Party Registration and Party Vote: the Relationship Between Registration and Results in Massachusetts Elections

Party Registration and Party Vote: The Relationship between Registration and Results in Massachusetts Elections

A dissertation presented

Dennis G. Dallaire, Jr.

The Department of Political Science

In partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

in the field of

Political Science

Northeastern University Boston, Massachusetts April 2016

Party Registration and Party Vote: The Relationship between Registration and Results in Massachusetts Elections

Dennis G. Dallaire, Jr.

ABSTRACT OF DISSERTATION

Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science in the College of Social Sciences and Humanities of Northeastern University April 2016

ABSTRACT

This study examines the relationship between election results in Massachusetts and voter partisanship as reflected in party registration data. It analyzes the influence of party registration on the Democratic vote in the state. Included for analysis are 8,536 races for the public offices of—President, U.S. Senate, U.S. House of Representatives, Massachusetts Governor, State

Senate, and the State House of Representatives—during the 35 general elections within the study’s time frame of seven decades. Party registration has been quite variable over time in the state, and it is the unit of analysis in this quantitative, correlational study. Since 1990, the advent of a voter enrollment shift, or seemingly apparent partisan dealignment, from the Democratic and

Republican parties toward independent voters has occurred, as they have steadily widened their segment of the electorate. Registered independents increased to over half the electorate in 2008, and currently represent nearly 54 percent of it—among the highest percentages in the nation.

The paradox of the Massachusetts voter, however, is that during this enrollment shift the state’s electorate still continues, on average, to elect Democrats across most federal and state offices. Overall, the Democratic Party in Massachusetts has enjoyed a yearly average vote of 62 percent across the offices examined. Therefore, the thesis in this study is that partisanship, not independence, drives elections in Massachusetts. Using elections statistics and survey data, the research design employs a longitudinal perspective, dating back to 1948, in order to analyze and explain partisan trends within the Bay State’s polity that impact its politics over time.

The key findings in this study: 1) of the statistically significant bivariate results—both

Democratic registration and independent registration each have all positive correlations with the

Massachusetts Democratic vote. In Massachusetts, generally speaking, independent voters behave like Democratic voters. Also, in the majority of political offices examined, independent registration behaves like Democratic registration, in a positive manner toward the Democratic vote—as independent registration goes up the Democratic vote goes up. This provides key insight into the paradox presented here; 2) Republican registration, surprisingly, often indicates a positive relationship with the Massachusetts Democratic vote; and, 3) Party registration effects the Massachusetts Democratic vote more often than party identification.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I thank my committee chair, Professor William G. Mayer, for his research expertise and educating me in the field of American elections. I also thank Professor John H. Portz for his guidance in the latter stages of my dissertation by moving the process along, taking the time to discuss ideas, and reading numerous manuscript drafts. I truly appreciate his efforts.

Michael S. Dukakis, another vital committee member, has been a true friend and mentor for the past 20 years—since first taking Professor Dukakis’ state and local government undergraduate course in 1996 at Northeastern University. The governor and I have had many talks over the years in Boston, and also in Los Angeles while enjoying the view from UCLA toward downtown, where I worked at city hall. His memorable friendship is one I truly cherish.

On a personal note, I sincerely thank my dear grandmother, Alice Dallaire-O’Neill, an avid reader her entire life and still is, for the hours spent double checking elections numbers.

I also sincerely thank my step-grandad, Hubert J. O’Neill, for his continued support throughout the many years of my higher education career. They are both truly my biggest fans and supporters in all that I do.

I also thank my mother, Marie St. Onge, and her late husband, Eugene St. Onge for their support throughout the years. I truly miss my in-depth discussions with Gene on many subjects.

Overall, I have earned my Bachelor of Science, Summa Cum Laude; my Master of Public

Administration; and now, my Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science from Northeastern

University in Boston, Massachusetts. I am a Northeastern Triple Husky.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Abstract 2

Acknowledgements 5

Table of Contents 6

Chapter 1: Introduction 9

I. Problem Statement and Research Significance 12 II. Why Study Registration and Results? 13 III. Why Study Massachusetts? 15 IV. Trends in Massachusetts Elections Compared to the Nation 24 V. Research Questions 40 VI. Conclusion 40

Chapter 2: Literature Review 42

I. Concept of Party ID 42 A. Definition 42 B. Major Characteristics 43 C. Measurement 44 D. Effects on Political Behavior, Especially Voting 45 II. Challenges to the Partisan School 46 A. Conceptual Debate—Partisanship and Independence 46 B. Partisanship 47 C. Independence 49 D. Independent Voters 52 III. Voter/ Party Registration 54 A. Definition 54 B. Party Registration in Massachusetts 55 C. Party Registration Literature is Sparse 58 IV. Conclusion 60

Chapter 3: Methodology 63

I. Research Design 63 II. Populations/ Sampling Plan 65 III. Data Collection 67 IV. Research Questions and Hypotheses 69 V. Data Analysis Methods 70 VI. Generalizability—Validity and Reliability 72 VII. Conclusion 73

Chapter 4: Analysis of the Democratic Vote in Massachusetts: Bivariate Analysis of the Registration-Vote Relationship 75

I. Description of the Populations 75 II. Dependent Variable—the Democratic Vote 76 III. Results 76 IV. Statewide General Elections from 1948 to 2014 77 V. Bivariate County-level Analysis of Massachusetts General Elections from 1976 to 2014 80 A. U.S. Presidential Elections 81 B. U.S. Senate Elections 83 C. U.S. House of Representatives Elections 84 D. Massachusetts Gubernatorial Elections 86 E. Massachusetts Senate Elections 87 F. Massachusetts House of Representatives Elections 89 VI. County-level Look at Democratic Registration on the Democratic Vote by Years 96 A. U.S. Presidential Elections 96 B. U.S. Senate Elections 102 C. Massachusetts Gubernatorial Elections 108 D. U.S. House of Representatives Elections 125 E. Massachusetts Senate Elections 125 F. Massachusetts House of Representatives Elections 126 VII. Conclusion 128

Chapter 5: Analysis of the Democratic Vote in Massachusetts: Multivariate Analysis of the Registration-Vote Relationship 131

I. Results 131 II. Statewide General Elections for Federal Offices from 1948 to 2014 133 III. Multivariate County-level Analysis of Massachusetts General Elections for Federal Offices from 1976 to 2014 135 A. U.S. Presidential Elections 136 B. U.S. Senate Elections 139 C. U.S. House of Representatives Elections 141 IV. Statewide General Elections for State Offices from 1948 to 2014 143 V. Multivariate County-level Analysis of Massachusetts General Elections for State Offices from 1976 to 2014 145 A. Massachusetts Gubernatorial Elections 145 B. Massachusetts Senate Elections 148 C. Massachusetts House of Representatives Elections 150 VI. Explaining the Variance 152 VII. Conclusion 158

Chapter 6: Analysis of the Democratic Vote in Massachusetts: Geography of the Vote 160

I. Registration and the Democratic Vote 161 II. Geography of the Democratic Vote in Massachusetts Counties 162 III. Democratic Vote Percentages—County Trends 164 IV. Regression Results of Party Registration and the Democratic Vote 168 V. Conclusion 175

Chapter 7: Analysis of the Democratic Vote in Massachusetts: Party Registration and Party Identification 176

I. Closet Partisanship in Massachusetts 177 II. Results 178 A. SPSS T-tests 182 III. Regression Analysis of Party Registration and Party ID on the Democratic Vote 188 A. U.S. Presidential Elections 190 B. U.S. Senate Elections 190 C. U.S. House of Representatives Elections 191 D. Massachusetts Gubernatorial Elections 192 E. Massachusetts Senate Elections 192 F. Massachusetts House of Representatives Elections 193 IV. Party Registration and Party ID in Massachusetts 194 V. Conclusion 194

Chapter 8: Discussion and Conclusion 196

I. Overview of the Research Study 196 II. Party Registration on the Massachusetts Democratic Vote 198 III. Study Implications 201 IV. Limitations of the Study 202 V. Recommendations for Future Research 204 VI. Conclusion 206

Bibliography 209

-Chapter 1- Introduction

This exploratory study is an examination of partisanship in Massachusetts. The study of electoral politics examines the political attitudes and behaviors of voters, parties, and candidates that encompass the electoral settings within our system of representative government.

Partisanship plays a key role in voting in American elections. According to Campbell (2008:

213), partisanship is “the most important concept in understanding American voters, and consequently campaigns and elections.” This study examines the registration-vote relationship and brings new knowledge of political change regarding party registration and its influence on election results. To support the purpose of this correlational study, the relationship between the

Democratic vote over time and changes in political party registration are examined. The central thrust of this investigation examines the following major research question: What is the effect of party registration on the Democratic vote in Massachusetts?

The concept of partisanship has two major measures: party registration (or party enrollment) and party identification (or party ID). Party registration is a legally defined partisan status. This partisan measure is reflected in official, state voter registration data. Party identification is a psychological attachment based on feelings of allegiance. Partisanship in the electorate, using the party ID measure obtained from surveys, can be measured by the percentage of voters adopting an identification with or attachment to one of the major political parties, the strength of that identification, and its use, particularly deciding how to vote. The party in the electorate consists of citizens who “see themselves” (Hershey 2011: 9) as partisan party members. A highly partisan electorate “would be one in which most voters identified strongly with one of the political parties and voted loyally for their party’s candidates” (Campbell 2008:

214). The scholarly literature on party registration and its influence on voting outcomes, unlike

9 the numerous works on party ID, the most studied variable in political science, is in fact, quite sparse. Therefore, party registration is the main variable of interest in this current study.

As discussed in detail in the upcoming problem statement, this study will use the case of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts to explain the influence of party registration on election results. This particular state has been chosen because, paradoxically, it currently has among the highest percentages of independent voters in the nation (State Secretaries of State 2015)—with over half of its electorate registering as independents, or unenrolled—combined with being arguably a one-party, Democratic state. Therefore, the Democratic vote in Massachusetts is the dependent variable in this study. In terms of party ID, the Gallup Poll ranks Massachusetts as the most Democratic state in the country (Gallup 2015). Their results are based on Gallup Daily tracking interviews throughout 2014 with more than 177,000 U.S. adults. Nationally, Democrats had a 3 percentage-point advantage. However, Massachusetts Democrats enjoy a nearly 22 percentage-point advantage (Gallup 2015). An important implication of a state’s partisanship is that it serves as an indicator of how the state will vote in federal and state elections.

Partisanship is the theory in this study. The thesis is that partisanship, not independence, drives elections in Massachusetts. For instance, it is a paradox that independent registration in

Massachusetts has been increasing even as the state has become more Democratic. Essentially partisan individuals, disguised as independents, drive politics and greatly influence election outcomes in the state. Regarding partisanship and voting, we know from the literature on party

ID that “the most important effect of party attachments is their influence on voting behavior”

(Hershey 2011: 108). However, other than party registration studies focused on voter turnout, we are lacking knowledge on the effect of voter enrollment on party success at the ballot box. The

“decline of political parties” theme essentially proposes that fewer American voters are now

10 affected by party ties and are exhibiting more independence—particularly in terms of registration numbers. Walter Dean Burnham wrote of the “onward march of party decomposition” (1970:

91). Further, The Changing American Voter (Nie, Verba, and Petrocik 1976: 47) concludes that the decline of partisanship has been the “most dramatic political change in the American public.”

This current study, conversely, argues that although political party registration numbers are declining, and have been quite variable over time, it is of little consequence to election outcomes, especially for the Democratic Party in Massachusetts since 1990.

Looking back even further, the last 67 years of Massachusetts party registration history, from 1948 to 2014, can be divided into three major eras. These time periods are based on the voting segments within the electorate, according to registration numbers. Era one, from 1948 to

1962, the independents had the highest voter enrollment percentages in Massachusetts. Era two, from 1964 to 1988, the Democrats had the highest voter enrollment percentages. Era three, from

1990 to 2014, the independents have the highest voter enrollment percentages in the state. Of note, during this most recent era, since 1990, paradoxically, with independents comprising the highest voter enrollment percentages, the Democratic Party in Massachusetts has enjoyed a higher overall vote percentage of 66 across the combined offices examined in this study, as compared to the previous period with a vote percentage of 63, when their own party had the highest numbers of enrolled voters.

The remainder of this chapter will provide an overview of the problem statement and research significance of this study, why studying registration is important, why studying it in

Massachusetts is important, the trends occurring in each of the political offices examined, the research questions guiding this analysis, and a chapter conclusion. Chapter two of this dissertation will provide a comprehensive literature review on partisanship, party registration,

11 party ID, and their impact on election results. Chapter three will focus on the methodology of the research and contains a detailed overview of the variables examined in this study, the research design, and a description of the data collection. Chapters four through seven provide the analysis of the data. Chapter eight concludes with a discussion of the results, the study limitations, and implications for further research.

I. Problem Statement and Research Significance

The Webster’s dictionary definition of a paradox is “a statement that is seemingly contradictory and yet is perhaps true.” Further, a paradox is defined as, “an argument that apparently derives self-contradictory conclusions by valid deduction from acceptable premises, and also as, something or someone with seemingly contradictory qualities or phases” (1994:

842). As stated earlier, it is a paradox that independent enrollments in Massachusetts have been increasing even as the state has become more Democratic.

In my view, the political paradox that exists in Massachusetts is essentially based on partisanship. Most recently, since 1990, the important puzzle analyzed in this research is that the majority of party registrations have shifted toward independent voters, unenrolled with either major party, yet the state’s electorate still continues to overwhelmingly elect Democratic candidates across most federal and state offices. The Democratic Party and its candidates dominate Bay State politics, in general, with regards to presidential, congressional, and state legislative elections, and have done so for many years.

Based on this puzzling and significant political issue, this quantitative, correlational study examines the relationship between party registration and election results. Regression analysis is used to analyze this relationship and its statistical significance. Further, this current investigation

12 also looks at Massachusetts geographically to understand—where specifically is the political change in terms of registration and results happening in the state? And, what does the change look like? This is accomplished both through examination of elections on a statewide basis since

1948 (The state has readily available registration data dating back to 1948), and also by analyzing each of the fourteen counties across the Commonwealth of Massachusetts since 1976

(The state began collecting registration data at the county-level beginning in 1976).

II. Why Study Registration and Results?

Elections are a cornerstone of our democracy. Public officials make numerous decisions that affect people’s everyday lives. Therefore, the empirical study of what influences American elections is important. This examination looks at how the independent variable of party registration by voters influences the election results in one key state, Massachusetts.

As said earlier, the scholarly literature on party registration is quite sparse. Therefore, this current analysis provides an original contribution to add to this limited base of empirical knowledge. From a practical standpoint, it appears of great interest to scholars, candidates, political parties, media, and the general public, what wins elections.

Voter registration in Massachusetts is similar to thirty one other U.S. states and the

District of Columbia (State Secretaries of State, 2015; DC Board of Elections, 2015), in that the enrollment status of a voter includes their official party choice. But, again, what sets

Massachusetts apart for the purpose of this study is the exemplar example it sets with its analytical paradox. Table 1.1 provides descriptive statistics of the political party registration percentages of the United States electorate in 2014.

TABLE 1.1: Party Registration Percentages for 31 U.S. States and the District of Columbia ranked by the Highest Independent Registration Percentage as of 2014.

State Independents Democrats Republicans Others Arkansas 92 4 4 * Idaho 59 8 32 1 Massachusetts 54 35 11 * Alaska 53 14 27 6 Rhode Island 50 40 10 * New Jersey 47 33 20 * New Hampshire 43 27 30 * Connecticut 42 37 21 1 Utah 42 9 48 2 Maine 41 32 27 * Iowa 37 31 32 * Arizona 35 30 35 1 Colorado 35 31 33 1 Kansas 33 15 51 1 Oregon 27 39 31 3 North Carolina 26 43 31 * Louisiana 25 47 28 * Delaware 24 48 29 * Florida 22 40 36 3 California 21 44 29 6 Nebraska 20 32 48 * New York 20 50 24 6 New Mexico 19 47 31 3 South Dakota 19 34 46 1 West Virginia 19 50 29 2 Maryland 18 55 25 2 Nevada 18 41 35 6 District of Columbia 17 76 6 * Wyoming 14 21 65 1 Pennsylvania 13 50 37 1 Oklahoma 12 45 43 * Kentucky 8 54 39 * Total Average % 31 36 31 3 Total Average % 31 36 32 3 less MA SOURCE: Compiled by the author on the basis of results reported by the U.S. Secretaries of States Registration Statistics and the D.C. Board of Elections. Note: Currently, 31 U.S. states plus the District of Columbia enable voters to pick a party upon registering to vote. Note: The asterisk symbol “*” means “less than one percent.”

III. Why Study Massachusetts?

Table 1.1 shows that Arkansas has the highest independent registration percentage in the nation, and also that the state of Idaho has a higher independent percentage than Massachusetts.

However, this study examines Massachusetts instead of these two states for several reasons.

First, Arkansas is a statistical outlier. The reason is that Arkansas, unlike the majority of other open primary states (i.e., 17 other states not listed in Table 1.1), allows both their Democratic and Republican primaries to be open to all registered voters. Arkansas also enables voters to pick a party or remain independent when registering to vote (Arkansas Secretary of State, 2015).

There is little incentive for a voter registering in this state to commit themselves to one of the two major parties. Conversely, the majority of other open primary states have varying rules— such as one parties primary is closed to independents, as the other party primary remains open; voters choosing a certain primary ballot must remain registered to that party in the upcoming general election—and also unlike the 31 states listed in Table 1.1, these other U.S. states do not enable voters to pick a party when registering. Generally, a registered voter will simply select a party’s ballot at the polling place on the day of the primary. It is this combination that makes

Arkansas an outlier at 92 percent.

Idaho also has a higher independent voter percentage than Massachusetts. This state utilizes a mixed primary system that allows parties to decide who may vote. For example, the

Democratic Party in Idaho allows independent voters to vote in their primary. However, the

Republican Party allows only voters registered with their party to vote in their primary.

Independent voters can choose to affiliate with a party for the primary election, but they will be registered to that party in the general election (Idaho Secretary of State, 2015). Massachusetts, on the other hand, also utilizes a mixed primary system in which unaffiliated voters are allowed to

15 vote in the primary election. But Massachusetts voters may choose which party ballot they wish to vote on and still remain unenrolled in the general election. In my view, this allows for greater voter independence and a better test state for this study.

American politics. Massachusetts is a model state in order to study this specific issue.

Massachusetts is also an interesting place to study this paradox because it is known nationally as one of the most Democratic, “blue” states in the country, yet its voter enrollments look more competitive, or “purple,” than “blue.” Importantly, the Commonwealth has also produced numerous presidential candidates, high-profile U.S. Senate races, and competitive gubernatorial races. Overall, the state is an important contributor in American elections.

Table 1.2 provides descriptive statistics of the most Democratic U.S. states based on party identification percentages ranked by Democratic advantage, according to Gallup in 2014.

Massachusetts is ranked as the most Democratic state in the nation based on the party identification and party leanings of its state voters.

TABLE 1.2: Most Democratic U.S. States based on Party Identification Percentages ranked by Democratic Advantage, according to Gallup, 2015.

Democratic Democratic/ Republican/ Gallup State State N Advantage Lean Democratic Lean Republican Classification Massachusetts 21.8 51.4 29.6 Solid Dem 3,727 Maryland 20.9 52.8 31.9 Solid Dem 3,123 Rhode Island 19.4 48.6 29.2 Solid Dem 654 New York 17.3 48.7 31.4 Solid Dem 9,860 Vermont 16.1 46.8 30.7 Solid Dem 570 California 15.0 47.4 32.4 Solid Dem 17,351 Hawaii 14.5 49.3 34.8 Solid Dem 583 Delaware 13.3 47.4 34.1 Solid Dem 496 Illinois 12.5 47.0 34.5 Solid Dem 5,678 Connecticut 11.7 46.9 35.2 Solid Dem 2,078 New Jersey 11.7 45.7 34.0 Solid Dem 4,531 Washington 7.6 44.7 37.1 Lean Dem 4,331 New Mexico 6.8 44.9 38.1 Lean Dem 1,506 Pennsylvania 6.6 45.8 39.2 Lean Dem 8,392 Michigan 6.6 43.7 37.1 Lean Dem 4,979 Maine 5.2 43.6 38.4 Lean Dem 1,079 Oregon 5.1 44.5 39.4 Lean Dem 2,865 SOURCE: Adapted by the author from “Gallup http://www.gallup.com/poll/181475/massachusetts-maryland- democratic-states.aspx Release date: February 4, 2015.”

Gallup’s finding on Massachusetts is interesting in that it may imply a closet partisanship exists in the state when comparing the partisan measures of party ID against the state’s official party registration data. For example, according to Massachusetts registration data, independents are at about 54 percent of the electorate, but here in this survey data, Massachusetts voters identify themselves as pure independents only about 19 percent of the time. Democratic registration in Massachusetts is at about 35 percent, but in these daily tracking interviews, state voters identify with the Democrats about 51 percent of the time. Republican registration in

Massachusetts is at about 11, however, voters identify themselves in these surveys as

Republicans about 30 percent of the time. This survey data may indicate that a partisan electorate exists in Massachusetts in which most voters identify strongly with either the Democrats or

Republicans. Emotional voter attachments and loyalties to one of the two major parties may be

17 influencing election outcomes in the state, as voters “see themselves” as partisans but are not being reflected in the official registration numbers.

Numerous combined polls by the Suffolk University Political Research Center in Boston and also by the University of New Hampshire (UNH) Survey Center in Durham suggests essentially the same party identification breakdown of Massachusetts voters as the Gallup Poll.

