Trading Regulations 2010 s 41 ����������������������������������������172 sch 1 ��������������������������������������171

xxviii AUSTRALIAN CIVIL LIABILITY GUIDE Carter Newell Lawyers

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Statute Amendment and Repeal s 5T ����������������������������������������193 Limitation Act 2005 (Fair Trading) Act 2009 (SA) s 5U ���������������������������������������192 s 3 ������������������������������������������203 s 60 ����������������������������������������171 s 5V ����������������������������������������192 s 14 ����������������������������������������202 s 5W ��������������������������������������192 s 17 ����������������������������������������202 Supreme Court Act 1935 s 5X ����������������������������������������192 s 30 ����������������������������������������202 s 30BA �����������������������������������182 s 5Y ���������������������������������������192 s 31 ����������������������������������������202 s 5Z ����������������������������������������192 s 32 ����������������������������������������202 Supreme Court Rules 1987 s 9 ������������������������������������������203 s 33 ����������������������������������������203 s 6A ���������������������������������������168 s 10A �������������������������������������203 s 35 ����������������������������������������203 div 2 ���������������������������������������168 s 11 ����������������������������������������204 s 36 ����������������������������������������203 s 12 ����������������������������������������204 s 38 ����������������������������������������202 Supreme Court Rules 2006 ���168 s 14 ����������������������������������������205 s 39 ����������������������������������������202 s 15 ����������������������������������������205 s 55 ����������������������������������������202 Volunteers Protection Act 2001 s 16 ����������������������������������������206 pt 3 ����������������������������������������203 s 4 ������������������������������������������173 s 17 ����������������������������������������206 s 18 ����������������������������������������206 Limitation Legislation Amendment WA s 19 ����������������������������������������206 and Repeal Act 2005 �������������202 s 20 ����������������������������������������206 Civil Aviation (Carriers Liability) s 21 ����������������������������������������206 Motor Vehicle (Third Party Act 1961 ��������������������������������186 pt 1 ����������������������������������������186 Insurance) Act 1943 pt 1A ��������������������������������������186 s 3A ���������������������������������������204 Civil Liability Act 2002 pt 1A, div 2 ����������������������������187 s 3D ���������������������������������������204 s 3 ������������������������������������������186 pt 1A, div 3 ����������������������������188 s 3A ���������������������������������������186 pt 1A, div 4 ��������������������190, 201 Volunteers and Food and other s 4A ���������������������������������������199 pt 1A, div 5 ��������������������195, 196 Donors (Protection from Liability) s 5A ���������������������������������������186 pt 1A, div 7 ����������������������������191 Act 2002 s 5AB �������������������������������������193 pt 1B �������������������������������������193 s 2 ������������������������������������������193 s 5AC �������������������������������������193 pt 1C �������������������������������������192 s 5 ������������������������������������������193 s 5AD �������������������������������������193 pt 1D �������������������������������������193 s 6 ������������������������������������������194 s 5AE �������������������������������������193 pt 1E ��������������������������������������207 s 5AF �������������������������������������201 pt 1F ��������������������������������������198 Volunteers (Protection from s 5AH �������������������������������������201 pt 2 ����������������������������������������186 Liability) Act 2002 s 5AI ��������������������������������������198 pt 2, div 2 ����������������������203, 204 s 8 ������������������������������������������194 s 5AJ ������������������������������198, 201 pt 2, div 3 ������������������������������204 s 5AK �������������������������������������198 pt 2, div 4 ������������������������������205 Workers Compensation and s 5AJA �����������������������������������198 pt 3 ����������������������������������������206 Rehabilitation Act 1981 ���������186 s 5AKA �����������������������������������198 pt 3, div 3 ������������������������������206 s 5AL �������������������������������������198 NT s 5AO �������������������������������������198 Civil Liability Amendment Act s 5B ���������������������������������������187 2003 �������������186, 187, 189, 190, Australian Consumer Law s 5C ���������������������������������������188 192, 193, 194, 195, 196, 198, 201 s 18 ����������������������������������������216 s 5E ��������������������������������189, 190 s 5F ��������������������������������189, 190 Civil Liability Amendment Act Consumer Affairs and Fair Trading s 5G ���������������������������������������190 2004 ������������������������������186, 191 (Amendment) Act 2003 s 5H ���������������������������������������190 s 68A �������������������������������������209 s 5I �����������������������������������������190 Criminal Code Act Compilation s 5J ����������������������������������������190 Act 1913 Law Reform (Miscellaneous s 5K ���������������������������������������196 s 371A �����������������������������������196 Provisions) Act 1956 s 5L ��������������������������������195, 196 s 15 ����������������������������������������212 s 5M ��������������������������������������189 Law Reform (Contributory s 16 ����������������������������������������212 s 5N ���������������������������������������189 Negligence and Tortfeasors’ s 17 ����������������������������������������212 s 5O ���������������������������������������189 Contribution) Act 1974 s 18 ����������������������������������������212 s 5P ���������������������������������������189 s 4 ������������������������������������������197 s 19 ����������������������������������������212 s 5PA ��������������������������������������191 s 7 ������������������������������������������202 s 20 ����������������������������������������212 s 5PB �������������������������������������191 s 21 ����������������������������������������212 s 5Q ���������������������������������������193 Legal Profession Act 2008 ����������� s 21A �������������������������������������212 s 5R ���������������������������������������193 ��������������������������������������205, 206 pt V ����������������������������������������212 s 5S ���������������������������������������193

AUSTRALIAN CIVIL Liability Guide xxix Carter Newell Lawyers

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Legal Profession Act 2006 s 22 ��������������������������������218, 220 s 64 ����������������������������������������224 s 1 ������������������������������������������220 s 23 ����������������������������������������219 s 82 ����������������������������������������231 s 2 ������������������������������������������220 s 26 ����������������������������������������219 s 87CB ���������������������������226, 227 s 17 ����������������������������������������221 s 27 ����������������������������������������218 s 87CC �����������������������������������226 s 19 ����������������������������������������221 s 29 ����������������������������������������220 s 87CD �����������������������������������226 s 20 ����������������������������������������221 s 30 ����������������������������������������220 s 87CE �����������������������������������226 s 21 ����������������������������������������221 s 32 ����������������������������������������220 s 87CF �����������������������������������226 s 22 ����������������������������������������221 s 35 ����������������������������������������210 s 87CG ����������������������������������226 s 23 ����������������������������������������221 pt 1 ����������������������������������������208 s 87CH �����������������������������������226 s 117 ��������������������������������������221 pt 2, div 1 ������������������������������208 s 87CI ������������������������������������226 s 118 ��������������������������������������221 pt 2, div 2 ������������������������������217 s 87D �������������������������������������232 s 288 ��������������������������������������221 pt 3 ����������������������������������������211 s 87E ��������������������������������������224 s 290 ��������������������������������������221 pt 4 ����������������������������������������218 s 87F ��������������������������������������230 s 291 ��������������������������������������221 pt 4, div 2 ������������������������������220 s 87G �����������������������������230, 232 s 292 ��������������������������������������221 pt 4, div 3 ��������������218, 219, 220 s 87H �����������������������������230, 232 s 293 ��������������������������������������221 pt 4, div 4 ������������������������������218 s 87I ���������������������������������������230 s 708 ��������������������������������������221 pt 4, div 5 ������������������������������220 s 87J ������������������������������230, 232 pt 2.1 �������������������������������������221 pt 4, div 6 ������������������������������220 s 87K �������������������������������������230 pt 2.6 �������������������������������������221 s 87L ��������������������������������������231 pt 3.2 �������������������������������������221 Personal Injuries (Liabilities and s 87M ������������������������������������231 Damages) Amendment Act 2010 s 87U �������������������������������������232 Legal Profession Regulations s 36 ����������������������������������������210 s 87W ����������������������������232, 235 2007 ��������������������������������������221 s 87X ������������������������������232, 233 Professional Standards Act 2004 s 87Y �������������������������������������232 Limitation Act 1981 s 1 ������������������������������������������209 s 87Z ��������������������������������������232 s 4 ������������������������������������������218 s 2 ������������������������������������������209 s 87ZA �����������������������������������233 s 12 ����������������������������������������218 s 87ZB �����������������������������������234 s 36 ����������������������������������������218 Proportionate Liability Act 2005 s 87ZC �����������������������������������234 s 44 ����������������������������������������217 s 2 ������������������������������������������213 s 139A ���������������������������224, 225 s 44A �������������������������������������218 s 4 ������������������������������������������213 pt VI ���������������������������������������231 s 6 ������������������������������������������213 pt VIA ���������������������226, 227, 229 Personal Injuries (Civil Claims) Act s 7 ������������������������������������������213 pt VIB, div 1 ���������������������������232 2003 s 9 ������������������������������������������213 pt VIB, div 2 �����������224, 230, 232 s 7 ������������������������������������������208 s 10 ����������������������������������������212 pt VIB, div 3 �������������������231, 237 s 8 ������������������������������������������208 s 12 ����������������������������������������214 pt VIB, div 5 �������������������224, 233 s 9 ������������������������������������������208 s 13 ����������������������������������������214 pt VIB, div 6 �������������������233, 234 s 10 ����������������������������������������208 s 14 ����������������������������������������214 pt VIB, div 7 ���������������������������234 s 11 ����������������������������������������208 s 15 ����������������������������������������214 pt XI, div 9 ���������������������224, 225 pt 2, div 1 ������������������������������208 sch 2, s 13 �����������������������������231 CTH sch 2, s 18 �����������������������������225 Personal Injuries (Liabilities and sch 2, s 67 �����������������������������230 Damages) Act 2003 Australian Securities and sch 2, div 3, s 236 �����������������231 s 3 ������������������������������������������211 Investments Commission Act s 4 ������������������������������������������208 2001 Corporate Law Economic s 7 ������������������������������������������208 s 12DA �����������������������������������228 Reform Program (Audit Reform s 7A ���������������������������������������208 & Corporate Disclosure) Act 2004 s 8 ������������������������������������������208 Commonwealth Volunteers s 82 ����������������������������������������226 s 9 ������������������������������������������208 Protection Act 2003 s 10 ����������������������������������������208 s 5 ������������������������������������������224 Corporations Act 2001 s 11 ����������������������������������������217 s 6 ������������������������������������������225 s 1041H ���������������������������������228 s 12 ����������������������������������������217 s 7 ������������������������������������������225 s 13 ����������������������������������������217 Royal Commissions Amendment s 14 ����������������������������������������211 Competition and Consumer Act Act 2006 s 15 ����������������������������������������211 2010 s 1 ������������������������������������������234 s 16 ����������������������������������������211 s 4 ����������������������������������226, 230 s 1B ���������������������������������������234 s 17 ����������������������������������������211 s 4K �������������������������������226, 231 s 2 ����������������������������������234, 235 s 19 ��������������������������������218, 220 s 13 ����������������������������������������231 s 3 ������������������������������������������234 s 20 ����������������������������������������218 s 18 ��������������������������������225, 226 s 6AA �������������������������������������235

xxx AUSTRALIAN CIVIL LIABILITY GUIDE Carter Newell Lawyers

Table of statutes

s 6AB �������������������������������������235 sch 1 ��������������������������������������234

Royal Commission Amendment Act 2006 – Explanatory Memorandum ������������������������234

Superannuation Guarantee (Administration) Act 1992 s 19 ����������������������������������������233

Trade Practices Act 1974 s 4KA �������������������������������������226 s 52 ����������������������������������������225 s 68B �����������������������������224, 225 s 82 ����������������������������������������231 s 87CB �����������������������������������215 s 87W ������������������������������������233 s 87X ��������������������������������������233 pt VIA �������������������������������������214

AUSTRALIAN CIVIL Liability Guide xxxi

Carter Newell Lawyers

INTRODUCTION Carter Newell Lawyers is pleased to release the 9th edition of the Australian Civil Liability Guide. This Guide continues to evolve from the first Australian Civil Liability Guide which was published in 2005, and is one of our suite of related industry publications which includes:

ƒƒ A Legal Guide to Contract Works and Construction Liability Insurance in Australia; ƒƒ Australian Airports Liability and Compliance Guide; ƒƒ Asia Pacific Carriers’ Liability Guide; ƒƒ A Guide to Directors’ and Officers’ Liability and Insurance; and our ƒƒ Injury Liability Gazettes.

As the legislation and case law develops, we continue to provide a comprehensive and updated annotated guide to the law of negligence Australia wide.

This Guide addresses legislative and case law developments relevant to civil liability federally and in all Australian States and Territories since the reform process began in 2002. It should be noted that the Guide does not address the law relating to claims in respect of motor vehicle accidents or workers compensation claims. A quick reference tool in the form of a table outlining the relevant legislative changes for the Commonwealth and the States and Territories is outlined in Appendix One and a guide to Proportionate Liability Regimes in all States and Territories in Appendix Two. Tables summarising all relevant legislation and cases for the Commonwealth and each State and Territory can also be found at the commencement of the Guide. This edition also includes legislative commencement information to assist the reader in the application of provisions.

Background to the tort reforms in Australia

A perceived ‘insurance crisis’ and concerns over the availability and affordability of personal injury liability insurance prompted the Ipp report published in October 2002. This report was, in turn, a springboard for tort law reform throughout Australia. Many, though not all, of the Ipp report’s recommendations were incorporated into current reforms at both Commonwealth and State Territory level. In some cases, the reforms went well beyond what the Ipp panel had recommended. The desirability of uniform reform of tort legislation was emphasised by the Ipp report and confirmed as an objective of the federal government in April 2003 at itsJoint Communiqué: Ministerial Meeting on Insurance Issues. Unfortunately, despite over a decade passing since the introduction by many states of civil liability legislation, a uniform approach remains illusive.

Commentary on the tort reforms

Since the reforms were introduced, there has been debate regarding the very existence of a liability insurance crisis and its causes and whether the reforms have achieved the important goal of restoring balance between the rights of victims of negligence and the stability of the insurance market.

Initial debates between stakeholders about the merits of recent Australian tort reform have been supplemented by a growing body of commentary from the judiciary and government.

In addition, there has been an increasing focus on perceived inequalities arising from the application of tort reform to the varying types of compensation schemes (i.e., motor vehicle, workers compensation and public liability) and the resultant inconsistency of approach across jurisdictions.

introduction 1 Carter Newell Lawyers

Whether or not the original objective has been achieved, it is clear that the reforms have served to tighten the law of negligence throughout Australia by imposing limitations on certain types of claims and capping various heads of damages. In some States, reforms to the substantive legal principles have also been coupled with a major procedural overhaul which has introduced legislative steps that must be taken prior to a claimant being entitled to commence court proceedings.

Future Reform

Over the last decade, since the reform process began, there has been much commentary and some opportunity for judicial consideration of the reforms. It is unclear how much further reform will potentially unfold over time, however, there have been no concrete steps taken by any jurisdictions to wind back the reforms.

The debate on legislative reform for personal injury litigation continues across Australia as the legislature and the judiciary attempt to find a balance between personal responsibility and social expectation of proper compensation and care for injured persons. In the meantime, this Guide is designed to assist in understanding the reforms that have occurred to date and the current state of civil liability law in Australia.

2 introduction Queensland Carter Newell Lawyers

QUEENSLAND

Queensland has been proactive in introducing reforms in response to the recommendations made in the Ipp report. The introduction of the Personal Injuries Proceedings Act 2002 (Qld) provided a complete overhaul of the procedural steps required in the commencement of actions for damages for personal injuries in Queensland and provided some legislative guidelines with respect to the assessment of damages in Queensland. Further, both the Personal Injuries Proceedings Act 2002 (Qld) and the Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld) have impacted on the method of calculating damages for general damages, gratuitous care, economic loss and interest.

Application of Statutory Reforms Personal Injuries Proceedings Act 2002 (Qld) pt 2 (s 6) commenced 29 August 2002 Sections 6(5)(c)–(e) were inserted by the Victims of Crime Assistance Act 2009 (Qld) and commenced on 1 December 2009 Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld) pt 2 (s 4–5), s 4(3) was inserted by the Professional Standards Act 2004 (Qld) and commenced 1 March 2005 Section 5(3) was inserted by the Civil Liability and Other Legislation Amendment Act 2010 (Qld) and commenced on 1 July 2010 In terms of civil claims in general, s 4 of the Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld) makes it clear that, subject to exclusions set out in s 5, the Act applies to any civil claim for damages for harm. The definition of civil claim is wide enough to encompass claims for breach of contract, breach of statutory duty and torts against property or person, at least where that duty is concurrent with the duty of care in negligence. Therefore, section 4 applies to the extent of any cause of action involving the discharge of duty to exercise reasonable care.

Section 5 operates to exclude from the operation of the Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld) personal injury claims to which the Motor Accident Insurance Act 1994 (Qld) applies and injuries which fall within Queensland’s workers’ compensation legislation, with the exception of pure journey claims. Injuries that are dust related conditions and injuries related to smoking are also generally excluded.1

The original wording of s 5 of the Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld) was interpreted by the Queensland Court of Appeal in the decision of Newberry v Suncorp Metway Insurance Ltd2 as meaning that the claimant’s employment had to be a significant contributing factor to the claim in orderto exclude the claim from the operation of the Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld).

In response to the Newberry decision, the Queensland legislature amended s 5 of the Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld) in 2006, and a new s 5 of the Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld) was inserted, and s 5(b) removed. The effect of those amendments, which apply only to injuries sustained on or after 6 November 2006, is that the Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld) will not apply to any personal injury claim after that date where workers’ compensation payments were made under Queensland workers’

1 Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld) see ss 5(a) to 5(d). With respect to the workers’ compensation exclusion, recent cases on this point have clarified the meaning of s 5 of the Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld) – see King v Parsons and Anor [2006] 2 Qd R 122; Newberry v Suncorp Metway Insurance Ltd [2006] 1 Qd R 519 and Clement v Backo [2006] QSC 129. In Newberry’s case, Keane JA with whom de Jersey and Muir CJJ agreed, held that a claim must be made where the plaintiff’s employment was a significantcontributing factor. It requires that the exigencies of the employment must contribute in some significant way to the occurrence of the injury and not simply that the occurrence happened whilst in the course of employment. The Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld) was subsequently amended to override the decision of Newberry but applies only to injuries sustained after 6 November 2006. 2 [2006] 1 Qd R 519.

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compensation laws (except for pure journey claims) regardless of whether a common law claim is actually made against the employer. In Wilkinson v BP Australia Pty Ltd3 the court held that for claims arising prior to 6 November 2006, the Newberry test remains applicable and the question of whether a claim is excluded from the Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld) will depend on the extent to which the claimant’s employment contributed to the claim.

Since the insertion of s 5(3) by the Civil Liability and Other Legislation Amendment Act 2010 (Qld) the Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld) now allows for damages to be awarded under s 59A, despite the general exclusion, for the gratuitous domestic services provided by an injured person, where those injuries are dust related or related to smoking. This provision applies retrospectively to any dust-related claim (s 85). This amendment partially reinstates Sullivan v Gordon4 damages.5

Section 6 of the Personal Injuries Proceedings Act 2002 (Qld) states that the Act applies with respect to all personal injury claims arising out of incidents happening before, on or after 18 June 2002, except in circumstances where court proceedings were commenced prior to that date. All claims that fall within s 6 therefore must comply with the pre-court procedures set out in Chapter 2 of the Act. The Act does not apply, however, to claims for dust related conditions or personal injuries arising from motor vehicle accidents. Injuries that fall within the workers’ compensation legislation are also excluded, but only to the extent that the entitlement to seek damages within the meaning of the workers’ compensation legislation is regulated by those Acts.6

The Personal Injuries Proceedings Act 2002 (Qld) does not affect claims for personal injury arising under s 209(1)(b) of the Anti-Discrimination Act 1991 (Qld) or the Civil Aviation (Carriers’ Liability) Act 1964 (Qld). Amendments to s 6 further excluded claims arising out of the Victims of Crime Assistance Act 2009 (Qld) and other specified legislation.

Queensland has taken a slightly different approach to other jurisdictions with respect to the application of its Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld) to intentional torts. Section 5 does not expressly exclude intentional torts and the provision states that damages may be awarded, as specified by the Act ‘to any civil claim for damages for harm’. The application of the Act to intentional torts has been contentious. The court’s interpretation of what a ‘civil claim’ includes has been consistently narrow, resulting in damages awards for intentional torts, not being made in accordance with the provisions of the Act, but in accordance with common law heads of damage.7

Pre-court Procedures Personal Injuries Proceedings Act 2002 (Qld) ch 2 pt 1 div 1–5 (ss 9–44) and pt 3 (ss 47–60) commenced 18 June 2002 Sections 9A(7)(a) & (14) were inserted by the Health and Hospital Network and Other Legislation Amendment Act 2012 (Qld) and commenced on 1 July 2012 The enactment of the Personal Injuries Proceedings Act 2002 (Qld) provided a complete overhaul of the procedures relating to commencement of actions for damages for personal injuries and sets out various steps that must be completed prior to court proceedings being instituted. The provisions are designed to encourage the economical and early resolution of claims for damages

3 [2008] QSC 171. 4 (1999) 47 NSWLR 319, which allowed damages for loss of the ability to provide gratuitous services due to their injury. This decision was overruled by CSR Ltd v Eddy (2005) 226 CLR 1, where it was held (p 32) that the ‘cases supporting Sullivan v Gordon as a principle of Australian common law should be overruled’. 5 For further discussion, see ‘Gratuitous Care’. 6 See s 6(2)(c) of the Personal Injuries Proceedings Act 2002 (Qld) for an example of the operation of this exclusion. 7 See Harvey v Harvey (Unreported, Sup Ct, Qld, White J, No S9790 of 1999, 10 Feb 2000) and Newberry v Suncorp Metway Insurance Ltd [2006] 1 Qd R 519.

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arising out of personal injuries without the parties having to proceed to court. Pursuant to the Personal Injuries Proceedings Act 2002 (Qld), a claimant is required to serve a Notice of Claim providing full details of the claimant, the incident, the injuries suffered, the treatment obtained and the reasons why the claimant considers the respondent is liable.8

A Notice of Claim must be served within nine months of the incident or within one month of the claimant seeking legal advice, whichever is earlier. If the Notice of Claim is not served within that time, the obligation to serve a Notice of Claim continues, but a reasonable excuse must be provided as to the reason for the delay.9

There are provisions allowing a respondent to the claim to serve a contribution notice on another party claiming contribution or an indemnity from that party and setting out the grounds of the claim for contribution. Time limits apply for the issuing of a contribution notice. All parties to the claim must co-operate through full and early disclosure of documents. The disclosure provisions require disclosure of all investigative, medical and rehabilitation reports. The extent of disclosure to be provided by each party has been considered by courts in recent times with particular focus on the obligations of a respondent.

There are two aspects to a respondent’s disclosure obligations under s 27 of the Act. The first aspect relates to a respondent’s obligation to disclose documents that are both directly relevant to an issue in dispute and about the incident.10 The second aspect relates to a respondent’s obligation to respond to a request for information from the claimant but only to the extent that the request relates to the circumstances of, or reasons for, the incident.11 The scope of a respondent’s obligations to disclose information and documents was discussed by the Queensland Court of Appeal in Haug v Jupiters Limited t/as Conrad Treasury Brisbane12 and more recently by the Supreme Court in Oliver v Mulp Pty Ltd.13

In Haug it was held that an ‘incident’ for the purposes of s 27 must be a reference to the incident as described and particularised in the Notice of Claim Form.

It was established that a respondent’s obligation to disclose documents about the incident was a narrower obligation than that which applies to a request for information from the claimant. In particular, a request made by the claimant under the second limb does not require ‘direct relevance’, nor is the respondent’s obligation to provide information to the claimant limited by the requirement that the information be ‘reasonably requested’ as it is otherwise under s 22(b) of the Act.

Nevertheless, the court limited the operation of s 27(1)(b), emphasising that a claimant is not at large with respect to the information sought. A request for information must still be in connection to the circumstances of, or the reasons for, the incident as referred to in the Notice of Claim. Moreover, the request is dependent on the information sought actually being in the respondent’s possession.

Ultimately, as subsequently held in Oliver v Mulp Pty Ltd, the process under s 27 is designed to determine what a respondent knows about the incident and not to enable a claimant to interrogate the respondent.

8 Particular provisions also apply to claims involving alleged medical negligence: see Personal Injuries Proceedings Act 2002 (Qld) s 9A. 9 See discussion under ‘Limitation Periods’ for examples of cases involving the provision of a ‘reasonable excuse’. 10 Personal Injuries Proceedings Act 2002 (Qld) s 27(1)(a)(i). 11 Ibid s 27(1)(b)(i). 12 [2008] 1 Qd R 276. 13 [2009] QSC 340.

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Disclosure of privileged documents was considered by the Queensland Court of Appeal in the case of Watkins v State of Queensland14 and more recently in the cases of Felgate v Tucker,15 State of Queensland v Allen,16 and Mahoney v Salt.17

Watkins v State of Queensland relates to an action by the litigation guardian of a boy who suffered spastic quadriplegia as a result of an induced labour. The claimant made a claim against Nambour Hospital. The State of Queensland (responding on behalf of the state-owned hospital) denied liability in a response provided pursuant to s 20 of the Act and produced a report from a medical specialist in support of that denial with that response.

The medical specialist’s report referred to three letters of instruction from the claimant’s solicitors. Attached to the report was a tax invoice, which referred to a 30 minute telephone conversation with the State’s solicitors. The claimant sought disclosure of these documents including the record of the discussion between the expert and the solicitor.

At first instance, the primary judge considered the issue of whether the documents equestedr were privileged. The State’s solicitor swore an affidavit that the documents requested had been brought into existence for the dominant purpose of anticipated litigation. The primary judge held the letters of instruction should be disclosed because they were referred to within the medical specialist’s report as part of the factual basis for his report. In relation to the file note, it was held that it should also be disclosed as it revealed further instructions to the specialist and an oral report which had been reduced to writing.

The State appealed, but was unsuccessful. In his reasons for the decision, Keane J in the Queensland Court of Appeal made it clear that he disagreed with the reasoning behind the primary judge’s decision, although he ultimately reached the same conclusion. Keane J’s reasoning was based solely on an interpretation of the provisions in the Act. In this regard, he noted that:

ƒƒ section 20 required all documents on which the assessment of liability was formulated to be disclosed; ƒƒ the specialist’s report was obtained for the purpose of complying with the pre-litigation steps of the Act and not for the purpose of anticipated litigation; and ƒƒ section 30 (which allows documents to be withheld if they are subject to legal professional privilege) does not apply to s 20.

The High Court refused the State special leave to appeal.

The decision also considered the extent to which a party can claim privilege over a document where it is manifestly unfair for it to do so, namely, where a party abuses privilege so as to disadvantage the other party.

The court acknowledged that while a party who enjoys a right to keep disclosable information (or a document) confidential will also enjoy the advantage over the party’s opponent, the mere existence of that advantage cannot be a reason for a court to refuse a party the right to do so. However, the court emphasised that it would be inclined to order the disclosure of a purportedly privileged document where there is no other basis for claiming privilege other than maintaining an advantage at trial.

14 [2007] QCA 430. 15 [2011] QCA 194. 16 [2012] 2 Qd R 148. 17 [2012] QSC 43.

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In State of Queensland v Allen,18 an action was commenced against the Prince Charles Hospital after the claimant suffered brain damage resulting from a complication that arose during surgery. Shortly after the procedure, the hospital, in contemplation of possible legal action and on legal advice, obtained a statement from the doctors involved. The claimant sought the disclosure of the statements from the doctors and of file notes made by solicitors during conferenceswith those doctors.

In determining whether each statement by the doctors was an ‘investigative report’ of the kind required to be disclosed under s 30(2) of Personal Injuries Proceedings Act 2002 (Qld), the court looked to the ordinary meaning of the words. The court concluded that a statement by a witness about an event that allegedly caused a personal injury, taken for the use in anticipated litigation, is not an investigative report and therefore is not required to be disclosed.19

In relation to the file notes made by the solicitor during discussions with the doctors, it was concluded that the solicitor’s file notes were ‘reports’ and also not required to be disclosed.20

In relation to the statements by the doctors, in the opinion of Fraser J, the term ‘medical reports’ in s 30(2) was not intended to include a report about a medical incident which related to liability.21 In reaching this conclusion it was noted that, in this case, even though the report referred to the claimant’s medical condition, the topic of the report was the incident itself.

However, the majority of the court concluded otherwise. Fryberg and White JJ concluded that the statements by the doctors were medical reports, the subject of the document was the claimant’s condition and the doctor’s involvement with him and, in content and form, resembled other medical reports prepared for the courts in similar matters.22 Thus, the document was required to be disclosed under s 30(2).

In Felgate v Tucker,23 the appellant underwent laparoscopic surgery. During the procedure, she experienced a phenomenon called ‘surgical awareness’, where she was conscious throughout the procedure but unable to communicate with medical staff. Soon after, she commenced a claim against her anaesthetist for damages for personal injuries.

During the compulsory conference, the appellant became aware of a document produced by her anaesthetist titled ‘Interpretation of anaesthetic record’, which she claimed was disclosable pursuant to ss 20(3), 27 and 30(2) of the Personal Injuries Proceedings Act 2002 (Qld). The trial judge dismissed the application on the grounds that any communications to a solicitor by a client seeking legal advice are privileged irrespective of impending litigation.

The court distinguished Felgate v Tucker from the decisions of Watkins and Allen because those matters involved communications between lawyers and third parties, whereas this matter involved a communication between a lawyer and client.24

The court also noted that the privilege that attaches to lawyer/client communications could only be abrogated by legislation that clearly and unequivocally purports to do so.25

18 [2012] 2 Qd R 148. 19 Ibid [156]. 20 Ibid [157]. 21 Ibid [158]. 22 Ibid [172]. 23 [2011] QCA 194. 24 Ibid [41]. 25 Ibid [44].

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In dismissing the appeal, the court found that, even though the document was used in mandatory pre-court proceedings, it was privileged as it was created for the dominant purpose of use in anticipated litigation.26 As to the argument that the document was a report within the meaning of s 30(2), the court was not persuaded that the word ‘report’ in this section was intended to include notes and statements given by clients to their lawyers for the purposes of progressing or answering a claim under the Act.27 Further, in relation to the argument that the respondent had impliedly waived privilege by producing the document at the compulsory conference, the court found that there was no implied waiver as the document contained no more information than what was in already disclosed medical records and it would be unfair to deny the respondent its right to maintain privilege.28

The case of Mahoney v Salt29 follows both the Allen and Felgate decisions and further clarifies what constitutes an ‘investigative report’ for the purposes of s 30(2) of the Personal Injuries Proceedings Act 2002 (Qld).

In this case, the claimant commenced a claim in respect of injuries sustained when she fell at her parents’ home. The respondents made a claim under their home insurance policy. The insurer appointed solicitors and included in their instructions that they should provide advice on indemnity and appoint a loss adjustor to undertake a factual investigation. The loss adjustor took statements (both draft and signed) from the respondents and forwarded these on to the respondents’ solicitor. The applicant argued that the statements were ‘investigative reports’ and as such, were required by s 30(2) to be disclosed. The respondents argued that statements were not investigative reports and, as they were brought into existence for the purpose of providing the insurer with legal advice, attracted privilege.

Boddice J held that the statements were the subject of legal professional privilege and were not required to be disclosed.30 In his opinion, although the statements were made during the loss adjustor’s investigation of the incident, the statements lacked the necessary qualities to qualify them as investigative reports.31

Relying on Watkins, the applicant alternatively argued that the statements were required to be disclosed under s 20 of the Act. His Honour found that Watkins was easily distinguishable as the reports in that case were medical reports and the statements in the present case were clearly not.32

This decision makes clear that legal professional privilege attaches to a witness statement made for the dominant purpose of providing legal advice.

Compulsory conference Once disclosure has been completed, the parties to the claim are required to participate in a compulsory conference and exchange mandatory final offers at the close of theconfer ence should the matter not be resolved.33 The exchange of mandatory final offers is an important consideration for the parties and may have adverse cost consequences to a claimant or respondent if a better outcome is not achieved after proceeding to trial (see discussion under ‘Legal costs’).

26 Ibid [46]. 27 Ibid [48]. 28 Ibid [53]. 29 [2012] QSC 43. 30 Ibid [30]. 31 Ibid [21]. 32 Ibid [22]–[23]. 33 Personal Injuries Proceedings Act 2002 (Qld) ss 36–42.

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There is a requirement pursuant to s 37 of the Personal Injuries Proceedings Act 2002 (Qld) that the parties must sign a certificate of readiness for trial prior to the compulsoryconfer ence. The 2010 amendments to the Act have slightly relaxed this requirement, requiring now that the certificate states that the parties are ready in all aspects for the conference and trial, rather than being ready subject to the compliance requirements of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999.

Amendments to s 43 allow claimants to commence proceedings with the agreement of the other parties notwithstanding non-compliance with the pre-court procedure if certain criteria can be met. Section 59(1) also provides that, subject to s 59(2), a claimant may commence a proceeding in court after the limitation period has expired where a complying notice of claim has been given before the end of the limitation period.

The Law of Negligence – Scope of Duty of Care Standard of care Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld) ch 2 pt 1 div 1 (ss 9–10) commenced on 2 December 2002 Section 9 of the Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld) states that a person does not breach a duty to take precautions against a risk unless:

ƒƒ the risk was foreseeable (which is a risk which the person knew or reasonably should have known about); ƒƒ the risk was not insignificant; and ƒƒ a reasonable person would have taken precautions.

The legislation also outlines the relevant factors a court must take into consideration when determining whether a reasonable person would have taken precautions against the risk which caused the harm.

The key element of s 9 is the ‘not insignificant’test. The purpose of the test is that respondents should only be held liable for failing to take precautions in relation to risks that are ‘not insignificant’, rather than being required to respond to risks which are less likely to materialise. The Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld) is not a codification of the law of negligence however,and it is still open to the court to have regard to the common law test regarding foreseeability as laid down in the decision of Wyong Shire Council v Shirt34 which defined a foreseeable risk as one that was ‘not far-fetched or fanciful’.

This approach was taken by the Queensland District Court in Tomlins v Sheikh35 where the court referred to the common law principle in Wyong but noted those principles were subject to the Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld) provisions. The court stated that it had taken both into consideration in its decision.

The Queensland Supreme Court had cause to consider whether a risk was not insignificant in the case of Pollard v Trude.36 In that case, the plaintiff was injured when struck by a golf ball on a golf course during a tournament. The plaintiff alleged that the defendant failed to provide adequate warning before playing his shot or after playing his shot as the ball was travelling towards the plaintiff.

Counsel for the defendant argued that no warning was required because the risk of injury was insignificant. The court considered the meaning of the double negative contained in s 9 by reference to the Ipp report and concluded that:

34 (1980) 146 CLR 40. 35 [2005] QDC 174. 36 [2008] QSC 119.

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‘Unless a risk is insignificant it should lead to the taking of precautions if it is foreseeable that the risk might lead to harm and if a reasonable person in the circumstances would have taken precautions.’37

The court concluded at first instance that the risk the plaintiff would be struck by the defendant’s ball was not insignificant, although ultimately found that no warning was required because, inter alia, the risk of being struck by a golf ball on a golf course is obvious and pursuant to s 15 of the Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld), no duty was owed to warn of an obvious risk. These findings were subsequently affirmed on appeal.38

In the High Court decision of New South Wales v Fahy,39 the State argued that the court should reconsider Wyong and, in particular, should abandon the principle that a ‘foreseeable risk’ is one that is ‘not far-fetched or fanciful’. This case concerned a claim for damages by a police woman who had allegedly suffered post-traumatic stress disorder in the course of her employment.

While Callinan and Heydon JJ rejected the test in their joint judgment, the High Court ultimately determined that there was no reason to revisit the principles in Wyong. Gummow and Hayne JJ nevertheless sought to reinforce that the Shirt calculus should not focus only upon how the particular injury happened, but requires a more thorough inquiry in identifying what a reasonable person would have done in the circumstances. This principle was endorsed by the High Court in the decision of Roads and Traffic Authority of New South Wales v Dederer40 in which Gummow J summarised the basic principles of negligence as follows:

‘First, the proper resolution of an action in negligence depends on the existence and scope of the relevant duty of care. Secondly, whatever its scope, a duty of care imposes an obligation to exercise reasonable care; it does not impose a duty to prevent potentially harmful conduct. Thirdly, the assessment of breach depends on the correct identification of the relevant risk of injury. Fourthly, breach must be assessed prospectively and not retrospectively. Fifthly, such an assessment of breach must be made in the manner described by Mason J in Wyong Shire Council v Shirt.’41

The High Court’s approach in Fahy and Dederer was applied by the Supreme Court of Queensland in Black v Warwick Shire Council.42 In that case, the plaintiff contracted Q-Fever in the course of his employment as a council road worker. He sued his employer, Warwick Shire Council, for negligence in failing to take adequate precautions against the risk of its employees contracting the illness, specifically, in failing to inoculate the plaintiff and relying on unreasonable medical advice in framing its health and safety policy.

Applying the test of reasonable foreseeability in Wyong, the court found that the risk of the plaintiff contracting the disease was not far fetched and fanciful, and was reasonably foreseeable. The defendant avoided liability on the basis of the second limb of the Shirt calculus, which required the court to consider the response of a reasonable employer in the position of the Council to that risk. The court found that the programs implemented by the Council through its safety officers and its reliance on advice from its medical consultants about vaccinations for its employees constituted a reasonable response.

Importantly, in coming to this conclusion, the court emphasised the prospective operation of the Shirt calculus, citing with approval the judgment of Gummow and Hayne JJ in Fahy in which their Honours said:

37 [2008] QSC 119 [40]. 38 Pollard v Trude [2009] 2 Qd R 248. 39 (2007) 81 ALJR 1021. 40 (2007) 234 CLR 330. 41 Ibid 337. 42 (2009) 182 IR 306.

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‘[The approach in Shirt] may wrongly be understood as requiring no more than a comparison between what it would have cost to avoid a particular injury that happened and the consequence of that injury . . . It requires looking forward to identify what a reasonable person would have done not backward to identify what would have avoided the injury.’43

More recently in Meandarra Aerial Spraying Pty Ltd & Anor v GEJ Geldard Pty Ltd,44 the Queensland Court of Appeal applied the ‘not insignificant’ test under the Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld). In that case, the second appellant (engaged by the first appellant) had conducted aerial spraying of a property which had resulted in the damage to crops. While having regard to the potentially catastrophic and widespread consequences of careless aerial spraying, Fraser JA held that the ‘not insignificant’ test was designed to increase the degree of probability of harm required for a finding that a risk is foreseeable, and as such, accepted that the test was more demanding than the common law test established in Wyong. His Honour stated that in determining claims to which the Act applies, the ‘not insignificant’ test should be applied instead of the common law test of ‘not far-fetched or fanciful’.

What is demonstrated by these decisions across all jurisdictions that have enacted Civil Liability legislation, is that it is still open to the court to have regard to common law principles as laid down in the decisions of Wyong and Dederer in determining the appropriate standard of care.

Causation Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld) ch 2 pt 1 div 2 (ss 11–12) commenced 2 December 2002 The provisions dealing with causation in the Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld) maintain common law principles used to determine causation. In Ipp JA’s leading judgment in the New South Wales case of Ruddock v Taylor,45 his Honour held that the relevant provisions dealing with causation in the Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW) must be read in light of the common law.

The Act requires that, for a finding of causation, there must initiallybe:

ƒƒ factual causation (the belief that negligence was a necessary condition of the harm); and ƒƒ a finding that the harm comes within the scope of the negligent person’s liability.

When determining issues of causation, the court must consider whether or not and why the responsibility for the harm rests with the defendant. The Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld) also provides guidance in relation to what evidence should be admissible when a court is attempting to determine the defendant’s contribution to the negligence which led to the plaintiff’s claim.

Section 12 of the Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld) provides that the plaintiff always bears the onus of proof on the balance of probabilities in establishing causation.

Sections 5D and 5E of the New South Wales Act, which is replicated in s 12 of the Queensland Act), was applied by the High Court in Wallace v Kam46 in the context of a claim that a neurosurgeon’s failure to warn the plaintiff of the (ensuing) risks of surgery caused the harm sustained by the plaintiff. At trial and on appeal, despite finding that the respondent surgeon was negligent in

43 Ibid 318. 44 [2013] 1 Qd R 319. 45 [2003] NSWCA 262. This case concerned an action in for false imprisonment. The decision was reversed by the High Court in [2005] HCA 48 on the basis that there were unlawful exercises of power by the ‘ministers’ which led to the plaintiff’s detention, however, the causation principles expressed by Ipp JA in the Court of Appeal remain. 46 (2013) 297 ALR 383; (2013) 87 ALJR 648.

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failing to advise of the risks and such failure was a necessary condition of the plaintiff’s harm, the claim was dismissed for a lack of proof that the plaintiff would have chosen not to undergo the surgery if properly warned of the risk of paralysis (the damage of which being the basis for the claim). The High Court unanimously dismissed the plaintiff’s appeal, holding it was inappropriate for the scope of the respondent’s liability to extend to the harm sustained. The distinct nature of the two risks inherent in the surgery and the plaintiff’s willingness to accept the risk which materialised meant the surgeon’s failure to warn could not be the legal cause of the damage.47

Section 5E of the New South Wales Act (mirrored in s 12 of the Queensland Act) was discussed by the High Court in Tabet v Gett.48 In that case, the plaintiff alleged that a delay by the defendant doctor in diagnosing her brain tumour resulted in her losing the chance of avoiding brain damage. At first instance the plaintiff won her claim,49 but the decision was reversed on appeal.50 This decision was appealed in the High Court, where the issue for determination was whether the loss of chance of a better medical outcome constituted a type of damage actionable in negligence.51 Affirming the decision of the Court of Appeal, the High Court held that the chance of a better medical outcome amounted to a mere possibility, as opposed to a probability (as required by the wording of both the Queensland and New South Wales Acts).52

In State of Queensland v Nudd53 the Court of Appeal considered the soundness of a primary judge’s finding that the test of causation in s 11(1)(a) of the Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld) was made out. At first instance, the plaintiff successfully argued that the defendant was liable for the injuries the plaintiff suffered after one of his crutches slipped on a small puddle of water in the common area of his cell block. The primary judge held that by failing to conduct two hourly inspections of the area of the fall, the State’s negligence caused the respondent’s fall and his consequential injuries. Had the appropriate system of two hourly inspections been in place, the primary judge held that it would probably have led to the discovery and removal of the water. Fraser JA (with whom Holmes JA and Atkinson J agreed) allowed the appeal, holding that the respondent failed to prove his case because he failed to prove that a reasonable system of inspections probably would have detected the presence of that water before the respondent’s accident.

Queensland has also introduced provisions to assist the court in determining what a plaintiff would have done had the defendant’s negligent conduct not occurred. Section 12(3) of the Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld) restricts the admission of statement evidence by a plaintiff regarding what they would have done if no breach of duty had occurred, to only those statements which are adverse to the plaintiff.

A more detailed discussion of these principles can be found under the discussion of this topic in the New South Wales jurisdiction.

Obvious risk Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld) ch 2 pt 1 div 3 (ss 13–16) commenced 2 December 2002 Section 15 of the Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld) states that there is no proactive duty to warn another of an obvious risk. Section 16 creates a defence in providing that there is no liability in negligence for harm suffered as a result of the materialisation of an inherent risk.

47 Ibid 393. 48 (2010) 240 CLR 537. 49 Tabet v Mansour [2007] NSWSC 36. 50 Gett v Tabet (2009) 254 ALR 504. 51 Tabet v Gett (2010) 240 CLR 537, 560. 52 Ibid 564, 575, 589. 53 [2012] QCA 281.

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An ‘obvious risk’ is defined in s 13 as a risk that, in thecir cumstances, would have been obvious to a reasonable person in that person’s position and includes risks that are patent or a matter of common knowledge. In accordance with s 14, a person will be deemed to be aware of an ‘obvious risk’ unless they can prove that they were not aware of it. This creates a reverse onus on the claimant to prove that they were not aware of the risk, despite it being obvious, and that such unawareness was reasonable.

A risk can be an obvious risk even if there is a low probability of the risk occurring. The considerations relevant to determining whether a risk is obvious are broad and have been held to include a claimant’s personal characteristics, expertise and age.

The case of Lynch v Kinney Shoes (Australia) Ltd & Ors54 provides an indication of those matters taken into account by a court when considering whether a risk was obvious as a concept under the common law. The court held that the defendant occupier of a shoe store was not liable for the injuries suffered by a plaintiff who tripped over a raised display platform while walking through the store. The court accepted that the platform posed a risk to customers and that it was foreseeable that a person might trip on the platform and sustain injury. However, the court held that the defendant was entitled to assume that those entering the store would take notice of the risk as it was obvious. It was found to be relevant that, over an eight year period, no other entrants had tripped over this particular platform.

The plaintiff submitted evidence, by way of a workplace health and safety expert, that if certain precautions were taken, the plaintiff’s fall would not have occurred. However, the court ultimately found that the cause of the plaintiff’s fall was her failure to look where she was going.

The Queensland Court of Appeal affirmed the reasoning of the Supreme Court when the matter was appealed,55 and noted the comments of the High Court in Thompson v Woolworths (Qld) Pty Ltd56 that:

‘in the case of some risks, reasonableness may require no response’.57

The court stated that the duty of care owed by a shopkeeper to a customer is not a general duty to protect people from the consequences of their careless actions. In response to the plaintiff’s expert evidence, the court noted that the experience of a customer walking into a shop like the defendant’s is a common and ordinary experience and, as such, the generality of the experience was to be given greater significance than expert evidence suggesting specific precautions that could have been taken to prevent the incident. The same type of reasoning could arguably apply when dealing with the obvious risk provisions contained in the Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld).

A recent case involving consideration of the relevant provisions of the Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld) was Kelly v State of Queensland.58 In that case, the plaintiff suffered injuries rendering him a partial tetraplegic after falling while running down sand dunes into a lake on Fraser Island. The plaintiff argued that the State had breached its duty of care by failing to warn of the risks associated with such an activity. The State argued that the risk of falling was so ‘obvious’ within the meaning of s 13 of the Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld) that it had no duty to warn of the risks associated with the activity. The court had regard to the plaintiff’s age and previous inexperience with sand dunes and found that, as the plaintiff had performed the activity many times before and had seen other people perform the same activity, there was no ‘obvious risk’ associated with the activity which caused the plaintiff to fall.

54 [2004] QSC 370. 55 See Lynch v Kinney Shoes (Australia) Ltd & Ors [2005] QCA 326. 56 (2005) 221 CLR 234. 57 Ibid [36]. 58 [2013] QSC 106.

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The decision turned on the specific nature of the activity being undertaken by the plaintiff and the detail of the warnings and signage displayed at the lake. Weight was also given to evidence of numerous prior incidents at the site resulting in serious injury which were known to the State authority, though the recommended changes had not been implemented to reduce the risk.

This decision was upheld on appeal, with Fraser JA (with whom Phillippides and Henry JJ agreed) holding that:

‘. . . the cumulative effect of the circumstances to which I have referred militate against a conclusion that this risk was so clear that it would have been “obvious” to a reasonable person in the respondent’s position: the message in the pictograms that the real danger was diving into water of uncertain depth; the fact that the explanation for the risk that the lake was often shallower than it looked was falsified by the ease of ascertaining the true depth of the water; the presence of numer ous persons repeatedly running down the sand dune into the lake in apparent safety; the respondent’s own experience in running into the lake without mishap on nine or ten occasions; the absence of any warning of that activity in the video which warned of different dangers on the Island; and the unusually high degree of the risk of very serious injury involved in running down the sand dunes into the lake’.59

In response to the decision, the Queensland’s State Government passed the Regional Planning Interests Act 2014 (Qld) to provide civil liability protection to the State in their dealings with publically managed land.60 This would likely result in the plaintiff’s claim failing if it were heard today.

Section 15 of the Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld) was discussed in the Queensland case of Pollard v Trude.61 In that case the plaintiff sought damages for injuries sustained when he was struck by a stray golf ball hit by the defendant. Chesterman J found that, whilst the risk of the plaintiff being hit was small, it was nevertheless an obvious risk.62 The court concluded that the plaintiff (an experienced golfer) knew the risks associated with standing on a golf course fairway. Because the risk was obvious, the claim failed.63 This decision was affirmed in theCourt of Appeal.64

As the Queensland obvious risk provisions are similar to those in the New South Wales legislation, the decision of the New South Wales Supreme Court of Appeal in Carey v Lake Macquarie City Council65 also provides guidance as to how the Queensland provisions may be interpreted. In Carey, the plaintiff was riding his bicycle along a concrete pathway in a public park when he struck a bollard erected in the middle of the path. The defendant council had care, control and management of the park and pathway. It sought to defend the claim on the basis that the bollard was an obvious risk so the council did not owe a duty of care to warn the plaintiff of that risk.

The court observed that the test to be adopted establishing obvious risk is not to be elevated to some doctrine or general rule of law.

Rather, ‘the weight to be attached to the obviousness of the risk depends on the totality of the circumstances’.66 Accordingly, the plaintiff’s case failed.

59 [2014] QCA 27 [48]. 60 Regional Planning Interests Act 2014 (Qld). 61 [2008] QSC 119. 62 Ibid [65]. 63 Ibid [65], [85]. 64 Pollard v Trude [2009] 2 Qd R 248. 65 (2007) Aust Torts Reports 81–874; [2007] NSWCA 4. 66 Citing Ipp JA in Consolidated Broken Hill Ltd v Edwards (2005) NSWCA 380 [53].

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The New South Wales Court of Appeal subsequently followed this approach in Jaber v Rockdale City Council.67 The case concerned an injury sustained by the plaintiff after he dived from a wharf that was under the care and control of the local council. In finding that diving into murky water was an obvious risk, the court noted that, under the Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW), the focus of the enquiry is upon the plaintiff, or a reasonable person in his position, as opposed to the defendant. This was a departure from the approach taken in Vairy v Wyong Shire Council68 and Roads and Traffic Authority of New South Wales v Dederer69 to which the Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW) did not apply.

This alternative approach was applied by the New South Wales Supreme Court in Collins v Clarence Valley Council (No 3).70 The plaintiff suffered injuries when she fell over guard rails on a bridge, after her bicycle had become stuck in a gap between planks of wood on the bridge. She alleged that the incident occurred due the bridge’s poor state of repair. Rejecting the plaintiff’s claim that the Council was liable in negligence, the court held that the risk of injury to a cyclist if the wheels of their bicycle become stuck in the gaps between planks was an ‘obvious risk’ to a reasonable person in the plaintiff’s position.

In outlining the factors taken into account to reach that conclusion, the court stated:

‘I consider that the relevant risk of harm in this case was one that would have been obvious to a reasonable person in Dr Collins’ position at a point. Such a reasonable person would be an adult cyclist like her of at least moderate ability who had successfully negotiated their bicycle over a reasonable distance to that point. Such a person would also be aware of the potential risks associated with wooden bridges, but would not have been warned about this specific risk. They would have been involved in an organised ride but not engaged in a race. From a distance of no less than forty metres from the bridge they would have seen that they were approaching a wooden bridge, which would have raised some degree of caution. Just prior to the bridge the gaps and their potential to trap the wheels of a bicycle would have become apparent.’71

The defence of ‘obvious risk’ was also considered by the New South Wales Court of Appeal in Scott v Williamson72 where the appellants, who were injured when struck by a passing vehicle, sought damages from a bystander on the basis that he owed them a duty to warn them of the approach of oncoming traffic and failed to do so. Beazley P held that:

‘. . . in this case, the appellants stepped onto the roadway from chained-off median strip in the early hours of the morning, onto a major roadway where the speed was 80 kph. In my opinion, that was an “obvious risk”’.

It was held, therefore, that there was no duty upon a bystander to warn of the approach of Vehicles.

67 (2008) Aust Torts Rep 81-952 68 [2005] 223 CLR 422. 69 (2007) 238 ALR 761. 70 [2013] NSWSC 1682. 71 Ibid [4], [119]. 72 (2013) 63 MVR396.

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Dangerous recreational activities Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld) ch 2 pt 1 div 4 (ss 17–19) commenced 2 December 2002 Section 19 of the Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld) provides that there is no liability in negligence for harm resulting from an obvious risk of a dangerous recreational activity. The provision applies whether or not the person who suffered harm was aware of the risk. The term ‘dangerous recreational activity’ is defined in s 18 as an activity engaged in for enjoyment,leisure or relaxation which involves a significant degree of risk of physical harm.

There has been little consideration of these sections in Queensland courts. In Wilson v Lambkin,73 Griffin DCJ stated that, when determining whether an activity is a dangerous recreational activity according to the Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld), ‘it is necessary to consider not only the activity itself but the circumstances surrounding which that activity was conducted’.74 In that case, the plaintiff and another were seriously injured when the car he was travelling in (driven by the defendant, who was also injured) left the road and smashed into a wall. The road in question was poorly lit and in a secluded area and there was evidence that the young men had been doing ‘burnouts’. After considering the surrounding circumstances, Griffin DCJ determined that the conduct could not be properly characterised as a dangerous recreational activity within the meaning of the Act.75

Further guidance as to the scope of the sections can be drawn from consideration of the similarly worded sections of the New South Wales Act.

The scope of the ‘dangerous recreational activity’ provisions of the Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW) was recently considered by the Supreme Court of New South Wales in Perrett v Sydney Harbour Foreshore Authority.76 In that case, the plaintiff attended the Sydney Convention Centre during the Good Food and Wine Festival to interview a potential recruit for his business. Having concluded his meeting, the plaintiff walked through the foyer towards the car park when he tripped down some stairs and sustained an injury.

He sued the owner/occupier and manager of the Convention Centre contending that the uniform tiling of the floor and steps and the lack of any delineation of the rises meant the steps werenot easily visible. Moreover, the plaintiff argued that the position of a sign showing directions to the car park made him look up as he came to the steps, thereby distracting him.

The defendants denied liability pursuant to s 5L of the New South Wales Act by arguing, inter alia, that the plaintiff was pursuing a dangerous recreational activity. The defendants noted that the Act defined a recreational activity as ‘any pursuit or activity engaged in at a place where people ordinarily engage in sport or in any pursuit or activity for enjoyment, relaxation or leisure.’ They submitted that the Convention Centre came within the contemplation of the provision as a ‘place’ where people ordinarily enjoy recreational activities.

The court rejected this argument, ruling that the dangerousness of the relevant activity ‘is to be determined by reference to the activities engaged in by the plaintiff at the relevant time’.77 It was held that walking through the Convention Centre to his car following an interview with a potential recruit did not amount to a dangerous recreational activity for the purposes of s 5L.

73 [2010] QDC 254. 74 Ibid [25]. 75 Ibid [42]. 76 [2009] NSWSC 1026. 77 Ibid [88].

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Other key principles that will be considered by the court are likely to be:

ƒƒ that the defendant bears the onus of proof to establish the defence afforded under the legislation; ƒƒ the question of whether the plaintiff was engaged in a dangerous recreational activity is to be determined objectively and prospectively having regard to whether a reasonable person in the position of the plaintiff would consider there was a significant degree of risk of harm that was obvious; ƒƒ the standard of such a test for the degree of risk lies between one that is trivial and one that is likely to occur; and ƒƒ the characterisation of the plaintiff’s conduct must take place in the context in which the plaintiff has placed himself or herself, without venturing into the realm of being subjective.

Liability of professionals Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld) ch 2 pt 1 div 5 (ss 20–22) commenced 2 December 2002 Professional Standards Act 2004 (Qld), ss 3–72 sch 1–2 commenced 1 July 2005 Section 73, ss 77–78 commenced 25 September 2004 and ss 74–76, 79 commenced 1 March 2005 Section 22 of the Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld) governs the standard of care owed by professionals and provides that a professional will not have breached a duty arising from the provision of a professional service if, at the time of providing the service, the professional acted in a way that was widely accepted by peer professional opinion as competent professional practice. However, s 22(2) provides that peer professional opinion cannot be relied on for the purposes of this section if the court considers that the opinion is irrational or contrary to a written law, mirroring the provision in New South Wales (s 5O(2)). Judge Levy in Hope v Hunter and New England Area Health Service78 provided guidance as to the interpretation of the term ‘irrational’ under the provision. His Honour held that the term did not mean ‘without reason’, but understood it to refer to ‘reasons that are illogical, unreasonable or based on irrelevant considerations’ (at 174).

Section 22 of the Act was considered by the Supreme Court of Queensland in Mazza v Webb.79 In that case, the plaintiff (who was suffering from abdominal symptoms) underwent an endoscopy conducted by the defendant. During the procedure, the endoscope was passed only part way into the plaintiff’s duodenum. The defendant determined that the plaintiff’s symptoms were the result of uncontrolled Coeliac Disease, and wrote a report to the treating general practitioner to that effect. The plaintiff’s condition continued to deteriorate for some further 15 months, when a subsequent endoscopy (performed by a different specialist) revealed advanced bowel cancer.

McMurdo J found that, in light of the symptoms the defendant was presented with, he had acted in accordance with peer professional opinion when performing the original endoscopy.80 However, the report the defendant provided to the treating doctor was deficient because it represented that the endoscopy had confirmed that the plaintiff’s symptoms were caused by untreated Coeliac Disease and made no mention of the partial nature of the investigation.81 It was determined that the report was a causative factor in the plaintiff’s cancer remaining undiagnosed because it created the impression that no further investigation was needed.82

78 (2009) 10 DCLR (NSW) 63. 79 [2011] QSC 163. 80 Ibid [29]. 81 Ibid [42]–[44]. 82 Ibid [47]–[48].

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Further instruction as to the operation of s 22 may be drawn from similarly worded New South Wales provisions. The decisions of Dobler v Kenneth Halverson; Dobler v Kurt Halverson (by his tutor)83 and MD v Sydney South West Area Health Services84 confirmed that the NewSouth Wales provision in respect to the liability of professionals operates as a defence with the onus of proof resting on the professional (in these cases, doctors), and does not define the content of the duty of care owed by the professional.85

However, where the relevant breach of duty can be categorised, and proved, inter alia, as consisting in the giving, or failure to give additional information, or some warning or advice in relation to the risk which ultimately materialises, the statutory exemptions listed in s 22 are inapplicable: ss 22(5).

In Queensland, a doctor’s duty to warn of a risk of medical treatment has been codified in s 21 of the Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld). A doctor will not breach a duty owed to a patient for failing to warn the patient of a risk of medical treatment unless the warning would be required by a reasonable person to make a reasonably informed decision and the doctor ought reasonably to know the patient in question wanted the information.

The operation of s 21 has not yet come under the scrutiny of the courts. As Queensland’s provisions with respect to a doctor’s duty to warn differ from those in New South Wales, little guidance can be obtained from decisions that have considered the legislative provisions in that jurisdiction. In New South Wales, the duty to warn has not been codified, except to say that the duty to warn of a risk of death or injury to a person has been distinguished from the duty of professionals generally and a breach of that duty will be measured differently.86

The liability of professionals in Queensland is also affected by the Professional Standards Act 2004 (Qld) which deals with the professional standards of professionals and provides an opportunity for professionals to limit their liability. Similar legislation has been enacted in most Australian jurisdictions, but has not had any noticeable impact on the court’s interpretation of the civil liability of professionals to date.

Liability of public authorities Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld) ch 2 pt 3 div 1 (ss 34–37) commenced 2 December 2002 Queensland has adopted the general principles put forward in the Ipp report and has legislated to provide a public policy defence to public authorities by describing the principles to be taken into account when deciding whether a public authority has a duty of care and if, by its conduct or inaction, that duty has been breached.87

The legislation covers the general principles to be used in determining liability. Section 35 of the Act provides that the resource allocations made by public authorities are not open to challenge. Section 36 provides that, in the instance of an allegation of wrongful exercise of authority, the act or omission in question will only be wrongful if it is so unreasonable that no other public authority in the same circumstances would have made the same decision.

83 (2007) 70 NSWLR 151. 84 (2009) 8DCLR (NSW) 232. 85 (2007) 70 NSWLR 151, 167. 86 See ss 5O and 5P of Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW). 87 See decision of Reardon v State of Queensland [2007] QSC 105.

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In addition, the Queensland provisions re-introduced the highway immunity or non-feasance rule in relation to road authorities.88 This immunity provides that liability will not attach to road authorities in respect of the condition of roads due to the actions or inactions of the road authorities unless they have knowledge of the defect prior to the incident in which the plaintiff suffered loss and/or damage.89

In August 2013, in response to the Supreme Court decision in Kelly v State of Queensland90 (later upheld by the Court of Appeal), the State Government introduced the Nature Conservation and Other Legislation Amendment Act (No.2) 2013 which made a number of changes to several Acts that limits the State’s exposure to liability in Queensland Parks and Wildlife Service (QPWS) managed areas.

The Act provides that both the State and nominated officials will not be civilly liable in a proceeding for any act done, or omission made, in relation to the functions of those entities under the relevant Act.

The Act became law in November 2013 and it remains to be seen how these new provisions will be treated by the courts.

Liability of volunteers and Good Samaritans Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld) ch 2 pt 3 div 2 sub-div 2 (ss 38A–38C) commenced 3 December 2004 and sub-div 3 (ss 39–44) commenced 9 April 2003 Law Reform Act 1995 (Qld) pt 5 (ss 15–16) commenced 25 October 197391 Each jurisdiction (except the Commonwealth) follows a basic framework for the exemption from civil liability for ‘volunteers’ who perform ‘community work’ for a ‘community organisation’. These three elements must be satisfied for the exemption to apply. The Commonwealth only requires work being performed for the Commonwealth or a Commonwealth authority on a voluntary basis.

Chapter 2 pt 3 div 2 of the Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld) provides for the limitations of the liability of volunteers in Queensland. These provisions deal with both general conduct by volunteers doing community work for community organisations and specifically conduct related to the donation of food.

In Queensland, a ‘volunteer’ is a person who does ‘community work’ on a voluntary basis. ‘Community work’ focuses on the overall activity engaged in by the ‘community organisation’ (not the conduct of the volunteer) and requires that the organisation either ‘organises, directs or supervises’ the community work. (Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld) s 38(1)). In determining whether the work done constitutes ‘community work’, the focus is on the overall activity engaged in by the community organisation, not upon the actual conduct of the volunteer that causes the incident. There are four common types of activities across all State and Territory legislation that has been defined as ‘community work’ that is, work done for charitable, benevolent, educational or sporting purposes. Queensland and New South Wales legislation further limits what work may be included in the definition of ‘community work’, and directs that work done for a private financial gain falls outside that definition (Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld) s 38; Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW) s 60(1)).

88 The highway immunity was removed by the High Court in Brodie v Singleton Shire Council (2001) 206 CLR 512. 89 Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld) s 37. 90 [2013] QSC 106. 91 These sections were previously part of the Voluntary Aid in Emergency Act 1973 (Qld), which was consolidated into the Law Reform Act 1995 (Qld) by the Statute Law Revision Act (No 2) 1995 (Qld).

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Each jurisdiction (other than the Commonwealth) provides a definition of ‘community organisation’ which includes a list of legal entities that can be considered ‘organisations’ and includes the words ‘body corporate’ or ‘corporation’. In Queensland (as well as the Australian Capital Territory), a ’corporation’ includes a body corporate and an incorporated association. No jurisdiction allows an unincorporated association to be an organisation for the purposes of the provision. Consequently, a volunteer acting for such a group will not be protected under the provision. In Queensland, Western Australia, Victoria and Tasmania, a ‘community organisation’ includes local government entities. Queensland has also extended the definition of ‘community organisation’ to include religious groups, registered political parties and trustees in exercising the role of trustee.

Each of the Queensland, Commonwealth, Victorian and New South Wales legislation specifically link the actual work which is the subject of the claim to the community organisation but the other jurisdictions do not.

In Queensland, a volunteer who acts in good faith whilst undertaking community work in Queensland will be protected from liability.92 However, protection from liability does not extend to:

ƒƒ criminal acts committed during the undertaking of voluntary work;93 ƒƒ acts committed whilst a volunteer was intoxicated;94 or ƒƒ actions undertaken by a volunteer that were outside the scope of activities or contrary to instructions.95

The provisions limiting the protection where a volunteer was intoxicated or acting outside the scope of his or her duties is similar to those contained in New South Wales, Australian Capital Territory, Tasmania, Western Australia and Commonwealth legislation. In relation to the limitation relating to criminal acts, the only other jurisdiction with a similar provision is New South Wales.

Food donors Section 38A of the Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld) protects food donors from civil liability, providing the donation is:

ƒƒ given in good faith; ƒƒ for charitable, benevolent or other philanthropic purpose; ƒƒ given with the intention that the consumer will not have to pay for the food; and ƒƒ safe to consume at the time of the donation.96

The food donor must advise the person to whom they give food whether the food must be handled in a particular way and the timeframe in which the food should be consumed. All Australian jurisdictions now provide such protection from civil liability to persons or organisations who donate food for charitable purposes. These provisions relate to donations made after 3 December 2003.

92 Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld) s 39. 93 Ibid s 40. 94 Ibid s 41. 95 Ibid s 42. 96 Ibid ss 39(2)–(3).

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Good Samaritans In relation to Good Samaritans, ss 15 and 16 of the Law Reform Act 1995 (Qld) govern the actions of medical personnel only. These provisions were originally contained in the Voluntary Aid in Emergency Act 1973 (Qld), which commenced on 25 October 1973. Further, ss 26 and 27 of the Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld) provide indemnity to certain emergency response entities named in the Civil Liability Regulation 2003 (Qld) and their employees or volunteers acting under their instruction, while providing services that enhance public safety. Both sections apply to incidents that occur on or after 9 April 2003.

However, regard must be had to the date that the relevant employing entity was named in the regulation which applied the protection through the repealed s 71 to any incident, no matter when it occurred, prior to commencement of s 26.

At present, there is protection from liability to a person performing duties for entities that enhance public safety (e.g. Brisbane City Council, Queensland Ambulance, State Emergency Services and the like).97 However, the Act does not provide protection to persons who provide assistance in other emergency situations. In response to the perceived lack of protection afforded to members of the public who assist in emergency situations, the Queensland Parliament introduced the Civil Liability (Good Samaritan) Amendment Bill 2007 (Qld).98 However, this was defeated on 4 September 2007.

In contrast, other States such as Victoria and Western Australia provide protection to people who without fee or reward, or the expectation of such, assist persons in emergency situations. Other jurisdictions, such as New South Wales, South Australia, the Australian Capital Territory and the Northern Territory also have relevant legislation protecting Good Samaritans from civil liability.

Liability for mental harm Unlike some other jurisdictions in Australia, Queensland has not implemented any of the Ipp reform recommendations with respect to restricting liability for mental harm. Liability for mental harm remains assessed by reference to the common law as stated by the High Court in Tame v State of New South Wales; Annetts v Australian Stations Pty Ltd99 and Gifford v Strang Patrick Stevedoring Pty Ltd.100

The High Court in Tame v State of New South Wales; Annetts v Australian Stations Pty Ltd101 limited the scope of recovery for emotional reactions to a defendant’s conduct. Only recognised psychiatric illnesses are accepted in order to avoid imposing ‘an intolerable burden on ordinary behaviour’. Mere emotional disturbances or normal grief reactions are excluded.

The High Court limited recovery to instances where the defendant’s conduct was such that it was foreseeable that a person of normal fortitude might suffer a recognised psychiatric illness. However, the ‘normal fortitude’ test may not apply to exclude a claim if the defendant had actual or constructive knowledge of the plaintiff’s susceptibility to suffering a psychiatric illness.102

97 Ibid s 26. 98 The Civil Liability (Good Samaritan) Amendment Bill 2007 (Qld) was introduced into Parliament on 7 March 2007. 99 [2002] 211 CLR 317; refer to the discussion of the New South Wales provisions on liability for mental harm for a thorough analysis. 100 (2003) 214 CLR 269. 101 [2002] 211 CLR 317; refer to the discussion of the New South Wales provisions on liability for mental harm for a thorough analysis. 102 Ibid.

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Mrs Tame suffered a psychotic depressive illness after learning that a police officer incorrectly reported that she registered a blood alcohol concentration of 0.14 (the correct reading was nil). Although no consequences of the error flowed to her, Mrs Tame became obsessed about it and ultimately developed a severe depressive illness. The High Court held that her response was not a foreseeable consequence of the police officer’s conduct because a person of normal fortitude would not normally react in that manner.

A relevant Queensland example is the case of Pickering v McArthur.103 In Pickering, the Queensland Court of Appeal considered the principles relevant to assessing the liability of an individual who falsely holds himself or herself out as being qualified to provide advice, and by doing so causes mental harm to another individual relying on the advice.

The plaintiff alleged that over a three year period while attending on the defendant for massage therapy the defendant also provided relationship advice. Significantly, the plaintiff alleged that the defendant represented to the plaintiff that he was qualified to provide such advice. The advice allegedly caused the plaintiff to terminate a de facto relationship he was in and suffer psychiatric injury. The Court of Appeal held that the allegation, if proven at a trial, would establish that the defendant assumed responsibility to take reasonable care not to harm the plaintiff when providing the advice. In its discussion, the court affirmed the duty one owes to take reasonable care to avoid causing psychiatric harm to others.

With reference to Tame, the Court of Appeal held that, because of the nature of the relationship between the parties, there was a strong case recognising a duty to exercise reasonable care to avoid inflicting psychiatric injury. Citing Tame, the Court of Appeal held that susceptibility to psychiatric injury would not mitigate the plaintiff’s case due to the circumstances of the relationship between Pickering and McArthur.

Intoxication and illegal activity Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld) ch 2 pt 4 divs 1 and 2 (ss 45–49) commenced 9 April 2003 Intoxication Pursuant to s 46 of the Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld), in deciding whether a duty of care arises with respect to an intoxicated claimant, it is not relevant to consider the possibility or likelihood that a person may be intoxicated or that a person who is intoxicated may be exposed to increased risk because the person’s capacity to exercise reasonable care is impaired as a result of intoxication. The legislation provides that a person is not owed a duty of care merely because the person is intoxicated. The fact a person may be intoxicated does not of itself increase or otherwise affect the standard of care owed to the person. However, it is expressly provided that this section does not affect the liability arising out of conduct on licensed premises.104

The case of French v QBE Insurance (Australia) Ltd105 looked at the operation of s 46. The plaintiff’s de facto partner was killed when he wandered intoxicated into the road after being dropped at the wrong address by a taxi driver. The taxi driver, who was aware that his passenger was heavily intoxicated, did not write down the correct address when it was given to him. The action was based on the fact that, irrespective of the deceased’s intoxication, he was owed a duty of care by the taxi driver because he was a passenger in the taxi.106 Relevant to the standard

103 [2005] QCA 294. 104 Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld) s 46(2). For guidance on the standard of care owed in relation to incidents happening on licensed premises see the following cases: Cole v South Tweed Heads Rugby League Football Club (2004) 217 CLR 469; Brophy v Dawson & Anor [2004] QSC 372; Livermore v Crombie & Anor [2006] QCA 169; Adeels Palace v Moubarak (2009) 239 CLR 420. 105 (2011) 58 MVR 214. 106 Ibid 244.

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of care was the fact that the deceased was not capable of looking after himself; the cause of his being in this condition was not relevant.107 Importantly, Fryberg J notes that s 46 of the Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld) does not operate to reduce the standard of care owed to a person who is voluntarily intoxicated.108 The taxi driver was found to be 80% responsible for the deceased’s death (with the other 20% attributed to the unidentified driver who ran down the deceased).109

Section 47 of the Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld) creates a presumption of contributory negligence where a person who suffers harm is intoxicated. If the presumption is raised, the court must reduce the plaintiff’s damages by 25% or greater in certain circumstances unless the presumption is rebutted by the plaintiff. This presumption can only be rebutted if the plaintiff shows that the intoxication did not contribute to the breach of the duty or that the intoxication was not self- induced.

Similarly, pursuant to s 48 of the Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld), this presumption arises where a person suffers harm after relying on the care and skill of a person they know or ought reasonably to have known was intoxicated. The presumption can be rebutted on the basis that the defendant’s intoxication did not contribute to their breach of duty, or the plaintiff could not reasonably be expected to have avoided relying on the defendant’s care and skill.

Section 49 of the Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld) operates in respect of claims involving motor vehicle accidents where the plaintiff who suffers injury is a passenger in a vehicle being driven by a person who has a blood alcohol content of 0.15 or more or is under the influence of drugs to the extent that they are incapable of exercising effective control over the vehicle. In those circumstances, the minimum reduction for contributory negligence will be 50%.

Of relevance due to the analogous provisions to those found in s 47 and 49 of the Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld), is an appeal from the South Australian District Court in relation to the appropriate apportionment for contributory negligence in Motor Accident Commission v Curzons.110 In this case, the plaintiff, who had been drinking for several hours and was intoxicated, was struck by a vehicle after attempting to cross the road to retrieve an iron rod that he had been brandishing at the defendant’s vehicle.

Despite the defendant’s driving being negligent, contributory negligence was increased from 25%, as found by the trial judge, to 50% to reflect the plaintiff’s extreme intoxication, and the plaintiff’s conduct in brandishing the bar at the defendant’s vehicle and retrieving the bar after it had been thrown across the road. Gray J held that:

‘The plaintiff was not only intoxicated but he was creating a situation of danger. He was or ought to have been aware of those matters. [48]’

Hawira v Connolly and Anor; Connolly v Hawira and Anor111 is an example of the operation of s 47 to 49 of the Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld). In that case, the plaintiff was an unrestrained passenger in a motor vehicle accident. The defendant driver was a co-worker, whom the plaintiff knew had been drinking alcohol. Based on a breath analysis taken two hours after the accident, the defendant driver’s blood alcohol concentration was estimated by forensic medical officers to be between 0.1395 and 0.1805 at the time of the accident. This estimation created uncertainty as to whether the blood alcohol threshold prescribed in s 49(2)(d)(i) of the Act was reached. The

107 Ibid 245. 108 Ibid. 109 Ibid 270. 110 (2012) 279 LSJS 491. 111 [2008] QSC 4.

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court concluded that, regardless of the uncertainty about the blood alcohol concentration, the driver was, on the evidence of the ambulance officers and doctors who attended her, incapable of exercising effective control over the vehicle. Thus, s 49(2)(d)(ii) applied. The plaintiff’s damages were reduced by 16% for his failure to wear a seatbelt and by a further 50% for his reliance on the skill and care of an intoxicated driver.

The onus is on a defendant to raise a plaintiff’s intoxication to enjoy the liability exemption afforded by these provisions. The onus then switches to the plaintiff to rebut the presumption.

Illegal activity Pursuant to s 45, a person does not incur civil liability if the court is satisfiedthat a person who suffered harm was engaged in an indictable offence and the person’s conduct contributed materially to the risk of harm, unless the provision results in a harsh or unjust result. If the circumstances allow for an award of damages the court must decrease the claimant’s damages by a minimum of 25% to take into account their own conduct.

It does not matter whether the person whose conduct is alleged to constitute an indictable offence has been or will be convicted of such an offence for the section to apply. Moreover, the court need only be satisfied on the balance of probabilities that the plaintiff has committed an indictable offence.

Section 6 of the Criminal Code Act 1899 (Qld) also prevents recovery of damages by a plaintiff who suffers injury in the course of committing an indictable offence although the plaintiff must have been found guilty of such an offence for the defence to apply. Conversely, there does not need to be a causal connection between the offence and the occurrence of the injury. There need only be a temporal connection.

