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The Proemio of the Decameron. Boccaccio's Hidden Dialogue With Andreas Kablitz The Proemio of the Decameron. Boccaccio’s Hidden Dialogue with Scholasticism Much attention has been paid to the Introduzione of the First Day in Boccaccio’s Decameron. Indeed, this drastic description of the Great Pestilence, of its physio- logical symptoms and its ruinous social consequences for the urban life in Flor- ence seem to deserve the reader’s particular interest. And, yet, this Introduzione is not the beginning of the Decameron. The text opens with a Proemio, a prologue, which has been widely neglected by literary criticism. Some translations even totally omit this Proemio. Of course, its content is or, at least, seems to be much less spectacular than the thrilling depiction of a disastrous disease. Nonetheless, as I will try to demonstrate in this paper, the Proemio, far from being a purely scholarly rhetorical exercise, establishes the very foundation of the intellectual profile of the Decameron and, especially, inaugurates its dialogue with scholas- tic philosophy. And, though the description of the raging disease might appear more striking, the conceptual conclusions that Boccaccio draws from scholastic anthropology are hardly less remarkable. On closer consideration, they consti- tute a real turning point in the development of Western thought. It is in this con- ceptual framework, even more than its narrative structures that the modernity of the Decameron comes to light, a subversive theoretical potential that undermines quite radically the idea of a Boccaccio medievale.1 Note: This article constitutes the first draft of a project I am working on. It aims at the publication of a book The ‘Decameron’ and Boccaccio’s Dialogue with Scholasticism. 1 This expression, obviously refers to one of the most prominent books of research on the De- cameron: Vittore Branca: Boccaccio medievale. Firenze: Sansoni 1956. This book belongs itself to an ongoing discussion that starts, at the latest, with Francesco de Sanctis’ Storia delle let- teratura italiana, where the modernity of Boccaccio’s Decameron is emphasized. Branca’s book constitutes an explicit counter-project in many regards stressing the adherence of Boccaccio’s one hundred tales to the tradition of medieval literature. The many links between the Decameron and the narrative world of the Middle Ages Branca succeeds to show are indisputable. Nonethe- less, Hans-Jörg Neuschäfer was right to claim that Boccaccio’s tales, though widely belonging to a medieval tradition, in the Decameron underwent decisive changes that are tantamount to a transgression of medieval concepts (H.-J. N.: Boccaccio und der Beginn der Novelle: Strukturen der Kurzerzählung auf der Schwelle zwischen Mittelalter und Neuzeit. München: Wilhelm Fink 1969 [Theorie und Geschichte der Literatur und der schönen Künste, 8]). Without any doubt, Neuschäfer elaborates convincingly the modernity of Boccaccio’s Decameron, even though he Open access. © 2018 Andreas Kablitz, published by De Gruyter. This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 license. https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110419306-010 The Proemio of the Decameron. Boccaccio’s Hidden Dialogue with Scholasticism 195 At first sight, it might appear quite astonishing that a collection of short stories, generally considered to be rather risqué than intellectually ambitious, should enter into a dialogue with the most prominent and, at the same time, most powerful contemporary discourse of the Trecento – a discourse, in addition, of considerable intellectual complexity. And, yet, it is the implicit debate with scholasticism, which leads us to the central ideological premises of Boccaccio’s Decameron. His novelle react to the frequently latent transformation of traditional dogma in scholastic theology by further developing its consequences. In the dogmatic text itself these consequences tend to remain implicit or even unrec- ognized. Such reluctance or even blindness is all the more understandable as they dangerously threaten the integrity of the Christian dogma. Yet, the licences of poetic discourse seem to allow for an investigation into the tacit implications of scholastic thought which in the hundred tales of the Decameron become more than apparent. Umana cosa è aver compassione degli afflitti: e come che a ciascuna persona stea bene, a coloro è massimamente richiesto li quali già hanno di conforto avuto mestiere e hannol trovato in alcuni; fra quali, se alcuno mai n’ebbe bisogno o gli fu caro o già ne ricevette piacere, io sono uno di quegli. (Proemio 2) [’Tis humane to have compassion on the afflicted; and as it shews well in all, so it is espe- cially demanded of those who have had need of comfort and have found it in others: among whom, if any had