These university researchers find that 53 percent of Massachusetts voters say that they identify with Democrats, 28 percent identify with Republicans, and again, 19 percent say they are pure independents. Again, this survey research data does not match with the official party registration numbers in Massachusetts. Table 1.3 provides the descriptive statistics of the party registration percentages of the Massachusetts electorate from 1948 to 2014.

TABLE 1.3: Party Registration Percentages of the Massachusetts Electorate, 1948-2014.

Year Democrats Republicans Independents 1948 26 25 49 1950 27 26 47 1952 28 27 45 1954 30 29 41 1956 29 26 45 1958 32 26 42 1960 30 24 46 1962 35 23 42 1964 39 25 36 1966 40 22 38 1968 43 22 35 1970 43 21 36 1972 43 19 38 1974 44 17 39 1976 47 15 38 1978 47 14 39 1980 46 15 39 1982 45 15 40 1984 48 13 39 1986 47 13 40 1988 46 14 40 1990 43 13 44 1992 40 14 46 1994 40 13 47 1996 39 14 47 1998 38 13 49 2000 36 15 49 2002 36 15 49 2004 37 14 49 2006 37 13 50 2008 37 12 51 2010 37 11 52 2012 36 11 53 2013 36 11 53 2014 35 11 54 SOURCE: Compiled by the author on the basis of results reported by the Massachusetts Registration Statistics . Note: Percentages are rounded to closest whole number.

As these percentages illustrate, party registration has been quite variable over time in

Massachusetts. From era one (1948 to 1962) into era two (1964 to 1988), the majority of voter party enrollment shifted from independents to Democrats. Then from era two (1964 to 1988) into era three (1990 to 2014), the majority of voter party enrollment again shifts from the Democrats back to the independents. In 2008, independents became the majority segment in the electorate

19 by reaching over half of the state’s voters, currently at about 54 percent. This is the first time during this study’s time frame that any voter segment obtained this percentage. In fact, neither major party in this state has ever, during the time frame of this study, reached this level.

Table 1.3 shows that Democratic Party enrollment ranges from a low of 26 percent in

1948 to a high of 48 percent in 1984, and currently stands at about 35 percent. Republican Party enrollment ranges from a current low of 11 percent, since 2010, to a high of 29 percent in 1954.

Independent voter enrollment ranges from a low of 35 percent in 1968, which is higher than the

Massachusetts Republican Party has ever seen during this time frame, to a current high point of about 54 percent, since 2012. In sum, dating back to 1948, the independents are currently at their highest point, the Republicans at their lowest point, and the Democrats about at their midpoint.

Figure 1.1 further illustrates this trend of rising independent voters and also the variability of party registration over time since 1948 in Massachusetts. Figure 1.1 shows the rising linear trend of independent registration in Massachusetts. It also indicates the crossover of the Democratic and independent voter majorities occurring in both 1964 and then again in 1990.

Figure 1.1 also illustrates the low and declining trend line of Republican Party registration in

Massachusetts during the entire time frame of this study. Since 1948, Republican registration has never been at the same level, or crossed over/above, with the other two voter segments shown here.

Figure 1.1: Party Registration Percentages of the Massachusetts Electorate, 1948-2014.

SOURCE: Compiled by the author on the basis of results reported by the Massachusetts Registration Statistics . Note: Percentages are rounded to closest whole number.

Now turning to Massachusetts election outcomes, the election results provided in Table

1.4 illustrate the strong partisanship effect in the Bay State. Table 1.4 provides descriptive statistics regarding the Democratic vote percentages in Massachusetts during the election years from 1948 to 2014. It is also marked by the three time eras based on party registration previously discussed.

TABLE 1.4: Democratic Vote Percentages in Massachusetts during Election Years 1948-2014.

Yearly Average US US US MA MA MA Year Democratic vote % President a Senate b House c Governor d Senate e House f across 6 offices 1948 55 46 50 59 47 48 51 1950 - - 50 56 53 53 53 1952 45 51 46 49 49 49 48 1954 - 49 47 48 53 54 50 1956 40 - 49 53 54 53 50 1958 - 73 57 56 59 58 61 1960 60 43 61 47 57 57 54 1962 - 55 58 50 g 57 56 55 Era 1 % 50 53 52 53 54 54 53 1964 76 74 63 49 59 63 64 1966 - 39 61 37 57 60 51 1968 63 - 50 - 63 63 60 1970 - 62 57 43 65 67 59 1972 54 35 58 - 62 68 55 1974 - - 69 54 76 67 66 1976 56 69 64 - 73 68 66 1978 - 55 69 53 73 68 64 1980 42 - 65 - 77 67 63 1982 - 61 69 59 75 69 67 1984 48 55 69 - 78 68 64 1986 - - 80 69 74 70 73 1988 53 65 75 - 66 73 66 Era 2 % 56 57 65 52 69 67 63 1990 - 57 69 47 52 56 56 1992 48 h - 58 - 61 67 62 1994 - 58 69 28 60 69 57 1996 61 52 66 - 69 71 64 1998 - - 75 47 78 72 68 2000 60 73 84 - 77 74 74 2002 - 80 89 45 74 71 72 2004 62 - 80 - 67 70 70 2006 - 69 85 56 76 76 72 2008 62 66 87 - 80 79 75 2010 - 47 58 48 i 62 66 58 2012 61 54 82 - 84 72 71 2013 - 57 - - - - 57 2014 - 62 85 47 74 71 64 Era 3 % 61 62 76 45 70 70 66 Total Avg. Dem % ------62 Total Office % 56 58 66 50 66 65 60 N 17 26 391 22 1,360 6,720 Total N = 8,536 SOURCE: Compiled by the author on the basis of results reported by the Massachusetts Election Statistics . a = Total Popular Vote; b, c, d, e, f = Total Vote; g = Peabody (D) won a plurality; h = Clinton (D) won a plurality; i = Patrick (D) won a plurality. Note: Percentages are rounded to closest whole number. (Table 1.4 is disassembled later in the chapter into separate tables examining the six different types of elections examined in this study.)

This data is very telling. Examining these election results overall indicates a trend of increasing Democratic vote percentages in Massachusetts over time, even as registration patterns change. For instance, when comparing the total yearly average Democratic vote percentage across 6 offices from era one with era two, the Democratic share increased by 10 percent overall from 53 percent to 63 percent. This increase for Democrats occurred at a time when registration numbers made them the majority voter segment in the state. However, the total yearly average

Democratic vote percentage across 6 offices continues to increase from era two into era three, even as independent voters are the majority segment. This Democratic vote increase went up from 63 percent to 66 percent.

Based on the strong patterns of Democratic partisanship shown in Table 1.4, arguably,

Massachusetts voters do not truly exhibit independence, nor are they impartial thinkers in the electoral contests between the Democratic and Republican parties. As the table indicates, the total average Democratic vote percentages for each major political office examined, between

1948 until 2014, is as follows: 56 percent for U.S. president; 58 percent for U.S. Senate; 66 percent for U.S. House; 50 percent for Massachusetts governor; 66 percent for state senate, and,

65 percent for the state house of representatives. Further, when looking at the total average

Democratic vote percentage for all of these six political offices combined since 1948, it is 62 percent. This is reflective of Democratic partisan strength even during times of party enrollment declines in the state. When examining each of these six major political offices by era, we still see, on average, that Democrats win more often than they lose in Massachusetts dating back to

1948.

Over these three time periods the Democratic vote in Massachusetts changes across these six major political offices. The average Democratic vote during the three eras are 53 percent to

63 percent to 66 percent most recently. From 1948 to 1962, Massachusetts Democrats have an overall winning percentage in five of the six offices examined, and a 50/50 winning percent in presidential elections. From 1964 to 1988, Massachusetts Democrats have an overall winning percentage in all six offices. Most recently, from 1990 to 2014, Massachusetts Democrats have held an overall winning percentage in five of the six offices examined. The Democratic percentage in the race for Massachusetts governor during this era is 45 percent. Although in the race for governor, Democrat Deval Patrick won the gubernatorial election in 2010 by plurality with 48 percent of the vote.

IV. Trends in Massachusetts Elections Compared to the Nation

Explaining what the data in Table 1.4 means within the scope of this quantitative study, focusing on the registration-vote relationship, is detailed in the analysis chapters. This data is now broken down into each political office being examined. The upcoming tables and figures describe the trends since 1948 regarding the Democratic vote percentages and Democratic seat percentages in Massachusetts compared to the rest of the United States.

Election results don’t lie. Since 1948 in Massachusetts: Democrats have won the state in the race for president in 13-of-17 general elections, or 77 percent of the time. Democrats have also won the race for U.S. Senate in 20-of-26 general elections, or 77 percent of the time.

Further, Democrats have held the majority of seats in the U.S. House in 29-of-32 general elections; or 91 percent of the time. [Note: In 1954 and 1956, each major party held 7-of-14 seats, or 50 percent, thus neither held a majority.] In the race for Massachusetts governor,

Democrats have won in 11-of-22 general elections, or 50 percent of the time. In the state senate,

Democrats have held the majority of seats in 29-of-33 general elections; or 88 percent of the

24 time. [Note: In 1948, each major party held 20-of-40 seats, or 50 percent, thus neither held a majority.] In the state house of representatives, Democrats have held the majority of seats in 33- of-34 general elections; or 97 percent of the time. With the exception of the race for governor, these numbers are clearly dominant, and indicative of a one-party state.

Beginning with federal elections held in Massachusetts, Table 1.5 describes the presidential Democratic vote percentages in Massachusetts compared to the rest of the nation during the election years of 1948 to 2012.

TABLE 1.5: Presidential Democratic Vote Percentages in Massachusetts compared to the rest of the nation during Election Years, 1948-2012.

MA National MA National Year Democratic Democratic Difference N % % % 1948 55 48 +7 47 1952 45 44 +1 47 1956 40 42 -2 47 1960 60 48 +12 49 1964 76 58 +18 50 1968 63 41 +22 50 1972 54 36 +18 50 1976 56 49 +7 50 1980 42 40 +2 50 1984 48 39 +9 50 1988 53 45 +8 50 1992 48 42 +6 50 1996 61 48 +13 50 2000 60 46 +14 50 2004 62 46 +16 50 2008 62 51 +11 50 2012 61 49 +12 50 Total % 56 45 N=17 SOURCE: Compiled by the author on the basis of elections results reported by the U.S. Secretaries of States and the D.C. Board of Elections. Note: National Democratic percentage for president is minus Massachusetts. National N= number of states other than Massachusetts. National N = 50 includes the District of Columbia.

Massachusetts is well-known as a solid Democratic state in presidential elections. The total Massachusetts Democratic vote is 56 percent compared to a total of 45 percent nationwide.

When looking at Table 1.5 the positive vote difference for Democrats in Massachusetts

25 compared to the other states ranges from a percentage of +1 to +22 in 16-of-the-17 elections examined. Only in 1956 is there a -2 percentage point difference between Massachusetts and the rest of the nation. Republican Dwight Eisenhower overwhelmingly won the presidency that year.

To further examine this trend in presidential elections since 1948, Figure 1.2 graphically illustrates presidential voting in Massachusetts compared to the rest of the country.

FIGURE 1.2: Presidential Democratic Vote Percentages in Massachusetts compared to the rest of the nation during Election Years, 1948-2012.

SOURCE: Compiled by the author on the basis of elections results reported by the U.S. Secretaries of States and the DC Board of Elections. Note: National Democratic percentage for president is minus Massachusetts. National N= number of states other than Massachusetts. National N = 50 includes the District of Columbia.

Figure 1.2 illustrates the upward trend of Democratic voting overall in Massachusetts since 1948. When looking year-by-year at this graph, the Democratic popular vote percentage ranges from winning percentages as high as 76 percent to losing percentages as low as 40 percent. However, of note, in 1992 even with a 48 percent Democratic vote share, Bill Clinton still won the state’s popular vote and all of its electoral votes against George H.W. Bush and 26

Henry Ross Perot on his way to becoming president. Overall, Democrats have won the state in the race for president in 13-out-of-17 general elections, or 77 percent of the time.

Table 1.6 describes the U.S. Senate Democratic vote percentages in Massachusetts compared to the rest of the nation during the election years of 1948 to 2014. Table 1.6 shows the total Massachusetts Democratic vote is 58 percent compared to a total of 50 percent nationwide.

When looking at Table 1.6 the positive vote difference for Democrats in Massachusetts compared to the other states ranges from a percentage of +2 to +38 in 20-out-of-the-25 elections examined. In the other five elections Massachusetts had a negative difference compared to the nation, with a low point of -13 in 1960.

TABLE 1.6: U.S. Senate Democratic Vote Percentages in Massachusetts compared to the rest of the nation during Election Years, 1948-2014.

MA National MA National Year Democratic Democratic Difference N % % % 1948 46 56 -10 27 1952 51 49 +2 31 1954 49 53 -4 33 1958 73 58 +15 34 1960 43 56 -13 31 1962 55 52 +3 37 1964 74 57 +17 33 1966 39 49 -10 31 1970 62 54 +8 34 1972 35 47 -12 33 1976 69 55 +14 31 1978 55 51 +4 34 1982 61 55 +6 32 1984 55 47 +8 32 1988 65 52 +13 32 1990 57 50 +7 34 1994 58 46 +12 34 1996 52 46 +6 33 2000 73 47 +26 33 2002 80 42 +38 33 2006 69 49 +20 32 2008 66 50 +16 34 2010 47 42 +5 36 2012 54 49 +5 32 2013 57 - - - 2014 62 41 +21 35 Total % 58 50 N = 26 SOURCE: Compiled by the author on the basis of elections results reported by the U.S. Secretaries of States. Note: National Democratic percentage for U.S. Senate is minus Massachusetts. National N= number of states other than Massachusetts. Note: In 2013, Massachusetts was the only state to hold a special election for U.S. Senate.

Figure 1.3 further examines this trend in U.S. Senate elections since 1948. The figure illustrates Democratic voting in Massachusetts compared to the rest of the country.

FIGURE 1.3: U.S. Senate Democratic Vote Percentages in Massachusetts compared to the rest of the nation during Election Years, 1948-2014.

SOURCE: Compiled by the author on the basis of elections results reported by the U.S. Secretaries of States. Note: National Democratic percentage for US Senate is minus Massachusetts. National N= number of states other than Massachusetts.

Figure 1.3 illustrates the upward trend of Democratic voting overall in Massachusetts since 1948. When looking year-by-year at this graph, the Democratic vote percentage ranges from winning percentages as high as 74 percent to losing percentages as low as 35 percent.

Overall, Democrats have also won the race for U.S. Senate in 20-out-of-26 general elections, or

77 percent of the time. Table 1.7 describes the Massachusetts Democratic Seat Percentage in the

U.S. House of Representatives compared to the rest of the nation since 1948.

TABLE 1.7: Massachusetts Democratic Seat Percentage in the U.S. House of Representatives compared to rest of the nation, 1948-2014.

MA National MA Democratic Democratic Democratic Year Seat Difference US Reps US Reps % Seat % Seat % (less MA) 1948 43 61 -18 1950 43 54 -11 1952 43 49 -6 1954 50 53 -3 1956 50 53 -3 1958 57 65 -8 1960 57 61 -4 1962 58 60 -2 1964 58 68 -10 1966 58 57 +1 1968 58 56 +2 1970 67 58 +9 1972 75 55 +20 1974 83 66 +17 1976 83 67 +16 1978 83 64 +19 1980 83 55 +28 1982 91 61 +30 1984 91 58 +33 1986 91 58 +33 1988 91 59 +32 1990 91 61 +30 1992 80 59 +21 1994 80 47 +33 1996 100 46 +54 1998 100 47 +53 2000 100 48 +52 2002 100 46 +54 2004 100 45 +55 2006 100 52 +48 2008 100 58 +42 2010 100 43 +57 2012 100 45 +55 2014 100 42 +58 Total % 76 55 +21 N = 391 SOURCE: Compiled by the author on the basis of elections results reported by the U.S. House of Representatives. N = Number of US House races. Note: Percentages are rounded to closest whole number.

Table 1.7 shows the total Massachusetts Democratic seat advantage is 76 percent compared to a total of 55 percent nationwide. Since 1966, Massachusetts has had a higher

Democratic percentage than the national average during each year analyzed. When looking at the

30 table the Massachusetts Democratic seat difference percentage ranges from +1 to +58 in 25-out- of-34 elections examined. In the other nine elections, the Massachusetts Democratic seat percentage had a negative difference compared to the nation ranging from -2 to -18. Of note, since 1996 until present, 100 percent of the Massachusetts delegation in the U.S. House of

Representatives is Democratic. To further examine this trend in U.S. House elections since 1948,

Figure 1.4 illustrates Democratic voting in Massachusetts compared to the rest of the country.

FIGURE 1.4: Massachusetts Democratic Seat Percentage in the U.S. House of Representatives compared to rest of the nation, 1948-2014.

SOURCE: Compiled by the author on the basis of elections results reported by the U.S. House of Representatives. Note: Percentages are rounded to closest whole number.

Figure 1.4 illustrates the upward trend of Democratic voting overall in Massachusetts since 1948. When looking year-by-year at this graph, the Massachusetts Democratic seat advantage ranges from winning percentages as high as 100 percent to losing percentages as low as 43 percent in 1948-1952. Democrats have held the majority of Massachusetts delegation seats 31 in the U.S. House in 29-out-of-32 general elections; or 91 percent of the time. In 1954 and 1956, each major party held 7-of-the-14 seats, or 50 percent, thus neither held a majority. Now turning to state elections in Massachusetts, Table 1.8 describes the gubernatorial Democratic vote percentages in Massachusetts compared to the rest of the nation since 1948.

TABLE 1.8: Gubernatorial Democratic Vote Percentages in Massachusetts compared to the rest of the nation during Election Years, 1948-2014.

MA National MA National Year Democratic Democratic Difference N % % % 1948 59 58 +1 35 1950 56 53 +3 34 1952 49 53 -4 32 1954 48 57 -9 35 1956 53 55 -2 32 1958 56 60 -4 35 1960 47 55 -8 30 1962 50 55 -5 36 1964 49 55 -6 24 1966 37 48 -11 34 1970 43 51 -8 34 1974 54 57 -3 34 1978 53 51 +2 36 1982 60 54 +6 35 1986 69 52 +17 35 1990 47 51 -4 35 1994 28 44 -16 35 1998 47 43 +4 35 2002 45 44 +1 35 2006 56 50 +6 35 2010 48 43 +5 36 2014 47 42 +5 35 Total % 50 51 N = 22 SOURCE: Compiled by the author on the basis of elections results reported by the U.S. Secretaries of States. Note: National Democratic percentage for governor is minus Massachusetts. National N= number of states other than Massachusetts. Note: In Massachusetts, in 1962, Peabody (D) won a plurality. In 2010, Deval Patrick (D) won a plurality.

Table 1.8 shows the total Massachusetts Democratic vote percentages is 50 percent compared to a total of 51 percent nationwide. This is the only instance that Massachusetts has a lower total percentage for a particular office when compared to the nation. When looking at the

32 table Massachusetts Democratic difference vote percentages range from +1 to +17 in 10-out-of-

22 elections compared to the nation. In the other twelve elections, the Massachusetts Democratic seat percentage had a negative difference compared to the nation ranging from -2 to -16. In the race for Massachusetts governor, Democrats have won in 11-out-of-22 general elections, or 50 percent of the time. To further examine this trend in gubernatorial elections since 1948, Figure

1.5 illustrates Democratic voting in Massachusetts compared to the rest of the country.

FIGURE 1.5: Gubernatorial Democratic Vote Percentages in Massachusetts compared to the rest of the nation during Election Years, 1948-2014.

SOURCE: Compiled by the author on the basis of elections results reported by the U.S. Secretaries of States. Note: National Democratic percentage for governor is minus Massachusetts. National N= number of states other than Massachusetts. Note: In Massachusetts, in 1962, Peabody (D) won a plurality. In 2010, Deval Patrick (D) won a plurality.

Figure 1.5 illustrates the downward trend of Democratic gubernatorial voting in

Massachusetts since 1948 compared to the nation. When looking at this graph, the Massachusetts

Democratic vote percentages range from winning percentages as high as 69 percent to the lowest

33 losing percentage of 28. This highpoint in 1986 is higher than the yearly national average and the low point in 1994 is lower than the yearly national average.

In general terms, the Massachusetts governor’s race appears to be the most competitive political office between the two major parties during the time frame of this study. Further, this is the lowest total political office percentage when compared to the other five public offices examined in this study.

Table 1.9 compares the Democratic seat percentage in the Massachusetts state senate to rest of the U.S. state senates since 1948. This table represents data for 49 U.S. states including

Massachusetts. Of note, since 1936 Nebraska has had a unicameral legislature elected on a non- partisan basis, therefore that state is not included here.

TABLE 1.9 Democratic Seat Percentage in the Massachusetts Senate compared to rest of the U.S. state senates, 1948-2014.

National MA MA State Senates State Senate Democratic Year Democratic Democratic Seat Seat % Seat % Difference % (less MA & NE) 1948 50 55 -5 1950 45 55 -10 1952 38 49 -11 1954 48 55 -7 1956 45 58 -13 1958 60 65 -5 1960 65 64 +1 1962 70 61 +9 1964 70 67 +3 1966 65 58 +7 1968 68 55 +13 1970 75 59 +16 1972 83 59 +24 1974 83 67 +16 1976 83 68 +15 1978 85 66 +19 1980 80 62 +18 1982 83 63 +20 1984 80 61 +19 1986 80 61 +19 1988 78 62 +16 1990 65 62 +3 1992 78 59 +19 1994 75 53 +22 1996 85 51 +34 1998 83 52 +31 2000 85 51 +34 2002 85 49 +36 2004 85 49 +36 2006 88 52 +36 2008 88 53 +35 2010 90 45 +45 2012 90 45 +45 2014 85 42 +43 Total% 74 57 +17 N = 1,360 SOURCE: Compiled by the author on the basis of results reported by 49 U.S. State Legislatures. Note: Since 1936 Nebraska has had a unicameral legislature elected on a non-partisan basis, therefore this state is not included here. Note: Percentages are rounded to closest whole number.