Contributory negligence Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld) ch 2 pt 1 div 6 (ss 23–24) commenced 2 December 2002 Chapter 2 pt 4 div 4 (ss 47–49) commenced 9 April 2003 Following the Ipp report, Queensland, along with other States, amended its legislation to incorporate recommendations made in relation to contributory negligence.

The provisions in div 6, ch 2 of the Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld) now specifically address contributory negligence. Section 23(1), which deals with the standard of care in relation to contributory negligence, relevantly states:

‘. . . the principles that are applicable in deciding whether a person has breached a duty also apply in deciding whether the person who suffered harm has been guilty of contributory negligence in failing to take precautions against the risk of that harm’.

The standard of care is that of a reasonable person on the basis of what they knew, or ought reasonably to have known, at the time the harm was suffered.

Pursuant to s 24, the courts have the power to reduce a plaintiff’s damages by up to 100% in situations where it is just and equitable to do so.

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There are guiding principles that the courts rely upon in assessing a plaintiff’s conduct. Any conclusion of contributory negligence on the part of the plaintiff will result in an apportionment of liability.112 The approach of the court is therefore twofold; firstly to determine that negligence on the part of the plaintiff occurred, and secondly to attribute a value or weight to such negligence, usually expressed as a percentage.

It is important to note that contributory negligence is a concept that will turn on the facts of each case. What is considered negligent conduct on the part of a plaintiff in respect of the cause of his or her own injuries is entirely circumstantial. Further, contributory negligence does not equate with ‘moral delinquency’.113

Contributory negligence was considered by the Queensland Court of Appeal in Green v Hanson Construction Materials Pty Ltd.114 In that case, the plaintiff fell down a flight of stairs. A handrail was present, but not used by the plaintiff. The trial judge found for the plaintiff and made no deduction for contributory negligence. The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge’s finding with respect to liability, but held that the failure to use the handrail consisted of contributory negligence, which was assessed at 30%.

Further consideration was given in Ellis v Uniting Church in Australia Property Trust.115 The case concerned a claim against the owner of a property upon which the plaintiff tripped on a protruding, uneven paver. The court found no duty of care was owed to the plaintiff because the risk was both known to him and obvious. However, Skoien AJ commented that if this finding were incorrect (that is, if a duty did exist and had been breached) he would assess the contributory negligence at 40% because the plaintiff failed, in his own carelessness, to keep a proper lookout and failed to choose a safer path to walk.116

In French v QBE Insurance (Australia) Ltd117 where the intoxicated passenger of a cab walked in front of a moving vehicle and was killed, Fryberg J declined to find the deceased guiltyof contributory negligence on a number of grounds.118 His Honour considered that the deceased’s death was not a reasonably foreseeable consequence of his getting drunk at a friend’s house. Further, it could not be said that the deceased voluntarily exposed himself to the risk that resulted in his death as he was not sufficiently in control of himself at the time of the accident.

As s 23 is analogous to s 5R of the Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW) the recent decision in Smith v Zhang119 provides useful authority for the application of the provision in Queensland contributory negligence cases. Smith v Zhang suggested that the provisions may operate to introduce a degree of subjectivity into contributory negligence adjudication, particularly where the plaintiff is elderly and potentially intellectually incapacitated. The New South Wales Court of Appeal allowed an appeal by an elderly, stooped and poor sighted pedestrian who took a shortcut to cross a road and was hit by a car. Meagher JA found that in determining that the standard of care required of the person who has suffered harm is that ‘of a reasonable person in the position of that person’ the court must have regard to the physical and mental capabilities of that person. As a result, the appellant bore 60% of the responsibility for her injuries, as opposed to 75% allocated by the District Court.

112 See ‘Proportionate Liability’. In considering apportionment, it is common place for courts to be guided by the leading authority of Podrebersek v Australian Iron & Steel Pty Ltd (1985) 59 ALJR 492, 494. 113 French v QBE Insurance (Australia) Ltd (2011) 58 MVR 214, 263. 114 (2007) Aust Torts Reports 81–907; [2007] QCA 260. 115 [2008] QSC 74. The decision was upheld on appeal: Ellis v Uniting Church in Australia Property Trust [2008] QCA 388. 116 Ellis v Uniting Church in Australia Property Trust [2008] QSC 74 [53]. 117 (2011) 58 MVR 214. 118 Ibid [186]–[194]. For the facts of the case, see – Intoxication and Illegal Activity. 119 (2012) 60 MVR 525.

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The onus is on the defendant to show that the plaintiff’s actions are a causative factor of the incident resulting in the injury.120 Mere inadvertence may not be sufficient to prove contributory negligence.121

In addition to ss 23 and 24, a person who is intoxicated is presumed to be guilty of contributory negligence pursuant to s 47 of the Act unless it is established that their intoxication did not contribute to the breach of duty or the intoxication was not self-induced. Unless the presumption is rebutted, the court must reduce the damages award by 25% or greater. In accordance with s 48, a similar reduction must be made if a plaintiff relies on a person who was intoxicated at the time of the breach of duty and knew or ought reasonably to have been aware that the defendant was intoxicated.122

Proportionate liability Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld) ch 2 pt 2 ss 28–33 commenced on 1 March 2005123 The proportionate liability provisions in the Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld) apply to any breach of duty ‘happening’ on or after 1 March 2005.

Section 31 provides that in any proceeding involving an ‘apportionable claim’, the liability of a defendant who is a concurrent wrongdoer in relation to the claim is limited to an amount reflecting that proportion of the loss and damage claimed, that the court considers just and equitable having regard to the extent of the concurrent wrongdoers’ responsibility for the loss and damage.

The Queensland proportionate liability provisions apply to claims for economic loss or property damage arising from a breach of a duty of care, or in respect of claims under the Fair Trading Act 1989 (Qld) or for a contravention of s 18 of the Australian Consumer Law (Qld).124

The following requirements must exist for the proportionate liability provisions to apply:

ƒƒ the proceeding must involve an ‘apportionable claim’ – i.e. a claim for economic loss or damage to property in an action for damages arising from a breach of duty of care;125 ƒƒ a defendant must be a ‘concurrent wrongdoer’ – i.e. a person who is one of two or more persons whose acts or omissions caused, independently of each other, the loss or damage that is the subject of the claim.126 It does not matter that a concurrent wrongdoer is insolvent, being wound up, has ceased to exist or is dead;127 and ƒƒ if a proceeding involves both an apportionable claim and a claim that is not an apportionable claim, liability for the claim that is not apportionable is to be decided in accordance with the legal rules that are relevant.128

120 Port Kembla Coal Terminal Ltd v Braverus Maritime Inc (2004) 140 FCR 445; 212 ALR 158; [2004] FCA 1211; Nominal Defendant v Rooskov (2012) 60 MVR 350; [2012] NSWCA 43. 121 Bankstown Foundry Pty Ltd v Braistina (1996) 160 CLR 301 at 310; Sungravure Pty Ltd v Meani (1964) 110 CLR 24 at 37; J Blackwood & Son v Skilled Engineering Ltd [2008] NSWCA 142. 122 For further discussion, see – Intoxication and Illegal Activity. 123 Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld) ss 4(3) and 82. 124 Ibid s 28(1)(b). 125 Ibid s 28(1)(a). 126 Ibid s 30(1). 127 Ibid s 30(2), compare the definition in Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW). 128 Ibid s 31(2)(b).

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Specifically excluded from the operation of the provisions are claims arising out of personal injury and claims by consumers.129 A consumer is defined as an individual whose claim is based on rights relating to goods or services, or both, in circumstances where the particular goods or services are being acquired for personal, domestic or household use, or where the goods or services relate to advice given by a professional for the individual’s non-business related use.130

The Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld) expressly prohibits a party from contracting out of the proportionate liability provisions.131 Furthermore concurrent wrongdoers are required to assist the claimant by identifying any other concurrent wrongdoers, including information to assist with the identification of the wrongdoer, and the circumstances involving the alleged wrongdoers’ involvement.132

There is also an independent obligation on the plaintiff to make a claim against all persons which it has reasonable grounds to believe may be liable for the damage.133 As de Jersey CJ indicated in obiter in WorkCover Queensland v Amaca Pty Ltd,134 s 31(1)(a) allows for a particular defendant’s liability to be assessed at less than 100% of the plaintiff’s loss if there are likely to be other concurrent tortfeasors who are not parties to the action. There are adverse costs and consequences for both plaintiffs and concurrent wrongdoers who fail to comply with those obligations.135

A concurrent wrongdoer will be severally liable for the damages awarded against any other concurrent wrongdoer if:

ƒƒ they fraudulently caused the loss or damage; ƒƒ they intended to cause the loss or damage; or ƒƒ they engaged in misleading or deceptive conduct under s 18 of the Australian Consumer Law (Qld).136

A court is required to appropriately reduce a plaintiff’s overall claim in respect of the proportion of the loss attributable to the plaintiff’s contributory negligence as part of the overall apportionment process.137

Concurrent wrongdoers cannot pursue contribution from other concurrent wrongdoers towards the determination of their apportionment of liability in respect of an apportionable claim.138 Similarly, concurrent wrongdoers cannot be required to indemnify other concurrent wrongdoers.139 Controversy exists as to whether the prohibition against concurrent wrongdoers indemnifying each other extends to contractual indemnity agreements entered into between two or more concurrent wrongdoers. One view is that in the absence of clear legislative intent, such a prohibition was not the purpose of the legislation.140

129 Ibid s 28(3). 130 Ibid s 7(3). 131 Ibid s 29. 132 Ibid s 32(2). 133 Ibid s 32(1). 134 [2009] QCA 72 [42]–[43]. 135 Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld) ss 32(4)–(5). 136 Ibid ss 32D–32F. 137 Ibid s 32G. 138 Ibid s 32A(a). 139 Ibid s 32A(b). 140 In comparing Tasmania, Western Australia and Northern Territory where a qualification in the legislation provides that the prohibition on the requirement to indemnify does not affect subsisting agreements by defendants to contribute to the damages recoverable from or to indemnify other concurrent wrongdoers.

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It should be noted that the legal principles as to when vicarious liability applies, and the joint and several liability principles applicable to agency and partnership relationships, remain unaffected by the Queensland proportionate liability provisions.141

The New South Wales case of Reinhold v New South Wales Lotteries Corporation (No 2)142 provides an example of the New South Wales Supreme Court’s approach to the interpretation of the similarly worded sections of the New South Wales Act dealing with proportionate liability.

The case concerned an action for damages to compensate the plaintiff for the cancellation of his winning lottery ticket by New South Wales Lotteries Corporation (‘Lotteries’) and a newsagency. Having found that both Lotteries and the newsagency were negligent, the court then had to determine whether:

ƒƒ the sum of $2 million, as damages payable to the plaintiff, was apportionable between the defendants; and ƒƒ in what amounts.

In answering the first question, the court held that Lotteries and the newsagency were concurrent wrongdoers for the purposes of the provisions, given that they had both caused the ‘subject of the claim’ by the plaintiff. Having established that the defendants were concurrent wrongdoers, the claim was apportionable between them on the basis of s 34(1) which defines an ‘apportionable claim’ as being a claim for economic loss in an action for damages arising from a failure to take reasonable care.

In assessing the amounts, the court was required to apportion the sum in a manner which, pursuant to s 35(1)(a) of the New South Wales Act, was ‘just and equitable having regard to the extent of the defendant’s responsibility for the loss or damage’. It is important to note that this wording is identical to that in s 31(1)(a) of the Queensland Act.

In interpreting this provision, the court held that the use of the word ‘just’ had to be considered separately to the word ‘equitable’; the distinction between just as opposed to just and equitable was found to be significant.143 The court interpreted this as affording the court the discretion to come to a conclusion about where the justice of the case lies. The alternative interpretation would have required the court to consider matters beyond the defendants’ liability, namely which party was more financially equipped to bear the liability.144 Accordingly, ‘blameworthiness and causative potency’145 was the principle factor in determining apportionment. The court found that Lotteries had a ‘greater degree of culpability’,146 and to that end was apportioned 90% of the liability.

The recent case of GEJ & MA Geldald Pty Ltd v Mobbs (No 2)147 provides an example of the application of apportionment under the Act. The plaintiff, a cotton farmer, brought a claim for economic loss against eight defendants, comprising of the owners of adjacent properties, the supplier of herbicides and the aerial spraying company and its pilot. The plaintiff reached an out of court settlement with all of the defendants, excluding the pilot and his employer. At trial, the plaintiff established that the remaining defendants were responsible for the loss and was awarded damages.

141 Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld) s 32I. 142 (2008) 82 NSWLR 762. 143 Ibid 773. 144 Ibid 776. 145 Ibid 774. 146 Ibid 783. 147 [2011] QSC 33.

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Lyons J concluded that it is for the defendant to prove that damages awarded against them should be reduced by an amount proportionate to the contribution to the damage by the other concurrent wrongdoers.148 As the other six defendants had settled out of court, no evidence was led in respect of their conduct, therefore the remaining defendants had failed to establish that the other defendants were concurrent wrongdoers.149 As such, it was not open to the court to apportion liability between the original eight defendants, so the total loss fell with the remaining two.

The case makes clear that, when arguing proportionate liability as a defence, there must be sufficient evidence to establish the liability of other parties.

The plaintiffs in this case were left in the unusual but favourable position of not only recovering the full amount of their loss at trial from the remaining defendants but also receiving an out of court settlement from the other defendants.150 This became the issue of a subsequent trial, in which it was decided that the out of court settlement amount could not be ignored.151 It was concluded that to allow otherwise would clearly go against both the common law and Civil Liability Act philosophy that a plaintiff should not be compensated by more than the amount of their loss.152

In another recent Queensland Supreme Court decision the court had to determine whether a third party was a ‘concurrent wrongdoer’ within the meaning of s 30 of the Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld). In Hobbs Haulage Pty Ltd v Zupps Southside Pty Ltd & Anor153 the matter related to an application brought by the plaintiff (Hobbs), for an order striking out certain paragraphs of the defendant’s (Zupps), third amended defence which raised a defence of proportionate liability under s 31 of the Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld).

Hobbs had purchased a truck from Zupps under a ‘contract of sale or supply’. It was agreed the truck would be modified, with the price of these modifications included in the contract price. This modification work was subcontracted to a third party (Trakka) by Zupps.

Following the modification work Hobbs alleged that Zupps had breached certain implied conditions of the Sale of Goods Act 1896 (Qld), or alternatively, the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth), relating to fitness for purpose and merchantable quality. Hobbs also alleged breaches of the warranty that the services would be rendered with due care and skill. Subsequently Zupps joined Trakker as the third party to the proceedings.

In essence Zupps argued that its liability to Hobbs, if any, should ‘be reduced to nil by reason of the proportionate liability defence under s 31 of the CLA’ as Trakka caused the loss or damage in undertaking the defective modifications.

Zupps argued on the other hand that Trakka was not a ‘concurrent wrongdoer’ within the meaning of s 30 of the Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld) because Trakka was ‘not a person whose acts or omissions caused the loss or damage that is the subject of the claim, independently of Hobbs’ acts or omissions.’ The court agreed with Zupps’ position and in closing stated:

148 Ibid [66]. 149 Ibid [83]. 150 This was because the settlement amount avoided the operation of s 32A (which would prevent the recovery of damages that exceeds the amount of the loss) because it did not constitute a judgment previously recovered for the same loss. 151 GEJ & MA Geldald Pty Ltd v Mobbs (No 3) [2011] QSC 297 [24]. 152 Ibid [25]. 153 [2013] QSC 319.

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‘The result is that in the present case, in my view, the acts or omissions constituting any breach of the implied warranty by Zupps, that it would exercise due care and skill in rendering the services supplied to Hobbs under the contract in carrying out the modification work, must be the same acts or omissions that would constitute Trakka’s breach of any duty of care owed to Hobbs in tort to carry out the modification work with reasonable care, or to exercise reasonable skill. [33]’

‘It follows, in my view, that Zupps and Trakka are not “concurrent wrongdoers,” because their acts or omissions did not cause the loss or damage independently of each other, and for that reason the application must succeed. [34]’

Importantly the presiding judge, Justice Jackson, stated that:

‘Once it is concluded that the loss-causing acts and omissions of each wrongdoer are the same, they are not “persons whose acts or omissions cause, independent of each other the loss or damage that is the subject of the claim”, and they are not, therefore, “concurrent wrongdoers” as defined in s 30(1) of the CLA. [26]’

Vicarious liability Queensland has not introduced any legislative reforms dealing with the issue of vicarious liability. An employer can be found vicariously liable for a wrongful, unauthorised or negligent act of an employee which is carried out in the course of his or her employment and is so closely connected with an authorised act that it may be regarded as a mode of doing the authorised act. This principle was endorsed in the High Court case of New South Wales v Lepore, Samin v Queensland, Rich v Queensland154 in which three appeals were held simultaneously.

An employer will not always be held responsible for the actions of his or her employees.155 The Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld) must be closely connected with his or her employment for vicarious liability to attach. Therefore, whether an employer will be held vicariously liable for the actions of his or her employee will depend upon the specific facts in each case.

Case law on vicarious liability is discussed further in the equivalent New South Wales and Victorian sections.

Non-delegable duties The term non-delegable duty is somewhat misleading. It does not mean that a party owing a duty cannot delegate the task to a third party, but rather that the liability for breach of the duty cannot be delegated. As such, it is a duty to ensure that reasonable care is taken. Therefore, if the third party to whom the task has been entrusted fails to exercise reasonable care, the non- delegable duty will have been breached.

The categories of non-delegable duties continue to evolve. The courts have struggled, however, to clearly define the parameters required to justify the existence of a non-delegable duty of care.

The known criteria include the superior capacity of the defendant to bear the risk of the mishap, the special obligation which it is proper to attach to extra-hazardous activities and the special dependence or vulnerability of the person to whom the duty is owed.156

154 (2003) 212 CLR 511. 155 Ibid. 156 Northern Sandblasting Pty Ltd v Harris (1997) 188 CLR 313.

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Previously recognised categories of persons between whom non-delegable duties are owed include:

ƒƒ employer and employee;157 ƒƒ host employer and contractor;158 ƒƒ school and student;159 ƒƒ hospital and patient;160 and ƒƒ owner of premises and licensee.161

The Ipp report recommended that the relevant civil liability legislation should ensure that plaintiffs could not circumvent the application of the civil liability legislation by pleading their action based upon breach of a non-delegable duty of care.

No specific legislation has been enacted in Queensland in response to this ecommendation.r It is thought that the definition of ‘claim’ within sch 2 of the Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld) captures non-delegable duties.

Exclusion clauses Queensland has not introduced any legislative reforms dealing with the issue of exclusion clauses. The common law principles therefore remain applicable. Accordingly, in order to have any prospect of an exclusion clause being upheld, the person or entity including such a clause should ensure that the clause is clearly incorporated into the contract, specifically draftedto cover the factual scenario encountered by the person or entity seeking to enforce it and to the extent possible, brought to the attention of the other party to the contract.162

Where the claim is one captured by the Australian Consumer Law, there are certain guarantees which cannot be excluded or limited by contract. See div 2–3 of sch 2 of the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth).

Expressions of regret and apologies Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld) ch 4 pt 1 (ss 68–72) commenced 9 April 2003 and ch 4 pt 1A (ss 72A–72D) commenced 1 November 2010. Pursuant to s 71 of the Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld), an expression of regret is defined as:

‘Any oral or written statement expressing regret for the incident to the extent that it does not contain an admission of liability on the part of the individual or someone else.’

Expressions of regret about an incident that do not admit liability are not admissible in a proceeding relating to personal injury if it was made prior to the commencement of the proceeding.163

157 Kondis v State Transport Authority (1984) 154 CLR 672. 158 TNT Australia Pty Ltd v Christie & 2 Ors; Crown Equipment Pty Ltd v Christie & 2 Ors; Manpower Services (Aust) Pty Ltd v Christie & 2 Ors [2003] NSWCA 47. 159 Commonwealth v Introvigne (1982) 150 CLR 258. 160 Samios v Repatriation Commission [1960] WAR 219. 161 Burnie Port Authority v General Jones Pty Ltd (1994) 179 CLR 520. 162 The New South Wales Court of Appeal decision of Lormine Pty Ltd v Anor v Xuereb [2006] NSWCA 200 may be of some relevance when considering how an exclusion clause might be interpreted in Queensland. 163 Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld) ss 68, 71, 72.

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As yet, there has been no judicial consideration of these sections in Queensland courts. The Supreme Court of New South Wales distinguished an expression of regret from an apology in the case of David Michael Wilson v Nilepac Pty Ltd t/as Vision Personal Training (Crows Nest).164 In that case a personal trainer was sued by his client for an injury sustained during a training session. The plaintiff placed reliance on two statements made by the defendant after having suffered his injury that he ‘shouldn’t have started [him] off so hard’ and ‘we should have done more core strengthening exercises first’. The court construed these statements as being mere expressions of regret and not admissions of breach of the legal standard of care.

Amendments to the Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld) extend similar protections to apologies. An apology for the purpose of the part is defined by s 72C as:

‘an expression of sympathy or regret, or of a general sense of benevolence or compassion, in connection with any matter, whether or not it admits or implies an admission of fault in relation to the matter’.

Section 72D provides that an apology made in relation to an incident does not constitute an admission of fault or liability, nor is it relevant to determining fault or liability in relation to the matter. This protection is extended to civil liability of any kind, with the exception of civil liability that arises from certain worker’s compensation claims, defamation, sexual or misconduct and unlawful intentional acts.165

For some High Court guidance on the distinction between admissions and apologies, see Dovuro Pty Ltd v Wilkins.166

Limitation periods Limitation of Actions Act 1974 (Qld) commenced 1 July 1975 Personal Injuries Proceedings Act 2002 (Qld) (s 9) commenced 18 June 2002 Section 11 of the Limitation of Actions Act 1974 (Qld) prescribes an underlying limitation period of three years in personal injury claims.

An applicant is able to extend the limitation period by virtue of s 31 of the Act if it can be shown that:

ƒƒ material fact of a decisive character relating to the right of action was not within the means of knowledge of the applicant until a date after the commencement of the year last preceding the expiration of the period of limitation for the action; and ƒƒ that there is evidence to establish the right of action apart from a defence founded on the expiration of a period of limitation.

Subject to several exceptions, the Personal Injuries Proceedings Act 2002 (Qld) has introduced an additional requirement that a notice of a claim be given to the defendant within nine months of the incident or within one month of seeking legal advice, whichever is sooner (s 9).

164 [2009] NSWSC 1365.It should be noted that this decision was overturned on appeal (Wilson v Nilepac Pty Ltd (t/as Vision Personal Training) (Crows Nest) [2011] NSWCA 63), however the trial judge’s findings in relation to these comments were left undisturbed. 165 Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld) s 72A. 166 (2003) 215 CLR 317.

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If a Notice of Claim is not provided within those time periods, a claimant is required to provide a reasonable excuse for delay, or seek the respondents’ consent or, failing that, leave of the court to commence proceedings despite their non-compliance with the pre-court procedure. However, in practice, only cases in which the defendant can show real prejudice have successfully defeated late claims to date.

In Brease v State of Queensland,167 an application for an extension of the limitation period was granted as the court held that a material fact was not known until after the limitation period had expired. In that case, an application was made for an extension of the limitation period in relation to a cause of action for damages for work related personal injuries. The applicant attempted rehabilitation and sought to exhaust employment opportunities before commencing a common law claim. The applicant consulted a solicitor who required a medical report before advising on the common law claim. Finally, proceedings were commenced after obtaining the medical report. The court extended the limitation period as material facts were not known until after the medical report had been received.

The case of Gillespie v Swift Australia Pty Ltd168 involved an appeal against the extension of a limitation period. In 2001 the respondent injured his knee at work and after minor surgery resumed normal duties within three months. Over the next seven years, the respondent continued normal duties with episodic pain and first aid treatment but did not take leave or seek further medical advice.

By the time the injury to his knee deteriorated to the extent he could no longer work, the limitation period to bring an action for damages in negligence in respect of the injury had expired. Accepting, therefore, that the relevant material fact was not within the means of knowledge of the respondent before November 2007, the trial judge granted an extension of time pursuant to s 30(1)(c) of the Limitation of Actions Act 1974 (Qld).169 His employer, Swift, appealed the order on the basis that the respondent’s failure to consult a medical practitioner until after November 2007 should have precluded the order granting the extension.

The court dismissed the appeal, finding that the respondent’s failure to seek medical treatment until after the relevant period was a reasonable response given that his pain was infrequent and caused no adverse effect upon work performance. The symptoms which the respondent later developed did not respond to the previous treatment employed by the respondent and adversely impacted his work performance, raising for the first time the prospect of significant future economic loss.

The case of Hargen v Kemenes170 provides an example of an unsuccessful application under s 31. The plaintiff was injured in a car accident when she was 16. The limitation period expired in April 2009, three years after she turned 18. The plaintiff filed an application for an extension of the period in which she could commence legal proceedings by claiming that a material fact of a decisive nature did not become known to her until October 2009 when she began to experience severe pain during strenuous dramatic rehearsals. The material fact the plaintiff relied upon was the realisation that her injuries would inhibit her earning capacity in her chosen career.

The plaintiff was unsuccessful both at first instance and on appeal because it wasconsidered that the pain she began to experience in 2009 during the rehearsals was in fact the realisation of the prediction that had been made to her at the time of her injury.171 As such, it could not be said that the plaintiff would not have realised that the pursuit of her contemplated career was contrary to the medical advice given to her some years before.

167 [2007] QSC 43. 168 [2009] QCA 316. 169 Gillespie v Swift Australia Pty Ltd [2009] QSC 10. 170 [2011] QCA 251. 171 Ibid [29].

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Another noteworthy decision is Fanti v State of Queensland172 in which the Supreme Court of Queensland held an application for an extension to a limitation could not be granted due to the prejudice that would be suffered by the defendant. The plaintiff had worked in the Queensland Radium Institute from 1976 to 1991. The plaintiff became an asthmatic sometime between 1990 and 1991.

In late 2002, the plaintiff received information that her asthma was possibly connected to her work at the Queensland Radium Institute. The plaintiff commenced proceedings in 2003 alleging negligence on behalf of her employer for exposing her to fumes from a solution of Glutaraldehyde from 1976 to 1991 which she alleged the employer knew or ought to have known exposed her to a risk of suffering asthma. The plaintiff’s application was made in accordance with s 31 of the Limitation of Actions Act 1974 (Qld), which required her to establish that a material fact relating to her right of action was not within her means of knowledge until a date after the last year of the limitation period and that there is evidence to establish a right of action apart from the issue of the expired limitation period.

The court found that the plaintiff’s cause of action met both these requirements. However, despite meeting these requirements, the court held that there would be significant prejudice to the defendant, which included:

ƒƒ the defendant would have difficulty locating elevantr witnesses; ƒƒ the witnesses, if located, would have to recall events from a long time ago; and ƒƒ the defendant’s premises where the breach was alleged to have occurred had since been demolished.

Because of the difficulties created by the lapse of time, McMurdo J found that it would notbe in the interests of justice to allow the application due to the prejudice that the defendant would suffer.173

Recently in the decision of Arndt v Harwood & Anor,174 the applicant successfully sought an order pursuant to s 31 of the Act for the extension of the limitation period to enable her to prosecute an action for damages for her personal injury. In that case the applicant was involved in a motor vehicle incident in November 2007 wherein she sustained soft tissue injuries to her cervical spine. The accepted evidence was that she had no reason to make further inquiries because of the nature of the injury (soft tissue), it settling down and that it did not cause her to stop working. The injury started to deteriorate in November 2010 and it worsened the following year wherein she was diagnosed with a 7% permanent impairment as a consequence. On the evidence, the court granted an extension of the 3 year limitation period and held that it was reasonable, in light of the initial injuries, for the applicant not to pursue a claim within the limitation period.

A decision dealing with the effect of the Personal Injuries Proceedings Act 2002 (Qld) provisions on limitation periods is that of Gu v To.175 That appeal related to a failed application to urgently institute proceedings pursuant to s 43 of the Act.

Section 43 states:

‘The court, on application by a claimant, may give leave to the claimant to start a proceeding in the court for damages based on a liability for personal injury despite non-compliance with this part if the court is satisfied there is an urgent need to start the proceeding.’

172 [2005] QSC 393. 173 Ibid [18], [20]. 174 [2012] QSC 104. 175 [2005] QCA 480.

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The cause of action in Gu v To related to the sexual abuse of the applicant by a church curate and the breach of tortuous and fiduciary duties. An application was made under s 43 to initiate court proceedings despite non-compliance with the Personal Injuries Proceedings Act 2002 (Qld). However, as the applicant’s limitation period for the actual cause of action had expired long prior, a further application was required under s 31 of the Limitation of Actions Act 1974 (Qld). The reason for the applicant’s failure at first instance was due to the court consideringthat the applicant’s following application under s 31 was likely to fail, and therefore there was not an urgent need to commence proceedings under s 43. The Queensland Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and granted the application, noting that a judge hearing an application under s 43 should not decide the application as if it were an s 31 application. The fact that there is an issue likely to require determination in an s 31 application is sufficient reason to have allowed the s 43 application on the facts of this case. For a recent application of Gu v To: See Van de Velde v Queensland.176

See also Cross v Moreton Bay Regional Shire Council for an example of a defendant successfully opposing a plaintiff’s attempt to join it as a third party to the claim after the expiry of the limitation period.177 The insertion of s 44 allows claimants to commence urgent proceedings with the agreement of the other parties. This provision mirrors s 276 of the Workers’ Compensation and Rehabilitation Act 2003 (Qld).

In the case of Cousins v Mt Isa Mines Ltd,178 a plaintiff’s alleged failure to provide a reasonable excuse for the delay in providing a notice of claim was considered. The plaintiff made an application to the effect that his excuse for the delay was sufficient and, alternatively, if the excuse was not sufficient, he applied pursuant to s18(c)(ii) of the Personal Injuries Proceedings Act 2002 (Qld) for an order that the claim could proceed despite the non-compliance. The court noted that, for the claim to be allowed to proceed, it must assess whether prejudice would be suffered by the defendant and if such prejudice could be ameliorated, or whether the prejudice is of such a nature that fairness between the parties can no longer be achieved. The court held that, when considering whether to allow such an application, the court had to be conscious that not to allow the application would deny a plaintiff access to the court to litigate his or her cause of action and that such access would only be denied in circumstances of severest prejudice. In this instance, the application to proceed with the claim was allowed because the respondent did not allege that there were no prospects of success for the plaintiff or that there was any other bar to pursue the claim – it rather argued a technical non-compliance and, in the event of this argument, the court allowed the claim to proceed.

An example of a court refusing an application to extend a limitation period in circumstances where the plaintiff has not complied with the Personal Injuries Proceedings Act 2002 (Qld) requirements can be found in the decision of Dunn v Lawrence.179

In that case, the Queensland Supreme Court heard an application initiated by Dunn to institute proceedings against Lawrence on the basis a complying Notice of Claim had been given, despite the limitation period having expired. The court heard evidence that, on receipt of Dunn’s Notice of Claim, Lawrence had identified a number of non-compliance issues. Some of the points of non- compliance were addressed by Dunn some two months outside the period in which Lawrence asked them to be addressed. The court found that Dunn had delayed bringing the appropriate application for four months. The court held that Lawrence never stated that Dunn’s Notice of Claim was considered compliant, nor had the plaintiff taken reasonable action to remedy the non-compliance. Therefore, the court’s conclusion was that a complying Notice of Claim had not been given before the limitation period expired and therefore, Dunn’s application to have the limitation period extended could not succeed.

176 (2011) 31 Qld Lawyer Reps 45. 177 (2011) 207 IR 197. 178 [2006] 2 Qd R 343. 179 [2006] 1 Qd R 405.

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In the case of Ward v Wiltshire Australia Pty Ltd,180 the appellant made an application to extend the limitation period. The Queensland Court of Appeal rejected the application due to her solicitor’s inaction. The plaintiff was involved in a two car accident on 8 March 2001 whereby the driver of the other car failed to stop at a red light. A few days later, the plaintiff retained a solicitor to progress her action for damages against the first respondent (the owner of the other vehicle) and the second respondent (the owner of the other vehicle’s insurer). The second respondent admitted liability but quantum was in dispute. Around February 2004, the second defendant required the plaintiff to undergo an independent medico-legal examination with an orthopaedic surgeon and agreed to extend the limitation period to 8 June 2004, that is, until receipt of the orthopaedic surgeon’s report. The medical report was received on 24 May 2004.

The limitation period subsequently expired and neither party called for a compulsory conference prior to the expiration. In the course of the retainer, the claimant’s solicitor was diagnosed with severe depression and significant psychiatric illness. He was subsequently admitted to a psychiatric clinic and attempted suicide twice in July 2004.

The second respondent refused to further extend the limitation period. The plaintiff sought further independent legal advice around September 2004. Around the same time, the claimant’s new solicitor commenced proceedings against her original firm of solicitors claiming damages for the lost opportunity to claim damages against the respondents for her injuries arising from the accident. The plaintiff’s new solicitor then realised the reason for the plaintiff’s former solicitor’s delay, which would otherwise be unprofessional behaviour, was that he was suffering the debilitating effect of serious depression.

In May 2007, the plaintiff’s new solicitors changed tactics and filed an application under s 57(2) (b) of the Motor Accident Insurance Act 1994 (Qld) to be allowed to commence proceedings against the former respondents. However, the primary judge refused the application with costs and the claimant appealed that order.

The applicant’s new solicitor explained that he did not become aware of the severity of the original solicitor’s illness until shortly before bringing the application. By 2–1, the Queensland Court of Appeal denied the application.

Here, it was accepted that:

ƒƒ the applicant was not personally responsible for any of the delay; ƒƒ the applicant relied on her solicitor’s expertise to progress her claim; and ƒƒ the respondents could not point to any significant prejudice given the fact that liability was admitted and the applicant had been independently examined. Therefore, a fair trial would still be held despite the lapse of time.

However, on the evidence, the delay appeared to be the product of inaction and was not referrable to any difficulties with the procedural requirements of the Motor Accident Insurance Act 1994 (Qld).

The court emphasised that a claimant will usually be able to show good reason for the favourable exercise of the discretion conferred by s 57(2)(b) only if he or she can show that the delay which occurred was occasioned by a ‘conscientious effort to comply’ with the Motor Accident Insurance Act 1994 (Qld). It was further emphasised that the issue is not whether the claimant may reasonably be excused for having relied upon his solicitor to comply with the requirements of the Motor Accident Insurance Act 1994 (Qld). The issue is whether the delay which occurred was related to compliance with the Motor Accident Insurance Act 1994 (Qld).

180 [2008] QCA 93.

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Therefore, the court held that it would not be just to grant the extension sought by the claimant. In contrast, the claimant in Venz v Moreton Bay Regional Council181 successfully appealed an order of the District Court refusing leave to commence proceeding despite non-compliance with the Personal Injuries Proceedings Act 2002 (Qld). In that case, the claimant contacted the respondent’s solicitor to inquire if the respondent would extend the limitation period. The respondent refused to agree to extend the limitation period but consented to an Application pursuant to s 43 of the Act if brought within the limitation period and if the Claim and Statement of Claim were filed within that time. A consent order was made to that effect. Theapplicant attempted to file the Claim and Statement of Claim in August 2007 however the documents were not filed. The clerk with conduct of the file failed to realise that the documents had not been successfully filed with the court. The Claim and Statement of Claim were not successfully filed until June 2008.

At first instance, the plaintiff was refused leave to commence proceedings on the basisthat granting leave would deprive the respondent of its contractual rights embodied in the consent order. On appeal, however, the court held that the respondent did not have any contractual rights under the consent order. The ramification of the claimant failing to file the Claim andStatement of Claim was that the claimant no longer had leave, or consent, to commence proceedings and a fresh application would be required.

The case of Gibb v Beaumont & Anor182 is another example of circumstances when a court will extend a limitation period. The case involved an application by the defendants to strike out an application by the plaintiff for leave to proceed. The plaintiff was injured in a car accident which occurred two days short of his fourth birthday. He was a passenger in a car driven by his father. In 1993, he commenced proceedings through his mother against the driver and the insurer claiming damages for personal injuries caused by the driver’s negligence.

By 1999, the proceedings had fallen into abeyance. The defendant applied to strike out the proceedings for want of prosecution. The application was adjourned without argument and the plaintiff, then still a child, was ordered to attend a physician for examination. No further step was taken in those proceedings. In July 2008, five days prior to the plaintiff’s 21st birthday, the limitation period expired and a second action was commenced. The first proceedings were still on foot, however the plaintiff’s guardian and solicitor thought they had been terminated.

The court found in favour of the plaintiff on the basis that the delay in the proceedings could be attributed to the conduct of the plaintiff’s guardian and solicitors as opposed to the plaintiff himself. It was significant that he took action once advised he was able to do so. Moreover,the court held that the defendants had not suffered any prejudice as a result of the delay due to the previous proceeding given that the majority of the investigations were already completed.

181 [2009] QCA 224. 182 [2009] QDC 36.

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Damages Awards

Queensland, like some other jurisdictions, has introduced legislation which significantly impacts on the calculation of damages in civil liability cases. In particular, the Personal Injuries Proceedings Act 2002 (Qld) and Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld) set out a regime for the calculation of general damages, economic loss, gratuitous care and interest. Pursuant to s 5 of the Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld), the application of the Act is specifically excluded from claims resulting from an injury as defined under the workers compensation legislation (apart from ‘journey claim’ injuries), an injury from a dust related condition or an injury related to smoking.183

General damages Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld) ch 3 pt 3 (s 62) commenced 9 April 2003 Section 62 amended and 75(2) inserted by ss 12 and 14 of the Civil Liability and Other Legislation Amendment Act 2010 (Qld) commenced 17 March 2010 Section 6A of the Civil Liability Regulation 2003 (Qld) amended by s 19 of the Civil Liability and Other Legislation Amendment Act 2010 (Qld) commenced 17 March 2010 The Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld) and the Civil Liability Regulation 2003 (Qld) regulate the assessment of general damages by reference to a scale. Section 62 of the Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld) applies to all personal injury claims arising out of a breach of duty that occurred after 2 December 2002. In Queensland, the cap on general damages was initially set at $250,000, and unlike other jurisdictions, no minimum threshold was introduced for a claim forgeneral damages. For injuries occurring after 1 July 2010, the Injury Scale Value (ISV) scale is now indexed each financial year to reflect increased values as a result of changes in average weekly earnings. At the time of publication of this guide, the cap on general damages is $337,300. This will again be increased at the start of each financial year to eflectr CPI increases.

Claimant’s injuries are given an ISV on a range from 0 to 100 reflecting 100 equal gradations of harm depending on the type, nature and severity of their injury. ISVs represent a scale from 0 representing ‘an injury not severe enough to justify an award’ to 100 being an injury ‘of the gravest conceivable kind’.184 The allocation of an ISV is based on a comprehensive table of injuries and symptoms which are contained in the Civil Liability Regulations 2003 (Qld). The Regulation provides an evidential preference for medical assessments undertaken in accordance with the AMA Guides to the Evaluation of Permanent Impairment (Fifth edition).

There is provision in the legislation for an ‘uplift’ to be made in cases involving multiple injuries.185

Amendments to the Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld) by the Professional Standards Act 2004 (Qld), which were proclaimed and commenced as at 1 March 2005, require that courts only assess an injury and the claimant’s symptoms according to the ISV and table of injuries. The courts must also have regard to the ISV applied in analogous cases.186

183 With respect to the workers compensation exclusion, recent cases on this point have clarified the meaning of s 5 of the Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld) – see King v Parsons and Anor [2006] 2 Qd R 122; Newberry v Suncorp Metway Insurance Ltd [2006] 1 Qd R 519; and Clement v Backo and Anor [2006] QSC 129. In Newberry’s case, Keane JA with whom de Jersey and Muir CJJ agreed, held that the claim must be made that the plaintiff’s employment was a significant contributing factor. It requires that the exigencies of the employment must contribute in some significant way to the occurrence of the injury and not simply that the occurrence happened whilst in the course of employment. The Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld) was subsequently amended to override the decision of Newberry but applies only to injuries sustained after 6 November 2006. 184 Civil Liability Regulation 2003 (Qld) reg 1 Notes; Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld) s 61(1). 185 Ibid reg 3. 186 Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld) s 61(1)(c)(ii); see also Coop v Johnston (2005) 26 Qld Lawyer Reps 32; Ballesteros v Chidlow and Anor [2005] QSC 280; and Carroll v Coomber and Anor [2006] QDC 146 for examples of the Court’s application of the provisions with respect to calculation of general damages under the Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld).

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The application of the Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld) was considered by the District Court of Queensland in the decision of Carroll v Coomber and Anor,187 where a plaintiff suffered seatbelt bruising, a whiplash injury, a lower back injury, a right knee injury, a left shoulder injury and a psychological injury. The court held that the dominant injury was the lower back injury, which had a maximum ISV of 10. However the court considered that due to the cumulative effect of the injuries, neither an assessment of an ISV of 10, nor an assessment with the primary uplift to the dominant ISV of 25%, was adequate. The court found that an ISV of 18 was appropriate in these circumstances (i.e. an award of $22,800 for general damages).

This method of calculating general damages appears to be a departure from the intention of the provisions in the Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld) and the Regulations. The Civil Liability Regulation 2003 (Qld) provides in sch 3 reg 4(3)(b) and (4) that the maximum uplift should rarely be more than 25% higher than the maximum dominant ISV but the court can, in its discretion, award a greater amount if detailed written reasons are given for that increase. There are many examples of the court allowing for more than the 25% uplift.188 Generally speaking, they are cases in which there have been multiple injuries of some severity. In any case, a trend has appeared towards awards much greater than the 25%, even as high as 100% uplift.

The case of Clark v Hall and Anor189 provides a useful analysis of the legislation relevant to the assessment of general damages as well as outcomes and assessments from previous cases. This decision shows that, in cases where the assessment exceeds the 25% maximum for multiple injury cases, the judgments all provide thorough reasons in support of the assessment and make particular reference to previous court decisions for which the Act also makes specific reference to and allowance for.190

Many of the multiple injury cases in which the uplift has been applied have allowed an uplift in excess of 25%. One example of a case below the 25% maximum is Raffaut v Gillard and Anor.191 In that case, a 20% uplift was applied in circumstances where the plaintiff sustained soft tissue injuries to the cervical and lumbar spine and a psychiatric injury. Another example is that of Wolgast v Connolly’s News and Anor192 where the court only awarded a very minor uplift despite several other injuries claimed. The plaintiff led evidence that he suffered a bilateral shoulder injury, stress disorder, an injury to his cervical spine and fracture of his thoracic spine. However, all but the fracture were dismissed as very minor injuries that resolved within a few months of the motor vehicle accident which allegedly caused the plaintiff’s loss.

The defendants submitted surveillance footage to the court which showed the plaintiff using full range of motion in his neck, contrary to his evidence regarding the fracture. The court found that the plaintiff ‘exaggerated the limitations imposed by his injuries’.193 However, the court did allow some uplift for the plaintiff’s suffering due to his multiple injuries. On an ISV range of 10 to 15 for the fracture, the court assessed the plaintiff’s injury at an ISV of 16.

Recent amendments to s 13 of the Law Reform Act 1995 (Qld) allow damages for loss or impairment of consortium to be available to de facto and same sex couples.

187 Carroll v Coomber and Anor [2006] QDC 146 Munzer v Johnston [2008] QSC 162 uplifted by 75% where plaintiff’s capacity to perform work is adversely affected and Munzer v Johnston the plaintiff’s degeneration from the injury is to be taken into consideration. 188 For example, see Clark v Hall and Anor [2006] QSC 274 [67] and [71]. 189 Ibid. 190 Clark v Hall and Anor [2006] QSC 274; refer also to the decision of McGill SC DCJ in Cook v Bowen and Anor [2007] QDC 108 [13] to [17]. 191 Raffaut v Gillard and Anor [2006] QDC 403. 192 Wolgast v Connolly’s News and Anor [2008] QSC 97. 193 Ibid [54].

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Economic loss Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld) ch 3 pt 3 (ss 54–56) ss 54 and 56 commenced 9 April 2003 Section 55 commenced 2 December 2002 Schedule 2 Dictionary meaning of ‘average weekly earnings’ inserted by Workers’ Compensation and Rehabilitation and Other Legislation Amendment Act 2013 (Qld) and commenced 15 October 2013 Section 54 provides that, in assessing damages for loss of earnings (including dependency claim), a court must disregard earnings above three times the average weekly earnings per week. Further, for injuries which occur on or after 2 December 2002, awards of damages for loss of earnings which are unable to be precisely calculated must be made with reference to s 55 of the Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld) and the court must have regard to the person’s age, work history, actual loss of earnings, permanent impairment and other relevant matters. The purpose of s 55 was to limit the judiciary’s scope to make considerable global awards for future economic loss which had become all too prevalent. Unfortunately for insurers, s 55 has not achieved its desired effect, as is indicated by several Queensland decisions.

Tomlins v Sheikh194 provides an early example of the judiciary maintaining its stance on awarding significant damages for future economic loss.

Ms Tomlins was injured whilst dining in the restaurant of Mr Sheikh. As the defendant was found liable for the plaintiff’s injury (a moderate cervical spine injury), the court proceeded to calculate the plaintiff’s future economic loss with reference to s 55. The section states that the court must have regard to a number of factors related to the plaintiff before any award is made. The factors include the plaintiff’s work history, actual loss and any permanent impairment. Despite the court finding that ‘the plaintiff’s capacity to work in full time employment has not been diminished’,195 the court accepted that the plaintiff’s capacity to undertake overtime had been reduced as a result of some minor persisting symptoms (stiffness and headaches). Additionally, the court noted that ‘it is reasonable to expect that she may have to take additional leave to rest and relieve her persisting symptoms’.196

On this basis, the court awarded the plaintiff $25,000 for future economic loss, despite evidence that since the accident, the plaintiff had not taken any sick leave.

The effect of s 55 was discussed in Ballesteros v Chidlow [2006] QCA 232, by per Mcmurdo P at [41]:

‘Because even judges cannot accurately predict the future, the calculation of such an award invariably involves informed guesses but s 55 requires that the reasons supporting the damages award must state the assumptions on which the award is based and the methodology used to arrive at it: s 55(3). I do not apprehend that the appellant has suggested the judge did not sufficiently state the assumptions on which she based her award but in his oral argument counsel for the appellant made a secondary submission that the judge erred in not setting out the arithmetical methodology of how she came to an award of $20,000. Section 55(3) must be read in the context of the whole section. The heading of the section is “When earnings can not be precisely calculated.” Section 55(1) makes plain that the section only applies to “an award of damages for loss of earnings that are unable to be precisely calculated by reference to a defined weekly loss”.’

194 [2005] QDC 174. 195 Ibid [67]. 196 Ibid [70].

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Other decisions demonstrating that the courts are generally willing to make a global award of damages for future economic loss include Rodger v Johnson,197 Snell v BP Refinery (Bulwer Island) Pty Ltd,198 Nucifora v AAI Limited199 and Whitney v Whiteway and Anor.200 In these cases, the court made positive findings that on the balance of probabilities, the plaintiff was likely to suffer a future loss of earnings or diminution in the plaintiff’s earning capacity.

Notwithstanding the above, in the matter of Reardon-Smith v Allianz Australia Insurance Ltd,201 the Queensland Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge’s assessment of the plaintiff’s future economic loss. The plaintiff was a professional surfer who was injured in a motor vehicle accident, suffering soft tissue injuries to his neck, lower back, right hip and knee. The trial judge awarded $35,000 for both past and future economic loss, and the decision was appealed by the plaintiff claiming that the award for economic loss was not properly assessed. The Court of Appeal found, after considering the plaintiff’s performance in surfing competitions both before and after the accident, that the trial judge’s assessment was reasonable in the circumstances. This was because the court thought that the plaintiff’s chance of substantial financial reward as a professional surfer was remote.

A further example of a reasoned approach to calculating economic loss, as opposed to awarding significant global awards based on more loose assumptions, was seen in Rogers v Body Corporate for Waterloo Crest CTS 25235 and Anor.202 The plaintiff allegedly suffered a neck injury when she fell down the stairs of the unit where she lived. In this case, Mullins J rejected the plaintiff’s estimations of past loss because the plaintiff had always intended to take time away from work to study. Further, the court found that the plaintiff had calculated her future loss based on a rounded figure which, in effect, increased her estimated future loss by 40%, which Mullins J described as unnecessarily inflated.

While there still appears to be a clear trend by Queensland courts to award increasingly greater damages for economic loss, these decisions confirm that it is necessary for a plaintiff to be able to substantiate claims for economic loss.

However, the recent decision by McMeekin J203 in Perfect v MacDonald provides an example of the courts assessment of economic loss where it was impossible for the plaintiff to show a loss of earning capacity in support of his claim. In this case the plaintiff was 14 years old. He was a pedestrian walking partly on the road when he was struck by the extended mirror of the defendant’s motor vehicle. The defendant contended that given the age of the plaintiff there was no loss of earning capacity to be considered. The defendant submitted that under s 55 where it was impossible to demonstrate the plaintiff will (not just may), suffer loss, no allowance could be made. His Honour rejected this argument and, following the reasoning in Malec v JC Hutton Pty Ltd,204 he held that damages would be awarded for loss of earning capacity where ‘the chance of loss of earnings post accident was more than negligible but significantly less than 50%’.205

197 [2013] QSC 117 where the court awarded a 27 year old working for an events management company, who suffered a 5% whole person impairment for a wrist fracture and a rare suspected neurological injury $5,000 for future care. 198 [2013] QSC 284 where the Court awarded a 52 year old working as a process technician at BP who was suffering 15% whole person impairment for a lumbar spine and an additional 7% whole person impairment for a shoulder injury for $369,730.78. 199 [2013] QSC 338, where the Court awarded a 41 year old who worked as a mining manager, and suffered a 10% whole body impairment after a motor vehicle accident, a ‘global’ future income loss of $280,000. 200 [2006] QDC 163 where the Court awarded a 32 year old paralegal who was suffering 8% whole person impairment of the lumbar spine $60,000. 201 [2007] QCA 211. 201 [2007] QSC 369. 203 [2012] QSC 11. 204 (1990) 169 CLR 638. 205 Perfect v MacDonald [2012] QSC 11 [48] approving Malec v JC Hutton Pty Ltd [1990] 169 CLR 638.

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Gratuitous care Personal Injuries Proceedings Act 2002 (Qld) (s 54) commenced 18 June 2002; repealed 9 April 2003 Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld) ch 3 pt 3 s 59 commenced 9 April 2003 and ss 59A–59D commenced 1 July 2010 Initially, s 54 of the Personal Injuries Proceedings Act 2002 (Qld) outlined the reforms which applied to awards for gratuitous services. This section only applied to claims where the injury was sustained prior to 9 April 2003. As a result of the decision in Grice v State of Queensland,206 a plaintiff who sustained injuries prior to that date would be eligible for an almost unfettered award of damages for gratuitous care. This section was repealed by the Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld) on 9 April 2003.

Currently, s 59 of the Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld) provides that damages for gratuitous care received by an injured person will not be awarded unless the services are necessary, the need for the services arises solely out of the injury for which the damages are being awarded and the services are, or are to be, provided for at least six hours per week and for at least six months. The section was amended in 2010 to include the words ‘provided to an injured person’ in the heading of the section. This serves to continue the prohibition of the award of Sullivan v Gordon damages under this section.207

The 2010 amendments to the Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld) partially reinstated Sullivan v Gordon damages, with the inclusion of s 59A damages, for losses that result from a breach of duty that occurred on or after 1 July 2010. Damages are assessed with reference to s 59C, requiring the court to take into account the injured person’s capacity to provide the service before the injury, the benefit to the recipient of the services and the vicissitudes of life. Sections 59A(2) and (4) outline the many factors of which the court must be satisfied before an award can be made under this section. The factors are:

ƒƒ the injured person dies because of the injuries suffered or general damages for the injured person are assessed at the amount prescribed under s 58 of the Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld); ƒƒ the recipient was a member of the injured person’s household when the relevant injury happened (or, if the symptoms of the injury are not immediately apparent, the injury will be taken to have happened when the nature and extent of the injury was known); ƒƒ before the relevant injury happened the injured persons provided the services to the recipient; ƒƒ the recipient was, or will be, incapable of performing services personally because of their age or physical or mental capacity; ƒƒ but for the injury, the injured person would have provided the services for at least six hours per week for a least a period of six months; and ƒƒ the need for the services is reasonable in all the circumstances.

Further, s 59B outlines circumstances in which an award cannot be made. Section 59D prevents double recovery of damages by a person for loss sustained by the claimant because of an injured person’s loss of their ability to provide gratuitous services if the injured person has previously recovered damages under s 59A for that loss.

206 [2006] 1 Qd R 222. 207 Sullivan v Gordon (1999) 47 NSWLR 319 damages refer to damages for the loss of ability of an injured person to provide gratuitous care because of their injury. The High Court ruled in CSR Ltd v Eddy (2005) 226 CLR 1 that damages for the loss of ability to care for another should be assessed as part of general damages.

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Despite being generally excluded from the Act, damages for gratuitous care can be claimed for dust and smoking related conditions.208

Interest Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld) ch 3 pt 3 (s 60) commenced 9 April 2003 The Act specifies that no interest is to be awarded on awards for general damages or on awards for damages for gratuitous care provided to an injured person. However, this section only applies to a breach of duty occurring after 9 April 2003. Interest is still available on general damages awards in claims arising out of a breach of duty that occurred prior to that date, even though the assessment of some heads of damages (such as general damages) may actually be subject to the provisions of the Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld). The provision links the amount of interest to the ten year Treasury bonds published by the Reserve Bank of Australia at the beginning of the quarter in which the award of interest is made.

The prohibition for the payment of interest was extended to awards for damages for loss of gratuitous services provided to an injured person by the 2010 amendments.

Interest is able to be awarded on past economic loss and past special damages.209

Discount rate Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld) ch 3 pt 3 (s 57) commenced 9 April 2003 Section 57 was amended by the Civil Proceedings Act 2011 and commenced 1 September 2012 Section 57 applies a discount rate of 5% to future economic loss or for damages for gratuitous services. The purpose of this provision is to prevent a plaintiff from being over-compensated for their injuries. As a lump sum is awarded to an injured plaintiff for compensation, the discount rate takes account of the potential for the compensation to be invested by the claimant or otherwise dealt with sooner than if they had to earn it over time.

Exemplary, punitive or aggravated damages Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld) ch 3 pt 2 (s 52) commenced 9 April 2003 Section 52 of the Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld) provides that a court cannot award exemplary, punitive or aggravated damages in relation to a personal injury claim. This does not apply to injuries arising from an unlawful intentional act done with the intent to cause injury or unlawful sexual assault or misconduct.210

In Coffee v State of Queensland and Ors,211 the court considered whether ‘humiliation, frustration and anger’ were a form of personal injury for which exemplary damages could be awarded. The plaintiff alleged that his claim for damages for the emotional harm he suffered at the hands of the defendant was not a claim for personal injury damages and as such, the court was free to award aggravated damages. Whilst conceding that injured feelings constituted harm, the Court of Appeal did not believe that they would (in the absence of a conventional personal injury) constitute an injury as contemplated by the Act.212

208 Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld) s 5(3). 209 Hunt v Lemura & Anor [2011] QSC 378. 210 Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld) s 52(2). 211 [2010] QSC 291. 212 Ibid [28].

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Structured settlements Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld) ch 3 pt 4 (ss 63–67) commenced 9 April 2003 Queensland has legislated to implement reforms to encourage and facilitate structured settlements. The provision allows the plaintiff to avoid the unrecoverable costs associated with managing a lump sum and to access a source of long term income.

Section 63 defines a ‘structured settlement’ as:

‘an agreement providing for the payment of all or part of an award of personal injury damages in the form of periodic payments funded by an annuity or other agreed means’.

Pursuant to s 64 a court is required to inform all the parties to the proceedings of a proposed award for future loss (not including interest) of more than the amount prescribed under a regulation for this section213 ahead of making the award to allow parties to negotiate (should they wish) a structured settlement. The parties may apply to the court for an order that the settlement be in the form agreed between them.214 A lawyer engaged by a plaintiff is under an obligation to advise in writing about the availability of a structured settlement and lump sum option while negotiating a settlement for a claim in personal injuries.215 An offer of compromise made pursuant to the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999, ch 9, pt 5, extends to a structured settlement on a claim for personal injuries.216 In these circumstances, a court is to have regard to the cost to the defendant of the proposed structured settlement as opposed to a lump sum payment of damages.217

Legal costs Personal Injuries Proceedings Act 2002 (Qld) ch 2 pt 3 (s 56) commenced 18 June 2002 Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld) ch 3 pt 4 (s 67) commenced 9 April 2003 The Personal Injuries Proceedings Act 2002 (Qld) currently sets out the amount of legal costs recoverable by a party to a personal injuries claim which proceeds to trial. The amount of costs recoverable is determined by reference to the amount of the award and the factors set out in s 56 of Personal Injuries Proceedings Act 2002 and s 13 of Personal Injuries Proceedings Regulations 2002. These provisions, however, do not apply to the cost of an appellate proceeding.

To determine the amount of costs recoverable it must first be determined if the amount awarded is less than, equal to or more than either the lower or upper offer limit.218 The award amount should then be compared to both the claimant’s and respondent’s mandatory final offers made during the unsuccessful compulsory conference. For example, where the amount of the damages award is equal or less than the lower offer limit and less than the claimant’s mandatory finalof fer but more than the respondent’s mandatory final, no costs are to be awarded.219

The court must not award costs to a party related to the introduction of unnecessarily repetitive evidence.220

213 Under s 75 of the Act, the Minister must make a recommendation about the amount to be prescribed. 214 Ibid s 65. 215 Ibid s 66. 216 Ibid s 67(1). 217 Ibid s 67(2). 218 The offer limits are defined in s 13 of the Personal Injuries Proceedings Regulations 2002. 219 Personal Injuries Proceedings Act 2002 (Qld) s 56 (2)(a). 220 Ibid s 56(4). The Act gives the example of a party introducing evidence of substantially the same effect from two expert witnesses.

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In Tomlins v Sheikh,221 Tutt DCJ opined that formal offers made under the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999 (Qld) do not have any relevance to the issue of costs in cases brought under the Personal Injuries Proceedings Act 2002 (Qld). Essentially, his Honour held, inter alia:

‘Although I was not addressed on this issue I should say that it is my view that the delivery of an offer to settle under the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999 (Qld) would have no impact on the court’s mandatory obligation to apply the “principles” set out in s 56 of the Personal Injuries Proceedings Act 2002 (Qld) when considering the question of costs under the Personal Injuries Proceedings Act 2002 (Qld).’

In Nicholls v Telstra Corporation Limited & Anor,222 the court considered whether mandatory final offers under the Personal Injuries Proceedings Act 2002 (Qld) could impact upon subsequent offers made under the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999 (Qld). In this case, it was held that a mandatory final offer would only be relevant to the extent that it might impact upon the other party’s attitude or approach in any subsequent litigation between the parties which could influence any subsequent offers to settle under the Rules.

The aforementioned case highlights the importance of both parties giving proper consideration to the making of a mandatory final offer and the effect that a mandatory final offer will have on costs should the matter proceed to trial. In doing so, the parties should also contemplate interest that may accrue up until trial should the matter not settle as this will not be dissected from the final judgment sum in determining the issue ofcosts. 223

The Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld) also provides a requirement for a court to have regard to the cost to the defendant of any proposed structured settlement as compared to a lump sum payment when deciding whether a reasonable offer of compromise has been made.

Practice and Procedure Legal practitioners Legal Profession Act 2007 (Qld), ss 1–2, pt 3.2 divs 1–4 [other than ss 217, 223 and 266], pt 7.6 div 6 [other than s 698] commenced 28 May 2007 Legal Profession Regulation 2007 (Qld) commenced 1 July 2007 Australian Solicitors Conduct Rules commenced 1 June 2012 In response to the Ipp report, Queensland enacted legislation regulating professional practice standards in 2007. Although these standards largely reinforce duties that were already developed by, acknowledged and implemented within the profession, they nonetheless play an important role in providing consistent protection for consumers and the public generally. The Legal Profession Act 2007 (Qld) and its regulations require legal professionals to preserve professional confidentiality and privilege as well as strict adherence to practices relating to trust monies, legal cost disclosures and cost assessments.

The Australian Solicitors Conduct Rules 2012 apply to persons who engage in legal practice as solicitors and include rules relating to relations with clients, advocacy and litigation relations with other lawyers, relations with third parties and legal practice.

221 [2005] QDC 174. 222 [2008] QDC 13. 223 Ward v Coomber and Allianz Australia [2005] QDC 251 which dealt with the application of similarly worded costs provisions in the Motor Accident Insurance Act 1994 (Qld).

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Fundamental duties of a solicitor The Australian Solicitors Conduct Rules 2012 outlines the fundamental duties of a solicitor. The rules provide that a solicitor’s duty to the court and the administration of justice is paramount and prevails to the extent of inconsistency with any other duty. A solicitor is also under an obligation to adhere to other ethical duties including:

ƒƒ to act in the best interests of clients; ƒƒ to be honest and courteous in all dealings in the course of legal practice; ƒƒ to deliver legal services competently, diligently and as promptly as reasonably possible; and ƒƒ to avoid compromise to their integrity and professional independence.

The rules expressly state that a solicitor must not disclose any information which is confidential to a client and acquired by the solicitor during the client’s engagement to any person who is not an employee of the practice or a barrister/other person engaged by practice.224 The rules provide some exceptions to this general principle including where the client authorises disclosure or when the solicitor is permitted or is compelled by law to disclose the information.

The Australian Solicitors Conduct Rules 2012 restricts a solicitor from acting for a client where there is a conflict between the client’s interests and the solicitor’s own interests.225

Consequences of failing to comply with Australian Solicitors Conduct Rules 2012 Failing to adhere to the rules detailed in the Australian Solicitors Conduct Rules 2012 can have dire consequences for a solicitor including a finding of professional misconduct.226 The punishment for misconduct can include the solicitor being removed from the roll of practitioners and unable to practice, fines and a further course of legal education.227

In Legal Services Commissioner v Mullins,228 the Legal Services Commissioner found a barrister guilty of professional misconduct for knowingly misleading an insurer and its lawyers about his client’s life expectancy. The barrister was issued a substantial fine and a public reprimand.

Legal advertising Personal Injuries Proceedings Act 2002 (Qld) ch 3 pt 1 (ss 62–69) and ch 4 pt 6 (s 85) commenced 18 June 2002 Sections amended by Personal Injuries Proceedings Act (Legal Advertising) and Other Acts Amendment Act 2006 commenced 29 May 2006 General advertising rule for solicitors Rule 36 of the Australian Solicitors Conduct Rules 2012 states that a solicitor or principal of a law practice must ensure that any advertising, marketing, or promotion in connection with the solicitor or law practice is not false, misleading, deceptive, offensive or prohibited by law.

Personal injury advertising Advertising personal injury services in Queensland is strictly regulated by the Personal Injuries Proceedings Act 2002 (Qld). According to the second reading speech of the amending Act, the two main restrictions placed on advertisement and the touting of personal injury legal services were pertinent as they were:

‘prompting unmeritorious claims and allowing unscrupulous lawyers to pressure claimants into making claims where they may not have otherwise ever considered so doing’.

224 Australian Solicitors Conduct Rules 2012 rule 9. 225 Ibid rule 12. 226 Legal Profession Act 2007 (Qld) s 420. 227 Ibid s 456. 228 [2006] LPT 012.

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As a result, advertising cannot include mention of ‘no win, no fee’ or other speculative services, nor can advertising be made in easily accessible mediums, such as through radio or television or include statements likely to induce persons to commence claims.

The provisions that regulate advertising have a broad ambit affecting the method of advertising services that also fall under other legislation like the Motor Accident Insurance Act 1994 (Qld) and the WorkCover Queensland Act 1996 (Qld). The provisions prohibit advertising personal injury services that intend to encourage or induce a person to make a claim and/or use the services of lawyers to make a claim. Solicitors are, however, able under s 66 to publish a statement containing their name, contact details and area of specialisation in a printed publication. This is obviously a fine line.

Personal Injuries Proceedings Act 2002 (Qld) was amended in 2006 by the Personal Injuries Proceedings (Legal Advertising) and Other Acts Amendment Act 2006 (Qld) which commenced on 29 May 2006. These amendments came in light of schemes developed by ‘claim harvesters’ as a loophole to the already existing restrictions on the advertising of legal services.229 Now provisions regulating advertising that were previously only applicable to lawyers, now also apply to non-lawyers.

The Legal Services Commission is the regulatory body for Personal Injuries Proceedings Act 2002 (Qld), and has issued numerous guides to assist legal practitioners determine what is appropriate advertising for personal injury services.

Definition of Personal Injury Advertising A person advertises personal injury services by publishing a statement that:

‘may reasonably be thought to be intended or likely to encourage or induce a person—

ƒƒ to make a claim for compensation for a personal injury; or ƒƒ to use the services of the practitioner, or a named law practice, in connection with the making of a claim.’230

Allowable Content & Publication Method Personal Injuries Proceedings Act 2002 (Qld) states that a personal injury firm may publish a statement that states only the name and contact details of the practitioner or law practice of which the practitioner is a member, together with information as to any area of practice or specialty of the practitioner or law practice.231

The allowable content must be published by an allowable publication method.232 The allowable publication methods include:

ƒƒ printed publications; ƒƒ internet websites that reproduce a printed publication which was published independently of the practitioner or law firm (eg Yellow Pages on-line); ƒƒ internet directories or databases that are published independently of a practitioner or law firm; ƒƒ public exhibitions such as billboards or signs provided they are not exhibited in or on a hospital or medical centre; and ƒƒ printed documents such as flyers that are sent or delivered.

229 Explanatory Memorandum, Personal Injuries Proceedings (Legal Advertising) and Other Acts Amendment Bill 2006 (Qld). 230 Personal Injuries Proceedings Act 2002 (Qld) s 64. 231 Ibid (Qld) s 66(1). 232 Ibid (Qld) s 65.

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Personal Injuries Proceedings Act 2002 (Qld) clearly specifies that this does not include printed documents that are sent, delivered or left in a hospital or on any vehicle in the vicinity of a hospital.

The Commissioner requires any website published in Queensland to be compliant with Personal Injuries Proceedings Act 2002 (Qld) requirements regardless of the place the website originated.233

Section 66 (2)(a) of Personal Injuries Proceedings Act 2002 (Qld) expressly provides that client inquiries do not breach the advertising restrictions in Personal Injuries Proceedings Act 2002 (Qld) if the client inquiry advertises personal injury services:

ƒƒ to any person who is already a client of the practitioner or law practice; or ƒƒ to any person at the practitioner’s or law practice’s place of business.

A client is defined as a ‘genuine inquiry’ of a practitioner or a law firm.234 The Commissioner is of the view that a genuine inquiry does not include a person who views or browses a law firm’s website.

According to s 66 (2)(b) of Personal Injuries Proceedings Act 2002 (Qld), law firms are permitted to include additional content on law firm websites including information about:

ƒƒ the operation of the law of negligence and a person’s legal rights under that law; and ƒƒ the conditions under which the practitioner or law practice is prepared to provide personal injury services.

For all other websites this material remains prohibited.

Prohibited content Personal Injuries Proceedings Act 2002 (Qld) prohibits all advertising other than allowable content. The Legal Services Commission Regulatory Guide 2 provides examples of prohibited content, including:

ƒƒ photographs or images of any kind; ƒƒ self promotion Statements about the practitioner or law firm such as: • ‘I am a strong advocate for injured workers’ or • ‘Our solicitors are members of the Fair Go for Workers Association’. ƒƒ advertisements on radio and television; ƒƒ public exhibition of photographs, films or other ecordingsr of images or sound (e.g. cinema advertising; and ƒƒ recorded telephone messages.

Advertising a ‘no win, no fee’ basis or fees being payable on a speculative basis is expressly prohibited as is touting at the scene of an incident under s 67 of the Personal Injuries Proceedings Act 2002 (Qld). The Legal Profession Act 2007 (Qld) also includes provisions on legal advertising and requires that the Queensland Law Society advertising restrictions are adhered to.

The Commissioner is also of the view that pages such as Facebook, Twitter or YouTube which advertise personal injury services constitute personal injury advertisement. Therefore, the Commissioner recommends that links on law firm websites comply with Personal Injuries Proceedings Act 2002 (Qld) advertising restrictions.

233 Dow Jones & Company v Gutnick (2002) 210 CLR 575. 234 Personal Injuries Proceedings Act 2002 (Qld) s 63.

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New South Wales Carter Newell Lawyers

new south wales

New South Wales was one of the first States in Australia to implement legislation in response to the Ipp report with some reforms implemented prior to the release of the Ipp report. Therefore, not surprisingly, New South Wales has dealt with the largest body of cases regarding the impact and interpretation of the negligence reforms. The reforms regulate the law of negligence, access to damages as well as professional standards of lawyers handling personal injury claims.

Application for Statutory Reforms Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW) pt 1 (ss 2, 3B) commenced 20 March 2002 Section 2 of the New South Wales Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW) states that the Act applies from 20 March 2002. Section 3B makes it clear that the Act applies to all civil claims for damages, whether made in tort, contract or breach of statute with the exception of claims for damages for injuries related to dust diseases, smoking and workers’ compensation claims. Section 3B(2) sets out the provisions of the Act which apply to claims for damages for injuries arising out of motor accidents which include the provisions relating to negligence, loss of superannuation, non-economic loss, structured settlements, intoxication and Good Samaritans. Apart from those specific provisions, the remainder of the Act is excluded from operation in relation tomotor vehicle accidents.

Section 3B also excludes the operation of the Act in relation to intentional acts that are done with intent to cause injury or death. There are essentially two limbs that must be satisfied in order to exclude such acts. Firstly, they must be shown to have been intentional and, secondly, they must be shown to have been executed with the intent to cause injury or death. The rationale for s 3B is that parties who intentionally cause injury or death should not benefit from thelimitations on liability provided by the Act.

Instead, they may be liable for uncapped damages at common law. The application of this exclusion has been tested in the case of McCracken v Melbourne Storm Rugby League Football Club.235 The plaintiff, McCracken, sought damages under the Act for injuries sustained from an illegal spear tackle during a rugby league match. It was held that the tackle was intentionally executed to cause harm to the plaintiff and was therefore excluded from the application of the Act and the common law principles of negligence therefore applied.

In the more recent case of Withyman v State of New South Wales236 a teacher was found to have seduced and carried on a sexual relationship with one of her pupils. The plaintiff pupil claimed damages for depression and suicidal tendencies which allegedly stemmed from the relationship. The court found the teacher’s actions fell within s 3B of the act because the teacher’s sexual misconduct was an intentional act. As a result, the plaintiff could seek common law damages free from the provisions of the Act. Although the teacher was liable, the court did not believe the Department of Education was vicariously liable as the sexual relationship was outside the scope of the teacher’s employment.

The decision in Withyman was upheld on appeal.237 In agreeing with the primary judge’s finding of ‘other sexual misconduct’, Allsop P also expounded upon the meaning and fluidity of that expression as it is used in s 3B(1)(a):

235 [2005] NSWSC 107. 236 [2010] NSWDC 186. 237 Withyman v State of New South Wales [2013] NSWCA 10.

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‘Here, in s 3B(1)(a), the Parliament has used a phrase that necessarily requires application of a community moral standard. What its reach is at any given time and place will be a matter for the court to assess. Its limits need not, and should not, be defined, especially by rules drawn up in advance of the resolution of disputes from particular factual circumstances. Some activity that in a past era would have been seen as sexual misconduct, no longer may be so viewed. Here, however, a teacher with responsibilities for the intellectual and emotional care of a vulnerable young man intentionally engaged in a sexual relationship with him . . . The phrase does not require a criminal act as “sexual assault” would. The word “other” does not in my view require criminality as is implicit within the phrase “sexual assault”.’238

The courts have also held that the definition of ‘intent’ for the purposes of exclusion can be extended at the discretion of the judiciary, to instances of reckless indifference.239

Neither intent nor reckless indifference could be established in the case of Drinkwater and Ors v Howarth240 where two security guards, escorting a troublesome client from a hotel, pushed the client into the plaintiff. The plaintiff fell backwards and in doing so suffered injuries to his ankle. Despite the defendants arguing that they had not intended to injure the plaintiff personally, Basten JA held that an intentional act could be intentional in the sense that it was intended to injure someone, without necessarily being directed towards the plaintiff. The plaintiff’s injuries were ultimately, therefore, inextricably connected to the intention to hurt the client being pushed.

Although the decision of McCracken clarified that the New South Wales position relating tothe exclusion of intentional torts is not limited to criminal conduct or bodily injury, the decision of Fuz v Carter & Ors241 has further clarified the scope of theexclusion.

The court in that matter held that the intention to cause injury need not relate to the specific injury suffered, nor to the ultimate extent of the injury that actually eventuated. Instead, the injury must simply have resulted as a consequence of an intentional act on behalf of the defendant.

Public policy considerations have also weighed heavily in the application of the intentional tort exclusion. In Bujdoso v State of New South Wales242 it was held by Basten JA that a prisoner assaulted by fellow prisoners whilst being incarcerated for child sex offences should not be able to claim damages under common law principles by virtue of the intentional tort exclusion. Although the assault by a number of prisoners was intentional, the failure of the State to take precautions in order to avoid such assaults from occurring amounted to negligence. The court held that State authorities should be held liable where a failure to satisfy their duty of care occurs. By applying the exclusion narrowly it has ensured that the Act cannot be bypassed in most cases in order to seek uncapped damages from common law avenues.243

The decision in Bujdoso was appealed and on appeal the court outlined the proper construction of the phrase ‘in respect of’ in s 3B(1)(a) of the Act (prior to the 2006 Amendment Act). The Court said the phrase should have been understood to refer to the liability of the person who did the intentional act with the relevant intent and not to a person whose liability derives from his or her own negligent conduct, where the risk against which precautions must be taken is the intentional violent act of another.244

238 Ibid [52]. 239 State of New South Wales v Ibbett (2005) 65 NSWLR 168. The decision went to the High Court on appeal but was dismissed. 240 [2006] NSWCA 222. 241 [2006] NSWSC 771. 242 [2006] NSWSC 896. 243 Coyle v State of New South Wales [2006] NSWCA 95. 244 State of New South Wales v Bujdoso (2007) 69 NSWLR 302; [2007] NSWCA 44.

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However, in Zorom Enterprises Pty Ltd (in liq) v Zabow245 the court found that s 3B excluded the operation of the Act in a claim where the defendant was alleged to be vicariously liable for the intentional acts of its employee (a security guard) who severely injured the plaintiff in an unprovoked assault outside the defendant’s hotel. This decision was recently followed in Webster v Coles Myer Limited; Thompson v Coles Myer Limited,246 where the court held the malicious conduct of an employee precluded the operation of the Act in a claim for false imprisonment against her employer. In another recent case of Smith v Cheeky Monkeys Restaurant247 the court held, where there is a finding of vicarious liability for trespass to a person, a courtcan award exemplary damages against an employer when no such damages are awarded against the employee who committed the trespass. In that decision, the owner of a Byron Bay nightclub was held liable when one of the nightclub’s employees assaulted a patron.

Although it may be difficult for a plaintiff to establish vicarious liability on the part of the employer in such circumstances, Smith v Cheeky Monkeys Restaurant248 shows that potential for uncapped liability remains.