ever need thereof or found it precious or delectable, I may be numbered.]2 By this ostentatious appeal to humanity Boccaccio opens his Proemio. The follow- ing sentence immediately explains the motivation for this stress on compassion. But, at first, this urgent appeal to human solidarity itself merits our attention. Why does Boccacio insist so intensively on humanity? An answer to this question might become possible by taking into account a remarkable difference between the beginning of Boccaccio’s Proemio, that is to say, the very beginning of the might somehow exaggerate its innovative character. Therefore, two more recent studies empha- sised the rather transitional character of the Decameron between medieval and Renaissance forms of narrative (Joachim Küpper: Affichierte Exemplarität, tatsächliche A-Systematik. Boc- caccios Decameron und die Episteme der Renaissance. In: Klaus W. Hempfer (ed.): Renaissance. Diskursstrukturen und epistemologische Voraussetzungen. Literatur-Philosophie-Bildende Kunst. Stuttgart: Steiner 1993 [Text und Kontext, 10], p. 47–93; Andreas Kablitz: Boccaccios Decameron zwischen Archaik und Modernität. Überlegungen zur achten Novelle des zehnten Tages. In: An- dreas Kablitz/Ulrich Schulz-Buschhaus (eds.): Literarhistorische Begegnungen. Festschrift zum 60. Geburtstag von Bernhard König. Tübingen: Narr 1993, p. 149–185). 2 The texts from the Decameron and their respective translations are drawn from Giovanni Boc- caccio: Decameron. Edited by Vittore Branca. Turin: Einaudi 1980; The Decameron of Giovanni Boccaccio Faithfully Translated by James M. Rigg. 2 vols. London: The Navarre Society 1932. 196 Andreas Kablitz whole Decameron, and the opening lines of the first novella. Panfilo, its narra- tor, explicitly states that whatever you begin, you should begin do in the name of God: – Convenevole cosa è, carissime donne, che ciascheduna cosa la quale l’uomo fa, dallo ammirabile e santo nome di Colui, il quale di tutte fu facitore, le dea principio. (I, 1, 2) [A seemly thing it is, dearest ladies, that whatever we do, it be begun in the holy and awful name of Him who was the maker of all.] Panfilo’s pious words are more than a devout gesture, as he refers to a famous word of Saint Paul. In his Epistle to the Colossians the Apostle to the Gentiles rec- ommends, rather demands to begin everything in the name of God: omne quodcumque facitis in verbo aut in opere omnia in nomine Domini Iesu gratias agentes Deo et Patri per ipsum. (Col. 3, 17) [And whatsoever ye do in word or deed, do all in the name of the Lord Jesus, giving thanks to God and the Father by him.] It is significant that the author of the Decameron himself apparently, not to say ostentatiously differs from St. Paul’s recommendation, which on the other hand is recalled by his first narrator. And this difference is all the more striking as, syn- tactically, Boccaccio’s first sentence in the Proemio and Panfilo’s first sentence in his novella I, 1 show an unmistakable parallelism: Umana cosa è – Convenevole cosa è. But this comparison also demonstrates the loss of relevance of St. Paul’s principle that already Panfilo’s formulation reveals. Paul’s categorical request in the wording of his novella becomes a pleasant, conventional custom: convenev- ole cosa è. On the other hand, it is the human thing, umana cosa, which gains normative force. Panfilo only apparently argues in favour of St. Paul’s request to begin everything in the name of God. For the first time, we encounter a rhetorical device that is characteristic for the entire Decameron. Boccaccio frequently refers to dogmatic principles, the validity of which he seems to reaffirm. Yet on closer consideration this reaffirmation proves a hidden rejection. In this way the appeal to human solidarity within the Proemio stands in opposition to a beginning in the name of God. Unavoidably, this substitution leads to the question if there is any connec- tion between both positions. Does it make sense to replace the invocation of God by a claim for the compassione degli afflitti? At least a hint to an answer might be offered by the fact that Boccaccio even suggests something like a caring society of the mournful who have the obligation to support each other. Somehow he outlines the idea of humanity as a kind of insurance company, The Proemio of the Decameron. Boccaccio’s Hidden Dialogue with Scholasticism 197 as a mutually-supportive group which provides protection against risks. And especially those who benefited from the help of others have the duty to support those who need help. Gratitude appears to be no longer a mutual obligation between single persons. Thankfulness, rather, becomes an obligation towards the society of mankind. But why does mankind need solidarity to such a high degree? An answer will be found
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