Table 1.9 shows the total Massachusetts Democratic seat advantage is 74 percent compared to a total of 57 percent nationwide. Since 1960, Massachusetts has had a higher

Democratic seat difference percentage than the national average during each year analyzed.

When looking at the table Massachusetts Democratic seat difference percentage ranges from +1 to +45 in 28-out-of-34 elections examined. In the other six elections, the Massachusetts

Democratic seat percentage had a negative difference compared to the nation ranging from -5 to

-13. Since 1958, Democrats have held the majority of state senate seats. In 1948, each major party held 20-of-the-40 seats, or 50 percent, thus neither held a majority. Figure 1.6 further examines the trend of the Democratic seat advantage in the Massachusetts Senate compared to rest of the U.S. state senates.

FIGURE 1.6: Democratic Seat Percentage in the Massachusetts Senate compared to rest of the U.S. state senates, 1948-2014.

SOURCE: Compiled by the author on the basis of results reported by 49 U.S. State Legislatures. Note: Since 1936 Nebraska has had a unicameral legislature elected on a non-partisan basis, therefore this state is not included here. Note: Percentages are rounded to closest whole number. 36

Figure 1.6 illustrates the upward trend of Democratic voting overall in Massachusetts since 1948. When looking year-by-year at this graph, the Massachusetts Democratic state senate seat advantage ranges from winning percentages as high as 90 percent to losing percentages as low as 38. Democrats have held the majority of state senate seats in 29-out-of-33 general elections; or 88 percent of the time. In 1948, each major party held 20-of-the-40 seats, or 50 percent, thus neither held a majority.

Table 1.10 compares the Democratic seat percentage in the Massachusetts state house of representatives to rest of the U.S. state house of representatives since 1948. This table represents data for 49 U.S. states including Massachusetts. Of note, since 1936 Nebraska has had a unicameral legislature elected on a non-partisan basis, therefore that state is not included here.

TABLE 1.10: Democratic Seat Percentage in the Massachusetts House of Representatives compared to rest of the U.S. state houses of representatives, 1948-2014.

National MA Democratic MA Democratic Democratic Year State Reps Seat Difference State Reps Seat % % Seat % (less MA & NE) 1948 51 57 -6 1950 52 53 -1 1952 48 49 -1 1954 53 57 -4 1956 55 55 0 1958 60 66 -6 1960 65 61 +4 1962 63 59 +4 1964 70 66 +4 1966 70 57 +13 1968 72 56 +16 1970 74 60 +14 1972 75 58 +17 1974 80 68 +12 1976 81 67 +14 1978 80 63 +17 1980 80 60 +20 1982 82 63 +19 1984 79 57 +22 1986 79 59 +20 1988 79 60 +19 1990 77 60 +17 1992 78 58 +20 1994 78 51 +27 1996 78 52 +26 1998 82 52 +30 2000 86 51 +35 2002 85 49 +36 2004 87 49 +38 2006 88 54 +34 2008 90 56 +34 2010 80 45 +35 2012 82 47 +35 2014 79 42 +37 Total% 72 56 +16 N = 6,720 SOURCE: Compiled by the author on the basis of results reported by 49 U.S. State Legislatures. Note: Since 1936 Nebraska has had a unicameral legislature elected on a non-partisan basis, therefore this state is not included here. Note: Percentages are rounded to closest whole number.

Table 1.10 shows the total Massachusetts Democratic seat advantage is 72 percent compared to a total of 56 percent nationwide. Since 1960, Massachusetts has had a higher

Democratic seat difference percentage than the national average during each year analyzed.

When looking at the table Massachusetts Democratic seat difference percentage ranges from +4 to +38 in 28-out-of-34 elections examined. In the five other elections, the Massachusetts

Democratic seat percentage had a negative difference compared to the nation ranging from -1 to

-6, and in 1956, both Massachusetts and the rest of the nation have an equal Democratic seat percentage of 55, so there is zero difference. Figure 1.7 further examines the trend of the

Democratic seat advantage in the Massachusetts House of Representatives compared to rest of the U.S. Houses of Representatives.

FIGURE 1.7: Democratic Seat Percentage in the Massachusetts House of Representatives compared to rest of the U.S. state houses of representatives, 1948-2014.

SOURCE: Compiled by the author on the basis of results reported by 49 US State Legislatures. Note: Since 1936 Nebraska has had a unicameral legislature elected on a non-partisan basis, therefore this state is not included here. Note: Percentages are rounded to closest whole number.

Figure 1.7 illustrates the upward trend of Democratic voting overall in Massachusetts since 1948. When looking year-by-year at this graph, the Democratic state representative seat advantage in Massachusetts ranges from winning percentages as high as 90 percent to losing percentages as low as 48. With the exception of 1952, Democrats have held the majority of state representative seats in 33-out-of-34 general elections; or 97 percent of the time, compared to the national average of 85 percent.

V. Research Questions

Due to the critical role that voters play in elections, it is important to study voter party registration and its influence on election results. This investigation therefore examines the following research questions: What is the effect of party registration on the Democratic vote in

Massachusetts? What is the effect of party registration on the Democratic vote geographically in

Massachusetts? How does party ID relate to voting behavior in Massachusetts?

By analyzing how registration affects results in Massachusetts elections, this study provides critical information to parties, candidates, and voters seeking to maximize their electoral decision-making. It is important to examine the key variables that are involved in this registration-vote relationship. After reviewing the existing literature, several questions remain unanswered, thus indicating the need for further research.

VI. Conclusion

40 variables influence the outcome of elections and play important roles along with partisanship, such as incumbency status, money, educational level, parties, candidates, issues, and other factors. However, the specific item chosen as the main variable of interest for this dissertation has been understudied and needs to be further analyzed in a scientific manner.

This original research provides additional insight into the main variable of interest and its influence on elections. This Massachusetts case study of 67 years, 35 general elections, 8,536 races, and six major political offices should be viewed as a much needed addition to the scholarly literature on party registration. By increasing our empirical knowledge of this specific area of elections, we gain valuable information and understanding for voters, parties, and candidates that encompass the electoral settings within our system of representative government.

-Chapter 2- Literature Review

This study is focused on the effect of partisanship in Massachusetts elections. The authors of The American Voter described the concept of partisanship as a “perceptual screen,” meaning that through it voters see what supports their own partisan orientation while filtering out dissonant information (Campbell et al. 1960). But before discussing this, it is important to understand the concept of party identification, the scholarly challenges to the partisan school of thought, and party registration. Such an understanding will provide the context necessary for understanding the complexities of the effect of partisanship in American elections.

Partisanship is the ultimate cue to how “people like me” think about candidates and issues and to which party in an election is likely to best represent an individual’s views. Partisanship also mobilizes people to show up at the polls to support “their party” and prevent the opposition from gaining office. These multiple effects are why partisanship is widely cited as the most important concept developed in political behavior research. (Dalton 2013: 13)

There is a wealth of research on political behavior and party identification, however, there is a very limited amount of empirical work on the influence of party registration on vote choice. This chapter exposes the need to examine the effect of party registration on election outcomes, and also justifies the major research question posed in this dissertation. What influence does party registration have on election results in Massachusetts?

I. Concept of Party ID

Definition

Decades of electoral research on partisanship have touted the vital importance of party identification. In fact, party ID has been called “the linchpin of our modern understanding of electoral democracy, and is likely to retain that crucial theoretical position” (Weisberg and

Greene 2003: 115). The theory first derived from The American Voter (Campbell et al. 1960) is that party identification is both very stable over time and may be the single best predictor of how someone will vote. Party identification is a psychological affiliation a voter has with a political party. It is an emotional attachment, or in other words, an “affective orientation” (Campbell et al.

1960: 121), toward one of the two major political parties, which is measured by survey questions. It is not a measure of behavior—for instance, who someone voted for, or ticket splitters—though it may influence behavior. It is not formal party membership, for instance, one being a card carrying organization member, nor is it registration in a party. It is also not a measure of a person’s ideology, such as being conservative or liberal, nor a summary of a voter’s issue positions. In fact, overall, party identification may have very little intellectual attachment, being analogous to choosing ones’ favorite baseball team. People are socialized into it based on their environment.

Major characteristics

The Michigan model of The American Voter illustrates for us that party ID, similar to choosing a favorite sports team, is psychological and not based on rational choice. Among the important characteristics of party ID are that it creates emotional ties to a party that are inherited from parents—it is stable at the individual level, for example, party switching is rare; it grows stronger with age; and, that its major source of change is young people, when someone is of voting age, which can imply future changes in a decade or so, since young people, in general, do not vote in large numbers, as opposed to older people.

The crux of party identification is that, “it is antecedent to, distinct from, and influential of individual voting decisions” (Keith et al. 1992: 10). In general, most people do not think about

43 politics at a high level, and do not have detailed knowledge about politics. Since they do not have factual knowledge (Delli Carpini and Keeter 1996), party identification serves as an anchor for voters. It should also be understood that in spite of the strong influences of the party, voters could vote against their identification if valid reasons are provided to them. When individuals are confronted with a candidate with which they are not familiar, they tend to fall back on their initial standing preference among the parties. In this manner, the process of identification with a party serves as a heuristic, which drives individuals to make decisions about candidates when they have little information to give them guidance. Party ID is a shortcut for voters (Lupia 1994).

Measurement

Much of the literature on party identification is based on survey questionnaires. In fact, party ID is a product of survey research (Keith et al. 1992: 3). Public opinion polls use these questions: “Generally speaking, do you usually think of yourself as a Republican, Democrat, an

Independent, or what?” If the respondent answers “Republican” or “Democrat,” then the interviewer continues by asking, “Would you call yourself a strong Republican [Democrat] or a not very strong Republican [Democrat]?” However, if the respondent states that they are an

“Independent,” then the interviewer asks: “Do you think of yourself as closer to the Republican party or to the Democratic party?” Polling questions, for example, often provide seven categories

(e.g., a seven-point scale) for measurement of party identification: Strong Democrat; Weak

Democrat; Independent Democrat; Pure Independent; Independent Republican; Weak

Republican; and, Strong Republican. These survey questions measure both the direction of partisanship—Democrats and Republicans—as well as the strength of the concept from strong partisans to independents.

Campbell et al. (1960: 121) state that, “great numbers of voters have party attachments that persist through time. The fact that attachments of this sort are widely held is confirmed by survey data on individual people.” More recently, however, the authors of The Myth of the

Independent Voter (1992: 3) state, “The portentous trend from partisanship to independence reflects an increase in the proportion of respondents who tell interviewers that they consider themselves not Republicans or Democrats but independents.” As the percentage of independents has grown in public opinion surveys, this has generated substantial debate on the implications of this trend for American politics (Dalton 2013: 9). Since 2004, about 40 percent of the American public call themselves independent, outnumbering both Democrats (about one-third of the public) and Republicans (just over a quarter of the public). The largest group of Americans today is independent of party identities (Dalton 2013: 2).

Effects on Political Behavior, Especially Voting

Much of this literature posits that voters are raised into a political camp. Early political socialization studies found that individuals are oriented by their family long before reaching voting age (Hyman 1959). “For a large proportion of the electorate the orientation toward politics expressed in our measure of party identification has its origins in the early family years”

(Campbell et al. 1960: 147). People not only vote for Democratic or Republican candidates, they consider themselves to be a Democrat or a Republican. Partisan orientations form early in life,

“often before young people fully understand the content of these labels” (Dalton 2013: 3). Voters claim their party ID in a manner similar to identifying their social class or religion (Campbell,

Guring, and Miller 1954). Partisan orientations often remain from childhood throughout a person’s lifetime, even as the candidates and the parties themselves change (Hess and Torney

1967; Jennings and Niemi 1974). As the authors of The American Voter claim, “Once a person has acquired some embryonic party attachment, it is easy for him to discover that most events in the ambiguous world of politics redound to the credit of his chosen party” (1960: 165).

The common citizen does not follow a majority of the political issues that take place, and make his or her participation by means of identifying themselves with political groups, organizations, racial or religious associations, or by means of symbols of identification that are either personalized or institutional, such as a political icon or a political party. As many scholars find, the most forceful power influencing the voting preference of an individual in an election is their party identification. Voters have a psychological bent toward the two major political parties.

II. Challenges to the Partisan School

Conceptual Debate — Partisanship and Independence

Previous writing on the effects of party ties on election outcomes can be divided into two concepts—partisanship and independence. The first claims that partisanship drives elections. The second claims that independence drives elections. These concepts are drawn from the scholarly literature which can be divided into the partisan school and the counter-revisionist literature versus the somewhat anti-partisan works of the revisionist school. In terms of voting, “the most important effect of party attachments is their influence on voting behavior” (Hershey 2011: 108).

The decline of parties theme essentially proposes that many fewer American voters are now affected by party ties, and thus are exhibiting independence. Burnham wrote of the “onward march of party decomposition” (1970: 91). Further, The Changing American Voter (Nie, Verba, and Petrocik 1976: 47) concludes that the decline of partisanship has been the “most dramatic

46 political change in the American public.” Dalton (2013: 8) recently furthered the support for the concept of independence claiming, “Apartisans are interested in politics and are often politically sophisticated, but they lack a partisan identity.”

Partisanship

Underpinned by decades of empirical research, the concept of partisanship argues that party identification is strong and is the most stable and important determinant of voting

(Campbell et al. 1960: 146; Converse 1964: 240; Green and Palmquist 1990, 1994; Miller 1991;

Keith et al. 1992; Green, Palmquist and Schickler 2002). With regard to partisanship, not independence, driving politics in Massachusetts elections, research finds that “most Americans identify with a political party, or at least consider themselves closer to one major party or the other,” and that, “party identification is still strongly associated with the vote” (Lewis-Beck et al.

2008: 424).

In terms of the electorate’s preferences and candidate’s compatibility with them, party ties are an organization tool. “There is an ongoing dynamic or interaction between parties and groups that leads to a sorting out of voters” (Brewer and Stonecash 2009: 207). A candidate’s party label can also be a source of material resources such as campaign finance and staff, along with the emotional attachments it may hold for the voters. Stokes and Miller (1962) claim that the electorate responds to individual legislative candidates overwhelmingly on the basis of their party labels, which is one piece of information every voter is guaranteed. Further, partisan attachments “respond very slowly to voters’ impressions of current party leaders, their policies, and their success or failure in handling government” (Miller and Shanks 1996: 495). Bartels

(2002: 64) finds, for instance, that party ID and voters’ partisan and ideological biases, and

47 general political attitudes are primarily important, claiming only when large numbers of uncommitted voters agree on candidates are their “assessments likely to have a significant impact on the election results.” Voters’ impressions of the candidates’ personalities are strongly shaped by more basic political predispositions, thus, candidate traits and images are of secondary importance with only modest effects in presidential elections (Bartels 2002).

Prior research also claims that political parties serve as “informative brands” (Snyder and

Ting 2002: 90) to voters. Therefore, pre-existing voter dispositions, based partly on party name, must be taken into account. Just as in private markets, well-known brand names have a reputation and a loyal following. Downs (1957) posits that political actors behaving like businessmen (e.g., in that private firms seek to profit-maximize via product production), seek to vote-maximize via policy production. Over time this results, in part, on the party’s brand name, reputation, and loyal following of voters. The image of a party and the connection that voters may feel to that party certainly can propel a candidate into a seat, based on an attachment between them and voters that they may have never (nor will ever) meet face-to-face. These candidates receive votes based, in part, on the party’s brand name printed next to the candidate’s name on the Election Day ballot, and exposure throughout their campaigns that reference their party. “During the past half-century, party identifiers have voted for their party’s candidates most of the time” (Hershey 2011: 108).

In terms of image, in recent decades, candidates in Massachusetts from “outside” the

Democratic Party certainly, both in reality and perception, face a powerful electoral challenge on many fronts such as fundraising, party bias among voters, and sheer numbers of party supporters for their opponents campaign organizations. Recently, for example, Republican U.S. Senator

Scott Brown essentially fell-victim to these challenges in the fall of 2012, a well-liked and

48 popular Senator wearing the “wrong” party label. On average, at this time, Republican candidates running for federal or state office in Massachusetts begin with the odds stacked against them. Rational, goal-oriented political actors face collective action and coordination problems, “thus a ‘party in service’ acts as a partisan brand name valuable to candidates in solving the collective action problem of information in the electorate, and mobilization issues”

(Aldrich 1995: 290).

Independence

On the other hand, the concept of political independence essentially claims that partisanship is not a replacement for the independent thought and behavior of the voters. “Today, fewer Americans express a party identification than at any time in modern electoral history”

(Dalton 2013: 7). This independence concept emphasizes that party identification is weaker, more fluid and malleable, and less important among more active and attentive voters comprising the electorate, than is believed to exist in the partisanship school. Regarding the party dealignment thesis, Wattenberg (1996) in The Decline of American Political Parties , extends beyond the claim that more voters are independent of parties, and in fact, argues that the growing independence of voters is based not on neutrality or even dislike of the two parties, but on a perception that the parties are actually irrelevant to them.

In terms of party attachments, the empirical analysis of The Changing American Voter

(Nie et al. 1976) contrasts sharply with the view of the American public provided in The

American Voter (Campbell et al. 1960). The Michigan view portrayed a largely passive citizenry, unaware of, and unconcerned about political issues, guided in its electoral choices primarily by party allegiance or identification. But, Nie et al. show that voters in the 1960s and early 1970s

49 were not only more aware of and sensitive to political issues but also far more likely to rely on their own issue positions and to desert their political party in making the voting decision.

The political behavior of the electorate is not determined solely by psychological and sociological forces, as Campbell et al. claim, but also by current issues and by the way in which candidates present them. Essentially, The Changing American Voter says that party ID still plays an important, though diminishing role, within an active and attentive citizenry.

The partisan view set forth in The American Voter faces more recent challenges from the independence camp. Indeed, there is a deep philosophical tradition that sees independence from political parties as a benefit to democracy (Rosenblum 2008).

These new independents may come closer to the model of the rational citizen that is lionized in democratic theory but seldom found in the early empirical studies of public opinion. A sophisticated independent might be politically engaged and even vote but lack firm commitments to a specific party. Such an independent might actually judge the candidates and sometimes pick the best candidate regardless of party. (Dalton 2013: 8)

In terms of their sheer numbers, according to Dalton (2013: 10), “Apartisan independents are too large a group to ignore in elections, and their preferences can and do often shift election outcomes.”

Additionally, as another alternative to party attachment and voter inactivity, Key (1966) in The Responsible Electorate (and later Fiorina, 1981) offers an illustration of voter independence and activity as a reward-punishment system, in which—voters reward politicians and their parties when they produce the results they want and punish them when they do not.

This theory is also against Campbell et al. (1960) in that the electorate is not passive and driven primarily by party identification, but instead they have issues in mind when voting and thus behave actively and rationally. “Voters are not fools,” according to Key (1966: 7). His study

50 finds that the electorate judges retrospectively. Essentially, he is saying that issues do have significance in American presidential politics even though their force is intermingled with the simultaneous influence of the candidates and ongoing events, along with party identification.

Although even Key and Munger (1959), in terms of partisan stability, speak of the “standing decision” of voter’s in partisan support of one major party or another. This clearly infers some level of party attachment, and therefore weakens the argument on voter independence.

Even assuming for a moment, any level of voting independence in Massachusetts, the state’s political culture generally exhibits strong partisanship based on preferences that have emerged from shared values and social relations to justify political behavior. Also, although over the courses of a persons’ life—as children, teenagers, young adults, older adults—there may be challenges to their partisan loyalties, “large-scale change in party identifications is the exception, however, and not the rule” (Hershey 2011: 103). Regarding party ID, “selective attention and selective exposure posit that individuals are more likely to attend to information and information sources they judge to be familiar than to challenge existing beliefs and preferences” (Neuman et al. 2007: 2). Massachusetts and its voters appear an example of this.

Franklin and Jackson (1983: 968) also claim that party identification is more malleable than the Michigan model claims, and that it is more susceptible to short-term change. According to Franklin and Jackson:

The most significant implication of our analysis is that party identification is not the fixed, exogenous force organizing other political behavior that we thought at one time. Party identifications are subject to change as individual preferences change, assuming fixed party positions, or as a consequence of shifts in the party positions, if individual preferences are stable, or both. Identifications are more than the result of a set of early socializing experiences, possibly reinforced by subsequent social and political activity. They are a person’s accumulated evaluations from previous elections and are dependent upon the events and the actions of political leaders during these elections and during subsequent terms in office. In this way, each campaign leaves its imprint, or residue, on individual

identifications. The adjustment process is more evolutionary than implied by the pure spatial models, in that previous partisanship exerts a significant brake on shifts in party preferences. (Franklin and Jackson 1983: 968)

Essentially, the alternative interpretations presented between the concepts of partisanship and independence emphasize the psychological attachment aspects versus the practical, decision- making aspects of voter party identification, respectively.

Independent Voters

Scholars claim that party ties for independent voters have not changed over time, dating back to The American Voter . Converse (1976) said the increasing numbers of independents since the 1960s may have been due to social and racial conflicts, and the Vietnam War. Keith et al.