Pre-court Procedures

There are no pre-court procedures for civil claims in New South Wales other than pre-court procedures arising out of motor vehicle accidents as governed by the Motor Accident Compensation Act 1999 (NSW) which were in place prior to the Ipp report. Although new procedures were expected to be introduced in early 2011, they have been postponed to enable New South Wales to monitor the effect of similar pre-court procedures introduced in Federal courts on 1 August 2011. New South Wales, Tasmania and Western Australia are now the only jurisdictions without pre-court procedures in Australia. Queensland, Victoria, South Australia and Northern Territory have all now introduced some form of pre-court procedures.

The Law of Negligence – Scope of Duty of Care Standard of care Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW) pt 1A div 2 (ss 5B–5C) commenced 20 March 2002 The common law principles set out in Wyong Shire Council v Shirt249 (and more recently in Roads and Traffic Authority of New South Wales v Dederer)250 have been restated in pt 1A, div 2 of the Act. The legislative provisions provide that a person is not negligent in failing to take precautions against a risk of harm unless the risk is foreseeable, not insignificant, and in the circumstances, a reasonable person in the same position would have taken precautions against the risk of harm.

This issue was considered in the case of Doubleday & Anor v Kelly251 where the plaintiff, aged seven, was injured while using roller skates on a trampoline at the home of the defendant. In determining whether the risk of harm was foreseeable, the court commented that the actual events as they happened were not the circumstances to which consideration of foreseeability of risk of injury was to be applied. The court held that what was to be considered was the foresight, in more general terms, of the risk of injury to a child of seven if she were to use the trampoline without adult supervision, and the appellant need not have foreseen that the respondent would use roller skates on it.

245 [2007] NSWCA 106. (2007) 7 NSWLR 354. 246 [2009] NSWDC 4. (2009) 9 DCLR (NSW) 123. 247 [2009] NSWDC 257. (2009) 9 DCLR (NSW) 241. 248 Ibid. 249 (1980) 146 CLR 40. 250 (2007) 238 ALR 761. 251 (2005) NSWCA 151.

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The court held that:

‘in determining the existence and scope of duty of care, both as articulated in Wyong Shire Council v Shirt (Mason J) and as restated in pt 1A of Division 2 of the Civil Liability Act, it is necessary to come to a decision about the response of a reasonable person in the position of the appellants to the foreseeability of risk of injury; even though there is a foreseeable risk of injury it may be a reasonable response to take no precaution against it’.252

The court held that a trampoline exists to be climbed on and jumped on, with an inherent risk of falling off in its ordinary use, and is furthermore designed to be interesting and attractive to children. In considering this position, the court found that a reasonable person in the position of the appellant would have taken precautions to avoid injury by turning the trampoline over, so that the jumping surface was on the ground, thus removing the attraction and ultimately preventing the child from using it.

The decision in Doubleday & Anor v Kelly should be tempered by the more recent decision of the New South Wales Court of Appeal in Shaw v Thomas.253 In this case, a child was permitted by a certain occupant to stay the night. He slept in a bunk bed. There was no ladder attached to the top bunk, nor any guard-rail. The child attempted to get down from the top by jumping and sustained serious injury. The plaintiff sued. Although the absence of a ladder and guard- rail breached Australia Safety Standards, the court considered it could not be assumed that reasonable people in the position of the appellants would have had knowledge of the terms of theAustralian Safety Standard or of the relevant publication referring to it. It would appear the New South Wales Court of Appeal in this case has set in place a ‘reasonable person’ test far less stringent than that in Doubleday & Anor v Kelly.

Pursuant to s 5B(2) of the Act, in determining whether a reasonable person would have taken precautions, the court is to consider:

ƒƒ the probability that the harm would occur if care was not taken; ƒƒ the likely seriousness of the harm; ƒƒ the burden of taking the precautions; and ƒƒ the social utility of the activity that creates the risk.

The High Court recently considered these issues in Adeels Palace Pty Ltd v Moubarak & Najem,254 primarily focusing on the first of the four elements under s 5B(2). The case concerned ascuffle which broke out between several patrons at a restaurant owned and operated by Adeels Palace. After being struck in the face, one of the patrons left the restaurant, returned with a pistol, and shot two other patrons involved in the altercation. The two patrons sued Adeels Palace for negligence for failing to prevent injury resulting from the criminal behaviour of a third party. The plaintiffs contended that the absence of licensed security guards on the premises led to their respective injuries.

The High Court confirmed the Court of Appeal’s finding that Adeels Palace owed a duty of care to its patrons to control the conduct of third parties for the avoidance of injury to other patrons. However, it was ultimately held that Adeels Palace did not breach this duty. In coming to its conclusion, the court had regard to the factors prescribed under s 5B(2) of the Act, noting that:

252 Ibid [16]. 253 [2010] NSWCA 169. 254 [2009] HCA 48.

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‘Of course there is always a risk that there will be some altercation between patrons at almost any kind of event. And the risk of that happening is higher if the patrons are consuming alcohol. But unless the risk to be foreseen was a risk of a kind that called for, as a matter of reasonable precaution, the presence or physical authority of bouncers or crowd controllers to deal with it safely, failure to provide security of that kind would not be a breach of the relevant duty of care.’255

The High Court’s decision in Adeels Palace was applied in the 2011 case of Williams v Twynam Agricultural Group Pty Ltd.256

The first of the four enumerated factors under s 5B(2) also proved to be the most influential in the recent decision of Sibraa v Brown.257 The New South Wales Court of Appeal had to determine the reasonableness of precautions taken by a home owner when a barefooted next-door neighbour tripped and fell on a steel mesh when traversing the home owner’s front lawn at night. In evaluating the relevant factors, the court did not consider that a reasonable person in the home owner’s position would have taken precautions against the risk of harm. Even though the risk of harm was serious and the burden of taking precautions fairly slight, the risk of that harm eventuating was fairly low. Potentially hazardous objects are not unusually left on one’s lawn and would only result in tripping by highly inattentive visitors in daylight; and householders would not expect to have to clear all obstacles in case such visitors came on their lawn (as opposed to front path or driveway) at night.258

Section 5B(2)(d), which requires that a court have regard to the social utility of an activity that creates a risk was discussed in David Michael Wilson v Nilepac Pty Ltd t/as Vision Personal Training (Crows Nest)259 and Stojan (No 9) Pty Ltd v Kenway.260

In Wilson, the plaintiff suffered an injury while exercising under the supervision of the defendant, a personal trainer. The defendant relied on s 5B(2)(d), arguing that the operation of personal training studios is an activity of high social utility to the extent that it promotes longevity and keeps health costs down. The court accepted that such an activity might well be of a high social utility and interpreted the provision to mean that it might be reasonable to take fewer precautions against a risk of harm created by an activity of high social utility.261 However, the court emphasised that the defendant ought to have remained mindful of the plaintiff’s prospect of injury if he was trained too hard, and that a delicate balance had to be found between these considerations. Accordingly, the court determined that s 5B(2)(d) did not operate as a complete immunity from liability.

However, the case of Wilson was reversed by the New South Wales Court of Appeal in 2011.262 The court held that the trial judge erred in not considering the trainer’s evidence of a departure from the standard or care required by a reasonably competent professional personal fitness trainer. Although reversing the decision, the court did agree with the trial judge’s acknowledgement that the standard of care is what is required in the circumstances.

In Stojan, the plaintiff suffered an injury when she tripped while ascending stairs from a shopping centre to an adjacent car park at night. Stojan, which had proprietary control over the stairs, allowed two large charity bins to be positioned in such a way that they obscured the lighting of the stairs. In considering s 5B(2)(d), the court accepted that the stairs were of a high

255 Ibid [38]. 256 [2011] NSWSC 1098. 257 [2012] NSWCA 328. 258 Ibid [75] per Campbell JA (with whom Hoeben JA and Tobias AJA agreed). 259 [2009] NSWSC 1365. 260 [2009] NSWCA 364. 261 Ibid [93]. 262 [2011] NSWCA 63.

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social utility in enabling public access to the centre and an adjacent car park. However, the court ultimately concluded that this utility was undermined by the absence of any precautions taken to remove the risk of a person tripping in the dark. The court stated:

‘The social utility of providing the stairs did not militate against the need to take precautions to ensure they were as safe as reasonable care could make them.’263

Insofar as s 5B(2)(c) was concerned, the court held that the burden of taking precautions against the risk, namely, in simply shifting the bins to a more appropriate place, was not onerous.

The subsequent taking of precautions that would have prevented the risk from occurring (if taken earlier) does not constitute an admission, nor does it give rise to or affect the determination of liability. In Drinkwater v Howarth,264 the respondent allegedly suffered an injury in an exchange with a security officer. The appellant complained that the judge at first instance erred when describing the risk of injury as being ‘far fetched or fanciful’ rather than using the terminology provided for in s 5B of the Act, which is a risk ‘not insignificant’.

Basten JA dismissed this ground of appeal, stating that ‘a risk which is not much more than far- fetched or fanciful may not differ materially from a risk which is not insignifican’.265 His Honour went on further to say that ‘section 5B is not concerned with how a risk came about. If the plaintiff was clearly at risk, then it cannot be said that the risk was insignificant. It was a clear risk.’266

Tobias and Hodgson JJA agreed with this reasoning, with Hodgson JA adding that:

‘there is no possibility of a different result of applying a test that the risk in question be not insignificant, from applying the test as formulated in Wyong, namely that the risk be not far-fetched or fanciful’.267

Basten JA added that:

‘there is a danger in seeking to take each limb of s 5B separately in considering how it should operate. It is clear from the report of the committee which recommended the change to the foregoing common law principles that in changing the terminology from not far-fetched or fanciful they were concerned to ensure that attention was given to other aspects of the risk’.268

The court also considered the operation of s 5B in the case of State of New South Wales v Tyszyk,269 where the plaintiff was injured by a falling piece of downpipe as he left his vehicle in a public street. The court held that two police officers attending at the scene had not failedto take reasonable precautions in circumstances where they did not block access to a public street and re-direct traffic. The court held that it would be sufficient that the officers were aware theof plaintiff’s vehicle entering the street and that they acted promptly with a view to warning the occupant of the vehicle. Ultimately, the plaintiff was unable to establish that the police officers had failed to take reasonable precautions. The plaintiff was refused special leave to appeal by the High Court.270

262 Ibid [139]. 264 [2006] NSWCA 222. 265 Ibid [13]. 266 Ibid [19] 267 Ibid [25]. 268 Ibid [21]. 269 [2008] NSWCA 107. 270 [2009] HCATrans 84.

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In the more recent case of Arabi v Glad Cleaning Service Pty Ltd,271 the NSW Court of Appeal said the respondent cleaning company had not breached its duty of care when the appellant slipped while walking up a shopping centre ramp. The court held that the respondents had evidence of a cleaning system in place where they regularly and frequently inspected the relevant area. Through such a system, the respondents had met their duty of care.

Yet, a lack of evidence of a cleaning system will not necessarily lead to the conclusion that a defendant failed to take reasonable precautions under s 5B(2). In Shoalhaven City Council v Pender,272 the plaintiff employee was a ferry master who slipped on a ramp while docking a ferry, resulting in injury. At first instance, he successfully argued that the Council’s failure to maintain the ramp – in the sense of keeping it clean of dry algae – rendered it liable in negligence. The Court of Appeal disagreed, holding that a reasonable person in the Council’s position would not have implemented a cleaning system to obviate the risk which materialised.273

This conclusion stemmed from the nature of the risk. Unlike wet surfaces, the conclusion that a ramp with dry algae would ordinarily be slippery was not, in the court’s view, something that could be inferred on the basis of ‘common knowledge or experience, let alone common sense’.274 As such, it was incumbent upon the employee to adduce evidence as to the steps required to mitigate it. The employee did not do so. For example, there was no evidence that anyone had slipped on the ramp’s dry surface before; as to the nature of dry algae and why it was imperceptible to view and why it was slippery; and as to the time period during which dry algae became slippery and required cleaning.275 Accordingly, the Council was not liable for the employee’s injuries.

A good example of reasonable precautions under s 5B not being met by an occupier is the decision of Indigo Mist Pty Ltd v Palmer.276 In that case, the New South Wales Court of Appeal considered where occupiers of a hotel had breached their duty of care to an occupier who slipped on a spilt liquid on the internal stairs of the hotel. Unlike in Pender, the nature of the particular risk in question – that hotel employees or patrons would spill drinks on the stairs, leading to a patron’s fall – could be inferred from ‘common knowledge and common sense’.277 Why this was so was not fully articulated by the court. Nevertheless, that inference led the court to hold that a reasonable response by the occupiers necessitated a system of inspection and the removal of liquids from stairs, as well the usage of signs prohibiting the movement of drinks between the floors.278 As no evidence of such a response by the occupiers was adduced, the requirements of s 5B were held to have been satisfied.279

The cases of Pender and Palmer show that the reasonableness of a defendant’s precautions under s 5B is very much influenced by the court’s assessment of the risk in question as being one inferable from common knowledge or not; an assessment which stakeholders may well find is plagued with uncertainty.

271 [2010] NSWCA 208. 272 [2013] NSWCA 210. 273 Ibid per McColl JA [94], per Barrett JA [98], per Ward JA [185]. 274 Ibid [88]–[90] per McColl JA. 275 Ibid [91]–[94] per McColl JA. 276 [2012] NSWCA 239. 277 [2012] NSWCA 239 [83] per Hoeben JA. 278 Ibid [80]–[81]. 279 Ibid [82].

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Causation Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW) pt 1A div 3 (ss 5D–5E) commenced 20 March 2002 In determining whether a person’s negligence caused a particular harm, s 5D of the Act states that the following elements must be present before a finding of causation ispermissible:

ƒƒ that negligence was a necessary condition of the occurrence of harm apart from an exceptional case (factual causation); and ƒƒ that it is appropriate for the negligent person’s liability to extend to the harm caused (scope of liability).

According to Ipp J in the New South Wales Court of Appeal decision of Ruddock & Ors v Taylor,280 s 5D embodies principles that accord with the common law. This view has since been endorsed in Nguyen v Cosmopolitan Homes,281 David Michael Wilson v Nilepac Pty Ltd t/as Vision Personal Training (Crows Nest)282 and the 2011 case of Sneddon v Speaker of the Legislative Assembly.283

The first of these principles is factual causation. In order to determine this issue, a court has always been obliged to undertake an enquiry as to whether or not the defendant’s conduct historically played a part284 in bringing about the harm or loss complained of. In mainstream cases, this issue is resolved by determining whether or not the defendant’s conduct was, as a matter of commonsense and experience,285 a cause of the loss. If the answer is in the affirmative, factual causation is established.286

The issue of factual causation was central to the case of Rickard v Allianz Australia Insurance.287 The matter concerned a motor vehicle collision on a highway that was under the care and control of the New South Wales Roads and Traffic Authority(RTA). One of the plaintiffs was a passenger in a car driven by Mr Kelly. That car came in contact with water on the highway at an excessive speed, causing it to aquaplane. Mr Kelly lost control of the vehicle and collided with an oncoming car. Mr Kelly was killed instantly while Mr Kelly’s passenger and the passenger in the other car suffered serious injuries.

It was contended at trial that the RTA breached its duty of care by failing to properly position a sign warning of the danger of the water on the highway, and this in turn caused Mr Kelly to drive at excessive speed over the water. While the court held that the RTA had breached its duty, the claim failed because causation could not be established.

The plaintiffs relied on two alternative reasons to establish why Mr Kelly drove at excessive speed. First, he did not observe the water on the highway in time, and secondly, having observed the water, he misjudged the situation and drove through it at excessive speed.

280 (2003) 58 NSWLR 269. 281 [2008] NSWCA 246. 282 [2009] NSWSC 1365. 283 (2011) 208 IR 255. 284 The defendant’s conduct need only be one of any number of concurrent causes for liability to attach to his actions/inaction. It is incorrect for a court to search for a solitary cause in its quest for the determination of fault when multiple causes exist – per Shorey v P T Ltd (2003) 197 ALR 410. 285 In Medlin v State Government Insurance Commission [1995] 182 CLR 1, the High Court stated that the enquiry as to ‘whether the requisite causal connection exists between a particular breach of duty and particular loss or damage is essentially one of fact to be resolved as a matter of commonsense and experience’. 286 A breach of duty alone is ordinarily insufficient to establish causation; the plaintiff must alsodemonstrate that the breach was a material cause of his loss e.g. Miller v Council of the Shire of Livingstone [2003] QCA 29. 287 [2009] NSWSC 1115.

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As to the first alternative, the court accepted that the RTA’s failure to properly position a sign may have contributed to the accident, although it noted that it was also possible that Mr Kelly may have been distracted and could have disregarded the sign anyway. The court concluded that even though the failure to properly position the sign may have increased the risk of injury, there was no evidence to indicate that this risk in fact materialised.

On the second alternative, the court held that the RTA’s failure to appropriately position the sign would have made no difference to whether the accident occurred or not. Given that there were two reasonably available scenarios in which negligence could be established against either Mr Kelly or the RTA, the court held that it could not prefer one scenario to the other, citing with approval the majority judgment in Luxton v Vines which held that:288

‘Many conjectures may be put forward which would explain these matters, but the fact that some of them imply negligence in the driver of the vehicle is not enough. Some of them clearly do not and there is no reason for rejecting the latter in favour of the former. There is no higher degree of probability on the one side than the other . . .

Any answer that you give to such questions is a guess. All lies in conjecture. The fact is that whatever reasons you can find for one explanation of the accident, reasonsof equal sufficiency or insufficiency exist for other explanations.’

Accordingly, in the absence of any clear evidence as to causation, the court found in favour of the RTA. This decision was upheld by the New South Wales Court of Appeal which said:

‘It is plain that the language [of the Act] was intended to raise the bar for plaintiffs in proof of breach of duty of care by an authority in the exercise of a special statutory power.’289

The High Court addressed the principles of causation in Amaca Pty Ltd v Ellis; The State of South Australia v Ellis; and Millennium Inorganic Chemicals Ltd v Ellis.290 This case arose following the death of Mr Cotton who died from lung cancer. The executor of Mr Cotton’s estate sued his former employer and the manufacturer of asbestos piping used in the course of his employment, alleging that they negligently exposed Mr Cotton to asbestos, thereby causing his cancer. The matter was complicated as Mr Cotton had smoked between 15 and 20 cigarettes per day for over 26 years before he was diagnosed with cancer.291

The issue for the High Court was whether Mr Cotton’s executor had established that it was more probable than not that exposure to asbestos fibres was a cause of Mr Cotton’s cancer.292

At first instance, the court acknowledged that it was impossible to establish the cause ofMr Cotton’s cancer with any scientific certainty. Nevertheless, the court accepted expert evidence that asbestos exposure was positively associated with the risk of contracting lung cancer and concluded that both Mr Cotton’s smoking and asbestos exposure had a cumulative effect on his cancer. It was on this basis that the court concluded that Mr Cotton’s asbestos exposure materially contributed to his cancer. Although the South Australian Court of Appeal upheld this decision, it was overturned by the High Court.

288 (1952) 85 CLR 352, p 360. 289 Allianz Australia Insurance Ltd v Roads and Traffic Authority of NSW; Kelly v Roads and TrafficAuthority of NSW (2010) 57 MVR 80. 290 (2010) 240 CLR 111. 291 Ibid 112. 292 Ibid.

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In finding that causation was not established against any defendant, the High Court unanimously held:

‘It was not shown to be more probable than not that asbestos was a cause of (a necessary condition for) his cancer. It was not shown that exposure to asbestos made a material contribution to his cancer. Material contribution was not shown because a connection between Mr Cotton’s inhaling asbestos and his developing cancer was not demonstrated.’293

Accordingly, although Mr Cotton’s exposure to asbestos may have been a cause of his cancer, it was not held to be a probable cause.294 This decision was followed in Evans v Queanbeyan City Council.295

The second limb of s 5D of the Act concerns the evaluation of whether or not it is appropriate for the defendant to be held liable to pay damages for the consequences of his conduct or inaction (the scope of liability).

As an example of this principle, and in deciding Ruddock & Ors v Taylor 296 (a case of wrongful imprisonment), Ipp J stated that, as a matter of public policy, the defendant (the Commonwealth Attorney-General) should be held liable to pay damages as a result of having unlawfully deprived the plaintiff of a fundamental privilege, namely his liberty.

The decision in Ruddock was upheld in the Court of Appeal but overturned by the High Court. The High Court held that there was lawful authority for the plaintiff’s detention and therefore no right to damages.297

A more recent case showing how s 5D operates is Hirst v Sydney South West Area Health Service.298 In that case, an obstetrician was held liable for not ordering an ultrasound on a pregnant woman when there was evidence of complications with the baby in the woman’s womb. The baby was born and suffered severe disabilities and damage. It was held that, had the respondent obstetrician ordered an ultrasound, the birth could have been induced and surgery performed on the baby to reduce the amount and severity of damage suffered by the baby. In other words, as a result of the obstetrician’s omission, the applicant suffered more damage than would otherwise have occurred.299

A similar approach was applied in determining factual causation under s 5D(1)(a) in Coregas Pty Ltd v Penford Australia Pty Ltd.300 An employee successfully settled a claim for damages in negligence from the respondent for injuries sustained while unloading a gas cylinder in the course of his employment. The respondent then claimed contribution from the appellant employer, arguing that the risk of injury would have been reduced had the appellant provided the employee with certain equipment to make the ramp horizontal. The appellant resisted the claim for contribution on the basis that factual causation could not be made out from a finding of a ‘reduced’ risk of injury. The New South Wales Court of Appeal rejected this submission, holding that the trial judge correctly found that the taking of steps to make the ramp horizontal would, on the balance of probabilities, have prevented or minimised the employee’s injuries.301

293 Ibid 135. 294 Ibid 123. 295 (2011) a DDCR 541. 296 (2003) 58 NSWLR 269. 297 (2005) 222 CLR 612. 298 [2011] NSWSC 664. 299 Ibid [152]. 300 [2012] NSWCA 350. 301 Ibid [123]–[132].

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In most cases these two queries will be readily resolved. However, there are cases (referred to within s 5D as ‘exceptional cases’) where a court must exercise value judgments in evaluating whether or not a defendant should also be held liable to pay damages. While the Act does not expressly define the phrase ‘an exceptional case’, historically, these cases have largely been confined to dust diseases or medical malpractice litigation, where proving factual causation is commonly difficult. Another potential case which could prove to be problematic in establishing causation is harm suffered from climate change.

As a specific example of an exceptional case, s5D(2) of the Act refers to ‘negligence that cannot be established as a necessary condition of the occurrence of harm’. In other words, those occasions when the defendant’s negligent conduct cannot be proven to be the ‘commonsense’ cause of the loss. The common law has long permitted a causal link to be inferred, for instance, where a defendant’s conduct had materially increased the risk of damage (and that damage ensued), even in the absence of proof to the requisite standard of a causal link between that conduct and the damage.

Recently in Strong v Woolworths Pty Ltd,302 the High Court considered the elements required under section 5D in determining whether a defendant’s act caused the plaintiff’s injury. The Plaintiff slipped and fell on a chip lying on the floor of an area occupied by Woolworths. The plaintiff argued that Woolworths’ failure to have a system in place for the periodic inspection and cleaning of the area was a ‘necessary condition of the occurrence of the harm’. The Court of Appeal rejected this argument and held that it could not conclude from the evidence that, had there been a proper cleaning system in place, it was more likely than not that the chip would have been detected and the plaintiff would not have slipped. However, on appeal to the High Court, the court found in favour of the plaintiff and held that while a plaintiff must show that it was more probable than not that the negligence was a necessary condition of the harm, this onus can be discharged on the balance of probabilities, where there is a lack of evidence. Therefore, where there is insufficient evidence presented by the plaintiff to complete the chain of causation necessary to show that the defendant’s breach had been causative of the plaintiff’s injury, courts can determine on the balance of probabilities that the injury would not have occurred had the defendant complied with its duty of care. This decision implies that a plaintiff will not fail to establish causation merely because there is an absence of evidence establishing a causal link between the defendant’s actions and the incident giving rise to the plaintiff’s injury.

The same absence of a direct causal link was present in Jones Lang LaSalle (NSW) Pty Ltd v Taouk.303 Sometime between 11:00pm and 11:30pm, the plaintiff had slipped and fallen on grease and oil in a car park. The spillage started sometime after 8:00pm, but there was no evidence making it more likely that the discharge had commenced at some particular time between 8:00pm and 10:45pm than at any other time in that period. Applying Strong v Woolworths, the New South Wales Court of Appeal held that the balance of probabilities favoured a finding that the spillage commenced between 8:00pm and 10:00pm rather than after 10:00pm and just before 10:45pm. On the assumption, adopted at trial and on appeal, that there should have been hourly inspections of the car park, factual causation was made out because an inspection would have noticed and rectified the spillage and consequently prevented the fall.304

In Adeels Palace, having found that the ‘but for’ test of causation under s 5D(1) had not been met in establishing the restaurant operator’s liability, the High Court considered whether causation could otherwise be inferred pursuant to s 5D(2). The court concluded that it could not, and rejected the plaintiff’s submission that the case fell within the category of exceptional cases and stated:

302 (2012) 246 CLR 182. 303 [2012] NSWCA 342. 304 [2012] NSWCA 350 [57]–[64], [81].

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‘Even if the presence of security personnel at the door of the restaurant might have deterred or prevented the person who shot the plaintiffs from returning to the restaurant, and even if security personnel on the floor of the restaurant might have been able to intervene in the incident that broke into fighting in time to prevent injuryto anyone, neither is reason enough to conclude that this is an “exceptional case” where responsibility for the harm suffered by the plaintiffs should be imposed on Adeels Palace. To impose that responsibility would not accord with established principles.’305

Although the High Court did not clarify precisely what constitutes an exceptional case, it noted that s 5D(2) was likely enacted by the legislature to deal with cases exemplified by the House of Lords decision in Fairchild v Glenhaven Funeral Services Ltd.306 In that case, the plaintiff suffered mesothelioma as a result of exposure to asbestos fibres in the course of several successive employments. The House overcame the impossibility of attributing liability to any one employer by holding each employer jointly liable on the basis that each materially contributed to the risk of harm. In Adeels Palace, the court held that an analogy between Fairchild and the present matter could not be drawn and thus s 5D(2) did not apply.

In ‘exceptional cases’, one is required to show that, on the balance of probabilities, the defendant ‘materially contributed’ to the injury suffered. The case of Seltsam Pty Ltd v McGuinnes307 discusses the distinction between the increase in risk and material contribution. As pointed out by Keane JA in Moore v State of Queensland:308

‘the creation of an increased risk of an adverse outcome may support an inference that the risk has come home where the adverse outcome occurs but the authorities establish that a trier of fact is not bound to draw that inference’.309

For instance, if there is uncontested evidence which demonstrates that a breach was not a cause of damage or that the risk would have eventuated and caused the damage in any event, an inference of contribution ought not to be drawn.

An example of where a plaintiff failed to establish a causal link is in Panagiotopoulos v Rajendram.310 This case reinforces the requirement to consider the necessary elements when proving a case based on psychiatric illness arising out of injury caused to another flowing from adefendant’ s negligence. It is more difficult to link negligence to psychiatric injuries if there are ‘other’ potential causes of the psychiatric distress which do not arise out of the negligence of the defendant.

In the case of Cox v State of New South Wales311 a school student claimed to have suffered depression and anxiety disorder as a result of being bullied by another student at a public school. The defendant argued that the plaintiff would have recovered if it were not for his previous family history.

It was established that the authority’s negligence was a ‘necessary’ condition of the plaintiff’s harm and that it was not essential to prove that the negligence was the ‘sole cause’ of the harm. Before concluding whether this ‘evidentiary gap’ may be bridged to permit a finding offactual causation, s 5D(2) of the Act demands that a court must now also consider ‘whether or not and why responsibility for the harm should be imposed on the negligent party’. An appeal point will probably arise whenever a court fails to adequately state its reasons for imposing liability on a defendant in an ‘exceptional case’.

305 (2009) 239 CLR 420, 421. 306 [2003] 1 AC 32. 307 (2000) 49 NSWLR 262. 308 [2005] QCA 299. 309 Ibid [38]. 310 [2007] NSWCA 265. 311 (2007) Aust Torts Reports 81–888; [2007] NSWSC 471.

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Oyston v St Patrick’s College312 was a case also involving psychiatric damage as a result of bullying at school. In that case the court explained why responsibility was imposed on the school. Although the school had bullying policies in place, these policies were not carried out according to proper procedure. The court also held that the policies placed too much emphasis on reforming the bullies than protecting the victims of their behaviour from injury.

The next component, s 5D(3) of the Act, deals with the subjective evidence of a plaintiff about what he or she alleges he or she would have done, but for the defendant’s negligent conduct. This issue will primarily come into consideration in cases of informed consent versus a failure to warn, which generally arise in medical liability litigation. There, a plaintiff would typically give evidence that he or she would not have undertaken elective surgery had he or she been properly warned beforehand about the attendant risks of the procedure.

The High Court has in the past cautioned about accepting evidence from a plaintiff about how his or her conduct would have differed, had he been given a warning. McHugh J stated in Chappel v Hart,313 that the reliability of such evidence was questionable and could only be measured against all of the surrounding factors, such as the attitude or conduct of the plaintiff at the time of the breach. Further, the enquiry is necessarily hypothetical, as it is based on a set of circumstances that did not occur.

Kirby J stated in Hoyts Pty Ltd v Burns314 that:

‘the evidence of what a claimant would have done if a non-existent warning had been given by a hypothetical sign is so hypothetical, self-serving and speculative as to deserve little (if any) weight, at least in most circumstances’.315

There, the plaintiff was permitted by the trial judge to give evidence about how she would have acted differently (more carefully) had the cinema operators posted a warning that the seats in the theatre folded upward when not in use. The High Court reappraised that evidence in light of the surrounding facts (for instance, her attention to a highly agitated child, rather than the cinema screen where the proposed warning might have been posted) and held that the failure to post a warning was not the cause of the plaintiff’s injuries.

Section 5D(3) of the Act avoids these quandaries by rendering inadmissible any statement by a plaintiff about what he or she would have done, save for the defendant’s breach of duty, except to the extent that such a statement is adverse to his or her interests.

Rather than accepting the plaintiff’s evidence as to how he or she may have acted differently, a court is now required by s 5D(3)(b) of the Act to have regard to subjective factors, in light of all the relevant circumstances that existed at the time of the breach, in determining whether the breach was the cause of the damage.

Exactly what those subjective factors may include is not specified within the legislation. While the Act was inapplicable to the claim, in deciding Elbourne v Gibbs,316 the New South Wales Court of Appeal has provided insight into how claims governed by s 5D(3)(b) of the Act may be decided.

312 [2011] NSWSC 269. 313 (1998) 195 CLR 232. 314 (2003) 201 ALR 470. 315 Ibid 483. 316 [2006] NSWCA 127.

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In that case, the plaintiff underwent surgery for the repair of bilateral inguinal hernias under the care of Dr Elbourne. His claim was one for a failure to warn or inform of certain potential adverse consequences that ultimately materialised (including a heart attack). He told the court that he would not have undertaken the procedure if warned of the risks associated with it (such evidence is of course now precluded). Ultimately, the New South Wales Court of Appeal (Ipp J dissenting) held that the evidence in totality supported a finding that the plaintiff would not have hadthe surgery had he been warned of the risks.

Basten JA drew attention to the type of subjective factors that may be taken into account under s 5D(3) of the Act for failure to warn in a medical treatment context. An example would include the plaintiff’s demonstrated desire for the treatment (the case law has in the past included instances of patients who are particularly desperate for cosmetic surgery or to increase their chances of conceiving a child). The plaintiff’s past experiences (for example, prior similar surgery) and particular knowledge are other relevant factors against which a court must evaluate how a plaintiff’s conduct would likely have been influenced as a result of a warning or the absenceof any breach of duty.

In Wallace v Kam317 the provided clarification of the principles concerning the scope of a medical practitioner’s liability under s 5D(1)(b) where the medical practitioner fails to warn a patient of risks involved in surgery.

In Livingston v Mitchell318 Walmsley AJ noted that the general prohibition against giving hypothetical evidence also extends to non-professional cases. Also of note in that case is that His Honour admitted hypothetical evidence of the plaintiff’s son, stating that such evidence was admissible because the son was not a party to the dispute. Walmsley AJ did say, however, that such evidence should not be given much weight.

By contrast, the Victorian legislation does not contain an analogous provision to s 5D(3) – in which case a plaintiff’s hypothetical evidence is not absolutely inadmissible in that jurisdiction. Indeed, in Lederberger and Scheiner v Mediterranean Olives Financial Pty Ltd319 the Victorian Court of Appeal was inclined to rely on such evidence as the sole basis for establishing factual causation under s 51 of the Wrongs Act. While acknowledging that the court would ordinarily have given little, if any, weight to such evidence, the fact that the evidence was strongly credible and unchallenged at trial meant the trial judge was not open, as his Honour did, to reject it.

Conversely, the Victorian Court of Appeal in Odisho v Bonazzi recently reiterated Kirby J’s dicta in Burns, highlighting the danger in accepting a plaintiff’s hypothetical evidence. The plaintiff claimed that her medical condition was caused by the negligence of the defendant in failing to warn of the side effects of a prescribed drug. In upholding, in obiter, the trial judge’s rejection of the plaintiff’s evidence as to whether she still would have taken the drug, Beach JA and McMillan AJA held:

‘The dangers that may be associated with the acceptance of such evidence were, in our view, well-illustrated in the present case. The exaggerated nature of the appellant’s answers to the questions put to her on the issue of what she would have done had she received a warning well justified the trial judge’s rejection of this evidence. When one looks at the whole of the evidence, including the evidence of treatment to which the appellant was prepared to consent, like the trial judge, we are unpersuaded that an appropriate warning of the risk of pulmonary emboli would have made any material change to the events that occurred.’320

317 (2013) 297 ALR 383. 318 [2007] NSWSC 1477. 319 [2012] VSCA 262 [115]–[119]. 320 [2014] VSCA 11 [41].

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Bonazzi perhaps illustrates that, in Victoria, overcoming the hurdle presented by a plaintiff’s self- serving hypothetical evidence is not as clear-cut as held in Lederberger.

Finally, s 5E of the Act states that in determining liability for negligence, the plaintiff always bears the onus of proving, on the balance of probabilities, any fact relevant to the issue of causation. According to Mason P of the New South Wales Court of Appeal,321 the common law has always demanded that a plaintiff prove that the defendant’s conduct contributed to the sustaining of his injury or loss. If that is correct, then s 5E of the Act takes the law no further than to remind the courts of which party bears the onus in proving causation.

Section 5E of the Act was recently discussed by the New South Wales Court of Appeal in Gett v Tabet.322 In that case, the plaintiff alleged that a delay by the defendant in diagnosing her brain tumour resulted in her losing the chance to avoid brain damage.

Ultimately, the plaintiff was unable to prove causation to the requisite degree under s 5E of the Act. The court rejected the notion that a party could recover for loss of chance on the basis that such claims are concerned with mere possibilities and are inconsistent with the requirement under s 5E that the evidentiary onus be discharged on the balance of probabilities. All that could be established was that the defendant’s negligence deprived the plaintiff of the possibility and not probability of a better outcome. The decision of the New South Wales Court of Appeal was affirmed in the High Court, where it was held that the chance of a better medical outcome amounted to a mere possibility, as opposed to a probability (as required by the wording of the Act).323

The more recent case of Roche Mining Pty Ltd v Jeffs324 also sheds light on the working of s 5E. That case concerned injuries incurred by the respondent while entering a dump truck. At first instance, the court held the applicant was negligent in not installing a ladder to avoid injury to employees accessing the dump truck. On appeal, McHoll JA upheld the trial judge’s application of s 5E but added some clarity to the requirements of a successful plaintiff, referring to the ‘reasonably foreseeable’ test. At [80] His Honour said:

‘The onus of proving, on the balance of probabilities, any fact relevant to the issue of causation lay on the respondent at all times: s 5E, CL Act. To satisfy the element of causation he had to identify the action which, on the available evidence, the primary judge could conclude ought to have been taken. That action, if failure to take it was to be considered negligent, had to be such that the foreseeable risk of injury would require it to be taken, having regard to the nature of the risk and the extent of injury should the risk mature into actuality. It was necessary to establish that the primary judge could conclude as a matter of direct evidence or legitimate inference that, more probably than not, the installation of the transverse stair access system would have prevented or minimised the injuries the respondent sustained.’

Obvious risk Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW) pt 1A div 4 (ss 5F–5I) commenced 20 March 2002 Liability to warn a person of an obvious risk is limited by pt 1A, div 4 of the Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW). Section 5H of the Act provides that a person does not owe a duty of care to another person to warn of an obvious risk. Obvious risks include risks that are patent or a matter of common knowledge, even if there is a low probability of it occurring.

321 TC by his tutor Sabatino v The State of New South Wales [2001] NSWCA 380. Ipp J quoted Mason P’s remarks in his judgment in Elbourne v Gibbs [2006] NSWCA 127. 322 (2009) 254 ALR 504. 323 Tabet v Gett (2010) 240 CLR 537 564, 575, 589. 324 [2011] NSWCA 184.

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Section 5F defines the meaning of ‘obvious risk’ as a risk that, in the circumstances, would have been obvious to a reasonable person in the position of the plaintiff. A plaintiff who suffers harm is presumed pursuant to s 5G of the Act to have been aware of an obvious risk, unless the plaintiff proves on the balance of probabilities that he or she was not aware of the risk. In considering what would have been obvious to a reasonable person in the same position as the plaintiff, the plaintiff’s age, characteristics and expertise are important factors.325

Section 5I of the Act provides that a person will not be liable in negligence for harm suffered by another person as a result of the materialisation of an inherent risk (something occurring that cannot be avoided by the exercise of reasonable care and skill).

The New South Wales Court considered what constituted an obvious risk in the case C G Maloney Pty Ltd v Hutton-Potts and Anor.326 The court considered the liability of a hotelier in circumstances where a patron had slipped and fallen on a polished floor. A warning sign was displayed and a person was using a buffing machine in the vicinity of the plaintiff’s fall. The court held that a reasonable person in the position of the plaintiff would have observed, or ought to have made observations that would have alerted the plaintiff to the possibility of, some risk.

However, the court concluded that this did not amount to an obvious or patent risk, but only a possible one. The court found that the test of whether the plaintiff was aware of the risk in order to rebut the presumption was a subjective one to be determined on the balance of probabilities. The Court of Appeal agreed with the trial judge’s findings that both the owner and cleaner had been negligent in the circumstances.

It is important to note that the existence of an obvious risk has the effect of negating the proactive duty to warn a person of the risk, but it does not affect liability in relation to a failure to take other precautions a reasonable person would have taken in response to the risk.327

The decision in C G Maloney was distinguished in Vreman and Morris v Albury City Council.328

That case involved injuries to plaintiffs who fell from their bicycles allegedly due to an anti- graffiti coating which had been applied to the concrete at a skate park. The court held that reasonable persons in the position of the plaintiffs would have been aware that the concrete coating increased the risk of a fall. As a result, the court ruled in favour of the defendants. Harrison J compared the two cases at [102] when he said:

‘This is not a case like Maloney v Hutton-Potts where the person suffering harm was confronted with a risk that could not have been anticipated or detected as a normal (or obvious) risk associated with a freshly polished floor. The fact that the floor had been polished was obvious but the unremoved residue of polish was not obvious to a reasonable person in that plaintiff’s position. The reasonable person in the position of Mr Vreman must be taken to have ridden on the painted surface of the skate park many times and to have been able to form his or her own conclusions about its suitability for riding upon in those circumstances. Similarly, the reasonable person in the position of Mr Morris must be taken to have had knowledge that Mr Vreman had been injured because his bike wheel reputedly slipped on the painted surface and also to have been able to form his or her own conclusions about its suitability for riding upon in those circumstances. The risks would have been obvious to a reasonable person in the position of each man.’

325 See Dederer v Roads and Traffic Authority and Anor(2005) Aust Torts Reports 81–792; Doubleday & Anor v Kelly [2005] NSWCA 151. The Queensland decision of Leyden v Caboolture Shire Council [2007] QCA. 134 may also provide guidance given the similar wording of provisions contained in the Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld). 326 [2006] NSWCA 136. 327 See C G Maloney Pty Ltd v Hutton-Potts and Anor [2006] NSWCA 136 [119]–[121]. 328 [2011] NSWSC 39.

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An attempt to advance an obvious risk defence in respect of a claim concerning exposure of a plaintiff to unsafe systems of work was rejected by the New South Wales Court of Appeal in Corbett v Toll Stevedoring Pty Ltd & Ors.329 A third party, who was not the plaintiff’s employer, was responsible for stacking uneven coils of steel upon which the plaintiff lost his footing whilst working. Despite observing that the risk was indeed an ‘obvious’ one, the court held that the third party could not rely on the obvious risk defence to exonerate it from exposing the plaintiff to that risk in the firstplace. 330

In Richards v Cornford,331 the plaintiff had only recently been employed as a truck driver by the defendant when she suffered an injury after she fell from the end of a tailgate loader while operating a fully laden pallet jack. The plaintiff was relatively inexperienced in using pallet jacks yet, nevertheless, offered to do so in order to improve her career prospects with her new employer. As she positioned the pallet jack over the tailgate loader, her supervisor startled the plaintiff by yelling ‘drop it, drop it’. She abruptly dropped the pallet, lost her balance on the tailgate loader, fell and injured her knee. She sued her supervisor and employer (the defendants) for negligence, contending, inter alia, that they had breached their duty of care in failing to warn her of the risk of injury in operating the pallet jack over a tailgate loader.

The defendants argued that the risk of falling from the tailgate loader and thereby sustaining an injury was an obvious risk pursuant to s 5F of the Act, and there was, therefore, no duty to warn.

The court held that the term ‘obvious risk’ under the Act is a reference to the injury resulting from the danger, and not a reference to the danger itself. In addition, the risk must have been obvious to a reasonable person in the plaintiff’s position at the relevant time. Having regard to the facts that the plaintiff was facing away from the tailgate loader, was intently focused on positioning the pallet, and was unprepared for the defendant’s distractive behaviour, the court concluded that the risk was clearly not obvious.

The New South Wales Court of Appeal in Carey v Lake Macquarie City Council332 confirmed the notion that ‘the weight to be attached to the obviousness of the risk depends on the totality of the circumstances’. For a more detailed discussion of this case please refer to this topic in the section of this guide dealing with Queensland jurisdiction.

The consideration of a risk and whether it is ‘obvious’ turns on the facts of each case. This was demonstrated by the recent decision of the Australian Capital Territory Supreme Court in Ackland v Stewart.333 Although the case was heard in the ACT, the incident occurred in New South Wales and its Act applied in considering liability.

The plaintiff suffered injuries rendering him a quadriplegic when attempting a back-flip on a jumping pillow at an amusement park. Burns J accepted that such an activity was a ‘dangerous recreational activity’ because it exposes a person to a risk of catastrophic physical harm if they fail to execute the manoeuvre perfectly (as occurred with the plaintiff).334 Burns J was not persuaded on balance, however, that this risk was an ‘obvious’ one because a reasonable person in the plaintiff’s position (a 21-year-old with sufficient intelligence to study law at university and who was not inebriated) would have perceived only a minor, and not a serious, risk of injury in attempting the backward somersault on the jumping pillow.335 The plaintiff’s experience with trampolines was noted to have informed his assessment of the risk, despite the jumping pillow being far less elastic.

329 [2007] NSWSC 656. 330 Ibid [19]–[22]. 331 (2009) 8 DCLR (NSW) 353. 332 (2007) Aust Torts Reports 81–874; [2007] NSWCA 4. 333 [2014] ACTSC 18. 334 Ibid [296]. 335 Ibid [304].

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Please refer to our discussion of Dangerous Recreational Activities for more detail in relation to that concept.

The joint decision of Great Lakes Shire Council v Dederer and Anor; Roads and Traffic Authority of New South Wales v Dederer and Anor336 did not involve the consideration of the Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW) but nevertheless considered similar principles. The New South Wales Court of Appeal ultimately found that a ‘no diving’ sign would have given sufficient warning to a reasonable teenager that diving into the water was dangerous. However, although finding the risk ‘obvious’, the court upheld a negligence claim against the Roads and Traffic Authority(RTA) in part due to a failure to erect a sign specifying both the ‘nature of the danger’ and a ‘prohibition’. In the High Court, that decision was overturned, and the RTA was found not liable, with Gummow J concluding that the erection of a ‘no diving’ sign was a reasonable response to the risk.

In Jaber v Rockdale City Council,337 the court also found that a Council was not liable for injuries resulting from activities that involved a significant risk of physical harm.

In Campbell v Hay,338 the plaintiff suffered injuries during a flying lesson when the plane was subject to an emergency landing by his flying instructor. At first instance, the District Court of New South Wales held that the injuries sustained were a materialisation of an obvious risk of a dangerous recreational activity. On appeal, the Court of Appeal considered that the instructor’s failure to keep the plane within reach of a possible landing area when the plane’s engines began to shudder, was unsatisfactory.339 However, the court confirmed that the defendant was not liable in negligence for the plaintiff’s injuries because it was found to be a dangerous recreational activity and there was an obvious risk, stating:

‘as a matter of common knowledge and common sense, there was a risk [albeit a low risk] that the defendant might be negligent in the manner in which he operated the aircraft after the second set of vibrations occurred, and that the aircraft engine might fail in flight and the defendant would be compelled to conduct a forced landing’.

The plaintiff therefore failed in his claim.

Dangerous recreational activities Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW) pt 1A div 5 (ss 5J–5N) commenced 20 March 2002 Part 1A, div 5 of the Act limits a person’s liability in negligence in respect of harm suffered by a plaintiff who engages in an obvious risk associated with participating in a dangerous recreational activity. Section 5K of the Act defines ‘dangerous’ as involving a significant risk ofphysical harm and defines ‘recreational activities’ as including any sport, any pursuit/activity engaged in for enjoyment, relaxation or leisure or any pursuit/activity engaged in at a place where people ordinarily engage in sport or any pursuit/activity for enjoyment, relaxation or leisure. This limit on liability applies whether or not the plaintiff was aware of the risk.

Further, pursuant to s 5M of the Act, a person (the defendant) does not owe a duty to another person who engages in a recreational activity (the plaintiff) to take care in respect of a risk of the activity if the risk is the subject of a warning to the plaintiff. The risk warning must be given in a manner which is reasonably likely to result in people being warned of the risk before engaging in the recreational activity. Sections 5M(6) to (9) of the Act set out a number of circumstances in which a defendant will not be entitled to rely on a risk warning.

336 [2006] NSWCA 101; (2006) Aust Tort Reports 81–860. 337 (2008) Aust Torts Reports 81–952; [2008] NSWCA 98. 338 [2013] NSWDC 11. 339 [2014] NSWCA 129.

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In the case of Falvo v Australian Oztag Sports Association and Anor,340 Ipp J considered the issue of what constitutes a dangerous recreational activity and concluded that the term ‘dangerous recreational activity’ cannot mean an activity involving everyday risks attendant on games such as Oztag, which involve a degree of athleticism with no tackling and no risk of being struck by a hard ball.341

The reasoning in Falvo’s case was approved in the later New South Wales Court of Appeal decision of Lormine Pty Ltd v Xuereb342 which involved a plaintiff who was seriously injured while on a dolphin watching cruise. A wave struck the boat the plaintiff was travelling in and threw her into the rear of the boat.

The defendants, amongst other defences, pleaded that pt 1A, div 5 of the Act absolved their liability by alleging that the dolphin watching cruise was a dangerous recreational activity. The Court of Appeal rejected this argument and held that there was nothing to suggest to a reasonable person in the plaintiff’s position that the boat would go into conditions where getting swamped was one of the expected thrills of the cruise.

The court did provide some guidance in relation to the ‘dangerous recreational activity’ defence including that:

ƒƒ the defendant bears the onus of proof to establish this defence; ƒƒ the question is to be determined objectively and prospectively; ƒƒ the standard lies between one that is a trivial risk and one that is likely to occur; ƒƒ ‘significance’ is to be informed by the risk and physical harm; and ƒƒ the characterisation of a dangerous recreational activity must take place in the context in which the plaintiff has placed him or herself.

In Smith v Perese,343 the plaintiff was spear fishing when a boat moving above hit and injured him. The court found that just because the plaintiff was injured did not mean that the activity he was engaged in was a dangerous recreational activity and that in these circumstances the activity was not a dangerous recreational activity as the plaintiff was experienced, in company, close to shore and his gun was attached to a buoy above him by a rope.

The New South Wales Court of Appeal decision of Fallas v Mourlas344 also provides guidance as to what will constitute a ‘dangerous recreational activity’. The plaintiff in that case sustained injury while on a kangaroo shoot at night with three other men. The plaintiff was shot whilst sitting in the car with the defendant. The defendant was sitting in the car with a handgun trying to un-jam it when it discharged, hitting the plaintiff. At first instance, it was held that the activity in which the plaintiff was engaged was not a ‘dangerous recreational activity’ and further, that the plaintiff did not suffer any harm as a result of the materialisation of the risk of a dangerous recreational activity. On appeal, the court held by a 2:1 majority that the plaintiff was engaged in a ‘dangerous recreational activity’ at the time of the accident. However, also by a 2:1 majority, the court held that the risk that materialised did not constitute an ‘obvious risk’ of the dangerous recreational activity as defined in the Act.

340 (2006) Aust Torts Reports 81–831; [2006] NSWCA 17. 341 Ibid [34]. 342 [2006] NSWCA 200. 343 [2006] NSWSC 288. 344 (2006) 65 NSWLR 418.

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The scope of the ‘dangerous recreational activity’ provisions were considered by the Supreme Court of New South Wales in Perrett v Sydney Harbour Foreshore Authority.345 In that case, the plaintiff attended the Sydney Convention Centre during the Good Food and Wine Festival to interview a potential recruit for his business. After concluding his meeting, the plaintiff walked through the foyer towards the car park when he tripped down some stairs and sustained an injury.

He brought an action against both the owner/occupier and the manager of the Convention Centre contending that the uniform tiling of the floor and steps and the lack of any delineationof the risers meant the steps were not easily visible. Moreover, the plaintiff argued that the position of a sign showing directions to the car park made him look up as he came to the steps, thereby distracting him.

The defendants denied liability pursuant to s 5L of the Act by arguing, inter alia, that the plaintiff was pursuing a dangerous recreational activity. The defendants noted that the Act defined a recreational activity as ‘any pursuit or activity engaged in at a place where people ordinarily engage in sport or in any pursuit or activity for enjoyment, relaxation . . . leisure’.346 They submitted that the Convention Centre came within the contemplation of the provision as a ‘place’ where people ordinarily enjoy recreational activities.

The court rejected this argument, ruling that the dangerousness of the relevant activity ‘is to be determined by reference to the activities engaged in by the plaintiff at the relevant time’.347 It was held that walking through the Convention Centre to his car following an interview with a potential recruit did not amount to a dangerous recreational activity for the purposes of s 5L of the Act.

In Belna Pty Ltd v Irwin,348 the New South Wales Court of Appeal considered whether an exercise program undertaken by the respondent to lose weight was in fact a ‘recreational activity’ as defined in s 5K of the Act. At first instance, the court found that such activity was not recreational on the basis that it was neither a ‘sport’ nor an ‘activity engaged in for enjoyment or relaxation’ as prescribed under the Act. On appeal, the court held that the loss of weight and achievement of physical fitness did not detract from the fact that the respondent undertook the activity for enjoyment, relaxation and leisure. The court added that weight loss and fitness was merely a by-product of the exercise she performed. Accordingly, the court held that the exercise program undertaken by the respondent at the appellant’s gym was a recreational activity for the purposes of the Act.

Based on the decisions considering the provisions relating to dangerous recreational activities in New South Wales to date, it appears that whether or not an activity constitutes a ‘dangerous recreational activity’ will very much depend on the particular facts of each case. Some of these decisions have also been substantially supported in the New South Wales Court of Appeal decision of Jaber v Rockdale City Council.349 The value of these cases over the key obvious risk case of Roads & Traffic Authority of New South Wales v Dederer,350 was highlighted by Tobias J, concluding that the High Court decision of Dederer is irrelevant to the concern of dangerous recreational activity because it did not consider the Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW).

However in Jaber the court considered yet another case of injuries sustained whilst diving off structures not ordinarily intended for (but often used as) diving platforms. The fact that the plaintiff admitted that generally diving into shallow water or water of uncertain depth could result in injury was sufficient to constitute awareness of a potential for danger. The court considered thatthis was the relevant risk to consider. This may be a change in the consideration of ‘significant’, but the court, on appeal, did not engage in further review of this position.

345 [2009] NSWSC 1026. 346 Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW) s 55K. 347 [2009] NSWSC 1026 [88]. 348 [2009] NSWCA 46. 349 [2008] NSWCA 98. 350 (2007) 238 ALR 761.

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The court considered that despite the fact that the plaintiff checked the water area prior to diving (albeit poorly), this did not negate the obviousness of the risk the plaintiff’s conduct was exposing him to.

Liability of professionals Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW ) pt 1A div 6 (ss 5O–5P) commenced 20 March 2002 Professional Standards Act 1994 (NSW) Act commenced 1 May 1995 Section 5O(1) of the Act provides that a professional does not incur a liability in negligence arising from the provision of a professional service if it is established that the professional acted in a manner that (at the time the service was provided) was widely accepted in Australia by peer professional opinion as competent professional practice. However, s 5O(2) of the Act provides that peer professional opinion cannot be relied on for the purposes of this section if the court considers that the opinion is irrational. Judge Levy in Hope v Hunter and New England Area Health Service, provided guidance as to the interpretation of the term ‘irrational’ under the provision. His Honour held that the term did not mean ‘without reason’, but rather, referred to ‘reasons that are illogical, unreasonable or based on irrelevant considerations’.351

Section 5P of the Act limits the scope of s 5O. It provides that div 6 of the Act (relating to professional negligence) does not apply to liability arising in connection with the giving of (or the failure to give) a warning, advice or other information in respect of the risk of death of or injury to a person associated with the provision by a professional of a professional service.

The application of s 5O of the Act was considered in the case of Halverson v Dobler352 and subsequently approved on appeal in Dobler v Kenneth Halverson; Dobler v Kurt Halverson (by his tutor).353 It was held that s 5O is intended to operate as a defence whereby the defendant, if found to have failed to exercise reasonable care and skill, could avoid liability if he or she established that he or she acted according to widely accepted peer professional opinion.354

Giles JA, on appeal, held that:

‘The plaintiff will usually call his expert evidence to the effect that the defendant’s conduct fell short of acceptable professional practice, and will invite the court to determine the standard of care in accordance with that evidence . . . The defendant has the interest in calling expert evidence to establish that he acted according to professional practice widely accepted by peer professional opinion, which if accepted will (subject to rationality) mean that he escapes liability.’355

He went on to say:

‘It follows that I do not accept the [defendant’s] submission that s 5O did not provide a defence but defined the content of the duty of care owed by the [defendant] . . . with the onus on the [plaintiff] to prove that the manner in which he acted was not widely accepted by peer professional opinion as competent professional practice. Section 5O may end up operating so as to determine the defendant’s standard of care, but the standard of care will be that determined by the court with guidance from evidence of acceptable professional practice unless it is established (in practice, by the defendant) that the defendant acted according to professional practice widely accepted by (rational) peer professional opinion.’356

351 [2009] NSWDC 307. 352 [2006] NSWSC 1307. 353 (2007) 70 NSWLR 151. 354 Ibid [157]. 355 Ibid [167]. 356 Ibid [167].

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In giving further direction to the application of s 5O as a defence to or basis for exemption from otherwise proven liability, Hodgson JA in Sydney South West Area Health Service v MD,357 held that the material facts contemplated by s 5O should be pleaded in a defence, even if specific reference to s 5O is not mandatory.

The Professional Standards Act 1994 (NSW) is also relevant to the issue of professional standards. One of the objects of this Act is to enable the creation of schemes to limit the civil liability of professionals.358

The case of Wilson v Tier 359 is a recent example of a case distinguished from Halverson. In that case, the plaintiff developed an infection which she claimed could have been avoided if the defendant oral surgeon had administered antibiotics one day earlier. The experts called were unable to decide conclusively whether the plaintiff’s assertion was correct but three of the experts felt that the infection was of such virulence that an earlier dose of antibiotics would have been fruitless. This was enough for the court to decide in favour of the defendant oral surgeon – causation not being made out.

Liability of public authorities Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW) pt 5 (ss 40–46) commenced 20 March 2002 The liability in tort of public and other authorities is governed by pt 5 of the Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW). This includes liability of the Crown, government departments, public health organisations, local councils, a public or local authority constituted under an Act and persons exercising public or other functions prescribed by regulations.

Section 43 provides that an act or omission of the authority does not constitute a breach of statutory duty unless the act or omission was, in the circumstances, so unreasonable that no authority having the function of the authority in question could properly consider the act or omission to be a reasonable exercise of its functions. Section 43A(3) applies the same test for determining whether an authority is liable for any act or omission involving an exercise of, or a failure to exercise, a special statutory power.

In the case of T & H Fatouros Pty Ltd v Randwick City Council,360 the Council had approved works undertaken on a set of stairs which was within the local government area administered by the Council. The Council undertook a number of inspections between the time the works began and the date of the incident. The court considered that the Council owed a duty of care because it had acted so that another relied on it to take care for their safety. Importantly, this decision was reversed in the New South Wales Court of Appeal. The trial judge had found that the Environmental Planning and Assessment Regulation 1994 (NSW) imposed a duty on the Council when issuing fire safety orders to supervise the whole building, not just those matters specified in the orders.Therefore, Council had a duty to ensure the safety of the external stairway even though it was not mentioned in the orders. On appeal, the court held that by issuing a fire safety order, or giving a notice to issue one, a Council does not take over the supervision of the whole building with respect to fire safety, any other result would be a disincentive to the Council to exercise their discretion to issue fire orders. The court made the following pertinentpoints: 361

357 (2009) 260 ALR 702. 358 Professional Standards Act 1994 (Cth) s 3. 359 [2008] NSWSC 92. 360 (2005) 142 LGERA 271. 361 Randwick City Council v T & H Fatouros Pty Ltd [2007] NSWCA 177.

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ƒƒ courts must be cautious in imposing common law duties of care on statutory authorities; ƒƒ for any duty to arise the measure of control must be significant andspecial; ƒƒ in determining the quality of reliance sufficient to contribute materially, regard must be had to the seriousness of the risk, the likelihood of its occurrence and the vulnerability of the persons at risk; ƒƒ an acknowledgment that a stairway is adequate as regards fire safety does not create a duty of care; ƒƒ the fundamental elements of control, reliance, and vulnerability on the part of the respondent must be considered; ƒƒ the danger constituted by the stairway was obvious to the respondent and could be remedied by him; ƒƒ there was no evidence that the respondent had relied upon the council’s conduct; ƒƒ the respondent was not a vulnerable person and was able to protect himself from harm; ƒƒ the failure to prove vulnerability was fatal.

The case of Bennett v Manly Council & Sydney Water Corporation362 concerned the duty of the Council to warn swimmers of submerged hazards such as storm water pipes which were only visible at low tide. Hislop J found the Council negligent and accepted the plaintiff’s allegation that the Council failed to erect a marker or sign warning of the presence of the pipes or prohibiting bathing in the vicinity of the pipes which would have alerted the plaintiff to the position of the pipes. Hislop J made a 50% reduction to damages as the plaintiff was aware of the existence of the pipes.

Similarly, in the case of Randwick City Council v Muzic,363 the plaintiff slipped and fell approaching the steps at the sea baths at Clovelly Bay in Sydney due to algae growing on the steps. Prior to the incident the Council had begun major remedial works on the promenades. The Council did not erect signs warning members of the public that the promenade was slippery near the entry to the sea baths. The Court of Appeal found the Council negligent for failing to close the promenade to the public until such time as the remedial work on the promenade was completed. The Court of Appeal also found that although the plaintiff was aware of the presence of algae, she was not aware of the dangers posed by it.

The Act operates to protect public authorities against claims allegedly arising out of its policy decisions based substantially on financial, economic, political or social factors orconstraints. 364

Sections 43 and 43A prescribe a different standard of care for public authorities as opposed to private individuals. The rationale of these sections was explained in the Second Reading Speech by the then Premier in the Legislative Assembly as follows:

‘Public authorities carry out what is often a limitless task with necessarily limited resources. We must ensure, therefore, that it is not left to the courts to determine a public authority’s expenditure on its tasks. In keeping with this approach, the bill will also provide immunity for a public or other authority for breach of statutory duty, unless it has acted irrationally.’365

362 (2006) 146 LGERA 60. 363 [2006] NSWCA 66. 364 D A Ipp (Chairman), Review of the Law of Negligence Report: Final Report, 2 October 2002, revofneg. treasury.gov.au, [10.1]. 365 New South Wales Legislative Assembly, Parliamentary Debates (Hansard), 23 October 2002, 5764, 5767.

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The effect of these provisions is not to provide an absolute immunity to public authorities, but rather to alter the standard of care owed by them in the exercise of its functions as a public authority. Thus, a public authority may be liable where the act in question is so unreasonable that a similar public authority would not think it reasonable.

Warren Shire Council v Kuehne366 provides a useful summary relating to the ambit of section 43A and found that the provision protected the Council. This case involved an appeal against a finding of the District Court of New South Wales that the Council had been negligent in failing to declare a number of dogs dangerous under the Companion Animals Act 1998, after a young girl had been mauled to death by pig-hunting dogs when she wandered unattended onto a neighbour’s property. Whealy JA found that the infrequent nature of complaints about the dogs could have been reasonably dealt with, as they in fact were, by approaches being made by the council to their owner on occasions when the dogs were roaming the streets. To the extent that it could be argued that the Council had failed to act reasonably in seeking a declaration that any of the dogs were dangerous, that failure could not, in his Honour’s view, be said to be based on unreasonableness ‘of an order sufficient to attract liability under the statute’. This indicates that s 43A provides substantial protection to councils and other public authorities when exercising particular statutory powers.

In Rickard v Allianz Australia Insurance,367 the Supreme Court considered the meaning of unreasonableness under s 43(2) of the Act. Having determined that the RTA was in breach of its duty to appropriately position a sign in accordance with the test in Shirt and s 5B of the Act, the court was required to apply the test in s 43A(3). The question posed was whether the decision to place a warning sign some distance away from the danger was unreasonable or irrational. The court concluded it was, noting that common sense dictated that positioning a warning sign so far away from the specific hazard was unlikely to alert a driver to that hazard.

The RTA also sought to rely on s 44 of the Act which precludes public authorities from liability to the extent that that liability is based on the authority’s failure to exercise its function to prohibit or regulate an activity. The court held that to ‘prohibit or regulate’ an activity as envisaged under the Act did not encompass the concept of warning.368 Accordingly, the RTA could not rely on this.

The approach outlined in Rickard was adopted by Beech-Jones J in Collins v Clarence Valley Council (No 3).369 The plaintiff, injured as a result of a fall from an unsafe bridge she was cycling on, claimed damages in negligence from the defendant, who had the care, control and management of the area in which the bridge was located. While the claim for damages was ultimately unsuccessful,370 the plaintiff successfully overcame s 43A. The court held that if the defendant Council did not propose to take some step to repair or rebuild the bridge then it was unreasonable for it to not have at least erected a sign. Such a measure was cheap, easy to undertake and likely to reduce the risk of injury faced by a significant group of cyclists that traverse the bridge.371

The case of Roads and Traffic Authority of New SouthWales v Refrigerated Roadways Pty Ltd372 considered the operation of s 42 of the Act in determining whether the RTA had a duty to protect an individual against the criminal wrongdoing of a third party. The case concerned the death of Mr Evans who was killed after a large concrete block was dropped from an overhead bridge

366 [2012] NSWCA 81. 367 (2009) 54 MVR 214. 368 Ibid [327]. 369 [2013] NSWSC 1682. 370 See discussion above in relation to ‘Obvious risk’. 371 [2013] NSWSC 1682 [206]–[207]. 372 (2009) 77 NSWLR 360.

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above a highway onto the windshield of the truck he was driving. The deceased’s employer brought an action against the RTA in negligence on the basis that it exposed the deceased to a risk of injury of which it knew or ought to have known, and failed to screen the bridge so as to prevent people from throwing missiles onto the highway below.

The court held that the RTA owed a duty of care to road users to take reasonable care to protect them from harm resulting from criminal behaviour. However, the court concluded that the RTA was not in breach of its duty in failing to screen the bridges by virtue of s 42 of the Act. While the RTA was aware of incidences of criminal conduct on its bridges, its failure to screen the bridges was due largely to budgetary constraints as opposed to any oversight. This was relevant in the application of s 42(a) which requires that a court have regard to the financial and other resources that are reasonably available to the RTA in exercising its functions when determining whether it breached its duty. Moreover, s 42(b) in providing that ‘the general allocation of those resources by the authority is not open to challenge’, precluded a finding of negligence on the basis that the taking of reasonable care in the manner in which the plaintiff contended would have required the RTA to make a different general allocation of resources than that which it in fact made.

The case of Roads and Traffic Authority(NSW) v Refrigerated Roadways Pty Ltd (No 2)373 did not change the decision but it did vary it. Sackville AJA agreed with Campbell JA that the primary judge’s analysis of the matters to be taken into account in determining whether the RTA breached its duty of care was flawed. They made the point that the primary judge was required by statute to satisfy himself that each of the matters specified in s 5B(1) was satisfied before he could find that the RTA had been negligent. While Their Honours noted that there was no real difference between the statutory directions found in ss 5B and 5C they said that it should be remembered that the very point of the statutory directions is to ‘encourage judges to address their minds more directly to the issue of whether it would be reasonable to require precautions to be taken against a particular risk.’374

The legislative provisions codified(in s 45 of the Act) the highway immunity or non-feasance rule. This immunity provides that a roads authority is not liable in proceedings for civil liability for harm arising from a failure of the authority to carry out road work or to consider carrying out road work unless at the time of the alleged failure the roads authority had actual knowledge of the particular risk the materialisation of which resulted in the harm. The requisite knowledge on the part of the public authority was described by the New South Wales Court of Appeal in North Sydney Council v Roman,375 namely that of actual knowledge of the particular risk at or above the level of the officer responsible for undertaking necessary repairs.376 Thus, Basten JA held that the section precludes reliance on constructive or imputed knowledge.377

The non-feasance immunity, however, may not provide relief for councils in various claims where the plaintiff relied on the authority’s representation. In Timbs v Shoalhaven City,378 the plaintiff was killed when a tree fell onto the roof of his residence causing it to collapse onto him. The Council was notified prior to the incident and had inspected the tree and advised it was safe. The court held that once the Council expressed an opinion regarding the safety of the tree, it represented a capacity based on experience and expertise.

373 [2009] NSWCA 336. 374 (2009) 77 NSWLR 360 [447]. 375 (2007) 69 NSWLR 240. 376 Ibid [271] per Basten JA (with whom Bryson JA agreed). Although see McColl JA’s contrary opinion 255. 377 Ibid [272]. 378 (2004) 132 LGERA 397.

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Liability of volunteers and Good Samaritans Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW) pts 8, 8A and 9 (ss 55–66) commenced 20 March 2002 The Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW) deals with the voluntary actions of people in three ways.

Firstly, pt 8 deals with the liability of Good Samaritans. Specifically, it deals with the conductof people acting without expectation of reward or payment in providing assistance to others who are injured or at risk of being injured. Pursuant to cl 6 of sch 1, it applies to all incidents no matter when they occur.

Secondly, pt 8A deals with liability that arises as a result of the donation of food, including the distribution of that food. Pursuant to cl 15A of sch 1, the provisions apply no matter when the incident occurred.

Thirdly, pt 9 deals with the actions of volunteers who do community work organised by a community organisation or who act as office holders of a community organisation. Similar to pt 8, this Part also applies to all incidents no matter when they occur, pursuant to cl 6 of sch 1.

Each jurisdiction (other than the Commonwealth) follows a basic framework which exempts ‘volunteers’ who perform ‘community work’ for a ‘community organisation’ from civil liability. Each element must be satisfied for the exemption toapply .

The Commonwealth only requires that the work be performed for the Commonwealth or a Commonwealth authority on a voluntary basis, but in New South Wales, a ‘volunteer’ is a person who does ‘community work’ on a voluntary basis. ‘Community work’ focuses on the overall activity engaged in by the ‘community organisation’ (not the conduct of the volunteer) and is work that is done not for financial gain, rather for charitable, benevolent,philanthr opic, educational, cultural or sporting purposes. Each jurisdiction (other than the Commonwealth) provides a definition of ‘community organisation’ and includes a list of legal entities that can be considered ‘community organisations’ which incorporates ‘bodies corporate’, churches or other religious organisations and authorities of the State.

In New South Wales, volunteers are protected against liability when doing community work in good faith. However, the protection will not be conferred on a volunteer in circumstances where the ability of the volunteer to exercise reasonable care and skill when doing the work was significantly impaired due to voluntary consumption of alcohol or drugs (whether or notlawfully taken or for medication) and the volunteer failed to exercise reasonable skill and care.

Further, a volunteer will also not be excused from liability if at the time of an act or omission:379

ƒƒ the volunteer was engaged in conduct that constituted an offence; or ƒƒ the liability in question is a liability that is required by legislation to be insured against.

Food donors A food donor is protected against liability in respect of any death or personal injury that results from the consumption of food in circumstances where the person donated the food:380

ƒƒ in good faith for a charitable or benevolent purpose; and ƒƒ with the intention that the consumer of the food would not have to pay for the food; and ƒƒ the food was safe to consume at the time it left the possession or control of the food donor.

379 Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW) ss 63–64. 380 Ibid ss 58A–58C.

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The food donor must advise the person to whom they give food whether the food must be handled in a particular way and the timeframe in which the food should be consumed. All Australian jurisdictions have now legislated to protect food donors from civil liability.

Good Samaritans A Good Samaritan is protected from personal civil liability in respect of any act or omission done or made by the Good Samaritan in an emergency when assisting a person who is apparently injured or at risk of being injured.381 For the purposes of the Act, a Good Samaritan is defined as a person who, in good faith and without expectation of payment or other reward, comes to the assistance of a person who is apparently injured or at risk of being injured.382

A Good Samaritan is not conferred protection if his or her intentional or negligent act or omission causes the original injury or risk of injury requiring the subsequent assistance to be provided.383

Further protection will also not be conferred on a Good Samaritan in respect of an act or omission if the ability of the Good Samaritan to exercise reasonable care and skill was significantlyimpaired due to voluntary consumption of alcohol or drugs (whether or not it was taken for medication) and in the circumstances the Good Samaritan failed to exercise reasonable care and skill in connection with the act or omission.

All other Australian jurisdictions maintain a similar position, with the exception of Queensland, which only affords protection to Good Samaritans associated with prescribed organisations.

Liability for mental harm Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW) pt 3 (ss 27–33) commenced 20 March 2002 Part 3 of the Act sets out the extent to which a plaintiff can recover damages resulting from psychiatric injury. It essentially replicates much of what the High Court held in deciding Tame v State of New South Wales; Annetts v Australian Stations Pty Ltd.384

There, the High Court limited the scope of recovery for the broad range of emotional reactions one might have in response to a defendant’s conduct to manifestations of recognised psychiatric illnesses, so as to avoid imposing ‘an intolerable burden on ordinary behaviour’. In doing so, the High Court excluded recovery for mere emotional disturbances or normal grief reactions.

A further threshold was imposed in that, unless a defendant had actual or constructive knowledge of the plaintiff’s susceptibility to suffering a psychiatric illness,385 the High Court limited recovery to instances where the defendant’s conduct was such that it was foreseeable that a person of normal fortitude386 might suffer a recognised psychiatric illness.

381 Ibid s 57. 382 Ibid s 56. 383 Ibid s 58. 384 [2002] 211 CLR 317. 385 Section 32(4) of the Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW) permits a court to have regard to what the defendant knew or ought to have known about the plaintiff’s fortitude in assessing whether a recognised psychiatric injury was a foreseeable consequence of the defendant’s conduct in light of the plaintiff’s particular circumstances. 386 This expression embodied the High Court’s idea of there being ‘some people with such a degree of susceptibility to psychiatric injury that it is ordinarily unreasonable to require strangers to contemplate the possibility of (mental) harm to them’. It does not connote a ‘normal’ person against whose emotional qualities and strengths a plaintiff will be compared.

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According to Gummow and Kirby JJ, the central enquiry for a court is ‘whether, in all the circumstances, the risk of the plaintiff sustaining a recognisable psychiatric illness (in reacting to the defendant’s conduct) was reasonably foreseeable’.387

There is possibly no better illustration of this principle being applied than in the case of Mrs Tame herself. She suffered a psychotic depressive illness after learning that a police officerincorrectly recorded in a traffic collision report that she registered a blood alcohol concentration of 0.14 (the correct reading was nil). Although no consequences of the error flowed to her, Mrs Tamebecame obsessed about it and ultimately developed a severe depressive illness. The High Court held that her response was not a foreseeable consequence of the police officer’s conduct (a person of normal fortitude not normally reacting in that manner), hence the plaintiff failed.

These concepts have been adopted within pt 3 of the Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW):

ƒƒ section 30 precludes the recovery for pure mental harm arising from shock unless the plaintiff witnessed at the scene the victim being killed, injured or put in peril, or the plaintiff is a close member of the family of the victim; ƒƒ section 31 precludes the recovery of damages for mental harm in the absence of proof of a diagnosed recognised psychiatric injury; and ƒƒ section 32 provides that no duty of care to avoid mental harm is owed:

‘. . . unless the defendant ought to have foreseen that a person of normal fortitude might, in the circumstances of the case, suffer a recognised psychiatric illness if reasonable care were not taken’.

The case of Hollier v Sutcliffe388 is an example of the working of s 32. In that case the plaintiff sought damages for mental trauma arising from the incorrect insertion of a contraceptive implant. Hulme J held that s 32 applied and therefore no damages could be awarded. Of note was that the defendant submitted that ‘a person of normal fortitude would not have had the psychiatric condition identified . . .’. Hulme J held that this submission was not in accordance with s 32. His Honour said:

‘The section speaks in terms of whether “a person of normal fortitude might, in the circumstances of the case, suffer a recognised psychiatric illness”. It does not speak of whether that hypothetical person might suffer the psychiatric illness from which the plaintiff suffered. Whether the plaintiff was a person of “normal fortitude” is not a relevant consideration. The focus is upon “a person”.’389

Further, pt 3 draws a distinction between:

ƒƒ ‘pure mental harm’, namely that is not suffered as a consequence of a personal injury; and ƒƒ ‘consequential mental harm’, namely mental harm that is a consequence of a physical injury of another kind.

Pure mental harm includes the mental or nervous shock suffered by an individual as a result of the death, injury or placement in ‘peril’ of another individual as a result of the conduct of the defendant. In order to limit the number of potential claimants seeking damages for pure nervous shock, s 30(2) provides that the plaintiff is not entitled to recover damages for pure mental harm unless:

387 [2002] 211 CLR 317 [201]. 388 [2010] NSWSC 279. 389 Ibid [220].