(1992) in The Myth of Independent Voter argue that, although an increasing number of voters are calling themselves independents, the belief that the strong effects of party attachment are declining in the American electorate may be wrong, and/or outdated (Bartels 2000: 35). Keith and his colleagues find that most so-called independents lean toward one of the two major parties and in all important respects resemble outright Democrats or Republicans, similar to the findings of Petrocik (1974).

It is somewhat understandable that there is an appeal to the independent label in

American society. Again, this type of romantic imagery can further be thought of in terms of a classic high school civics text:

As on the playground, some do not care always to go with the crowd, or even prefer to be by themselves. Such as these, who think for themselves, and dare to stand alone, make the Independents in politics. They are likely to prefer the good of their country to the success of their party. They will not act with their party, or will leave it, if it is wrong. If the other party changes, as parties sometimes change, and advocates measures that they believe in; if they change their own minds as sensible men sometimes must; or if the other party puts forward better

candidates; or if a new party arises, the independent voters are willing to act wherever they believe they can best secure the public welfare. (Dole 1891: 127)

However, Keith et al. (1992: 13) claim that nearly two-thirds, the majority, of those who initially label themselves in surveys as independents concede that they are closer to one or the other major party. Most independents do not “dare to stand alone.” These are the “leaners,” “partisan

Independents,” or “Independent Republicans” and “Independent Democrats.” On the other hand, the minority segment of independents, or “Pure Independents” are those who continue to deny any partisan inclinations when asked in surveys about closeness to a party.

“Pure Independents” are not the good citizens touted by the concept of independence, but rather that the partisans are the good citizens. Partisans are more interested, more informed, and participate more in politics than “Pure Independents.” Overall, what is most true of “Pure

Independents” is that they are less informed and less interested in politics. They generally do not vote, do not write letters to newspaper editors, do not follow campaigns closely, and do not even read a daily newspaper on a regular basis (Mayer, 2012 lecture).

“Pure Independents,” however, may be more persuadable than independent leaners. The picture that emerges from Keith et al.’s (1992) study is that independent leaners have information and “Pure Independents” are much less informed. In fact, according to Hershey

(2011: 113), these attitudinal independents are “less well informed than party identifiers are, less concerned about specific elections, and less likely to vote.” However, this small percentage of these true independent and/or even swing voters (about 10 percent) is what the battle via campaigns is about in presidential elections, for instance.

The percentage that political parties and their candidates try to influence with their campaigns is relatively small because not a lot of voters change their minds. A major reason for

53 this is that party identification anchors the voter to their party. Therefore, both major parties must fight for the swing voters, not the base. As Mayer (2007: 385; 2008: 4) indicates, not all voters are equal, and that voters will receive campaign attention based on their expected payoff—in terms of either votes gained or not lost. Further, Campbell (2008) claims the theory of the predictable campaign—political competition, presidential incumbency, and election-year economic conditions—suggests that increased coverage of campaign issues by the press and increased attention by the electorate will not affect the decisions of most voters. He says,

This is because most voters have already made up their minds or can be reminded of the basis of their partisanship. Most voters have an easy or relatively easy time reaching their vote choices. For the vast majority, additional information about the candidates, their records, and their issue positions would make little if any difference to their vote. Nevertheless, increased attention to the content of the campaign may be helpful to a small but important minority of late-deciding voters. About 4 or 5 percent of voters for major-party candidates in typical presidential elections are late-deciding independents who might benefit from an increased focus on the issue positions and leadership qualities of the candidates. Additionally, about another 9 percent of voters in the typical election are late- deciding partisans who decide during the campaign to defect and vote for the opposing party’s candidate. These voters struggle with their choice and additional information may make a difference. (Campbell 2008: 201) Again, a major reason for this is because party identification anchors the voter to their party. The strong influence of party identification in Massachusetts, for instance, has been anchoring voters to the Democratic Party for decades.

III. Voter/ Party Registration

Definition

Voter registration is the process used by the U.S. government to ensure that everyone who votes in an election is legally eligible to do so, votes in the assigned location, and only votes once. Registering to vote is required in order to cast a ballot in all U.S. states, except North

Dakota. To register, a person needs to be a U.S. citizen, 18 or older by the next election, and a

54 resident of the state. Also, most states do not allow voter registration if a person is a felon or mentally incompetent (Secretaries of States, 2015). The National Voter Registration Act of 1993 , also known as the Motor Voter Act , has enhanced voter registration opportunities for people by making required forms and assistance available at state or local government offices such as motor vehicle offices, public libraries, public schools, offices of city and county clerks, fishing and hunting license bureaus, government revenue offices, unemployment compensation offices, and government offices providing services to persons with disabilities (www.justice.gov, 2015).

People can also register to vote by mail and online. In Massachusetts, for instance, the

Online Voter Registration System allows eligible voters to submit an internet application. They must have a valid driver’s license, learner’s permit, or non-driver ID issued by the Massachusetts

Registry of Motor Vehicles (RMV). They must also have a signature on file with the RMV. If they don’t have an RMV ID, voters can still use the online system to create an application, then print out and sign the completed form, and mail or bring it to their local election office.

Massachusetts voters can use this online system to apply to register to vote, change their name or address for voter registration purposes, and enroll in a political party, change their party enrollment, or unenroll from a party (Massachusetts Secretary of State, 2015).

Party Registration in Massachusetts

Massachusetts voter registration is similar to 31 other U.S. states and the District of

Columbia (State Secretaries of State, 2015; DC Board of Elections, 2015), in that the enrollment status of a voter includes their official party choice. Only a person who is a U.S. citizen, a resident of Massachusetts, 18 years old on or before Election Day is allowed to register, and thus able to vote in the state. In order to vote they must be registered: 20 days before all primaries and

55 elections, and/or, 10 days before a special town meeting. If they are registering to vote for the first time in Massachusetts, The Help America Vote Act of 2002 requires those who registered to vote by mail on or after January 1, 2003 to show identification when voting for the first time in a federal election. Registrants may include a copy of an approved identification—such as a current and valid driver’s license, state-issued ID card, or any other government document showing their name and address—with their registration, otherwise, they may be asked to provide identification at their polling place (Massachusetts Secretary of State 2015).

In Massachusetts, when a person registers to vote, they may choose to enroll in a political party or political designation or may choose to remain unenrolled, which is commonly referred to as independent. If they do not enroll in a party, they may still vote in state and presidential primaries by choosing a party ballot and will remain unenrolled from a political party. Once they make an enrollment choice they may change their enrollment status by notifying their election official in writing at least 20 days before an election. If they enroll in either of the two major parties, Democratic or Republican, they may vote only in that party’s primary. Germane to this study of Massachusetts general elections, “enrollment in a political party does not affect your right to vote in the general election. In the general election, all voters receive the same ballot and vote for the candidate of their choice, regardless of party enrollment” (Massachusetts Secretary of State 2015).

Political parties are a collective platform by which citizens participate in their government and representative democracy. Essentially, a political party is a free association of people, one of the aims of which is to participate in the management of public affairs, including through the presentation of candidates to free and democratic elections. Massachusetts voters have a selection of 4 political parties and 24 legal, political

56 designations in which they can choose enroll in. The 4 political parties are the Democratic Party,

Republican Party, Green-Rainbow Party, and the United Independent Party (not to be confused with being an unenrolled, unaffiliated, or independent voter). If a Massachusetts voter enrolls in any of these 4 parties they may vote only in that party’s primary. Enrollment in a political party does not affect their right to vote in the general election. In the general election, all voters receive the same ballot and vote for the candidate of their choice, regardless of party enrollment

(Massachusetts Secretary of State 2015).

In addition to these political parties, there are 24 legal, political designations in which

Massachusetts voters can also enroll. Currently these are: America First Party, American

Independent Party, American Terms Limits, Conservative Party, Constitution Party, Green Party

USA, Independent 3 rd Party, Libertarian, Massachusetts Independent Party, Natural Law Party,

New Alliance Party, New World Council, Pirate, Pizza Party, Prohibition Party, Rainbow

Coalition, Reform Party, Socialist, Twelve Visions Party, Timesizing not Downsizing, Veterans

Party America, We The People, Working Families, and the World Citizens Party Massachusetts

(Massachusetts Secretary of State 2015). This study only examines the two major political parties—Democratic and Republican—because the third parties and legal, political designations only account for about a half of a percent of the Massachusetts electorate.

In the seminal study, The American Voter , Campbell et al. (1960: 266) claim that voters are responsive to the “political system” that they exist and participate within. The Massachusetts political system, as with all other U.S. states, elects the president, its U.S. senators and governor on a statewide basis, and also holds elections for the U.S. House of Representatives and the state legislature in districts across the state. There are 351 cities and towns in the Commonwealth of

Massachusetts divided into 14 counties with about 4.1 million registered voters in the state. The

57 governor is the chief executive officer of the Commonwealth, and is elected every four years.

Prior to 1966, the governor was elected every two years. The state legislature (officially called the General Court) is the bicameral legislative body of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts. It consists of a 40-member Senate and a 160-member House of Representatives. Prior to 1978, there were 240 members in the House of Representatives, some in multi-member districts.

Members of the state senate and house are elected to two-year terms in even-numbered years

(Massachusetts Secretary of State 2015).

Party Registration Literature is Sparse

There is a lack of previous scholarly research on the topic of party registration. In fact, there is not even a reference article on party registration in the “Parties and Elections” section in the International Encyclopedia of the Social and Behavioral Sciences (2014). In this section, within this well-known reference source, there are scholarly works on party ID, voter turnout, and numerous other voting and elections topics, except registration per se or about its influence on elections. In general, most academic literature on registration mainly focuses on voter turnout or on the obstacles to voter registration per se. This body of scholarly work does not examine the effect of registration on vote choice. However, the current study does examine this issue.

In Massachusetts, as Finkel and Scarrow (1985: 625) argue, “there is a strong but not perfect correlation between the pattern of partisanship as indicated by voter enrollment figures and the pattern established by voter self-descriptions.” Further, they state, “Not only may independents masquerade as partisans; the opposite is also true. Partisans may refuse to make public their partisanship, preferring the status of non-enrollment.” In states, like Massachusetts,

58 this tactic is positively encouraged in the sense that the mechanics of the enrollment system here provide the basis for large numbers of independents. According to Finkel and Scarrow:

In Massachusetts it is possible for a non-enrolled voter to appear at the polling place on primary election day, formally declare a party affiliation, vote, and then formally change affiliation back to that of non-enrollment. A voter who takes advantage of this opportunity can maintain partisan anonymity during the period between primaries and flexibility of partisan choice on the day of the primary. (Finkel and Scarrow 1985: 630)

Essentially, these authors find that the legal registration status of a voter probably influences their self-description regarding their party identification. These scholars claim that “This is strong evidence that survey responses to the party identification question are influenced by enrollment status” (Finkel and Scarrow 1985: 634). Dalton (2013) does not examine registration laws as an explanation for the rise in independent voters that he discusses. However, it appears that the enrollment system does play a role in encouraging the increase of registered independent voters in Massachusetts.

Political practitioners often turn to party registration data to determine whether a given district is marginal, heavily Democratic or Republican. They then rely on such a determination as a guide to a range of decisions. Bruce Cain observes that registration data

…are not biased by candidate, election, and issue-specific factors. They are easy to work with and appealing as a measure of partisan strength. Typically, rules of thumb develop about the safety of seats with registration of certain amounts.... These rules of thumb become so universally accepted that they affect the decisions of all sorts of political actors. The opposing party will base its targeting decision on the level of registration. Challengers and potential candidates will assess their prospects by studying registration figures. These figures will even influence the decisions of contributors. (1984: 141)

Importantly, as evidenced above, political practitioners depend, in part, on party registration data as a partisan indicator in guiding election campaigns and decision-making. Further, as Costantini and Dannehl (1993) claim…

Political practitioners have confidence in party registration data as indicators of expected voting outcomes; they use these data when deciding whether to become candidates for legislative office, where to target political efforts and allocate scarce political resources, how to draw district lines during the decennial dance over reapportionment, and so on. (31)

These authors examined the relationship between legislative election outcomes in California and the partisan predispositions of district electorates as reflected in voter registration data. They analyzed the extent to which Democratic candidates for Congress and the state legislature over a two-decade period failed to receive election-day support commensurate with their party’s district registration. Costantini and Dannehl’s regression analysis finds that a legislative district’s party registration indicates a lot about its party vote. Their data analysis reveals that Democratic Party registration in the legislative districts they examined is strongly correlated with the vote received by Democratic candidates in those districts (Pearson’s r = 0.83; p < .001).

IV. Conclusion

In summarizing and evaluating this literature review, there exists a lot of knowledge regarding the concepts of partisanship and independence. However, what is missing from the scholarly literature is the empirical analysis on the effects of party registration on election outcomes specifically, which is currently very limited. This current study of voting is concerned with partisanship in Massachusetts electoral politics. Lots of studies discuss independents in public opinion surveys, but they don’t examine the effects of party registration on voting.

In closing this chapter, it may be understandable that people tend to admire the independent label. The independence concept may further claim that a partisan dealignment is occurring in Massachusetts, especially since 1990, as the registered independent segment of the electorate has steadily grown. The dealignment thesis is based on an assumed reduction in

60 importance of partisan voting. However, it appears that just the opposite is occurring in

Massachusetts. In fact, partisanship remains a powerful and enduring force in American politics.

“Voters continue to perceive candidates, issues, and elections in partisan terms and often vote accordingly” (Hershey 2011: 116). In spite of the fact that people are leaving both major parties in Massachusetts, in terms of enrollment numbers, and have been for several decades,

Massachusetts appears neither to be experiencing a partisan realignment or dealignment. It is true that party registration is down and has been continuing to decline since 1990. This is clearly evident based on the data in Table 1.3, however, during this same time frame, Massachusetts has become more Democratic based on its election results.

Massachusetts may be experiencing continuing partisanship among an increasing numbers of registered independents. As Keith et al. (1992: 4) claim, “Independents, defined inclusively, have little in common. They are more diverse than either Republicans or Democrats.

Most of them are not uncommitted, and they are not a bloc. They are largely closet Democrats and Republicans.” A recent reassessment of Keith et al. (1990) repeats their original claim; that as of 2011, much of the speculation about independents perpetuate a myth (Magleby, Nelson and

Westlye 2011).

It appears that the mechanics of the Bay State’s political system may be influencing the continuing rise of independent voters. Partisans may refuse to make public their partisanship, preferring the status of non-enrollment. This tactic is positively encouraged in the sense that the mechanics of the state’s enrollment system provides the basis for large numbers of independents.

“Not only may independents masquerade as partisans; the opposite is also true” (Finkel and

Scarrow 1985: 630). Most independents tend to adopt political viewpoints similar to those of

61 voters enrolled in parties, and these partisan viewpoints are reflected in their electoral behavior, even when not reflected in their official, party registration status (Keith et al. 1992).

-Chapter 3- Methodology

Partisanship is the concept being examined in this exploratory study. It has two major measures—party registration and party identification. The main variable of interest in this current analysis is party registration. The Democratic vote is the dependent variable. Party registration is the unit of analysis. The research contribution in this study is an empirical examination of the relationship between party registration and vote choice in Massachusetts general elections. This analysis is conducted on six major federal and state offices from 1948 to

2014. The partisan relationship between voters and parties is measured in terms of election results, registration statistics, and also in survey research via the party identification questions.

Using a non-experimental design (Johnson et al. 2008: 147), the information examined in this study has been gathered from archival data of different sources.

The organization of this chapter is as follows: subsequent to this introduction, the research design is outlined. The populations being examined and sampling plan in the study are then explained. Next, the data collection procedures are discussed. Further, the research questions and hypotheses, including data analysis methods, are presented. Finally, the generalizability of this study and the chapter conclusion are given.

I. Research Design

The research design presented here shows how the empirical questions being asked in this study are analyzed. The primary goal of this exploratory study is to demonstrate the effect of partisanship on state and federal general elections in Massachusetts. A quantitative, correlational research design was deemed appropriate. This approach was chosen because it involves the

63 numeric manipulation of the data (Johnson et al. 2008: 244). The statistical analysis, detailed in the upcoming chapters, assess the relationship between the study’s variables. Pollock (2012: 182) states, “Correlation analysis produces a measure of association known as Pearson’s correlation coefficient or Pearson’s r that gauges the direction and strength of a relationship between two interval-level variables. Regression analysis produces a statistic—the regression coefficient, slope value, or b value—that estimates the size of the effect of the independent variable on the dependent variable.” The quantitative analysis here will examine, for instance, the relationship(s) among the numerical variables of interest for any changes in Democratic vote percentages and any changes in voter registration percentages.

This longitudinal study of Massachusetts elections performs these quantitative methods, using the Statistical Package of the Social Sciences (SPSS), in order to test the hypotheses.

Regarding research methods and design appropriateness, the quantitative research design allows the researcher to compare variables and determine the statistical relationships between the variables in the study. The level of measurement for the independent variables and the dependent variable in this analysis are continuous. They are all operationalized and measured in percentages. The measurement scales of this study’s variables exhibit both order and distance among categories (Berman 2002: 15).

The dependent variable is the Massachusetts Democratic vote. It is measured in percentages as follows: average Democratic percentage of the presidential total, popular vote; average Democratic percentage of the U.S. Senate total vote; average Democratic percentage of the U.S. House total vote; average Democratic percentage of the Massachusetts gubernatorial total vote; average Democratic percentage of the state senate total vote; and, the average

Democratic percentage of the state house of representatives total vote.

The independent variables are party registration and party identification. The party registration variable is measured as the percentage of the total for each of the voter segments within the Massachusetts electorate. This three-point scale consists of Democrats, Republicans, and independents. Since third parties and political designations generally play such a minimal role in Massachusetts election outcomes (and account for less than one percent of the total, registered voting population in the state) they have been excluded from this current analysis.

Party identification is the second independent variable of interest in this study. This variable is also measured in percentages of the total for each of these groups within the

Massachusetts electorate. The party ID of voters is operationalized through the use of survey questions. Survey research uses these questions: “Generally speaking, do you usually think of yourself as a Republican, Democrat, an Independent, or what?” If the respondent answers

“Republican” or “Democrat,” then the interviewer continues by asking, “Would you call yourself a strong Republican [Democrat] or a not very strong Republican [Democrat]?” However, if the respondent states that they are an “Independent,” then the interviewer asks: “Do you think of yourself as closer to the Republican party or to the Democratic party?” These questions provide seven categories (e.g., a seven-point scale) for measurement of party identification: Strong

Democrat, Weak Democrat, Independent Democrat, Pure Independent, Independent Republican,

Weak Republican, and, Strong Republican.

II. Populations/ Sampling Plan

This study collects data for the entire populations involved in this research. For example, this analysis includes all the races for the six political offices being examined in the election years within this study’s time frame. Johnson et al. (2008: 211) state, that when possible, “it

65 would almost always be better to collect data for a population, because we would then be sure that the observed cases accurately reflected the population characteristics of interest.” Therefore, this current study does not sample by choosing a proportion from within the entire population.

Sampling is being done, however, by selecting certain offices and election years to examine.

Regarding variation, this study will only analyze the case of Massachusetts and its major state and federal general elections, as a prime example of the voting paradox already discussed.

Therefore, there is no sampling or variation across U.S. states. This analysis does, however, draw a sample from within the entire set of possible elections during the study’s time frame. For example, state elections for Attorney General, Secretary of State, Treasurer, Auditor, Governor’s

Council, County Sheriff, and others, are excluded in favor of the major offices and elections that are being included in this study. The federal and state general elections within the scope of this study are those held for U.S. President, U.S. Senate, U.S. House of Representatives,

Massachusetts Governor, State Senate, and the State House of Representatives. Further, variation certainly exists among the numerous general elections, which contain thousands of races, millions of voters, and the major parties being examined, which may have implications for other

American states.

Massachusetts, being analyzed as a case study may be viewed, possibly, as an outlier.

Ideologically, for instance, the state has, for quite some time, been seen as extremely liberal, and also financially costly in terms of its elections. However, again, it serves as a leading example to investigate the research questions and the paradox that are being posed in this study.

III. Data Collection

This study tests its hypotheses using data from several premier sources. These sources have been collected from 1948 until 2014. This reflects a time frame consisting of three distinct party registration eras, discussed previously.

Data for this study was obtained by gathering archival information from the

Commonwealth of Massachusetts, survey research centers, as well as other sources. The first data source is the Massachusetts Party Registration Statistics . These data sources are the official political party registration numbers, conducted and published by the Massachusetts Secretary of the Commonwealth, Elections Division. The information contained in these statistics is the statewide party enrollment breakdown of voters—according to the total number of registered voters: categorized by political party, such as Democrat, Republican, and third parties, as well as

“unenrolled” or Independent voters. This data source also provides the percentage of the total for each of these voter and party segments within the electorate. This study has collected registration information on a statewide basis from 1948 to 2014. It has also gathered registration information on a county-level from 1976 to 2014. Of note, 1976 is when the state began organizing this registration data on a county level, in addition to statewide. This is a primary data source.

The second data source is the Massachusetts Elections Statistics . These data sources are the official federal and state election statistics conducted and published by the Massachusetts

Secretary of the Commonwealth, Elections Division. These election results are published as

Public Document 43 (or PD43). The information contained in these election outcomes is based on data for these election years collected and compiled by the Commonwealth from the ballots and polling locations across the state on behalf of candidates. This study has collected elections results data on a statewide basis and also on the county-level from 1948 to 2014.

I collected the state’s raw data on election numbers. Cleaned the data by removing candidate names and replacing the names with party labels—Democrat, Republican, or

Independent. 3 rd party candidates were put into the category named “Others.” In addition, unlike the statewide and county-level elections statistics available for presidential, U.S. Senate, and

Massachusetts gubernatorial elections, the data for congressional and state legislative offices are based on districts, which are drawn and redrawn often. Over time this process often includes and excludes cities and towns from the changing districts throughout the time frame of this study.