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a) the plaintiff witnessed, at the scene, the victim being killed, injured or put in peril; or b) the plaintiff is a close member of the family of the victim390 who suffers mental harm either as a result of witnessing the victim’s plight or later learning of it.391

The operation of s 30 of the Act was considered by the New South Wales Court of Appeal in Sheehan v State Rail Authority of New South Wales.392 In that case, the plaintiffs were both police officers who attended the scene of an horrific train derailment. Being first to arrive at the scene, the plaintiffs cleared survivors from the wreck, administered first aid and reassured the victims awaiting medical assistance. During the rescue, the plaintiffs observed dismembered bodies and were exposed to significant danger while extricating survivors and corpses fromthe carnage. The plaintiffs brought a claim for damages against the State Rail Authority (SRA) on the basis that they suffered psychiatric injury due to the SRA’s negligence in failing to prevent the derailment. The issue was whether the plaintiffs satisfied s 30(2)(a) in that they ‘witnessed, at the scene, a person being killed, injured or put in peril.’

In interpreting the language of s 30(2)(a) of the Act, the court identified ‘being’ as the operative word in the provision. The court held that in order for such a claim to succeed, the plaintiffs had to have directly observed the causal event whereby another person is killed, injured or put in peril. Here, the plaintiffs merely witnessed the aftermath of the incident. The court noted that the equivalent provision in the Tasmanian Act contained, following the recommendation of the Ipp report, the words ‘witnessed . . . the immediate aftermath’. The omission of such language in the New South Wales Act was a significant factor in the court’s determination that s 30(2)(a) does not extend to people ‘who came upon the scene after the incident itself in which victims were killed, injured or put in peril was over’.393 Accordingly, the plaintiffs were precluded from recovery. This finding casts doubt on whether a rescuer can ever claim damages for pure mental harm.

In considering the language of s 30(2)(a), the court in Sheehan also established that the phrase ‘at the scene’ precludes recovery for pure mental harm for observations through television or the media.394 Accordingly, a plaintiff must witness the incident in person.

Importantly the decision in Sheehan v State Rail Authority was reversed in Wicks v State Rail Authority of New South Wales.395 The court made four major findings in the case:

ƒƒ the expression ‘being put in peril’ found in ss 30(1) and 30(2)(a) has the meaning that the words ordinarily convey. A person is put in peril when put at risk; the person remains in peril (is ‘being put in peril’) until the person ceases to be at risk; ƒƒ section 30 and particularly s 30(2)(a) does not assume that all cases of death, injury or being put in peril are events that begin and end in an instant, or even that they are events that necessarily occupy only a time that is measured in minutes. Death, injury or being put in peril can take place over an extended period; ƒƒ the consequences of the derailment took time to play out. Some aboard the train were killed instantly, some injuries were suffered during the process of derailment and others during the process of removal. The survivors of the derailment remained in peril until they had been rescued and taken to a place of safety; and

390 Close members of the family are defined under s30(5) to include, apart from the obvious examples, the de-facto partner, half and step siblings of the victim. 391 According to the High Court in Annetts, a family member need not be present at the time of the victim’s death or injury and thereby directly perceive the event or its aftermath. This point was reinforced in the subsequent High Court decision of Gifford v Strang Patrick Stevedoring Pty Ltd (2003) 214 CLR 269. 392 [2009] NSWCA 261. 393 Ibid [77]. 394 Ibid [68]. 395 (2010) 241 CLR 60.

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ƒƒ the rescuers at the scene of the derailment witnessed victims of the accident being put in peril as a result of the negligence of the respondent, even though the rescuers did not witness the derailment.

In Cox v State of New South Wales,396 the plaintiff suffered years of bullying at primary school. This included incidences where the plaintiff:

ƒƒ was found to have red marks on the front of his neck and what looked like burn marks on the back of his neck; ƒƒ was found to have red welts across the back of his body; ƒƒ had various bruises and lacerations to his mouth and body; and ƒƒ received numerous threats of further harm if he reported the bullying to authorities.

Despite many complaints to the school by the plaintiff’s mother, it did not improve the situation. The medical evidence at the trial revealed that the plaintiff suffered from psychiatric conditions variously identified as depression and anxiety disorder, separation anxiety disorder and post- traumatic stress disorder. The plaintiff was assessed as being unemployable and was in receipt of a disability pension. The plaintiff commenced proceedings against the defendant as being responsible for the conduct and administration of government schools in New South Wales.

Here, the court confirmed that the defendant, through the school authorities, owed a duty of care to the plaintiff. Based on the evidence led by the plaintiff’s mother and, in the absence of any contradictory evidence led by the defendant, the court found that the school authorities failed to exercise reasonable care to prevent the attacks upon the plaintiff. Accordingly, the court found in favour of the plaintiff.

Lastly, in a departure from the common law, the contributory negligence of a person killed or injured as a result of the defendant’s conduct will now result in a corresponding reduction in the damages recovered by a person bringing a resultant action for pure mental harm.397 Previously, the contributory negligence of the victim could not be raised in answer to the plaintiff’s claim.

Intoxication and illegal activity Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW) pts 6 and 7 (ss 47–54H) commenced 20 March 2002 Intoxication The reforms in relation to intoxication introduced by the Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW) are more far reaching than in any other jurisdiction. Under pt 6, a court cannot award damages to a plaintiff where the plaintiff was intoxicated to the extent that the plaintiff’s capacity to exercise reasonable care and skill was impaired at the time of the act or omission causing death, injury or damage.398 Pursuant to s 48 of the Act, a reference to a person being intoxicated is a reference to a person being under the influence of alcohol or drugs (whether or not taken for a medicinal purpose and whether or not lawfully taken). However, there is an exception in s 50(2) in circumstances where the court is satisfied that the injury was likely to have occurred even if the person had not been intoxicated. Section 50(3) provides that if the court is satisfied that the injury would have occurred even if the person had not been intoxicated, a presumption of contributory negligence will apply unless the court is satisfied that the person’s intoxication did not contribute in any way to the cause of the death, injury or damage.

396 (2007) Aust Torts Reports 81-888. 397 Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW) s 30(3). 398 Ibid s 48.

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The case of Jackson v Lithgow City Council399 considered the operation of ss 50(2) and 50(3). The appellant in that case was found unconscious in a concrete drain in a park having suffered significant injuries to his head and spine. It was established that he had taken his dogs for a walk late in the evening in a state of intoxication. He had no memory of the accident, although it was accepted that he had tripped over a low, unfenced retaining wall around the drain and had fallen some 1.5 metres onto the drain itself.

The court considered the position of the wall and the absence of any lighting in the park and concluded that it was indeed very possible that the accident would have happened had the appellant not been intoxicated. Having come to this conclusion pursuant to s 50(2), the court then engaged s 50(3) which prescribes a statutory presumption that the appellant is contributorily negligent unless the court is satisfied that the appellant’s intoxication did not contribute to his cause of injury. Ultimately, the court could not conclude on the evidence that the appellant’s intoxication did not play a part in his injury, and thus imposed the mandatory 25% allowance for contributory negligence. While the court reiterated that it was empowered by virtue of s 50(4) to impose a greater deduction, it saw no reason to do so.

Importantly, the primary liability finding against the defendant was overturned in Lithgow City Council v Jackson.400 The reversal of the decision was not based upon the court’s application of ss 50(2) and 50(3) so the court’s application of these provisions is still enlightening. Rather, the decision was reversed due to issues concerning the admissibility of evidence by ambulance officers who responded to the scene. The court held that without the evidence from the ambulance officers there was an insufficient link between the respondent’s fall and appellant’s negligence, and the plaintiff’s case failed.

A further exception to the rule is made under s 50(5) in circumstances where the court is satisfied that the intoxication was not self-induced.

By contrast, in most other State jurisdictions, recovery is not precluded; instead there is a presumption of contributory negligence and a minimum reduction in damages. Section 49(1) outlines the principles that apply in connection with the effect that a person’s intoxication has on the duty and standard of care that an intoxicated person is owed. First, it is irrelevant to consider the likelihood that a person may be intoxicated or that an intoxicated person may be exposed to an increased risk because of their impaired ability to exercise reasonable care and skill. Secondly, a person is not owed a duty of care merely because they are intoxicated. Finally, the fact that a person is, or may be, intoxicated does not affect the standard of care owed to a person. Section 49 of the Act prevails over the relevant provisions of the Motor Accidents Act 1988 (NSW) and the Motor Accidents Compensation Act 1999 (NSW).

If the court is satisfied that the injury is likely to have occurred even if the person had not been intoxicated, there is a presumption of contributory negligence of at least 25% unless the court is satisfied the person’s intoxication did not in any way contribute to the cause of death, injury or damage.

The case of Vale v Eggin401 is an example of the application of s 49 of the Act. This case involved a claim by an apparently intoxicated man who was struck by a motor vehicle. The driver of the vehicle recalls having seen the stumbling man on the road from a distance of 90 metres, but when she thought he was moving away, increased her speed as she approached the area where he stood. The man stumbled backwards and the driver was unable to avoid hitting him.

399 [2008] NSWCA 312. 400 (2011) 244 CLR 352. 401 (2006) 46 MVR 514.

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At trial, the judge was asked to determine whether the driver owed a duty of care to the intoxicated pedestrian. It was held that the driver was not negligent, having swerved and failed to brake, increased her speed upon seeing the pedestrian and failing to flash her lights or beep herhor n as she was acting ‘in the agony of the moment’. The trial judge’s interpretation of s 49 meant that the driver was not negligent because the man would have required a higher standard of care due to his intoxication.

On appeal, the New South Wales Court of Appeal held the trial judge wrongly incorporated the provisions of s 50 of the Act into s 49. The majority in the appeal held that s 49 deals with the effect of intoxication in respect of both the duty and standard of care owed to the intoxicated person and this does not create a bar to recovery as occurs if the provisions of s 50 apply.

As s 50 had no application to this case, the trial judge was found to have wrongly concluded the driver’s liability on this basis. The Court of Appeal therefore upheld the appeal and found the driver negligent in her actions, awarding the plaintiff $925,000 plus interest. An appeal was made to the High Court but special leave to appeal was refused.

Illegal activity Pursuant to s 54(1) of the Act, a court must not award damages in a claim to which the Act applies if the death or injury to the plaintiff occurred at the time of or following conduct by the plaintiff which constitutes a serious offence and that conduct contributed materially to the death, injury or damage, or to the risk of death, injury or damage.

For s 54 to apply it is not necessary for the plaintiff to have been convicted of an offence or to have been sentenced to imprisonment. Moreover, the commission of a serious offence need only be proven on the balance of probabilities.

The term ‘serious offence’ is defined in s 54(3) to mean an offence punishable by imprisonment of six months or more which means that the defence will operate with respect to a wide range of offences.

Determining whether there is a sufficient temporal connection between the plaintiff’sof fence and the injury or damage may prove to be difficult in light of the fact that the damage must have occurred ‘at the time of, or following, the criminal conduct.’ How long after the offence the injury can occur is uncertain.402

The onus is on a defendant to raise a plaintiff’s intoxication or involvement in illegal activity to enjoy the liability exemption afforded by these provisions. The exclusions to the presumption raised in light of these provisions in turn must be raised by the plaintiff to avoid liability being excluded.

Under pt 7 of the Act, a person does not incur liability arising from conduct carried out in self defence if the conduct to which the person was responding was unlawful or would have been unlawful had the person carrying out the conduct not been suffering from a mental illness.

The conduct is only considered to be in self defence if the person believes the conduct is necessary to:

ƒƒ defend himself or herself from another person; ƒƒ prevent or terminate the unlawful deprivation of his or her liberty or the liberty of another person; ƒƒ protect property from being unlawfully taken, damaged, interfered with or destroyed; or ƒƒ prevent criminal trespass.

402 For a helpful analysis of this issue and the operation of this section see the article ‘A Revival of the Doctrine of Attainder? The Statutory Illegality Defences to Liability in Tort’ [2007] 29 Sydney Law Review 445.

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The section also requires that the conduct is a reasonable response in the circumstances as he or she perceives them. The section does not apply to force involving the intentional or reckless infliction of death to protect property or prevent criminal trespass.

If the conduct is not a reasonable response in the circumstances, a court is still not to award damages unless it is satisfied the circumstances of the case are exceptional and the failureto award damages would be harsh and unjust. If a court awards damages due to an unreasonable response, the court is to award damages in accordance with pt 2 of the Act but is not to award damages for non-economic loss.

Part 1 of the Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW) excludes the application of the Act in relation to an intentional act that is done with intent to cause injury or death or sexual assault or other sexual misconduct apart from the provisions relating to interest on damages and pt 7 relating to self defence and recovery by criminals.

Contributory negligence Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW) pt 1A, div 8 (ss 5R–5T) commenced 20 March 2002 Section 5R of the Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW) provides that the principles which apply to determining whether a person has been negligent also apply in determining whether a plaintiff has been contributory negligent in failing to take precautions against the risk of that harm. The standard of care required of a plaintiff is that of a reasonable person in the position of the plaintiff, and is determined on the basis of what that person knew or ought to have known at the material time. In accordance with s 5S, the court has the power to reduce damages by up to 100% for contributory negligence if the court thinks it just and equitable to do so; and in such circumstances the claim will be defeated.

Section 5T also provides that a claim brought under the Compensation to Relatives Act 1897 (NSW) may also be reduced for contributory negligence on the part of the deceased.

It is important to note that contributory negligence is a concept that will turn on the facts of each case. Despite being an objective test, what is considered negligent conduct on the part of a plaintiff in respect of the cause of his or her own injuries will be entirely circumstantial. However, there are guiding principles that courts rely upon in assessing a plaintiff’s conduct.

Any conclusion of contributory negligence on the part of the plaintiff will result in an apportionment of liability.403 The approach of the court is therefore twofold; firstly to determine that negligence on the part of the plaintiff occurred, and secondly to attribute a value or weight to such negligence, usually expressed as a percentage. In apportioning liability, it is important to note that appellate courts will not interfere with a trial judge’s apportionment in the absence of some demonstrated error of principle or of fact or unless the apportionment is plainly wrong.404

403 See ‘Proportionate liability’. In considering apportionment, it is common place for courts to be guided by the leading authority of Podrebersek v Australian Iron & Steel Pty Ltd (1985) 59 ALJR 492 494. 404 Podrebersek v Australian Iron & Steel Pty Ltd (1985) 59 ALR 529, 532; 59 ALJR 492, 494. For a recent application of this principle, see Marien v Gardiner; Marien v HJ Heinz Company Australia Ltd (2013) 66 MVR 1, 13-14.

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The case of Jones v Dapto Leagues Club Limited405 is one of a long line of judicial considerations of contributory negligence in accidents involving intoxication of a plaintiff.406 The plaintiff, whilst drinking and playing pool at his local leagues club, stuck his fingers into an empty (and readily accessible) light socket forming part of ornamental lighting on a barrier near the pool table. The plaintiff believed the power to be turned off, having earlier witnessed this. The power had been restored by a staff member of the club, and the plaintiff suffered electric shock, burns and subsequently post-traumatic stress disorder.

The court considered the plaintiff’s actions in the context of what was deliberate or accidental. As no one was aware that the power had been restored, on appeal, the court considered that, in the circumstances, the plaintiff had not been negligent.

However, characterising conduct as merely accidental does not necessarily escape a finding of contributory negligence. In Sheldrick v State of New South Wales407 the plaintiff sought to justify his conduct by reference to earlier case law (under employment related cases) that a failure to keep a proper lookout for vehicular traffic (whilst traversing an intersection on a bicycle) was merely a lapse of concentration rather than a deliberate or conscious decision.

On appeal, the court noted that inattention or accidental conduct can escape characterisation as contributory negligence if it is:

‘inattention bred of familiarity and repetition, the urgency of [a] task, [and the plaintiff’s] preoccupation with the matter in hand . . .’408

Conversely, an instance of momentary inattention in the context of a failure to keep a proper lookout was held by the New South Wales Court of Appeal to be a departure from the standard of care a contractual entrant ought to have exercised while walking on the occupier’s premises.409 In light of this, the Court of Appeal affirmed the trial Judge’s decision, assessing contributory negligence at 40%.

Sheldrick is also authority for the objective test to be applied in characterising the plaintiff’s conduct; the plaintiff’s inexperience in cycling did not impact on the assessment of the standard of care to be expected by a reasonable person of his age. A plaintiff’s degree of experience is therefore not a circumstance imposed upon the ‘reasonable person’ test.

However, as the standard of care required of a person who has suffered harm is that ‘of a reasonable person in the position of that person’, courts have assessed the physical and mental capabilities of that particular person. In the case of Smith v Zhang, the plaintiff was an elderly and poor sighted pedestrian who took a shortcut across the road and was hit by a car. The court reduced the contributory negligence attributed to the plaintiff by reference to her physical capabilities.

The onus is on the defendant to show that the plaintiff’s actions are a causative factor of the incident resulting in the injury.410 Mere inadvertence may not be sufficient to prove contributory negligence.411

405 [2008] NSWCA 32. 406 It is of value to refer also to the section ‘Intoxication and Illegal Activity’. 407 [2007] NSWCA 105. 408 Ibid [53]. 409 Boral Bricks Pty Ltd v Cosmidis (No 2) [2014] NSWCA 139 [71]. 410 Port Kembla Coal Terminal Ltd v Braverus Maritime Inc (2004) 140 FCR 445; Nominal Defendant v Rooskov (2012) 60 MVR 350. 411 Bankstown Foundry Pty Ltd v Braistina (1996) 160 CLR 301, 310; Sungravure Pty Ltd v Meani (1964) 110 CLR 24, 37; J Blackwood & Son v Skilled Engineering Ltd [2008] NSWCA 142.

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Of particular note, given the prevalence of distracting digital devices for pedestrians or drivers today, in Skulander v Willoughby City Council412 the court succinctly considered the plaintiff’s lack of patience in continuing to use her mobile telephone whilst walking (and ultimately striking an unseen but plainly visible obstacle) accounted for a contribution of 50% to her injuries.

An interesting discussion arose in the New South Wales Court of Appeal case of ACQ v Cook; Aircair Moree v Cook; Cook v Country Energy; Country Energy v Cook413 in respect of contributory negligence in multiple defendant actions where there was a dispute as to whether the Act’s contributory negligence provisions would apply in respect of alleged breaches of statutory duties arising under Commonwealth legislation.414

The Court of Appeal held that the contributory negligence provisions which applied to other defendants as tortfeasors could not be considered in assessing the liability of the defendant found in breach of statutory duty that did not allow for the characterisation of that defendant as a tortfeasor.

On appeal to the High Court, the appellants maintained that the use of the relevant legislative history, by the court, to illustrate an extension of liability by means of the 1999 Act was erroneous. It was argued, in particular, that the court’s conclusion that the purpose of ss 10 and 11 was to extend liability without limitation, was false. The court held that the appellants were correct to say, at least in relation to this case, that there was nothing in the extrinsic materials definitively supporting the result at which the Court of Appeal arrived. The High Court held that the Court of Appeal, nevertheless, was correct to conclude that s 10(1)(d) did, in a sense, extend liability from ‘direct consequences’ to indirect or consequential results. What these two categories of expression might mean was another issue.

Proportionate liability Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW) pt 4 (ss 34–39) commenced 20 March 2002, s 34(1)(b) removed and substituted 1 January 2011 The proportionate liability provisions in the Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW) apply to incidents occurring on or after 26 July 2004.415

Pursuant to the Act, an apportionable claim is defined as a claim for economic loss or damage to property in an action for damages (whether in contract, tort or otherwise) arising from a failure to take reasonable care.416 The provisions also apply to a claim for economic loss or damage to property in an action for damages under s 42 of the Fair Trading Act 1987 (NSW) or s 18 of the Australian Consumer Law 2010 (Cth), where applicable.417 The provisions will not apply to claims arising out of personal injury.418

For an action for damages to have arisen from a failure to take reasonable care, Macfarlan JA opined ‘it is in my view necessary that the absence of reasonable care was an element of the, or a, cause of action upon which the plaintiff succeeded.’419 He considered that this approach ensures that a party in breach of contract cannot benefit from being found to have acted negligently rather than ‘innocently’. On this point Barrett JA noted:

412 (2007) 73 NSWLR 44. 413 (2008) 72 NSWLR 318. 414 Damage by Aircraft Act 1999 (Cth). 415 Civil Liability Regulation 2009 (NSW) reg 5. 416 Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW) s 34(1). 417 Ibid s 34(1)(b). 418 Ibid s 34(3). 419 Perpetual Trustee Company Ltd v CTC Group Pty Ltd (No 2) [2013] NSWCA 58, [22]–[23].

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‘It cannot be suggested . . . that the nature or quality of a “claim” is, for relevant purposes, to be determined solely be looking at the court’s decision in relation to it. Nor is the nature of quality of a “claim” to be determined solely by looking at the terms in which it is framed. Rather, it is a combination of the terms in which the claim is framed (or pleaded) and relevant findings of the court in relation to it that must be assessed in order to decide whether it is a claim “in an action for damages, arising from a failure to take reasonable care” and has the other attributes of an “apportionable claim” under s 34(1)(a).’420

A ‘concurrent wrongdoer’ is defined in s 34 as a person who is one of two or more persons whose acts or omissions caused, independently of each other or jointly, the damage or loss that is the subject of the claim. This definition of a concurrent wrongdoer in New South Wales differs slightly from the Queensland definition. In Queensland, concurrent wrongdoers are those whose acts or omissions cause damage independently of each other, as opposed to independently or jointly.421

With respect to apportionable claims, the liability of a defendant, who is a concurrent wrongdoer in relation to that claim, is limited to an amount reflecting that proportion of the damage orloss claimed that the court considers just, having regard to the extent of the defendant’s responsibility for the damage or loss.422

Importantly, if the proceedings involve both an apportionable claim and a claim that is not an apportionable claim, then liability for the non-apportionable part of the claim is to be determined in accordance with ordinary applicable legal rules.423 Therefore, the principle of joint and several liability still applies to non-apportionable parts of a plaintiff’s claim.

In the decision of Ucak v Avante Developments Pty Ltd,424 Hammerschlag J provided guidance for defendants intending to plead and rely on proportionate liability provisions. It was held that a defendant, pleading and relying on proportionate liability, must plead and rely upon the material facts pertaining to the causes of action by which it is alleged the claim is an ‘apportionable claim’. Put simply, if a defendant intends to allege that other concurrent wrongdoers either caused or contributed to the plaintiff’s loss, the defendant must allege the relevant facts which caused the defendant to make these assertions.

This construction has since been adopted by the Queensland Supreme Court of Appeal in the decision of Meandarra Aerial Spraying Pty Ltd v GEJ & MA Geldard Pty Ltd.425 In Meandarra, Fraser J (White JA and Mullins J agreeing) noted:

‘. . . The same construction should be adopted in relation to the [Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld)]. There are textual differences between the Act and similar legislation in New South Wales and Victoria, but the differences are not material to this issue . . . It follows that proof that an act or omission of a person other than a defendant was an independent cause of the claimed loss or damage is necessary before any occasion arises to consider whether or how a defendant’s liability should be limited under section 31. A plaintiff’s cause of action is complete without any evidence that there is a concurrent wrongdoer; the plaintiff is entitled to recover its proved loss in full from a defendant who is proved to be legally liable for that loss. If a defendant wishes to achieve a different result, the onus must be on the defendant to prove the necessary facts.’426

420 Ibid [42]. 421 Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW) s 34(2), compare Queensland’s Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld) s 30. 422 Ibid s 35(1). 423 Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW) s 35(2). 424 [2007] NSWSC 367. 425 [2013] 1 Qd R 319. 426 Ibid [346].

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The New South Wales Court of Appeal has confirmed that the proportionateliability provisions in the New South Wales legislation will only apply to circumstances where the liability arose after 26 July 2004. In Origin Energy LPG Ltd v Bestcare Foods Ltd,427 the validity of reg 3 of the Civil Liability Regulation 2003 (NSW) was challenged. The proceedings related to property damage resulting from an explosion at the Bestcare premises on 25 January 2003, which Bestcare alleged, resulted from the conduct of Origin in a gas installation. Origin denied liability and submitted that should it be found liable for the damage, it was only liable for part of the damage.

In upholding the decision of the Supreme Court, the New South Wales Court of Appeal confirmed that cl 3 of the Civil Liability Regulation 2003 (NSW) was valid, displacing the operation of cl 6(1) and cl 13 of sch 1 of the Act, thus preserving the commom law liability of Origin as a concurrent tortfeasor. Therefore, as the liability arose before 26 July 2004, Origin was not entitled to rely on the proportionate liability provisions, even though the proceedings relevant to the damage commenced after 1 December 2004, when the proportionate liability provisions were enacted. The High Court refused Origin special leave to appeal.

When apportioning responsibility for a claim, a court is to exclude that proportion of the damage caused by the plaintiff’s own contributory negligence,428 and may also have regard to comparative responsibility of any concurrent wrongdoer whether or not the wrongdoer is a party to the proceedings.429

The recent High Court decision of Hunt and Hunt Lawyers v Mitchell Morgan Nominees Pty Ltd430 has provided some discussion as to the purpose of proportionate liability legislation.

Importantly, a defendant against whom judgment is given as a concurrent wrongdoer in relation to an apportionable claim cannot be required to contribute to any damages or contribution recovered from another concurrent wrongdoer in respect of an apportionable claim (whether or not the damages or contribution are recovered in the same proceedings in which judgment is given against the defendant), nor can they be required to indemnify any other such concurrent wrongdoer.431

Barrett J in Reinhold v New South Wales Lotteries Corporation (No 2)432 provides an example of how the Court approaches apportionment under the Act. The case concerned an action for damages to compensate the plaintiff for the cancellation of his winning lottery ticket by New South Wales Lotteries Corporation (‘Lotteries’) and a newsagency. Having found that both Lotteries and the newsagency were negligent, the Court then had to determine whether:

ƒƒ the sum of $2 million, as damages payable to the plaintiff, was apportionable between the defendants; and, if so, ƒƒ in what amounts.

In determining apportionment, Barrett J held that Lotteries and the newsagency were concurrent wrongdoers for the purposes of the provisions, given that they had both caused the ‘subject of the claim’ by the plaintiff. Having established that the defendants were concurrent wrongdoers, the claim was apportionable between them.

Accordingly, Barrett J considered s 35(1)(a) of the Act to in terms of apportionment. This section requires the Court to limit liability to an amount reflecting that proportion of the damage or loss claimed that the Court considers just having regard to the extent of the defendant’s responsibility

427 [2007] NSWCA 321. 428 Civil Liability Act 2002 s 35(3)(a). 429 Ibid s 35(3)(b). 430 (2013) 247 CLR 613. 431 Civil Liability Act 2002 s 36. 432 (2008) 82 NSWLR 762.

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for the damage or loss. In interpreting this provision, the distinction between just as opposed to just and equitable was found to be significant.433 His Honour interpreted this distinction as affording the Court the discretion to come to a conclusion about where the justice of the case lies. The alternative interpretation would have required the Court to consider matters beyond the defendants’ liability, namely which party was more financially equipped to bear the liability.434 Accordingly, ‘blameworthiness and causative potency’435 was the principle factor in determining apportionment. The Court found that Lotteries had a ‘greater degree of culpability’,436 and to that end was apportioned 90% of the liability.

Further, concurrent wrongdoers have a duty to assist the plaintiff in identifying other concurrent wrongdoers, including providing in writing, as soon as practicable, notice of the identity of the other wrongdoer and the circumstances which make the other person a concurrent wrongdoer under the claim.437 The failure to do so can have adverse cost consequences for the concurrent wrongdoer.438

However, s 35A is intended to make provision for costs when notice has not been provided by the defendant to the plaintiff and the plaintiff unnecessarily incurs costs. The section does not operate to reject the defendant’s defence altogether in circumstances whereby notice has not been provided in accordance with this section.439

Of significance is s 3A(2) of the Act, which allows parties to contract out of their rights, obligations and liabilities with respect to matters referred to under the Act (except pt 2 which deals with personal injury damages).

This provision was successfully relied upon in the decision of the New South Wales Court of Appeal in Perpetual Trustee Company Ltd v CTC Group Pty Ltd (No 2).440 The primary judge had found that that the respondent was liable for damage to the appellant for failing to take reasonable care when approving a mortgage origination deed (the lendee was a victim of fraud, with his brother signing the loan application, loan agreement and mortgage over his property). The respondent entered a Notice of Contention, seeking to limit the extent of its liability by claiming that other identified parties (including the lendee’s brother) were concurrent wrongdoers, which should be considered by the Court in apportioning liability. The respondent argued that its liability was limited by s 35(1) of the Act.

Relevantly, the appellant claimed damages from the respondent pursuant to cl 14.3 under the mortgage origination deed, submitting that the respondent was liable to indemnify the appellant. The Court accepted that cl 14.3 rendered the respondent liable for the full amount of the appellant’s loss resulting from a breach of warranty or other obligation under the mortgage origination deed.441 The Court held the cl 14.3 was inconsistent with the application of the apportionment provision under pt 4 of the Act. Macfarlan JA noted that if the respondent’s liability were so limited, the appellant would be deprived of its contractual right to indemnity, as agreed to between the parties.442 As such, s 3A(2) of the Act was applicable. Focusing on the fact of inconsistency, the court held that no particular means of exclusion is necessary to come within s 3A(2):

433 Ibid [773]. 434 Ibid [776]. 435 Ibid [774]. 436 Ibid [780]. 437 Civil Liability Act 2002 s 35A. 438 Ibid s 35A(2). 439 See Pastrovic & Co Pty Ltd v Farrington (2011) 13 DCLR (NSW) 37,49 (Johnstone J). 440 [2013] NSWCA 58. 441 Ibid [11]. 442 Ibid [11].

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‘The question to which s 3A(2) gives rise is whether a contract makes express provision for the parties’ rights, obligations and liabilities which differs from that provided by the Act. It is not relevant to consider whether the parties adverted to the existence of the apportionment provisions of the Act and decided to contract out of them. Section 3A “does not require the parties to use any particular form of wording to effect a contracting out” (Aquagenics at [71]). No reference needs to be made to the Act. All that matters is that the contractual indemnity is inconsistent with the provisions of Part 4.’443

Vicarious liability New South Wales has not introduced any legislative reforms dealing with the issue of vicarious liability. An employer can be found vicariously liable for a wrongful, unauthorised or negligent act of an employee which is carried out in the course of his or her employment and is so closely connected with an authorised act that it may be regarded as a mode of doing the authorised act. This principle was endorsed in the High Court case of New South Wales v Lepore; Samin v Queensland; Rich v Queensland444 in which three appeals were held simultaneously. However, an employer will not always be held responsible for the actions of his or her employees.445 The Act must be closely connected with his or her employment for vicarious liability to attach. Therefore, whether an employer will be held vicariously liable for the actions of his or her employee will depend upon the specific facts in each case.

New South Wales v Lepore; Samin v Queensland; Rich v Queensland was applied in Sweeney v Boylan Nominees Pty Ltd.446 In that case the appellant was injured when the door of a refrigerator fixed by a third party contractor fell off and hit her. The appellant argued that the respondent was vicariously liable for the conduct of the contractor. The court said that the proposition underpinning the appellant’s argument, that if one person ‘represents’ a second, then the second person is vicariously liable for the conduct of the first, is so general that it goes well beyond the bounds set in previous cases by notions of control or notions of course of employment. The distinction between independent contractors and employees has been critical to definingthe ambit of vicarious liability. The view that the distinction should be abandoned in favour of a wider principle has not been accepted by a majority of the High Court of Australia.

In Webster v Coles Myer Limited; Thompson v Coles Myer Limited,447 the plaintiffs claimed that the defendant was vicariously liable for the actions of its employee where that employee falsely and maliciously identified the plaintiffs as credit card fraudsters to the police. The court cited with approval the finding of Gummow and Hayne JJ in Lepore that vicarious liability will be established where:

‘. . . the conduct of which complaint is made was done in the ostensible pursuit of the employer’s business or the apparent execution of the authority which the employer held out the employee as having’.448

443 Ibid [14] (per McFarlan JA, Meagher and Barrett JJA agreeing) quoting Aquagenics Pty Ltd v Break O’Day Council [2010] TASFC 3, [71] (Tennent J). 444 (2003) 212 CLR 511. 445 Ibid. 446 (2006) 266 CLR 161. 447 (2009) 9 DCLR (NSW) 123. 448 Ibid [236].

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The court heard evidence on the system employed by the defendant for reporting potential criminal conduct and found that its employees’ vigilance and duty to report suspicious or dishonest conduct to the police was an integral part of that system. With this in mind, the defendant was found vicariously liable for the conduct of its employee. This decision was later affirmed by the New South Wales Court of Appeal.449

Withyman v State of New South Wales450 concerned a claim for vicarious liability where a special care school teacher engaged in a sexual relationship with one of her pupils. The student successfully claimed damages against the teacher for psychological harm and damage caused by her termination of this sexual relationship, but unsuccessfully argued the State was vicariously liable for the misconduct. On appeal, the plaintiff argued that, applying Lepore, there was a sufficient connection between the teacher’s misconduct and her employment because the intimacy and vulnerability inhering in such student/teacher relationships created a risk of sexual activity. The New South Wales Court of Appeal (Allsop P, Meagher and Ward JJA agreeing) rejected this argument, holding that the emotional vulnerability of special care pupils does not create a new ambit of risk of sexual activity. As such, there was an insufficient nexus to justify the imposition of liability on the State for the teacher’s out of character, sexual misconduct.451

A similar line of reasoning was applied in Zakka v Elias.452 The plaintiff claimed that the employer solicitor was vicariously liable for the professional negligence of its employee solicitor who was found to have breached her duty of care in respect of legal advice given for loan transactions entered into by the plaintiff. In circumstances where the plaintiff approached the employee personally and not the firm, the employee’s conduct was not authorised to be done as an employed solicitor of the firm. The employer therefore had done nothing to position the employee with respect to the plaintiff to commit the wrongful act, other than to employ her as a solicitor. Instead, the employee ‘engaged in a frolic of her own or at her own whim’.453 The New South Wales Court of Appeal (Ward JA, Emmett JA and Tobias AJA agreeing) held there was an insufficient connection between the employee solicitor’s unauthorised conduct and her employment to invoke the doctrine of vicarious liability as explained in Lepore and Withyman.

Non-delegable duties Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW) pt 1A div 7 (s 5Q) commenced 20 March 2002 The term ‘non-delegable duty’ is perhaps somewhat misleading. It does not mean that a party owing a duty of care cannot delegate the task to a third party, but rather that the liability for breach of a duty to take reasonable care cannot be delegated. As such, there is a duty to ensure that reasonable care is taken. Therefore, if a third party to whom a task has been entrusted fails to exercise reasonable care, the non-delegable duty will have been breached.

The categories of non-delegable duties continue to evolve. The courts have struggled however to clearly define the parameters required to justify the existence of a non-delegable duty of care. The known criteria include the superior capacity of the defendant to bear the risk of the mishap; the special obligation which it is proper to attach to extra-hazardous activities; and the special dependence or vulnerability of the person to whom the duty is owed.454

449 [2009] NSWCA 299. 450 [2013] NSWCA 10. 451 Ibid [143]. 452 [2013] NSWCA 119. 453 Ibid [142]. 454 Northern Sandblasting Pty Ltd v Harris (1997) 188 CLR 313.

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Common relationships in which non-delegable duties exist include:

ƒƒ employer and employee;455 ƒƒ host employer and contractor;456 ƒƒ school and student;457 ƒƒ hospital and patient;458 and ƒƒ owner of premises and licensee.459

The Ipp report recommended that the relevant civil liability legislation should ensure that plaintiffs could not circumvent the application of the civil liability legislation by pleading their action based upon breach of a non-delegable duty of care.

In response to the recommendation, New South Wales has enacted s 5Q of the Act which provides that a party who has breached a non-delegable duty to ensure that reasonable care is taken will be liable to the extent that they would be had their liability arisen as a result of vicarious liability.

Exclusion clauses Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW) pt 1A div 5 (s 5N) commenced 20 March 2002 Section 5N was inserted by Civil Liability Amendment (Personal Responsibility) Act 2002 (NSW) and commenced 10 January 2003 Part 1A, div 5 of the Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW) expressly allows a contract for the supply of recreational services to exclude, restrict or modify any liability that results from a breach of an express or an implied warranty that the services will be rendered with reasonable care and skill.

To be upheld, however, the exclusion clause will still need to abide by common law principles, and the person or entity seeking to rely upon such a clause should ensure that same is clearly incorporated into the contract, specifically drafted to cover the factual scenario encountered by the person or entity seeking to enforce it, and to the extent possible, brought to the attention of the other party to the contract.460

The High Court considered s 5N in Insight Vacations Pty Ltd v Young.461 In this case it was held that s 5N applies only to contracts for the provision of recreation services that are to be performed in New South Wales. It does not apply to contracts that are to be performed outside New South Wales, even if the governing law of the contract is the law of New South Wales. Accordingly, s 5N did not apply to a contract, the proper law of which was the law of New South Wales, as the provision of coach transportation wholly outside New South Wales.

More recently, s 5N was considered in Nair-Smith v Perisher Blue Pty Ltd.462 The New South Wales Supreme Court was asked to determine whether terms on a ski-lift ticket operated to exclude a ski operator’s liability in negligence and under the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth). The Court held that s 5N barred neither of the plaintiff’s claims as neither claim involved the supply of ‘recreational services’ by Perisher. Instead, the parties had contracted for transportation services up and between ski slopes.463

455 Kondis v State Transport Authority (1984) 154 CLR 672. 456 TNT Australia Pty Ltd v Christie & 2 Ors; Crown Equipment Pty Ltd v Christie & 2 Ors; Manpower Services (Aust) Pty Ltd v Christie & 2 Ors [2003] NSWCA 47. 457 Commonwealth v Introvigne (1982) 150 CLR 258. 458 Samios v Repatriation Commission [1960] WAR 219. 459 Burnie Port Authority v General Jones Pty Ltd (1994) 179 CLR 520. 460 Lormine Pty Ltd & Anor v Xuereb [2006] NSWCA 200. 461 [2011] 243 CLR 149. 462 [2013] NSWSC 727. 463 Ibid [106], [116].

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Where the claim is one captured by the Australian Consumer Law, there are certain guarantees which cannot be excluded or limited by contract. See div 2–3 of sch 2 of the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth).

Apology Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW) pt 10 (ss 67–69) commenced 20 March 2002 Pursuant to s 68 of the Act, an apology is defined as:

‘an expression of sympathy or regret, or of a general sense of benevolence or compassion, in connection with any matter whether or not the apology admits or implies an admission of fault in connection with the matter’.

The Supreme Court of New South Wales distinguished an expression of regret from an apology in the case of David Michael Wilson v Nilepac Pty Ltd t/as Vision Personal Training (Crows Nest).464 In that case, a personal trainer was being sued by his client for an injury sustained during a training session. The plaintiff placed reliance on two statements made by the defendant after having suffered his injury that he ‘shouldn’t have started [him] off so hard’ and ‘we should have done more core strengthening exercises first’. The court construed these statements as being mere expressions of regret and not admissions of breach of the legal standard of care. It should be noted that the decision was overturned on appeal, but the trial judge’s findingsabout the expressions of regret were left undisturbed.465

Essentially, the Act provides that an apology in connection with any matter alleged to have been caused by a person does not constitute an admission of liability by the person in connection with that matter and will not be relevant to the determination of fault or liability. Evidence of an apology is not admissible in a court hearing as evidence of fault or liability (other than categories of civil liability excluded by s 3B of the Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW)).

For some High Court guidance on the distinction between admissions and apologies, see Dovuro Pty Ltd v Wilkins.466

Limitation periods Limitation Act 1969 (NSW) commenced 1 January 1971 New South Wales has not legislated to change the limitation period in personal injury actions (apart from survivorship action and compensation to relatives’ actions) which remains three years from the date on which the cause of action first accrues to the plaintiff or to a person through whom the plaintiff claims.467 However, the Limitation Act 1969 (NSW) does not apply to death or personal injury caused by the fault of the owner or driver of a motor vehicle in the use or operation of the vehicle.468

Under s 58 of the Limitation Act 1969 (NSW), a plaintiff is able to extend the limitation period should a plaintiff be able to point to a ‘fact of material and decisive character’ that was not within the knowledge of the applicant until after expiration of the limitation period.

In survivorship actions and compensation to relatives’ actions, the limitation provisions applying to negligence actions involving personal injury or death are as follows:469

464 [2009] NSWSC 1365. 465 Wilson v Nilepac Pty Ltd t/as Vision Personal Training (Crows Nest) [2011] NSWCA 63. 466 (2003) 215 CLR 317. 467 Limitations Act 1969 (NSW) s 18A; compare general limitation of six years. 468 Motor Accidents Compensation Act 1999 (NSW) s 109. 469 Limitations Act 1969 (NSW).

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ƒƒ the period starting three years from when the cause of action is discoverable, or 12 years starting from the occurrence that gives rise to the claim, whichever expires first; ƒƒ the 12 year period may be extended at the discretion of the court but not beyond three years after the cause of action is discoverable; ƒƒ the suspension of a limitation period during incapacity will not apply to a child who has a capable parent or guardian and discoverability of a cause of action by a minor will be assessed according to the knowledge of the parent or guardian; ƒƒ for actions by minors injured by a parent or guardian or close associate of their parent or guardian, the applicable limitation period will not start running until the person turns 25 years of age; and ƒƒ where the failure to bring an action on behalf of a minor was due to an irrational decision by a parent or guardian of the minor, a court will be able to extend a limitation period by up to one year.470

In relation to defamation, an action for defamation is not maintainable if brought after the end of a limitation period of one year running from the date of the publication of the matter complained of.471

However, a person claiming to have a cause of action for defamation may apply to the court for an order extending the limitation period for the cause of action under s 56A Limitation Act 1969 (NSW). If a court is satisfied that it was not reasonable in the circumstances for the plaintiff to have commenced an action in relation to the matter complained of within one year from the date of the publication, then the court must extend the limitation period mentioned in s 14B to a period of up to three years running from the date of the publication.

Damages Awards

Damages awarded in personal injury claims in New South wales are regulated by pt 2 of the Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW). Part 2 of the Act regulates damages awarded for general damages, economic loss, gratuitous care (received and provided) and interest.

General damages Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW) pt 2 div 3 (ss 16–17A) commenced 20 March 2002 Sections 16, 17 and 17A amended 6 December 2002; s 17A(2) amended 24 November 2005, ss 17(1) and 17(6) amended 28 June 2010 The Act established a minimum threshold for general damages for non-economic loss in accordance with a recommendation made in the Ipp report. Pursuant to pt 2, div 3 of the Act, no allowance is to be made in respect of general damages unless the severity of the loss is equal to or greater than 15% of a most extreme case. Where the severity of the non-economic loss is equal to or greater than 15% of the most extreme case, the allowance for general damages is to be calculated by the court with reference to a table in the legislation which contains a sliding scale. The operation of this scale was illustrated recently in Berkeley Challenge Pty Ltd v Howarth.472 In assessing non-economic loss for the respondent who was injured during work Basten JA stated that:

470 Ibid s 62D. 471 Limitation Act 1969 (NSW) s 14B. 472 [2013] NSWCA 370.

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‘damages for non-economic loss are required to be assessed as a proportion of a most extreme case: Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW), s 16. Non-economic loss assessed at less than 15% of such a case cannot be compensated: s 16(1). An assessment between 15% and 33% gives rise to an award on a scale increasing from 1% to 33% of the prescribed maximum amount. The trial judge assessed the severity at 33% of a most extreme case, thus permitting an award of 33% of the maximum amount, being $171,500. The appellant submitted that this assessment of severity was disproportionate and that the proper figure should have been in the order of 25%. Because of the tapered scale, the result of such a variation has a disproportionate effect on the award. An assessment of severity as 25% of a most extreme case will give rise to an award of $33,780, being a reduction of $137,720. Thus, the effect of the taper is that a variation from 33% of a most extreme case to 25% gives rise to an 80% reduction in an award.’

Depending on the severity of the loss, the amount allowed for general damages is calculated as a percentage of the maximum amount, which is currently capped at $551,500 (effective from 23 September 2013) The maximum amount allowable for general damages is gazetted each year prior to 1 October. Section 17A provides that in determining damages for non-economic loss, a court may refer to earlier decisions of that court or other courts.

What constitutes ‘15% of the most extreme case’ was considered in Owners-Strata Plan 156 v Gray.473 In that case the New South Wales Court of Appeal determined that it involved a legal and not a medical inquiry (i.e. it is not the same as an assessment of permanent impairment). The court held that ‘a most extreme case’ might include cases of quadriplegia, some serious cases of paraplegia, cases of serious brain damage and perhaps some cases of extremely serious scarring and disfigurement. An enquiry as to the determination of a percentage of ‘a most extreme case’ involves consideration of consequences such as present and future disability, pain and suffering, loss of amenities of life, loss of expectation of life and disfigurement.

In Gray’s case the plaintiff suffered a serious ankle sprain. The most generous medical assessment considered that the plaintiff had suffered a loss of efficient use of the left leg below the knee of 16%. This assessment was not of whole person impairment, which would have been less than 15%. The court, bearing in mind the evidence of pain and suffering and loss of amenities of life, including the possible development of osteoarthritis, and that the plaintiff had to abandon an occupation and outdoor activities which she enjoyed, assessed the severity of her non- economic loss as a proportion of a most extreme case at 20%.

In the case of Jopling v Isaac,474 the New South Wales Court of Appeal did not disturb an assessment of 28% of the most extreme case for a plaintiff who fell three metres to the ground from a balcony after the rusted and corroded balcony rail gave way when Isaac leant against it. Isaac suffered a number of injuries, the most serious of which was an injury to his right leg. He also suffered injuries to his right arm and also disfigurement from a post-operative scarto his right leg. The injuries were found to have severely diminished his surfing prowess, hisability to snowboard and caused pain in his right leg if he was required to stand for more than a short period of time. In upholding the primary judge’s s 16 assessment of the most extreme case (which was considered conservative), the court noted Isaac’s age when the accident occurred and the consequential impacts the injuries would have on his quality of life.

473 [2004] NSWCA 304; compare Khan v Polyzois [2006] NSWCA 59. 474 [2006] NSWCA 299.

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Economic loss Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW) pt 2 div 2 (ss 12–15C), pt 3 (ss 27–33) and pt 7 (ss 51–54A) Part 2 div 2 commenced 20 June 2002, s 15A amended 6 December 2002, ss 15, 15A and 15B amended 20 June 2006, s 15B(1) amended 19 May 2010 Part 3 commenced 6 December 2002 Part 7 amended 28 October 2005, s 52(1)(a) and (b) amended 19 December 2003, s 54(A) inserted 19 December 2003 and s 54D(4) amended 16 November 2007 Part 2, div 2 of the Act regulates the maximum amount to be awarded for economic loss. Under s 12(2) when awarding damages for economic loss (both past and future), the court is to disregard the claimant’s gross weekly earnings to the extent that they exceed an amount that is three times the average weekly earnings at the date of the award.

The court is not to award damages for future economic loss unless it is satisfied that the assumptions about future economic earning capacity or other events on which the award is to be based accord with the claimant’s most likely future circumstances but for the injury. The court is required to state the assumptions on which the award is based. If the court makes an award for future economic loss, it must reduce the award by reference to the percentage possibility that the events might have occurred but for the injury.

When assessing damages for future economic loss, the court is also to apply a prescribed discount rate of 5% (if no discount rate is otherwise prescribed by the Regulation) to the present day value of that future economic loss. Superannuation is to be allowed at the minimum percentage required by law to be paid as employer superannuation contributions. In cases involving consequential mental harm, pt 3 of the Act states the court is not to award damages unless the harm consists of a recognised psychiatric illness. Similarly, pt 7 of the Act states that damages for economic loss are not to be awarded where the conduct of a mentally ill plaintiff constituting a serious offence results in the loss.475

In the case of Fegan (bnf Rozenauers) v Lane Cove House Pty Limited476 the 16 year old female plaintiff suffered an injury to her left hand when she was almost four years of age. She claimed a buffer for future earning capacity on the basis that she was restricted in performing typing tasks, and intended to work in law or commerce. The trial judge allowed no buffer for future loss of earning capacity. The plaintiff appealed the decision, however, the appeal was dismissed, as the plaintiff was unable to demonstrate that her impairment was likely to result in any financial loss.

The decision of Pollard v Baulderstone Hornibrook Engineering Pty Ltd,477 this case demonstrates the court’s use of a buffer on economic loss where the court awarded $121,000, equivalent to 21% of the plaintiff’s net average weekly earnings over his expected working life. The court held that an award of a buffer is appropriate when ‘the impact of the injury upon the economic benefit from exercising earning capacity after injury is difficult todeter mine’.478

A further example of the court awarding a buffer on economic loss can be seen in Guiney v Australand Holdings Ltd and Ors; Castlehaven Sales No 2 Trading As Castlehaven Realtors and Ors v Guiney and Ors.479

475 A serious offence is an offence punishable by imprisonment for six months or more. 476 [2007] NSWCA 88. 477 (2008) Aust Torts Reports 81-949. 478 Ibid [84]. 479 [2008] NSWCA 44.

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Under s 13 the court must not award a claimant future economic loss unless they are satisfied the claimant assumptions about future earning capacity on which the award is to be based, accords with the most likely future circumstances but for the injury. This provision was considered by the New South Wales Court of Appeal in MacArthur District Motorcycle Sportsmen Inc v Ardizzone480 and Penrith City Council v Parks.481 In Penrith, McClellan AJA outlined s 13, stating that:

‘the court must determine the “most likely future circumstances” of a claimant “but for the injury”. This requires the court to assess matters such as the prospects of a claimant gaining gaining or remaining in employment, and for what period and also determine the rate at which he or she may earn during that employment; these are “assumptions about future or other events”. Secondly, the court must make an adjustment to any award by reference to “the percentage possibility that the events might have occurred but for the injury.” Thirdly, the assumption and percentage must be stated.’482

Gratuitous care Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW) pt 2 div 2 (ss 15–15C) commenced 20 March 2003 (s 15A) amended 6 December 2002 (ss 15, 15A and 15B) amended 20 June 2006 Attendant gratuitous care Damages for attendant gratuitous care are the equivalent of the damages formerly known as Griffiths v Kerkemeyer483 damages under common law. Part 2, div 2 of the Act now regulates when damages for gratuitous attendant care are to be allowed. Under s 15(2) no allowance is to be made for gratuitous attendant care unless:

ƒƒ there is (or was) a reasonable need for the services to be provided; ƒƒ the need has arisen (or arose) solely because of the injury to which the damages relate; and ƒƒ the services would not be (or would not have been) provided to the claimant but for the injury.

Further, under s 15(3) no damages may be awarded to a claimant for attendant gratuitous care unless the services are provided, or are to be provided:

ƒƒ for at least six hours per week; and ƒƒ for a period of at least six consecutive months.

The provision of gratuitous assistant care was considered in the case of Harrison v Melhem.484

The Civil Liability Amendment Act 2008 introduced amendments to the Civil Liability Act 2002 designed to reflect the decision in Harrison v Melham. In that case, Spigelman J considered the threshold provision contained in s 15(3) of the Act and held that ‘when either threshold in s 15(3) is satisfied, recovery for gratuitous services is open to be awarded’.485 His Honour found that the fact that for the purposes of calculating this head of damage, it is divided into two periods (before trial and in the future), does not require the threshold to be applied to each period. Once either threshold is satisfied, the plaintiff may recover damages for gratuitous services, subject to the other provisions of s 15 of the Act. Therefore, a claimant is not required to need future care for at least six hours per day for at least six months if they have already received this amount of care.

480 [2004] NSWCA 145. 481 [2004] NSWCA 201. 482 Ibid [51]. 483 (1977) 15 ALR 387. 484 (2008) Aust Torts Reports 81-951. 485 Ibid [20].

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Section 15(4) provides that where the amount of care required exceeds 40 hours per week, damages must not exceed the amount estimated by the Australian Statistician per week comprising the average weekly total earnings of all employees in New South Wales. Where the amount of care is less than 40 hours per week, the amount allowed must not exceed the amount calculated at an hourly rate of one-fortieth of the amount per week comprising the average weekly total earnings of all employees in New South Wales.486

Assisted gratuitous care Damages for assisted gratuitous care are the equivalent of the damages formerly known as Sullivan v Gordon487 damages under the common law. In 2005, the High Court in CSR Ltd v Eddy488 held that the decision of Sullivan v Gordon should be overruled as such damages properly form part of general damages. The High Court held that the damages departed from normal tort law principles where only the damage suffered by the claimant is compensated.

In June 2006, the New South Wales government responded to the decision of CSR Ltd v Eddy by introducing an amendment to the Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW) to re-instate this head of damage. Under s 15B of pt 2, div 2 of the Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW) damages may be awarded where the court is satisfied of the loss of the claimant’s capacity to provide gratuitous domestic services and where:

ƒƒ the claimant provided domestic services to those dependants before the time that the liability in respect of the claim is made arose; and ƒƒ the claimant’s dependants were not (or will not be) capable of performing the services themselves by reason of their age or physical or mental incapacity.

Further, no damages may be awarded to a claimant for assisted gratuitous care if the services are provided, or are to be provided:

ƒƒ for less than six hours per week; and ƒƒ for less than six consecutive months.

However, if the dependant to whom the services were to be provided has recovered damages in respect of that loss, no allowance is to be made. Similarly, if the claimant has recovered damages by reason of the claimant’s loss of capacity to provide gratuitous domestic services, another person may not recover damages by reason of the claimant’s loss of capacity to provide the services to that person.

An example of the court considering these provisions is the case of Angel v Hawkesbury City Council.489 The plaintiff alleged that she injured her arm, hip, face, hands and head when she tripped over a defective slab, falling very heavily and striking her head on the pavement. However, there was an issue whether the carpal tunnel syndrome suffered by the plaintiff following the incident was a pre-existing injury or occurred as a result of her arm fracture. The plaintiff also had a pre-existing injury to her right shoulder which had caused continuing difficulties with some tasks. After a detailed examination of the medical evidence and the plaintiff’s allegations regarding her need for care, the New South Wales Court of Appeal did not disturb the trial judge’s assessment of the plaintiff’s need for eight hours per week of gratuitous attendant care.

486 Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW) s 15(5). 487 (1999) 47 NSWLR 319. 488 (2005) 226 CLR 1. 489 (2008) Aust Torts Reports 81-955.

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In Harrison v Melhem490 the court contrasted s 15B with s 15. The court determined that s 15B was entirely unambiguous in its application in that it required both the intensity (six hours per week) and duration (six consecutive months) threshold be met before damages under this head could be awarded, whereas s 15 (although similarly worded) allowed for either threshold to be met before damages for gratuitous services could be recovered.

Interest Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW) pt 2 div 4 (s 18) commenced 20 June 2006 Pursuant to pt 2, div 4 of the Act, the court cannot order the payment of interest on damages awarded for non-economic loss, gratuitous attendant care services or loss of a claimant’s capacity to provide gratuitous domestic services to the claimant’s dependants.

Where the court is satisfied interest is payable on other damages awards, the interest rate is to be equivalent to the Commonwealth Government 10 year benchmark bond rate as at the date of the determination of the damages.

Discount rate Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW) pt 2 div 2 (s 14(2)) commenced 20 March 2002 Section 14(2) of the Act provides that the prescribed discount rate is a discount rate of the percentage prescribed by regulations or, if no percentage is prescribed, a discount rate of 5% is applicable.

Exemplary, punitive or aggravated damages Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW) pt 2 div 6 (s 21), was inserted by Civil Liability Amendment (Personal Responsibility) Act 2002 and commenced 6 December 2002 The Act provides that, in cases involving personal injury claims where the act or omission that caused the injury or death was negligence, an award of punitive, exemplary or aggravated damages cannot be made.

Structured settlements Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW) pt 2 div 7 (ss 22–26) was inserted by Civil Liability Amendment (Personal Responsibility) Act 2002 and commenced 10 January 2003 The New South Wales legislation defines a ‘structured settlement’ in the same terms as Queensland.491

Pursuant to s 23 a court must notify the parties and give them a reasonable opportunity to negotiate a structured settlement where, in a personal injuries claim, the court has decided to award damages for future loss in excess of $100,000. The New South Wales legislation also imposes an obligation on the court under s 23(3) to notify the NSW Trustee and Guardian of the terms of the award it proposes to make if it considers that the person may be a ‘person in need of protection’.492 The requirements of the notification are set out in s 23(4).

490 (2008) Aust Torts Reports 81-951. 491 Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW) s 22. 492 A ‘person in need of protection’ is defined in s 23 as ‘a person who is liable to be subject to an order that the estate of the person be subject to management under the NSW Trustee and Guardian Act 2009 because the person is not capable of managing his or her own affairs’.

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There is a similar obligation on legal representatives to advise a plaintiff in writing of the availability of structured settlements and the desirability of the plaintiff obtaining independent financial advice about structured settlements and lump sum settlements of the claim.493 The court is to have regard to the cost to the defendant of the proposed structured settlement as compared to the lump sum payment of damages when determining whether a reasonable offer of compromise has been made, pursuant to s 340 of the Legal Profession Act 2004 (NSW).494

Legal costs Legal Profession Act 2004 (NSW) pt 3.2 div 9 (ss 338 and 338B) commenced 1 October 2005 If the amount recovered on a claim for personal injury damages does not exceed $100,000, the maximum costs for legal services provided to a party in connection with the claim are fixed as follows:

ƒƒ in the case of legal services provided to a plaintiff, maximum costs are fixed at 20% ofthe amount recovered or $10,000, whichever is greater; or ƒƒ in the case of legal services provided to a defendant, maximum costs are fixed at 20% of the amount sought to be recovered by the plaintiff or $10,000, whichever is greater.

Where the matter has proceeded to a District Court trial after a failed arbitration, the recoverable costs are increased:

ƒƒ in the case of legal services provided to the plaintiff, an additional amount of 15% of the damages recovered or $7,500 whichever is greater; or ƒƒ in the case of legal services provided to the defendant an additional 15% of the damages sought or $7,500, whichever is greater.

However, the New South Wales Court of Appeal in Boylan Nominees Pty Ltd v Williams Refrigeration Australia Pty Ltd,495 delivered a decision with significant costs ramifications for plaintiffs. The court unanimously held that in cases where the plaintiff was unsuccessful in establishing liability on behalf of the defendant, the costs cap in s 198D of the Legal Profession Act 1987 (NSW) (equivalent to s 338 of the Legal Profession Act 2004 (NSW)) will not apply to the proceeding if there is a verdict for the defendant.

Offenders in custody Civil Liability Act 2002 pt 2A (ss 26A–26W) sections inserted by Civil Liability Amendment (Offender Damages) Act 2004 (NSW) and commenced 19 November 2004, s 26QA inserted 28 June 2010, s 26I(2) amended by Workers Compensation Legislation Amendment Act 2012 (NSW) and commenced on 27 June 2012 In New South Wales, if an offender in custody seeks to bring a claim for personal injuries allegedly suffered while he or she was in custody, the offender must be able to show that he or she has suffered a whole person permanent impairment of at least 15% before damages can be awarded. This is regulated by pt 2A, which was inserted as a result of the Civil Liability Amendment (Offender Damages) Act 2004 (NSW). The aim of the legislation is to:

‘remove some of the more fanciful claims from offenders that the community are entitled to regard as spurious by setting thresholds on injuries and limits on damages payable to offenders’ and to ensure that ‘there will be no unfairness between compensation available to different groups of offenders, and no offender will receive compensation that is unavailable to a law-abiding worker suffering the same injury’.

493 Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW) s 25. 494 Ibid s 26. 495 (2006) 65 NSWLR 717.

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Where the offender’s injury exceeds the 15% threshold, damages are not calculated in accordance with the Act but are limited (significantly) to compensation as provided by the Workers Compensation Act 1987 (NSW).

Practice and Procedure Legal practitioners Legal Profession Act 2004 (NSW) commenced 1 October 2005 Professional Conduct and Practice Rules 2013 (Practice Rules) (NSW) commenced 1 January 2014 under s 307 of the Legal Profession Act 2004 (NSW) The Legal Profession Act 2004 (NSW) provides that a law practice cannot file court documentation on a claim or defence of a claim for damages unless the principal of the practice, or a legal practitioner associate responsible for the file concerned, certifies that there are reasonable grounds for believing on the basis of provable facts and a reasonably arguable view of the law that the claim or the defence has reasonable prospects of success. In circumstances where it appears to the court that a legal practitioner has provided legal services to a party ‘without reasonable prospects of success’, the court may of its own motion, or on the application of any party to the proceedings, order the practitioner personally pay the costs that the client has been ordered to pay to the other party.496

In Degiorgio v Dunn (No 2),497 the New South Wales Supreme Court provided an analysis of the provisions regarding reasonable prospect of success when considering s 198J under the old Legal Profession Act 1987 (NSW). This provision is the equivalent to s 348 of the Legal Profession Act 2004 (NSW). In that case the judge found in favour of the defendant and the defendant then sought a personal costs order against the plaintiff’s solicitor.

The court held that the provisions apply to ‘proceedings taken on a claim for damages’ irrespective of the cause/s of action and drew various alternate phrases and concepts from authorities and writings on the meaning of ‘reasonable prospects of success’, including:

ƒƒ ‘arguable’; ƒƒ something less than ‘likelihood of success’; ƒƒ ‘not hopeless or entirely without merit’; ƒƒ ‘not fanciful’; ƒƒ ‘a theory that is rationally based’, contrasted against one that is ‘irrational, absurd or ridiculous’; ƒƒ something that is ‘not devoid of merit’; and ƒƒ something that is ‘false or not genuine’.

The court concluded that ‘without reasonable prospects of success’ means ‘so lacking in merit or substance as to be not fairly arguable’ and is a concept ‘that falls appreciably short of “likely to succeed”’.498 On this basis the court found in favour of the plaintiff’s solicitor.

Barrett J observed that the statutory provision was not intended to expose a lawyer to personal liability for costs in every case in which the court reached a conclusion that a party’s case was not as strong as it may have appeared at the outset:

496 Legal Profession Act 2004 (NSW) s 347. 497 (2005) 62 NSWLR 284. See also Lemoto v Able Technical Pty Ltd & Ors (2005) 63 NSWLR 300. 498 Ibid [28].

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‘the Legal Profession Act should not, in my opinion, be presumed to intend that lawyers practising in New South Wales courts must boycott every claimant with a weak case. The legislation is not meant to be an instrument of intimidation, so far as lawyers are concerned.’499

Therefore, a solicitor needs to be able to show that there are some prospects of success based on the facts that is not fanciful and without merit.

The case of Degiorgio has been looked upon favourably by New South Wales courts being applied in the two more recent cases of Tarabay v Bechara500 and Fitzpatrick v Cheal.501

Supplementary to the case law and Legal Profession Act, the Professional Conduct and Practice Rules 2013 (Practice Rules) provide rules relating to the ethical obligations of legal practitioners and include rules relating to relations with clients, advocacy and litigation relations with other lawyers.

Legal advertising Personal injury advertising Regulations 23 to 40 of the Legal Profession Regulation 2005 and div 2 of the Workers Compensation Regulation 2010 effectively prohibits legal practitioners from advertising personal injury services.

In New South Wales a more comprehensive ban on advertising personal injury services exists, preventing personal injury advertising on any form of public notice including websites, billboards, newspapers, television, radio and telephone directories. Regulation 24 of the Legal Profession Regulation 2005 states that a barrister or solicitor must not publish an advertisement that promotes the availability of the legal practitioner to provide personal injury services.

A breach of this provision involves severe consequences for legal practitioners including a finding of professional misconduct.502

On 20 June 2009, the Supreme Court of New South Wales in The Council of the Law Society of New South Wales v Australian Injury Helpline & Ors503 declared that reg 34 of the Legal Profession Regulation 2005 (which placed restrictions upon the ability of solicitors to advertise legal services for personal injury claims) was invalid.

Although the decision in Australian Injury Helpline has not been overruled, it was not followed in the 2010 case of Hagipantelis v Legal Services Commissioner of New South Wales.504

The provisions prohibiting personal injury advertising exist in addition to the general restriction on false or misleading advertising contained in ss 84, 149 and 176 of the Legal Profession Act 2004 (NSW).

Exceptions to the Comprehensive Ban An exception to the comprehensive ban is an advertisement that advertises a barrister or solicitor as a specialist. A legal practitioner must not hold themselves out as a specialist unless the practitioner is accredited under an accreditation scheme approved by the appropriate Council. Accredited specialist advertising must only be published by:

499 Ibid [27]. 500 [2010] NSWSC 202. 501 [2010] NSWSC 717. 502 Legal Profession Regulation 2005 (NSW) s 24 (2). 503 (2008) 71 NSWLR 715. 504 (2010) 78 NSWLR 79.

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ƒƒ an entry in the practitioner directory; ƒƒ a sign displayed at the place of business of the legal practitioner; or ƒƒ an advertisement on an internet website operated by the barrister or solicitor.

Other exceptions include advertising personal injury services to:

ƒƒ any person who is already a client of the legal practitioner; or ƒƒ any person on the premises of a place of business of the barrister or solicitor, but only if the advertisement cannot be seen from outside those premises, or ƒƒ to the extent to which it relates only to legal education and is published to members of the legal profession by a person in the ordinary course of the person’s business or functions as a provider of legal education.

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victoria

In 2003, Victoria introduced substantial amendments to the Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic) to adopt many of the Ipp recommendations. These amendments have impacted on the law of negligence with legislative guidance being provided with respect to the concepts of foreseeability and causation, as well as the introduction of provisions dealing with proportionate liability. The amendments also deal with the assessment of damages in personal injuries claims in Victoria, with legislative restrictions placed on the recovery of general damages, economic loss and gratuitous care.

Application of Statutory Reforms Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic) pt 5B (s 28C), pt 10 div 1 (ss 44–45) Section 28C(2)(f) was repealed and replaced by the Victoria State Emergency Service Act 2005 (Vic) and commenced 1 November 2005 Section 28C(2)(l) was amended by the Education and Training Reform Act 2006 (Vic) commenced 1 July 2007 Section 44 was inserted by the Wrongs and Other Acts (Law of Negligence) Act 2003 (Vic) and commenced 3 December 2003 Section 45(1)(d)(ii) was substituted by the Victoria State Emergency Service Act 2005 (Vic) and commenced 1 November 2005 Section 45(1)(d)(vi) amended by the Education and Training Reform Act 2006 (Vic) and commenced 1 July 2007 In accordance with s 28C of the Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic), the Act extends to an award for personal injury damages even if the damages are recovered in an action for breach of contract or any other action. The section provides that certain types of claims are excluded, including inter alia, a claim arising from an intentional act done with the intent to cause injury, sexual assault or misconduct, worker’s compensation claims, motor accident claims and discrimination claims.

The introduction of reforms to the Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic) was staggered, with the provisions introducing caps to general damages and economic loss and changes to the discount rate commencing on 22 October 2002. Those amendments apply to all proceedings commenced after that date regardless of the date of injury.

In accordance with s 44 of the Act, the provisions relating to negligence apply to any claim for damages resulting from negligence regardless of whether the claim is made in tort, contract and statute or otherwise. These provisions commenced on 2 December 2003. Section 45 provides, however, that motor vehicle accident claims, workers’ compensation claims and claims relating to dust related diseases and smoking are excluded from the operation of pt X of the Act which contains the provisions relating to negligence. The Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic) also expressly excludes damages for personal injury and non-economic loss when the act causing the loss is both intentional and results in death or injury.

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Pre-court Procedures Civil Procedure Act 2010 commenced 1 January 2011 The Victorian Government enacted the Civil Procedure Act 2010 (Vic) to reform and modernise the laws, practice, procedure and processes relating to civil proceedings in Victorian Courts. The reform also aims to facilitate the just, efficient, timely and cost-effective resolution of disputes.505 The Act applies to all court proceedings in Victoria with some exceptions.506

The Act creates overarching obligations that apply to any person who is party to a proceeding, a legal practitioner, a law firm or a person providing financial assistance or whohas direct or indirect control over the proceeding (for example, an insurance company).507 These obligations include a paramount duty to the court to further the administration of justice. Other requirements include obligations to act honestly, to use reasonable endeavours to resolve the dispute, minimise delay, narrow the issues in dispute and ensure costs are reasonable.508

The Act gives the court the power to impose sanctions for contravention of these overarching obligations, which may include adverse cost orders or compensation for any loss that arises as a result of the contravention.509

Under the Act, discovery is to be in accordance with the Act and is subject to discretionary orders (such as requiring or relieving the obligation of discovery) that the court considers appropriate. The court is empowered to impose sanctions for non-compliance with the discovery requirements.510

Both the plaintiff and defendant are entitled to apply for a summary judgment if the other party’s claim has no real prospect of success, however the court may decide that the matter should proceed to trial if it is not in the interest of justice to dispose of the matter summarily.511 The court may also make an order that a dispute (or part of a dispute) be referred to appropriate dispute resolution rather than proceeding to trial.

To date, there has been no judicial consideration of any of the provisions of the Act.

The Law of Negligence – Scope of Duty of Care Standard of care Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic) pt 10 div 2 (ss 48–50) Sections inserted by the Wrongs and Other Acts (Law of Negligence) Act 2003 (Vic) and commenced 3 December 2003

Section 48(1) of the Act clarifies the position in relation to foreseeability of harm and provides that a person is not negligent in failing to take precautions against a risk of harm unless:

ƒƒ the risk was foreseeable (that is, it is a risk of which the person knew or ought to have known); and ƒƒ the risk was not insignificant; and ƒƒ in the circumstances, a reasonable person in the person’s position would have taken those precautions.

505 Civil Procedure Act 2010 (Vic) s 1. 506 For a complete list of exceptions see s 4(2) of the Act. 507 Civil Procedure Act 2010 (Vic) s 10. 508 For a complete list of all the Overarching Obligations see Civil Procedure Act 2010 (Vic) ss 16–26. 509 Civil Procedure Act 2010 (Vic) ss 28–30. 510 Ibid ss 54–59. 511 Ibid ss 60-66.

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Additionally, s 48(2) of the Act outlines the relevant factors a court must consider when determining whether a reasonable person would have taken precautions against the risk which caused the harm. These factors include, but are not limited to:

ƒƒ the probability that the harm would happen if precautions were not taken; ƒƒ the likely seriousness of the harm; ƒƒ the burden of taking precautions to avoid the risk of harm; and ƒƒ the social utility of the activity creating the risk of harm.

Further, s 48(3) of the Act provides that for the purposes of sub-s (1)(b):

a) insignificant risks include, but are not limited to, risks that are far-fetched or fanciful; and b) risks that are not insignificant are all risks other than insignificant risks and include, but are not limited to, significant risks.

Section 49(b) of the Act also provides that in a proceeding relating to liability for negligence, the fact a risk of harm could have been avoided by doing something in a different way or the subsequent taking of action that would have (had it happened earlier) avoided the risk of harm, do not themselves effect liability or amount to an admission of liability in relation to a risk.

In recent decisions involving ss 48 and 49 of the Act, Victorian courts have adopted the analysis by Garling J in Benic v State of New South Wales512 of the similarly worded sections of the Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW).513

The court must first clearly identify the risk of harm against which the defendant has negligently failed to take precaution against and then a determination must be made as to whether the risk of harm was reasonably foreseeable.514

In order to determine reasonable foreseeability, the court must apply the factors found in s 48(1). Firstly, it must be established that the defendant had actual or constructive knowledge of the risk of harm. This is to be determined with reference to factors such as the common knowledge and experience of a person similar to the defendant, the obviousness of the risk occurring to a person in the position of the defendant, and common sense.515 Secondly, the probability of the risk occurring must be ‘not insignificant’, which must be judged from the point of view of a reasonable person in the defendant’s position and in prospect not retrospect.516 Finally, an assessment must be made of whether a reasonable person in the position of the defendant would have taken precautions, with reference to the non-exhaustive list of factors contained in ss 48(2) and 49.517

Causation Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic) pt 10 div 3 (ss 51–52) Sections were inserted by the Wrongs and Other Acts (Law of Negligence) Act 2003 and commenced 3 December 2003 Section 51 of the Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic) requires that, for a finding of causation, there must initially be factual causation (the belief that negligence was a necessary condition of the harm) and subsequently, a finding that the harm comes within the scope of the negligent person’s

512 [2010] NSWSC 1039. 513 Ultra Thoroughbred Racing v Those Certain Underwriters & Ors [2011] VSC 589, [282], Gunnersen v Henwood [2011] VSC 440, [359]–[362] adopting the analysis of Garling J in Benic v State of New South Wales [2010] NSWSC 1039. 514 Gunnersen v Henwood [2011] VSCA 440, [362]. 515 Ibid. 516 Ultra Thoroughbred Racing v Those Certain Underwriters & Ors [2011] VSC 589, [285]. 517 Gunnersen v Henwood [2011] VSC 440, [362].

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liability. When determining issues of causation, the Act directs the court to consider whether or not and why the responsibility for the harm rests with the defendant. The Act also provides guidance in relation to when a court should permit the admission of evidence which would normally be inadmissible, and what evidence should be admissible when attempting to determine the defendant’s contribution to the negligence which led to the plaintiff’s claim.

Section 51(3) provides that when a court considers what the plaintiff would have done had the defendant’s negligent conduct not occurred, it must do so ‘subjectively in the light of all relevant circumstances.’ A more detailed discussion of these principles appears in this guide under the discussion of this topic in the New South Wales jurisdiction. In Raciti v Wadren Pty Ltd,518 the appellant was injured when she fell down a number of steps at the bottom of a stairway at the respondent’s commercial premises. A ramp extended upwards from the foot of the staircase to the base of the fourth step thereby intruding into the stairs so as to reduce the width of the remaining steps beyond the hand-rail. The appellant ultimately failed in her claim. Although the court was satisfied that the appellant adopted the course taken because of the ramp, it found that the ramp was not causative of the accident and the respondent’s failure to remove the ramp did not amount to breach of the required standard of care.

In addition, s 52 of the Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic) provides that the plaintiff always bears the onus of proof in relation to establishing causation.

Obvious risk Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic) pt 10 div 4 (ss 53–56) Sections inserted by the Wrongs and Other Acts (Law of Negligence) Act 2003 (Vic) and commenced 3 December 2003 Section 53 of the Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic) states that an ‘obvious risk’ is a risk that, in the circumstances, would have been obvious to a reasonable person in the position of the plaintiff, even if it has a low probability of occurring or is not prominent, conspicuous or physically observable. In considering what would have been obvious to a reasonable person in the same position as the plaintiff, the plaintiff’s age, personal characteristics and expertise are important factors in establishing sufficient maturity for a plaintiff to exercise his or her own judgment and fully appreciate any risk.

Given the similar wording of provisions in New South Wales and Queensland, cases determined pursuant to those provisions as well as the decisions of Dederer v Roads and Traffic Authority and Anor519; Doubleday & Anor v Kelly520 and Leyden v Caboolture Shire Council521 are relevant to considering the application of the provisions in Victoria.

Unlike other jurisdictions, Victoria has not enacted express provisions removing the duty to warn of an obvious risk. However, s 54 of the Act provides that, where a defendant raises the common law defence of voluntary assumption of risk, a plaintiff is presumed to have been aware of the risk of harm if it was an obvious risk, unless the plaintiff proves on the balance of probabilities that he or she was not aware of the risk. Whilst an objective test is used to determine the obviousness of a risk under s 53, any attempt by a plaintiff to rebut the presumption of an awareness is based on a subjective test taking into account the plaintiff’s knowledge and appreciation at the relevant time and any implied agreement from the conduct of the plaintiff.522

518 [2006] VSCA 132. 519 [2005] Aust Torts Reports 81–792; [2005] NSWSC 185. 520 [2005] NSWCA 151. 521 [2007] QCA 134. 522 Paltidis v The State Council of the Young Men’s Christian Association of Victoria [2006] VSCA 122 [37].