Therefore, I chose to disaggregate these made-up, ever-changing district entities. Instead, I standardized the elections data by applying the election results back into the actual 351 cities and towns that voted. The data was then “backed out” of the ever-changing districts, and entered into an Excel file. This Excel file was created with filters to accept the elections data by the 351 cities and towns in the state of Massachusetts. Once the votes were organized by the cities and towns, it was then transferred in the 14 Massachusetts counties (which have been the same since

Massachusetts was one of the original thirteen colonies). Of note, in fact, the only name change that has occurred has been the town of Gay Head on Martha’s Vineyard, which is now Aquinnah.

The third data source is a series of elections survey data. This public opinion survey research provides a description of trends, opinions, and attitudes of the voting population. This source includes both pre-election and exit polls, relative to Massachusetts, conducted by both public and private survey research centers. These include: the Roper Center for Public Opinion

Research at Cornell University, the Survey Center at the University of New Hampshire, and the

Suffolk University Political Research Center. These data sources are available online (and via written agreement with Roper). The survey responses for the variables of interest in this study have been numerically coded for quantitative analysis. This is a primary data source.

Of some minor concern, regarding exact question wording, state polls may be a bit less consistent over time (as compared to national polls such as the American National Election

Studies), but there are numerous state polls that have been conducted dating back for decades. As an example, the survey conducted by the University of New Hampshire uses a seven-point party identification scale. Also, respondents subjected to public opinion polling can be less than candid with their levels of conceptualization for any number of reasons; including the fact that people just don’t think about politics at a high level, a lack of interest, a lack of detailed knowledge, and/or, for personal and private reasons. Also, in general, surveys can under-sample (or over- sample), certain populations, and also possibly produce an interviewer effect. These problems are understood, but do not pose a significant issue for this study. Overall, this study attempts to find its data through the triangulation of multiple sources of information in order to strengthen its validity, but possible survey weakness is an issue that cannot be completely ignored.

IV. Research Questions and Hypotheses

To support the purpose of this correlational study, the relationship between the

Democratic vote over time and changes in party registration and party identification are examined. This analysis is guided by these research questions (RQ):

RQ 1: What is the effect of party registration on the Democratic vote in Massachusetts? RQ 2: What is the effect of party registration on the Democratic vote geographically in Massachusetts? RQ 3: How does party ID relate to voting behavior in Massachusetts?

To be able to answer the research questions for this study, hypotheses were also constructed, respectively: Hypothesis 1: There is a statistically significant correlation between changes in the Democratic vote and changes in party registration in Massachusetts.

Hypothesis 2: Party registration effects Democratic voting trends in Massachusetts counties.

Hypothesis 3: Survey respondents identified as Democrats or as independents will have statistically significant differences in their choices about Democratic candidates but the independent voters will lean Democratic, more-often-than-not.

V. Data Analysis Methods

In order to address the objectives of this study, different statistical procedures were used to examine the continuous variables of interest in this research. The quantitative tests include bivariate regression analysis, multiple regression analysis, correlation analysis, and independent samples t-tests. The statistical analysis is focused on the relationships among party registration, party identification, and the Democratic vote. Based on analysis and interpretation, this statistical research draws inferences about the trends and variations that emerge from the data. These procedures were performed to test the study’s hypotheses.

The primary purpose of regression analysis is hypothesis testing (not prediction: standard error shows this). That is, we use the regression model to test the hypothesis that X is related to

Y (e.g., b does not equal 0). The most critical piece of information produced by these regressions is the slope coefficient estimates (b values). The slope/regression coefficient is the best available indicator of the impact of X on Y in the populations being examined. The slope coefficient can be viewed as a measure of the effect of an independent variable on the dependent variable.

Importantly, it tells us the change in the expected (or average) value of the dependent variable resulting from a one-unit increase in an independent variable (Berry and Sanders, 2000).

Pearson’s correlation coefficients were also computed to assess the degree to which the variables are interrelated. The correlation coefficient is appropriate for this study since the purpose of the coefficient is to indicate how two variables are related with one another. These coefficients range from -1 to +1, with +1 indicating perfect positive correlation, -1 indicating

70 perfect negative correlation and 0 indicating no correlation. Each coefficient also has an associated p-value to assess its statistical significance. For example, a positive significant correlation between changes in Democratic vote and changes in Democratic registration will result in rejecting a null hypothesis. The values of the correlation coefficient can range from a low of – 1 up to a high of + 1. If a value of – 1 is observed between two variables, this would indicate that there is a strong negative relationship between the two variables (Pollock 2012:

184). This means that as one variable increases the other variable decreases.

If a positive value of +1 is observed, then this indicates that there is a strong positive association between the variables (Pollock 2012: 185). This means that as one variable increases the other variable will tend to increase as well. Either a positive or a negative association provides evidence that there are significant relationships between the two variables. A value of 0 for the correlation coefficient indicates there is no relationship between the two variables. This means the increase or decrease in one variable does not have an impact the other variable.

Following the correlation analysis, both bivariate and multivariate regression analysis was conducted. The dependent variable in the regression indicates the change in Democratic vote, while the independent variables indicate the changes in party registration. This analysis assesses the relationships among these variables. The coefficients from the regression analysis indicate the extent to which each of the variables of interest is associated with changes in the

Democratic vote. For example, a regression coefficient of 0.5 for changes in party registration suggests that each extra 1 percentage increase in party registration is associated with a 0.5 percentage increase in Democratic vote. The multiple regression model used is as follows:

Yp (Massachusetts Democratic Vote) = a + b1X1 (Independent Registration) + b2X2 (Democratic Registration) + b 3X3 (Republican Registration) + e

Further hypothesis testing involves survey polling data that were coded, measured in percentages, and statistically examined. These data show, for the elections examined, the perceptions toward the candidates of those elections for three groups: people identified as

Democratic, Republican, or Independent. The relevant perceptions considered are: favorability rating toward Democratic candidates, favorability rating toward Republican candidates, proportion of people who find the Democratic candidates more likeable than the Republican ones, and proportion of people choosing Democratic candidates for the elections.

For each of these variables, an independent samples t-test was also conducted. T-tests are used for testing whether two groups have different means of a continuous variable (Berman

2002: 93). This test is appropriate to assess the difference in some variable between two separate groups, such as “Strong Democrats” and “Independent Democrats” in this study. In this case, the two groups are people identified as Democratic, and people identified as Independent. The average of the outcome variables are computed separately for each group, and the significance of the differences between the groups are assessed through the t-test.

VI. Generalizability—Validity and Reliability

This study examines the concept of partisanship using the measurements of party registration and party identification variables as the operational tools. Party registration indicators are simply the three major segments of the electorate—Democrats, Republicans, and

Independents—as registered with, and then reported by the state. Party identification is the single most analyzed variable in political science. Therefore, this variable serves as a valid operational measure, and (along with registration) establishes construct validity for this study. External validity is also established in that the results of this analysis are generalizable, as this study is

72 based on theory and replicates similar empirical research. This study is also relevant to other states and the American political system overall. Internal validity is established via the research design, as well as the testable hypotheses. Reliability in this study is maximized via the research measures and procedures used, which are also well-established in the literature. Further, this analysis uses reliable and premier sources.

In general, regarding the validity and reliability of this dissertation study, U.S. states vary in their levels of partisanship and its effect on their election outcomes. This is a reflection of the demographic, economic, political, and social complexions of each state. As such, the influences of party registration and/or party identification on election outcomes may differ from state to state. However, the scope of this current analysis, using Massachusetts as a case study, collects the data discussed here and conducts scientific analyses for the voters within the state in order to answer the specific puzzle being examined in this study. Using this approach, the patterns that emerge, despite the diversity of other state political environments, indicate that there is a good chance that the conclusions made in this study may hold true regardless of such state diversity. If this is not the case, then perhaps voters exist within their own state political environments and there are other factors beyond party registration and party identification that affect the vote choice and election outcomes in those states—such as other political system factors.

VII. Conclusion

Chapter 3 discusses the research methodology used in this empirical study. The research methodology is a quantitative, correlational research design. A correlational design is used to determine linear relationships between two or more continuous variables. A quantitative, correlational research design was deemed appropriate because it allows the researcher to

73 examine direct relationship between variables. Chapter 3 also contains the information on the data collection process and the statistical analyses procedures conducted on the data, which includes bivariate regression analysis, multiple regression analysis, Pearson’s correlation analysis, and independent samples t-tests.

Next, chapter 4 presents the bivariate results and findings for the statistical analysis in this study. The analysis between changes in the Democratic vote and changes in party registration are presented and explained. The correlation and regression analysis of the relationships between the Democratic vote and changes in party registration are further detailed.

-Chapter 4- Analysis of the Democratic Vote in Massachusetts Bivariate Analysis of the Registration-Vote Relationship

The purpose of this chapter is to describe the populations examined in this study and to analyze the data collected from the various sources. Results regarding the research questions and hypotheses are reported in narratives and a series of tables and figures outlining the statistical results in the several analysis chapters. Due to the critical role that voters play in elections, it is important to study voter party registration and its influence on election results. Party registration is the unit of analysis in this study. This investigation therefore examines the following major research question:

What is the effect of party registration on the Democratic vote in Massachusetts?

I. Description of the Populations

The populations examined in this study of Massachusetts general elections consists of the registered voters, party identifiers, political candidates, and federal and state public offices.

Registered voters include those enrolled as Democrats, Republicans, or independents. Party identifiers, via survey research, are those polling respondents self-identifying with one of the two major political parties or as independents. Political candidates are aggregated and labeled as either party members, or non-party entities, as they are not individually named. The political offices and the number of races (N) for each of these offices examined are as follows: President

(N=17), U.S. Senate (N=26), U.S. House (N=391), Massachusetts Governor (N=22),

Massachusetts State Senate (N=1,360), and, Massachusetts State House of Representatives

(N=6,720). The total number of races examined in this large-N study is 8,536. Examined in this study, on the federal level, are the quadrennial election for president from 1948 to 2012; the

75 election for U.S. Senate from 1948 to 2014 (note: specific election years for this office are listed in Chapter 1, Table 1.4); and, the biennial election for U.S. House of Representatives from 1948 to 2014. On the state level, the biennial election for Massachusetts Governor from 1948 to 1966, and, the quadrennial elections for governor from 1970 to 2014; and also, the biennial elections for both chambers of the Massachusetts state legislature from 1948 to 2014.

The Democratic vote in Massachusetts general elections is analyzed from 1948 to 2014 on a statewide basis, and from 1976 to 2014 on the county level. (The state of Massachusetts began reporting a party registration data breakdown by county in 1976.) Massachusetts has fourteen counties: Barnstable, Berkshire, Bristol, Dukes, Essex, Franklin, Hampden, Hampshire,

Middlesex, Nantucket, Norfolk, Plymouth, Suffolk, and Worcester.

II. Dependent Variable—the Democratic Vote

The dependent variable is the Democratic vote in Massachusetts. The continuous variable is measured in percentages as follows: average Democratic percentage of the presidential total, popular vote; average Democratic percentage of the U.S. Senate total vote; average Democratic percentage of the U.S. House total vote; average Democratic percentage of the Massachusetts gubernatorial total vote; average Democratic percentage of the state senate total vote; and, the average Democratic percentage of the state house of representatives total vote.

III. Results

Research hypotheses are examined to identify whether there is a relationship between the independent variables and the dependent variable. Analysis was conducted using IBM SPSS,

(Statistical Package of the Social Sciences ) Statistics Version 20. The hypotheses presented in

76 the analysis chapters were evaluated using the quantitative techniques of bivariate regression, multiple regression, and t-tests. The statistical results obtained are now presented.

What is the effect of party registration on the Democratic vote in Massachusetts?

Hypothesis 1: There is a statistically significant correlation between changes in the Democratic vote and changes in party registration in Massachusetts.

IV. Statewide General Elections from 1948 to 2014

Table 4.1 demonstrates the various effects of party registration on the Democratic vote in

Massachusetts. At the broadest level, both independent registration and Democratic registration indicate statistically significant relationships for 4 of the 6 political offices—president, U.S.

Senate, U.S. House of Representatives, and the Massachusetts state senate. These two registration types are moderately-to-strongly correlated to the Democratic vote in the state for these offices. Thus, an increase in registration correlates with an increase in the Democratic vote.

One would expect this relationship between Democratic registration and Democratic vote; it is interesting to note that the same relationship holds between independent registration and

Democratic vote. This supports the general argument that Democratic voting has continued to increase even as independent registration also increases.

Republican registration follows a different pattern. Looking at the same four offices – president, U.S. Senate, U.S. House of Representatives, and the Massachusetts state senate – there is an inverse correlation between Republican registration and Democratic vote. In two cases this has statistical significance. Such an inverse correlation between Republican registration and

Democratic vote would be expected simply on party bases.

There are two offices—MA governor and MA House of Representatives—in which these patterns just described do not hold. In the case of the Massachusetts Governor, there are no statistically significant relationships between party registration and Democratic vote. The correlations between party registration and Democratic vote are generally weak. Furthermore, when examining both Democratic and Republican registrations and the dependent variable the results are somewhat puzzling. As Democratic registration increases the Democratic vote for governor slightly decreases, and also, as Republican registration increases so does the

Democratic vote. Why? Although these bivariate results are not statistically significant for this office, they still do tell us something. In my view, voters may be basing their candidate vote choice on factors other than party loyalty alone. In these gubernatorial elections during the time frame examined voters may have been casting their vote based on individual candidate characteristics such as personality, work history, educational attainment, incumbency, race, campaign finance, and other important campaign factors. Ticket splitting happens throughout

American elections and Massachusetts is certainly not immune to it.

Another puzzling result is found in the elections for the Massachusetts House of

Representatives. But first some brief background. Since 1948 in Massachusetts, Democrats have held the majority of the seats in the “people’s house” in 33 of 34 general elections, or an astonishing 97 percent of the time, well above the national average during the same time period.

The most interesting finding in these bivariate regressions is the statistically significant relationship that as Republican registration increases so does the Democratic vote. The data reveal that Republican registration in Massachusetts is strongly correlated with the Democratic vote for state representative (Pearson’s r = .55; p < .01). The table indicates that Republican

78 registration increases the Democratic vote for state representative 1.630, on average, for every one percentage change, and also explains about 30 percent of the variation in the vote.

This finding at first appears puzzling but again voters may be ticket splitting. Also in the

Massachusetts House prior to 1978 there were 240 seats and since then until present there are

160 seats. That is a lot of seats to fill and the incumbency advantage (usually held by Democrats) in these races is strong. The fact is that often these state representative elections go uncontested.

Therefore, many times there is no Republican candidate for party voters to even pick instead of a

Democratic incumbent or even an independent. There have actually been attempts in the recent past by the Massachusetts Republican Party to encourage candidates to run for state representative under their party label. Further, in my view, we may be seeing Democratic voters

(in contested races) ticket splitting because the state house of representatives is so overwhelmingly Democratic that in the election booths they are seeking a bit more partisan balance in their legislative representation. Although this finding is interesting, in reality

Republican voter numbers are limited in Massachusetts compared to independents and

Democrats and thus do not necessarily translate to actually winning elections due to lack of party voters. Overall, these findings in Table 4.1 provide some expected results and certainly some unexpected ones too.

TABLE 4.1: Bivariate Regression of Registration on Democratic Vote, Statewide, 1948-2014.

Registration US US US MA MA MA Status President Senate House Governor Senate House Independent .434** .363* .620** .036 .405** -.046 (.135) (.143) (.103) (.107) (.099) (.131) [.637] .406 [.477] .228 [.735] .540 [.077] .006 [.593] .351 [.062] .004 Democratic .529* .616** .925** -.093 .680** -.315 (.207) (.207) (.142) (.129) (.128) (.181) [.550] .303 [.536] .287 [.760] .577 [.164] .027 [.690] .476 [.298] .089 Republican -.643 -.936 -1.628** .266 -1.074* 1.630** (.726) (.651) (.541) (.338) (.459) (.447) [.223] .050 [.293] .086 [.476] .226 [.177] .031 [.387] .150 [.548] .300

N = 8,535 17/17 24/24 33/382 21/21 33/1,320 33/6,560 * p < .05, ** p < .01. All tests are two-tailed. Note: The first row of numbers are unstandardized regression coefficients (i.e., the slope coefficients, b values). The second row of numbers in parentheses are standard errors. The third row of numbers in brackets are Pearson’s correlation coefficients—r, followed by r 2. N = Elections/Races.

V. Bivariate County-level Analysis of Massachusetts General Elections from 1976 to 2014

This section now begins a statistical examination at the county-level in Massachusetts.

Practitioners, as one example of political actors interested in this type of analysis, often turn to party registration data to determine whether an area is marginal, heavily Democratic or

Republican. They then rely on such a determination as a guide to a range of decisions. Political practitioners have confidence in registration data as indicators of expected voting outcomes.

They use this information when deciding whether to become candidates for public office, where to target campaign efforts, and in decision-making for the allocation scarce political resources.

The current analysis is performed in order to look more closely at political changes based on voter registration and the election outcomes throughout different parts of the state in order to determine if and where changes in registration have influenced the Democratic vote. The statistical effect of party registration on election results for each political office being examined

80 in this study is now explored. (Chapter 6 provides more in-depth analysis based on electoral geography.)

U.S. Presidential Elections

When examining Tables 4.2-4.4 regarding presidential elections overall, each voter registration segment has statistically significant relationships in more than half the counties in

Massachusetts. Independent registration has the largest effect on the Democratic vote. Of the significant correlations, it can be seen that 13 of 14 counties have a strong relationship between independent registration and the Democratic vote for president. In fact, there are very strong correlations between independent voter registration and the dependent variable, which range from r = 79 to r = 98. All these counties have (p < .01). For all 13 counties independent registration explains about 62 to 96 percent of the variation in the Democratic vote for president.

Both Democratic registration and Republican registration have significant relationships in

8 counties each. For Democratic registration, they are all positive meaning that as the voter registration numbers increase so does the vote for Democrats. Of the significant correlations, all

8 counties have a strong correlations between Democratic voter registration and the Democratic vote (r = 73 to r = 99). Further, Democratic registration explains about 53 to 97 percent of the variation in the vote. Republican registration also indicates a strong relationship among the variables examined (r = 67 to r = 91). Similar to the other two registration segments, Republican registration also explains a good proportion of the variance in the dependent variable.

Republican registration has an inverse relationship with the dependent variable in 2 of their significant counties. However, a standout finding here is that in 6 counties as Republican enrollments increase so does the Democratic vote in these presidential elections. In my view, it is

81 important to keep in mind that voters are sometimes ticket splitters and vote for opposition party candidates. Some registered Republican voters may be ideologically conservative yet find certain

Democratic presidential candidates appealing. The opposite has already happened in

Massachusetts. In 1980 Republican Ronald Reagan won a plurality of the state’s popular vote

(41.9 percent). This came at the time when voter registration numbers in Massachusetts were

Republican 15 percent, Democratic 46 percent, and independents 39 percent. So theoretically even with full (meaning 100 percent) Republican turnout (which of course it was not) it is impossible to say that additional electoral support did not come to this Republican candidate from Democratic and independent voters. In 1984 it not only happened again but incumbent- president Reagan won Massachusetts this time with an even higher vote share of the popular vote

(51.2 percent). This time the registration numbers in Massachusetts were Republican 13 percent,

Democratic 48 percent, and independents 39 percent. So in fact Republican registration had dropped 2 percent since the last election and Democratic registration picked up that 2 percent.

When looking now at the Massachusetts counties that did not produce statistically significant bivariate results there are still important findings to discuss. For independent registration only one county fits this group. Norfolk County however has a positive slope value of 5.8 percent for every one percent change in independent registration. This value is actually the highest effect of X on Y found in this regression for the office of president. Although not found statistically significant that does not mean that it does not exist, or happen, in the populations being examined. It is just not at the 95 percent level of confidence. Democratic registration has 6 counties that did not meet the level of confidence for statistical significance. However, they all indicate positive effects on the Democratic vote and mostly moderate (and a few weak) correlations between X and Y. Republican registration has 6 counties under the level of

82 confidence. The strongest relationship (r = .56) indicated in Dukes County showing a decrease of nearly 7 percent for every 1 percent registration increase. On the other hand, there also 5 other counties that show a positive relationship between Republican registration and the Democratic vote at about a 2 or 3 percent dependent variable increase for every 1 percent registration increase. The strength of these correlations ranges for weak to strong among these counties.

Overall, since 1948 Democrats have won the state of Massachusetts in the race for president in

13-of-17 general elections, or 77 percent of the time.

U.S. Senate Elections

In U.S. Senate general elections, as seen in Tables 4.2-4.4, less than half of the counties in Massachusetts are influenced significantly by party registration. However, for these counties the three registration types all indicate strong correlations among the variables and increase the

Democratic vote in U.S. Senate races. Of the significant correlations, it can be seen that 6 counties have a strong relationship between Democratic registration and the Democratic vote.

Republican registration and independent registration also both have a strong relationships with the Democratic vote in 5 counties each. All three voter registration segments explain about 30 to

75 percent of the variation in the Democratic vote.