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An example of the application of the ‘obvious risk’ provisions of the Act is the case of Chandley v Roberts.523 In that decision, the plaintiff, a subcontractor, fell four metres from scaffolding and suffered severe injuries. The plaintiff claimed that the defendant, the principal contractor, was negligent because he failed to secure the ladder holding the scaffolding as he usually would, according to their established system of work. The defendant pleaded that the ladder presented an obvious risk. The court found the risk was not obvious because, although it would have been easy for the plaintiff to check whether a chock had been nailed to the floor to stabilise the ladder, the two men had been working together for 25 years and, according to usual practice, it was the defendant who took that safety precaution and the plaintiff was not in the habit of checking that it was secure.

Dangerous recreational activities Australian Consumer Law and Fair Trading Act 2012 (Vic) s 22 commenced 1 July 2012 Victoria has not enacted any provisions dealing specifically with obvious risk in relation to dangerous recreational activities, although the general provisions relating to obvious risk will apply.524

Since 2003, s 32N of the Fair Trading Act 1999 (Vic) allowed a provider of recreational services to execute a contract which validly excludes, restricts or modifies its liability as long as the terms are brought to the attention of the purchaser before the supply of the services. This Act has since been repealed, but s 32N was substantially re-enacted in s 22 of the Australian Consumer Law and Fair Trading Act 2012 (Vic).

The new provision provides that the term of a contract for recreational services that excludes, restricts or modifies liability is not void by reason of s 64 of the Australian Consumer Law (Victoria). The term of the contract must be in the prescribed form and must be brought to the attention of the purchaser of the services prior to their supply. The exclusion, however, does not apply to a death or injury caused by an act or omission done with reckless disregard with or without consciousness of the consequences of the act or omission.

Liability of professionals Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic) pt 10 div 5 (ss 57–60) Sections were inserted by the Wrongs and Other Acts (Law of Negligence) Act 2003 (Vic) and commenced 3 December 2003 Professional Standards Act 2003 (Vic) commenced 8 June 2004

Section 59 of the Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic) governs the standard of care owed by professionals in Victoria and provides that a professional is not negligent in providing a professional service if, at the time of providing the service, the professional acted in a manner which was widely accepted in Australia by a significant number of respected practitioners in the field (peer professional opinion) as competent professional practice. However, s 59(2) provides that peer professional opinion cannot be relied upon for the purposes of this section if the court determines that the opinion is unreasonable.

The Victoria County Court recently considered the operation of s 59 in the case of Hooper v Efe, where Saccardo J considered that s 59, given the structure of the Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic), operates as a potential defence with the burden of proof lying with the defendant.525 In that case, the plaintiff suffered severe complications after undergoing breast reduction surgery. She alleged that her doctor breached the duty of care owed to her by choosing an inappropriate surgical method. The doctor was unable to rely on s 59 as she was not able to establish that the chosen surgical method was consistent with peer professional opinion.

523 [2005] VSCA 273. 524 See Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic) ss 53–56. 525 [2010] VCC 880, [95].

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This finding is consistent with the position of the New South Wales court in relation to the similarly worded section in that jurisdiction.526

Further indication as to how s 59 is to be interpreted can be found in Freidin v St Laurent.527 In that case, the Victorian Court of Appeal commented on the recent changes to the Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic). At trial, a jury found that Dr Freidin was negligent in accordance with the law at the time. Section 59 had been inserted into the Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic) since the trial. Callaway JA discussed s 59 and stated that:

‘Given the highly qualified expert witnesses called on both sides in this case, one cannot help but think that the result might have been different under the law as it now stands; it was changed to protect competent professionals acting in accordance with a widely accepted practice.’ 528

In 2012, the Supreme Court of Victoria in Brakoulias v Karunaharan529 provided further clarification regarding the interpretation of s 59. The case concerned alleged medical negligence where a patient suffered a cardiac arrest after being prescribed a weight loss drug. In determining the liability of the doctor, the Court concluded that s 59 constituted a statutory defence to common law negligence. The doctor argued that the plaintiff had to discharge the legal burden to prove negligence according to the common law standard of care as defined in Rogers v Whitaker.530 The Court confirmed the applicability of the Rogers v Whitaker test in relation to the plaintiff’s legal burden, but found that if a case is made out on that standard, the defendant would not be found negligent if they were able to establish that they acted in a manner according with peer professional opinion as set out in s 59.

In Grinham v Tabro Meats Pty Ltd,531 facing the case of a medical practitioner’s failure to recall a patient, Forrest J wrote of what was required of the application of the s 59 defence [181]:

‘Peer professional opinion is directed to acceptance or otherwise of the manner in which the professional acted in the circumstances confronting the defendant. It is to this issue that the opinions of the other professionals in the field are directed. It may be that in some cases an opinion is based upon hypothetical analysis rather than one actually encountered in practice. Whilst this factor may go to the quality of the opinion expressed, what matters is the opinion of the other professionals as to the way in which the defendant carried out or failed to carry out the professional tasks impugned in the proceeding.’

As is the case in New South Wales, Victoria has not codified the duty of care with respect to liability arising in connection with giving warnings about a risk. Section 60 of the Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic) specifically provides that s 59 does not apply to liability arising in connection with giving (or failure to give) a warning about a risk to a person if the giving of the warning is associated with the provision by a professional of a professional service.

In addition to the amendments to the Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic), the Professional Standards Act 2003 (Vic) in Victoria allows occupational associations to limit the liability of its members in certain circumstances by preparing an approved scheme. Part 6 of the Professional Standard Act 2003 (Vic) establishes a Professional Standards Council whose role it is to encourage

526 For more information, see the discussion of Dobler v Kenneth Halverson; Dobler v Kurt Halverson (by his tutor) [2007] NSWCA 335 in ‘Liability of Professionals’ – New South Wales. 527 [2007] VSCA 16, (2007) 17 VR 439. 528 Ibid [6]. 529 [2012] VSC 272. 530 (1992)175 CLR 479. 531 [2012] VSC 491.

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and assist in the development of standards and self-regulation of associations that represent occupational groups. As with legislation that has been enacted in most Australian jurisdictions, this legislation has not had any noticeable impact on the court’s interpretation of the civil liability of professionals to date.

Liability of public authorities Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic) pt 12 (ss 79–87) Sections were inserted by the Wrongs and Other Acts (Law of Negligence) Act 2003 (Vic) and commenced 3 December 2003 The Victorian government has legislated to provide a public policy defence to public authorities by describing the principles to be taken into account when determining whether a public authority has a duty of care and if, by its conduct or inaction, that duty has been breached. The amendments to the Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic) have resulted in the definition of ‘public authority’ being expanded to include a wider range of entities within the definition. The Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic) sets out the general principles to be used in determining liability, provides that resource allocations by authorities are not open to challenge and determines the standard by which authorities are to be judged as that of a ‘reasonable public authority’.

In Whittlesea City Council v Merie,532 the plaintiff fell over a piece of concrete which was detached from the footpath. The issue was whether the Council had breached its duty of care to a pedestrian exercising reasonable care for her own safety. The Victorian Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge’s decision and held that the Council was in breach of its duty of care as it was aware of the hazard and had not taken reasonable remedial action.

Unlike other jurisdictions, Victoria has not codified the highway immunity or non-feasance rule.

Liability of volunteers and Good Samaritans Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic) pts VIA (s 28A), VIB (ss 28B–28LAC and IX (ss 34–42)) Section 28A was inserted by No. 9353 Sections 28C–I, 28K, 28J, 28L were inserted by the Wrongs and Other Acts (Public Liability Insurance Reform) Act 2002 (Vic) and commenced 23 October 2002 Section 28C(2)(f) was substituted by the Victoria State Emergency Service Act 2005 (Vic) and commenced 1 November 2005 Section 28C(2)(l) was amended by the Education and Training Reform Act 2006 (Vic) and commenced 1 July 2007 Sections 28HA, 28ID–28IE, 28IF were inserted by the Wrongs and Other Acts (Law of Negligence) Act 2003 (Vic) and commenced 3 December 2003 Sections 28IA–28IC, 28LA were inserted the Wrongs and Limitation of Actions Acts (Insurance Reform) Act 2003 (Vic) and commenced 21 May 2003

The Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic) limits and/or excludes liability for certain groups of people for incidents which arise out of their charitable actions. Part VIA deals with the protection of Good Samaritans who provide assistance, care or advice in an emergency or in relation to an accident, without any expectation of reward. Pursuant to s 31C, the provisions apply to any incident on or after 23 October 2002.

532 [2005] VSCA 199.

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Part VIB of the Act relates to food donor protection, and pursuant to s 31G, also relates to any incident on or after 23 October 2002. Part IX deals with the actions of volunteers who perform community work for a community organisation, but pursuant to s 41 it applies to incidents that occur on or after 15 March 2003.

Volunteers533 Each jurisdiction (other than the Commonwealth) follows a basic framework for the exemption from civil liability of ‘volunteers’ who perform ‘community work’ for a ‘community organisation’. Each element must be satisfied for the exemption to apply. The Commonwealth only requires work being performed for the Commonwealth or a Commonwealth authority on a voluntary basis. In Victoria, a ‘volunteer’ is a person who performs ‘community work’ on a voluntary basis.

‘Community work’ focuses on the overall activity engaged in by the ‘community organisation’ (not the conduct of the volunteer). The four common types of activity across all State and Territory legislation are work done for charitable, benevolent, educational or sporting purposes. Each jurisdiction (other than the Commonwealth) provides a definition of ‘community organisation’ which includes a list of legal entities that can be considered ‘community organisations’ which incorporates ‘bodies corporate’, churches or other religious organisations and authorities of the State. In Victoria, as well as Western Australia, Queensland and Tasmania, a ‘community organisation’ includes local government entities. Western Australia, Victoria and Tasmania further extend the definition of ‘community organisation’ to include incorporated associations under their relevant associations incorporation legislation.

The Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic) stipulates under s 37(1) that a person who provides a service in relation to community work on a voluntary basis, is protected from liability so long as the person acts in good faith.

The term ‘community work’ in this context is defined under s 36 to mean any work that is done, or to be done for:

ƒƒ a religious, educational, charitable or benevolent purpose; ƒƒ the purpose of promoting or encouraging literature, science or the arts; ƒƒ the purpose of sport, recreation, tourism or amusement; ƒƒ the purpose of conserving or protecting the environment; ƒƒ the purpose of establishing, carrying on or improving a community, social or cultural centre; ƒƒ a political purpose; or ƒƒ the purpose of promoting the common interests of the community generally or of a particular section of the community.

However under s 38 there are some exceptions to s 37(1) including, inter alia, that the provision does not apply to a volunteer who knew, or ought reasonably to have known, that at the relevant time he or she was acting outside the scope of the community work organised by the community organisation, or regarding any claim to recover damages in respect of defamation.

Under s 40 Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic), a volunteer is prohibited from providing a community organisation with an indemnity against, or making a contribution towards a community organisation in relation to civil liability the volunteer himself would incur or which the community organisation incurs.

533 Pursuant to s 41, pt IX applies to incidents that occur on or after 15 March 2003.

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Food donors534 Where food is donated in good faith for a charitable or benevolent purpose with the intention that the consumer would not be required to pay for the food, and the food was safe to consume at the time it was donated, the donor is excluded from liability for bodily injury.535 This position is consistent with all other Australian jurisdictions, with the exception of the Australian Capital Territory, which is yet to legislate in this area.

Good Samaritans536 In accordance with pt VIA of the Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic), a ‘Good Samaritan’ is defined as a person who provides assistance, advice or care to another person in relation to an emergency or accident in circumstances where they expect no reward or payment and the person is assisted due to an apparent injury or risk of death or injury.537 A person is not liable in negligence where they have given assistance at the scene or by telephone or other means of communication to a person at the scene of the incident. All other Australian jurisdictions maintain a similar position, with the exception of Queensland, which only affords protection to Good Samaritans associated with prescribed organisations.

Liability for mental harm Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic) pt 11 (ss 67–78) Sections were inserted by the Wrongs and Other Acts (Law of Negligence) Act 2003 (Vic) and commenced 3 December 2003 The Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic) provides an avenue for the recovery of damages for economic loss with respect to mental harm in circumstances where the plaintiff has a recognised psychiatric illness.538 The provisions relating to mental harm limit liability for mental harm to incidents where:

ƒƒ the plaintiff was actually injured; or ƒƒ the plaintiff was at the scene of the accident; or ƒƒ the injured person was an immediate family member of the plaintiff.539

Section 72(1) provides that there will be no duty of care unless the defendant ought to have foreseen that a reasonable person in the plaintiff’s position might suffer a recognised psychiatric illness. Section 72(3) provides that the Act does not affect the standard of care owed when the defendant knew or ought reasonably to have known that the plaintiff was a person of less than normal fortitude.

In Kirkland-Veenstra v Stuart,540 Mr Veenstra was discovered alone in a parked car by two police officers early one morning. The police officers noted what appeared to be tubing running from the car’s exhaust to the cabin. When they approached the car, they found Mr Veenstra writing and considered that he appeared to be depressed but not mentally ill. Mr Veenstra told the officers that he had contemplated doing ‘something stupid’. The officers offered to contact his doctor or family, but Mr Veenstra declined, saying he would see his own doctor and that he wanted to return home to talk things over with his wife. Later that day Mr Veenstra was found dead having committed suicide by asphyxiation in his vehicle at home.

534 Pursuant to Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic) s 31G, the provisions apply to any incident on or after 23 October 2002. 535 Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic) ss 31E–31H. 536 Pursuant to s 31C, the provisions apply to any incident on or after 23 October 2002. 537 Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic) s 31B. 538 Ibid (Vic) s 75. 539 Ibid s 73(2). 540 [2008] VSCA 32, (2008) 23 VR 36.

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Mrs Veenstra sued the officers and the State of Victoria alleging she had developed a psychiatric illness as a result of her husband’s suicide. At first instance, the trial judge found that neither defendant owed a duty of care to Mr Veenstra, and the claim therefore failed. However, in a split 2–1 decision, the Victorian Court of Appeal allowed the appeal. Warren CJ noted that Victoria’s Mental Health Act 1986 (Vic) specifically addressed the situation in which Mr Veenstra was found. It empowered the officers to either take him to a hospital or have a medical practitioner attend at the scene. They had not exercised either of those options. The officers were granted special leave to appeal to the High Court of Australia.

In three separate judgments, the High Court ruled that there was no legal duty of care to protect another from self harm. Gummow, Hayne, and Heydon JJ held that a duty of care failed to arise as the police officers did not have the requisite control over the source of risk. Their Honours emphasised the concept of personal autonomy and stated, ‘the co-existence of a knowledge of a risk of harm and power to avert or minimise that harm does not, without more, give rise to a duty of care at common law.’ Citing with approval Dixon J in Smith v Leurs,541 the court held that

‘the general rule is that one man is under no duty of controlling another man to prevent his doing damage to a third’.542

Crennan and Kiefel JJ delivered a separate judgment, as did French CJ. Their Honours concluded that no duty of care was owed by the police officers as they lacked the authority to apprehend Mr Veenstra under s 10 of the Mental Health Act 1986 (Vic). French CJ held that, the duty of care which the majority in the Court of Appeal found to exist could not have existed because the critical statutory power conferred by s 10, which was in the end the foundation of the duty of care in the circumstances of the case, did not exist. Their Honours concluded that the necessary requirements for the exercise of s 10 had not been satisfied as the police officers did not believe that Mr Veenstra was mentally ill.

Intoxication and illegal activity Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic) pt 2B (ss 14F–14H) were inserted the Wrongs and Other Acts (Public Liability Insurance Reform) Act 2002 (Vic) and commenced 23 October 2002 Transport Accident Act 1986 (Vic) s 40 commenced 1 January 1987 Unlike some other jurisdictions, the Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic) does not automatically prevent recovery or mandate minimum reductions in damages in claims involving injury to plaintiffs who are intoxicated or involved in illegal activity.

Instead, the Act has introduced a number of considerations that must be taken into account in determining whether a breach of duty of care has been established in matters involving intoxication and criminal conduct.

Pursuant to s 14G, the court must consider, among other things:

ƒƒ whether the plaintiff was intoxicated by alcohol or drugs voluntarily consumed; ƒƒ the level of intoxication; and ƒƒ whether the plaintiff was engaged in an illegal activity.

541 (1945) 70 CLR 256 [262]. 542 Stuart v Kirkland-Veenstra [2009] HCA 15 [63].

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The Act itself provides little guidance about how these provisions will operate in practice or whether and to what extent it will affect established common law principles. The second reading speech made at the time of the introduction of these sections records that they were introduced to address ‘a perception in the community that the courts have been too quick to establish a duty of care owed by a defendant in some situations where the plaintiff should have exercised greater care for their own safety.’ This community concern was also said to exist with respect to claims where the plaintiff was engaged in illegal activity.

These provisions clearly grant the court significant scope to make findings against plaintiffs who are intoxicated or involved in illegal activities at the time they are injured. While s 14G of the Act stops short of imposing mandatory minimum reductions in the case of intoxication or precluding recovery in the case of plaintiffs involved in illegal activity, it is likely that a court will penalise plaintiffs making claims in those circumstances.

The onus is on a defendant to raise a plaintiff’s intoxication or involvement in illegal activity to enjoy the liability exemption afforded by these provisions. To avoid a defendant’s liability being excluded, the plaintiff must raise the above points of consideration to demonstrate that their state of intoxication was not a relevant factor.

Section 40 of the Transport Accident Act 1986 (Vic) deals with intoxication with respect to motor vehicle accidents.

Contributory negligence Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic) pt 5 (ss 25–28AA) and pt 10 div 7 (ss 62–63) Section 25 was amended by the Wrongs (Amendment) Act 2000 (Vic) and commenced 21 November 2000 Section 26 was amended by the Wrongs and Other Acts (Law of Negligence) Act 2003 (Vic) and commenced 3 December 2003 Section 27 was repealed and replaced by the Wrongs (Amendment) Act 2000 (Vic) and commenced 21 November 2000 Section 28AA was inserted by the Wrongs (Amendment) Act 2000 (Vic) and commenced 21 November 2000 Sections 62–63 were inserted by the Wrongs and Other Acts (Law of Negligence) Act 2003 (Vic) and commenced 3 December 2003 Following the Ipp report, Victoria amended its legislation to incorporate the recommendations made in relation to contributory negligence. Part V Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic) outlines the principles of contributory negligence. Section 26 states that a plaintiff’s damages must be reduced to account for the personal degree of liability attributed to their injuries.

Section 62 Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic) states that the same principles used to determine whether a person has been negligent apply in determining the degree of contributory negligence present in a plaintiff’s action. The standard of care required of a plaintiff is that of a reasonable person in the position of the plaintiff, and is determined on the basis of what that person knew or ought to have known at the material time.

A claim will not be defeated purely because contributory negligence arises. However, s 63 allows for the reduction of 100% of a damages award in circumstances where it is just and equitable to do so, which would in effect defeat the claim. While each case turns on its own facts, a court is to rely on common law principles in assessing a plaintiff’s conduct.

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An example of a claim being defeated by contributory negligence is provided by Bult & Anor v Lawrence (Vic) Pty Ltd (Civil Claims).543 In that case, the plaintiff was injured whilst standing on a hydraulic lift mounted on the rear of a truck used for removing furniture. The lift was operated by a five year old child. Deputy President Steele concluded that the risk was so obvious and the plaintiff took so little care for his own safety that the claim should be defeated.544

Any finding of contributory negligence on the part of the plaintiff will result in an apportionment of liability.545 The approach of the court is therefore twofold; firstly to determine that negligence on the part of the plaintiff occurred; and secondly to attribute a value or weight to such negligence, usually expressed as a percentage.

The decision in Transport Accident Commission v Estate of Ewer546 exemplifies this twofold approach. In this case, the Commission sought indemnification from the Estate of Hayden Ewer for compensation it paid to and on behalf of Simon Bayne, an occupant of the vehicle. The Commission submitted that Mr Bayne’s contributory negligence contributed to his injuries.

Robson J held:

‘that a reasonable person in the position of Mr Bayne at the time ought to have known by making reasonable inquiries that Mr Ewer was likely to have had his driving ability impaired by the consumption of alcohol and that Mr Bayne was taking a risk in permitting Mr Ewer to drive his utility and riding as a passenger in the utility’.547

Subsequently, having regard to Mr Bayne’s share in the responsibility for damage, the court attributed a value of 10% to such negligence.

In determining whether negligence can be attributed to a plaintiff, the Court of Appeal distinguished conduct that was merely inadvertent or inattentive, from conduct that was negligent. In Mayhew v Lewington’s Transport Pty Ltd,548 the appellant was injured in the course of his employment while descending a ladder at the back of his prime mover. The appellant had been on a truck between the rear of the cabin and the front of the first trailer for the purpose of hooking lines up between the truck and the trailers he was carrying. Whilst descending the steps, the appellant fell and suffered injuries affecting his back and right leg. At first instance the jury found the plaintiff guilty of contributory negligence, assessed at 30%. However, on Appeal, the court said that the position and alignment of the ladder and size of the steps was patently deficient. The court found the accident that occurred was of a kind that was inevitable. In questioning whether the appellant’s conduct amounted to contributory negligence, her Honour referred to a number of workplace cases. In particular, her Honour referred to the High Court’s decision in Podrebersek v Australian Iron and Steel Pty Ltd,549 where Gibbs CJ, Mason, Wilson, Brennan and Deane JJ) said in the case of an employee:

543 [2008] VCAT 1286. 544 Ibid [47]. 545 See ‘Proportionate liability’. In considering apportionment, it is common place for courts to be guided by the leading authority of Podrebersek v Australian Iron & Steel Pty Ltd (1985) 59 ALJR 492 [494]. 546 [2009] VSC 488, (2009) 54 MVR 434. 547 Ibid [112]. 548 [2010] VSCA 202. 549 59 ALJR 493.

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‘. . . the issue of contributory negligence had to be approached on the footing that the respondent [employer] had failed to discharge its obligations to take reasonable care, and that in considering whether there was contributory negligence on the part of the appellant [worker], the circumstances and conditions in which he had to do his work had to be taken into account. The question was whether in those circumstances and under those conditions the appellant’s conduct amounted to mere inadvertence, inattention or misjudgement, or to negligence.’

The Court of Appeal held it was a ‘classical’ case of mere misjudgment not amounting to contributory negligence. The appellant was under no disability and his injury arose merely through inadvertence falling short of exposing himself to a risk where a reasonable and prudent man would not have done so. The Court of Appeal set aside the jury’s finding of contributory negligence.

Proportionate liability Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic) pt IVAA (ss 24AE–24AS) Sections were inserted by the Wrongs and Limitation of Actions Acts (Insurance Reform) Act 2003 (Vic) and commenced 1 January 2004

The proportionate liability provisions of the Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic) apply to all incidents where proceedings were commenced after 1 January 2004. The Victorian proportionate liability provisions are of similar effect to those in Queensland and New South Wales and apply only to:

ƒƒ claims for economic loss or damage to property in an action for damages arising from a failure to take reasonable care;550 and ƒƒ claims for damage in contravention of s 18 of the Australian Consumer Law (Victoria).551

The provisions do not apply to claims arising out of an injury,552 with ‘injury’ being expressly defined as personal or bodily injury.553 The operative provision is in similar terms to the Queensland and New South Wales provisions, providing that the liability of a defendant, who is a concurrent wrongdoer in relation to that claim, is limited to an amount reflecting that proportion of the loss or damage claimed that the court considers just having regard to the extent of the concurrent wrongdoer’s responsibility for the loss or damage.554

A ‘concurrent wrongdoer’ is defined as a person who is one of two or more persons whose acts or omissions caused, independently of each other or jointly, the loss or damage that is the subject of the claim.555 In considering the construction of s 24AH, in the decision of Utility Services Corporation Ltd v SPI Electricity Pty Ltd556 Dixon AJA noted:

‘To establish a tenable proportionate liability defence, a defendant must allege:

a) that the claim against it is an apportionable claim; b) that in relation to that claim the defendant is a concurrent wrongdoer; c) that another defendant to the proceeding is a concurrent wrongdoer, or, that another person, not a party to a proceeding, who is dead or has been wound up, is a concurrent wrongdoer in relation to the plaintiff’s claimed loss and damage; and (sic)

550 Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic) s 24AF(1)(a). 551 Ibid s 24AF(1)(b). 552 Ibid s 24AG(1). 553 Ibid s 24AE. 554 Ibid s 24AI(1)(a). 555 Ibid s 24AH(1). 556 [2012] VSCA 158.

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d) in relation to all of the apportionable claims in the proceedings for the same damage, the material facts by reference to which the court is to assess the extent of that defendant’s responsibility for the plaintiff’s damage, which can include regard to the comparative responsibility of other defendants for the plaintiff’s damage; [and] e) if the plaintiff has not alleged a claim against a concurrent wrongdoer whose comparative responsibility is alleged by the defendant to be material, the material facts that establish the responsibility of that other concurrent wrongdoer for the loss and damage claimed by the plaintiff in the proceeding.’557

An important difference in the Victorian legislation is the provision stating that the court, when apportioning responsibility between defendants, must not have regard to the comparative responsibility of any person who is not a party to the proceedings, unless the person is dead or if the person is a corporation, the corporation has been wound-up.558 This differs from the provisions of the Queensland and New South Wales legislation, which specifically state that a court may have regard to the comparative responsibility of any concurrent wrongdoer who is not a party to the proceedings.559

The Victorian legislation prohibits recovery between concurrent wrongdoers by way of claims for contribution or requirements to indemnify.560 The Victorian legislation also contains exception provisions relating to vicarious liability, partner’s liability and agent’s liability,561 commensurate with the provisions enacted in Queensland.

The Victorian legislation is silent as to a concurrent wrongdoer’s obligations to identify other known concurrent wrongdoers. This is consistent with the prohibition in the legislation preventing the court from having regard to the comparative responsibility of persons who are not a party to the proceedings.

The issue of whether the proportionate liability provisions apply to claims for liquidated damages was examined in the Victorian Supreme Court of Appeal decision of Commonwealth Bank of Australia v Witherow.562 In that case the bank claimed payment of approximately $150,000 on the basis of a personal guarantee to pay the overdraft for a company of which Witherow was a director. Witherow argued that, in accordance with Pt IVAA of the Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic), the proportionate liability regime was applicable so as to reduce his liability to the bank. The Victorian Supreme Court of Appeal overturned the original decision, holding that the full amount owing was payable by Witherow, as Pt IVAA had no application in an action of this type as the claim was not for ‘damages’ as defined by the Act.

In 2008, the Supreme Court of Victoria handed down the decision of Godfrey Spowers (Victoria) Pty Ltd v Lincolne Scott Australia Pty Ltd & Ors,563 restricting the scope of recovery by a defendant from a third party with respect to a compromise paid in settlement of a claim. The third party argued the compromise was reflective of the defendant’s liability for an apportionable claim. The claim related to economic loss resulting from construction defects in a commercial office building. The defendant sought to recover from the third party the entire sum of the compromise as a contribution for the amount paid in settlement of the claim. In interpreting the application of an apportionable claim under the Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic), Mandie J determined that the good faith settlement by the defendant could only reflect the amount for which the defendant, to the exclusion of the other parties, was responsible for the damage.

557 Ibid [24]. 558 Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic) s 24AI(3). 559 Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld) s 31(3); Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW) s 35(3). 560 Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic) s 24AJ. 561 Ibid s 24AP. 562 [2006] VSCA 45. 563 [2008] VSC 90.

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This decision has since been reversed by the Victorian Court of Appeal.564 In a unanimous decision, the court held that s 24AI of the Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic) does not prohibit a defendant who has settled an apportionable claim from claiming a contribution, under pt IV of the Act, from a person who is liable in respect of the same damage.565 This decision was similarly applied in Gunston v Lawley.566

Vicarious liability Victoria has not introduced any legislative reforms dealing with the concept of vicarious liability. At common law an employer can be found vicariously liable for a wrongful, unauthorised or negligent act of an employee which is carried out in the course of his or her employment and is so closely connected with an authorised act that it may be regarded as a mode of doing the authorised act. This principle was endorsed in the High Court decision of New South Wales v Lepore, Samin v Queensland, Rich v Queensland567 in which three appeals were heard simultaneously.

An employer will not always be held responsible for the actions of his or her employees.568 The act must be closely connected with his or her employment for vicarious liability to attach. Therefore, whether an employer will be held vicariously liable for the actions of his or her employee will depend upon the specific facts in each case.

In Webster v Coles Myer Limited and Thompson v Coles Myer Limited,569 the plaintiffs claimed that the defendant was vicariously liable for the actions of its employee where that employee falsely and maliciously identified the plaintiffs as credit card fraudsters to the police. The court cited with approval the finding of Gummow and Hayne JJ in Lepore that vicarious liability will be established where:

‘. . . the conduct of which complaint is made was done in the ostensible pursuit of the employer’s business or the apparent execution of the authority which the employer held out the employee as having’.570

The court heard evidence on the system employed by the defendant for reporting potential criminal conduct and found that its employees’ vigilance and duty to report suspicious or dishonest conduct to the police was an integral part of that system. With this in mind, the defendant was found vicariously liable for the conduct of its employee. This decision was later affirmed by the New South Wales Court of Appeal.571

Exempt from the doctrine of vicarious liability are police officers and other public officers who commit torts in the execution of an independent duty cast on them by law.572 The rationale for this exception is that the officer is not subject to the State’s control at the time he or she is executing some legal duty that arises independent of the employment relationship.573

564 [2008] VSCA 208, (2008) 21 VR 84. 565 Ibid [129]. 566 [2008] VSC 97, (2008) 20 VR 33. 567 (2003) 212 CLR 511. 568 Ibid. 569 [2009] NSWDC 4. 570 Ibid [236]. 571 Coles Myer Ltd v Webster; Coles Myer Ltd v Thompson [2009] NSWCA 299. 572 Slaveski (by his litigation guardian Slaveska) v State of Victoria and Ors [2010] VSC 441. 573 Ibid.

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In the case of police officers, once a police officer takes their oath, the individual is vested with powers under the Act and at common law. Authority is derived from the officer taking the oath of office rather than the fact that they are employed by the state as a police officer. As such, the individual is responsible for intentional torts committed whilst exercising their statutory power.574

Blake v JR Perry Nominees Pty Ltd575 was a case involving alleged vicarious liability for injury caused by the unauthorised act of an employee. The employee played a practical joke on the plaintiff, hitting him on the back of the knees and causing him to fall and injure his back. The plaintiff argued that the practical joke was the product of employment-related boredom and frustration. The Victorian Court of Appeal (Harper JA, Robson AJA agreeing) rejected this argument, upholding the primary judge’s finding that the employer was not vicariously liable for the plaintiff’s injuries. The court held that the unauthorised act was not done in furthering the employer’s interests or under its express or implied authority; nor was it an incident to or in consequence of the employee’s duties:

‘It was a spontaneous act of a prankster. No proper thought was given to it. The occasion for the prank, and the form it took, may have arisen from the fact that Mr Jones was a truck driver employed by the defendant; but a prank of this kind, generated wholly within the confines of Mr Jones’ [sic] brain, was not within the course of his employment as a truck driver.’576

Importantly, Harper JA said this conclusion flowed from the application of any of the four different tests expounded by the High Court in New South Wales v Lepore.577

Non-delegable duties Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic) pt 10 div 6 (s 61) Section inserted by the Wrongs and Other Acts (Law of Negligence) Act 2003 (Vic) and commenced 3 December 2003 The term non-delegable duty is somewhat misleading. It does not mean that a party owing a duty cannot delegate the task to a third party, but rather that the liability cannot be delegated. As such, it is a duty to ensure that reasonable care is taken. Therefore, if the third party to whom the task has been entrusted fails to exercise reasonable care, the non-delegable duty will have been breached.

The categories of non-delegable duties continue to evolve. The courts have struggled, however, to clearly define the parameters required to justify the existence of a non-delegable duty of care. The known criteria include the superior capacity of the defendant to bear the risk of the mishap, the special obligation which it is proper to attach to extra-hazardous activities, and the special dependence or vulnerability of the person to whom the duty is owed.578

574 Section 123 of the Police Regulation Act 1958 (Vic) imposes liability on the state only for torts ‘necessarily or reasonably done in good faith in the course of duty’, thereby excluding for example, intentional assaults. See Victoria v Horvath [2002] VSCA 177, [62]. 575 (2012) 221 IR 456. 576 (2012) 221 IR 456 at 471[66]. 577 (2012) 221 IR 456 at 471–2, [67]–[70]. 578 Northern Sandblasting Pty Ltd v Harris (1997) 188 CLR 313.

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Common known relationships in which non-delegable duties exist include:

ƒƒ employer and employee;579 ƒƒ host employer and contractor;580 ƒƒ school and student;581 ƒƒ hospital and patient;582 and ƒƒ owner of premises and licensee.583

The Ipp Report recommended that the relevant civil liability legislation should ensure that a plaintiff could not circumvent the application of the civil liability legislation by pleading an action based upon a breach of a non-delegable duty of care.

In response to that recommendation, Victoria has enacted s 61 of the Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic) which provides that a party who has breached a non-delegable duty will only be liable to the extent that they would have been, had their liability arisen as a result of vicarious liability.

Exclusion clauses Australian Consumer Law and Fair Trading Act 2012 (Vic) s 22 commenced 1 July 2012 Prior to 1 July 2012, the supplier of recreational services was able to restrict or modify their liability in relation to the supply of recreational services under s 32N of the Fair Trading Act 1999 (Vic). This section has since been repealed but its contents have been substantially re-enacted in s 22 of the Australian Consumer Law and Fair Trading Act 2012 (Vic) and regulation 6 of the Fair Trading (Recreation Services) Regulation 2012 (Vic).

Section 22 of the Act allows a contract for the supply of recreational services to exclude, restrict or modify liability that arises from an express or implied breach of a warranty that the service would be rendered with reasonable skill and care. For such an exclusion to be effective, the contract must be entered into after 1 June 2004, the exclusion must relate to personal injury or death, the supplier must not have made a false or misleading statement in relation to the term, and the term must have been brought to the attention of the purchaser before the supply of the services.

The exclusion, however, does not apply to a death or injury caused by an act or omission done with reckless disregard with or without consciousness of the consequences of the act or omission.

Where the claim is one captured by the Australian Consumer Law, there are certain guarantees which cannot be excluded or limited by contract. See div 2–3 of sch 2 of the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth).

Apology Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic) pt 2 (ss14I–14L) Sections were inserted by the Wrongs and Other Acts (Public Liability Insurance Reform) Act 2002 (Vic) and commenced 23 October 2002

Pursuant to s 14I of the Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic), an apology is defined as ‘an expression of sorrow, regret or sympathy, but does not include a clear acknowledgement of fault’.

579 Kondis v State Transport Authority (1984) 154 CLR 672. 580 TNT Australia Pty Ltd v Christie & 2 Ors; Crown Equipment Pty Ltd v Christie & 2 Ors; Manpower Services (Aust) Pty Ltd v Christie & 2 Ors [2003] NSWCA 47. 581 Commonwealth v Introvigne (1982) 150 CLR 258. 582 Samios v Repatriation Commission [1960] WAR 219. 583 Burnie Port Authority v General Jones Pty Ltd (1994) 179 CLR 520.

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Section 14J provides, that in a civil proceeding where the death or injury of a person is in issue, an apology does not constitute an admission of liability or an admission of unprofessional conduct, carelessness, incompetence or unsatisfactory professional performance. This section applies to oral apologies and apologies in writing which are made either before or after the civil proceeding was in contemplation or commenced.

The Supreme Court of New South Wales recently distinguished an expression of regret from an apology in the case of David Michael Wilson v Nilepac Pty Ltd t/as Vision Personal Training (Crows Nest).584 In that case, a personal trainer was being sued by his client for an injury sustained during a training session. The plaintiff placed reliance on two statements made by the defendant after having suffered his injury that he ‘shouldn’t have started [him] off so hard’ and ‘we should have done more core strengthening exercises first’. The court construed these statements as being mere expressions of regret and not admissions of breach of the legal standard of care.585

Section 14J(3) provides that ‘nothing in this section affects the admissibility of a statement with respect to a fact in issue or tending to establish a fact in issue’. Unlike other states, the Victorian Act provides that a reduction or waiver of fees does not constitute an admission of guilt (s 14K).

For High Court guidance on the distinction between admissions and apologies, see Dovuro Pty Ltd v Wilkins.586

Limitation periods Limitation of Actions Act 1958 (Vic) pt 2 div 2 (s 23A) and pt 2A (ss 27A–27N) Section 23A was repealed and substituted by Limitation of Actions (Amendment) Act 2002 (Vic) and commenced 5 November 2002 Sections 23A(6), 27A–27N were inserted by the Wrongs and Limitation of Actions Acts (Insurance Reform) Act 2003 (Vic) and commenced 21 May 2003 Defamation Act 2005 (Vic) commenced 1 January 2006 Victoria has the following limitation provisions applying to negligence actions involving personal injury or death:

ƒƒ the limitation period is three years starting from when the cause of the action is discoverable or 12 years starting from the occurrence that gives rise to the claim, whichever expires first (Limitation of Actions Act 1958 (Vic) s 27D); ƒƒ the 12 year period is able to be extended at the discretion of the court but not beyond three years after the cause of action is discoverable (Limitation of Actions Act 1958 (Vic) s 27); and ƒƒ the suspension of a limitation period during incapacity will not apply to a child who has a capable parent or guardian and discoverability of a cause of action by a minor will be assessed according to the knowledge of the parent or guardian (Limitation of Actions Act 1958 (Vic) s 27D).

Under s 23A of the Limitation of Actions Act 1958 (Vic), a court has the power to extend the limitation period as it sees fit, if it decides that it is just and reasonable to do so. In exercising this power, a court must have regard to the following:

584 [2009] NSWSC 1365. 585 It should be noted that this decision was overturned on appeal (Wilson v Nilepac Pty Ltd (t/as Vision Personal Training) (Crows Nest) [2011] NSWCA 63), however the trial judge’s findings in relation to these comments were left undisturbed. 586 (2003) 215 CLR 317.

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ƒƒ the length and reasons for the delay on the part of the plaintiff; ƒƒ the extent to which, having regard to the delay, there is or is likely to be prejudice to the defendant; ƒƒ the extent, if any, to which the defendant had taken steps to make available to the plaintiff means of ascertaining facts which were or might be relevant to the cause of action of the plaintiff against the defendant; ƒƒ the duration of any disability of the plaintiff arising on or after the date of the accrual of the cause of action; ƒƒ the extent to which the plaintiff acted promptly and reasonably once they knew that the act or omission of the defendant, to which the injury of the plaintiff was attributable, might be capable at that time of giving rise to an action for damages; and ƒƒ the steps taken by the plaintiff to obtain medical, legal or other expert advice and the nature of any such advice he may have received.

The Limitation of Actions Act 1958 (Vic) was amended by the Defamation Act 2005 (Vic) (which commenced on 1 January 2006) to limit the limitation period for actions in defamation to one year from the date of publication of the defamatory material. However, if it was not reasonable for a plaintiff to have commenced proceedings within one year of publication, the court must extend the period of limitation, but to no more than three years.

In Millard v State of Victoria,587 an appeal was made against a refusal to grant an application to extend the limitation period pursuant to s 23A of the Limitation of Actions Act 1958 (Vic). However, it was held that there was no reasonable delay having regard to the applicant’s injuries and that the delay was not likely to prejudice the respondent. Moreover, it was just and reasonable to grant the extension, hence the appeal was allowed.

In regards to psychiatric injury, the majority in the Victorian Court of Appeal in Cavenett v Commonwealth,588 held that, where a plaintiff is seeking damages for mental injury, the limitations period does not commence until the plaintiff knows that his or her mental condition is a medically recognised mental illness.

This does not necessarily mean that the plaintiff is required to know the name of the mental illness or that it has been recognised by the medical profession as a mental illness. It does however require that the plaintiff know, in the sense of belief, that his or her mental condition is of such a nature that the medical profession would recognise it as a mental illness.

In the decision of Cavenett Nettle JA stated:

‘[W]ith psychiatric disorders, everyday experience is that some people react adversely to psychological pressures to which they may be subject in the work-place. They may suffer head-aches or become anxious or despondent or irritable or melancholy, or they may be unable to sleep or they may wake thinking about their work, and, from time to time, some may have nightmares about particular aspects of their work. The bulk of persons who suffer in that fashion would probably acknowledge that their symptoms are indicative of a change in their mental condition. Yet it is unlikely that they would consider that they have suffered a mental injury. Human nature being what it is, they are more likely to look upon their symptoms as the kind of thing which it is normal for human beings to exhibit from time to time and to take the view that they should put up with the problem for as long as it lasts while they get on with their work. It is only when and if they are advised that their symptoms are emblematic of a condition that the medical profession recognises as a psychiatric injury that they are likely to know, in the sense of believe, that they have sustained a mental injury.’589

587 [2006] VSCA 29. 588 [2007] VSCA 88. 589 Ibid [100].

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Therefore, the limitation period will not commence until the plaintiff knows that his or her mental condition is a mental illness which would be recognised by the medical profession.

Damages Awards

Awards of damages in personal injuries claims in Victoria are now regulated by the reforms to the Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic).

General damages Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic) pt 5B–5BA div 2 (ss 28G–28LF) Sections 28H to 28L were inserted by the Wrongs and Other Acts (Public Liability Insurance Reform) Act 2002 (Vic) and commenced 23 October 2002 Sections 28LA–LF were inserted by the Wrongs and Limitation of Actions Acts (Insurance Reform) Act 2003 (Vic) and commenced 21 May 2003 A claim can be made for non-economic loss under these provisions except for cases of intentional acts or sexual assaults, claims under the Transport Accident Act 1986 (Vic), the Accident Compensation Act 1985 (Vic) and the Workers Compensation Act 1958 (Vic). Victoria has amended its damages regime to incorporate a cap on any award for general damages and provides that there will be no award of general damages unless the plaintiff has a ‘significant injury’.590 A ‘significant injury’ is defined as a ‘5% permanent impairment (10% if psychiatric),’ as assessed on the AMA Guide to the Evaluation of Permanent Impairment (4th Edition) in accordance with an assessment process set out in the Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic).591 The court may also have regard to in determining the assessment of general damages.592

The maximum amount recoverable for non-economic loss is capped by s 28G. This amount is indexed annually in accordance with the consumer price index calculation in s 28H. As of 1 July 2013, the maximum amount recoverable is $497,340.

An example of the application of these provisions can be found in the case of Hynes v Hynes.593 In this case, the plaintiff was injured when the defendant motorist released the radiator cap on his vehicle and hot water escaped. The plaintiff suffered burns on her back, left shoulder, left side of her face and scalp. She also suffered residual scarring and disfigurement as well as alleged psychological upset. The Victorian County Court found that the plaintiff could not recover damages for non-economic loss under the provisions of the Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic) because the accident was caused by the driving of a motor vehicle, and in turn evoked the exclusion in the Transport Accident Act 1986 (Vic). On appeal, the Court of Appeal held that the restrictions did not apply to claims made under s 94 of the Transport Accident Act 1986 (Vic) because the incident was not directly caused by driving a motor vehicle and the plaintiff was therefore entitled to receive general damages which were assessed under s 28H to 28LF.

590 Ibid s 28LE. 591 Ibid s 28LF. 592 Ibid s 28HA. 593 (2007) 15 VR 475.

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Economic loss Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic) pt 5B (s 28F) Section inserted by the Wrongs and Other Acts (Public Liability Insurance Reform) Act 2002 and commenced 23 October 2002 The Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic) regulates awards for economic loss in terms similar to the New South Wales legislation by adopting in essence the same provisions for past economic loss, albeit that the average weekly earnings are calculated by reference to the earnings of all employees in Victoria.594 The Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic) does not regulate awards for future economic loss with the exception of s 28I which sets the discount rate for future economic loss at 5%, unless another amount is prescribed by regulation. Section 28F applies a cap to the amount of economic loss able to be awarded in personal injury claims.

The decision of Tuohey v Freemasons Hospital595 considered the legislative intent behind s 28F, and confirms that a person is restricted to claiming damages for loss of earning capacity at a rate of three times the average weekly wage in Victoria. In this case the plaintiff was an engineer earning $10,550 a week pre-injury and $6,450 post-injury. In light of s 28F(2), it was agreed that $2,836.50 was three times the average weekly wage at the time of judgment. It was argued that s 28F(2) operated to prevent the plaintiff from claiming the difference between his loss of weekly earning capacity and three times the average weekly wage. The plaintiff held that he was entitled to damages for loss of earning capacity, in addition to the $6,450 he could earn in future employment.

However, the Court of Appeal unanimously rejected this argument explaining that the cap in s 28F(2) applies to the total of a plaintiff’s pre-injury earnings before their post-injury earnings are deducted. Where post-injury earnings exceed pre-injury earnings cap of three times the average weekly wage, a plaintiff will not be entitled to damages for loss of earning capacity. The plaintiff in this case was able to earn well in excess of $2,836.50 post-injury, and therefore could not claim damages for loss of earning capacity.

Gratuitous care Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic) pt 5B Sections 28IA–IF were inserted by the Wrongs and Other Acts (Law of Negligence) Act 2003 (Vic) and commenced 3 December 2003 Section 28LA was inserted by the Wrongs and Limitation of Actions Acts (Insurance Reform) Act 2003 (Vic) and commenced 21 May 2003 Gratuitous attendant care Damages for gratuitous attendant care are the equivalent of the damages formerly known as Griffiths v Kerkemeyer damages under the common law.596 Section 281A of the Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic) states that damages for gratuitous care are not to be provided to a plaintiff unless:

ƒƒ there is (or was) a reasonable need for the services to be provided; ƒƒ the need has arisen (or arose) solely because of the injury to which the damages relate; and ƒƒ the services would not be (or would not have been) provided to the plaintiff but for the injury.

Further, s 281A(2) provides that no damages may be awarded to a plaintiff for gratuitous care if the services are provided, or are to be provided:

594 Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic), s 28F. 595 [2012] VSCA 80. 596 Griffiths v Kerkemeyer (1977) 15 ALR 387.

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ƒƒ for less than six hours per week; and ƒƒ for less than six months.

Section 231B provides that the maximum award for gratuitous care must not exceed:

ƒƒ the amount per week comprising the amount estimated by the Australian Statistician as the average weekly total earnings of all employees in the State if care is over 40 hours per week; or ƒƒ an hourly rate of 1/40 of the average weekly wage in Victoria if care is less than 40 hours per week.

Loss of capacity to provide care for others The Act also provides for damages for loss of capacity to provide care for others. This is the equivalent of the damages formerly known as Sullivan v Gordon damages.597 The minimum requirements for this entitlement mirror that for gratuitous attendant care.

Section 28ID of the Act provides that damages to compensate a plaintiff for their capacity to provide gratuitous care for others must not be awarded unless the court is satisfied that:

ƒƒ the care was provided to the plaintiff’s dependants for at least six hours per week for six consecutive months before the relevant injury; and ƒƒ there is a reasonable expectation that, but for the injury to which the damages relate, the gratuitous care would have been provided to the plaintiff’s dependants for at least six hours per week for at least six consecutive months.

Section 28IE of the Act sets out the method for calculating damages for gratuitous care provided to a claimant’s dependants. This calculation varies depending on whether the care was awarded for less than or more than 40 hours per week.

Damages must not be awarded under s 28ID and 28IE if the action for damages relates to an injury that is a dust related condition or results from smoking or other use of tobacco products. These provisions apply to injuries sustained after 21 May 2003. From 1 October 2003, the provisions govern claims for gratuitous attendant care for injuries received before 21 May 2003, unless the claim was commenced in court before 1 October 2003 (see s 28LA).

Interest The Victorian legislation does not contain any restrictions on a claim for interest on damages awards for civil liability claims.

The common law indicates that, unlike other states, a claim for interest on general damages is allowable.598

Discount rate Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic) pt 5B (s 28I) Section was inserted by the Wrongs and Other Acts (Public Liability Insurance Reform) Act 2002 (Vic) and commenced 23 October 2002 The discount rate in Victoria was raised under the post Ipp reforms from 3% to 5% in line with the Ipp recommendations. This rate appears in s 28I of the Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic) and remains current as at 2014.

597 Sullivan v Gordon (1999) 47 NSWLR 319. 598 Walker & Anor v Hamm & Ors (No 2) [2009] VSC 290.

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Exemplary, punitive or aggravated damages Exemplary damages have been abolished in respect of motor vehicle accidents by way of s 93(7) of the Transport Accident Act 1986 (Vic), and in actions which survive for the benefit of a deceased plaintiff’s estate.

There have otherwise been no further legislative provisions removing or limiting the ability of the courts to make awards for punitive, exemplary and/or aggravated damages.

Structured settlements Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic) pt 5C (ss 28M–28N) Sections inserted by the Wrongs and Other Acts (Public Liability Insurance Reform) Act 2002 (Vic) and commenced 14 February 2003 Victoria has legislated to implement reforms to encourage and facilitate structured settlements. The relevant legislation provides for the courts to advise of a proposed award ahead of making the award to allow parties to negotiate (should they wish) a structured settlement. The parties then apply to the court for an order that the settlement be in the form agreed between them.

Legal costs Section 24 Civil Procedure Act 2010 commenced 1 January 2011 Sections 1(2)(b) and 65A–65E inserted by the Civil Procedure Amendment Act 2012 (Vic) and commenced on 1 May 2013 Sections 55(4)–(5) and 55A–55C inserted by the Justice Legislation Amendment (Discovery, Disclosure and Other Matters) Act 2014 (Vic) and commenced on [day or days to be proclaimed, and if it does not come into operation before 31 October 2014, it comes into operation on that day] Prior to the enactment of the Civil Procedure Act 2010 (Vic), Victorian legislation provided no limitations in relation to legal costs.

Section 24 of the Act provides that a person to whom the overarching obligations apply599 must use reasonable endeavours to ensure that legal and other costs incurred in connection with the civil proceeding are reasonable and proportionate to the complexity of the proceeding and the amount in dispute. These provisions are intended to reduce unnecessary expenditure on litigation and are part of an ongoing review of the costs rules for litigation.600

The newly inserted ss 65A–65E expand the powers of the courts in relation to costs in civil proceedings. Courts are empowered to make an order directing a legal practitioner to prepare a memorandum setting out estimates of costs and length of a proceeding or trial, as well as any other order with respect to costs that it considers appropriate to further the overarching purpose.

Sections 55(4)–(5) and 55A–55C, which will come into effect no later than 31 October 2014, are intended to provide for further case management powers in relation to discovery and disclosure. Specifically, s 55(4) empowers courts to order a party to pay another party an amount in relation to the costs of discovery in any manner considered appropriate by the court. Sections 55A–55C confer broad powers in respect of ordering parties to provide all documents in their possession or control; parties to provide affidavits of document management; and deponents of an affidavit of document management, or another person who is able to provide information in relation to the matters dealt with the affidavit, be subject to oral examination in relation to that affidavit.

As yet there has been no judicial consideration of these provisions.

599 Section 11 of the Civil Procedure Act 2010 (Vic) the overarching obligations apply generally in respect of the conduct of any aspect of a civil proceeding in a court. 600 Victoria, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Assembly, 24 June 2010, 2607–2608 (Rob Hulls).

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Practice and Procedure Legal practitioners Legal Profession Act 2004 (Vic) Sections 3.5.2(7), (9) and 8.1.1(1) commenced 15 December 2004 with the remainder of the Act commencing 12 December 2005 Professional Conduct and Practice Rules (2005) (Vic) commencing 30 June 2005 The Legal Profession Act 2004 (Vic) was enacted in 2004 in order to provide consistent protection to practitioners (including solicitors and Counsel), consumers and third parties. It also aimed to streamline professional practice in Victoria and across the nation by modelling the provisions closely with the Model Laws Project. The Act applies to all matters where instructions were first obtained on or after 12 December 2005 and the Legal Practice Act 1996 (Vic) governs all matters where instructions were obtained prior to 12 December 2005.

In June 2014, the Victorian Legal Services Board finalised consultation for the proposed adoption of the Victorian Solicitors’ Conduct Rules, which would replace the current Professional Conduct and Practice Rules (2005) (Vic). These proposed rules would impose further professional obligations on Victorian solicitors in their dealings with their clients, the courts, their fellow lawyers, regulators and other third parties.

Failing to adhere to the rules detailed in the Professional Conduct Rules can have serious consequences for a solicitor including a finding of professional misconduct. In the recent case of Legal Services Commission v C (Legal Practice),601 the solicitor was charged with four counts of professional misconduct relating to misleading and false representations made to three Judges whilst acting on behalf of a client charged with a criminal offence. ‘Professional misconduct’ at common law is constituted by conduct by a professional person in practise, which would be reasonably regarded, as disgraceful or dishonourable by professional brethren of good repute and competency.602

As a result of his false representations, the solicitor’s practising certificate was cancelled, he was prohibited from obtaining one for 12 months and he was ordered to pay costs in an amount of $10,089.

Legal advertising Although the Legal Profession Act 2004 (Vic) provides some regulation as to the appropriate manner of advertising legal services, it continues to fall short of implementing personal injury specific regulations as recommended by the Ipp report.

The Victorian Law Society has issued Direct-Marketing Guidelines. The guidelines state that specific forms of firm promotion cannot be broadly prohibited as they may be acceptable in some circumstances but not in others.

601 [2012] VCAT 890. 602 Re a solicitor [1960] VR 617, 620.

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australian capital territory

Whilst the Australian Capital Territory has moved to introduce some legislative reforms in accordance with the Ipp recommendations, it has been more reluctant than other States to implement major changes in other areas. This is highlighted in the lack of reform in areas such as obvious risks/inherent risk, liability of recreational service providers and, notably, in the area of assessment of damages.

Application of Statutory Reforms Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 2002 (ACT) ch 4 pt 4.1, ch 5 pt 5.1, ch 7 pt 7.1 (ss 41, 50 and 93) commenced 1 November 2002 The Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 2002 (ACT) commenced on November 2002. The Act imposes restrictions on the rights of persons suffering personal injury, both in relation to the scope of liability and the damages that may be awarded. Pursuant to s 41 of the Act, the provisions relating to negligence contained in ch 4 of the Act apply to all claims for damages for harm resulting from negligence whether brought in tort, contract or statute, with the exception of workers’ compensation claims.

Pursuant to s 50, the provisions of the Act which set out the pre-proceedings steps (which are contained in ch 5 of the Act) apply to all civil claims for damages, including compulsory third party motor vehicle accident claims, with the exception of some claims relating to children. Claims are also excluded if a claim for compensation under the workers’ compensation legislation is made in relation to the injury, unless the claim is a compulsory third party claim or one of the respondents to the claim is not an employer or workers’ compensation insurer, even though one of the other respondents to the claim may be an employer or workers’ compensation insurer.

Section 93 of the Act makes it clear that the provisions impacting on damages contained in ch 7 of the Act apply to all civil claims for damages for harm, including compulsory third party claims, except claims under workers’ compensation legislation.

The Australian judicial system has proceeded independently of civil liability legislation by providing general statements that may provide support for the doctrinal development of negligence for intentional harm.603 In the Australian Capital Territory, unlike some other jurisdictions, intentional torts are not expressly excluded from the application of the Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 2002 (ACT). The application of the Act is yet to be applied to or tested by an intentional tort matter.

Pre-court Procedures Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 2002 (ACT) ch 5 (ss 49–80) Sections 47–74 commenced 1 November 2002 Sections 75–80 commenced 1 July 2003 Sections 49 to 80 of the Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 2002 (ACT) set out various steps that are required to be completed prior to formal court proceedings being instituted. The Act is designed to encourage the economical and early resolution of personal injury damages claims without the need for a court to determine liability or damages.

603 Stingel v Clarke (2006) 226 CLR 442.

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By way of summary, an injured person is required to serve a Notice of Claim and both parties then co-operate in full and early disclosure of documents (including investigative reports, excluding statements of opinion). In Brown v Haureliuk604, the court applied the principles set out in McGregor v Franklin605 and Al-Rawahi v Niazi606 and supported the action to continue to trial notwithstanding the plaintiff’s non-compliance with s 51 of the Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 2002 (ACT). The court was more concerned with the plaintiff’s deprivation as a result of barring an action for damages than adhering to the legislative process.

Should the matter not be resolved, the parties then participate in a compulsory conference and exchange mandatory final offers at the close of the conference. These offers are considered on the question of costs should the matter be adjudicated by a court.

The Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 2002 (ACT) pre-court procedures allow a party to compel the opposing party to provide documents and evidence. Non-compliance will allow a party to make an application to the court for an order remedying the non-compliance prior to the substantive proceedings being issued. Costs orders are available against the non-complying party as part of this procedure.

The claimant is required under s 64(1)(a) of the Act to provide the respondent with reports and documents about the accident and to provide medical and rehabilitation reports. Section 64(1) (b) allows the respondent to request a range of further information from the claimant, including information regarding the claimant’s medical condition and relevant treatment and rehabilitation, medical history, and information related to any claims for past or future economic loss and gratuitous care. Section 72 of the Act prevents the claimant from claiming client legal privilege in relation to an investigative report, medical report or report relevant to the claimant’s rehabilitation. Should a party fail to disclose a document, they are precluded from later using the document in the proceeding.607

Section 64(4) enables the respondent to compel the claimant to verify, by way of statutory declaration, any of the requested information. The Act makes it an offence to make a false or misleading statement in any documents disclosed under ch 5 of the Act.608 The subsection also contains new notes which clarify that the Statutory Declarations Act 1959 (Cth) and Criminal Code (pt 3.4) apply to the making of the statutory declaration.

However, these provisions do not apply to claims for compensation under the Workers Compensation Act 1951 (ACT).

The Law of Negligence – Scope of Duty of Care

The Australian Capital Territory Government’s response to the perceived insurance crisis was the enactment of the Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 2002 (ACT). This legislation consolidates the law in the Australian Capital Territory relating to torts, wrongs and negligence.

Standard of care Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 2002 (ACT) ch 4 pt 4.2 (ss 42–43) commenced 1 November 2002 The standard of care required of a defendant is, pursuant to s 42 of the Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 2002 (ACT), that of a reasonable person in the defendant’s position who was in possession of all the information that the defendant either had, or ought reasonably to have had, at the time of the incident out of which the harm arose.

604 [2011] ACTSC 9. 605 (2006) 201 FLR 303. 606 (2006) 203 FLR 94. 607 Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 2002 (ACT) s 75. 608 Ibid s 80.

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The Australian Capital Territory has also clarified the position in relation to foreseeability of harm under s 43 of the Act, which provides that a person will not be liable for harm unless:

ƒƒ the person knew or ought to have known of the risk; ƒƒ the risk was not insignificant; and ƒƒ a reasonable person in that person’s position at the time of the incident who was in possession of all the information that the person had, or ought to reasonably have had, would have taken precautions against the risk.

Additionally, the Australian Capital Territory has legislated to outline the relevant factors a court must take into consideration when determining whether a reasonable person would have taken precautions against the risk which caused the harm including probability of harm, seriousness of harm, and the burden of precautions and concepts of social utility.

In Grierson v Australian Capital Territory,609 the plaintiff claimed damages for an injury that occurred on a footpath. The court outlined the relevant provisions of the Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 2002 (ACT) and held that a duty is owed to all road users of a footpath, though the level of the duty is dependent on persons taking reasonable care for their own safety. The court held that the defendant breached that duty by failing to carry out a permanent repair of a known hazard: albeit the court was satisfied the plaintiff would have noticed the hazard had they been keeping a proper lookout.

Causation Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 2002 (ACT) ch 4 pt 4.3 (ss 45–46) commenced 1 November 2002 In order to establish causation in the Australian Capital Territory, there must initially be causation (i.e. the negligence was a necessary condition of the harm) and a finding that the harm comes within the scope of the negligent person’s liability. These concepts are outlined in ss 45–46 of the Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 2002 (ACT).

The causation limb is proved where it is shown to be more probable than not that, but for the act of the defendant, the harm would not have occurred. When determining issues as to the scope of liability, the court must consider whether or not and why the responsibility for the harm rests with the defendant. The plaintiff bears the burden of proof with respect to causation. A more detailed discussion of these principles appears under the discussion of ‘Causation’ in the New South Wales jurisdiction.

These principles have been recently applied in the case of Crowley v Commonwealth of Australia, Australian Capital Territory and Glen Pikethly.610 The plaintiff was a mentally ill person who became quadriplegic after being shot in the neck by a federal police officer who was trying to restrain him. In determining whether the police had been negligent, the test from March v Stramare611 was applied to the effect that causation is a question of fact to be resolved upon the application of common sense. It was held that, in failing to stop and consider alternative approaches to best deal with the plaintiff, the police were negligent and consequently caused his injuries. However, the finding of negligence was recently overturned by the ACT Court of Appeal. The judge found the police not to be negligent, as it would have been impossible for them to consider alternative approaches and conduct a risk assessment before entering the scene and finding Mr Crowley.612

609 [2011] ACTSC 113. 610 [2011] ACTSC 89. 611 (1991) 171 CLR 506. 612 Australian Capital Territory v Crowley [2012] ACTCA 52.

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Obvious risk Civil Law (Wrongs) 2002 (ACT) ch 4 pt 4.2 (s 43) commenced 1 November 2002 The obvious risk defence imposes a presumption that the plaintiff is aware of the risk if it is obvious. The Ipp Report indicated that the intention of the presumption was ‘to encourage greater use by the courts of the defence of assumption of risk’.613 However, the Australian Capital Territory legislation has not provided for a presumption that the plaintiff knew of the risk if it was obvious.

The Australian Capital Territory has not specifically implemented any legislative reform to limit liability in respect to obvious risk or the duty to warn of an obvious risk.

However, s 43 of the Civil Law (Wrongs) 2002 Act (ACT) does provide that a reasonable person is to take precautions against a risk of harm if that risk is foreseeable and not insignificant. The relevant considerations as to whether a reasonable person would take precautions include the probability and likely seriousness of harm together with the burden of the precautions and social utility of the activity creating the harm.

When a risk is not insignificant, it is important to note that the wording of the provisions has been specifically chosen to provide a broad scope that includes a risk that, although not significant, is itself also not insignificant and falls somewhere in between the two.

In relation to this provision, it has been suggested that, for a plaintiff to succeed at trial, the court would need to be satisfied that there were alternative precautions available which a reasonable person in the position of the defendant would and should have taken.614

Dangerous recreational activities Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 2002 (ACT) sch 3 commenced 1 November 2002 Australian Consumer Law (ACT) ss 60–61 commenced 1 January 2011 The Australian Capital Territory has not enacted any provisions dealing specifically with obvious risks in relation to dangerous recreational activities. Similarly, the Australian Capital Territory has not implemented any general legislative reform to limit a service provider’s liability when offering recreational activities. However, sch 3 of the Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 2002 (ACT) does provide that an equine activity sponsor, an equine professional or anyone else is not liable for personal injury to a participant in an equine activity. ‘Equine’ is defined to include a horse, donkey, mule or hinny and the liability limitation extends to instances of shows, competition, riding, teaching, boarding or shoeing. The inherent risks are defined as instances which are an integral part of equine activities, specifically the movements of the equine itself, surface conditions, collisions and other participants’ actions.

In relation to the standard of care owed by providers of recreational services, it appears that the statutory guarantees contained in the newly enacted Australian Consumer Law (ACT) may be of some relevance. Sections 60 and 61 provide (by extended definition) that recreational services will be:

ƒƒ provided with due care and skill; ƒƒ reasonably fit for the purpose for which the services are being acquired; and ƒƒ of such a nature, and quality, state or condition, that they might reasonably be expected to achieve the result that the consumer wishes to achieve so long as that wish is made known to the service provider.

613 Law of Negligence Review Panel, Review of the Law of Negligence, Final Report (Commonwealth of Australia, 2002) 129. 614 M v Australian Capital Territory [2012] ACTSC 20, [40].

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There has been no judicial consideration of these provisions so their application to dangerous recreational activities is as yet unclear.

Liability of professionals Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 2002 (ACT) sch 4 Schedule 4 was inserted by Civil Law (Wrongs) (Proportionate Liability and Professional Standards) Amendment Act 2004 (ACT) and commenced 8 March 2005 with consequential amendments made by the Justice and Community Safety Legislation Amendment Act 2008 (ACT) commenced 7 May 2008 The Australian Capital Territory has not consolidated the law relating to standard of care to be applied to professionals or medical practitioners. The Australian Capital Territory’s Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 2002 (ACT) provides a general standard of care to be applied in cases of negligence at s 42 of the Act, but the Act does not provide any direction on whether a special standard should be applied either to professionals generally, or to a doctor’s duty to warn a patient of risks of medical treatment. Accordingly, it appears that the common law duty elucidated in Rogers v Whitaker continues to govern the standard of care of professionals in the Australian Capital Territory. In 2006, the Supreme Court of the Australian Capital Territory in the decision of Haylock v Morris and Hugh615 applied Rogers v Whitaker and confirmed that whilst it is ultimately a matter for the court, expert evidence of prevailing professional standards must be taken into account and will often prove decisive when determining the appropriate standard of care of a medical practitioner.616

Schedule 4 of the Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 2002 (ACT) commenced on 8 March 2005 to enable the creation of schemes to limit the civil liability of professionals and others. The Act also establishes a council which supervises the preparation and application of schemes proposed by occupational associations or prepared by the Council upon request by an occupational association. As with similar legislation that has been enacted in most Australian jurisdictions, this legislation has not had any noticeable impact on the court’s interpretation of the civil liability of professionals to date.

Liability of public authorities Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 2002 (ACT) ch 8 (ss 108–114) Sections 108–112 commenced 1 November 2002 Sections 113–114 commenced 1 January 2003 The liability of public authorities is governed by ch 8 of the Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 2002 (ACT). The legislation sets out the general principles to be used in determining whether a public authority owes or has breached a duty of care.617 Specifically included is a consideration of the financial and resource limitations of the authority. In claims for breach of statutory duty, a breach will be established only if the act or omission was so unreasonable that no authority having the functions of the defendant authority could properly consider the act or omission to be a reasonable exercise of its functions.618 In the case of Traynor v Australian Capital Territory,619 the plaintiff who was riding a mountain bike collided with a car due to a tree blocking vision of traffic ahead. The court found that the Australian Capital Territory government had a duty to consider potential hazards and apply common sense when performing duties, in this case, the planting of trees.

The Act includes a highway immunity or non-feasance rule in relation to road authorities.620

615 [2006] ACTSC 86. 616 Ibid [57]. 617 Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 2002 (ACT) s 110. 618 Ibid s 111. 619 [2007] ACTSC 38. 620 Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 2002 (ACT) s 113.

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Specifically, liability will not attach to road authorities in respect of the condition of roads due to the actions or inactions of the road authorities unless they have knowledge of the defect prior to the incident in which the plaintiff suffered loss and/or damage. In Grierson v Australian Capital Territory,621 the public authority responsible for maintenance of a footpath was precluded from relying on s 113 as they had knowledge of the hazard which contributed to the plaintiff’s injuries due to the fact they had carried out a temporary repair at the site three years earlier. In light of evidence of the defendant’s usual practice of following up a temporary repair with a permanent one within 12 months, it was concluded that the defendant either had knowledge of the hazard or in the circumstances, ought reasonably to have known of it.

The provisions do not apply to a claim to which pt 10 of the Road Transport (General) Act 1999 (ACT) applies or a claim under the Workers’ Compensation Act 1951 (ACT).

Liability of volunteers and Good Samaritans Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 2002 (ACT) ch 2 pt 2.1, 2.2 (ss 5–11) commenced 1 November 2002 The Australian Capital Territory legislation deals with the conduct of Good Samaritans in s 5 of the Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 2002 (ACT). Pursuant to s 224, the provisions do not apply to incidents that occur before 1 July 2004. Sections 6–11 of the Act deal with the conduct of volunteers who perform community work for a community organisation. It commenced on 1 November 2002 and applies regardless of when the incident occurred.

Volunteers Each jurisdiction (except the Commonwealth) follows a basic framework for the exemption from civil liability for ‘volunteers’ who perform ‘community work’ for a ‘community organisation’. Each element must be satisfied for the exemption to apply. The Commonwealth only requires work being performed for the Commonwealth or a Commonwealth authority on a voluntary basis.

In the Australian Capital Territory, a ‘volunteer’ is a person who performs ‘community work’ on a voluntary basis. ‘Community work’ focuses on the overall activity engaged in by the ‘community organisation’ (not the conduct of the volunteer) and the four common types of activity across all State and Territory legislation is work done for charitable, benevolent, educational or sporting purposes. Each jurisdiction (other than the Commonwealth) provides a definition of ‘community organisation’ but includes a list of legal entities that can be considered ‘organisations’ and includes the words ‘body corporate’ or ‘corporation’. In the Australian Capital Territory and Queensland, a ‘corporation’ includes a body corporate and an incorporated association.

In the Australian Capital Territory, the Act provides that a volunteer will not be liable where they act honestly and without recklessness while carrying out community work for a community organisation, without remuneration. Instead the liability transfers to the community organisation.622

‘Community work’ is defined in the Act to exclude work that involves threats of violence, or severe risk to the health or safety of the public or is declared by regulation not to be community work. The Act also provides that there is no protection from liability if:623

621 [2011] ACTSC 113. 622 Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 2002 (ACT) s 9. 623 Ibid s 8.

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ƒƒ the liability falls within the ambit of a scheme of compulsory third-party motor vehicle insurance; ƒƒ the liability is for defamation; ƒƒ the volunteer’s ability to carry out the work is significantly impaired by a recreational drug; ƒƒ the volunteer was acting, and knew or ought to have known that he or she was acting, outside the scope of the activities authorised by the community organisation; or ƒƒ the volunteer was acting contrary to instructions given by the community organisation.

In the case where liability is transferred to the community organisation, the Act allows the Minister to assume the liability of that organisation if that community organisation carries out a recognised government responsibility.624

Food donors A food donor is exempted from civil liability where the consumption of donated food results in personal injury provided the food was fit for human consumption when it left the possession or control of the donor and the donor made the person to whom the food was given aware of any handling requirements and limits on time for the consumption of the donated food.625

Good Samaritans The Act specifically provides that Good Samaritans will not be liable if they acted honestly and without recklessness.626 However, the protection from civil liability does not apply if the liability falls within the ambit of a scheme of compulsory third party motor vehicle insurance or if the Good Samaritan was impaired by a recreational drug at the time.627

The definition of a Good Samaritan includes not only persons acting without expectation of pay when coming to the aid of persons injured or in need of medical assistance but also medically qualified persons who without expectation of payment provide advice concerning the treatment of injured persons.628 Other States and Territories that have made provision for this type of protection from civil liability are Victoria, New South Wales, Western Australia, South Australia and Northern Territory. Queensland is yet to adopt a similar position.

Liability for mental harm Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 2002 (ACT) ch 3 pt 3.2 (ss 32–36) commenced 1 November 2002 Part 3.2 of the Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 2002 (ACT) outlines the instances where damages for mental harm can be awarded. The Act provides that there is no duty of care not to cause mental harm unless a reasonable person in the defendant’s position would have foreseen that a person of normal fortitude in the plaintiff’s position might suffer a recognised psychiatric illness if reasonable care is not taken.629 The Act distinguishes between pure mental harm and consequential mental harm (that which is the consequence of a bodily injury) and provides that damages should not be awarded for either unless the harm results in a recognised psychiatric illness.630 The Act also includes those considerations that the court must take into account when determining an award for damages.

624 Ibid s 10. 625 Ibid s 11B. 626 Ibid s 5(1). 627 Ibid s 5(2). 628 Ibid s 5(3). 629 Ibid s 34. 630 Ibid s 35.

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Those persons who are eligible for an award include sufferers of mental or nervous shock including a parent of an impaired or deceased person or a domestic partner. The Act also extends to those persons who are eligible for an award to other family members provided they are within sight or hearing of the incident. However, there is currently no formula for assessing damage for mental harm and the court has the discretion to award damages that it considers appropriate. These provisions are similar to those in the New South Wales civil liability legislation.631

Intoxication and illegal activity Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 2002 (ACT) ch 7 pt 7.1 (ss 92–97) commenced 1 November 2002 There is a presumption of contributory negligence where the injured person was intoxicated at the time of the incident and the defendant claims contributory negligence.632 The presumption can be rebutted if the injured person can establish that the intoxication did not contribute to the incident or the intoxication was not self-induced. If the presumption is not rebutted, the court must reduce the damages by an amount the court considers just and equitable having regard to the injured person’s share in the responsibility for the injury.

Contributory negligence is also presumed if the injured person relied upon the care and skill of an intoxicated person where they had knowledge of the intoxication.633 This presumption can be rebutted if the injured person can establish that the intoxication did not contribute to the accident or the injured person could not reasonably be expected to have avoided the risk. If the presumption is not rebutted, the court must reduce the damages by an amount the court considers just and equitable having regard to the injured person’s share in the responsibility for the injury.

A person is intoxicated if they are under the influence of alcohol or a drug to the extent that the person’s capacity to exercise appropriate care and skill is impaired.634

Section 94 of the Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 2002 (ACT) also excludes liability where the injured person was, on the balance of probabilities, engaged in conduct which amounts to an indictable offence which materially contributed to the risk of injury unless the application of the provision operates harshly or unjustly or the case is exceptional.

The onus is on a defendant to raise a plaintiff’s intoxication or involvement in illegal activity to enjoy the liability exemption afforded by these provisions. The exclusions to the presumption raised in light of these provisions in turn must be raised by the plaintiff to avoid liability being excluded.

This part also includes a presumption of contributory negligence when the injured person is not wearing a seat belt or a helmet at the time of a vehicular incident.635 However, unlike the legislative changes in Queensland, New South Wales, South Australia and Tasmania, the Act does not state a minimum reduction to be applied as it merely provides that the court is to reduce damages as it sees just and equitable.

631 Refer to the New South Wales section on ‘Liability for mental harm’ for a thorough discussion and background history to these provisions. 632 Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 2002 (ACT) s 95. 633 Ibid s 96. 634 Ibid s 92. 635 Ibid s 97.

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Contributory negligence Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 2002 (ACT) ch 7 pt 7.3 (ss 101–105) commenced 1 November 2002 The Australian Capital Territory has introduced legislative reforms dealing with contributory negligence. Part 7.3 of the Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 2002 (ACT) allows the court to reduce the damages recoverable by a plaintiff to what it considers just and equitable in light of the plaintiff’s own negligence. Similarly to other jurisdictions, the Australian Capital Territory has included express provisions which provide courts with the power to reduce a plaintiff’s award by 100% in situations where it is just and equitable to do so.636 However, s 27 Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 2002 (ACT) provides that contributory negligence is no defence in respect of claims involving death. Similarly, s 102(2) stipulates that in respect of personal injuries as a result of a breach of statutory duty, there shall be no reduction in damages due to contributory negligence.

Part 7.1 of the Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 2002 (ACT) prescribes a presumption of contributory negligence in circumstances where the plaintiff was either intoxicated, relying on an intoxicated person, or not wearing a seatbelt.637 The presumption can be rebutted and the plaintiff bears the onus in this regard.

It is important to note that contributory negligence is a concept that will turn on the facts of each case, what is considered negligent conduct on the part of a plaintiff in respect of the cause of his or her own injuries is entirely circumstantial. However, there are guiding principles that courts rely upon in assessing a plaintiff’s conduct.

Any conclusion of contributory negligence on the part of the plaintiff will result in an apportionment of liability.638 The approach of the court is therefore twofold: firstly to determine that negligence on the part of the plaintiff occurred; and secondly to attribute a value or weight to such negligence, usually expressed as a percentage.

Although a plaintiff may be considered negligent, the attribution of value grants a court significant discretion. The case of Heywood v Miller639 is authority for the proposition that the court’s task is not to determine the proportions in which the plaintiff and defendant(s) contributed to the cause of the damages, but that the legislation directs the court to reduce the plaintiff’s damages in accordance with what is ‘just and reasonable’. The court in the case of Gray v Conroy,640 considered the presumption of contributory negligence for failure to wear a seatbelt against a plaintiff riding in a special needs bus for transportation of disabled children. With liability of the defendants admitted, contributory negligence was the sole concern of the court regarding liability. The court attributed 10% negligence on the part of the plaintiff, who was tending to the needs of the disabled children at the time of the motor vehicle accident.

In Grierson v Australian Capital Territory641 the court held that, in accordance with s 102 of the Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 2002 (ACT), a reduction of the plaintiff’s damages by 20% was just and equitable. In the opinion of Harper M, the plaintiff was responsible for her share of the damage suffered through her own failure to keep a proper look out.642

636 Ibid s 47. 637 On 6 September 2007 the Act was amended to recognise a rebuttable of the presumption if it can be established that the plaintiff was incapable of fastening a seatbelt without assistance. 638 See ‘Proportionate liability’. In considering apportionment, it is common place for courts to be guided by the leading authority of Podrebersek v Australian Iron & Steel Pty Ltd (1985) 59 ALJR 492 [494]. 639 [2005] ACTSC 4. 640 [2005] ACTSC 81. 641 [2011] ACTSC 113. 642 [2011] ACTSC 113, [29].

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Proportionate liability Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 2002 (ACT) ch 7A (s 107A–107K) Sections 107A to 107K were inserted by Civil Law (Wrongs) (Proportionate Liability and Professional Standards) Amendment Act 2004 (ACT) and commenced 8 March 2005 Chapter 7A of the the Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 2002 (ACT) provides for the proportionate liability provisions. These provisions came into effect on 8 March 2005 and appear to apply to any incident regardless of when the incident occurred.643

Burns J of the Australian Capital Territory Supreme Court recently considered whether ch 7A of the Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 2002 (ACT) could apply retrospectively. Relevantly, his Honour considered a decision of the Full Court of the Supreme Court of South Australia in Glemont Investments Pty Ltd v O’Loughlin (No 2)644 in determining whether s 107F of the Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 2002 (ACT) should be taken as applying to a cause of action which arose prior to the commencement of pt 7A of the Act. His Honour considered the proposition of the Full Court of South Australia in that decision was obiter. Burns J dismissed the application to strike out the plaintiff’s proportionate liability defence as there were considerable questions that should be determined by the court before the application of pt 7A in this instance could properly be determined. His Honour stopped short of ruling on whether this section could apply retrospectively. At the time of writing, the court had provided no further consideration on this issue.

The provisions apply to claims for economic loss or damage to property in an action for damages arising from a failure to take reasonable care, or claims for economic loss or damage to property in an action for damages under the Australian Consumer Law (ACT).645

However, personal injury claims and consumer claims are specifically excluded from the operation of the Australian Capital Territory’s proportionate liability legislation.646 This is similar to the Queensland legislation, whereas in New South Wales and Victoria the proportionate liability provisions do apply to consumer claims.647 The legislation is also prevented from applying to claims made under the Discrimination Act 1991 (ACT), claims applying under ch 4 of the Road (General) Act 1999 (ACT) and claims under the Workers’ Compensation Act 1951 (ACT).648

As with the proportionate liability provisions which apply in Queensland, New South Wales and Victoria, the Australian Capital Territory’s operative provision allows for the liability of a defendant who is a concurrent wrongdoer for the claim to be limited to an amount reflecting the proportion of loss or damage claimed that the court considers just having regard to the extent of the defendant’s responsibility.649 The definition of a concurrent wrongdoer is one of two or more people whose acts or omissions caused, independently of each other or jointly, the loss or damage the subject of the claim.650 This definition is in similar terms to the definition provided in the New South Wales legislation. Contrary to the Victorian proportionate liability legislation, the Australian Capital Territory’s legislation allows the court to consider the comparative responsibility of any concurrent wrongdoer who is not a party to the proceedings when deciding on an apportionment of responsibility.651 This approach is in line with the legislative provisions of Queensland and New South Wales.

643 See Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 2002 (ACT) s 107B. 644 (2000) 79 SASR 185. 645 Ibid s 107B(1)–(2); Fair Trading (Australian Consumer Law) Amendment Act 2010 (ACT). 646 Ibid s 107B(3). 647 See Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld) s 28(3), compare Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW) s 34(1), Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic) s 24AG(1). 648 Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 2002 (ACT) s 107B(4). 649 Ibid s 107F(1)(a). 650 Ibid s 107D. 651 Ibid s 107F(2)(b), compare the situation in Victoria, see Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic) s 24AI(3).

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Concurrent wrongdoers are required to assist the plaintiff in identifying other concurrent wrongdoers.652 A failure to so identify other known concurrent wrongdoers can have adverse cost consequences for the offending concurrent wrongdoer.653

As with the legislative provisions in other Australian jurisdictions, the Australian Capital Territory’s proportionate liability provisions do not apply to those concurrent wrongdoers who intentionally or fraudulently cause loss or damage.654 Importantly, if the proceedings involve both an apportionable claim and a claim that does not fall within the definition of an apportionable claim, then liability for the non-apportionable part of the claim is to be determined in accordance with ordinary applicable legal rules.655 Therefore the principle of joint and several liability may still apply to non-apportionable parts of a plaintiff’s claim. The Australian Capital Territory provisions prohibit recovery between concurrent wrongdoers by way of claims for contribution or requirements to indemnify.656 Further, provisions do not prevent from operation the principles of vicarious liability, and the principles of joint and several liability in regards to partnership and agency relationships.657

The Australian Capital Territory proportionate liability legislation is similar to that of the relevant New South Wales legislation, the case law from New South Wales may assist in determining the application of the proportionate liability provisions.

In the decision of Ucak v Avante Developments Pty Ltd658 the New South Wales Supreme Court provided guidance for defendants intending to plead and rely on proportionate liability provisions. It was held that a defendant, pleading and relying on proportionate liability, must plead and rely on the material facts pertaining to the causes of action by which it is alleged the claim is an ‘apportionable claim’. Put simply, if a defendant intends to allege that other concurrent wrongdoers either caused or contributed to the plaintiff’s loss, the defendant must plead the relevant facts which cause the defendant to make such assertions.

Vicarious liability The Australian Capital Territory has not introduced any legislative reforms dealing with the issue of vicarious liability. An employer can be found vicariously liable for a wrongful, unauthorised or negligent act of an employee which is carried out in the course of his or her employment and is so closely connected with an authorised act that it may be regarded as a mode of doing the authorised act. This principle was endorsed in the High Court case of New South Wales v Lepore, Samin v Queensland, Rich v Queensland,659 in which three appeals were heard simultaneously.

An employer will not always be held responsible for the actions of his or her employees.660 The act must be closely connected with his or her employment for vicarious liability to attach. Therefore, whether an employer will be held vicariously liable for the actions of his or her employee will depend upon the specific facts in each case.

Further case discussion on vicarious liability is contained in the equivalent New South Wales and Victorian sections.

652 Ibid s107G(1). 653 Ibid s107G(2)–(3). 654 Ibid s107E(1). 655 Ibid s107F(3). 656 Ibid s107H. 657 Ibid s107K. 658 [2007] NSWSC 367. 659 (2003) 212 CLR 511. 660 Ibid.

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Non-delegable duties The term non-delegable duty is somewhat misleading. It does not mean that a party owing a duty cannot delegate the task to a third party, but rather that the liability cannot be delegated. As such, it is a duty to ensure that reasonable care is taken. Therefore, if the third party to whom the task has been entrusted fails to exercise reasonable care, the non-delegable duty will have been breached.

The categories of non-delegable duties continue to evolve. The courts have struggled however to clearly define the parameters required to justify the existence of a non-delegable duty of care. The known criteria include the superior capacity of the defendant to bear the risk of the mishap, the special obligation which it is proper to attach to extra-hazardous activities, and the special dependence or vulnerability of the person to whom the duty is owed.661

Common known relationships in which non-delegable duties exist include:

ƒƒ employer and employee;662 ƒƒ host employer and contractor;663 ƒƒ school and student;664 ƒƒ hospital and patient; 665 and ƒƒ owner of premises and licensee.666

The Ipp report recommended that the relevant civil liability legislation should ensure that plaintiffs could not circumvent the application of the civil liability legislation by pleading their action based upon breach of a non-delegable duty of care. The Australian Capital Territory has not implemented any legislation in response to the Ipp report recommendation.

Exclusion clauses The Australian Capital Territory has not introduced any legislative reforms dealing with the issue of exclusion clauses. The common law principles will therefore remain applicable. Accordingly in order to have any prospect of an exclusion clause being upheld, the person or entity including such a clause should ensure that it is clearly incorporated into the contract, specifically drafted to cover the factual scenario encountered by the person or entity seeking to enforce it, and to the extent possible, brought to the attention of the other party to the contract.667

Where the claim is one captured by the Australian Consumer Law, there are certain guarantees which cannot be excluded or limited by contract. See div 2–3 of sch 2 of the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth).

661 Northern Sandblasting Pty Ltd v Harris (1997) 188 CLR 313. 662 Kondis v State Transport Authority (1984) 154 CLR 672. 663 TNT Australia Pty Ltd v Christie & 2 Ors; Crown Equipment Pty Ltd v Christie & 2 Ors; Manpower Services (Aust) Pty Ltd v Christie & 2 Ors [2003] NSWCA 47. 664 Commonwealth v Introvigne (1982) 150 CLR 258. 665 Samios v Repatriation Commission [1960] WAR 219. 666 Burnie Port Authority v General Jones Pty Ltd (1994) 179 CLR 520. 667 The New South Wales Court of Appeal decision of Lormine Pty Ltd and Anor v Xuereb [2006] NSWCA 200 may be of some relevance when considering how an exclusion clause might be interpreted in the Australian Capital Territory.

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Expressions of regret and apologies Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 2002 (ACT) ch 2 pt 2.3 (ss 12–14) commenced 1 November 2002 Pursuant to s 13 of the Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 2002 (ACT) an apology is defined as:

‘an oral or written expression of sympathy or regret, or of a general sense of benevolence or compassion, in relation to an incident, whether or not the expression admits or implies fault or liability in relation to the incident’.

Section 14 of the Act states that an apology made by or on behalf of a person in relation to an incident claimed to have been caused by the person is not (and must not be taken to be) an express or implied admission of fault or liability by the person in relation to the incident and is not relevant to deciding fault or liability in relation to the incident, nor is it admissible in any civil proceeding as evidence of the fault or liability of the person in relation to the incident.

These principles were reiterated in Hutchinson v Fitzpatrick,668 where Harper M, after considering these provisions, made clear that an apology is not admissible in a civil proceeding as evidence of fault or liability.

This provision applies to civil liability of any kind except claims for damages for defamation, or claims for damages or compensation under the Discrimination Act 1991 (ACT), the Victims of Crime (Financial Assistance) Act 1983 (ACT) or the Workers Compensation Act 1951 (ACT).

For some High Court guidance on the distinction between admissions and apologies, see Dovuro Pty Ltd v Wilkins.669

Limitation periods Limitation Act 1985 (ACT) commenced 19 December 1985 The Limitation Act 1985 (ACT) specifically provides that the applicable limitation period with respect to claims for personal injury are:

ƒƒ three years from the date of the occurrence of the injury or if the injury includes a disease or disorder, three years from the date of discovery of the injury. However, this limitation does not apply to causes of action that arose before 9 September 2003. Previously, the limitation period was six years;670 or ƒƒ In respect of children under the age of 15, six years from the date of the accident or discovery of the injury. Parents or guardians of children under 15 years of age must give notice of a claim to the prospective defendant, but in cases involving medical malpractice and health services, there are more restrictive provisions relating to the children.671

Under s 36(2) of the Limitation Act 1985 (ACT), an application can be made to the court to extend the limitation period for personal injuries. However, in exercising its powers to extend the limitation period, a court must have regard to the following:

ƒƒ the length of and reasons for the delay on the part of the plaintiff; ƒƒ the extent to which, having regard to the delay, there is or is likely to be prejudice to the defendant; ƒƒ the conduct of the defendant after the cause of action accrued to the plaintiff including the extent (if any) to which the defendant took steps to make available to the plaintiff means of ascertaining facts that were or might be relevant to the cause of action of the plaintiff against the defendant;

668 [2009] ACTSC 43. 669 (2003) 215 CLR 317. 670 Limitation Act 1985 (ACT) s 16B. 671 Ibid s 16.

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ƒƒ the duration of any disability of the plaintiff arising on or after the date of the accrual of the cause of action; ƒƒ the extent to which the plaintiff acted promptly and reasonably once he or she knew that the act or omission of the defendant, to which the injury of the plaintiff was attributable, might be capable at that time of giving rise to an action for damages; and ƒƒ the steps (if any) taken by the plaintiff to obtain medical, legal or other expert advice and the nature of the advice the plaintiff may have received.

Pursuant to s 21B(1) of the Limitation Act 1985 (ACT), an action for a cause of action for defamation is not maintainable if brought after the end of a limitation period of one year running from the date of the publication of the matter complained of. However, a court must, if satisfied that it was not reasonable in the circumstances for the plaintiff to have commenced an action in relation to the matter complained of within one year from the date of the publication, extend the limitation period mentioned in s 21B(1) to a period of up to three years running from the date of the publication.

Damages Awards

The Australian Capital Territory, unlike a number of the other Australian jurisdictions, has not deemed it necessary to enact any significant legislative reforms to regulate the assessment of damages in personal injury claims.

General damages Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 2002 (ACT) ch 7 pt 7.1 (s 99) commenced 1 November 2002 There is currently no cap on general damages in the Australian Capital Territory. The Civil Law (Wrongs) (Thresholds) Amendment Bill 2003 (ACT) proposed to introduce a limit on general damages for medical claims. However, it lapsed on 16 October 2004 and was never enacted.

Although there is no cap on general damages in the Australian Capital Territory, pursuant to s 99 (1) of the Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 2002 (ACT), the court may refer to previous decisions of the court in determining the appropriate award in a proceeding. This system follows the common law position of general damages awards prior to the reforms that were made in most States.

Economic loss Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 2002 (ACT) ch 7 pt 7.1 (s 98) commenced 1 November 2002 Section 98 of the Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 2002 (ACT) caps the award for past and future economic loss to three times the average weekly earnings. ‘Average weekly earnings’ is defined as the average weekly earnings seasonally adjusted for the ACT issued by the Australian Bureau of Statistics. This limitation also applies to motor vehicle accident damages claims arising under ch 4 of the Road Transport (Third Party Insurance) Act 2008 (ACT). There are no provisions pertaining to the assessment of future economic loss.

Gratuitous care / Gratuitous services Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 2002 (ACT) ch 7 pt 7.2 (s 100) commenced 1 November 2002 Section 100 of the Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 2002 (ACT) outlines when damages are recoverable for the loss of capacity to perform domestic services (gratuitous services). Damages may be awarded for any resulting impairment or loss of the injured person’s capacity to perform domestic services that the injured person might have been expected to perform for his or her household if the injured person had not been injured. In calculating damages that are to be awarded, it is immaterial whether:

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ƒƒ the services would be performed for the benefit of the other members of the household or solely for the claimant’s benefit; ƒƒ that the claimant was not paid to perform the services; ƒƒ that the claimant has not been and will not be, obliged to pay someone else to perform the service; or ƒƒ that the services have been, or are likely to be, performed (gratuitously or otherwise) by other people (whether members of the household or not).672

The Act does not provide any formula or cap on damages for gratuitous services.

In Leighton v Blundell,673 the plaintiff was injured in a motor vehicle accident and claimed damages for domestic assistance under the head of Griffith v Kerkemeyer674 damages. The court applied the principle set out in Becker v Queensland Investment Corporation and Ors675 and found against the plaintiff as a result of the lack of sufficient evidence, stating that more than a brief reference to domestic assistance is required.

Interest Court Procedures Rules 2006 (ACT) commenced 1 July 2006 The civil court procedures are now contained in the Court Procedures Rules 2006 (ACT) which at pt 2.16, reg 1616, provides for the interest up until judgment. In proceedings for damages the court may:

a) order that interest be included in the amount for which judgment is given— i. at the rate it considers appropriate; and ii. on all or any part of the money; and iii. for all or any part of the period beginning on the day the cause of action arose and ending on the day before the day judgment is entered; or b) order that a lump sum be included in the amount for which judgment is given instead of interest under paragraph (a).

However, a court must not order that interest be included, or that an amount be included in a lump sum instead of interest.

Discount rate There are no provisions prescribing a discount rate in this jurisdiction.

Exemplary, punitive or aggravated damages Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 2002 (ACT) s 139H commenced 1 November 2002 The Australian Capital Territory has not specifically legislated to exclude punitive damages. However, s 139H of the Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 2002 (ACT) provides that a plaintiff cannot be awarded exemplary or punitive damages for defamation.

Structured settlements Section 45 of the Civil Law (Wrongs) (Thresholds) Amendment Bill 2003 (ACT) initially provided for the court to consent to a structured settlement. However, this Bill lapsed on 16 October 2004. There is currently no provision for structured settlements in the ACT legislation.

672 Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 2002 (ACT), s 100(2). 673 [2011] ACTSC 136. 674 (1977) 139 CLR 161. 675 [2009] ACTSC 134.

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Legal costs Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 2002 (ACT) ch 14 pt 14.1–14.2 (ss 180–190) sections commenced 1 January 2003 Chapter 14 of the Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 2002 (ACT) provides that the amount of costs recoverable is dependant on the amount of damages awarded. Pursuant to s 181, if damages are awarded for $50,000 or less for a personal injury claim, then:

ƒƒ a lawyer is not entitled to be paid; ƒƒ a court must not decide that a lawyer is entitled to be paid; and ƒƒ a court must not order anyone to pay to a lawyer an amount for legal services in relation to the claim that is more than the maximum costs allowable, that is $10,000 or 20% whichever is greater.

Also pursuant to s 183, if the court is satisfied that:

ƒƒ the legal services provided to a party to a claim for personal injury damages were provided in response to action on the claim by or on behalf of the other party to the claim; and ƒƒ in the circumstance, the action was not necessary or reasonable for the advancement of the party’s case or was intended, or was reasonably likely to unnecessarily delay or complicate determination of the claim; then the court may order that the costs for the legal services are to be excluded from the operation of s 181 (maximum costs for claims of $50,000 or less).

The court has the discretion to allow additional costs taking into consideration, the following:

ƒƒ the complexity of the claim; and ƒƒ the behaviour of one or more of the parties to the claim.

The court may order that the lawyer who provided the services is entitled to stated additional costs and may state who is to pay the additional costs pursuant to s 184.

In the case of Eggins v Knaus,676 the Supreme Court considered the above sections of the legislation in an application under the Act for costs above $10,000 where the damages amounted to $40,000 plus costs ‘as agreed or assessed’. The court considered the ‘behaviour’ of each party and in particular of the defendant unnecessarily commissioning an expert report which required the plaintiff to incur additional costs that would otherwise not have been necessary. It was held that these additional costs incurred by the plaintiff would be excluded from the application of s 181 of the Act.

Practice and Procedure Legal practitioners Legal Profession Act 2006 (ACT) commenced 1 July 2006 Legal Professional Regulation 2007 (ACT) commenced 1 October 2007 Legal Profession (Solicitors) Rules 2007 (ACT) commenced 1 October 2007 The Legal Profession Regulation 2007 (ACT) supports and amplifies theLegal Profession Act 2006 (ACT). The Regulation establishes administrative processes to assist regulators and those directly affected by it to apply and comply with the law. The Legal Profession Act 2006 (ACT) regulates admission, use of trust money, and the disciplinary procedures for misconduct.

676 [2007] ACTSC 17.

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The Legal Profession (Solicitors) Rules 2007 (ACT) outlines fundamental duties of a solicitor. The rules provide that a solicitor’s duty to the court and the administration of justice is paramount and prevails to the extent of inconsistency with any other duty. The rules also cover:

ƒƒ Relations with Clients ƒƒ Duties to the Court ƒƒ Advocacy Rules ƒƒ Relations with other Lawyers ƒƒ Relations with Third Parties ƒƒ Legal practice.

Legal advertising The Australian Capital Territory has not, to date, implemented the suggested Ipp reforms in relation to advertisement of personal injury legal services. The Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 2002 (ACT) does however regulate legal profession advertising generally.

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tasmania

In response to the Ipp recommendations, Tasmania has enacted the Civil Liability Act 2002 (Tas). Additional key Ipp recommendations were implemented in 2003 with further revisions made to the legislation in 2005 with the Civil Liability Amendment Act 2005 (Tas) and the Civil Liability Amendment (Proportionate Liability) Act 2005 (Tas). The Tasmanian reforms with respect to the law of negligence largely mirror many of the other States with respect to the issues such as foreseeability of risk, causation and obvious risk. The Tasmanian legislative reforms have also impacted on the calculation of general damages, economic loss and gratuitous services.

Application of Statutory Reforms

Civil Liability Act 2002 (Tas) pt 1 (ss 3B, 4, 5A) Section 3B was inserted in the Civil Liability Amendment Act 2003 (Tas) and commenced 4 July 2003 Section 4(2)–(4) was inserted in the Civil Liability Amendment Act 2004 (Tas) and commenced 4 July 2003 Section 4(5) was inserted by the Civil Liability Amendment Act 2008 (Tas) and commenced 22 October 2008 Sections 8A–8B was inserted by the Civil Liability Amendment Act 2013 (Tas) and commenced 1 March 2014 Section 4 of the Civil Liability Act 2002 (Tas) sets out the commencement of the provisions of the Civil Liability Act 2002 (Tas). In accordance with that section, the provisions relating to negligence and damages (with the exception of s 12 of the Act which deals with subsequent action taken after an event that would have avoided a risk) do not apply to causes of action that accrue before 4 July 2003. Section 12 applies whether the action accrued before or after 4 July 2003.

Section 3B prescribes that the Act does not apply to claims for injury or death resulting from smoking and or with respect to workers’ compensation claims. The Act also excludes claims for an injury under pt III of the Motor Accidents (Liabilities and Compensation) Act 1973 (Tas), except for the provisions relating to intoxication, criminal activity, structured settlements, negligence, damages and mental harm. Section 3B also expressly excludes intentional torts from the application of the Civil Liability Act 2002 (Tas). However, there have been no cases directly testing the application of this exclusion.

The newly inserted ss 8A and 8B of the Civil Liability Amendment Act 2013 (Tas) set out the approach a court may take when awarding damages in respect of a dust-related disease where a plaintiff may, at some definite or indefinite time in the future, develop another dust-related disease wholly or partly as a result of the act or omission giving rise to the cause of action.

Pre-court Procedures

There are no pre-court procedures for claims and no proposed legislative reforms in Tasmania. The stance is similar to that in New South Wales and Western Australia, but unlike Queensland, Victoria, South Australia, Australian Capital Territory and Northern Territory.

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The Law of Negligence – Scope of Duty of Care

Standard of care Civil Liability Act 2002 (Tas) pt 6 div 2 (ss 11–12) was repealed and replaced by Civil Liability Amendment Act 2003 (Tas) and commenced 4 July 2003 Tasmania has clarified its position in relation to the standard of care through the implementation of the Civil Liability Act 2002 (Tas). Section 11(1) of the Act provides that a person does not breach a duty to take ‘reasonable care’ unless:

ƒƒ there was a foreseeable risk of harm (that is, a risk of harm of which the person knew or ought reasonably to have known); and ƒƒ the risk was not insignificant; and ƒƒ in the circumstances, a reasonable person in the position of the person would have taken precautions to avoid the risk.677

Additionally, s 11(2) of the Act outlines the relevant factors a court must take into consideration when determining whether a reasonable person would have taken precautions against the risk which caused the harm. These factors are:

ƒƒ the probability that the harm would occur if care were not taken; ƒƒ the likely seriousness of the harm; ƒƒ the burden of taking precautions to avoid the risk of harm; and ƒƒ the potential net benefit of the activity that exposes others to the risk of harm.678

The Civil Liability Act 2002 (Tas) is not an exclusive codification of the court’s consideration. It is still open to the court to have regard to the common law principles of negligence as outlined in the decision of Wyong Shire Council v Shirt.679 In the case of Williams v Latrobe Council,680 Underwood CJ applied the following passage from Wyong:

‘In deciding whether there has been a breach of the duty of care the tribunal of fact must first ask itself whether a reasonable man in the defendant’s position would have foreseen that his conduct involved a risk of injury to the plaintiff or to a class of persons including the plaintiff. If the answer be in the affirmative, it is then for the tribunal of fact to determine what a reasonable man would do by way of response to the risk. The perception of the reasonable man’s response calls for a consideration of the magnitude of the risk and the degree of the probability of its occurrence, along with the expense, difficulty and inconvenience of taking alleviating action and any other conflicting responsibilities which the defendant may have. It is only when these matters are balanced out that the tribunal of fact can confidently assert what is the standard of response to be ascribed to the reasonable man placed in the defendant’s position.’681

In this case the court concluded that the Council and two local football clubs had all breached their respective duties of care to a player who was injured in a game of AFL on an irrigation pit cover that was not flush with the ground.

677 Civil Liability Act 2002 (Tas) s 11(1). 678 Ibid s 11(2). 679 (1980) 146 CLR 40. 680 [2007] TASSC 2. 681 Ibid [63].

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Causation Civil Liability Act 2002 (Tas) pt 6 div 3 (ss 13–14) commenced 1 January 2003 To establish causation the Civil Liability Act 2002 (Tas) requires that there must be factual causation (i.e. the negligence was a necessary condition of the harm) and a finding that the harm comes within the scope of the negligent person’s liability. When determining issues of causation, the court must consider whether or not, and why, the responsibility for the harm rests with the defendant. The provisions provide guidance in relation to when a court should permit the admissability of evidence, that would normally be inadmissible.

Further, the plaintiff always bears the onus of proof in establishing causation. Tasmania has also introduced provisions to assist the court in determining what a plaintiff would have done had the defendant’s negligent conduct not occurred. These provisions restrict the admissibility of statement evidence by the plaintiff regarding what that person would have done if no breach of duty had occurred. Only those statements that are adverse to the plaintiff are admissible. A more detailed discussion of these principles appears under the discussion of this topic in the New South Wales jurisdiction.

Obvious risk Civil Liability Act 2002 (Tas) pt 6 div 4 (ss 15–17) commenced 1 January 2003 In Tasmania, liability to warn a person of an obvious risk is limited by s 17 of the Civil Liability Act 2002 (Tas), which provides for ‘no proactive duty’ to warn of obvious risks, subject to certain exceptions including circumstances where the injured party expressly requests advice regarding risks. Section 15 defines an obvious as a risk that, in the circumstances, would have been obvious to a reasonable person in the position of the person who suffers harm.

Obvious risks can include:

ƒƒ risks that are patent or a matter of common knowledge; ƒƒ risks of something occurring even though it has a low probability of occurring; and ƒƒ a risk (or a condition or circumstance that gives rise to the risk) that is not prominent, conspicuous or physically observable.

While a risk is not an obvious risk merely because a warning about the risk has been given, there is no liability for a failure to warn of obvious risks. For a defence of voluntary assumption of risk, pursuant to s 16, a person is deemed to be aware of obvious risks unless they can prove otherwise. Unlike some other jurisdictions (such as Queensland), there are no provisions in the Tasmanian legislation to limit liability for the materialisation of an ‘inherent’ risk.

Dangerous recreational activities Civil Liability Act 2002 (Tas) pt 6 div 5 (ss 18–20) commenced 1 January 2003 Tasmania has enacted provisions that deal specifically with obvious risks in relation to dangerous recreational activities. In accordance with s 20, no liability for harm will result from an obvious risk of a dangerous recreational activity, whether or not the plaintiff was aware of the risk. A ‘recreational activity’ is defined in s 19 as including any sport (whether or not the sport is an organised activity) or any pursuit or activity engaged in for enjoyment, relaxation or leisure. The term ‘dangerous’ is defined as meaning that the activity involves a significant degree of risk of physical harm to a person.

A case involving a sport-related injury that perhaps should have attracted the operation of the dangerous recreational activities provisions was Williams v Latrobe Council.682 The claimant was participating in an Australian Rules football game in 2004 and was injured while attempting

682 [2007] TASSC 2.

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to mark an airborne ball after landing awkwardly on an irrigation pit cover plate that was not flush with the surrounding ground, with a recess of approximately 100 millimetres. The court determined issues of liability in Williams v Latrobe Council on the common law principles of Wyong Shire Council v Shirt,683 a decision which pre-dates the tort law reform in Tasmania. There is no explanation given in Williams v Latrobe Council as to why the court did not consider the provisions of the Civil Liability Act 2002 (Tas) when considering liability and why no argument was raised at trial based on the dangerous recreational activities provisions contained in the Act. On appeal, the decision was varied but little discussion of the Act was entered into.

In the recent case of Dodge v Snell,684 the Tasmanian Supreme Court considered the provisions relating to dangerous recreational activities. In that case, a jockey was injured in a horse race by the negligence of another jockey. The defendant sought to rely on the statutory immunity relating to dangerous recreational activities in s 20 of the Act. After considering the definition of recreational activity in s 19, Wood J concluded that, while the class of activities that fall within the section should be construed broadly, the section should be limited to activities that are recreational in nature. Her Honour held that the immunity did not extend to activities carried out in the course of employment or occupation.685 As the jockeys were engaged in paid employment at the time of the injury, the defendant was not entitled to rely on s 20.

Liability of professionals Civil Liability Act 2002 (Tas) pt 6 div 6 (ss 21–22) commenced 1 January 2003 Section 21 was amended by Civil Liability Amendment Act 2005 (Tas) and commenced 15 December 2005 Professional Standards Act 2005 (Tas) commenced 1 August 2005 Sections 21 and 22 of the Civil Liability Act 2002 (Tas) deal with the liability of professionals in Tasmania. Pursuant to s 22, a professional is deemed not to have breached a duty of care if the person acted in a manner that, at the time the professional service was provided, was widely accepted in Australia by peer professional opinion as competent professional practice. An exception will be made if the court considers that the peer professional opinion is irrational. There have not been any cases considering s 22 in Tasmania. However given the similarity between s 22 and equivalent provisions in New South Wales, the New South Wales Court of Appeal decision of Dobler v Kenneth Halverson; Dobler v Kurt Halverson (by his tutor)686 may be instructive on how s 22 will be applied in Tasmania. The decision in that case confirmed that the New South Wales provision with respect to the liability of professionals operates as a defence and does not define the content of the duty of care owed by the professional.687

Section 21 of the Civil Liability Act 2002 (Tas) is similar to the legislative provisions in Queensland688 and provides that a medical practitioner does not breach their duty owed to a patient for failing to warn the patient of a risk of medical treatment, unless the medical practitioner fails to provide information about the risk (whether or not the patient requests the information) that:

ƒƒ would be required by a reasonable person to make a reasonably informed decision; and ƒƒ the medical practitioner ought reasonably to know the patient would want to be given before deciding to undergo the treatment.

The Act exempts from this provision cases where a medical practitioner must act promptly in order to avoid serious risk to the life or health of the patient and:

683 (1980) 146 CLR 40. 684 [2011] TASSC 19. 685 Ibid [277]–[278]. 686 [2007] NSWSC 335. 687 Ibid [60]–[61]. 688 Compare s 21 Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld).

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ƒƒ the patient is not able to hear or respond to a warning of the risk; and ƒƒ there is not sufficient time to contact a person responsible for making a decision for the patient.

There have been no recent cases considering s 21 in Tasmania (or its equivalent in Queensland). Similar to legislation enacted in other States, the Professional Standards Act 2005 (Tas) provides schemes for the limitation of professional liability in similar terms to existing law in other States. The provisions of the Act allow, inter alia, for limited liability to members of occupational associations in certain circumstances and impose occupational standards and risk management strategies in associations. The Act does not limit liability in respect of claims arising out of acts involving death or personal injury, fraud, or intentional tort. As with the legislation that has been enacted in most Australian jurisdictions, this legislation has not had any noticeable impact on the courts’ interpretation of the civil liability of professionals to date.

Liability of public authorities Civil Liability Act 2002 (Tas) pt 9 (ss 36–43) commenced 1 January 2003 Tasmania has legislated to provide a public policy defence for public authorities by describing the principles to be taken into account when deciding whether a public authority has a duty of care and if, by its conduct or inaction, that duty has been breached.

Sections 36 to 43 of the Civil Liability Act 2002 (Tas) set out the general principles to be applied in determining liability, providing that resource allocations by authorities are not open to challenge, and that the standard by which authorities are to be judged is that of a ‘reasonable public authority’. In the case of Williams v Latrobe Council,689 the plaintiff suffered an injury during a football match when his left foot landed on a sprinkler head cover that was not set flush with the surface of the surrounding ground. The court held that the Council had breached its duty of care to the plaintiff by failing to remove the risk posed by the sprinkler head cover. The court also held that the two football clubs were also liable as they had undertaken an inspection of the ground prior to the match. The court decided the Council ought to bear 85% of the responsibility with the two football clubs sharing the remaining 15%. On appeal by all of the defendants, the full bench of the Supreme Court rejected the submission by the respondent’s counsel that an inspection where club representatives get down on their hands and knees was not burdensome or unreasonable.

In addition to the above provisions, Tasmania has re-introduced the highway immunity or the non-feasance rule in relation to road authorities by virtue of s 42 of the Act. This immunity provides that liability will not attach to road authorities in respect of the condition of roads due to the actions or inactions of the road authorities unless they have knowledge of the defect prior to the incident in which the plaintiff suffered loss and/or damage.

Liability of volunteers and Good Samaritans Civil Liability Act 2002 (Tas) pt 10 (ss 44–49) commenced 1 January 2003 Part 10 of the Civil Liability Act 2002 (Tas) deals with the conduct of volunteers while doing community work for a community organisation. Pursuant to ss 4(3) and 46, the part applies to any incident on or after 4 July 2003.

Volunteers In Tasmania, a ‘volunteer’ is a person who does ‘community work’ on a voluntary basis. ‘Community work’ focuses on the overall activity engaged in by the ‘community organisation’ (not the conduct of the volunteer) and the four common types of activity across all State and Territory legislation is work done for charitable, benevolent, educational or sporting purposes.

689 [2007] TASSC 2.

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The Act provides a definition of ‘community organisation’ but also includes a list of legal entities that can be considered ‘organisations’ and includes the words ‘body corporate’ or ‘corporation’. In Tasmania, as well as Western Australia, Queensland and Victoria, a community organisation includes local government entities.

In Tasmania, volunteers have been afforded protection from liability for damage that arises in the course of community work that has been performed in good faith.690 However, the protection does not apply to a volunteer who knew or ought to have reasonably known that at the relevant time he or she was acting outside the scope of the community work, contrary to instructions given by the community organisation or whose ability was significantly impaired by alcohol or drugs taken voluntarily (other than for therapeutic purposes).691

A community organisation incurs the liability of its volunteers in the performance of community work organised by the community organisation.692

Under the Act, a volunteer is prohibited from providing a community organisation with an indemnity against (or to make contribution toward) a community organisation in relation to civil liability the volunteer himself or herself would incur or which the community organisation incurs.693

Tasmania is joined by the legislation of Victoria and Western Australia which have also incorporated similar prohibitions.

Food donors Tasmania has legislated to provide protection to food donors.

Part 8B of the Civil Liability Act 2002 (Tas) provides that a food donor who donates food does not incur any liability for any death or personal injury that results from the consumption of the food if the food donor donated the food in good faith, for a charitable purpose and the food was safe to consume at the time it left the possession or control of the food donor.

Good Samaritans Tasmania has legislated to provide protection from civil liability for Good Samaritans.

Part 8A of the Civil Liability Act 2002 (Tas) provides that a Good Samaritan is not liable in any civil proceeding for anything done or not done by him or her in good faith and without recklessness in the provision of assistance or advice. However, this protection is not afforded if the Good Samaritan was significantly impaired due to the influence and voluntary consumption of alcohol or drugs, whether or not it was consumed for medication.

Liability for mental harm Civil Liability Act 2002 (Tas) pt 8 (ss 29–35) commenced 1 January 2003 The Tasmanian legislative provisions allow for the recovery of damages for economic loss due to mental harm only in circumstances where the plaintiff has a recognised psychiatric illness. Liability for mental harm is limited to incidents where the plaintiff was actually injured or at the scene of the accident, or in circumstances where the injured person was an immediate family member of the plaintiff.

690 Civil Liability Act 2002 (Tas) s 47. 691 Ibid s 47(3). 692 Ibid s 48. 693 Ibid s 49.

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The provisions also provide guidelines for the assessment of mental harm and state there will be no duty of care unless the defendant ought to have foreseen that a reasonable person in the plaintiff’s position might suffer a recognised psychiatric illness. These provisions are similar to those in New South Wales.694

Intoxication and illegal activity Civil Liability Act 2002 (Tas) pt 2 (ss 4A–5) Section 4A was inserted by the Civil Liability Amendment Act 2003 (Tas) and commenced 4 July 2003 Section 5 commenced 1 January 2003 In situations where the plaintiff is intoxicated at the time the harm occurs, a rebuttable presumption arises by virtue of s 5 of the Civil Liability Act 2002 (Tas) to the effect that the plaintiff’s award will be discounted by 25% for contributory negligence unless the court is satisfied that the person’s intoxication did not contribute in any way to the cause of the death, injury or damage. The court has discretion to impose a greater or lesser percentage of contributory negligence where it is felt this is appropriate.

Additionally, the Act specifies that a person is not to be awarded damages at all if the court finds that, on the balance of probabilities, the plaintiff was engaged in conduct that constitutes a serious offence and the conduct contributed materially to the risk of the death, injury or damage that was suffered. This provision takes the penalty against at-fault plaintiffs a step further than other jurisdictions, requiring courts to apply a 100% discount for contributory negligence in appropriate cases. South Australia has a similar provision.

The onus is on a defendant to raise a plaintiff’s intoxication or involvement in illegal activity to enjoy the liability exemption afforded by these provisions. In turn, the exclusions to the presumption raised in light of these provisions must be raised by the plaintiff to avoid liability being excluded.

The High Court considered the issue of intoxication at the time of harm in the case of CAL no 14 Pty Ltd v Motor Accidents Insurance Board,695 which has recently been followed in Chaplin v Lane [2014] TASSC 32. In CAL no 14 the plaintiff’s husband, Mr Scott, was fatally injured in a motorcycle accident after leaving the Tandara Motor Inn on the evening of 24 January 2002. The deceased had been drinking and recorded a blood alcohol reading of 0.253g per 100mL of blood.

Proceedings were initiated against the hotel and the licensee of the hotel by the deceased’s wife and, subsequently, by the Motor Accidents Insurance Board of Tasmania. The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants breached their duties to Mr Scott namely, their duty to take reasonable care to avoid Mr Scott riding his motorcycle whilst under the influence of alcohol. The deceased had previously arranged with the hotel that his motorcycle would be stored at the hotel and that his wife would be contacted to collect him when he was ready to leave. As such, the plaintiffs alleged that the defendants’ breach arose from the following factors:

ƒƒ failure to ring Mrs Scott and have her attend the premises; ƒƒ failure to deflect, delay, stall or provide resistance to Mr Scott leaving the hotel; ƒƒ failure to refuse to hand over the motorcycle; and ƒƒ failure to drive Mr Scott home.

694 For further discussion see the New South Wales section on Liability for Mental Harm. 695 [2009] HCA 47.

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The High Court concluded no duty of care was owed to the deceased in the circumstances of the case. The court reasoned that ‘outside exceptional cases, persons in the position of the Proprietor and the Licensee owe no general duty of care at common law to customers which requires them to monitor and minimise the service of alcohol or to protect customers from the consequences of the alcohol they choose to consume’.696

Contributory negligence Civil Liability Act 2002 (Tas) pt 6 div 7 (s 23) was repealed and replaced by Civil Liability Amendment Act 2003 (Tas) and commenced 4 July 2003 Tasmania has incorporated the recommendations made in the Ipp report in relation to contributory negligence. The legislation specifies that the principles applicable in determining whether a person has been negligent also apply in determining whether the person who suffered harm has engaged in contributory negligence. The standard of care required of the person who suffered harm is that required of a reasonable person in that person’s position. The issue is determined on the basis of what that person knew or ought to have known at the time.

The Act also allows the court to reduce a plaintiff’s damages award by 100% in situations where it is just and equitable to do so. Section 5 of the Civil Liability Act 2002 (Tas) provides that there is a presumption of contributory negligence where it can be shown that the plaintiff was intoxicated at the time of the injury. The presumption can be rebutted and the plaintiff bears that onus. In such circumstances the deduction is to be a minimum of 25% or a greater percentage determined by the court to be appropriate.

It is important to note that contributory negligence is a concept that will turn on the facts of each case; what is considered negligent conduct on the part of a plaintiff in respect of the cause of his or her own injuries is entirely circumstantial. However, there are guiding principles that courts rely upon in assessing a plaintiff’s conduct.

Any conclusion of contributory negligence on the part of the plaintiff will result in an apportionment of liability.697 The approach of the court is therefore twofold; firstly to determine that negligence on the part of the plaintiff occurred, and secondly to attribute a value or weight to such negligence, usually expressed as a percentage.

In Cook v Jennings698 the court considered the need for there to be something more than a mere error of judgment, but a degree of negligence on the part of the plaintiff. The case concerned a motor vehicle accident where the plaintiff collided with a stationary vehicle on the side of the Bass Highway (after breaking down). The stationary vehicle was not displaying any hazard or warning lights to oncoming traffic.

At first instance the court considered the driver of the stationary vehicle to have solely caused the accident. On appeal the court held that the plaintiff was contributory negligent by 20% for failing to keep a proper lookout, which had he done so would have assisted not so much in observing the stationary vehicle, but in being alert to driving patterns ahead of him that ought to have indicated that an obscured and unknown obstruction was affecting traffic flow in his lane.

696 Ibid [64] . 697 See ‘Proportionate Liability’. In considering apportionment, it is commonplace for courts to be guided by the case of Podrebeserk v Australian Iron and Steel Ltd (1985) 59 ALJR 492. 698 [2007] TASSC 40.

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Proportionate liability Civil Liability Act 2002 (Tas) pt 9A (ss 43A–43G) were inserted by the Civil Liability Amendment (Proportionate Liability) Act 2005 (Tas) and commenced 1 June 2005 The Tasmanian provisions in the Civil Liability Act 2002 (Tas) apply to causes of action arising after 1 June 2005.699

Tasmania has introduced proportionate liability provisions commensurate with those provisions enacted in other jurisdictions. The provisions apply only to ‘apportionable claims’, which is specifically limited to a claim for economic loss or damage to property in an action for damages (whether in tort, contract or otherwise) arising from a failure to take reasonable care, or a claim for loss or damage arising from a breach of s 236 of the Australian Consumer Law (Tasmania) Act 2010 (Tas) for misleading and deceptive conduct.700

An ‘apportionable claim’ does not include a claim arising out of personal injury.701 Claims where a wrongdoer intentionally or fraudulently caused the economic loss or damage are not subject to the Tasmanian proportionate liability provisions.702

Tasmania’s proportionate liability provisions are similar to those in Queensland, New South Wales and Victoria. Tasmania’s operative provision in s 43B(1)(a) allows for the liability of a defendant who is a concurrent wrongdoer in relation to that claim to be limited to an amount reflecting the proportion of loss or damage claimed that the court considers just, having regard to the extent of the defendant’s responsibility.703

The definition of a ‘concurrent wrongdoer’ is defined as a person who is one of two or more persons whose acts or omissions (or act or omission) caused, independently of each other or jointly, the damage or loss that is the subject of the claim.704 This is in similar terms to the definition provided in the New South Wales legislation.

Importantly, if the proceedings involve both an apportionable claim and a claim that does not fall within the definition of an apportionable claim, then liability for the non-apportionable part of the claim is to be determined in accordance with ordinary legal rules.705 Therefore the principle of joint and several liability may still apply to non-apportionable parts of a plaintiff’s claim.

Contrary to the Victorian proportionate liability legislation, the Tasmanian legislation allows the court to consider the comparative responsibility of any concurrent wrongdoer who is not a party to the proceedings when deciding on an apportionment of responsibility.706 This is in line with the legislative provisions of Queensland and New South Wales.

699 Proclamation under the Civil Liability Amendment (Proportionate Liability) Act 2005 (Tas). 700 Civil Liability Act 2002 (Tas) s 43A(1). 701 Ibid s 43A(3). 702 Ibid s 43A(5). 703 Ibid s 43B(1). 704 Ibid s 43A(2). 705 Ibid s 43B(2). 706 Ibid s 43B(3). Compare the situation in Victoria, Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic) s 24AI(3).

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The Tasmanian provisions prohibit recovery between concurrent wrongdoers by way of claims for contribution or requirements to indemnify.707 However, of considerable importance is a qualification to the limits imposed on recovery between concurrent wrongdoers, whereby agreements between defendants to contribute to the damages recoverable from, or to indemnify other concurrent wrongdoers, remain unaffected.708 This qualification does not appear in the legislative provisions of Queensland, New South Wales,709 Victoria or the Australian Capital Territory but is similar to Western Australia and Northern Territory. The clear qualification present in the Tasmanian legislation therefore raises doubts as to the ability for concurrent wrongdoers in other jurisdictions to rely on agreements providing for contribution or indemnity in respect of apportionable claims where there is no such explicit qualification.

Concurrent wrongdoers are required by the Tasmanian legislation to assist the plaintiff in identifying other concurrent wrongdoers.710 Failure to identify other known concurrent wrongdoers can have adverse cost consequences for the offending concurrent wrongdoer.711

Finally, the Tasmanian provisions do not exclude the principles of vicarious liability, and the principles of joint and several liability in regard to partnership relationships.712 Of significance is the provision in the Tasmanian legislation permitting all or any of the provisions dealing with proportionate liability to be excluded, modified or restricted by way of agreement (except for claims for personal injury or death).713 This principle was considered in Aquagenics Pty Ltd v Break O’Day Council.714 In this case, the Full Court of the Supreme Court of Tasmania determined that the proportionate liability provisions of the Civil Liability Act 2002 (Tas) did not apply because the parties had contracted out of the proportionate liability legislation pursuant to s 3A of the Act.

In light of the similarity between the Tasmanian proportionate liability legislation and that of New South Wales, the decision of Ucak v Avante Developments Pty Ltd715 may be of further assistance in determining the judicial application of the proportionate liability provisions.

In that case, the New South Wales Supreme Court provided guidance for defendants intending to plead and rely on proportionate liability provisions. It was held that a defendant pleading proportionate liability must rely on the material facts pertaining to the causes of action by which it is alleged the claim is an ‘apportionable claim’. Put simply, if a defendant intends to allege that other concurrent wrongdoers either caused or contributed to the plaintiff’s loss, the defendant’s pleading must allege the relevant facts that cause the defendant to make such assertions.

Vicarious liability Tasmania has not introduced any legislative reforms dealing with the issue of vicarious liability. An employer can be found vicariously liable for a wrongful, unauthorised or negligent act of an employee which is carried out in the course of his or her employment and is so closely connected with an authorised act that it may be regarded as a mode of doing the authorised act. This principle was endorsed in the High Court case of New South Wales v Lepore, Samin v Queensland, Rich v Queensland,716 in which three appeals were held simultaneously.

707 Ibid s 43C(1). 708 Ibid s 43C(2). 709 There is no such section in the New South Wales legislation regarding agreements by defendants to contribute or indemnify remaining unaffected, however the same result can be achieved if the proportionate liability sections have been contracted out of; see Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW) s 3A(2). 710 Civil Liability Act 2002 (Tas) s 43D. 711 Ibid s 43D(2). 712 Ibid s 43G. 713 Ibid s 3A(3). New South Wales has a similar provision; see Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW) s 3A(2). 714 (2010) 20 Tas R 239. 715 [2007] NSWSC 367. 716 (2003) 212 CLR 511.

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An employer will not always be held responsible for the actions of an employee.717 The act must be closely connected with his or her employment for vicarious liability to attach. Therefore, whether an employer will be held vicariously liable for the actions of an employee will depend upon the specific facts in each case. The New South Wales case of Webster v Coles Myer Limited; Thompson v Coles Myer Limited718 is indicative of this approach.

Further case discussion on vicarious liability is contained in the equivalent New South Wales and Victorian sections.

Non-delegable duties Civil Liability Act 2002 (Tas) pt 1 (s 3C) Section inserted by the Civil Liability Amendment Act 2003 (Tas) and commenced 4 July 2003 The term non-delegable duty is somewhat misleading. It does not mean that a party owing a duty cannot delegate the task to a third party, but rather that the liability for the breach of the duty cannot be delegated. As such, it is a duty to ensure that reasonable care is taken. Therefore, if the third party to whom the task has been entrusted fails to exercise reasonable care, the non- delegable duty will have been breached.

The categories of non-delegable duty continue to evolve. The courts have struggled however to clearly define the parameters required to justify the existence of a non-delegable duty of care. The known criteria include the superior capacity of the defendant to bear the risk of the mishap; the special obligation which it is proper to attach to extra hazardous activities; and the special dependence or vulnerability of the person to whom the duty is owed.719

Common known relationships in which non-delegable duties exist include:

ƒƒ employer and employee;720 ƒƒ host employer and contractor;721 ƒƒ school and student;722 ƒƒ hospital and patient;723 and ƒƒ owner of premises and licensee.724

The Ipp report recommended that the relevant civil liability legislation should ensure that plaintiffs could not circumvent the application of the civil liability legislation by pleading their action based upon breach of a non-delegable duty of care.

In response to the recommendation, Tasmania has enacted s 3C of the Civil Liability Act 2002 (Tas) which provides that the Act applies to non-delegable duties.

717 Ibid. 718 [2009] NSWDC 4. This case was confirmed on appeal; see Coles Myer Ltd v Webster; Coles Myer Ltd v Thompson [2009] NSWCA 299. Further discussion of this case can be found in Vicarious Liability (New South Wales). 719 Northern Sandblasting Pty Ltd v Harris (1997) 188 CLR 313. 720 Kondis v State Transport Authority (1984) 154 CLR 672. 721 TNT Australia Pty Ltd v Christie & 2 Ors; Crown Equipment Pty Ltd v Christie & 2 Ors; Manpower Services (Aust) Pty Ltd v Christie & 2 Ors [2003] NSWCA 47. 722 Commonwealth v Introvigne (1982) 150 CLR 258. 723 Samios v Repatriation Commission [1960] WAR 219. 724 Burnie Port Authority v General Jones Pty Ltd (1994) 179 CLR 520.

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Exclusion clauses Tasmania has not introduced any legislative reforms dealing with the issue of exclusion clauses. The common law principles will therefore remain applicable. Accordingly, in order to have any prospect of an exclusion clause being upheld, the person or entity including such a clause should ensure it is clearly incorporated into the contract, specifically drafted to cover the factual scenario encountered by the person or entity seeking to enforce it, and to the extent possible, brought to the attention of the other party to the contract.725

Where the claim is one captured by the Australian Consumer Law, there are certain guarantees which cannot be excluded or limited by contract. See div 2–3 of sch2 of the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth).

Expressions of regret and apologies Civil Liability Act 2002 (Tas) pt 4 (s 7) commenced on 1 January 2003 Pursuant to s 7(3) of the Civil Liability Act 2002 (Tas) an apology is defined as:

‘an expression of sympathy or regret, or of a general sense of benevolence or compassion in connection with any matter, which does not contain an admission of fault in connection with the matter’.

Section 7 provides that evidence of an apology made by or on behalf of a person in connection with any matter alleged to have been caused by the fault of the person is not admissible in any civil proceedings as evidence of the fault or liability of the person in connection with that matter. Nor does it constitute an express or implied admission of fault or liability. It is not relevant to the determination of fault or liability.

The provision applies to civil liability of any kind except civil liability excluded by s 3B which includes matters related to sexual offences or intentional acts, injuries related to the use of tobacco and claims made under pt III of the Motor Accidents (Liabilities and Compensation) Act 1973 (Tas).

For High Court guidance on the distinction between admissions and apologies, see Dovuro Pty Ltd v Wilkins.726

Limitation periods Limitations Act 1974 (Tas) commenced 24 January 1975 The Limitation Act 1974 (Tas) provides that damages for personal injury must be brought within either three years from the date of discoverability (see definition below), or 12 years commencing on the date of the act or omission which it is alleged resulted in the personal injury or death that is the subject of the action.

The ‘date of discoverability’, in the case of an action for damages for personal injuries means the date when the plaintiff knew or ought to have known that personal injury or death:

ƒƒ had occurred; ƒƒ was attributable to the conduct of the defendant; and ƒƒ in the case of personal injury, was sufficiently significant to warrant bringing proceedings.

Section 5A(5) allows a judge to extend the limitation period in certain circumstances. The judge must have regard to the justice of the case and consider such things as:

725 The New South Wales case of Lormine Ltd and Anor v Xuereb [2006] NSWCA 200 may be of some relevance when considering how an exclusion clause may be interpreted in Tasmania. 726 (2003) 215 CLR 317.

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ƒƒ whether the passage of time has prejudiced a fair trial of the action; ƒƒ the nature and extent of the plaintiff’s loss; and ƒƒ the nature of the defendant’s conduct.

An example where the limitation period was not extended was in the case of Kaye v Hoffman.727

In that case an application was made under s 5A(5) of the Limitations Act 1974 (Tas) to extend the limitation period to a claim for damages for personal injuries. The respondent was an endocrinologist who misdiagnosed the applicant with a tumour. Another endocrinologist advised the applicant that she had no tumour. The applicant asserted that the misdiagnosis resulted in side effects of the prescribed drugs, pregnancy termination, fear, stress, anxiety and depression. The applicant’s solicitor issued and served a writ despite the expiration of the limitation period. The issue on the application was whether the applicant had constructive knowledge of the respondent’s wrongdoing. The application was dismissed as the court held that the applicant had constructive knowledge of the respondent’s wrongdoing because a reasonable person in the applicant’s position is expected to make detailed enquiries at an early stage of diagnosis and ought to have known of a misdiagnosis.728

As to applicants with a disability at the time an action arises, s 26 provides that an action may be brought at any time before the expiration of three years from the date when a person ceased to be under a disability or died whichever event first occurred notwithstanding that the period of limitation has expired.

Damages Awards

Damages awards in personal injury claims in Tasmania are now regulated by the Civil Liability Act 2002 (Tas). That Act regulates the amounts awarded for general damages, economic loss (including superannuation entitlements), gratuitous care and interest.

General damages Civil Liability Act 2002 (Tas) pt 7 ( ss 27–28) commenced 1 January 2003 Tasmania does not provide a cap on general damages but applies an indexed threshold. Section 27 of the Act provides that if general damages are assessed at or below $5,000 (Amount A) no award will be made. Section 27(4)(a)(ii) provides that Amount A is to be recalculated on 1 July each financial year by adjusting the sum to reflect the consumer price index figure for Hobart for the March quarter immediately preceding the financial year in which the threshold amount is to apply. Where the assessment lies between $5,000 and Amount B (an amount five times Amount A or $25,000) the amount awarded is calculated using the following formula:

Award = 1.25 x (amount assessed – Amount A).

Where the assessment exceeds Amount B, the amount awarded is equal to the amount assessed. The courts are also able to refer to common law for the purpose of establishing the appropriate award in the proceeding.

727 (2009) 19 Tas R 357. 728 The decision was appealed but the application was dismissed; see Kaye v Hoffman (No 2) [2008] TASSC 2 and Kaye v Hoffman [2009] TASSC 5.

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Economic loss Civil Liability Act 2002 (Tas) pt 7 (s 26) and pt 8 (s 35) Section 26 was amended by the Civil Liability Amendment Act 2005 (Tas) and commenced 15 December 2005 Section 26(1) was amended by the Justice and Related Legislation (Miscellaneous Amendments) Act 2012 (Tas) and commenced 31 May 2012 Section 35 commenced 1 January 2003 In awarding damages for economic loss (in the form of loss of past and future earnings as well as superannuation entitlements), pt 7 of the Civil Liability Act 2002 (Tas) outlines the procedure to calculate the amount the plaintiff is entitled to claim. Section 26(1) provides that where a person is entitled to damages for loss of earning capacity or where a claim for damages is made pursuant to the Fatal Accidents Act 1934 (Tas), a court must not award those damages on the basis that the person was, or may have been capable of, earning income at greater than three times the adult average weekly earnings as published by the Australian Bureau of Statistics before damages are awarded.

In relation to an award for economic loss as a consequence of mental harm, under s 35 Civil Liability Act 2002 (Tas) a court cannot make an award of damages resulting from breach of duty unless the harm consists of a recognised psychiatric illness.

Gratuitous care Civil Liability Act 2002 (Tas) pt 7 (ss 28B, 28BA) Section 28B was amended by Justice and Related Legislation (Miscellaneous Amendments) Act 2008 (Tas) and commenced 15 December 2005 Section 28C was inserted by Civil Liability Amendment Act 2005 (Tas) and commenced 15 December 2005 Similarly worded to the amended New South Wales provision, s 28B(2) precludes awards of damages for gratuitous care unless:

ƒƒ the services are necessary; ƒƒ the need for services arise solely out of the injury for which the damages are to be awarded; and ƒƒ the services have been provided, or are likely to be provided, to that person for more than six hours per week and for more than six consecutive months.

In calculating damages for gratuitous services, the hourly rate must not exceed 1/40 of adult average weekly earnings, and the weekly rate must not exceed adult average weekly earnings.729 Under s 28C, an award for gratuitous services cannot be made for claims in relation to pt III of the Motor Accidents (Liabilities and Compensation) Act 1973 (Tas).

Section 28BA provides that damages can only be awarded to an injured person for the loss of capacity to provide gratuitous services if such services have been provided for a period of more than six hours per week for six consecutive months after the person was injured.

Interest Tasmania has not implemented any legislative reforms with respect to interest on civil liability damages awards.

729 Civil Liability Act 2002 (Tas), s 28B(3).

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Discount rate Civil Liability Act 2002 (Tas) pt 7 (s 28A) commenced 1 January 2003 Section 28A states that if an award of damages is to include any component assessed as a lump sum for future loss, the present value of that future loss is to be qualified by adopting a discount rate of 5%, or if another discount rate is prescribed, that other discount rate. This 5% discount rate is current as at 2014.

Exemplary, punitive or aggravated damages Whilst there have been indications that Tasmania may implement legislative changes to remove a plaintiff’s right to claim exemplary, punitive or aggravated damages, no legislation has yet been enacted in this regard.

Structured settlements Civil Liability Act 2002 (Tas) pt 5 (s 8) commenced 1 January 2003 Section 8 of the Civil Liability Act 2002 (Tas) defines a structured settlement in the same terms as the Queensland, New South Wales and Victorian legislation. The relevant legislation provides for the courts to advise of a proposed award ahead of making the award to allow parties to negotiate (should they wish) a structured settlement. Pursuant to s 8(1) one or more parties to a claim for personal injury or death may apply to the court for an order approving of, or in the terms of, the structured settlements.

Legal costs There is currently no legislation that restricts the amount of legal costs recoverable in Tasmania as recommended by the Ipp report.

This is in line with other jurisdictions including Victoria, South Australia and Western Australia.

Practice and Procedure Legal practitioners Legal Profession Act 2007 (Tas) ss 657, 661(1) commenced 9 April 2008 with the remainder of the Act not yet proclaimed Legal Profession (Miscellaneous and Consequential Amendments) Act 2007 (Tas) ss 3 and 4 commenced 9 April 2008 with the remainder of the Act not yet proclaimed The Legal Profession Act 2007 (Tas) repealed the Legal Profession Act 1993 (Tas) in order to model its professional practice legislation to align with all Australian jurisdictions and achieve nationwide consistency.

The Act proposes to:

ƒƒ provide for the recognition and regulation of interstate and foreign lawyers; ƒƒ regulate the admission of lawyers generally; ƒƒ provide for the granting of, amendments to, conditions upon and suspension or cancellation of practising certificates; ƒƒ establish a scheme for the recognition and regulation of corporations that provide legal services and the recognition and regulation of partnerships that provide both legal and other services; ƒƒ provide for community legal centres and their employees; ƒƒ regulate the way in which law practices hold, disburse and account for trust money; ƒƒ provide for investigations in relation to trust accounts, including special provisions for incorporated legal practices;

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ƒƒ require disclosure for certain matters relating to legal costs, and provide for costs agreement and disputes; ƒƒ outline the requirements relating to professional indemnity insurance; ƒƒ make provision for a Solicitor’s Guarantee Fund to provide a source of compulsory compensation for defaults by law practices and set out various requirements relating to Solicitor’s Trust Income; ƒƒ provide that mortgage investment schemes do not form part of a law practice, set out the prohibitions regarding mortgage schemes and regulate the use and conduct of mortgage investment schemes; ƒƒ establish a nationally consistent scheme for disciplining the legal profession, governing complaint-handling, mediation, Tribunal proceedings and compensation; ƒƒ provide for external intervention in a law practice, including the appointment of a supervisor, manager or receiver; ƒƒ provide for the constitution and functions of regulatory authorities; and ƒƒ set out various miscellaneous provisions, particularly in relation to notices and evidentiary matters, and provide for related consequential and transitional matters.

The Legal Profession (Miscellaneous and Consequential Amendments) Act 2007 (Tas) was assented to on 19 December 2007. It clarifies some of the provisions referenced within the principal Act.

Legal advertising Regulation of legal service advertising is governed entirely by the Council of the Tasmanian Law Society within their rules and guidelines. Specific regulation of advertisement for personal injury legal services is yet to be implemented.

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south australia

Unlike most Australian jurisdictions, South Australia had existing legislation that addressed civil liability before the Ipp report was published, in the form of the Civil Liability Act 1936 (SA). This Act has, however, been substantially amended to incorporate some recommendations made in the Ipp report. Among other things, South Australia has legislated to reinstate the previous common law position with respect to the highway immunity rule and to regulate claims against recreational service providers, public authorities, volunteers and Good Samaritans. Reforms have also impacted on the assessment of damages in personal injuries claims in South Australia, with the introduction of caps on general damages and limits on claims for gratuitous care and economic loss.

Application of Statutory Reforms Civil Liability Act 1936 (SA) pt 1 (s 4), pt 8 (s 51) Sections were inserted by Law Reform (Ipp Recommendations) Act 2004 (SA) and commenced 1 May 2004 South Australia has introduced its reforms to civil liability through a number of amendments to the Civil Liability Act 1936 (SA). Section 4 makes it clear that the Act applies to the exclusion of inconsistent laws to the determination of liability and the assessment of damages for harm arising from accidents occurring in South Australia. The Civil Liability Act 1936 (SA) expressly excludes any application to rights for compensation under the South Australian workers compensation legislation. The negligence provisions contained in pt 6 of the Act only apply to causes of action which arise after 1 May 2004. Section 51 of the Act provides that the damages provisions apply to claims involving motor accidents, negligence, breach of contractual duties of care and wrongful death actions. Intentional torts, such as , assault or false imprisonment which result in injury are not covered by the Act. Instead, damages provisions apply only to accidents caused wholly, or in part, by negligence or some other unintentional tort on the part of a person other than the injured person. The damages provisions contained in the Act only apply to injuries that occurred after 1 December 2002.

Pre-court Procedures

South Australia has long had in place provisions within the Supreme Court Rules 1987 (SA)730 requiring a plaintiff to give a defendant a written notice of claim at least 90 days before commencing legal action. The notice must contain enough information about the claim to enable the defendant to make an offer to settle and must include copies of any expert reports. The defendant is required to respond within 60 days, advising whether liability is admitted or denied and include copies of expert reports. The court can penalise the parties for the costs of failing to comply with these requirements.

The court process also stipulates that a settlement conference must be convened at an early stage to explore the possibility of a negotiated resolution of the claim. The rules of the court also permit either party to a case to file an offer of settlement at any time. If a party chooses not to accept a filed offer and does not achieve a better outcome than that filed offer, there is a risk of an adverse costs order at trial.

730 Sections 6A.02 to 6A.09 of the Supreme Court Rules 1987 (SA) applies to actions commenced on or after September 2000 but before 3 September 2006. Division 2 of the Supreme Court (Civil) Rules 2006 (SA) apply to actions commenced on or after 4 September 2006. Both sets of rules contain similar provisions.

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The Law of Negligence – Scope of Duty of Care Standard of care Civil Liability Act 1936 (SA) pt 6 div 1 (s 31–32) Sections were inserted by the Law Reform (Ipp Recommendations) Act 2004 (SA) and commenced 1 May 2004 South Australia has clarified its position in relation to foreseeability of harm through the implementation of amendments to the Civil Liability Act 1936 (SA).

Section 31(1) of the Act provides that for determining whether a defendant was negligent, the standard of care required of the defendant is that of a reasonable person in the defendant’s position who was in possession of all information that the defendant either had, or ought reasonably to have had, at the time of the incident out of which the harm arose.

Section 32(1) of the Act provides that a person will not be liable for failing to take precautions against a risk of harm unless:

ƒƒ the risk was foreseeable (that is, it is a risk of which the person knew or ought to have known); and ƒƒ the risk was not insignificant; and ƒƒ in the circumstances, a reasonable person in the person’s position would have taken those precautions.

Additionally, s 32(2) of the Act outlines the relevant factors a court must take into consideration when determining whether a reasonable person would have taken precautions against the risk which caused the harm. These factors are:

ƒƒ the probability that the harm would occur if precautions were not taken; ƒƒ the likely seriousness of the harm; ƒƒ the burden of taking precautions to avoid the risk of harm; and ƒƒ the social utility of the activity that creates the risk of harm.

The Civil Liability Act 1936 (SA) is not a codification of the law of negligence and it is still open to the court to have regard to the common law test regarding foreseeability as outlined in the decision of Wyong Shire Council v Shirt.731 This decision defined a foreseeable risk as one that was ‘not far-fetched or fanciful’. This approach was taken by the South Australian Supreme Court in Trevorrow v South Australia732 in deciding that the State knew or ought to have known at the relevant times that separating a child from its parents was likely to cause damage to the child.

In the decision of Starick v Starick & Edwards, Starick v Edwards,733 the defendant, a truck driver in control of a large, heavy, long vehicle capable of causing great damage, was held to have breached the duty of care he owed to the plaintiff. Tilmouth J thought that a driver in the position of the defendant was under not only the same duty expected of any other driver, but also a duty to keep a particularly careful look out.734 This duty was breached when the defendant failed to take note of the plaintiff’s vehicle before manoeuvring his truck into its path.

731 (1979) 146 CLR 40. 732 [2007] SASC 285. 733 [2010] SADC 79. 734 Ibid [71].

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Causation Civil Liability Act 1936 (SA) pt 6 div 2 (ss 34–35) commenced 1 May 2004 The Act provides guidance in relation to multiple tortfeasors and the distribution of liability among them, by considering the position of each defendant individually and applying the established principle under which responsibility may be assigned. Unlike other jurisdictions, South Australia has not implemented any provisions to assist the court in determining what a plaintiff would have done had the defendant’s negligent conduct not occurred.

Section 35 of the Act provides that the plaintiff always bears the onus of proof in relation to establishing issues associated with causation. A more detailed discussion of these principles appears under the discussion of this topic in the New South Wales jurisdiction.

The issue of causation was examined by the Full Court of the South Australian Supreme Court in the appeal decision of Queen Elizabeth Hospital v Curtis.735

The plaintiff presented to the Queen Elizabeth Hospital in December 1999 after experiencing dizziness, nausea and headaches. A medical officer in the employ of the hospital diagnosed the plaintiff as suffering from a migraine. The plaintiff returned to the hospital the next morning due to ongoing symptoms. The plaintiff was diagnosed with bacterial meningitis. The defendant accepted that it had breached its duty of care by failing to diagnose the plaintiff at first instance. The primary issue on appeal was whether the plaintiff had established that her injuries were caused by the defendant’s breach of its duty of care.

The Supreme Court held that a failure to promptly administer antibiotics materially contributed to the plaintiff’s injuries, specifically, a loss of hearing. Accordingly, the appeal was dismissed.

Obvious risk Civil Liability Act 1936 (SA) pt 6 div 3 (ss 36–39) commenced 1 May 2004 Sections 38 and 39 of the Civil Liability Act 1936 (SA) provide that there is no duty of care to warn of an obvious risk and no liability in negligence for harm suffered as a result of the materialisation of an inherent risk. The term ‘obvious risk’ is defined in s 36 to mean a risk that, in the circumstances, would have been obvious to a reasonable person in the position of that person.

Pursuant to s 37, a person will be deemed to be aware of an obvious risk unless they can prove that they were not.

In the District Court decision of Curzons v Motor Accident Commission,736 it was held that retrieving a tyre iron from the middle of the road did not amount to an obvious risk even in circumstances where the vehicle that hit the claimant had been involved in a car chase with the vehicle in which the claimant had been a passenger prior to the incident.

In the case of Neindorf v Junkovic,737 the High Court of Australia considered an injury sustained by a woman attending a suburban garage sale when she tripped on an uneven concrete driveway. The Full Court of the South Australian Supreme Court had reduced the original award to the plaintiff by 30% for contributory negligence. The defendant at first instance argued that the gap in the concrete was an obvious risk so her duty of care as an occupier did not extend to the plaintiff’s injuries. The High Court agreed, finding that the event should not be considered in hindsight and the plaintiff, a visitor at the time, should have taken care when visiting the property for the first time.

735 [2008] SASC 344. 736 [2011] SADC 103. 737 (2005) 222 ALR 631.

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Another South Australian case to have considered what constitutes an ‘obvious risk’ in the context of an occupier’s liability is Fantis and Ors v Abi-Mosleh and Ors.738 The plaintiff sustained injuries after tripping on a metal cover to a large sump in an unsealed car park operated by the defendant. The defendant asserted that the exposed edge of the sump and its cover were obvious and it was therefore relieved of a duty to warn or protect. The court rejected this argument on a factual basis, finding that the danger posed by the sump and its cover was not obvious. The court noted that there was a ‘degree of disguise or camouflage’ and the danger, while not obvious to the plaintiff, was known or ought to have been known to the defendants.739

Dangerous recreational activities Fair Trading Act 1987 (SA) s 42 commenced 1 January 2011 Australian Consumer Law (SA) ss 60–61 commenced 1 January 2011 Until recently, South Australia had a unique system for addressing issues of liability arising from the provision of dangerous recreational activities. The Recreational Services (Limitation of Liability) Act 2002 (SA) allowed recreational service providers to register a Code of Practice governing the provision of the recreational service which set out measures that the providers should take in order to ensure a reasonable level of protection for consumers. A provider was only liable in damages if the consumer established that a failure to comply with the Code of Practice caused or contributed to the injury.740 The regime established by this Act was considered ‘unworkable’741 and was repealed on 1 January 2011.742

The new regime in South Australia reflects a similar position to that in the other states. In relation to recreational services, ss 60 and 61 of the Australian Consumer Law (SA) provides a statutory guarantee that those services will be:

ƒƒ provided with due care and skill; and ƒƒ reasonably fit for the purpose for which the services are being acquired; and ƒƒ of such a nature, and quality, state or condition, that they might reasonably be expected to achieve the result that the consumer wishes to achieve so long as that wish is made known to the service provider.

Recreational services are defined as services that consist of the participation in a sporting activity or leisure time pursuit or any other activity that involves a significant degree of physical exertion or risk and is undertaken for the purposes of recreation, enjoyment or leisure.743

Section 42 of the Fair Trading Act 1987 (SA) allows the provider of recreational services to exclude, restrict or modify the guarantees that would otherwise have been implied into the contract for the provision of the recreational service. Depending on the terms of the waiver, providers of recreational services are able to reduce or even exclude their liability in the event of personal injury to a consumer. Should the consumer not agree to the terms of the waiver, the service provider is able to refuse the provision of services.744 Importantly, a child under the age of 18 is not legally able to exclude or modify their own rights, nor is the parent of the child able to exclude or modify the child’s rights.745

738 (2007) 97 SASR 360; [2007] SASC 110. 739 Ibid 369. 740 Recreational Services (Limitation of Liability) Act 2002 (SA) s 7. 741 South Australia, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Council, 8 April 2009, 1896 (Michelle Lensink). In the period of operation of the Act, only one service provider was able to have their Code of Practice successfully registered. 742 Statute Amendment and Repeal (Fair Trading) Act 2009 (SA) s 60. 743 Fair Trading Regulations 2010 (SA) sch 1; Fair Trading Act 1987 (SA) s 42. 744 Fair Trading Regulations 2010 (SA) sch 1. 745 Ibid.

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The ability of a service provider to alter liability does not apply where a significant personal injury is suffered by the consumer if it is established that the reckless conduct of the service provider caused the injury.746 For this section, ‘significant personal injury’ is one that is not nominal, trivial or minor, and the recklessness of the conduct in question is to be determined by the general principles set out in s 34 of the Civil Liability Act 1936 (SA).

As yet, there has been no judicial consideration of these provisions.

Liability of professionals Civil Liability Act 1936 (SA) pt 6 div 4 (ss 40–41) commenced 1 May 2004 Professional Standards Act 2004 (SA) commenced 1 October 2006 Section 41 of the Civil Liability Act 1936 (SA), which was inserted into the Act in May 2004, addresses the standard of care for professionals and states that a person who provides a professional service incurs no liability in negligence arising from the service, if it is established that the provider acted in a manner that (at the time the service was provided) was widely accepted in Australia, by members of the same profession, as competent professional practice. However, s 41(2) provides that professional opinion can not be relied on for the purposes of this section if the court considers that the opinion is irrational.

Section 41(5) limits the scope of s 41 in respect to liability arising in connection with the giving (or failure to give) a warning, advice or other information in relation to a risk of death or injury from the provision of health care service. Section 41 (5) differs from similar provisions in New South Wales and Victoria as it specifically applies to the provision of health care services and not professional services generally. There have been no recent cases considering s 41 in South Australia, however, the New South Wales Court of Appeal decision of Dobler v Kenneth Halverson; Dobler v Kurt Halverson (by his tutor),747 may be instructive on how South Australia’s s 41 should be applied. The decision in that case confirmed that the New South Wales provision in respect to the liability of professionals operates as a defence and does not define the content of the duty of care owed by the professional.748

Similar to legislation enacted in other States, the Professional Standards Act 2004 (SA) allows limited liability to members of occupational associations in certain circumstances. The Act does not limit liability in respect of claims arising out of acts such as death or personal injury, fraud, or intentional tort. The primary difference between South Australia and the similar legislation in New South Wales, is that New South Wales has amended its legislation to include liability for damages arising out of any negligence or other fault of a legal practitioner in acting for a client in a personal injury claim,749 whilst the South Australian legislation expressly excludes the operation of the Professional Standards Act 2004 (SA) to such liability. As with similar legislation enacted in most Australian jurisdictions, the South Australian legislation has not had any noticeable impact on the courts’ interpretation of the civil liability of professionals to date.