Tables 4.2-4.4 also show the counties that did not produce statistically significant results, which is more than half the state. When looking at Democratic and independents registrations, both voter segments indicate positive relationships between registration and the Democratic vote; as these registration types increase so does the vote. Republican registration also has many counties without significant findings in this regression. There is an inverse relationship occurring between the variables in some of the counties. However, as has been seen already in paragraphs

83 above, Republican registration also indicates a positive relationship in some counties, as this registration type increases so does the Democratic vote. Once again this appears a mirror image of what should be happening, however, as stated already—ticket splitting—and also the trend we are discovering may be indicating, in general, some level of voter independence (as discussed in chapter 2). This briefly lessens the thesis about partisanship a bit, but does not reject it due to the overwhelming election, on average, of Democrats across all 6 offices by Democrats and independents alike that far outnumber Massachusetts Republicans. In fact as stated in chapter 1, since 1948 Democrats have won the race for U.S. Senate in 19-of-25 general elections, or 76 percent of the time. Also, during this time frame Massachusetts had long-time, well-known

Democratic U.S. Senators such as Edward “Ted” Kennedy and John Kerry, both serving for decades.

U.S. House of Representatives Elections

Democratic registration and independent registration each have statistically significant relationships in at least half of Massachusetts counties. Of the significant correlations, it can be seen that the majority, 14 of 15, of these counties have a strong relationship with each of these two registration types and the Democratic vote for U.S. Representative. Bivariate analysis indicates that both Democratic registration and independent registration each increase the

Democratic vote in all these counties. Republican registration has statistically significant relationships in 6 counties. Of the significant correlations, it can be seen that 5 counties have a strong relationship and 1 county has a moderate relationship between Republican registration and the Democratic vote for U.S. Representative. Republican registration, interestingly, has a positive relationship by increasing the Democratic vote in 5 counties for this race. Whereas in

84 one county Republican registration decreases the vote for every one percentage change. In the counties that the Democratic vote is increased, again, voters may be ticket splitters and voting for big name, well-known Massachusetts Democratic U.S. Representatives.

When looking at the Massachusetts counties that did not produce statistically significant results at least at the .05 level, it can be seen that for Republican registration 2 of the 8 counties falling into this group have inverse effects on the Democratic vote, as high as a 13 percent decrease. Conversely, as a building theme in this study, there are counties (the other 6) that

Republican registration shows a positive effect on the dependent variable ranging from about 2 percent to a high of 8 percent in one county. Independent registration has 7 counties without reaching .05, and all of them indicate modest but positive gains for Democrats as independent registration increases. The least number of counties without reaching the significance level is for

Democratic registration on the Democratic vote, which is logical. In these 6 counties, weak to moderate relationships occur between the X and Y variables with gains ranging from less than one percent to about 2 percent.

In my view, regarding Republican registration, when looking at the composition of the

Massachusetts delegation to the U.S. House of Representatives during this time frame of 1976 to

2014, most of the biggest names in Massachusetts politics were Democrats. There were certainly standout, long-term Republican U.S. Representatives from Massachusetts that won elections for many years such as Silvio Conte, but the majority were Democrats. To name a few of the biggest, but certainly not an exhaustive list—Thomas P. “Tip” O’Neill, Jr., John Joseph

Moakley, Barney Frank, Joseph Early, Richard Neal, Gerry Studds, Joseph Kennedy, Paul

Tsongas, John Olver, Edward Markey—to name a few. In general, as with sports, in politics voters like to be on the winning side, so even Republican voters will choose a well-known, big

85 name incumbent Democrat in the U.S. House as opposed to a lesser-known, less established

Republican candidate. Since 1948 Democrats have held the majority of Massachusetts seats in the U.S. House of Representatives in 29-of-32 general elections; or 91 percent of the time. [Note:

In 1954 and 1956, each major party held 7-of-14 seats, or 50 percent, thus neither held a majority.]

Massachusetts Gubernatorial Elections

Overall the office of Massachusetts governor has resulted in the fewest statistically significant relationships between party registration and the Democratic vote in the state. In fact, it is the only office that for each of the three party registration types all of them have statistically significant findings in less than half of the state’s counties. This political office is the most competitive of the 6 offices examined in this study. In the race for Massachusetts governor,

Democrats have won in 11-of-22 general elections, or 50 percent of the time. This illustrates a truly back-and-forth political pendulum between Democrats and Republicans battling for the governor’s office in Massachusetts.

As seen in Tables 4.3-4.5, the effect of party registration on the Democratic vote for

Massachusetts governor indicate statistically significant relationships for 6 of 14 counties for

Democratic registration; 4 of 14 counties for independent registration; and, 2 of 14 counties for

Republican registration. However, of the significant correlations, it can be seen that all these counties have a strong relationship (ranging from r = 67 to r = 95) between registration and the

Democratic vote for governor. For these counties all three types of registration increases the

Democratic vote for Massachusetts governor, on average, for every one percentage change. This is generally expected with Democratic registration and the Democratic vote, and as this study

86 shows, it can also be expected to a good degree with independent registration generally as well.

However, it is not generally expected that when looking at Republican registration and the

Democratic vote, but again this study finds that often this is also occurring. Republican registration at times indicates a positive a relation with the Democratic vote (for the reasons that have been discussed). Overall, in these counties the three voter registration types each explains about 45 to 90 percent of the variation in the Democratic vote in Massachusetts.

Numerous counties do not meet the 95 percent level of statistical confidence between registration and the Democratic vote for Massachusetts governor. Republican registration has 12 of 14 counties that do not, followed by independent registration with 10 of 14 counties, and then

Democratic registration with 8 of 14 counties. Republican registration has an even mix of half of these counties showing inverse relationships with the Democratic vote, and the other half indicating positive relationships with the Democratic vote. The counties falling into this category for independent registration show weak relationships that in some counties are positive and in others negative with the dependent variable. Democratic registration has 8 counties that do not have significant results. Seven of them show the logical, positive relationship between

Democratic registration and the Democratic vote. Bristol County is slightly inverse (b = -.018).

State Senate Elections

When examining Tables 4.3-4.5 the results indicate that Democratic registration and independent registration both have statistically significant relationships in over half of the counties in Massachusetts. Of the significant correlations, it can be seen that the majority of these counties have a strong relationship between registration and the Democratic vote for

Massachusetts state senate. Both of these registration types have a positive effect on the

Democratic vote. Republican registration results indicate statistically significant relationships for

5 of the 14 counties in the state. Of the significant correlations, it can be seen that all these counties have a strong relationship (r = 60 to r = 82; p < .01) between Republican registration and the Democratic vote for the upper chamber of the Massachusetts legislature. One county shows an inverse relationship between Republican registration and the Democratic vote, however, as is trending in this study, several counties indicate a positive relationship between

Republican registration and the Democratic vote in Massachusetts.

Looking at the counties without statistically significant relationships reveals that 6 of them when examining Republican registration again indicate a positive relationship on the dependent variable. Three other counties have inverse effects on the Democratic vote.

Independent registration has a mix of both types of relationships on Y occurring with weak to moderate correlations. Most of the Democratic regressions produced significant findings but 4 counties did not. Of these, they are all positive with weak to moderate correlations.

Regarding the effect on the dependent variable, studies of American legislative elections suggest candidate vote share is largely a function of party support, incumbency, and campaign spending. Research provides evidence of a positive incumbency advantage in American elections since 1900 (Ansolabehere and Snyder 2002: 2; Gelman and King 1990: 1142). When examining the election results of the Massachusetts state senate races and its candidates from 1976 to 2014 this study finds it is common to see many long-term, Democratic incumbents that are unchallenged. Therefore, in a case like this, a Republican voter is often left with few choices— leave their election ballot blank, write in a name, or vote Democratic. Long-term, Democratic incumbents in some cases also have large campaign finance accounts which discourages some potential candidates from entering a race. Empirical findings indicate that spending “is an

88 increasingly important component” of election outcomes (Krebs 1998: 932) because of district fluidity and the needs of candidates to connect themselves with a variety of different voters, as well as increasing campaign costs based on inflation. Jacobson (2009) claims “Challengers rarely win if they do not spend a substantial amount of money, and the more they spend, the more likely they are to win;” whereas, “Incumbents usually exploit their official resources for reaching constituents so thoroughly that the additional increment of information about their virtues put forth during the campaign adds comparatively little to what is already known and felt about them” (46-49). In my interpretation, this helps to explain the positive relationship between

Republican registration and the Democratic vote in Massachusetts general elections for U.S.

House of Representatives (as well as the U.S. Senate) and the two chambers of the state legislature (Massachusetts House of Representatives is forthcoming). Since 1948 in the

Massachusetts state senate, Democrats have held the majority of seats in 29-of-33 general elections; or 88 percent of the time. [Note: In 1948, each major party held 20-of-40 seats, or 50 percent, thus neither held a majority.]

State Representatives Elections

The Democratic stronghold is even more evident in the Massachusetts House of

Representatives. Democrats have held the majority of state representative seats 100 percent of the time from 1976 to 2014. Tables 4.2 and 4.3 demonstrate that both Democratic registration and independent registration both have statistically significant relationships each with over half the counties in the state. Of the significant correlations, it can be seen that each registration type shows 7 counties each having a strong relationship and 1 county each has a moderate relationship between registration and the Democratic vote for Massachusetts state representative.

The correlation coefficients for these registrations range from r = 48 to r = 83; and, on average, for every one percentage change, and also explains about 23 to 69 percent of the variation in the vote.

Table 4.4 presents the bivariate analysis of the relationship between Republican voter registration and the Democratic vote in state representative general elections in Massachusetts.

The regression results indicate statistically significant relationships for 2 of the 14 counties in the state. Of the significant correlations, it can be seen that Nantucket and Plymouth counties have a strong relationship between Republican registration and the Democratic vote for Massachusetts state representative. The table provides the correlation coefficients and p values for each county, which is r = 63 and r = 82, respectively, and both are p < .01. For Nantucket and Plymouth counties, Republican registration increases the Democratic vote for Massachusetts state representative, on average, 3.277 and 4.455, for every one percentage change, and also explains about 39 and 67 percent of the variation in the vote, respectively. Again, as this trend here continues, Republican registration at times is showing a positive relationship with the

Democratic vote in Massachusetts.

Regarding the counties without significant results, Republican registration has 12 of 14 counties in this category. Of these counties, 3 of them have moderate to strong relationships that decrease the Democratic vote as Republican registration goes up, whereas in 9 counties there is a positive relationship occurring. Eight of these 9 counties have moderate correlations and 1 has a weak correlation. Both Democratic and independent registration each have 6 counties without statistically significant findings. The majority of these counties have moderate correlations and all of them have positive relationships with the dependent variable.

Importantly, as discovered earlier in this study with all the statistically significant bivariate results in the majority of the political offices examined—4 of 6 offices—(e.g., all three federal offices and the MA state senate), now this also enhances the key finding in this study that of the statistically significant bivariate results—both Democratic registration and also independent registration each have ALL positive correlations with the Massachusetts Democratic vote. In essence, Massachusetts registered independent voters behave like Massachusetts registered Democratic voters . In the state senate, Democrats have held the majority of seats in

29-of-33 general elections; or 88 percent of the time since 1948. With the exception of the competitive race for Massachusetts governor, overall, these numbers are arguably dominant and indicative of a one-party state.

In sum, Democratic registration is behaving the way we think it should. In other words, in a positive manner (Table 4.3) toward the Democratic vote; as registration goes up the vote goes up. This analysis has found also that independent registration is also behaving just like

Democratic registration, also in a positive manner (Table 4.4) toward the Democratic vote; as registration goes up the vote goes up. Of the statistically significant correlations, all of the slope coefficients (b values) in Tables 4.3 and 4.4 show a positive effect of X on Y. This provides a key insight into the paradox presented earlier. This finding is also very supportive of the partisan thesis that Massachusetts independent voters have similar electoral behavior to Massachusetts

Democratic voters. They are disguised partisans that are hiding their loyalty to the Democratic

Party, not only in their party ID claims of being independents (forthcoming in chapter 7), but here through use of the rules and mechanics of state’s voter registration system.

To a lesser degree, another finding in terms of weakening the partisan thesis here, but in overall an important discovery is the behavior of some Massachusetts Republican voters in that

91 at times they behave loyally to the Democratic Party instead of their own. Republican registration, unlike the other two registration segments with all positive relationships (positive slope values) have produced a mixed bag of results. At times indicating an inverse relationship with the dependent variable, as would be expected, but often times showing a positive influence on the Democratic vote in Massachusetts.

TABLE 4.2: Bivariate Regression of Independent Registration on Democratic Vote, 1976-2014.

MA US US US MA MA MA County President Senate House Governor Senate House Barnstable .818** .552** .479* .348* 1.435** .549** (.079) (.149) (.165) (.141) (.211) (.135) [.964] .930 [.731] .534 [.576] .332 [.683] .466 [.855] .730 [.701] .499 Berkshire 1.031** .474 1.663 .114 2.297** .374 (.248) (.396) (.873) (.459) (.536) (.435) [.826] .683 [.326] .107 [.419] .176 [.093] .009 [.721] .520 [.204] 042 Bristol .516** .130 .478** -.093 .564** .153 (.087) (.172) (.156) (.155) (.178) (.153) [.903] .816 [.214] .046 [.596] .355 [.222] .049 [.611] .373 [.236] .056 Dukes 1.415** 1.117** .310 .851** 1.900** 1.304** (.108) (.187) (.932) (.198) (.376) (.228) [.977] .955 [.865] .749 [.080] .006 [.852] .726 [.775] .601 [.811] .658 Essex .511** .096 .285 -.117 -.064 .292* (.094) (.178) (.138) (.184) (.149) (.129) [.887] .788 [.154] .024 [.447] .200 [.234] .055 [.103] .011 [.481] .231 Franklin 1.229** .707* 1.287 .671 .942** 1.767** (.211) (.280) (1.083) (.352) (.209) (.296) [.900] .809 [.589] .347 [.277] .077 [.584] .341 [.738] .544 [.823] .677 Hampden .423** .079 .644** -.068 -.358 .219 (.118) (.214) (.215) (.213) (.315) (.169) [.785] .617 [.106] .011 [.588] .345 [.119] .014 [.266] .071 [.300] .090 Hampshire .851** .624* 1.504** .573* .353 .673** (.179) (.207) (.425) (.208) (.194) (.219) [.859] .738 [.656] .430 [.651] .424 [.721] .520 [.404] .164 [.598] .358 Middlesex .613** .155 .449* -.021 .277 .377* (.114) (.201) (.174) (.230) (.188) (.150) [.886] .784 [.217] .047 [.530] .281 [.020] .000 [.337] .113 [.520] .270 Nantucket 1.222** .853** .820** .728** 1.896** 1.176** (.169) (.183) (.184) (.094) (.172) (.344) [.931] .867 [.803] .645 [.734] .539 [.946] .896 [.937] .877 [.638] .407 Norfolk 5.752 .156 .215 -.105 .109 .293 (.095) (.194) (.175) (.200) (.188) (.147) [.905] .819 [.226] .051 [.285] .081 [.194] .038 [.139] .019 [.436] .190 Plymouth .616** .294 .353* .020 .375* .520** (.089) (.164) (.146) (.144) (.146) (.137) [.925] .856 [.461] .212 [.504] .254 [.052] .003 [.528] .279 [.677] .459 Suffolk .684** .352 .314 .086 .219 .299 (.115) (.179) (.215) (.179) (.134) (.145) [.903] .816 [.493] .243 [.335] .112 [.178] .032 [.368] .135 [.447] .200 Worcester .418** .128 .282 -.016 .468** .030 (.090) (.162) (.179) (.168) (.128) (.089) [.855] .731 [.224] .050 [.358] .128 [.035] .001 [.664] .441 [.081] .007

N 10/10 14/14 19/200 10/10 19/760 19/3,200 * p < .05, ** p < .01. All tests are two-tailed. Note: The first row of numbers are unstandardized regression coefficients (i.e., the slope coefficients, b values). The second row of numbers in parentheses are standard errors. The third row of numbers in brackets are Pearson’s correlation coefficients—r, followed by r 2. N = Elections/Races.

TABLE 4.3: Bivariate Regression of Democratic Registration on Democratic Vote, 1976-2014.

MA US US US MA MA MA County President Senate House Governor Senate House Barnstable 1.738** 1.184** .998* .759 3.081** 1.191** (.162) (.304) (.348) (.276) (.414) (.274) [.967] .935 [.747] .558 [.571] .326 [.721] .520 [.875] .765 [.726] .527 Berkshire 1.444 1.297 .310 2.466* 3.847 2.533* (1.203) (1.072) (2.733) (1.002) (1.990) (1.103) [.391] .153 [.330] .109 [.027] .001 [.681] .464 [.425] .180 [.486] .237 Bristol 1.835** .711 2.157** -.018 1.868* .685 (.507) (.679) (.550) (.595) (.749) (.592) [.788] .621 [.290] .084 [.689] .475 [.012] .000 [.517] .268 [.270] .073 Dukes 1.327** .974** .213 .730** 1.712** 1.102** (.108) (.184) (.855) (.187) (.352) (.237) [.975] .950 [.836] .699 [.060] .004 [.828] .686 [.762] .581 [.748] .560 Essex .899 .600 1.938** 1.796 .860 1.262 (.936) (.875) (.610) (.809) (.715) (.665) [.322] .103 [.194] .038 [.611] .373 [.643] .413 [.280] .078 [.418] .175 Franklin 1.732** 1.014** 2.442 .903 1.269** 2.283** (.191) (.328) (1.314) (.404) (.249) (.370) [.955] .911 [.665] .444 [.411] .169 [.645] .416 [.777] .603 [.832] .692 Hampden .869 1.072 1.885 1.773 3.016* .889 (.863) (.964) (1.177) (.824) (1.372) (.815) [.335] .112 [.306] .094 [.362] .131 [.631] .398 [.470] .221 [.256] .065 Hampshire 1.918** 1.398** 3.181** 1.232* .900* 1.602** (.295) (.378) (.839) (.392) (.371) (.397) [.917] .841 [.730] .533 [.677] .458 [.765] .585 [.507] .257 [.699] .489 Middlesex 1.698 1.463 1.743 2.333* 2.656** 1.636 (1.312) (.970) (.991) (.833) (.824) (.833) [.416] .173 [.399] .159 [.392] .154 [.727] .529 [.616] .379 [.430] .185 Nantucket 1.427** 1.004** .968** .728** 1.979** 1.513** (.085) (.198) (.187) (.170) (.256) (.333) [.986] .972 [.826] .682 [.782] .612 [.851] .725 [.882] .778 [.741] .549 Norfolk .856 1.187 2.388* 1.815 .482 1.561 (1.229) (1.132) (.840) (.985) (1.052) (.828) [.239] .057 [.290] .084 [.568] .322 [.571] .326 [.110] .012 [.416] .173 Plymouth 2.122** 1.101 1.700** .681 1.321 1.900** (.579) (.686) (.571) (.581) (.639) (.620) [.792] .627 [.420] .176 [.585] .342 [.405] .164 [.448] .201 [.596] .356 Suffolk .829* .601* .912** .532 .545** .656** (.274) (.256) (.281) (.242) (.184) (.199) [.730] .533 [.561] .314 [.618] .382 [.638] .407 [.583] .340 [.624] .390 Worcester .688 1.273 1.110 2.754** 2.649* .788 (1.163) (1.170) (1.311) (.776) (1.009) (.596) [.205] .042 [.300] .090 [.201] .040 [.802] .643 [.537] .289 [.305] .093

TABLE 4.4: Bivariate Regression of Republican Registration on Democratic Vote, 1976-2014.

MA US US US MA MA MA County President Senate House Governor Senate House Barnstable 4.135* 4.431** 2.981* 2.021 7.402** 1.966 (1.614) (.922) (1.197) (1.015) (2.175) (1.225) [.671] .451 [.811] .658 [.517] .267 [.601] .362 [.637] .405 [.363] .132 Berkshire -3.606* -.338 -9.074 -.487 -2.453 -2.261 (1.293) (1.658) (3.390) (2.006) (3.193) (1.784) [.702] .493 [.059] .003 [.545] .297 [.090] .008 [.183] .034 [.294] .086 Bristol 4.642** 2.342 3.226 .236 3.699 2.041 (1.306) (1.705) (1.738) (1.501) (2.006) (1.463) [.782] .612 [.369] .136 [.411] .169 [.059] .004 [.408] .167 [.320] .103 Dukes -6.952 -3.173 -13.011 -1.705 -4.536 -4.703 (3.662) (2.865) (6.966) (.2.921) (4.735) (2.977) [.557] .311 [.305] .093 [.413] .170 [.215] .046 [.226] .051 [.358] .128 Essex 2.070 3.418 2.929 1.068 2.035 2.595 (2.052) (1.728) (1.506) (2.205) (1.534) (1.454) [.336] .113 [.496] .246 [.427] .182 [.180] .032 [.306] .094 [.397] .158 Franklin -3.658** -1.756 -7.281* -1.644 -2.449** -5.478 (.803) (.961) (3.114) (1.271) (.784) (.985) [.850] .722 [.467] .218 [.493] .243 [.439] .193 [.604] .365 [.803] .645 Hampden 2.114** .968 3.343** -.110 -2.404 1.183 (.758) (1.099) (1.099) (1.002) (1.578) (.865) [.702] .493 [.246] .061 [.594] .352 [.041] .002 [.347] .120 [.315] .099 Hampshire 1.657 5.881* 8.414 5.481* 1.328 4.864 (3.799) (2.569) (5.345) (2.288) (2.136) (2.526) [.152] .023 [.551] .304 [.357] .127 [.671] .451 [.149] .022 [.423] .179 Middlesex 2.173 3.302 3.844* -.111 2.848 2.045 (2.133) (1.627) (1.536) (1.995) (1.601) (1.456) [.339] .115 [.506] .256 [.519] .269 [.021] .000 [.396] .157 [.322] .104 Nantucket 3.595** 2.719** 2.369** 1.519** 4.702** 3.277** (.657) (.541) (.514) (.499) (.808) (.993) [.888] .789 [.823] .678 [.745] .556 [.755] .569 [.816] .665 [.625] .391 Norfolk 2.078 3.940* 2.094 .237 1.921 2.463 (1.945) (1.437) (1.503) (1.736) (1.580) (1.284) [.353] .125 [.620] .385 [.320] .102 [.052] .003 [.283] .080 [.422] .178 Plymouth 4.451** 2.922* 2.924** .375 3.067** 4.455** (.732) (1.082) (.978) (.985) (.974) (.767) [.907] .822 [.615] .378 [.587] .345 [.142] .020 [.607] .368 [.816] .665 Suffolk 3.222 1.537 1.469 .347 .620 1.121 (.1.404) (1.182) (1.339) (.984) (.865) (.949) [.630] .397 [.351] .124 [.257] .066 [.132] .017 [.171] .029 [.275] .076 Worcester 2.615** 1.322 1.616 -.012 2.867** .372 (.531) (.914) (1.035) (.911) (.704) (.510) [.867] .752 [.385] .148 [.354] .125 [.005] .000 [.703] .494 [.174] .030

VI. County-level Look at Democratic Registration on the Democratic Vote by Years

Partisanship is theoretically central in this research. Therefore since the focal point of this study is the Democratic vote in Massachusetts general elections, it appears justified to examine in detail the effect that Democratic registered voters have on their own party candidates. Table

4.5 provides the ordinary least squares (OLS) regression results of Democratic registration on the

Democratic vote in general elections for the highly visible political offices of U.S. president,

U.S. Senate, and Massachusetts governor by year from 1976 to 2014. Figures 4.1 to 4.3 graphically present these bivariate regressions at the county-level. Also, Tables 4.6-4.8 present data on Democratic registration on the Democratic vote along with the positive or negative difference between them for each office and in each county from 1976 to 2014.

U.S. Presidential Elections

Since 1976 there have been 10 presidential elections held in Massachusetts. When looking at Democratic registration on the Democratic vote in the state’s counties there has been a lot of variation. It is also clear by looking at the numbers that Democratic registration alone cannot produce the total Democratic vote percentages (e.g., a negative difference between

Democratic registration and the Democratic vote) in most years examined without also getting electoral support (votes) from the other registration segments. In other words, independent and

Republican voters are also voting Democratic to some degree. This may be due to individual candidate characteristics, issues, or other election-specific factors.

In 1976 Democratic presidential candidate Jimmy Carter won the state with 56 percent of the popular vote and also all of the state’s electoral votes. Whereas Republican Gerald Ford received about 40 percent of the popular vote in Massachusetts that year. In the election 13 of 14

96 counties show a negative difference between their Democratic registration percentage and their

Democratic vote percentage. So assuming even 100 percent turnout, which of course does not occur, although presidential turnout is very high among registered voters, this indicates that other registration segments (independents and/or Republicans) are also providing some electoral support by voting for Democratic candidates. Only Suffolk County has a positive registration- vote difference, but even here, assuming less than complete turnout by every registered

Democratic voter in the county, the Democratic vote in Suffolk County is also influenced by independents and to some degree by Republicans too. The bivariate analysis indicates that the relationship between the variables is statistically significant (p < .01) and there is a strong correlation (r = 84) between the variables. Democratic registration explains about 71 percent of the variation in the vote. As Figure 4.1 indicates there are 6 counties above, 2 counties on, and 6 counties below the positive regression line, and also ten of the counties have a Democratic vote share at or above 51 percent.

In 1980 incumbent Democratic president Carter lost the state of Massachusetts to

Republican challenger Ronald Reagan with about 41.75 percent of the popular vote to Reagan’s

41.90 percent, and all of the state’s electoral votes. Independent presidential candidate John

Anderson received 15 percent of the popular vote. In the election 8 of 14 counties show a positive difference between their Democratic registration percentage and their Democratic vote percentage. Ironically with more Democratic registered voters in this election than in the previous one, increased Democratic registration alone was not enough to secure a Democratic victory. The regression indicates a positive relationship between the variables that is statistically significant (p < .05). There is a strong correlation (r = 65) between the variables and Democratic registration explains about 42 percent of the variation in the vote. Less variation in the

Democratic vote is explained in this election as compared to the last. Thus meaning that other factors weighed more heavily in the election booth, such as the Iran Hostage Crisis. As Figure

4.1 indicates there are 8 counties above, no counties on, and 6 counties below the positive regression line. Only 1 of the counties have a Democratic vote share at or above 51 percent.

The 50th quadrennial U.S. presidential election was held in 1984. In Massachusetts,

Republican president Ronald Reagan won the state with 51 percent of the popular vote against

Democrat Walter Mondale with 48 percent. Looking at the Massachusetts counties reveals that 4 of them have a positive difference and 4 of them are even (e.g., zero difference) between their

Democratic registration percentage and their Democratic vote percentage. The correlation is moderate between the variables examined, and Democratic registration explains only about 9 percent of the variation in the vote. With such a low variation explained by Democratic registration, other election-specific issues such as the strong economy under Reagan at the time of the election were important factors. As Figure 4.1 indicates there are 7 counties above, no counties on, and 7 counties below the positive regression line. Three of the counties have a

Democratic vote share at or above 51 percent. Overall, Reagan won the election by a major landslide victory earning nearly 98 percent of the total electoral votes nationwide.

Massachusetts Governor Michael S. Dukakis was the Democratic presidential nominee in

1988. He won the state of Massachusetts with 53 percent of the popular vote, which is 1 percent lower than the statistical constant produced by the bivariate regression, compared to George

H.W. Bush’s 45 percent of the popular vote. Dukakis also took all of the state’s electoral votes.

In the 1988 election 13 of 14 counties show a negative difference their Democratic registration percentage and their Democratic vote percentage. There is a weak correlation between the variables, and Democratic registration explains only about 1 of the variation in the Democratic

98 vote. As Figure 4.1 indicates there are 7 Massachusetts counties above, 1 county on, and 6 counties below the positive regression line. Ten of the counties have a Democratic vote share at or above 51 percent. However, overall, in my view, other factors played a greater role in this election as opposed to party registration. For instance, President Reagan was still very popular but due to restrictions in the 22 nd Constitutional Amendment he was ineligible to seek a third term. Vice President Bush on the coattails of Reagan’s popularity along with a good economy and stable international affairs benefitted nationally.

In 1992 Democrat Bill Clinton won a plurality in the state of Massachusetts with 48 percent of the popular vote compared to Republican President Bush’s 29 percent and

Independent candidate H. Ross Perot’s 23 percent. There is a moderate correlation between the variables examined and Democratic registration explains about 19 percent of the variation in the vote. Twelve Massachusetts counties show a negative difference between their Democratic registration percentage and their Democratic vote percentage. This indicates that other registration segments (independents and/or Republicans) provided electoral support by voting for

Democratic candidates. In part, this may be attributed to negative feelings toward Bush from his conservative base for breaking his 1988 campaign promise against raising taxes. Also the national economy was in a recession at the time of the election, and foreign policy importance a strength for Bush were lessened after the dissolution of the Soviet Union and relative peace in the Middle East after the Gulf War. As Figure 4.1 indicates there are 7 counties above, no counties on, and 7 counties below the positive regression line. Four of the counties have a

Democratic vote share at or above 51 percent. As we know Bill Clinton also won the national election via plurality in the popular vote and by a wide margin in the Electoral College to become the 42 nd President of the United States.

From the presidential election in 1996 through to the presidential election in 2012, in

Massachusetts all of the counties indicate negative differences between Democratic registration and the Democratic vote. As stated earlier, this signals that the other two voter registration segments of the Massachusetts electorate are supporting Democratic candidates via the

Democratic vote. Beginning with the presidential election in 1996, the bivariate relationship between the variables is statistically significant (p < .01) and has a strong correlation (r = 70) between the variables. For this election Democratic registration explains about 49 percent of the variation in the Democratic vote. As Figure 4.1 indicates there are 6 counties above, 2 counties on, and 6 counties below the regression line. All 14 counties have a Democratic vote share at or above 51 percent, as incumbent Democratic President Clinton handily won the state (on his way to winning the national election) with about 61 percent of the Massachusetts popular vote compared to Republican Bob Dole at about 28 percent and Reform Party candidate H. Ross Perot about 9 percent.

Democrat Al Gore, Jr. won nearly 60 percent of the Massachusetts popular vote (and the national popular vote as well) in the controversial (and losing effort) of the 2000 presidential election, as compared to about 33 percent for George W. Bush and Green Party candidate Ralph

Nader’s approximate 6 percent. The relationship between the variables analyzed is statistically significant (p < .01) and the correlation is strong (r = 78). Also, in the 2000 presidential election

Democratic registration explains about 61 percent of the variation in the Massachusetts

Democratic vote. As Figure 4.1 indicates there are 5 counties above, 1 county on, and 8 counties below the positive regression line. All 14 counties have a Democratic vote share at or above 51 percent. Other election-specific issues however such as 3 rd party candidate Nader’s possible

100 weakening of the Democratic vote and election result recounts in Florida had a major overall impact in this presidential election.

Democratic Party candidate John Kerry, a longtime U.S. Senator from Massachusetts, won his state in the 2004 presidential election. The Massachusetts Democratic vote for Kerry was about 62 percent compared to 37 percent for Republican and incumbent president George

W. Bush. The analyzed relationship between the Democratic registration variable and the dependent variable is statistically significant (p < .05). There is also a strong correlation (r = 57) between the variables and Democratic registration explains about 33 percent of the variation in the vote. Other issues played a larger role overall in this election compared to registration.

Foreign policy was a central theme in this election especially the War on Terrorism after the

September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States and also the issue of the 2003 invasion of Iraq seeking weapons of mass destruction. As Figure 4.3 indicates there are 6 counties above, no counties on, and 8 counties below the regression line. All 14 counties have a Democratic vote share at or above 51 percent. This helped Kerry win Massachusetts, but he lost a relatively close national election both in terms of the popular vote and in the Electoral College.

Barack Obama was the 2008 Democratic presidential nominee. Obama won

Massachusetts with a popular vote of about 62 percent compared to Republican John McCain at about 36 percent. There are strong correlations (r = 52) between the variables in the bivariate analysis, and Democratic registration explains about 27 percent of the variation in the

Democratic vote. Other major issues during the time of this election contribute to explaining the variance in voting. There was a focus on the Iraq War and the unpopularity of outgoing

Republican President George W. Bush. Also the national economy was in crisis with the onset of the Great Recession and a major financial crisis peaking in September 2008. As Figure 4.1

101 indicates there are 6 counties above, no counties on, and 8 counties below the positive regression line. All 14 counties have a Democratic vote share at or above 51 percent.

In 2012 incumbent Democratic President Barack Obama won the state of Massachusetts with about 61 percent of the popular vote compared to former Massachusetts Republican governor Mitt Romney with about 38 percent. The relationship between the variables is statistically significant (p < .05) and have a strong correlation (r = 66). Democratic registration explains about 43 percent of the variation in the vote. Other issues that played a role in the campaigns and in the election were economic issues relative to the Great Recession such as economic recovery and jobs; social insurance programs; and affordable health care. Military issues also were discussed; among them—phasing out of the Iraq War, military spending, and terrorism. As Figure 4.1 indicates there are 5 counties above, no counties on, and 9 counties below the positive regression line. All 14 counties have a Democratic vote share at or above 51 percent.

U.S. Senate Elections

In half of the bivariate regressions analyzed for U.S. Senate general elections in

Massachusetts from 1976 to 2014 the Democratic vote constant (the intercept: the expected value of the dependent variable for cases having a score of zero on the independent variable) is at or above 51 percent. Therefore, theoretically even without any additional increase in Democratic registration the Democratic candidates for U.S. Senate from Massachusetts should have a substantial opportunity to win the election. In fact since 1976 only Republican Scott Brown in the 2010 Special Election, which was prompted by the death of longtime Democratic Senator

Ted Kennedy in August 2009, has been to only Republican to serve as a U.S. Senator from

102

Massachusetts. Brown then lost his reelection bid for a first full-term two years later in 2012 to the current Class 1 Democratic Senator Elizabeth Warren.

In 1976 incumbent Democratic U.S. Senator Ted Kennedy won reelection with about 69 percent of the vote. The constant is are about 61 percent. The relationship between the variables is statistically significant (p < .05) with a strong correlation (r = 66) between the variables.

Democratic registration explains about 44 percent of the variation in the vote. In my view, at least in part, the Kennedy name and popularity also contributed to receiving votes from some voters outside the Democratic Party. As Figure 4.2 indicates there are 8 counties above, 1 county on, and 5 counties below the positive regression line. All 14 counties have a Democratic vote share at or above 51 percent. Following this election, popular Democrat Paul Tsongas won by defeating incumbent Republican Ed Brooke in the general election for U.S. Senate in 1978 with about 55 percent of the vote. The relationship between the variables is statistically significant (p

< .01) and there is a strong correlations (r = 82) between the variables. Democratic registration explains about 68 percent of the variation in the vote. As Figure 4.2 indicates there are 7 counties above, 1 county on, and 6 counties below the positive regression line. 9 counties have a

Democratic vote share at or above 51 percent. Thirteen Massachusetts counties in both 1976 and again in 1978 show a negative difference between their Democratic registration percentage and their Democratic vote percentage. This indicates that other registration segments (independents and/or Republicans) are providing electoral support by voting for Democratic candidates.

In 1982 Ted Kennedy won reelection to U.S. Senate defeating Republican Ray Shamie with about 61 percent of the vote. The constant is about 54 percent. There is a moderate correlation (r = 49) between the variables, and Democratic registration explains about 24 percent of the variation in the vote. Again, in my view, at least in part, the Kennedy name and popularity,

103 along with the benefits of incumbency, also contributed to receiving votes from some voters outside the Democratic Party. As Figure 4.2 indicates there are 6 counties above, 2 counties on, and 6 counties below the positive regression line. All 14 counties have a Democratic vote share at or above 51 percent. John Kerry in 1984 won general election by also defeating Republican

Ray Shamie, as Kennedy did just two years earlier, with 55 percent of the vote to succeed

Democratic U.S. Senator Paul Tsongas. The constant is about 54 percent. There is weak correlation between the variables, and Democratic registration explains only about 2 percent of the variation in the vote. In addition to Lt. Governor Kerry’s own attributes, other factors such as the popularity of Governor Dukakis, and the health concerns of well-liked Democratic Senator

Tsongas may have helped Kerry win votes, as well as prosperity in the state during this time. As

Figure 4.1 indicates there are 7 counties above, no counties on, and 7 counties below the positive regression line. Three of the counties have a Democratic vote share at or above 51 percent.

Thirteen Massachusetts counties in 1982 (with one county equal) and 12 counties in 1984 (with two counties equal) show a negative difference between their Democratic registration percentage and their Democratic vote percentage.

From 1988 to 2014 all of the 14 counties in Massachusetts indicate a negative difference between their Democratic registration percentage and their Democratic vote percentage. Thus it appears that both independents and/or Republicans provided needed electoral support by voting for Democratic candidates. In fact during this time period from 1988 up until the U.S. Senate election in 2008 Senators Kennedy and Kerry continued alternating Democratic victories for reelection to the U.S. Senate from Massachusetts over several elections. I would speculate that had it not been for the passing of Ted Kennedy and the later resignation of John Kerry to become

U.S. Secretary of State, their successful elections probably would have continued.

104

Ted Kennedy won U.S. Senate elections in 1988, 1994, 2000, and 2006. In 1988

Kennedy with 65 percent of the vote to defeat Republican Joe Malone. The constant is also about

65 percent. There is a weak correlation between the variables and Democratic registration explains about 1 of the variation in the vote. As Figure 4.3 indicates there are 7 counties above, no counties on, and 7 counties below the positive regression line. All 14 counties have a

Democratic vote share at or above 51 percent. In 1994 Kennedy defeated Republican Mitt

Romney. There is a moderate correlation between the variables and Democratic registration explains about 22 percent of the variation in the vote. As Figure 4.2 indicates there are 8 counties above, no counties on, and 6 counties below the positive regression line. All 14 counties have a

Democratic vote share at or above 51 percent. In 2000 Kennedy easily won reelection with about

73 percent of the vote. The constant is 61 percent. The relationship between the variables is statistically significant (p < .05). There is a strong correlation (r = 64) between the variables, and

Democratic registration explains about 41 percent of the variation in the vote. As Figure 4.2 indicates there are 5 counties above, 1 county on, and 8 counties below the positive regression line. All 14 counties have a Democratic vote share at or above 51 percent.

In Ted Kennedy’s final election, he received about 69 percent of the vote to defeat

Republican Ken Chase with about 31 percent. The constant is about 51 percent. The relationship between the variables in the senate race is statistically significant (p < .05), and there is a strong correlation (r = 61) between the variables. Democratic registration explains about 38 percent of the variation in the vote. As Figure 4.2 indicates there are 6 counties above, no counties on, and 8 counties below the positive regression line. All 14 counties have a Democratic vote share at or above 51 percent.

105

John Kerry won U.S. Senate elections in 1990, 1996, 2002, and 2008. In 1990 Kerry received 57 percent of the vote to defeat Republican Jim Rappaport. The constant is about 53 percent. There is a moderate correlations (r = 25) between the variables, and Democratic registration explains about 7 percent of the variation in the vote. As Figure 4.3 indicates there are

7 counties above, no counties on, and 7 counties below the positive regression line. All 14 counties have a Democratic vote share at or above 51 percent. Kerry later defeated Republican

Bill Weld in 1996 with 52 percent of the vote. The constant is about 42 percent. There is a moderate correlation (r = 48) between the variables. Democratic registration explains about 23 percent of the variation in the vote. As Figure 4.2 indicates there are 7 counties above, no counties on, and 7 counties below the regression line. Nine counties have a Democratic vote share at or above 51 percent. In 2002 easily won reelection with 80 percent of the vote. The constant is about 73 percent. There is a moderate correlations (r = 50) between the variables, and

Democratic registration explains about 25 percent of the variation in the vote. As Figure 4.2 indicates there are 5 counties above, no counties on, and 9 counties below the positive regression line. All 14 counties have a Democratic vote share at or above 51 percent. In 2008 Kerry received about 66 percent of the vote. The relationship between the variables is statistically significant (p < .01). There are strong correlation (r = 67) between the variables, and Democratic registration explain about 44 percent of the variation in the vote. As Figure 4.2 indicates there are

5 counties above, no counties on, and 9 counties below the positive regression line. All 14 counties have a Democratic vote share at or above 51 percent.

Republican Scott Brown won the Special Election in 2010, to fill Ted Kennedy’s seat, defeating Democrat Martha Coakley. Brown received about 52 percent of the vote compared to

Coakley’s 47 percent. The relationship between the variables is statistically significant (p < .05).

106

There is a strong correlation (r = 53) between the variables, and Democratic registration explains about 29 percent of the variation in the vote. As Figure 4.2 indicates there are 5 counties above, no counties on, and 9 counties below the positive regression line. Seven counties have a

Democratic vote share at or above 51 percent

In 2012 Democrat Elizabeth Warren with nearly 54 percent of the vote defeated incumbent Republican Scott Brown with about 46 percent in the Massachusetts general election for U.S. Senate. The relationship between the variables is statistically significant (p < .05). There are strong correlations (r = 64) between the variables, and Democratic registration explains about

41 percent of the variation in the vote. In addition to party support, this was a highly visible election with both campaigns spending record amounts of money to win. As Figure 4.2 indicates there are 5 counties above, no counties on, and 9 counties below the positive regression line.

Nine counties have a Democratic vote share at or above 51 percent.

Democrat Ed Markey won the Special Election in 2013 in order to fill the seat for the remainder of the term which was vacated by John Kerry to become U.S. Secretary of State.

Markey received about 55 percent of the vote to defeat Republican Gabriel Gomez who received about 45 percent. The relationship between the variables is statistically significant (p < .05).

There are strong correlations (r = 61) between the variables, and Democratic registration explains about 38 percent of the variation in the vote. As Figure 4.2 indicates there are 6 counties above, no counties on, and 8 counties below the positive regression line. Nine counties have a

Democratic vote share at or above 51 percent.

Democrat Ed Markey won reelection to his first full term as U.S. Senator in 2014 with about 62 percent of the vote. The relationship between the variables is statistically significant (p

< .01). There is a strong correlation (r = 70) between the variables, and Democratic registration

107 explains about 49 percent of the variation in the vote. As Figure 4.2 indicates there are 5 counties above, 1 county on, and 8 counties below the positive regression line. All 14 counties have a

Democratic vote share at or above 51 percent.

Massachusetts Gubernatorial Elections

In 1978 Democrat Ed King won the Massachusetts gubernatorial election with 51 percent of the vote defeating Republican Francis Hatch with 46 percent. The relationship between the variables is statistically significant (p < .01). There is a strong correlation (r = 84) between the variables, and Democratic registration explains about 70 percent of the variation in the vote.

Eleven of the 14 counties in Massachusetts indicate a negative difference between their

Democratic registration percentage and their Democratic vote percentage. Thus it appears that both independents and/or Republicans provided needed electoral support by voting for King. As

Figure 4.3 indicates there are 8 counties above, no county on, and 6 counties below the positive regression line. Seven counties have a Democratic vote share at or above 51 percent.