Liability of public authorities Civil Liability Act 1936 (SA) pt 6 div 5 (s 42) Section was inserted by the Law Reform (Ipp Recommendations) Act 2004 (SA) and commenced 1 May 2004 Legislative reforms in South Australia have restated the previous common law position with respect to the highway immunity rule under s 42 of the Civil Liability Act 1936 (SA). Prior to the High Court decision in Brodie v Singleton Shire Council,750 which allowed for a finding

746 Fair Trading Act 1987 (SA) s 42(3). 747 [2007] NSWSC 335. 748 Ibid [60]–[61]. 749 See Professional Standards Act 1994 (NSW) s 5(3). 750 (2001) 206 CLR 512.

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of negligence against a road authority, the position in South Australia was that an authority responsible for a highway could not be held liable in tort for harm in respect of the use of that highway. The introduction of legislative reforms in line with the Ipp recommendations merely reinstates this previous position.

Liability of volunteers and Good Samaritans Volunteers Protection Act 2001 (SA) commenced 15 January 2002 Civil Liability Act 1936 (SA) pt 9 div 11 (s 74) commenced 1 May 2004 Civil Liability (Food Donors and Distributors) Amendment Act 2008 (SA) commenced 12 December 2008 The Volunteers Protection Act 2001 (SA) was implemented to exclude volunteers performing community work on behalf of the government or incorporated bodies from liability. The liability of Good Samaritans assisting people in need of emergency assistance is dealt with in pt 9 div 11 (s 74) of the Civil Liability Act 1936 (SA).

Volunteers Each jurisdiction (other than the Commonwealth) follows a basic framework for the exemption from liability for ‘volunteers’ who perform ‘community work’ for a ‘community organisation’. Each element must be satisfied for the exemption to apply. In South Australia a ‘volunteer’ is a person who performs ‘community work’ on a voluntary basis. ‘Community work’ focuses on the overall activity engaged in by the ‘community organisation’ (not the conduct of the volunteer). The four common types of activity across all state and territory legislation is work done for charitable, benevolent, educational or sporting purposes. Each jurisdiction (other than the Commonwealth) provides that a ‘community organisation’ includes a ‘body corporate’ or ‘corporation’.

As mentioned above, the Volunteers Protection Act 2001 (SA) was introduced to limit and/or exclude volunteers from liability. The Act protects volunteers of government and incorporated bodies who perform community work in good faith. However, the protection from civil liability is limited by the following exceptions:751

ƒƒ CTP liability; ƒƒ liability for defamation; ƒƒ impairment caused by recreational drugs; ƒƒ actions outside the scope of those authorised by the community organisation; and ƒƒ actions contrary to instructions received from the community organisation.

Food donors Civil Liability (Food Donors and Distributors) Amendment Act 2008 (SA) div 11A (s 74A) commenced 12 December 2008 The Civil Liability (Food Donors and Distributors) Amendment Act 2008 (SA) amended the Civil Liability Act 1936 (SA) by introducing s 74A which provides that a food donor or distributor incurs no civil liability for loss of life or personal injury arising from consumption of food donated or distributed. It should be noted that, the immunity does not operate if the food donor or distributor knew or was recklessly indifferent to the fact that when the food left the possession or control of the food donor or distributor it was unsafe within the meaning of s 8 of the Food Act 2001 (SA).

751 Volunteers Protection Act 2001 (SA) s 4.

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Good Samaritans Under s 74 of the Civil Liability Act 1936 (SA), persons who come to the aid of a victim in an emergency are protected from civil liability. However, there are some limitations placed on the immunity from liability in relation to persons who were under the influence of drugs or alcohol. All other Australian jurisdictions maintain a similar position, with the exception of Queensland, which only affords protection to Good Samaritans associated with prescribed organisations.

Liability for mental harm Civil Liability Act 1936 (SA) pt 6 div 1 (s 33) and pt 8 (s 53) Section 33 commenced 1 May 2004 Section 53(1)(b) commenced 1 June 2007 The Civil Liability Act 1936 (SA) was amended to introduce s 33 which provides that a person does not owe a duty to take care not to cause mental harm to another unless it is reasonably foreseeable that a person of normal fortitude might, in the circumstances of the case, suffer a psychiatric illness. This follows the principles determined by the High Court in Tame v State of New South Wales; Annetts v Australian Stations Pty Ltd.752

Section 53 limits liability for mental harm to incidents where the plaintiff was actually injured, or at the scene of the accident, or to circumstances in which the injured person was an immediate family member of the plaintiff. Furthermore, damages may only be awarded for pure mental harm if the harm consists of a recognised psychiatric illness, which is again consistent with Tame.

An illustration of the operation of mental harm provisions can be found in the case of Halech v State of South Australia753 where a claim for psychological injury arose after police had misidentified four victims of a fatal car accident and the mistake was only revealed after the funerals and cremations were held. The action was dismissed with the court reasoning that if the police were held to owe a duty of care, it would inhibit their ability to perform their primary responsibility of investigating incidents. This is also consistent with the rationale behind the decision in Tame v State of New South Wales.754

Intoxication and illegal activity Civil Liability Act 1936 (SA) pt 6 div 6 (s 43) and pt 7 (ss 46–49) commenced 1 May 2004 Under s 46 of the Act, a rebuttable presumption of contributory negligence arises in cases where the plaintiff was intoxicated at the time they suffered their injury. Where this presumption applies, damages are to be reduced by a minimum of 25%. Contributory negligence will also be presumed in cases where the plaintiff relies on the skill and care of another person who is intoxicated. If a plaintiff fails to rebut this presumption, their damages are to be reduced by a minimum of 25%.

Section 43 of the Act excludes liability for damages if the accident in which the plaintiff sustained injury occurred while thatperson was committing an indictable offence. The provision is the only statutory illegality defence which requires proof of the commission of an indictable offence beyond reasonable doubt. A conviction or acquittal is conclusive evidence of guilt or innocence of the offence to which it relates. Further, the indictable offence must be conducted contemporaneously with the accident, that is to say, at the same time.755 There is also discretion to award damages even in the event of illegality if the case is exceptional and the operation of the principle would be harsh or unjust.

752 (2002) 211 CLR 317; Refer to the section in this guide on ‘Liability for Mental Harm’ in the New South Wales jurisdiction for further discussion of these provisions. 753 (2004) 234 LSJS 1; [2004] SADC 78. 754 (2002) 211 CLR 317. 755 Curzons v Motor Accident Commission [2011] SADC 103.

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The onus is on a defendant to raise a plaintiff’s intoxication or involvement in illegal activity to enjoy the liability exemption afforded by these provisions. The exclusions to the presumption raised in light of these provisions in turn must be raised by the plaintiff to avoid liability being excluded.

Contributory negligence Civil Liability Act 1936 (SA) pt 7 (ss 44–50) commenced 1 May 2004 Law Reform (Contributory Negligence and Apportionment of Liability) Act 2001 (SA) s 7 commenced 16 August 2001 Following the Ipp report, South Australia amended the Civil Liability Act 1936 (SA) to incorporate the recommendations made in relation to contributory negligence. There are specific provisions now in place outlining what principles and factors should be taken into account when determining whether or not a plaintiff has been contributorily negligent. Section 44 applies the same general standard of negligence when determining whether a person has been contributorily negligent.756 Section 46 establishes a rebuttable presumption that a person who is injured while intoxicated has been contributory negligent to the extent of at least 25%.

The case of Motor Accident Commission v Curzons757 provides a good example of the application of s 46. At first instance the respondent successfully claimed damages for the appellant’s negligence, reduced by 25% for contributory negligence attributable to the former’s intoxication at the time of the incident. On appeal, the Full Court of the South Australian Supreme Court increased the apportionment of contributory negligence to 50% to properly reflect the parties’ culpabilities. In the court’s view, the respondent not only created the situation of danger when he was struck by a vehicle, his case was also more than mere intoxication, but extreme intoxication: he had a blood alcohol reading in excess of 0.2g per 100mL of blood.758

Section 47 outlines a similar presumption in relation to relying on the skill of a person who is known to be intoxicated. Section 49 imposes such a presumption on an individual who fails to wear a seatbelt. Although earlier versions of this provision required the defendant to establish the proper use of a seatbelt would have reduced or lessened the severity of the injury, there is no longer such a discretion or onus in the case of failing to wear a seatbelt. In such a case, the presumption of contributory negligence is ‘irrefutable’.759 The methodology for calculation of damages where a contributory negligence percentage is a factor prescribed in s 50.

It is important to note that contributory negligence is a concept that will turn on the facts of each case. What is considered negligent conduct on the part of a plaintiff in respect of the cause of his or her own injuries is entirely circumstantial.

Section 7 of the Law Reform (Contributory Negligence and Apportionment of Liability) Act 2001 (SA) also outlines the process for reducing an award for damages where the total has been reduced because of contributory negligence, including reporting methods by the court. This section operates subject to any contradictory legislation, so in cases of overlap, the provisions of the Civil Liability Act 1936 (SA) will prevail. Section 6 allows for apportionment through a contribution from a third person who is liable for the same harm if a claim is made within two years of the amount of damages being finally determined (or within the plaintiff’s statutory limitation period if the remaining time exceeds two years).

756 Starick v Starick & Edwards, Starick v Edwards [2010] SADC 79, [73]. 757 [2012] SASCFC 22. 758 [2012] SASCFC 22, [45], [48] (per Gray J, with whom Sulan and David JJ agreed). 759 Ibid [89].

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Proportionate liability Law Reform (Contributory Negligence and Apportionment of Liability) Act 2001 (SA) pt 3 (ss 8–11) commenced 16 August 2001 Sections 8–9 were repealed and substituted by the Law Reform (Contributory Negligence and Apportionment of Liability) (Proportionate Liability) Amendment Act 2005 (SA) and commenced 1 October 2005 Sections 10–11 were inserted by the Law Reform (Contributory Negligence and Apportionment of Liability) (Proportionate Liability) Amendment Act 2005 (SA) and commenced 1 October 2005 The proportionate liability provisions in the Law Reform (Contributory Negligence and Apportionment of Liability) Act 2001 (SA) apply to causes of action which arise after 1 October 2005.760

The South Australian legislative provisions with respect to proportionate liability appear to be somewhat different to the provisions adopted in the other Australian jurisdictions. However, it is likely that the effect and applicability of the South Australia provisions is largely the same.

In South Australia an apportionable liability is one for which the liability is for harm (but not derivative harm) consisting of economic loss (but not economic loss consequent on personal injury) or loss of, or damage to, property.761

In the District Court of South Australia’s decision of Outback Health Screenings Pty Ltd v Gwam Investments Pty Ltd [2009] SADC 30, at para 62, Judge Tilmouth discussed the statutory scheme relating to apportionment liability in South Australia:

‘Apportionate liability arises when the acts or omissions of “two of more wrongdoers” caused or contributed to the harm: s 8(2)(b). That end is achieved by determining the extent of the defendants’ responsibility for the harm, then the extent of the responsibility for the harm caused or contributed to by “other wrongdoers” (whether parties to the proceedings or not): s 8(2). Next the court may limit a defendant’s liability to the plaintiff in damages, to a percentage that is fair and equitable having regard for the extent of its responsibility: s 8(2). Still further, in the case of other wrongdoers who also happen to be defendants to the proceedings, the court is given the power to determine as against each, a proportion of the plaintiff’s damages equivalent to the percentage representing the extent of each defendants respective contribution to the plaintiffs’ harm: s 8(4).’

Importantly, if the proceedings involve both an apportionable claim and one that does not fall within the definition of an apportionable claim, then liability for the non-apportionable part of the claim is to be determined first in accordance with ordinary applicable legal rules.762 Therefore, the principle of joint and several liability may still apply to non-apportionable parts of a plaintiff’s claim. This is consistent with the legislation in New South Wales, Tasmania and the Australian Capital Territory. Contribution proceedings between wrongdoers are prohibited in respect of liability limited by the apportionment provisions763. There is however an exception to this rule as contribution proceedings between wrongdoers who are classed as being from the same group are permitted.764

760 Law Reform (Contributory Negligence Apportionment of Liability) (Proportionate Liability) Amendment Act 2005 (SA). 761 Ibid s 3(2)(a). 762 Ibid s 3(2)(a). 763 Ibid s 9. 764 Ibid s 9(a).

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The South Australian legislation also requires defendants to assist the plaintiff in identifying other parties who may be liable in respect of the plaintiff’s claim and the circumstances giving rise to the other party’s liability.765 A failure to identify other potential defendants can have adverse cost consequences for the offending defendant.766 This is consistent with the legislation in Tasmania, New South Wales, Queensland and the Australian Capital Territory.

The South Australian legislation is silent on the issue as to whether defendants whose liability is limited under the apportionment legislation can or cannot be required to indemnify other defendants. The general provisions applicable to contribution claims state that if it is fair and equitable to do so, the court may order that the contribution to be recovered is to amount to a complete indemnity or the court may exempt a person from liability to make contribution.767 However, an order providing a complete indemnity may be held to only operate between wrongdoers who are members of the same group, and not between wrongdoers whose liability has been limited as per the apportionment provisions for a claim, but who are not part of the same group. In absence of judicial determination on this issue, the operation of the legislative provisions remains unclear.

Additionally the South Australian apportionment legislation does not apply in respect of certain building works under s 72 of the Development Act 1993 (SA). There have been limited decisions in South Australia which substantively address the judicial application of pt 3 of the Law Reform (Contributory Negligence and Apportionment of Liability) Act 2001 (SA).

However, with the South Australian proportionate liability legislation having a similar requirement to assist the plaintiff to that of New South Wales, the case law from New South Wales may assist in determining the application of the proportionate liability provisions.

In the decision of Ucak v Avante Developments Pty Ltd,768 the New South Wales Supreme Court provided guidance for defendants intending to plead and rely on proportionate liability provisions. It was held that a defendant, pleading and relying on proportionate liability, must plead and rely on the material facts pertaining to the causes of action by which it is alleged the claim is an ‘apportionable claim’. Essentially this means that if a defendant intends to allege that other concurrent wrongdoers either caused or contributed to the plaintiff’s loss, the defendants pleading the same must allege the relevant facts which cause the defendant to make such assertions.

Vicarious liability Civil Liability Act 1936 (SA) s 59 commenced 1 May 2004 Under s 59 of the Civil Liability Act 1936 (SA), despite any other law to the contrary, an employee is not liable to indemnify their employer in respect of the vicarious liability incurred by the employer. Further, the employer will be liable to indemnify the employee for any liability incurred by the employee in respect of the tort unless the employee is otherwise entitled to an indemnity from another source.

765 Ibid s 10(1). 766 Ibid s 10(2). 767 Ibid s 6(7). 768 [2007] NSWSC 367.

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Non-delegable duties The term non-delegable duty is somewhat misleading. It does not mean that a party owing a duty cannot delegate the task to a third party, but rather that the liability for breach of the duty cannot be delegated. As such, it is a duty to ensure that reasonable care is taken. Therefore, if the third party to whom the task has been entrusted fails to exercise reasonable care, the non- delegable duty will have been breached. The categories of non-delegable duties continue to evolve. The courts have struggled, however, to clearly define the parameters required to justify the existence of a non-delegable duty of care. The known criteria include the superior capacity of the defendant to bear the risk of the mishap; the special obligation which it is proper to attach to extra-hazardous activities; and the special dependence or vulnerability of the person to whom the duty is owed.769

Common known relationships in which non-delegable duties exist include:

ƒƒ employer and employee;770 ƒƒ host employer and contractor;771 ƒƒ school and student;772 ƒƒ hospital and patient;773 and ƒƒ owner of premises and licensee.774

The Ipp report recommended that the relevant civil liability legislation should ensure that the plaintiff could not circumvent the application of the civil liability legislation by pleading their action based upon breach of a non-delegable duty of care.

South Australia has not enacted any legislation in response to the Ipp report recommendation. The legislature has announced that it does not believe any provisions regarding non-delegable duties are necessary as the current legislation is already applicable to breaches of non-delegable duties by virtue of the fact that strict liability exists and therefore operates in the same way as vicarious liability does.

Exclusion clauses The South Australian legislature has not introduced any reforms dealing with the issue of exclusion clauses. The common law principles will therefore remain applicable. Accordingly in order to have any prospect of an exclusion clause being upheld, the person or entity including such a clause should ensure that same is clearly incorporated into the contract, specifically drafted to cover the factual scenario encountered by the person or entity seeking to enforce it, and to the extent possible, brought to the attention of the other party to the contract.775

Where the claim is one captured by the Australian Consumer Law, there are certain guarantees which cannot be excluded or limited by contract. See div 2–3 of sch 2 of the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth).

769 Northern Sandblasting Pty Ltd v Harris (1997) 188 CLR 313. 770 Kondis v State Transport Authority (1984) 154 CLR 672. 771 TNT Australia Pty Ltd v Christie & 2 Ors; Crown Equipment Pty Ltd v Christie & 2 Ors; Manpower Services (Aust) Pty Ltd v Christie & 2 Ors [2003] NSWCA 47. 772 Commonwealth v Introvigne (1982) 150 CLR 258. 773 Samios v Repatriation Commission [1960] WAR 219. 774 Burnie Port Authority v General Jones Pty Ltd (1994) 179 CLR 520. 775 The New South Wales Court of Appeal decision of Lormine Pty Ltd & Anor v Xuereb [2006] NSWCA 200 may be of some relevance when considering how an exclusion clause might be interpreted in South Australia.

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Expressions of regret and apologies Civil Liability Act 1936 (SA) pt 9 div 12 (s 75) previously s 39 inserted by the Law Reform (Ipp Recommendations) Act 2004 (SA) No. 9 commenced on 1 May 2004 Section 39 was redesignated as s 75 by the Law Reform (Ipp Recommendations) Act 2004 (SA) and commenced 1 May 2004.

Section 75 of the Civil Liability Act 1936 (SA) provides that in:

‘proceedings in which damages are claimed for a tort, no admission of liability or fault is to be inferred from the fact that the defendant or a person for whose tort the defendant is liable expressed regret for the incident out of which the cause of action arose’.

Basically, expressions of regret about an incident that do not admit liability are not admissible in a court proceeding if it was made prior to the commencement of the proceeding.

For High Court guidance on the distinction between admissions and apologies, see Dovuro Pty Ltd v Wilkins.776

Limitation periods Limitation of Actions Act 1936 (SA) commenced 13 August 1936 Dust Diseases Act 2005 (SA) sch 1 pt 2 Civil Liability Act 1936 (SA) s 36 (1a) commenced 8 February 2006 Defamation Act 2005 (SA) s 37 was repealed and substituted and commenced on 1 January 2006 Law Reform (Ipp Recommendations) Act 2004 s 48(3a) and (3b) commenced 1 May 2004 Section 36(1) of the Limitation of Actions Act 1936 (SA) provides that a claim for personal injury must be commenced within three years after the cause of action accrued. An amendment has been included in s 36(1a) to provide that in the case of a personal injury that remains latent for some time after its cause, the period of three years begins to run when the injury first comes to the person’s knowledge. Personal injuries under this Act include any disease and any impairment of a person’s physical or mental condition.

A plaintiff may apply to the court for an extension of the limitation period under s 48. A court cannot extend a limitation period unless it is satisfied that:

ƒƒ facts material to the plaintiff’s case were not ascertained by him until some point of time occurring within 12 months before the expiration of the period of limitation or occurring after the expiration of that period and that the action was instituted within 12 months after the ascertainment of those facts by the plaintiff; or ƒƒ that the plaintiff’s failure to institute the action within the limitation period resulted from representations or conduct of the defendant, or a person whom the plaintiff reasonably believed to be acting on behalf of the defendant, and was reasonable in view of those representations or that conduct and any other relevant circumstances; and ƒƒ that in all the circumstances of the case, it is just to grant the extension of time.

Furthermore, a fact is not considered material unless it forms an essential element of the plaintiff’s cause of action or it would have major significance on an assessment of the plaintiff’s loss.

776 (2003) 215 CLR 317.

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In regards to claims for defamation, pursuant to s 37 of the Limitation of Actions Act 1936 (SA), defamation proceedings generally are to be commenced within one year from the date of the publication of the matter complained of. However, if a court is satisfied that it was not reasonable in the circumstances for the plaintiff to have commenced an action in relation to the matter complained of within one year from the date of the publication, it must extend the limitation period mentioned in subsection (1) to a period of up to three years running from the date of the publication (but no further extension is to be allowed under any other provision of the Limitation of Actions Act 1936 (SA)).

Furthermore, where the time for bringing an action or proceeding is limited by the Act, and the person who is entitled to bring the action or proceeding is under a legal disability, the time for bringing that action or proceeding shall be extended by the period or periods for which the disability exists or continues after the time at which the right to bring the action or proceeding arose. Section 45(3) provides that no period of limitation shall be extended by this section to more than 30 years from the time at which the right to bring the action or proceeding arose.

The Limitation of Actions Act 1936 (SA) has a special provision regarding children. If a child suffers personal injury and the time for bringing an action for damages is extended by this Act to more than six years from the date of the incident out of which the injury arose (the relevant date), then pursuant to s 45A(1)(b), a notice of an intended action must be given within six years after the relevant date by or on behalf of the child to the person alleged to be liable in damages (the defendant).

If the notice of intended action is not served within the six year time period, the plaintiff is not prevented from bringing an action for damages. However, if the court is satisfied that there is valid reason to excuse the non-compliance, no damages will be allowed to compensate for medical or gratuitous services provided before the date of action commenced, and no legal or other costs incurred in contemplation of the action or a possible action will be allowed.

Damages Awards

South Australia has introduced legislative reforms to regulate the assessment of damages in personal injury claims. The reforms impact on the assessment of general damages, gratuitous care and economic loss in relation to mental harm and lost earning capacity in relation to a claim for a deceased person.

General damages Civil Liability Act 1936 (SA) pt 8 (ss 51–58) commenced 13 August 1936 Subsections 52(3)–(8) inserted by Motor Vehicle Accidents (Lifetime Support Scheme) Act 2013 (SA) and commenced 26 March 2014 The Civil Liability Act 1936 (SA) currently provides a cap on general damages of $350,000 (calculated according to s 52(2)(c)–(d)). Section 52(1) states that there will be no award of general damages unless the plaintiff’s ability to lead a normal life was significantly impaired for a period of at least seven days, or medical expenses of at least the prescribed minimum have been incurred. In the decision of Dighton v The Nominal Defendant,777 Tilmouth J found that an assessment under this section requires the court to objectively ‘make a comparison of the severity of the loss sustained with the most and least severe loss which anyone could suffer.’778

Additionally, s 52(2)(a) of the Act provides that the plaintiff is to be ascribed a numerical value from 0 to 60 reflecting 60 equal gradations of harm, depending on the type, nature and severity of their injury. Each point equates to a monetary value on a sliding scale up to $350,000.

777 [2011] SADC 187. 778 Ibid [129]. Tilmouth J was quoting reasoning from the decision of Percario v Kordysz (1990) 54 SASR.

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The operation of this scheme was demonstrated in the case of Prentergast v Bulner,779 where an appeal was heard against an award for loss of earning capacity. The plaintiff was an aged care worker who broke her foot. This injury required surgery and was attributed 15 points on the scale. Following continued problems, she was unable to fulfil her job requirements and was terminated by her employer. An expert witness recommended further surgery at a cost of over $12,000 and a further three months off work to alleviate some of the problems she was experiencing. The defendant argued that the amounts of $115,000 for past loss of earning capacity and $445,000 for future economic loss were manifestly excessive as the trial judge only reduced the award by 25% for contingencies. In dismissing the appeal, the South Australian Court of Appeal held that the trial judge was entitled to take his assessment of the plaintiff’s character and desire to continue to work into account. The operation of the scheme was also considered in the recent District Court decision of Jaspers v Prospect City Council780 where McIntyre J assigned a numerical value of 15 to the plaintiff’s loss after being satisfied of the plaintiff’s ability to lead a normal life was significantly impaired by the injury for at least seven days. The plaintiff was awarded $23,840 for non-economic loss.

The newly inserted sub-s 52(3)–8) prescribe the means for assessing damages for non-economic loss in relation to personal injury arising from a motor vehicle accident.

On 1 July 2013, the Civil Liability Regulations 2007 (SA) was replaced by the Civil Liability Regulations 2013 (SA). The 2013 regulations incorporated rules regulating to the assessment of the ISV for motor vehicle accident cases, and included a schedule of ranges of ISV’s for various injuries. The rules schedule appears directly based on Queensland rules and schedule for assessment of ISVs generally.

Economic loss Civil Liability Act 1936 (SA) pt 8 (s 3, s 54, s 55, s 56) commenced 13 August 1936 Economic loss is only briefly addressed in the South Australian legislation. Section 3 of the Civil Liability Act 1936 (SA) includes economic loss in the definition of ‘harm’. Pursuant to s 53, damages may be awarded for economic loss that has resulted from mental harm. Section 54 prescribes limits on the amount of damages able to be awarded for economic loss in relation to loss of earning capacity of a deceased’s representative action. Under s 55 an injured person is compensated by way of lump sum and an actuarial multiplier will be used for the purpose of calculating the present value of the future loss.

Gratuitous care Civil Liability Act 1936 (SA) pt 8 (s 58(2)) Section was amended by the Statutes Amendment (Domestic Partners) Act 2006 and commenced 1 June 2007 Section s 58(1) of the Civil Liability Act 1936 (SA) provides that an award for gratuitous care can only be made where the services are provided by a parent, spouse, domestic partner or child of the injured person. In addition to this, gratuitous care may also be allowed for the reimbursement of expenses other than reasonable out-of-pocket expenses, voluntarily incurred, or to be voluntarily incurred by a person rendering gratuitous services to the injured person. Section 58(2) provides that damages are not to exceed an amount that is four times the state average weekly earnings.781 Pursuant to s 58(3) the court may make an award in excess of the prescribed limit if it

779 [2005] SASC 426. 780 [2012] SADC 6. 781 See Perry v Diverse Barrel Solutions Pty Ltd [2011] SAIRC 24 and Terry v Leventeris (2011) 109 SASR 358.

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is satisfied that the services were reasonably required by the injured person and that the services were not provided by a family member (i.e. parent, spouse, or child). Furthermore, the application of gratuitous care in South Australia is guided by the principles established at common law, but limited by the legislative provisions.782

Interest Civil Liability Act 1936 (SA) pt 8 (s 56) commenced 1 May 2004 Under s 56 of the Civil Liability Act 1936 (SA), no interest may be awarded on damages for non- economic or future loss.

Discount rate Civil Liability Act 1936 (SA) pt 1 (s 3) commenced 1 May 2004 The discount rate in South Australia was defined in line with the Ipp recommendations. Under s 3 of the Civil Liability Act 1936 (SA) the discount rate is:

a) if no percentage is fixed by regulation for the purposes of this definition – 5%; or b) if such percentage is fixed by regulation – the percentage so fixed.

Exemplary, punitive or aggravated damages Civil Liability Act 1936 (SA) pt 9 div 8 (s 70(6)) commenced 1 May 2004 Pursuant to s 70(6), exemplary, punitive or aggravated damages may be awarded in circumstances where a defendant is found to have unreasonably delayed in the resolution of a claim in circumstances where the defendant knew the plaintiff was at risk of dying before the claim was resolved. In the case of a deceased person’s claim for workers compensation, damages cannot exceed the total amount of the compensation for non-economic loss to which the deceased person would have been entitled if the claim had been resolved immediately before his or her death. Such an award of damages is to be made to the deceased person’s dependants or their estate. The section applies to a death after the commencement of the section, regardless of whether the circumstances out of which the injury arose occurred before or after the commencement date.

Structured settlements Magistrate Court Act 1991 (SA) s 33A, was inserted by Statutes Amendment (Structured Settlements) Act 2002 (SA) and commenced 1 December 2002 District Court Act 1991 (SA) s 38A was inserted by Statutes Amendment (Structured Settlements) Act 2002 (SA) and commenced 1 December 2002 Supreme Court Act 1935 (SA) s 30BA was inserted by Statutes Amendment (Structured Settlements) Act 2002 (SA) and commenced 1 December 2002 South Australia has legislated to implement reforms to encourage and facilitate structured settlements and has amended each of its Magistrate Court Act 1991 (SA) (s 33A), District Court Act 1991 (SA) (s 38A) and Supreme Court Act 1935 (SA) (s 30BA) Acts respectively.

In an action for damages for personal injury, the court may, with the consent of the parties, make an order for damages to be paid wholly or in part in the form of periodic payments, by way of an annuity or otherwise, instead of in a lump sum.

782 As discussed in the recent case of Dighton v The Nominal Defendant [2011] SADC 187, [151]. Tilmouth J referred to the established principles in the High Court cases of Griffiths v Kerkemeyer (1977) 139 CLR 161, Van Gervan v Fenton (1992) 175 CLR 327 and Nguyen v Nguyen (1990) 169 CLR 245 in respect of gratuitous care.

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Legal costs There is currently no legislation which restricts the amount of legal costs recoverable in South Australia as recommended by the Ipp report.

This is in line with other jurisdictions including Victoria, Tasmania and Western Australia.

Practice and Procedure Legal practitioners Australian Solicitor Conduct Rules 2011 (ASCR) commenced on 25 July 2011

South Australia implemented the Model Rules promulgated by the Law Council of Australia through the adoption of the Australian Solicitor Conduct Rules 2011 (ASCR). The adoption will ensure that solicitors are bound by a set of professional obligations and ethical principles when dealing with their clients, the courts, their fellow legal practitioners and other persons. However, no Legal Profession Act has to date been enacted or introduced as a bill in South Australia to implement the Ipp recommendations and Model Laws Project.

Legal advertising The regulation of legal service advertising in South Australia is governed by the relevant Law Society. Specific guidelines in relation to the advertisement of personal injury legal services are yet to be implemented.

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Western Australia Carter Newell Lawyers

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In the first wave of tort reform in Western Australia, the key areas addressed by the Civil Liability Act 2002 (WA) included damages for economic loss, provision for structured settlements and gratuitous attendant care, as well as restrictions on legal advertising. Further key Ipp recommendations were implemented by the Civil Liability Amendment Act 2003 (WA) to address liability of volunteers and Good Samaritans, recreational activities, proportionate liability for economic loss and the impact of apologies.

Application of Statutory Reforms Civil Liability Act 2002 (WA) pt 1 (s 3A) and pt 1A (s 5A) Section 3A was inserted by the Civil Liability Amendment Act 2003 (WA) and commenced 1 December 2003 Section 5A commenced 1 January 2003 Sections 5A(3a), 5A(5) were inserted by the Civil Liability Amendment Act 2004 (WA) and commenced 9 November 2004 Section 5A of the Civil Liability Act 2002 (WA) provides that the Act applies to any claim for damages for harm caused by the fault of a person, including motor vehicle accident claims.

‘Harm’ is defined in s 3 of the Act to include personal injury, economic loss and property damage. These provisions only apply if the harm giving rise to the claim arises out of an incident which occurred on or after 1 December 2003.

Section 3A of the Civil Liability Act 2002 (WA) provides that the Act applies to all awards of personal injury damages regardless of whether the action is founded in tort, breach of contract or another legal basis. These provisions do not, however, apply to tortious claims generally (for example, torts solely causing economic loss, such as claims for negligent misrepresentation, are not covered). The personal injury damages provisions contained in pt 2 take effect only in respect of incidents occurring after 1 January 2003.

Furthermore, s 3A expressly excludes the application of the Civil Liability Act 2002 (WA) with respect to claims falling within the operation of the Motor Vehicle (Third Party Insurance) Act 1943 (WA), the Workers Compensation and Rehabilitation Act 1981 (WA), the Civil Aviation (Carriers’ Liability) Act 1961 (WA) and awards relating to death or injury caused by asbestos inhalation or smoking. The Act also expressly excludes damages relating to unlawful intentional acts. There have been no cases directly testing the application of this exclusion.

Pre-court Procedures

There are no pre-court procedures for civil claims and no proposed legislative reforms in relation to substantive pre-litigation procedures in Western Australia. This stance is similar to that in New South Wales and Tasmania, but is unlike Queensland, South Australia, Australian Capital Territory, Victoria and Northern Territory.

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The Law of Negligence – Scope of Duty of Care Standard of care Civil Liability Act 2002 (WA) pt 1A div 2 (s 5B) Section inserted by the Civil Liability Amendment Act 2003 (WA) and commenced 1 December 2004 Western Australia has clarified the position in relation to foreseeability of harm through the implementation of provisions in the Civil Liability Act 2002 (WA).

Section 5B(1) of the Act provides that a person is not liable for harm caused by that person’s failure to take precautions against a risk of harm unless:

ƒƒ the risk was foreseeable (that is, it is a risk of which the person knew or ought to have known); ƒƒ the risk was not insignificant; and ƒƒ in the circumstances, a reasonable person in the person’s position would have taken those precautions.

Section 5B(2) of the Act outlines the relevant factors a court must take into consideration when determining whether a reasonable person would have taken precautions against the risk which caused the harm. These include:

ƒƒ the probability that harm would occur if care were not taken; ƒƒ the likely seriousness of the harm; ƒƒ the burden of taking precautions to avoid the risk of harm; and ƒƒ the social utility of the activity that creates the risk of harm.

The case of Markey v Scarboro Surf Life Saving Club Inc & Anor783 considered the general principles of s 5B(1). Yeats J made the following comment:

‘It can be seen that the provisions of s 5B(1)(a) alter the meaning of foreseeability; the plaintiff must now satisfy me that the defendants knew or ought to have known of the risk.’

In that case, a cyclist was injured when his bike struck a hole in a path which was obscured by water run off from a surf club positioned above the path. Maintenance of the pathway was the responsibility of the local council. Yeats J considered the cyclist could not satisfy him that the council knew or ought to have known about the pot hole.

The court also referred to the decision of Roads & Traffic Authority of New South Wales v Dederer,784 which provides a summary of the principles of negligence consistent with the common law principles in Wyong Shire Council v Shirt.785

The court ultimately found that the surf club was not liable as there was no breach of duty in allowing or permitting the water to flow from their premises and the surf club neither knew nor ought to have known of the holes existence in the pathway.

The case of Cheetham v Shire of Manjimup786 considered the interrelationship between the common law and the Civil Liability Act 2002 (WA) in identifying a defendant’s duty of care and determining any breach of such duty. The court noted that with respect to these issues:

783 [2007] WADC 194. 784 (2007) 238 ALR 761. 785 (1980) 146 CLR 40 786 [2009] WADC 169.

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‘there is no relevant difference in the nature or scope of the duty of care created by this statute and the common law principles enunciated in cases relevant to the plaintiff’s claim’.787

Accordingly, the court considered the provisions of s 5B of the Act as requiring an examination and determination based upon the judgment of Mason J in Wyong Shire Coucil v Shirt.788 It was held in that case, that in the context of negligence generally, the court must identify what a reasonable person in the position of the defendant would have done by way of a response to a reasonably foreseeable risk. Thus in Cheetham, a case concerning a plaintiff’s claim against the occupier of a camping ground for negligence, the standard of care of the defendant was described as being ‘what a reasonable person in the position of the occupier would, in the circumstances, do by way of response to the foreseeable risk’.789

The Court has since directed that the assessment of the existence and content of a duty of care is to be undertaken prospectively, that is, before the occurrence of the injury giving rise to the claim, rather than with the benefit of hindsight.790 This finding was upheld on appeal in Shire of Manjimup v Cheetham.791

The case of Kerslake v Shire of Northam792 also considered the interrelationship between the common law and the Civil Liability Act 2002 (WA). In that case, the plaintiff was severely injured when the motorcycle he was riding left the road and crashed while attempting to negotiate a bend. The plaintiff brought an action against the Shire of Northam in negligence, claiming that the Shire failed to adequately warn him of the oncoming bend and to reduce speed on the road.

The court determined that the defendant had a duty to ‘exercise reasonable care so that the road was safe for users exercising reasonable care for their own safety’.793 In considering whether or not the defendant was in breach of that duty, the court had regard to the decision in Wyong. This required an examination of the precautions a reasonable person in the position of the Council would have taken against a foreseeable risk which was not ‘far-fetched or fanciful’.794

Further, the court acknowledged the requirement in s 5B(1)(b) and was satisfied that serious injury could be occasioned to a motorist who failed to take the bend at a safe speed. The court concluded that such a risk was not insignificant.

Ultimately, the court decided the sign in place did not warn motorists of the need to reduce speed to negotiate the bend, and to that end, was an inadequate and unreasonable precaution against the risk of harm. The court found that a reasonable person in the position of the defendant would have erected signs indicating the need to reduce speed.

Causation Civil Liability Act 2002 (WA) pt 1A div 3 (s 5C) commenced 1 January 2003 The Civil Liability Act 2002 (WA) requires factual causation (the belief that negligence was a necessary condition of the occurrence of harm) and, secondly, that the harm comes within the scope of the negligent person’s liability.

787 Ibid [45]. 788 (1980) 146 CLR 40. 789 [2009] WADC 169, [55]. 790 (2005) 223 CLR 422. 791 [2010] WASCA 225. 792 [2009] WADC 129. 793 Ibid [86]. 794 (1980) 146 CLR 40, [202].

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In Lines v Workfocus Australia Pty Ltd795 the court confirmed that proof of causation under s 5C of the Act involves considerations similar to those at common law.796

The High Court in Adeels Palace Pty Ltd v Moubarak & Bou Najem,797 confirmed that the test for factual causation under the first limb of s 5C is the ‘but for’ test at common law. When considering the scope of liability under the second limb, the court followed the approach of the New South Wales Court of Appeal in Ruddock v Taylor798 where it was held the principles in the Civil Liability Act 2002 (WA) follow common law policy considerations.

The Act provides guidance in relation to the admissibility of evidence determining negligence.

Western Australia has also introduced provisions to assist the court applying the ‘but for’ test. A discussion of these principles appears under the discussion of this topic in the New South Wales jurisdiction.

Obvious risk Civil Liability Act 2002 (WA) div 4 (ss 5E–5F) and div 6 (5M–P) Sections 5E–5F and 5M–5P were inserted by the Civil Liability Amendment Act 2003 (WA) and commenced 1 December 2003 Western Australia has enacted legislative reforms dealing with obvious risk. Section 5F of the Civil Liability Act 2002 (WA) defines‘obvious risk’ as a risk that would have been obvious to a reasonable person in the position of that person. Obvious risks include risks that are patent or a matter of common knowledge. A risk can be an obvious risk even if the risk is not prominent, conspicuous or physically observable.

In Kerslake v Shire of Northam799 the court considered whether the risk of serious injury suffered by a motorist who failed to take the bend at a safe speed was an obvious risk pursuant to s 5F. The court cited with approval the joint judgment of Ipp and Basten JJA in the New South Wales case of Fallas v Mourlas800 where it was held that, for the provisions relating to obvious risk to be relevant, the obvious risk must be the risk of negligent conduct. The court stated that this might involve the plaintiff having to accept the risk of another person being negligent. It was noted that, while that risk might be obvious in some circumstances, the risk of a person being grossly negligent is often not. The court was satisfied that the circumstances giving rise to the injury were not obvious to a reasonable person in the plaintiff’s position.

Section 5N provides that a person will be deemed to be aware of an obvious risk unless they can prove that they were not.

Section 5O of the Act provides that there is no duty to warn of an obvious risk, except where the plaintiff requested advice or information about the risk, the defendant is required by law to warn about the risk, or the defendant is a professional and the risk of harm is a risk from the provision of a professional service by the plaintiff.

Section 5P provides that there is no liability in negligence for harm suffered as a result of the materialisation of an inherent risk.

795 [2009] WADC 203. 796 Ibid 123. 797 (2009) 239 CLR 420, 440. 798 (2003) 58 NSWLR 269. 799 [2009] WADC 129. 800 (2006) 65 NSWLR 418.

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Dangerous recreational activities Civil Liability Act 2002 (WA) pt 1A div 4 (ss 5E–J) Sections inserted by the Civil Liability Amendment Act 2003 (WA) and commenced 1 December 2003 Western Australia has implemented provisions in the Civil Liability Act 2002 (WA) which deal specifically with obvious risks and dangerous recreational activities which limit the liability of service providers.

A ‘dangerous recreational activity’ is defined in s 5F as an activity that involves a significant risk of physical harm. The activity may be a sport (whether organised or not), or any activity or pursuit engaged in for enjoyment, relaxation or leisure and includes any pursuit or activity engaged in at a place (such as a beach, park or other public open space) where people ordinarily engage in sport or in any pursuit or activity for enjoyment, relaxation or leisure.801

Section 5H provides that no liability will arise from harm suffered as a result of the materialisation of an obvious risk of a dangerous recreational activity, except where the plaintiff requested advice or information about the risk from the defendant, or the defendant is required by law to warn the plaintiff of the risk. In respect of other reasonably foreseeable risks relating to recreational activities that are not deemed dangerous, no duty of care arises where a risk warning has been provided in accordance with s 5I. In addition, s 5J states the participant and provider of the recreational services are entitled to enter into a contract which limits the liability of the provider.

The operation of s 5H was considered in Kerslake v Shire of Northam.802 In this case, the issue was whether the activity of motorcycle riding was a dangerous recreational activity for the purposes of s 5E. While the court accepted that the activity in which the plaintiff was engaged was for enjoyment, relaxation or leisure, it held that in order to satisfy the provision there was a requirement that the activity involved a significant risk of harm.

The court applied the series of principles outlined by Ipp JA in Fallas v Mourlas803 in determining whether an activity is dangerous:

‘1. The test as to whether a recreational activity is “dangerous” is objective.

2. The word “significant”, in the expression “significant risk of physical harm”, lays down a standard lying somewhere between a trivial risk and a risk likely to materialise.

3. A significant risk that converts a recreational activity into a dangerous recreational activity may be an entirely different risk from the risk (which may be obvious or not) that materialises. Thus, s 5L may be held to apply where the significant risk (converting a recreational activity into a dangerous one) differs from the obvious risk that materialises.

4. The question of whether a particular activity may be dangerous should be determined by reference to the particular activities engaged in by the plaintiff at the relevant time and to the actual circumstances giving rise to the harm. This could require segmenting the particular activities the plaintiff was engaged in.’804

801 See Civil Liability Act 2002 (WA) s 5E. 802 [2009] WADC 129. 803 (2006) 65 NSWLR 418. 804 Ibid [150].

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In Kerslake the plaintiff was riding his motorcycle on a country road in broad daylight, complying with all road signs and driving under the speed limit. The court was not satisfied that the activity involved a significant risk of harm and accordingly the activity was held not to be dangerous in the circumstances.

Liability of professionals Civil Liability Act 2002 (WA) pt 1A div 7 (ss 5PA–5PB) Sections were inserted by the Civil Liability Amendment Act 2004 (WA) and commenced 9 November 2004 Sections 5PA and 5PB of the Civil Liability Act 2002 (WA) relate to the standard of care of health professionals and provide that an act or omission will not be negligent if, at the time of the act or omission, it accorded with peer professional opinion as ‘competent professional practice’. It should be noted that a practice does not have to be universally accepted as competent practice to be considered widely accepted as competent professional practice.805 The provisions are similar to those in other jurisdictions except they only apply to health care professionals, rather than professionals generally.

This was demonstrated in the decision of Fitzpatrick v Robert Norman Job and Wendy Barbara Job t/as Jobs Engineering & Ors,806 which involved the alleged negligence of an engineer. The Supreme Court of Western Australia found the engineer was negligent by relying on the application of common law principles and did not apply either the Bolam test,807 which has been codified for health care professionals in s 5PB, or the common law principles found in Rogers v Whitaker,808 considered to be the current common law authority on the liability of professionals generally. Accordingly, in Western Australia, with the exception of health care professionals, the standard of care of professionals is not a special standard.

Section 5PB does not apply where the act or omission of the health care professional relates to the duty to warn of a risk of injury or death associated with:

ƒƒ the treatment proposed for a patient or a foetus being carried by a pregnant person; or ƒƒ a procedure proposed for the purpose of diagnosing a condition of a patient or foetus being carried by a pregnant person.

Section 5PB(4) provides that a health professional will not escape liability if the practice in accordance with which the health professional acted or omitted to do something is so unreasonable that no reasonable health care professional could have acted or omitted to do something in accordance with that practice.

Another point of difference is that the Western Australian legislation specifies at s 5PB(6) that the plaintiff bears the onus of proving that the applicable standard of care has been breached by a health professional. Other jurisdictions do not have this requirement. The New South Wales Court of Appeal has concluded that the New South Wales provisions in respect of liability of professionals operate as a defence and do not define the content of the duty of care owed by the defendant.809

805 See Civil Liability Act 2002 (WA) s 5PB(5). 806 [2007] WASCA 63. 807 See Bolam v Friern Barnet Hospital Management Committee (1957) 1 WLR 582. 808 (1992) 175 CLR 479. 809 See Dobler v Kenneth Halverson; Dobler v Kurt Halverson (by his tutor) [2007] NSWCA 335.

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Liability of public authorities Civil Liability Act 2002 (WA) pt 1C (ss 5U–Z) Sections inserted by the Civil Liability Amendment Act 2003 (WA) and commenced 1 December 2004 Western Australia has adopted the general principles of the Ipp report in relation to a public policy defence to public authorities, by describing the principles to be taken into account when deciding whether a public authority has a duty of care and if, by its conduct or inaction, that duty has been breached.

The Civil Liability Act 2002 (WA) outlines the general principles to be used in determining liability and provides that resource allocations by authorities are not open to challenge. The standard by which authorities are to be judged is that of a ‘reasonable public authority’.

The public policy defence was recently considered in the case of Southern Properties (WA) Pty Ltd v Executive Director of the Department of Conservation and Land Management.810 The case involved a claim for damages by a number of vignerons who suffered smoke taint to their grapes after the Department of Conservation and Land Management conducted a prescribed burn in close proximity to the land owner’s grape vines. As a result of the burning the grapes were rendered unfit for winemaking and the plaintiffs contended that the department ought to have postponed burning until after the grapes were harvested.

The Supreme Court of Western Australia concluded that any fault by the department in executing the prescribed burn was a policy decision within the meaning of s 5X of the Act and as such, there was no breach of duty.

In addition to the above provisions, Western Australia has re-introduced the highway immunity nonfeasance rule in relation to the State’s respective road authorities. This immunity provides that liability will not attach to road authorities in respect of the condition of roads due to action or inaction, unless they have ‘actual knowledge’ of the defect which caused the harm.

In Kerslake v Shire of Northam811 the court considered the operation of s 5Z which provides special protection for road authorities in carrying out road work. The immunity will operate unless the authority had actual knowledge of the particular risk that caused the harm. In determining the applicability of s 5Z the court considered:

ƒƒ whether ‘road work’ as defined in the Act included work done in relation to signage, guideposts and chevrons; and ƒƒ whether the Council had actual knowledge of the particular risk that caused the plaintiff’s harm.

On the first issue the court held that the definition of ‘road work’ should be interpreted as relating to things which road users travel over, under, across or through. Signage, chevrons and guideposts were held to be of a different character and thus outside the ambit of ‘road work’ as provided in s 5Z(1).

As to the second issue, the court held that the Council had actual knowledge of the risk on the basis that the Council had a system which included reports and monthly meetings where signage was discussed. Therefore the immunity under s 5Z(1) did not apply. It is worth noting that this finding was based on inference as opposed to direct evidence.

810 [2010] WASC 45. 811 [2009] WADC 129.

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Liability of volunteers and Good Samaritans Civil Liability Act 2002 (WA) pt 1D (ss 5AB–5AE) Sections 5AB–5AE were inserted by the Civil Liability Amendment Act 2003 (WA) and commenced 1 December 2004 Volunteers and Food and Other Donors (Protection from Liability) Act 2002 (WA) Act commenced 1 January 2003 Section 1CA was inserted into the Civil Liability Act 2002 by the Health, Safety and Civil Libility (Children in Schools and Child Care Services) Act 2011 (WA) and commenced 1 January 2013 Similar to South Australia, Western Australia has separate legislation pertaining to the liability of volunteers. The Volunteers (Protection from Liability) Act 2002 (WA) applies to the actions of volunteers doing community work for community organisations only. The Act applies to incidents on or after 1 January 2003.

The Volunteers (Protection from Liability) Amendment Act 2006 (WA) amended the initial Act to put in place protection for donors of food and grocery items, such as personal hygiene products, household cleaning products, and non prescription medicinal items. The amending Act also amended the short title of the primary legislation to the Volunteers and Food and Other Donors (Protection from Liability) Act 2002 (WA). Pursuant to s 5(1)(a) these provisions apply to donations made on or after 2 December 2006.

The liability of Good Samaritans is dealt with under pt 1D of the Civil Liability Act 2002 (WA) and provides a Good Samaritan with immunity from personal civil liability in respect of an act or omission done or made at the scene of an emergency. The provisions deal with persons generally and medically trained personnel specifically. This applies to incidents happening on or after 1 December 2003.

Indemnity also extends to teachers and staff of child care in circumstances where they are providing emergency medical treatment to a child under their care (pt 1CA).

Volunteers Each jurisdiction (except the Commonwealth) follows a basic framework for the exemption from civil liability for ‘volunteers’ who perform ‘community work’ for a ‘community organisation’. Each element must be satisfied for the exemption to apply. The Commonwealth only requires work being performed for the Commonwealth or a Commonwealth authority on a voluntary basis. In each state, and the Australian Capital Territory, a ‘volunteer’ is a person who does ‘community work’ on a voluntary basis.

‘Community work’ focuses on the overall activity engaged in by the ‘community organisation’ rather than the conduct of the volunteer, and the four common types of activity or work carried out include those done for charitable, benevolent, educational or sporting purposes.

Each jurisdiction (other than the Commonwealth) provides a definition of ‘community organisation’ but includes a list of legal entities that can be considered ‘organisations’ and includes the words ‘body corporate’ or ‘corporation’. In Queensland, Western Australia, Victoria and Tasmania, a community organisation includes local government entities.

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The Ipp recommendations in relation to the limitation and/or exclusion of volunteers from liability for incidents which arise out of their actions as a volunteer and which were done in good faith have been implemented into Western Australian legislation. A volunteer does not incur civil liability for anything done in good faith when doing community work. This protection does not apply to a volunteer who knew or ought reasonably to have known that they were acting outside the scope of the ‘community work’ or outside the instructions given by the ‘community organisation’ or if they were significantly impaired by drugs or alcohol.812

Under s 8 of the Volunteers (Protection from Liability) Act 2002 (WA) a volunteer is prohibited from providing a ‘community organisation’ with an indemnity against (or from making contribution towards) a ‘community organisation’ in relation to civil liability the volunteer himself would incur or which the ‘community organisation’ incurs. Victoria and Tasmania have also incorporated similar prohibitions.

Food donors The Volunteers (Protection from Liability) Amendment Act 2006 (WA) amended the initial Act to incorporate protection from civil liability for personal injury resulting from the consumption of food to persons who donate food and grocery products for charitable purposes. Such protection is only extended where the food or grocery product is donated in good faith, without a requirement for payment, is fit for human consumption and/or safe to use, and all instructions with respect to consumption, handling requirements and/or time limits on the food and groceries were given to the consumer.

The amending Act also amended the short title of the primary legislation to the Volunteers and Food and Other Donors (Protection from Liability) Act 2002 (WA).

Good Samaritans Western Australia has legislated under the Civil Liability Act 2002 (WA) to provide protection from liability for Good Samaritans who are acting with good faith and without recklessness in assisting a person in apparent need of emergency assistance. The Act seems to limit the protection to emergency situations only, as it provides no other scenarios for such protection.

All other Australian jurisdictions maintain a similar position, with the exception of Queensland, which only affords protection to Good Samaritans associated with prescribed organisations.

Liability for mental harm Civil Liability Act 2002 (WA) pt 1B (ss 5Q–5T) Sections inserted by the Civil Liability Amendment Act 2003 (WA) and commenced 1 December 2003 Western Australia has enacted legislation with respect to the recovery of damages for mental harm. The Civil Liability Act 2002 (WA) under pt 1B provides that a person does not owe a duty of care not to cause a plaintiff mental harm unless the person ought to have foreseen that a person of normal fortitude might suffer a recognised psychiatric illness, in the circumstances of the case, if reasonable care was not taken. For the purposes of application in respect of mental harm, the Act sets out the circumstances which include: whether or not mental harm was suffered as the result of a sudden shock; whether the plaintiff witnessed a person being killed, injured or put in peril; the nature of the relationship between the person killed or injured and the plaintiff; and whether or not there was a pre-existing relationship between the plaintiff and the defendant. The circumstances also include the physical injury suffered by the plaintiff.

812 Volunteers and Food and Other Donors (Protection from Liability) Act 2002 (WA) s 6(3).

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Section 5S of the Act was recently considered in the case of Manthe v BHP Billiton Iron Ore Pty Ltd (BHP)813. In this case the defendant contended that it did not owe the plaintiff a duty of care not to cause mental harm because the defendant ‘could not have foreseen that a person of normal fortitude might in the circumstances of the case suffer a recognised psychiatric illness if reasonable care were not taken’.814 The District Court of Western Australia rejected the submission and held the psychiatric harm suffered by the plaintiff following a sudden train derailment was reasonably foreseeable in the circumstances.

These provisions are similar to those in New South Wales.815

Intoxication and illegal activity Civil Liability Act 2002 (WA) pt 1A div 5 (s 5L) Section inserted by the Civil Liability Amendment Act 2003 (WA) and commenced 1 December 2003 Intoxication Section 5L of the Civil Liability Act 2002 (WA) provides for a finding of contributory negligence if the plaintiff is found to be intoxicated at the time the incident occurred, unless the intoxication was not self-induced. Contributory negligence will be presumed unless the plaintiff establishes on the balance of probabilities that the person’s intoxication did not contribute in any way to the cause of the harm.

In D’Vorak v Hiscox816 the court considered the operation of s 5L. The plaintiff was rendered a quadriplegic after the defendant, engaging in apparent ‘horse-play’, seized him in a bear hug at a party and thrust him onto a trampoline. The plaintiff’s friend who was not a party to the proceedings was on the trampolin e at the time and inadvertently landed on the plaintiff’s head, breaking his neck. The defendant relied, inter alia, on s 5L arguing for a finding of contributory negligence against the plaintiff in relation to his consumption of alcohol leading to the ‘horse-play’. The court concluded that even if it was satisfied that the plaintiff was intoxicated, it would reject the proposition that the plaintiff’s consumption of alcohol contributed in any way to the cause of harm. Once seized by the defendant the plaintiff was powerless to control what happened.

The recent decision in Miller v Miller817 has further consolidated and clarified the law surrounding illegality and intoxication in negligence. The case involved a 16 year old girl who, after being refused entry to a nightclub and having missed the last train home, decided to steal a car. The appellant was unlicensed and had been drinking. The appellant’s second cousin and respondent in the matter took responsibility for driving the car. After initially driving safely the respondent commenced driving in a dangerous and reckless manner. The appellant asked the respondent to drive more sensibly and later asked to be let out of the vehicle. The respondent refused. The respondent subsequently lost control of the vehicle and the car struck a pole. The appellant was seriously injured and rendered a tetraplegic. The central issue at trial was whether or not the respondent owed a duty of care to the appellant.

813 [2011] WADC 160. 814 Ibid [192]. 815 Refer to the section in this guide on ‘Liability for Mental Harm’ in the New South Wales jurisdiction for a thorough discussion and background history to these provisions. 816 [2008] WADC 152. 817 (2011) 275 ALR 611.

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At first instance the District Court of Western Australia held that a duty of care was owed to the appellant. On appeal however, the Western Australia Court of Appeal held that no duty of care was owed on the basis that the appellant and the respondent had jointly breached s 371A of the Criminal Code Act Complication Act 1913 (WA) which prohibits use of a motor car without the owner’s consent. The appellant appealed to the High Court.

In a joint opinion, French CJ, Gummow, Hayne, Crennan, Kiefel and Bell JJ determined that immediately prior to the accident, the appellant and the respondent were no longer engaged in a joint illegal enterprise because the appellant had terminated her complicity in the respondent’s illegal acts when she requested to be allowed to exit the vehicle. Consequently, the respondent was deemed to have owed the appellant a duty of care and the appeal was allowed.

Unlike the legislative changes in Queensland, New South Wales, South Australia and Tasmania, there is no minimum reduction for contributory negligence in Western Australia.

The onus is on a defendant to raise a plaintiff’s intoxication in order to invoke the presumption of contributory negligence afforded by these provisions. The onus of proof is on the plaintiff to rebut the presumption of contributory negligence.

Illegal activity Unlike most other jurisdictions the Act does not expressly prevent recovery of damages or reduce the amount of damages in the event the plaintiff is injured while involved in illegal activity. Defendants are left with illegality defences available at common law.818

Contributory negligence Civil Liability Act 2002 (WA) pt 1A div 5 (ss 5K–L) Sections were inserted by the Civil Liability Amendment Act 2003 (WA) and commenced 1 December 2003 Following the Ipp report Western Australia amended the Civil Liability Act 2002 (WA) to incorporate the recommendations made in relation to contributory negligence. There are now specific legislative statements outlining what principles and factors a court should take into account when determining whether or not contributory negligence will apply.

In accordance with s 5K, the principles that apply in determining primary liability also apply in determining whether there has been any contributory negligence. The standard of care required of the person who has suffered harm is that of a reasonable person in the position of that person and the matter is to be determined on the basis of what that person knew or ought to have known at the time.

In Town of Port Hedland v Hodder (No. 2)819 the Western Australian Court of Appeal considered at length the case for adopting a more flexible standard in determining whether the mentally disabled can be contributory negligent. In that case, the respondent was born with cerebral palsy and intellectual disability. He was blind, deaf and virtually unable to speak. He attended a public swimming pool accompanied by family members where he proceeded to mount a diving block (one of eight placed on the edge of the shallow end of the pool). He entered the water head first, striking his head on the bottom of the pool and fracturing his cervical spine. The accident rendered him quadriplegic. Despite dissent by Martin CJ, the court ultimately determined that a finding of contributory negligence should be made without reference to disability, confirming the generally objective standard of care by which contributory negligence is assessed.

818 For a helpful analysis of the available common law defences, see the article ‘A Revival of the Doctrine of Attainder? The Statutory Illegality Defences to Liability in Tort.’ [2007] 29 Sydney Law Review 445. 819 [2012] WASCA 212 [Hodder].

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Section 5L provides for a presumption of contributory negligence in circumstances where a person who suffers harm is intoxicated, unless they can prove the intoxication did not contribute in any way to the cause of the harm.

Section 4 of the Law Reform (Contributory Negligence and Tortfeasors’ Contribution) Act 1947 (WA) states that where the court is satisfied there has been contributory negligence on the part of the plaintiff, the court shall reduce the amount of damages awarded to the plaintiff accordingly.

The Western Australian Supreme Court considered the issue of contributory negligence in the decision of Avram v Gusakoski.820 The appellant and respondent had consumed a large quantity of alcohol. After an argument between the appellant and another person who was not intoxicated over who would drive, the appellant drove the vehicle and subsequently had an accident. The trial judge initially applied a reduction for contributory negligence of 30%. The appellant argued the reduction for contributory negligence should be increased as the respondent had ridden in the vehicle with the appellant, who was clearly drunk.

On appeal the court said the issue is not whether a reasonable person in the intoxicated passenger’s condition would have foreseen the risk of injury, but whether an ordinary reasonable sober person would have foreseen that accepting a lift from an intoxicated driver was exposing them to a risk of injury. Upon examining the whole conduct of each of the negligent parties, the court considered the culpability of the appellant far outweighed that of the respondent, and the trial judge did not err in not making an apportionment in excess of 30%.

It is important to note contributory negligence is a concept that will turn on the facts of each case. What is considered negligent conduct on the part of a plaintiff in respect of the cause of his or her own injuries is entirely circumstantial. However, there are guiding principles that courts rely upon in assessing a plaintiff’s conduct. Any conclusion of contributory negligence on the part of the plaintiff will result in an apportionment of liability. The approach of the court is therefore twofold. Firstly, to determine negligence on the part of the plaintiff, and secondly, to attribute a value or weight to such negligence, usually expressed as a percentage. The principles involved when exercising a judicial discretion to apportioning liability for contributory negligence was considered by the Court of Appeal in Gorman v Scofield821 and subsequently applied in Beydoun v Burswood Nominees Ltd:822

‘An assessment of the culpability of a plaintiff and a defendant, for the purposes of apportionment, requires a consideration of the relative importance of the conduct of each party in causing the damage. The whole conduct of each negligent party in relation to the circumstances of the accident must be subjected to comparative examination.

‘A finding on a question of apportionment, as between a defendant who has been found to be negligent and a plaintiff who has been found guilty of contributory negligence, is a finding upon a “question, not of principle or of positive findings of fact or law, but of proportion, of balance and relative emphasis, and of weighing different considerations. It involves an individual choice or discretion, as to which there may well be differences of opinion by different minds”: British Fame (Owners) v MacGregor (Owners) [1943] AC 197 at 201. It is well-established that such a finding, if made by a Judge, is not lightly reviewed.’823

820 [2006] 31 WAR 400. 821 [2008] WASCA 78. 822 [2009] WADC 64. 823 [2008] WASCA 78 [20]–[21].

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In the case of Markey v Scarboro Surf Life Saving Club Inc & Anor824 the court considered the statutory test of contributory negligence in circumstances where the plaintiff failed to take precautions against the risk of harm. The plaintiff in this case was a cyclist who had reacted too late to a pool of water. The plaintiff fell of his bicycle whilst swerving to avoid the pool of water.

The standard was considered to be conjunctively that of a reasonable person in the position of the plaintiff and on the basis of what the plaintiff knew or ought to have known at the time. In this circumstance, the court considered that it was clear ‘that the plaintiff has been the author of his own misfortune’. This case demonstrates that the court can, and will, reduce a plaintiff’s damages by 100% if the circumstances are sufficient to warrant such a finding.

In the case of Gorman v Scofield825 it was held that where a plaintiff motorcyclist collided with the rear of the defendant’s vehicle, the plaintiff’s manner of driving was so reckless and conducted with such ‘blatant disregard’ for his own safety or his pillion passenger and other road users, that he was more culpable than the defendant. On appeal, the court increased the contributory negligence from 50% to 65%.

Proportionate liability Civil Liability Act 2002 (WA) pt 1F (ss 5AI–5AO) Sections were inserted by the Civil Liability Amendment Act 2003 (WA) and commenced 1 December 2004 The proportionate liability provisions in the Civil Liability Act 2002 (WA) apply to causes of action that arise after 1 December 2004.

The Western Australian provisions provide in proceedings involving an apportionable claim, the liability of a defendant who is a concurrent wrongdoer is limited to an amount reflecting the proportion of the damage or loss claimed, or that the court considers just having regard to the extent of the defendant’s responsibility for the damage or loss.826

An apportionable claim is defined as meaning ‘a claim for economic loss or damage to property in an action for damages (whether in contract, tort or otherwise) arising from a failure to take reasonable care or a claim for economic loss or damage to property in an action for damages under the Fair Trading Act 2010 based on misleading or deceptive conduct’.827 Personal injury claims are specifically excluded from the application of the Western Australian provisions.

The definition of a ‘concurrent wrongdoer’ is ‘a person who is one of two or more persons whose act or omission caused, independently of each other or jointly, the damage or loss that is the subject of the claim’.828 A court can have regard to the responsibility of concurrent wrongdoers who are not party to the proceedings; it does not matter that the concurrent wrongdoer is insolvent, being wound up, or has ceased to exist or died.829

In the Western Australian decision of Orchard Holdings Pty Ltd v Paxhill Pty Ltd (as trustee for Paxhill Trust t/as Property People),830 Justice Allanson stated at paragraph 340 that ‘proportionate liability legislation was designed to alleviate the perceived injustice in the growing number of actions against parties whose culpability was low, but who were singled out for action because of their capacity to pay large damages awards’.

824 [2007] WADC 194. 825 [2008] WASCA 78. 826 Civil Liability Act 2002 (WA) s 5AK(1)(a). 827 Ibid s 5AI. 828 Ibid s 5AI. 829 Ibid s 5AJ(1). 830 [2012] WASC 271.

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As with the legislative provisions in other Australia jurisdictions, the Western Australian proportionate liability provisions do not apply to concurrent wrongdoers who intentionally or fraudulently cause loss or damage.831 These parties are known as ‘excluded concurrent wrongdoers’.

Importantly, if the proceedings involve an apportionable claim and a claim that does not fall within the definition of an apportionable claim, liability for the non-apportionable part of the claim will be determined in accordance with ordinarily applicable legal rules.832 The principle of joint and several liability may apply to non-apportionable parts of a plaintiff’s claim. This is consistent with the legislation in South Australia, New South Wales, Tasmania and the Australian Capital Territory.

The Western Australian legislation provides the court is to consider the comparative responsibility of any concurrent wrongdoer who is not a party to the proceedings when deciding on an apportionment of responsibility,833 line with the legislative provisions of Queensland and New South Wales.

Additionally a court is also required to appropriately reduce a plaintiff’s overall claim in respect of the proportion of the loss attributable to the plaintiff’s contributory negligence as part of the overall apportionment process.834

Of significance in the Western Australian legislation is the provision for all or any of the sections under the part dealing with proportionate liability to be excluded, modified or restricted.835 This result can be affected by a written agreement signed by the relevant parties.836

Concurrent wrongdoers are required to assist the plaintiff in identifying other concurrent wrongdoers837 and failure do so can have adverse cost consequences for the offending concurrent wrongdoer.838

There is no onus on the plaintiff to make a claim against all persons the plaintiff reasonably considers to be liable (which differs from the position in Queensland).

The Western Australian provisions prohibit recovery between concurrent wrongdoers by way of claims for contribution or requirements to indemnify.839 Of considerable importance is a qualification to the limits imposed on recovery between concurrent wrongdoers, whereby agreements between defendants to contribute to damages recoverable from or to indemnify other concurrent wrongdoers remain unaffected.840 This qualification does not appear in the legislative provisions of Queensland, New South Wales,841 Victoria or the Australian Capital Territory, but is similar to Tasmania and the Northern Territory. The clear qualification present in the Western Australian legislation raises doubts as to the ability of concurrent wrongdoers in other jurisdictions to rely on agreements providing for contribution or indemnity in respect of apportionable claims where there is no such explicit qualification.

831 Ibid s 5AJA. 832 Ibid s 5AK2(b). 833 Ibid s 5AK(3)(b), compare the position in Victoria, Wrongs Act 1958 (VIC) s 24AI(3). 834 Ibid s 5AK(3)(a). 835 Ibid s 5AJ(2)(b). 836 Ibid s 4A(1). 837 Ibid s 5AKA(1). 838 Ibid s 5AKA(2). 839 Ibid s 5AL(1). 840 Ibid s 5AL(2). 841 There is no section in the New South Wales legislation regarding agreements by defendants to contribute or indemnify remaining unaffected, however the same result can be achieved in New South Wales if the proportionate liability sections have been contracted out of; see Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW) s 3A(2).

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Finally, in relation to apportionable claims, the Western Australian provisions do not prevent the principles of vicarious liability from operating, nor do they prevent the principles of joint and several liability applying to partnership relationships.842

In Curtin University of Technology v Woods Bagot Pty Ltd,843 the Western Australian Supreme Court held that proportionate liability provisions of the CLA do not, as a matter of legislative force, apply to commercial arbitrations. The parties’ dispute arose from a construction contract, requiring all disputes to be determined by arbitration. At the arbitration, the respondent sought to invoke the proportionate liability legislation on the basis that there were other concurrent wrongdoers responsible for the losses alleged by the claimant Curtin University. The Court found that the proportionate liability regime was inapplicable in arbitral proceedings. An arbitrator’s jurisdiction was sourced from the agreement between the parties of the arbitration, and thus an arbitrator is unable to join other wrongdoers to an arbitration absent their consent (s 5AN). The court left open the possibility that the proportionate liability provisions may be expressly or impliedly adopted by the parties in their arbitration agreement.

Vicarious liability Western Australia has not introduced any legislative reforms dealing with the issue of vicarious liability. An employer can be found vicariously liable for a wrongful, unauthorised or negligent act of an employee which is carried out in the course of his or her employment and which is so closely connected with an authorised act that it may be regarded as a mode of doing the authorised act. This principle was endorsed in the High Court case of New South Wales v Lepore, Samin v Queensland, Rich v Queensland844 in which three appeals were held simultaneously.

An employer will not always be held responsible for the actions of his or her employees.845 The act must be closely connected with his or her employment for vicarious liability to attach. Whether an employer will be held vicariously liable for the actions of his or her employee will depend upon the specific facts in each case.

Further case discussion on vicarious liability is contained in the equivalent New South Wales and Victorian sections.

Non-delegable duties The term ‘non-delegable duty’ is somewhat misleading and does not mean that a party owing a duty cannot delegate the task to a third party, but rather the liability for breach of the duty cannot be delegated. It is a duty to ensure that reasonable care is taken and where a third party to whom a task has been entrusted fails to exercise reasonable care, the non-delegable duty will have been breached.

Categories of non-delegable duties continue to evolve and courts have struggled to clearly define the parameters required to justify the existence of a non-delegable duty of care. The known criteria include the superior capacity of the defendant to bear the risk of the mishap; the special obligation attaches to extra-hazardous activities; and the special dependence or vulnerability of the person to whom the duty is owed.846

842 Ibid s 5AO. 843 [2012] WASC 449. 844 (2003) 212 CLR 511. 845 Ibid. 846 Northern Sandblasting Pty Ltd v Harris (1997) 188 CLR 313.

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Common established relationships in which non-delegable duties exist include:

ƒƒ employer and employee;847 ƒƒ host employer and contractor;848 ƒƒ school and student;849 ƒƒ hospital and patient; and850 ƒƒ owner of premises and licensee.851

The Ipp report recommended the relevant civil liability legislation should ensure the plaintiff could not circumvent the application of the civil liability legislation by pleading their action based upon a breach of a non-delegable duty of care.

At the time of writing, Western Australia has not implemented any legislation in response to the Ipp report recommendation.

Exclusion clauses Civil Liability Act 2002 (WA) pt 1A div 4 (s 5J) commenced 1 January 2003 Section 5J of the Civil Liability Act 2002 (WA) expressly allows a contract for the supply of recreational services to exclude, restrict or modify any liability that results from a breach of an express or an implied warranty that the services will be rendered with reasonable care and skill. To be upheld the exclusion clause needs to abide by common law principles and the person or entity including such a clause should ensure that the clause is clearly incorporated into the contract. The contract needs to be specifically drafted to cover the factual scenario encountered by the person or entity seeking to enforce it, and to the extent possible, brought to the attention of the other party to the contract.852

To date, there have been no cases which have considered s 5J of the Civil Liability Act 2002 (WA).

Where the claim is one captured by the Australian Consumer Law there are certain guarantees which cannot be excluded or limited by contract. See div 2–3 of sch 2 of the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth).

Expressions of regret and apologies Civil Liability Act 2002 (WA) pt 1E (ss 5AF and 5AH(1)) Sections were inserted by the Civil Liability Amendment Act 2003 (WA) and commenced 1 December 2003 Pursuant to s 5AF of the Civil Liability Act 2002 (WA) an apology is defined as:

‘an expression of sorrow, regret or sympathy by a person that does not contain an acknowledgement of fault by that person’.

847 Kondis v State Transport Authority (1984) 154 CLR 672. 848 TNT Australia Pty Ltd v Christie & 2 Ors; Crown Equipment Pty Ltd v Christie & 2 Ors; Manpower Services (Aust) Pty Ltd v Christie & 2 Ors [2003] NSWCA 47. 849 Commonwealth v Introvigne (1982) 150 CLR 258. 850 Samios v Repatriation Commission [1960] WAR 219. 851 Burnie Port Authority v General Jones Pty Ltd (1994) 179 CLR 520. 852 As the Western Australian provisions are similar to the provisions in New South Wales, the decision of Lormine Pty Ltd & Anor v Xuereb [2006] NSWCA 200 may be relevant when considering similar cases in Western Australia.

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Pursuant to s 5AH of the Act an apology made in connection with any matter alleged to have been caused by the fault of a person does not amount to an admission and is not admissible in any civil proceedings as evidence of fault or liability. This applies to civil liability of any kind except to those situations as excluded by s 3A of the Act.

In Blythe v Hamblin853 the plaintiff asserted the defendant’s failure to apologise for negligently removing vegetation from his land was a basis for an award of aggravated damages. The court distinguished the significance of an apology in an action for defamation (where the absence of an apology is an important factor in assessing aggravated damages), from an action in negligence, where an apology is inadmissible by virtue of s 5AF. For High Court guidance on the distinction between admissions and apologies see Dovuro Pty Ltd v Wilkins.854

Limitation periods Limitation Legislation Amendment and Repeal Act 2005 (WA) commenced 15 November 2005 The Limitation Act 1935 (WA) was repealed by the Limitation Legislation Amendment and Repeal Act 2005 (WA). The provisions of the Limitation Act 1935 (WA) will continue to apply to causes of action which arose prior to the enactment of the Limitation Act 2005 (WA) which came into force on 15 November 2005 and limitation periods for actions that arose prior to 15 November 2005 will still be enforced under the provisions of the repealed Act. This concept was illustrated in the case of Ducker v The State of Western Australia.855

The new Act provides that:

ƒƒ an action for damages relating to personal injury or death cannot be commenced if three years has elapsed since the cause of action accrued – s 14; ƒƒ a cause of action for damages relating to personal injuries accrues when a person becomes aware they have sustained a not insignificant injury or where the first symptom, clinical sign or other manifestation of personal injury consistent with the person having sustained a not insignificant personal injury occurs – s 55(1); ƒƒ a court will have power to extend time beyond the initial three year period in circumstances where the victim was unaware of the cause of injury, identity of the person responsible or was unable to establish that person’s identity – s 39(3); ƒƒ on application a court may extend the time in which the action can be commenced if the court is satisfiedthat the failure to commence the action was attributable to fraudulent or other improper conduct by the defendant or a person for whom the defendant is vicariously liable – s 38(2); ƒƒ an action for contribution under the Law Reform (Contributory Negligence and Tortfeasors’ Contribution) Act 1974 (WA) s 7 cannot be commenced if two years have elapsed since the cause of action accrued – s 17; ƒƒ if a child is under 15 years of age when a cause of action accrues an action cannot be commenced if 6 years have elapsed since the cause of action accrued – s 30(1); ƒƒ if a child is 15, 16 or 17 years of age when a cause of action accrues, an action cannot be commenced if the person has reached 21 years of age – s 31(1); ƒƒ if a child is under 18 years of age when a cause of action accrues and during any time after the accrual, but before the child turns 18, the child is without a guardian, the time during which the child is without a guardian does not count in considering the limitation period for commencing an action, although the cause of action must be commenced before the person reaches 21 years of age – s 32;

853 [2009] WADC 192. 854 (2003) 215 CLR 317. 855 [2006] WASCA 93.

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ƒƒ if a child is under 18 years of age when a cause of action accrues, and during any time after accrual, but before the child turns 18, a defendant is a person in a close relationship (as defined in s 35) with the child, an action on that cause of action cannot be commenced once the child has reached 25 years of age – s 33(1); ƒƒ if a person is suffering a mental disability at any time after a cause of action accrues and during the time in which the person is suffering the mental disability he or she is without a guardian, the time during which the person is without a guardian does not count in the reckoning of a limitation period for commencing an action. It should be noted that an action cannot be commenced in these circumstances if 12 years have elapsed since the cause of action accrued – ss 35(1) and 35(2); and ƒƒ if a person is suffering a mental disability at any time after a cause of action accrues to the person and during the time in which the person is suffering the mental disability a defendant is a person in a close relationship with the person, an action cannot be commenced if three years have elapsed since the relationship ceased but an action on the cause of action cannot be commenced if three years have elapsed since the cause of action accrued – s 36(1) and (3).

The limitation period can also be shortened in the same way as it can be extended if the court considers it is just and reasonable: pt 3 Limitation Act 2005 (WA).

Damages Awards General damages Civil Liability Act 2002 (WA) pt 2 div 2 (ss 9–10A) commenced 1 January 2003 Section 9PA amended 30 May 2007 Section 10A inserted 1 December 2003 Western Australia does not apply a cap on an award of general damages for non-pecuniary loss but applies an indexed threshold. The indexed threshold amounts since the commencement of the Civil Liability Act 2002 (WA), are set out in the table below:

Date* Amount A Amount C

1 July 2003 $12,500 $38,000 1 July 2004 $13,500 $39,500 1 July 2005 $13,500 $41,000 1 July 2006 $14,000 $42,500 1 July 2007 $14,500 $44,500 * The applicable date is the date the assessment of damages is made.

In accordance with the formulas set out in the Act, from 1 July 2007 where general damages are assessed at or below $14,500, no award will be made (s 9(1)). Where the assessment falls between $14,500 and $44,500, the amount assessed is reduced by $14,500 (s 9(2)). Where the assessment falls between $44,500 and $58,500 (the sum of Amount A and Amount C), the amount awarded is to be calculated as the amount by which the damages assessed exceed the following formula:

$14,500 – (damages assessed – $44,500) (s 9(3)).

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On or before each 1 July, the Minister is required to publish a notice in the Gazette specifying the amounts for Amount A and Amount C for the financial year commencing on that date. Additionally, s 10A(1) allows the court to refer to earlier decisions of that court or other courts for the purpose of establishing an appropriate award in a proceeding. From July 2012–July 2013 the prescribed amounts were $18,000 (Amount A) and $55,000 (Amount C) respectively.

An example of the application of the general damages provisions can be seen in the case of Pitchen v Cado Metal Design Pty Ltd.856 The plaintiff brought a claim for personal injuries when the balustrade on his first floor balcony gave way and he fell to the ground. He brought a claim against the manufacturer and installer of the balustrade, as well as the builders of the house. In assessing the plaintiff’s entitlement to general damages the judge noted his ability to consider other cases, however no cases were put forward by either party. Without providing any details of calculations, the judge simply awarded the plaintiff $65,000 for this head of damage.

Economic loss Civil Liability Act 2002 (WA) pt 2 div 2 (s 11) commenced 1 January 2003 The Civil Liability Act 2002 (WA) provides that in assessing damages for economic loss (including a dependency claim), the court is to disregard earnings in excess of three times the average weekly earnings at the date of the award.857 Aside from the cap, there are no provisions that relate specifically to the calculation of future economic loss or economic loss.

Gratuitous care Civil Liability Act 2002 (WA) pt 2 div 3 (s 12) commenced 1 January 2003 Western Australia has implemented a $5,000 minimum threshold for damages for gratuitous care. Section 12(3) imposes a threshold on awards of an amount described as Amount B, which is defined in s 13 as being $5,000. Section 13(2) provides that for any other financial year, Amount B is obtained by varying the original sum for the preceding year according to s 4. Section 13(3) provides that the minister is to publish a notice in the Gazette on or before each 1 July specifying Amount B for the relevant financial year. In addition there is a cap on the entitlement to damages for gratuitous care to an amount equivalent to average weekly earnings, as calculated by the Australian Statistician of a maximum of 40 hours a week.

Under div 3 of pt 2, no damages are to be awarded for gratuitous services if the services required would have been provided to the person even if the person had not suffered the personal injury. This provision also appears in s 3D of the Motor Vehicle (Third Party Insurance) Act 1943 (WA). The case of Churchill v Brown858 demonstrates the difficulties involved in determining causation and applying principles of gratuitous attendant care where several accidents occurred and the damage from each was required to be isolated.

Interest The Western Australian Civil Liability Act 2002 (WA) does not contain any restrictions on a claim for interest on damages awards for civil liability claims.

Interest will be payable at the interest rate fixed by the Supreme Court Act 1935 (WA).

856 [2008] WADC 16. 857 This amount is estimated by reference to the average weekly total earnings of a full-time adult employee in Western Australia as calculated by the Australian Statistician for the quarter ending most recently before the date of the award. 858 [2004] WADC 161 and on appeal (2006) 31 WAR 246.

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Discount rate Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1941 (WA) s 5 commenced 24 Oct 1942 Section 5 provides that the present value of the future loss shall be quantified by adopting a discount rate of the percentage fixed by the Governor by order; or, where no percentage is fixed, a discount rate of 6%.859

Exemplary, punitive or aggravated damages The ability of the courts to make awards for acts of intentional wrongdoing including punitive, exemplary and/or aggravated damages has not been restricted by the Western Australian legislative reform and there has been no stated intention to do so.

Structured settlements Civil Liability Act 2002 (WA) pt 2 div 4 (ss 14–15) commenced 1 January 2003 Western Australia has included provisions in the Civil Liability Act 2002 (WA) to encourage and facilitate structured settlements. The relevant legislation allows a court to propose an award ahead of making the award to allow parties to negotiate (should they wish to formulate a structured settlement). The parties can then apply to the court for an order that the settlement be in the form agreed between them.

‘Structured settlement’ is defined in s14 as ‘an agreement that provides for all or part of the damages agreed or awarded to be paid in the form of periodic payments funded by annuity or other agreed means’.

Practice and Procedure Legal costs Western Australia has not addressed the proposals in the Ipp recommendations with respect to legal costs and has not announced any intention to date to legislate in this respect. This is in line with other jurisdictions including Victoria, Tasmania and South Australia.

Legal practitioners Legal Profession Act 2008 (WA) Act commenced 27 May 2008 Legal Profession Conduct Rules (2010) (WA) commenced on 1 January 2011 The purpose of the Act was to complete the legislative reform parliament commenced when it enacted the Legal Profession Act 2003 (WA). It seeks to regulate the legal profession in a way that is sufficiently flexible to balance the requirements of small local firms and larger national firms. Some of the relevant sections of the Act which deal with prohibitions on the undertaking of legal practice work by unqualified persons include:

ƒƒ admission rules of persons for the legal profession including foreign and interstate practitioners; ƒƒ rules with respect to practising certificates; ƒƒ inter-jurisdictional matters; ƒƒ regulation of incorporated legal services; ƒƒ requirements with respect to trust money; ƒƒ rules of disclosure with respect to legal costs including the establishment of a Legal Costs Committee; ƒƒ regulations regarding complaint handling and compensation; ƒƒ disciplinary issues; and ƒƒ other minor, transitional related provisions.

859 Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1941 (WA) s 5(d), (e).

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The Legal Profession Conduct Rules (2010) (WA) consolidates ethical obligations imposed on solicitors relating to their relations with clients, advocacy and litigation relations with other lawyers.

Legal advertising Civil Liability Act 2002 (WA) pt 3 (ss 16–21) commenced 1 January 2003 (ss 16–19) were amended by Legal Profession Act 2008 (WA) Amendments in Western Australia with respect to legal advertising go slightly further than other jurisdictions and resemble the legislation in Queensland and the Northern Territory.

Section 17 of the Civil Liability Act 2002 (WA) states that a legal practitioner must not publish a statement which is intended or likely to encourage or induce a person –

ƒƒ to make a claim for a personal injury; or ƒƒ to use the services of the legal practitioner to do so.

Western Australia largely mirrors the Queensland legislation in respect to allowable publication materials.860 Similarly to Queensland, legal professionals have a range of methods by which they can publish statements containing their name, contact details and area of specialisation. These include print, internet, public exhibition or billboard and leaflets. The Western Australian legislation also expressly forbids public exhibition in a hospital or the delivery of leaflets to a hospital and touting at the scene of an accident.

In July 2006 the decision of Legal Practitioners Complaints Committee v Browne861 was handed down. In this case, the extent of regulation of personal injury advertising was called into question. In particular dispute was the application of s 17 of the Civil Liability Act 2002 (WA), which prohibits advertisements that induce or encourage claims. The respondent law firm had advertised their services in a newspaper, Yellow Pages and also on the television with phrases such as ‘first consultation free’ and ‘no compensation no legal fees’. It was held by the court that these advertisements did not breach s 17 of the Act.

860 Civil Liability Act 2002 (WA) s 18. 861 (2006) 42 SR (WA) 342.

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northern territory

In response to the Ipp report recommendations and perceived insurance crisis, the Northern Territory enacted the Personal Injuries (Civil Claims) Act 2003 (NT) and Personal Injuries (Liabilities and Damages) Act 2003 (NT). The objective of this legislative reform was to improve the efficiency of the process for the resolution of claims for personal injuries by providing a process for claims before proceedings are commenced in court. However, many of the provisions within the Personal Injuries (Civil Claims) Act 2003 (NT) are not as yet in force. The Northern Territory is also yet to introduce much in the way of legislative reform to the law of negligence with issues such as the standard of care, obvious risk and causation untouched by the legislature in the Northern Territory.

However, provisions are in effect which restrict the assessment of damages and also affect liability in respect of volunteers, donors of food and grocery products, Good Samaritans, intoxicated persons or persons engaged in criminal activity and occupiers. The effect of apologies has also been addressed. Legislation is also in effect in respect of proportionate liability.

Application of Statutory Reforms Personal Injuries (Liability and Damages) Act 2003 (NT) pt 1 (s 4) commenced 1 May 2003, s 4(3)(e) removed and substituted 1 January 2011 In accordance with s 4 of the Personal Injuries (Liabilities and Damages) Act 2003 (NT), the Act applies to all civil claims for damages for personal injuries from 1 May 2003. The Act provides for the entitlement to damages for personal injuries, clarifies principles of contributory negligence, fixes reasonable limits on certain awards of damages for personal injuries and provides for periodic payments of damages for personal injuries. Section 4 specifically excludes claims related to motor accidents, workers compensation, dust-related conditions and certain provisions of the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth).

Intentional torts are not expressly excluded. Essentially this means that the restrictive provisions of the Act, including capped damages, are applicable to claimants who are injured from an intentional act. The application of the Act is yet to be applied to or tested in an intentional tort matter.

Pre-court Procedures Personal Injuries (Civil Claims) Act 2003 (NT) pt 2 div 1 (ss 7–11) The Personal Injuries (Civil Claims) Act 2003 (NT) is modelled on the Queensland Personal Injuries Proceedings Act 2002 (Qld) and contains similar procedural requirements with respect to the steps to be taken prior to a claimant being entitled to commence court proceedings.

The Law of Negligence – Scope of Duty of Care

Personal Injuries (Liability and Damages) Act 2003 (NT) pt 1 (s 4) commenced 1 May 2003, s 4(3)(e) removed and substituted 1 January 2011 Standard of care The Northern Territory is yet to formulate or implement any provisions recommended by the Ipp report regarding foreseeability of harm. The common law position set out in Wyong Shire Council v Shirt,862 and more recently in Roads and Traffic Authority of New South Wales v Dederer,863 therefore continues to apply.

862 (1980) 146 CLR 40. 863 (2007) 238 ALR 761; [2007] HCA 42.

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The most recent application of Wyong in the Northern Territory can be found in the decision of Young v Central Australian Aboriginal Congress Inc and Ors.864

Causation Unlike other jurisdictions, the Northern Territory has not implemented any provisions with respect to causation.

Obvious risk The Northern Territory has not implemented any legislative reforms regarding inherent or obvious risks.

Dangerous recreational activities Consumer Affairs and Fair Trading Amendment Act 2003 (NT) s 68A commenced 1 May 2003 The Northern Territory has not enacted any provisions dealing specifically with liability in relation to dangerous recreational activities.

The Northern Territory has, however, legislated to enable service providers’ liability to be restricted with respect to participants in recreational and sporting activities. Pursuant to s 68A of the Consumer Affairs and Fair Trading Amendment Act 2003 (NT), consumer contracts from 1 May 2003 concerning provision of recreational services and sporting activities may validly exclude, restrict or modify the liability of the supplier.

Liability of professionals Professional Standards Act 2004 (NT) s 1–2 commenced 21 December 2004 Remainder of Act commenced 1 January 2006 Similar to the Australian Capital Territory, the Northern Territory has not consolidated the law relating to the standard of care of professionals or medical practitioners in legislation. Further, the Northern Territory has not codified any specific standard of care with respect to a doctor’s duty to warn a patient of risks from medical treatment.

Accordingly, it appears the common law duty elucidated in Rogers v Whitaker865 continues to govern the standard of care of professionals in the Northern Territory. The Supreme Court of the Northern Territory in the decision of Jaensch v Campbell866 applied Rogers v Whitaker and confirmed that a medical practitioner has a duty to warn a patient of a material risk inherent in the proposed treatment. The recent Australian Capital Territory Supreme Court decision Haylock v Morris and Hugh867 which also applied Rogers v Whitaker may give further guidance as to the standard to be applied in the Northern Territory.

Similar to legislation enacted in other States, the Professional Standards Act 2004 (NT) provides for the introduction of schemes for the limitation of civil liability of professionals and others and to facilitate the improvement of occupational standards of professionals. As with similar legislation that has been enacted in most Australian jurisdictions, this legislation has not had any noticeable impact on the courts’ interpretation of the civil liability of professionals to date.

Liability of public authorities No legislation has been enacted in the Northern Territory with reference to the liability of public authorities.

864 [2008] NTSC 47. 865 (1992) 175 CLR 479. 866 [2001] NTSC 87. 867 [2006] ACTSC 86.

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Liability of volunteers and Good Samaritans Personal Injuries (Liabilities and Damages) Act 2003 (NT) pt 2 div 1 (ss 7–8) commenced 1 May 2003, s 7A inserted 15 December 2010

The Northern Territory legislature deals with the liability of volunteers, food donors and Good Samaritans in the Personal Injuries (Liabilities and Damages) Act 2003 (NT). Specifically, s 7 deals with the liability of a volunteer doing community work for a community organisation; s 7A deals with the liability of donors of food and grocery products; while s 8 deals with Good Samaritans, both generally and specifically trained medical personnel when providing emergency assistance. Sections 7 and 8 commenced on 1 May 2003 but apply to all matters regardless of when they occur. However, s 7(5) of the Act does not affect a contract of insurance entered into before this date, pursuant to s 35(1). Section 7A applies to donors of food or grocery products only after the commencement of the Personal Injuries (Liabilities and Damages) Amendment Act 2010 (NT), pursuant to s 36.

Volunteers Each jurisdiction (except the Commonwealth) follows a basic framework for the exemption from civil liability for ‘volunteers’ who perform ‘community work’ for a ‘community organisation’. Each element must be satisfied for the exemption to apply. In contrast, the Commonwealth only requires work to be performed for the Commonwealth or a Commonwealth authority on a voluntary basis for the exemption to apply.

In each respective State, a ‘volunteer’ is a person who does ‘community work’ on a voluntary basis.

‘Community work’ focuses on the overall activity engaged in by the ‘community organisation’ (not the conduct of the volunteer) and the four common types of activity across all State and Territory legislation is work done for charitable, benevolent, educational or sporting purposes.

Each jurisdiction (other than the Commonwealth) provides a definition of ‘community organisation’ and includes a list of legal entities that can be considered ‘organisations’ and includes the words ‘body corporate’ or ‘corporation’.

The Northern Territory has legislated to provide that volunteers will not incur civil liability for personal injury caused by actions done in good faith and without recklessness or while doing community work for a community organisation.868

Food donors The Act protects food donors from civil liability in circumstances where the donor donated the food or grocery product:

ƒƒ in good faith or for a charitable or benevolent purpose; and ƒƒ with the intent that the consumer of the food or user of the grocery product would not have to pay for it; and ƒƒ that the food was fit for human consumption, or the grocery product was safe to use, at the time it left the possession or control of the donor.

The food donor must advise the person to whom they give food whether the food must be handled in a particular way and the timeframe in which the food should be consumed. The recent insertion of s 7A brings the Northern Territory into line with New South Wales, Queensland, Victoria and Western Australia with respect to civil liability protection to persons or organisations who donate food for charitable purposes.

868 Personal Injuries (Liabilities and Damages) Act 2003 (NT) s 7.

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Good Samaritans The Act provides that Good Samaritans (both generally and medically trained personnel specifically) who are acting in good faith and without recklessness while giving aid to a person in need of emergency assistance will not incur civil liability for personal injury caused by their actions.869

Other States and Territories that have made provision for this type of protection from civil liability are Western Australia, South Australia, Victoria, New South Wales and Australian Capital Territory. Queensland is yet to adopt a similar position. Queensland introduced the Civil Liability (Good Samaritan) Amendment Bill 2007 (Qld) in March 2007 but it was defeated on 4 September 2007.

Liability for mental harm There has been no action to date by the Northern Territory in relation to the implementation of the Ipp recommendations with respect to liability for mental harm nor does the Personal Injuries (Liabilities and Damages) Act 2003 (NT) refer to liability for mental harm.

Pursuant to s 25 of the Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1956 (NT) liability for mental or nervous shock in respect of injury is extended to include a parent, spouse or defacto partner of the person ‘killed, injured or put in peril’ and to other family members where the incident occurred ‘within the sight or hearing of that other member of the family’.

Intoxication and illegal activity Personal Injuries (Liabilities and Damages) Act 2003 (NT) pt 3 (s 14–17) commenced 1 May 2003, s 16 amended 1 September 2011 Intoxication The Northern Territory has enacted a legislative presumption of contributory negligence if the claimant is found to have been intoxicated.870 ‘Intoxicated’ is defined to mean ‘under the influence of alcohol or a drug to the extent that the capacity to exercise proper care and skill is significantly impaired’.871 The presumption can be rebutted if the intoxication was not causative of the injury or the intoxication was involuntary.872

The presumption extends to reliance on the care and skill of an intoxicated person who caused the negligence.873 Again, this presumption can also be rebutted.

A person is deemed to be intoxicated if the court finds that at or about the time of the incident that person had:

ƒƒ in his or her breath a concentration of 0.08 or more grams of alcohol in 210 litres of exhaled breath; or ƒƒ in his or her blood a concentration of 0.08 or more grams of alcohol in 100 millilitres of blood.874

This test is the most scientific and objective of all jurisdictions. The test otherwise relies on the objective witness assessing whether the plaintiff was intoxicated based on their behaviour and appearance.

869 Ibid s 8. 870 Ibid s 14. 871 Ibid s 3. 872 Ibid s 14(2). 873 Ibid s 15. 874 Ibid s 16.

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Illegal activity The Act also prohibits the recovery of damages for those persons engaged in criminal activity when injured.875 The Act is unique in that it requires the commission of an offence punishable by imprisonment. It does not specify any term of imprisonment. Specific provision is also made to protect occupiers of premises from civil liability for personal injury to a person who is entering or has entered premises with the intention of committing an offence punishable by imprisonment.876

Contributory negligence Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1956 (NT) pt V (ss 15–21A) commenced 28 June 1956 It is important to note that contributory negligence is a concept that will turn on the facts of each case. What is considered negligent conduct on the part of a plaintiff in respect of the cause of his or her own injuries is entirely circumstantial. However, there are guiding principles that courts rely upon in assessing a plaintiff’s conduct.

Any conclusion of contributory negligence on the part of the plaintiff will result in an apportionment of liability.877 The approach of the court is therefore twofold: firstly to determine that negligence on the part of the plaintiff occurred, and secondly to attribute a value or weight to such negligence, usually expressed as a percentage by which the damages are reduced, and calculated in accordance with the applicable test for the jurisdiction.

Section 16 of the Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1956 (NT) provides that if a person suffers damage as the result partly of their own failure to take reasonable care and partly of the wrong of another, then the reduction of damages for contributory negligence is by reference to what the court thinks just and equitable having regard to the claimant’s share in the responsibility for the damage. Preti v Sahara Tours Pty Ltd and Anor,878 which involved a bizarre and unfortunately fatal set of events surrounding diving at a waterhole, considered the issue of contributory negligence arising under pt V of the Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1956 (NT). The court followed the reasoning in Joslyn v Berryman879 that a plaintiff is guilty of contributory negligence when he or she exposes themselves to a risk of injury which might reasonably have been foreseen and avoided and suffers an injury within the class of risk to which he or she was exposed.

It is essential that not only the plaintiff’s departure from the standard of care of a reasonable man is ascertained, but also that the court considers the acts of each of the tortfeasors and examines the conduct of each party in relation to the circumstances of the accident.880

At the stage of characterising the plaintiff’s conduct to establish contributory negligence the court held that a significant factor was the state of his knowledge as to the dangers involved in his undertaking at the time.

When considering an appropriate reduction of damages, the court held that a comparison must be made between the plaintiff’s fault on one hand, and the combined fault of the tortfeasors, as a whole, on the other. In Preti, at first instance the reduction was 50%, however was amended on appeal to 20%. Although the above legislation leaves the assessment of contributory negligence to the discretion of the court, it would appear that in circumstances where the contributory negligence is established by intoxication, s 17 of the Personal Injuries (Liabilities and Damages) Act 2003 (NT) provides damages are to be reduced by at least 25%.

875 Ibid s 10. 876 Ibid s 9. 877 See ‘Proportionate Liability’. In considering apportionment, it is common place for courts to be guided by the leading authority of Podrebersek v Australian Iron & Steel Pty Ltd (1985) 59 ALJR 492 [494]. 878 [2008] NTCA 2. 879 (2003) 214 CLR 552. 880 [2008] NTCA 2 [11]; Podrebersek v Australian Iron & Steel Pty Ltd (1985) 59 ALJR 492.

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Proportionate liability Proportionate Liability Act 2005 (NT) commenced 1 June 2005 The proportionate liability provisions in the Proportionate Liability Act 2005 (NT) apply to claims where the loss occurs after 1 June 2005.881

The long title to the Northern Territory’s Proportionate Liability Act 2005 (NT) succinctly defines the Act’s purpose as:

‘an act to replace the common law rule that imposes joint and several liability for economic loss or damage to property caused by concurrent wrongdoers with rules that limit the liability of each concurrent wrongdoer to reflect the extent of the wrongdoer’s responsibility for the loss or damage, and for related purposes’.

The Northern Territory legislation applies in relation to an apportionable claim if the loss or damage that is the subject of the claim occurred wholly or partly after the commencement of the Act.882 Apportionable claims are defined as those concerning a claim for damages arising from a failure to take reasonable care or a claim in respect of loss or a claim under the Consumer Affairs and Fair Trading Act 1990 (NT) in respect of loss or damage arising from a contravention of s 42 of that Act.883 Apportionable claims do not include claims arising from personal injury.884

In a proceeding to which the Northern Territory provisions apply, the liability of a defendant who is a concurrent wrongdoer is limited to an amount reflecting the proportion of the loss or damage claimed that the court considers just having regard to the extent of the defendant’s responsibility for the loss or damage.885

The definition of a concurrent wrongdoer is one of two or more persons whose acts or omissions caused (either jointly or independently) the loss or damage that is the subject of the claim.886 In apportioning responsibility for loss and damage between the defendants a court can have regard to the responsibility of concurrent wrongdoers who are not party to the proceedings.887 Further, it does not matter that the concurrent wrongdoer is insolvent, being wound up, or has ceased to exist or died.888

As with the legislative provisions in other Australian jurisdictions, the Northern Territory proportionate liability provisions do not apply to those concurrent wrongdoers who intentionally or fraudulently cause loss or damage.889

Importantly, if the proceedings involve both an apportionable claim and one that does not fall within the definition of an apportionable claim, then liability for the non-apportionable part of the claim is to be determined in accordance with ordinary applicable legal rules.890 Therefore the principle of joint and several liability may still apply to non-apportionable parts of a plaintiff’s claim.

881 Proportionate Liability Act 2005 (NT) s 2. 882 Ibid s 4(1). 883 Ibid s 4(2). 884 Ibid s 4(3)(a). 885 Ibid s 13(1)(a). 886 Ibid s 6(1). 887 Ibid s 13(2)(b). 888 Ibid s 6(2). 889 Ibid s 7(1). 890 Ibid s 9.

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Concurrent wrongdoers are required to assist the plaintiff in identifying other concurrent wrongdoers if they have reasonable grounds to believe that another person may be a concurrent wrongdoer in relation to the apportionable claim.891 A failure to identify other known concurrent wrongdoers can have adverse cost consequences for the offending concurrent wrongdoer.892 There is no onus on the plaintiff to make a claim against all persons who the plaintiff reasonably considers are liable, which differs from the Queensland legislation.893

The Northern Territory legislation allows the court to consider the comparative responsibility of any concurrent wrongdoer who is not a party to the proceedings when deciding on an apportionment of responsibility.894 This is in line with the legislative provisions of Queensland and New South Wales. A court is required to reduce a claimant’s overall claim in respect of the proportion of the loss attributable to the claimant’s contributory negligence.895

The Northern Territory provisions prohibit recovery between concurrent wrongdoers by way of claims for contribution or requirements to indemnify.896 However, of considerable importance, is a qualification to the limits imposed on recovery between concurrent wrongdoers, whereby agreements between defendants to contribute to the damages recoverable from, or to indemnify, other concurrent wrongdoers, remain unaffected.897 This qualification does not appear in the legislative provisions of Queensland, New South Wales,898 Victoria or the Australian Capital Territory but is similar to Tasmania and Western Australia.

The clear qualification present in the Northern Territory legislation therefore raises doubts as to the ability for concurrent wrongdoers in other jurisdictions to rely on agreements providing for contribution or indemnity in respect of apportionable claims where there is no such explicit qualification. Finally, the Northern Territory provisions do not prevent from operation the principles of vicarious liability, and the principles of joint and several liability in regards to partnership relationships.899

There have been no substantive decisions in the Northern Territory which address the judicial application of the Proportionate Liability Act 2002 (NT). However, in the Federal Court decision of Shrimp v Landmark Operations Limited900 Besanko J confirmed that the provisions in the Proportionate Liability Act 2002 (NT) should be construed in the same way as the proportionate liability provisions in the since superseded Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth).901 Although the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) has been replaced by the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth) the provisions regarding proportionate liability for misleading and deceptive conduct are codified exactly as they were under pt VIA of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) under pt VIA of the new Act.

891 Ibid s 12. 892 Ibid s 12(2). 893 Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld) s 32(1). 894 Proportionate Liability Act 2005 (NT) s 13(2)(b). 895 Ibid s 13(2)(a). 896 Ibid s 15(1). 897 Ibid s 15(2). 898 There is no such section in the New South Wales legislation regarding agreements by defendants to contribute or indemnify remaining unaffected, however the same result can be achieved in New South Wales if the Proportionate Liability sections have been contracted out of. See Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW) s 3A(2). 899 Proportionate Liability Act 2005 (NT) s 14. 900 (2007) 163 FCR 510. 901 See the Commonwealth section of ‘Proportionate Liability’ for further information on pt VIA of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth).

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The issue before Besanko J in Shrimp v Landmark Operations Limited, was whether the proportionate liability provisions in the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) can apply in circumstances where a person is liable for damage, but does not have any liability to the plaintiff for the damage. The claim related to grass seeds supplied to the plaintiff by the first defendant, which, as a result of the incorrect grass seeds being supplied, resulted in substantial losses to the plaintiff. The plaintiff pleaded the defendant was in breach of the express and implied contractual terms, negligence and the defendant engaged in misleading and deceptive conduct under the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth). Various cross-claims were issued between the defendant and third parties that were involved in the supply of the grass seeds, and the testing of the grass seeds. The plaintiff applied to the Federal Court for orders that the principal proceedings (the plaintiff’s claim against the defendant) should be heard separately from the cross-claim proceedings with the third parties. This application was opposed by the defendant and various third parties.

The application was then amended to have the court order that all matters of law and fact decided in the severed action be binding on all parties to the various cross claims in the matter. The cross defendants argued that the claim as between the plaintiff and the defendant was an ‘apportionable’ claim within the meaning of pt VIA of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth). It was considered that if a separate trial between the plaintiff and the defendant went ahead, the court would be required by pt VIA to make a determination on each of the cross defendants’ liability and if the application had succeeded, the various cross defendants would not be given the opportunity to be heard at the primary trial on matters of law and fact relevant to each of the cross defendants’ liability.

The plaintiff contended that the definition of a ‘concurrent wrongdoer’ in s 87CB(3) of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) includes other persons whose acts or omissions caused the loss or damage. The defendant and third parties submitted that a ‘concurrent wrongdoer’ should include another category of persons, being persons responsible for the damage but that are not liable to the plaintiff for the damage. This was not accepted by Besanko J as the purpose behind the proportionate liability provisions in the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth). In dismissing the plaintiff’s application, Besanko J stated that the proportionate liability provisions would not apply in these proceedings, as there was no legal cause of action between the plaintiff and the third parties with respect to the loss and damage.

Vicarious liability The Northern Territory has not introduced any legislative reforms dealing with the issue of vicarious liability. An employer can be found vicariously liable for a wrongful, unauthorised or negligent act of an employee which is carried out in the course of his or her employment and is so closely connected with an authorised act that it may be regarded as a mode of doing the authorised act. This principle was endorsed in the High Court case of New South Wales v Lepore, Samin v Queensland, Rich v Queensland902 in which three appeals were held simultaneously.

An employer will not always be held responsible for the actions of his or her employees.903 The act must be closely connected with his or her employment for vicarious liability to attach. Therefore, whether an employer will be held vicariously liable for the actions of his or her employee will depend upon the specific facts in each case.

Further case discussion on vicarious liability is contained in the equivalent New South Wales and Victorian sections.

902 (2003) 212 CLR 511. 903 Ibid.

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Non-delegable duties The term non-delegable duty is somewhat misleading. It does not mean that a party owing a duty cannot delegate the task to a third party, but rather that the liability for the breach of the duty cannot be delegated. As such, it is a duty to ensure that reasonable care is taken. Therefore, if the third party to whom the task has been entrusted fails to exercise reasonable care, the non- delegable duty will have been breached.

The categories of non-delegable duties continue to evolve. The courts have struggled however to clearly define the parameters required to justify the existence of a non-delegable duty of care. The known criteria include the superior capacity of the defendant to bear the risk of the mishap, the special obligation which it is proper to attach to extra-hazardous activities, and the special dependence or vulnerability of the person to whom the duty is owed.904

Previously recognised non-delegable duties include:

ƒƒ employer and employee;905 ƒƒ host employer and contractor;906 ƒƒ school and student;907 ƒƒ hospital and patient;908 and ƒƒ owner of premises and licensee.909

The Ipp report recommended that the relevant civil liability legislation should ensure that the plaintiff could not circumvent the application of the civil liability legislation by pleading their action based upon a breach of a non-delegable duty of care.

The Northern Territory has not enacted any legislation in response to the Ipp report recommendation.

Exclusion clauses The Northern Territory legislature has not introduced any reforms dealing with the issue of exclusion clauses. The common law principles will therefore remain applicable. Accordingly, in order to have any prospect of an exclusion clause being upheld, the person or entity including such a clause should ensure that same is clearly incorporated into the contract, specifically drafted to cover the factual scenario encountered by the person or entity seeking to enforce it and, to the extent possible, brought to the attention of the other party to the contract.910

Where the claim is one captured by the Australian Consumer Law, there are certain guarantees which cannot be excluded or limited by contract. See div 2–3 of sch 2 of the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth).

904 Northern Sandblasting Pty Ltd v Harris (1997) 188 CLR 313. 905 Kondis v State Transport Authority (1984) 154 CLR 672. 906 TNT Australia Pty Ltd v Christie & 2 Ors; Crown Equipment Pty Ltd v Christie & 2 Ors; Manpower Services (Aust) Pty Ltd v Christie & 2 Ors [2003] NSWCA 47. 907 Commonwealth v Introvigne (1982) 150 CLR 258. 908 Samios v Repatriation Commission [1960] WAR 219. 909 Burnie Port Authority v General Jones Pty Ltd (1994) 179 CLR 520. 910 The New South Wales Court of Appeal decision of Lormine Pty Ltd & Anor v Xuereb [2006] NSWCA 200 may be of some relevance when considering how an exclusion clause might be interpreted in the Northern Territory.

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Expressions of regret and apologies Personal Injuries (Liabilities and Damages) Act 2003 (NT) pt 2 div 2 (ss 11–13) commenced on 1 May 2003 Pursuant to s 12 of the Personal Injuries (Liabilities and Damages) Act 2003 (NT) an apology is defined as:

‘An oral or written statement by a person that expresses regret for an incident that is alleged to have caused a person injury and that does not contain an acknowledgment of fault by that person.’

An expression of regret about a personal injury made at any time before the commencement of a proceeding in respect of that injury is not admissible as evidence in that proceeding.911 For High Court guidance on the treatment of apologies, see Dovuro Pty Ltd v Wilkins.912

Limitation periods Limitation Act 1981 (NT) commenced 26 February 1982 The Northern Territory provides a three year limitation period in personal injury claims and there have been no legislative changes to this limitation period.

Pursuant to s 44, a court has the power to extend the limitation period or limit the limitation period upon such terms as it thinks fit. However, a court can only extend the limitation period if it is satisfied that:

ƒƒ facts material to the plaintiff’s case were not ascertained by him until some time within 12 months before the expiration of the limitation period or occurring after the expiration of that period and that the action was instituted within 12 months after the ascertainment of those facts by the plaintiff; or ƒƒ the plaintiff’s failure to institute the action within the limitation period resulted from representations or conduct of the defendant, or a person whom the plaintiff reasonably believed to be acting on behalf of the defendant, and was reasonable in view of those representations or that conduct and other relevant circumstances and that in all the circumstances of the case, it is just to grant the extension of time.913

In May v Competitive Foods Pty Ltd914 the Northern Territory Supreme Court had to determine whether the plaintiff was entitled to an extension of time, pursuant to s 44 of the Limitation Act 1981 (NT), for a personal injury claim after injuring her shoulder after falling over at a fast food outlet in 2002. In 2002, following the accident, the plaintiff made a claim outlining the circumstances of the incident to the defendant and the defendant undertook an investigation and took witness statements.

Although the plaintiff sought medical attention contemporaneously with the incident the injury gradually worsened. In 2010 an orthopaedic surgeon told the plaintiff she would require surgery on the shoulder. It was held this surgeon’s advice constituted a material fact for the purposes of s 44(3)(b)(i) of the Act, as it was not available before the expiration of the limitation period. Consequently the discretion available to the court under s 44(3)(b) was enlivened and the court had to be satisfied that it was just in all the circumstances that the discretion be exercised. After considering the arguments made by both parties it was held that the evidence of alleged prejudice against the defendant if the claim was to be allowed was inconclusive and speculative at best and as such an extension of time was granted to the plaintiff.

911 Personal Injuries (Liabilities and Damages) Act 2003 (NT) s 13. 912 (2003) 215 CLR 317. 913 Limitation Act 1981 (NT) s 44(3)(b). 914 [2011] NTSC 79.

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With respect to persons with a disability, if that person has a cause of action and the limitation period fixed by the Act for the cause of action has commenced to run, then the running of the limitation period is suspended for the duration of the disability.915

Pursuant to s 4, ‘disabled person’ includes a minor. In regards to defamation pursuant to s 12(1A), an action on a cause of action for defamation is not maintainable if brought after the end of a limitation period of one year from the date of the publication of the matter complained of.

Under s 44A, a person claiming to have a cause of action for defamation may apply to a court for an order extending the limitation period for the cause of action. If a court is satisfied it was not reasonable in the circumstances for the plaintiff to have commenced an action in relation to the matter complained of within one year from the date of publication, the court must extend the limitation period mentioned in s 12(1A) to a period of up to three years from the date of the publication.

Furthermore, pursuant to s 44A(3), a court may not order the extension of the limitation period for a cause of action for defamation other than in the circumstances specified above.

Damages Awards

Damages awarded in personal injury claims in the Northern Territory are now regulated by provisions contained in the Personal Injuries (Liabilities and Damages) Act 2003 (NT). Part 4 of that Act regulates the award of general damages, economic loss, gratuitous care and interest in civil liability claims.

General damages Personal Injuries (Liabilities and Damages) Act 2003 (NT) pt 4 div 4 (s 27) commenced 1 May 2003 The maximum amount of damages that can now be awarded for non-pecuniary loss in personal injury claims in the Northern Territory is provided by annual declaration. The current applicable cap is $571,000. Ministerial declarations are gazetted October each year.

Section 27 of the Act specifically abolishes the common law principles relating to the assessment and award of damages for pain and suffering, loss of amenities of life, loss of expectation of life or disfigurement and substitutes a regime for the assessment and award for damages for non- pecuinary loss on the basis of the degree of permanent impairment suffered by the person.

When awarding damages for non-pecuniary loss, a court must award as follows:

ƒƒ if the degree of permanent impairment is less than 5% of the whole person, the court must not make any award; ƒƒ if the degree of permanent impairment is 85% or more of the whole person, then the court must award the maximum amount; ƒƒ if the degree of permanent impairment is not less than 15% and not more than 84% of the whole person, then the court must award the relevant percentage of the maximum amount; and ƒƒ if the degree of permanent impairment is between 5% and 14%, general damages are calculated as follows:

915 Limitation Act 1981 (NT) s 36.

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Degree of permanent impairment – Amount of general damages to be awarded As percentage of whole person Not less than 5% but less than 10% 2% of maximum amount 10% 3% of maximum amount 11% 4% of maximum amount 12% 6% of maximum amount 13% 8% of maximum amount 14% 12% of maximum amount

In determining the degree of permanent impairment, s 26 of the Act provides that both the claimant and respondent may adduce evidence by medical practitioners who assess impairment in accordance with the prescribed guides and regulations.

Economic loss Personal Injuries (Liabilities and Damages) Act 2003 (NT) pt 4 div 3 (s 18, s 20, s 21, s 22) commenced 1 May 2003 In assessing damages for past and future economic loss as well as the loss of expectation of financial support, s 20 of the Northern Territory legislation has introduced a cap on the amount that may be recovered. A court may not award an amount where the plaintiff’s gross weekly earnings are in excess of three times average weekly earnings. The average weekly earnings figure used in the calculation is that published before 1 January preceding the date on which the assessment is made. ‘Average weekly earnings’ means the average weekly earnings of Full Time Adult Persons, Weekly Ordinary Time Earnings for the Northern Territory as estimated and published by the Australian Statistician.916 Pursuant to s 21 a court may award damages for future pecuniary loss only if satisfied by the claimant that the assumptions about the injured person’s future earning capacity accord with the injured person’s most likely future circumstances had the personal injury not occurred. If the court is satisfied by these assumptions then it must adjust the amount of damages for future pecuniary loss (as assessed on those assumptions) by reference to the percentage possibility that the events might have occurred regardless of the personal injury. Section 22 provides that if a Court is to award damages as a lump sum component for future economic loss, the sum is to be discounted by 5% (unless another amount is prescribed by the regulation).

Gratuitous care Personal Injuries (Liabilities and Damages) Act 2003 (NT) pt 4 div 3 (s 23) commenced 1 May 2003

The Personal Injuries (Liabilities and Damages) Act 2003 (NT) regulates the entitlement of an injured person to claim damages for personal injury for the provision of gratuitous services. To be awarded damages for gratuitous services, claimants in the Northern Territory must now meet the minimum threshold requirement for an award for gratuitous services under s 23. Section 23(1) provides that the court must be satisfied that there was a reasonable need for the services, that the need for the services is or was solely because of the personal injury to which the damage relates and that the services would not have been provided but for the personal injury to which the damage relates. Section 23(2) requires that the services must be provided for more than six hours per week and for longer than six months. Where the services provided exceed 40 hours per week, the legislation caps the award so that it does not exceed the amount of average weekly earnings,917 or exceed the amount calculated at an hourly rate of one-fortieth of the average weekly earnings.918

916 Personal Injuries (Liabilities and Damages) Act 2003 (NT), s 18. 917 Ibid s 23(3). 918 Ibid s 23(4).

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Furthermore, s 23(5) provides that the court must also take into account any offsetting benefit the service provider obtains as a result of providing the services because the injured person has been or is likely to be cared for in a hospital or other institution.

Interest Personal Injuries (Liabilities and Damages) Act 2003 (NT) pt 4 div 5 (ss 29–30) commenced 18 March 2003 Pre-judgment interest on awards for future damages is calculated at the Commonwealth Government ten year Treasury bond rate. However, the legislation prohibits the award of interest on damages for non-pecuniary loss or gratuitous services.

Discount rate Personal Injuries (Liabilities and Damages) Act 2003 (NT) pt 4 div 3 (s 22) commenced 1 May 2003 The discount rate for awards for damages for future losses in the Northern Territory is 5%.

Exemplary, punitive or aggravated damages Personal Injuries (Liabilities and Damages) Act 2003 (NT) pt 4 div 2 (s 19) commenced 1 May 2003 The Northern Territory legislation prohibits courts from awarding aggravated or exemplary damages in personal injury.

Structured settlements Personal Injuries (Liabilities and Damages) Act 2003 (NT) pt 4 div 6 (ss 31 and 32) commenced 1 May 2003 The Northern Territory government has included provision for the court, with the consent of the parties to a proceeding, to make an order for a structured settlement.

The Northern Territory legislation defines a ‘structured settlement’ as ‘an order providing for the payment of all or part of an award of damages by one or both of the following means:

a) periodic payments funded by an annuity or other agreed means; b) periodic payments in respect of future reasonable expenses for medical, hospital, pharmaceutical or attendant care services, payable as those expenses are incurred.’919

The Act also allows for a court to make an order for a structured settlement with the consent of the parties.

Practice and Procedure Legal practitioners Legal Profession Act 2006 (NT) ss 1–2 commenced 18 December 2006 Rules of Professional Conduct and Practice Act (NT) 2002 The Professional Conduct Rules outline the ethical obligations imposed on legal practitioners including their relations with clients, advocacy and litigation relations with other lawyers.

In addition, in December 2006 the Northern Territory Government enacted the Legal Profession Act 2006 (NT) which implemented the same provisions as other States and Territories in order to follow the Model Laws Project.

919 Personal Injuries (Liabilities and Damages) Act 2003 (NT) s 31.

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Legal advertising Legal Profession Act 2006 (NT) pts 2.1 (ss 17–23), 2.6 (ss 117–118) and 3.2 (ss 288–293) commenced 31 March 2007 Previously legal advertising restrictions were dealt with by pt XA of the Legal Practitioners Act 1974 (NT). These provisions restricted legal practitioners from publishing statements intending to encourage or induce a person to make a claim for compensation for damages or to use the legal services of a particular legal practitioner. This Act was repealed on 31 March 2007.

The Legal Profession Act 2006 (NT), assented to in December 2006, now sets out a number of restrictions on advertising personal injury legal services. These provisions closely follow the Ipp recommendations by making it an offence to advertise with the intent of inducing claimants and also by setting out permitted advertising methods. In April 2007 the Legal Profession Regulations 2007 (NT) was enacted and provides a number of exemptions from the operation of the Act in relation to personal injury legal services advertising, including advertising by the Law Society and community legal centres. Touting is still specifically prohibited under the Act.920

920 Legal Profession Act 2006 (NT) s 293.

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CommonwealtH

The Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth) replaced the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) (effective 1 January 2011) and now serves as a law of the Commonwealth and of each State and Territory as all States and Territories have enacted legislation repealing their respective fair trading legislation and adopting the Australian Consumer Law.

Application of Statutory Reforms Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth) pt VIB div 2 s 87E commenced 1 January 2011 Commonwealth Volunteers Protection Act 2003 (Cth) s 5 commenced 24 August 2003 In accordance with pt VIB div 2 s 87E of the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth), the damages provisions contained in pt VIB of the Act apply to proceedings under the Act that relate to pts 2-2, 3-3, 3-4, 3-5 or div 2 of pt 5-4 in which the plaintiff is seeking a damages award, where the proceedings do not concern death or personal injury related to smoking.

The Commonwealth Volunteers Protection Act 2003 (Cth) protects volunteers from civil liability for acts that the volunteer has done in good faith in doing work for the Commonwealth or a Commonwealth authority and was enacted on 24 February 2003. In accordance with s 5, the Act applies to civil liability for a thing done by an individual after the commencement of the Act in good faith, on a voluntary basis and organised by the Commonwealth or a Commonwealth authority. The Act does not apply to claims involving compulsory third party insurance or defamation, or if the individual was affected by a recreational drug or acting outside the scope of their authority.

Pre-court Procedures

There are no pre-court procedures in the federal jurisdiction.

The Law of Negligence – Scope of Duty of Care Standard of care There have been no legislative reforms at a federal level that have an impact on the foreseeability of harm as the test for the standard of care.

Causation There have been no legislative reforms at a federal level that have an impact on determination of causation.

Obvious risk There have been no legislative reforms at a federal level regarding the defence of ‘obvious risk’.

Dangerous recreational activities Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth) pt XI, div 9 (s 139A) commenced 1 January 2011 Part XI div 9 s 139A of the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth) adopts the operative language formerly included within s 68B of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) and allows suppliers of recreational services to exclude, restrict or modify (i.e. contract out of) their contractual liability for the provision of recreational services under s 64 of the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth).

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Unlike s 68B of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth), pt XI div 9 s 139A of the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth) now does not apply if the significant personal injury suffered by a person is caused by the recreational service provider’s reckless conduct.

This section applies to:

ƒƒ a sporting activity or a similar leisure-time pursuit; or ƒƒ any other activity that involves a significant degree of physical exertion or physical risk.

Liability of professionals Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth) sch 2 (s 18) commenced 1 January 2011 Section 18 of sch 2 of the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth) effectively replaces s 52 of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) providing consumers with protection against misleading or deceptive conduct, with one distinction – the misleading of deceptive conduct in s 18 of sch 2 of the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth) is applicable to persons, not just corporations [as in s 52 of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth)].

Liability of public authorities There have been no legislative reforms at the federal level with regard to the liability of public authorities.

Liability of volunteers and Good Samaritans Commonwealth Volunteers Protection Act 2003 (Cth) commenced 24 August 2003 The conduct of volunteers acting for the Commonwealth government, or a Commonwealth authority, is dealt with under the Commonwealth Volunteers Protection Act 2003 (Cth). Pursuant to s 5, it applies only to incidents that occur after the commencement of the Act. It appears the exemption will only apply to incidents occurring on or after 24 February 2003.

Volunteers Each State and Territory jurisdiction follows a basic framework for the exemption from civil liability for ‘volunteers’ who perform ‘community work’ for a ‘community organisation’. Each element must be satisfied for the exemption to apply. However, the Commonwealth legislation provides that an individual does not incur liability for anything done in good faith merely while doing work (which is not a defined term and potentially has wide application) for the Commonwealth or a Commonwealth authority on a voluntary basis.921 This will result in a wider range of conduct potentially being included within the Commonwealth provisions. However, it will remain necessary to investigate whether the work is being done for the appropriate ‘organisation’ and that it is being done voluntarily.

Each of the Commonwealth, Queensland, Victoria and New South Wales legislation specifically require a link between the actual work, the subject of the claim and the community organisation, while other jurisdictions do not. The protection does not extend to individuals who act outside the scope of their authority or are under the influence of recreational drugs. The Act states that an individual must cooperate with the Commonwealth in any action, claim or demand relating to a civil liability that it may assume in respect of a volunteer’s work for the Commonwealth.922

Food donors There is no protection afforded under the Commonwealth legislation in respect of food donations.

921 Commonwealth Volunteers Protection Act 2003 (Cth) s 6. 922 Ibid s 7.

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Good Samaritans There is no protection afforded under the Commonwealth legislation in respect of Good Samaritans.

Liability for mental harm Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth) pt I s4 commenced 1 January 2011

There have been no substantive legislative reforms at the federal level with regard to liability for mental harm. Under pt I s 4 of the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth) (formerly s 4KA of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth)) personal injury does not include mental harm unless it is a recognised psychiatric illness.

Intoxication and illegal activity While there have been no legislative reforms at the federal level with regard to liability for intoxication and illegal activity, the exemptions in each jurisdiction, except Queensland and South Australia, are not worded so as to limit the circumstances of breach of duty to claims for personal injuries. Therefore, the exemption, as it applies in each State and Territory, may be raised in relation to a range of actions including a claim for breach of contract or terms implied by the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth).

Contributory negligence Corporate Law Economic Reform Program (Audit Reform and Corporate Disclosure) Act 2004 (Cth) (CLERP 9) commenced 1 July 2004 Subsection 82(1B) introduced by CLERP 9 allows for a court to reduce the damages awarded to a plaintiff where:

ƒƒ the plaintiff has sustained economic loss or property damage as a result of the defendant’s misleading or deceptive conduct; ƒƒ the defendant did not intend and did not fraudulently cause that loss or damage; and ƒƒ the loss or damage was partly caused by the plaintiff’s own negligence.

Proportionate liability Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth) pt VIA (ss 87CB–87CI) The proportionate liability provisions in pt VIA of the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth) apply to incidents that occur on or after 1 January 2011. Part VIA of the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth) imposes a proportionate liability regime for claims arising from a contravention of pt 2-1 s 18 of the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth) (formerly s 52 of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth)) as a result of a party engaging in misleading and deceptive conduct (apportionable claims). These proportionate liability provisions are aimed at ensuring that a person who is jointly responsible for loss or damage with other persons will be liable only to the extent of their actual responsibility for the loss or damage.923

923 Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth) pt VIA s 87CD.

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Prior to the introduction of the provisions, the principle of joint and several liability applied to such actions, which meant that a plaintiff could recover the full amount of its loss from a defendant even though that defendant only partially contributed to the plaintiff’s loss. Furthermore, a plaintiff could recover its entire loss even though its own negligence may have contributed to the loss. This situation has now changed. The operative provision provides that liability of a defendant who is a concurrent wrongdoer924 in relation to that claim is limited to an amount reflecting that proportion of the damage or loss claimed that the court considers just, having regard to the extent of the defendant’s responsibility for the damage or loss.925

Further operative provisions in the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth) allow a court to have regard to the responsibility of concurrent wrongdoers who are not party to the proceedings,926 and require a court to appropriately reduce a claimant’s overall claim in respect of the proportion of the loss attributable to the claimant’s contributory negligence.927 It is irrelevant whether the concurrent wrongdoer is insolvent, being wound up, or has ceased to exist or died.928

Importantly, if the proceedings involve both an apportionable claim and a claim that does not fall within the definition of an apportionable claim, then liability for the non-apportionable part of the claim is to be determined in accordance with ordinary legal rules.929 Therefore the principle of joint and several liability may still apply to non-apportionable parts of a plaintiff’s claim.

Concurrent wrongdoers are required by the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth) to assist the plaintiff in identifying other concurrent wrongdoers.930 A failure to identify other known concurrent wrongdoers can have adverse cost consequences for the offending concurrent wrongdoer.931 There is no onus on the plaintiff to make a claim against all persons who the plaintiff reasonably considers are liable, which differs from the Queensland legislation.932

Concurrent wrongdoers cannot pursue contribution from other concurrent wrongdoers toward the determination of their apportionment of liability in respect of an apportionable claim.933 Similarly, concurrent wrongdoers cannot be required to indemnify other concurrent wrongdoers.934 Controversy exists as to whether the prohibition against concurrent wrongdoers indemnifying each other extends to contractual indemnity agreements entered into between two or more concurrent wrongdoers. One view is that in the absence of clear legislative intent, such a prohibition was not the purpose of the legislation.

Finally, the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth) provisions do not prevent from operation the principles of vicarious liability, and the principles of joint and several liability in regard to partnership relationships.935

924 Defined by pt VIA s 87CB(3) of the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth) as a person who is one of two or more persons whose acts or omissions (or act or omission) caused, independently of each other or jointly, the damage or loss that is the subject of the claim. 925 Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth) s 87CD(1)(a). 926 Ibid s 87CD(3)(b). 927 Ibid s 87CD(3)(a). 928 Ibid s 87CB(5). 929 Ibid s 87CD(2). 930 Ibid s 87CE(1). 931 Ibid s 87CE(2). 932 Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld) s 32(1). 933 Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth) s 87CF(a). 934 Ibid s 87CF(b). 935 Ibid s 87CI.

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It should also be noted that proportionate liability regimes commensurate with the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth) regime outlined above, have been enacted for contraventions of s 1041H of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth)936 and s 12DA of the Australian Securities and Investments Commission Act 2001 (Cth).937

The Commonwealth proportionate liability provisions were considered in the Supreme Court of Victoria decision of Woods v De Gabriele.938 This decision related to an application by the defendants to amend their pleadings to allege a party not presently joined to the proceedings should be regarded as a concurrent wrongdoer and so joined as a defendant, and that liability in respect of the plaintiff’s claim should therefore be apportioned. The plaintiff sought to avert this by amending the statement of claim in a way that attempted to render the claim against the defendants as one that could not be considered apportionable. Of importance was the fact that the party the defendants were seeking to have regarded as a concurrent wrongdoer was in liquidation. Hollingworth J found for the defendants, holding that the plaintiff’s narrow construction would permit the objects of the legislation to be defeated in many cases simply by the plaintiff changing the legal label attaching to the contravening conduct.

Therefore, if the facts supporting the cause of action pleaded against a defendant either specifically or as a matter of construction also make out a claim against a defendant which is apportionable, the relevant apportionment legislation will apply.

In the Federal Court decision of Shrimp v Landmark Operations Limited,939 the issue before Besanko J was whether the proportionate liability provisions in the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) could apply in circumstances where a person is liable for damage, but does not have any liability to the plaintiff for the damage. The claim related to grass seeds supplied to the plaintiff by the first defendant, which, as a result of the incorrect grass seeds being supplied, resulted in substantial losses to the plaintiff. The plaintiff pleaded the defendant was in breach of the express and implied contractual terms, negligence and the defendant engaged in misleading and deceptive conduct under the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth). Various cross-claims were issued between the defendant and third parties that were involved in the supply of the grass seeds, and the testing of the grass seeds. The plaintiff applied to the Federal Court for orders that the principal proceedings (the plaintiff’s claim against the defendant) should be heard separately from the cross-claim proceedings with the third parties. This application was opposed by the defendant and various third parties.

The application was then amended to have the court order that all matters of law and fact decided in the severed action be binding on all parties to the various cross-claims in the matter. The cross-respondents argued that the claim as between the plaintiff and the defendant was an ‘apportionable’ claim within the meaning of pt VIA of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth). Therefore it was considered that if a separate trial between the plaintiff and the defendant went ahead, the court would be required by pt VIA to make a determination on each of the cross- respondents’ liability and if the application had succeeded, the various cross-respondents would not be given the opportunity to be heard at the primary trial on matters of law and fact relevant to each of the cross-respondents’ liability.

936 A person must not, in this jurisdiction, engage in conduct, in relation to a financial product or a financial service, that is misleading or deceptive or is likely to mislead or deceive. 937 A person must not, in trade or commerce, engage in conduct in relation to financial services that is misleading or deceptive or is likely to mislead or deceive. 938 [2007] VSC 177. 939 (2007) 163 FCR 510.

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The plaintiff contended that the definition of a ‘concurrent wrongdoer’ in s 87CB(3) of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) includes other persons whose acts or omissions caused the loss or damage. The defendant and third parties submitted that a ‘concurrent wrongdoer’ should include another category of persons, being persons responsible for the damage but who are not liable to the plaintiff for the damage.

This was not accepted by Besanko J as the purpose behind the proportionate liability provisions in the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth). In dismissing the plaintiff’s application, Besanko J stated that the proportionate liability provisions would not apply in these proceedings, as there was no legal cause of action between the plaintiff and the third parties with respect to the loss and damage.

Although the above-referenced decisions pre-date the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth) and apply Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) provisions, pt VIA of the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth) was adopted from pt VIA of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) and the operative provisions of pt VIA of the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth) are identical to the pt VIA of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth). Therefore, the above-referenced decisions serve as valid precedent for proportionate liability.

Vicarious liability The Commonwealth has not introduced any legislative reforms dealing with the issue of vicarious liability. An employer will still therefore be held vicariously liable for a wrongful, unauthorised or negligent act of an employee that is carried out in the course of his or her employment and so closely connected with an authorised act that it may be regarded as a mode of doing the authorised act. This principle was endorsed in the High Court case of New South Wales v Lepore, Samin v Queensland, Rich v Queensland,940 in which three appeals were held simultaneously. An employer will not always be held responsible for the actions of an employee.941 The employee’s wrongful/harmful act must be closely connected with his or her employment for vicarious liability to attach. Therefore, whether an employer will be held vicariously liable for the actions of an employee will depend upon the specific facts in each case.

Non-delegable duties The term non-delegable duty is somewhat misleading. It does not mean that a party owing a duty cannot delegate the task to a third party, but rather that the liability cannot be delegated. As such, it is a duty to ensure that reasonable care is taken. Therefore, if the third party to whom the task has been entrusted fails to exercise reasonable care, the non-delegable duty will have been breached.

The categories of non-delegable duty continues to evolve. However, the courts have struggled to clearly define the parameters required to justify the existence of a non-delegable duty of care. The known criteria include the superior capacity of the defendant to bear the risk of the mishap, the special obligation which it is proper to attach to extra-hazardous activities, and the special dependence or vulnerability of the person to whom the duty is owed.942

940 (2003) 212 CLR 511. 941 Ibid. 942 Northern Sandblasting Pty Ltd v Harris (1997) 188 CLR 313.

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Common known relationships in which non-delegable duties exist include:

ƒƒ employer and employee;943 ƒƒ host employer and contractor;944 ƒƒ school and student;945 and ƒƒ hospital and patient.946

The Ipp report recommended that the relevant civil liability legislation should ensure that plaintiffs could not circumvent the application of the civil liability legislation by pleading their action based upon breach of a non-delegable duty of care.

The Commonwealth legislature has not enacted any legislation in response to the Ipp report recommendation.

Exclusion clauses Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth) sch 2 (s 67) Section 67 of the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth) establishes that parties cannot contractually substitute or exclude the consumer guarantee provisions of sch 2 ch 3 of the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth).

Apology There have been no legislative reforms at the federal level with regard to apologies. For High Court guidance on the treatment of apologies see Dovuro Pty Ltd v Wilkins.947

Limitation periods Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth) pt VIB div 2 (ss 87F–87K) commenced 1 January 2011 Regarding personal injury claims, legal proceedings must be commenced within three years from the date of discoverability of the injury or death and no later than 12 years after the event on which the claim is based. The ‘date of discoverability’ is defined as meaning the date:

ƒƒ when the plaintiff knew or ought to have known that the death or personal injury had occurred; and ƒƒ was attributable to a contravention of the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth); and ƒƒ the injury was significant enough to justify bringing an action.

If the plaintiff would have ascertained the fact had the plaintiff taken all reasonable steps before the date in question to ascertain the fact, this will be sufficient to consider the plaintiff ‘ought to have known’.

Pursuant to pt I s 4 of the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth), personal injury includes:

ƒƒ pre-natal injury; ƒƒ impairment of a person’s physical or mental condition; or ƒƒ disease;

but does not include an impairment of a person’s mental condition unless the impairment consists of a recognised psychiatric illness.

943 Kondis v State Transport Authority (1984) 154 CLR 672. 944 TNT Australia Pty Ltd v Christie & 2 Ors; Crown Equipment Pty Ltd v Christie & 2 Ors; Manpower Services (Aust) Pty Ltd v Christie & 2 Ors [2003] NSWCA 47. 945 Commonwealth v Introvigne (1982) 150 CLR 258. 946 Samios v Repatriation Commission [1960] WAR 219. 947 (2003) 215 CLR 317.

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In regard to plaintiff minors, facts that a capable parent or guardian of the plaintiff knows or ought to know are taken to be facts that the plaintiff knows or ought to know. The same applies to incapacitated persons pursuant to pt VIB div 2 s 87G(5) of the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth).

Furthermore, pursuant to pt VIB div 2 s 87J of the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth), in working out whether the period of three years after the date of discoverability has expired, the court should disregard any period during which the plaintiff has been:

ƒƒ a minor who is not in the custody of a capable parent or guardian; or ƒƒ an incapacitated person in respect of whom there is no guardian, and no other person to manage all or part of the person’s estate, under a law of a State or Territory relating to the protection of incapacitated persons.

Also, pursuant to pt VIB div 2 s 87H of the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth), ‘long stop period’ is described as:

ƒƒ the period of 12 years following the act or omission alleged to have caused the death or the injury; or ƒƒ that period as extended by the court.

When extending the limitation period, the court must not extend the period by more than three years beyond the date of discoverability for the death or injury. Furthermore, in considering whether to extend the period, the court must have regard to the justice of the case, and in particular, the following;

ƒƒ whether the passage of time has prejudiced a fair trial; ƒƒ the nature and extent of the person’s loss or damage; ƒƒ the nature of the defendant’s conduct alleged to have caused the death or injury; and ƒƒ the nature of the defendant’s conduct since the alleged act or omission.

This diagram shows when this Division prevents an award of personal injury damages:

Have 3 years elapsed since the date of discoverability?

No Yes

Did the death or personal injury result from smoking or other use of tobacco products?

Yes No

Has the long-stop period expired?

No Yes

Personal injury damages Personal injury damages may be awarded cannot be awarded

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Damages Awards

The damages provisions of the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth) are contained within pt I s 4K, sch 2 s 13, pt VI s 82 and sch 2 div 3 s 236 of the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth) (formerly s 82 of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth)). These sections provide the primary basis for compensation for contraventions for the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth). These sections entitle a person who has suffered loss or damage resulting from a breach of the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth) to claim compensation for that loss or damage, particularly:

ƒƒ part I s 4K, sch 2 s 13 of the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth), provides that a reference to ‘loss or damage’ made within the provisions of the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth) includes a reference to injury; ƒƒ under sch 2 div 3 s 236 of the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth), a claimant that suffers loss or damage because of (1) misleading or deceptive conduct, (2) unconscionable conduct or (3) unfair contract terms (as discussed and defined in ch 2 of the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth)) may commence an action at any time within six years after the day on which the cause of action that relates to the conduct accrued.

When considering s 236 in conjunction with ss 4 and 13, the section is quite broad and contains no stated limitation on the kinds of loss or damage that may be recovered under the section. This broad scope was intentional and enacted by the legislature to broaden the scope of recovery.

General damages Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth) pt VIB div 3 (ss 87L–87M) General damages are awarded under pt VIB div 3 ss 87L and 87M of the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth) for contravention of the offence provisions which lead to personal injury or death.

Under pt VIB div 1 s 87D, non-economic loss is defined as pain and suffering, loss of amenities of life, loss of expectation of life or disfigurement. In 2004 when the cap was introduced, general damages could only be awarded up to $250,000, pursuant to s 87M. That amount is indexed in September each year in line with the consumer price index.

General damages are calculated according to an indexed table linking a percentage of a most extreme case with a proportion of the maximum award allowed. Notably, cases assessed at less than 15% of a most extreme case do not attract any award for non-economic loss (15% of a most extreme case equates on the tables to 1% of the maximum award of damages).

In determining general damages a court may refer to earlier decisions to establish the appropriate award (s 8TT). However, the court cannot award more than the amount permitted under the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth).

Economic loss Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth) pt VIB div 3 (ss 87U and 87Z) Both pt VIB div 3 (ss 87U and 87Z) carry over the language of ss 87U and 87Z of the former Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth). Part VIB div 3 s 87U provides for a cap of twice the average weekly earnings for the financial quarter on damages for loss of earning capacity awarded for contravention of provisions in the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth) leading to personal injury or death.

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Section 87Z provides, when calculating lost superannuation:

ƒƒ damages for loss of employer superannuation contributions should be calculated as a percentage of the damages awarded for loss of earnings or earning capacity (subject to the cap on those damages); and ƒƒ the percentage should be the highest level of compulsory employers’ contributions required under s 19 of the Superannuation Guarantee (Administration) Act 1992 (Cth).

Gratuitous care Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth) pt VIB div 5 (ss 87W, 87X) Both pt VIB div 5 (ss 87W and 87X) carry over the language of ss 87W and 87X of the formerTrade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) in considering the calculation of damages for gratuitous care:

ƒƒ damages for gratuitous services shall not be recoverable unless they meet the threshold test of being required for equal to or more than six hours per week and for equal to or more than six months; ƒƒ for claims for services of less than 40 hours per week, the maximum hourly rate for calculating damages for gratuitous services shall be 1/40 of average weekly earnings; ƒƒ for claims of 40 hours or more per week, the maximum weekly rate for calculating damages for gratuitous services shall be average weekly earnings; and ƒƒ damages for gratuitous services may be awarded only in respect to services required by the plaintiff as a result of the injuries to which the damages awarded relate.

Section 87X pertains to damages recoverable where the plaintiff’s own capacity to provide gratuitous attendant care services to another has been affected as a result of contravention of the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth). This provision states that a court may not award damages in this circumstance unless it is satisfied that prior to the claimant’s loss of capacity, they provided the services for at least six hours per week and for at least six months, and the other person would have been entitled to recover damages for the loss of those services had the plaintiff died as a result of the contravention of the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth).948

Where the services have been provided for at least 40 hours per week, the section further states that a court must not award an amount per week that exceeds the average weekly earnings for that financial quarter. However, where the services would have continued beyond the judgment date or, if that amount cannot be ascertained, the figure for the average weekly earnings at the time the award is made is to be used. If the plaintiff would have provided services for less than 40 hours per week the court must not award damages in excess of 1/40 of average weekly earnings for that financial quarter, or where future service was anticipated or this amount cannot be ascertained, the most recent figure at the date of judgment is used.

Interest Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth) pt VIB div 6 (s 87ZA) The Commonwealth legislation provides that a court must not award pre-judgment interest on damages for non-economic loss or gratuitous care for contravention of the above provisions in the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth). This provision also provides that the rate of interest payable on other heads of personal injury damages is either that prescribed by regulation or the ten year benchmark Treasury bond rate on the day that the court determines the personal injury damages.

948 See Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth) pt VIB div 5 s 87X (1), (2).

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Discount rate Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth) pt VIB div 6 (s 87Y) The Commonwealth legislation provides that a discount rate of 5% should be applied to damages awarded for future economic loss for contravention of the above provisions in the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth). The Act also puts in place a regulation making power so that the discount rate may be varied.

Exemplary, punitive and aggravated damages Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth) pt VIB div 6 (s 87ZB) Section 87ZB provides that a court cannot award exemplary or aggravated damages where a person claims damages for personal injury or death. This provision prevents the award for exemplary and aggravated damages that exists for contravention of the above provisions in the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth) leading to personal injury or death. However, exemplary and aggravated damages are still payable for damages awarded in respect of claims outside the application of pt VIB or that are not for personal injury and death.

Structured settlements Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth) pt VIB div 7 (s 87ZC) Section 87ZC allows structured settlement damages to be awarded under the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth). The provision defines a structured settlement as an agreement that provides for the payment of all or part of an award of damages in the form of periodic payments funded by an annuity or other agreed means. The court may, on the application of the parties, make an order under this section that approves a structured settlement, or the terms of a structured settlement, even though the payment of damages is not in the form of a lump sum. A court can also make an order under this section without application from a party.

Legal costs There have been no legislative reforms at the federal level with regard to legal costs.

Practice and Procedure Legal practitioners Royal Commissions Amendment Act 2006 (Cth) ss 1–3 commenced 14 June 2006 Schedule 1 commenced 15 June 2006 The Federal Court of Appeal decision of AWB Limited v Cole and Anor,949 has brought about changes to legal professional practice. In this case, the concept of legal professional privilege was challenged and trumped by public interest considerations. The background to the case stemmed from a Royal Commission Inquiry headed by Mr Cole into the UN Oil-for-Food Programme. The case related to an application to the Federal Court for review of Mr Cole’s decision to require disclosure of documents subject to legal professional privilege. The application sought to challenge firstly, whether Mr Cole had capacity to determine issues on claims relating to legal professional privilege and secondly, whether the document should be disclosed. The Federal Court dismissed the application however, the decision cast significant doubt on the Commission’s power to require production of documents for inspection where a claim for legal professional privilege was made.950

949 [2006] FCA 571. 950 See the Explanatory Memorandum of the Royal Commissions Amendment Bill 2006.

234 Australian civil Liability Guide Carter Newell Lawyers

As a result of the judgment in the AWB case, the Royal Commissions Amendment Act 2006 (Cth)951 was enacted in order to clarify the operation of legal professional privilege provisions and the overriding importance of administering justice over private concerns. The Act was amended to empower members of a Commission to require or summon a person to produce a document that is subject to legal professional privilege.952

The Act was further amended to:

ƒƒ clearly define the meaning of ‘reasonable excuse’ as something that would excuse an act or omission of a similar nature by a witness before or summoned to court;953 ƒƒ provide that it is not a reasonable excuse to refuse to comply with a requirement of the Commission on the basis that a document is subject to legal professional privilege;954 and ƒƒ provide for consequences of a Commissioner’s decision about a claim of legal professional privilege.955

Legal advertising There have been no legislative reforms at the federal level relating to legal advertising.

951 The relevant sections of the Act commenced on 15 June 2006. 952 Royal Commissions Amendment Act 2006 (Cth) s 2(5). 953 Ibid s 1B (definition of reasonable excuse). 954 Ibid s 6AA. 955 Ibid s 6AB.

commonwealth 235 Carter Newell Lawyers

Appendix one

Principle of reform Legislative basis

QLD NSW VIC ACT TAS SA WA NT CTH

Intentional Torts Excluded No Yes No No Yes Yes Yes No No

Pre-court procedures Yes No No Yes No Yes No NYP No

Standard of care Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No No

Causation Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No No

Obvious risk Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes No No

Dangerous recreational activities Yes Yes Partially Partially Yes No Yes No Yes

Liability of professionals Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Partially Yes

Liability of public authorities Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Partially Yes No No

Liability of volunteers Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes

Liability of Good Samaritans Partially Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes No

Liability of food donors Yes Yes Yes No No No Yes No No

Liability for mental harm No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No No

Intoxication and illegal activity Partially Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Partially Yes No

Contributory negligence Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Partially Partially Partially Partially

Proportionate liability Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes

Vicarious liability No No No No No Yes No No No

Non-delegable duties No Yes Yes No Yes Partially No No No

Exclusion Clauses No Partially Partially No No No Yes No Yes

Apology Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No

Limitation periods Partially Yes Yes Partially Partially Partially Partially Partially Partially

General damages Partially Yes Yes No Partially Yes Yes Yes Yes

Economic loss Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes

Gratuitous care Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes

Interest Yes Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes Yes

Discount rate Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes

Exemplary, punitive or aggravated Yes Yes No Partially No No No Yes Yes damages

Structured settlements Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes

Legal costs Yes Yes No Yes No No No Yes No

Offenders in custody No Yes No No No No No No No

Legal practitioners Yes Yes Yes Yes No No Yes Yes No

Legal advertising Yes Yes No No No No Yes Yes No

236 Australian civil Liability Guide Carter Newell Lawyers an a Yes Yes Yes to s 32H) (refer C defendant seek contribution a person from who is not a party to the original proceeding an a o o o N N N to s 32A) (refer concurrent wrongdoer from recover on a or rely contractual indemnity another from concurrent wrongdoer? C

Must efendant’s efendant’s o Yes The defendant is encouraged to N (Silent) Defendant inform the claimant s 32) (refer D obligation to inform the of plaintiff identify of other wrongdoers ourt C an the May No (Court must not unless the person is not a party to the proceeding because the person is dead or, if the person is a corporation, the corporation has been wound up) May to s 31(3))(refer C have regard to have regard of responsibility who wrongdoer is not a party to proceedings oes the o Yes Yes N to (refer s 28(3)(b)) D Act apply to consumers o o Yes to s 3A) (refer N (Silent) N (refer to(refer s 7(3)) Ability to contract out ch 2005 ecember 2004 ommencement ate D 1 for any action commenced on or after that date 1 January 2004 for any action commenced on or after that date, but the causenot where of action which arose prior to 26 July 2004 1 Mar offor any breach duty happening on or after that date (refer to s 4(3)) C D

egimes in all states and territories R rongs Act 1958 Civil Liability Act 2002 W Civil Liability Act 2003 Legislation o Tw x ndi D SW oportionate Liability IC ppe N V Jurisdiction QL A Pr

AUSTRALIAN CIVIL Liability Guide 237 Carter Newell Lawyers an a Yes Yes Yes Yes C defendant seek contribution a person from who is not a party to the original proceeding an a o o o Unless the defendant tohas agreed contribute to the damages or indemnify another concurrent wrongdoer N N Unless the defendant tohas agreed contribute to the damages or indemnify another concurrent wrongdoer No N Unless the defendant has contracted out with the other concurrent wrongdoer concurrent wrongdoer from recover on a or rely contractual indemnity another from concurrent wrongdoer? C efendant’s efendant’s Yes The defendant is encouraged to Yes The defendant is encouraged to Yes The defendant is encouraged to Yes The defendant is encouraged to D obligation to inform the of plaintiff identify of other wrongdoers ourt C an the Yes May May Yes C have regard to have regard of responsibility who wrongdoer is not a party to proceedings oes the o o Yes N N Yes D Act apply to consumers o N

o Yes Yes/ Concurrent onlywrongdoers silent as between andplaintiff defendant N (Silent) Yes The defendant is encouraged to Ability to contract out ecember 2004 D ommencement ate 1 June 2005 for any cause of action which accrues on or after that date 1 June 2005 for when the loss or damage to which the occursclaim relates partly or wholly after that date 8 March 2005 8 March for any action commenced on or after that date for any cause of action which accrues on or after that date 1 C D

2005

Civil Liability Act 2002 Proportionate Liability Act Civil Law Act(Wrongs) 2002 Civil Liability Act 2002 Legislation CT AS T NT A Jurisdiction WA

238 Australian civil Liability Guide Carter Newell Lawyers an a Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes C defendant seek contribution a person from who is not a party to the original proceeding an a o o o o o N N N to s 87CF (b)) (refer N to s 87CF (b)) (refer N the However, defendant might may be able to contract out with other concurrent wrongdoers concurrent wrongdoer from recover on a or rely contractual indemnity another from concurrent wrongdoer? C efendant’s efendant’s Yes Yes Yes to s 87CE (1)) (refer Yes to s 87CE (1)) (refer Yes The defendant is obliged to D obligation to inform the of plaintiff identify of other wrongdoers ourt C an the May May May to s 87CD(refer (3)(b)) May to s 87CD(refer (3)(b)) Yes C have regard to have regard of responsibility who wrongdoer is not a party to proceedings oes the Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes D Act apply to consumers o o o o o N (Silent in respect of proportionate liability) N (Silent in respect of proportionate liability) N (Silent in respect of proportionate liability) N (Silent in respect of proportionate liability) N (Silent) Ability to contract out Competition and ctober 2005 ommencement ate O 26 July 2004 for any cause of action which arises on or after that date 26 July 2004 for any cause of action which arises on or after that date 1 January 2011 for any cause of action which arises on or after that date 26 July 2004 for any cause of action which arises on or after that date until the commencement of the Consumer Act 2010 1 for any cause of action which accrues on or after that date C D

1974 Australian Securities and Investments Commission Act 2001 Corporations Act 2001 Competition and Consumer Act 2010 Trade Practices Trade Act Law Reform (Contributory Negligence and Apportionment of Liability) Act 2001 Legislation H H H H CT CT CT CT Jurisdiction SA

AUSTRALIAN CIVIL Liability Guide 239 Carter Newell Lawyers

Notes