In the following election, Democrat Michael Dukakis won back the governor’s office by defeating incumbent Ed King in the Democratic primary, then in the general election with percent 59.5 of the vote defeated Republican John Sears with about 37 percent. In 1982, the constant is about 53 percent. There is a moderate correlations (r = 50) between the variables, and

Democratic registration explains about 25 percent of the variation in the vote. In this election 13 of the 14 counties in Massachusetts indicate a negative difference between their Democratic registration percentage and their Democratic vote percentage. Dukakis therefore received electoral support from outside the Democratic voter base. As Figure 4.3 indicates there are 6

108 counties above, 1 county on, and 7 counties below the positive regression line. Thirteen counties have a Democratic vote share at or above 51 percent.

Dukakis in 1986 handily won reelection with about 69 percent defeating Republican

George Kariotis with about 31 percent. The constant is about 73 percent, thus the Democratic vote share is actually slightly less than the constant. Other factors apparently influenced the vote—in my view, the Democratic vote in the race is higher overall than in all the other gubernatorial races examined and therefore the “law of diminishing returns” may have played a role here statistically speaking. There is a weak correlation between the variables and

Democratic registration explains about 2 percent of the variation in the vote. All 14 counties in

Massachusetts indicate a negative difference between their Democratic registration percentage and their Democratic vote percentage. Dukakis again received electoral support from outside is political party. As Figure 4.3 indicates there are 7 counties above, 1 county on, and 6 counties below the negative regression line. All 14 counties have a Democratic vote share at or above 51 percent.

1990 begins a string of 4 successive Republican victories for the office of Massachusetts governor. Republican Bill Weld with just over 50 percent of the vote defeated Democrat John

Silber’s 47 percent. The Democratic constant is about 37 percent, therefore Silber started out in a statistical deficit. The relationship between the variables is statistically significant (p < .01).

There is a strong correlation (r = 69) between the variables, and Democratic registration explains about 48 percent of the variation in the vote. Twelve Massachusetts counties indicate a negative difference between their Democratic registration percentage and their Democratic vote percentage. I posit that the Democrat probably received some electoral support from some independent voters but not enough support overall to win the election. As Figure 4.3 indicates

109 there are 6 counties above, 1 county on, and 7 counties below the positive regression line. Only 2 counties have a Democratic vote share at or above 51 percent.

Bill Weld was easily reelected with about 71 percent of the vote in 1994. The Democratic constant is 22 percent, meaning the Democratic candidate needed to a lot of electoral support from the Democratic base—which Mark Roosevelt did not get. There is a moderate correlation between the variables, and Democratic registration explains about 16 percent of the variation in the vote. When looking at the counties this is actually quite an accomplishment for Republican

Weld because the majority of the state’s counties were Democratic in their registration numbers.

Eleven counties have a positive difference between Democratic registration and the Democratic vote, however when examining an electoral map of this election the state is almost all

Republican red. As Figure 4.3 indicates there are 6 counties above, 1 county on, and 7 counties below the positive regression line. No counties have a Democratic vote share at or above 51 percent.

In 1998 Weld’s Lieutenant Governor Argeo Paul Cellucci was elected governor with about 51 percent of the vote defeating Democrat Scott Harshbarger with about 47 percent. The analysis indicates that the constant is about 40 percent. There is a moderate correlation between the variables and Democratic registration explains about 14 percent of the variation in the vote.

In 1998 (and through 2014) all the counties in Massachusetts have a negative difference between

Democratic registration and the Democratic vote. In the fairly close 1998 gubernatorial election the Democratic candidate did receive a considerable amount of electoral support from his own party but even more from outside the party. As Figure 4.3 indicates there are 5 counties above, no counties on, and 9 counties below the regression line. Four counties have a Democratic vote share at or above 51 percent.

110

Republican Mitt Romney with a plurality of just under 50 percent of the vote defeated

Democrat Shannon O’Brien with about 45 percent in 2002. The constant is about 30 percent.

There is a moderate correlation between the variables, and Democratic registration explain about

20 percent of the variation in the vote. All of the counties have a negative difference between

Democratic registration and the Democratic vote. When looking at this negative difference it is apparent that the Democrat received votes from other voters beyond her own party to make this a fairly close gubernatorial election. As Figure 4.3 indicates there are 5 counties above, 2 county on, and 7 counties below the positive regression line. Six counties have a Democratic vote share at or above 51 percent.

In the most competitive office examined in this study, the political pendulum swung back to the Democrats in the 2006 Massachusetts gubernatorial election. Democrat Deval Patrick won the general election with nearly 56 percent of the vote thus defeating Republican Kerry Healey at about 35 percent and also Independent candidate Christy Mihos with about 7 percent. The constant is about 36 percent. There is a moderate correlation between the variables, and

Democratic registration explains about 23 percent of the variation in the vote. This Democratic victory to win back the governor’s office is impressive based on the fact that all of the counties have a negative difference between Democratic registration and the Democratic vote. As Figure

4.3 indicates there are 5 counties above, no counties on, and 9 counties below the positive regression line. Twelve counties have a Democratic vote share at or above 51 percent.

Deval Patrick won reelection with a plurality victory in 2010. Democrat Patrick received about 48 percent of the vote defeating Republican Charlie Baker with about 42 percent, and also

Independent Tim Cahill with about 8 percent. The Democratic constant is about 22 percent. The relationship between the variables is statistically significant (p < .05), and there is a strong

111 correlation (r = 59) between the variables. Democratic registration explains about 35 percent of the variation in the vote. Again, Patrick won this competitive election with all of the counties having a negative difference between Democratic registration and the Democratic vote. As

Figure 4.3 indicates there are 5 counties above, 2 counties on, and 7 counties below the positive regression line. Seven counties have a Democratic vote share at or above 51 percent.

In the most recent Massachusetts gubernatorial election Republican Charlie Baker won a plurality to become governor in 2014. Baker received just over 48 percent of the vote closely defeating Democrat Martha Coakley with about 46.5 percent. The constant is about 21 percent.

The relationship between the variables is statistically significant (p < .05) with a strong correlation (r = 58) between the variables. Democratic registration explains about 34 percent of the variation in the vote. In making this a close election, the Democratic candidate again overcame the obstacle of having all 14 counties with a negative difference between Democratic registration and the Democratic vote. As Figure 4.3 indicates there are 5 counties above, 1 county on, and 8 counties below the positive regression line. Five counties have a Democratic vote share at or above 51 percent.

It is my interpretation that throughout these Massachusetts general elections for president,

U.S. Senate, and governor, Democratic candidates are clearly benefitting (even in a lost election) from electoral support on the ballot from voters outside of the Democratic Party. Democratic registration explains a varying degree of the Massachusetts Democratic vote, but also election specific issues, candidate characteristics, independent voters, and even some Republican electoral support helps Democrats win elections more-often-than-not in Massachusetts.

112

TABLE 4.5: OLS Bivariate Regression of Democratic Registration on Democratic Vote for President, U.S. Senate, and Massachusetts Governor by Year from 1976 to 2014.

MA US r US r MA r County President r2 Senate r2 Governor r2 1976 .324** .84 .165* .66 - - .060 .71 .054 .44 - - 1978 - - .429** .82 .551** .84 - - .086 .68 .104 .70 1980 .268* .65 - - - - .081 .42 - - - - 1982 - - .151 .49 .150 .50 - - .078 .24 .075 .25 1984 .125 .31 .050 .14 - - .112 .09 .105 .02 - - 1986 - - - - -.052 .13 - - - - .119 .02 1988 .035 .07 .026 .08 - - .137 .01 .095 .01 - - 1990 - - .117 .25 .273** .69 - - .129 .07 .083 .48 1992 .234 .44 - - - - .138 .19 - - - - 1994 - - .251 .47 .207 .40 - - .136 .22 .137 .16 1996 .391** .70 .332 .48 - - .116 .49 .176 .23 - - 1998 - - - - .271 .38 - - - - .192 .14 2000 .531** .78 .336* .64 - - .123 .61 .116 .41 - - 2002 - - .218 .50 .541 .45 - - .110 .25 .309 .20 2004 .598* .57 - - - - .248 .33 - - - - 2006 - - .571* .61 .646 .48 - - .212 .38 .341 .23 2008 .631 .52 .726** .67 - - .298 .27 .234 .44 - - 2010 - - .846* .53 .836* .59 - - .387 .29 .331 .35 2012 .830* .66 .910* .64 - - .275 .43 .315 .41 - - 2014 - - .930** .70 .835* .58 - - .274 .49 .337 .34 N 10 15 10 * p < .05, ** p < .01. All tests are two-tailed. Note: The first row of numbers are unstandardized regression coefficients (i.e., the slope coefficients, b values). The second row of numbers are standard errors. The next column of numbers are Pearson’s correlation coefficients—r, then the second row is r 2. N = Elections.

113

Table 4.6: Democratic Registration, Democratic Vote, and the Difference in Percentages for President by County, 1976-2012.

MA County 1976 1980 1984 1988 1992 1996 2000 2004 2008 2012 Barnstable 21 24 26 26 25 25 25 27 27 26 43 29 43 49 43 53 52 55 56 53 -22 -5 -17 -23 -18 -28 -27 -28 -29 -27 Berkshire 39 40 42 41 38 36 35 37 37 37 57 43 45 61 54 65 64 73 75 76 -18 -3 -3 -20 -16 -29 -29 -36 -38 -39 Bristol 46 48 50 49 44 42 39 39 38 36 61 44 50 56 48 64 65 63 60 59 -15 +4 0 -7 -4 -22 -26 -24 -22 -23 Dukes 16 20 19 22 23 28 30 34 36 36 49 44 54 64 54 67 62 73 75 73 -33 -24 -35 -42 -31 -39 -32 -39 -39 -37 Essex 43 44 45 43 37 35 33 33 33 32 55 39 45 50 44 59 57 58 59 57 -12 +5 0 -7 -7 -24 -24 -25 -26 -25 Franklin 21 21 23 27 26 27 27 30 31 30 48 39 49 58 48 60 54 68 72 72 -27 -18 -26 -31 -22 -33 -27 -38 -41 -42 Hampden 52 52 54 52 47 44 41 41 40 39 59 45 49 56 46 61 58 61 61 62 -7 +7 +5 -4 +1 -17 -17 -20 -21 -23 Hampshire 41 41 41 43 41 38 36 38 38 38 58 46 56 61 54 64 56 69 71 70 -17 -5 -15 -18 -13 -26 -20 -31 -33 -32 Middlesex 48 46 50 49 42 40 38 39 38 37 56 42 50 55 50 63 61 64 64 63 -8 +4 0 -6 -8 -23 -23 -25 -26 -26 Nantucket 11 13 14 19 21 24 25 27 28 29 42 37 46 59 48 59 58 63 67 63 -31 -24 -32 -40 -27 -35 -33 -36 -39 -34 Norfolk 46 45 47 44 40 38 36 37 36 34 51 39 46 51 46 60 59 60 58 57

-5 +6 +1 -7 -6 -22 -23 -23 -22 -23 Plymouth 37 36 39 36 32 30 29 30 30 28 51 34 39 44 38 55 55 54 53 51

-14 +2 0 -8 -6 -25 -26 -24 -23 -23 Suffolk 74 71 66 67 62 58 53 53 54 54 61 52 62 64 61 73 71 76 77 77

+13 +19 +4 +3 +1 -15 -18 -23 -23 -23 Worcester 44 45 46 43 37 34 32 32 31 29 60 42 43 48 44 58 56 56 56 54 -16 +3 +3 -5 -7 -24 -24 -24 -25 -25

Source: Compiled by the author on the basis of results reported by the Massachusetts Registration Statistics and the Massachusetts Election Statistics , 1976 to 2012. The first row represents the Democratic registration in the county. The second row represents the Democratic vote in the county. The third row represents the difference between the row 1 and row 2.

114

Table 4.7: Democratic Registration, Democratic Vote, and the Difference in Percentages for U.S. Senate by County, 1976-2014.

MA County 1976 1978 1982 1984 1988 1990 1994 1996 2000 2002 2006 2008 2010 2012 2013 2014

Barnstable 21 21 24 26 26 24 26 25 25 25 26 27 26 26 26 26 58 44 53 49 60 52 52 46 68 76 62 55 42 48 46 54 -37 -23 -29 -23 -34 -28 -26 -21 -43 -51 -36 -28 -16 -22 -20 -28 Berkshire 39 40 39 42 41 39 37 36 35 34 37 37 38 37 37 37 71 55 61 54 74 55 65 59 79 86 79 78 68 71 73 75 -32 -15 -22 -12 -33 -16 -28 -23 -44 -52 -42 -41 -30 -34 -36 -38 Bristol 46 46 48 50 49 46 44 42 39 39 38 38 37 36 36 35 72 60 66 61 70 56 61 58 75 83 70 67 43 52 49 59 -26 -14 -18 -11 -21 -10 -17 -16 -36 -44 -32 -29 -6 -16 -13 -24 Dukes 16 18 18 19 22 23 27 28 30 31 35 36 36 36 37 36 66 31 65 63 72 64 64 61 77 84 77 73 64 68 69 72 -50 -13 -47 -44 -50 -41 -37 -33 -47 -53 -42 -37 -28 -32 -32 -36 Essex 43 42 43 45 43 39 36 35 33 33 33 33 33 32 32 32 70 54 61 51 63 55 55 48 71 80 66 64 43 50 51 59 -27 -12 -18 -6 -20 -16 -19 -13 -38 -47 -33 -31 -10 -18 -19 -27 Franklin 21 20 21 23 27 25 27 27 27 27 30 31 31 30 31 30 66 48 57 56 68 56 58 54 69 77 77 74 63 67 67 73 -45 -28 -36 -33 -41 -31 -31 -27 -42 -50 -47 -43 -32 -37 -36 -43 Hampden 52 51 52 54 52 48 47 44 41 41 40 40 40 39 40 39 69 59 55 54 65 51 54 48 71 82 66 66 44 54 47 60 -17 -8 -3 0 -13 -3 -7 -4 -30 -41 -26 -26 -4 -15 -7 -21 Hampshire 41 42 40 41 43 40 40 38 36 36 38 38 38 38 38 37 70 56 59 61 68 58 61 57 73 78 76 73 61 66 68 72 -29 -14 -19 -20 -25 -18 -21 -19 -37 -42 -38 -35 -23 -28 -30 -35 Middlesex 48 47 45 50 49 45 42 40 38 38 38 38 37 37 37 36 71 57 63 56 65 61 61 54 74 79 71 67 52 56 61 66 -23 -10 -18 -6 -16 -16 -19 -14 -36 -41 -33 -29 -15 -19 -24 -30 Nantucket 11 12 13 14 19 19 24 24 25 26 27 28 29 29 29 29 63 39 56 57 67 61 58 53 72 83 70 67 51 56 56 62 -52 -27 -43 -43 -48 -42 -34 -29 -47 -57 -43 -39 -22 -27 -27 -33 Norfolk 46 45 44 47 44 41 39 38 36 36 36 36 35 34 34 34 65 53 58 52 62 58 57 51 73 80 68 64 44 49 52 59

-19 -8 -14 -5 -18 -17 -18 -13 -37 -44 -32 -28 -9 -15 -18 -25 Plymouth 37 37 35 39 36 34 31 30 29 29 30 30 29 28 28 28 64 50 55 48 60 50 51 46 68 78 63 58 36 44 43 53

-27 -13 -20 -9 -24 -16 -20 -16 -39 -49 -33 -28 -7 -16 -15 -25 Suffolk 74 71 69 66 67 64 60 58 53 52 54 54 55 54 54 53 71 57 69 66 70 70 69 66 80 85 83 80 66 73 74 80

+3 +14 0 0 -3 -6 -9 -8 -27 -33 -29 -26 -11 -19 -20 -27 Worcester 44 44 44 46 43 40 36 34 32 31 31 31 30 29 29 29 72 53 59 52 64 52 54 46 69 79 65 60 38 46 43 53 -28 -9 -15 -6 -21 -12 -18 -12 -37 -48 -34 -29 -8 -17 -14 -24

Source: Compiled by the author on the basis of results reported by the Massachusetts Registration Statistics and the Massachusetts Election Statistics , 1976 to 2014. The first row represents the Democratic registration in the county. The second row represents the Democratic vote in the county. The third row represents the difference between the row 1 and row 2.

115

Table 4.8: Democratic Registration, Democratic Vote, and the Difference in Percentages for Massachusetts Governor by County, 1978-2014.

MA County 1978 1982 1986 1990 1994 1998 2002 2006 2010 2014 Barnstable 21 24 25 24 26 25 25 26 26 26 38 50 63 41 25 43 39 46 44 43 -17 -26 -38 -17 +1 -18 -14 -20 -18 -17 Berkshire 40 39 41 39 37 35 34 37 38 37 46 64 79 49 36 48 62 76 71 66 -6 -25 -38 -10 +1 -13 -28 -39 -33 -29 Bristol 46 48 49 46 44 40 39 38 37 35 61 62 76 56 32 49 51 57 47 45 -15 -14 -27 -10 +12 -9 -12 -19 -10 -10 Dukes 18 18 21 23 27 29 31 35 36 36 29 63 79 49 34 56 53 63 58 61 -11 -45 -58 -26 -7 -27 -22 -28 -22 -25 Essex 42 43 43 39 36 34 33 33 33 32 51 59 67 45 25 45 39 51 44 43 -9 -16 -24 -6 +11 -11 -6 -18 -11 -11 Franklin 20 21 25 25 27 27 27 30 31 30 37 56 75 42 31 55 55 71 61 57 -17 -35 -50 -17 -4 -28 -28 -41 -30 -27 Hampden 51 52 52 48 47 42 41 40 40 39 48 56 72 50 24 48 47 55 46 41 +3 -4 -20 -2 +23 -6 -6 -15 -6 -2 Hampshire 42 40 41 40 40 37 36 38 38 37 38 62 74 45 35 57 59 67 59 56 +4 -22 -33 -5 +5 -20 -23 -29 -21 -19 Middlesex 47 45 49 45 42 39 38 38 37 36 52 61 68 43 29 49 45 56 51 50 -5 -16 -19 +2 +13 -10 -7 -18 -14 -14 Nantucket 12 13 14 19 24 24 26 27 29 29 32 55 76 43 27 48 44 56 52 49 -20 -42 -62 -24 -3 -24 -18 -29 -23 -20 Norfolk 45 44 45 41 39 37 36 36 35 34 53 58 65 46 28 46 42 52 44 43

-8 -14 -20 -5 +11 -9 -6 -16 -9 -9 Plymouth 37 35 37 34 31 29 29 30 29 28 55 53 62 44 24 41 38 46 39 38

-18 -18 -25 -10 +7 -12 -9 -16 -10 -10 Suffolk 71 69 67 64 60 54 52 54 55 53 61 66 74 56 39 58 60 70 68 64

+10 +3 -7 +8 +21 -4 -8 -16 -13 -11 Worcester 44 44 44 40 36 33 31 31 30 29 54 59 66 49 24 41 39 54 42 38 -10 -15 -22 -9 +12 -8 -8 -23 -12 -9

Source: Compiled by the author on the basis of results reported by the Massachusetts Registration Statistics and the Massachusetts Election Statistics , 1978 to 2014. The first row represents the Democratic registration in the county. The second row represents the Democratic vote in the county. The third row represents the difference between the row 1 and row 2.

116

Figures 4.1: Massachusetts Democratic Registration and Democratic Vote for President by County from 1976 to 2012.

117

118

Figures 4.2: Massachusetts Democratic Registration and Democratic Vote for U.S. Senate by County from 1976 to 2014.

119

120

121

Figures 4.3: Massachusetts Democratic Registration and Democratic Vote for Governor by County from 1978 to 2014.

122

123

This section briefly expands on the interpretation that in the Massachusetts general elections being examined Democratic candidates are benefitting from electoral support on the ballot from voters outside of their own party. Presented now is a concise look at the U.S. House of Representatives and the two chambers of the Massachusetts state legislature. Figures 4.4–4.6 provide graphic illustrations showing the positive regression slopes overall for these legislative bodies from 1976 to 2014. The averaged Democratic registration and Democratic vote by county percentages indicate positive relationships between party registration and votes for Democrats in these offices/ races during this time frame.

Since 1976, with the exception of the race for Massachusetts governor, the Democratic number of wins is clearly dominant across most of the offices analyzed. This is indicative of a one-party state (Key, 1949). Republican Ronald Reagan is the only presidential candidate and

Republican Scott Brown, via a U.S. Senate Special Election to fill a seat for a partial term, are the only 2 Republicans to win Massachusetts elections in these two major offices since 1976.

Again, the Massachusetts governor’s race is the exception here but to be clear both parties are even at 11 wins each in the last 22 elections, dating back to 1948.

The political dominance of the Massachusetts Democratic Party continues in the legislative offices of the U.S. House of Representatives and the Massachusetts state legislature.

Since 1976, Democrats have held the majority of the seats in each of these three legislative bodies 100 percent of the time. In other words, in each of these 3 offices, Democrats have held the majority of seats in the past 20-of-20 general elections.

124

U.S. House of Representatives Elections

Massachusetts Democrats in the U.S. House of Representatives from 1976 to 2014 have a total average seat percentage of about 93 percent (compared to 53 percent nationally) with a total average Democratic vote of about 71 percent. The bivariate relationship between Democratic registration and the Democratic vote is statistically significant (p < .01). There is a strong correlation (r = 92) between the independent variable and the dependent variable. Democratic registration explains about 84 percent of the variation in the vote. As Figure 4.4 indicates there are 7 counties above, no county on, and 7 counties below the positive regression line. All 14

Massachusetts counties have an average Democratic vote share at or above 51 percent during this time frame. Further, all 14 counties during this time frame show a negative difference between their average Democratic registration percentage and their average Democratic vote percentage.

This indicates that independents and/or Republicans are providing electoral support by voting for

Democratic U.S. House of Representative candidates.

State Senate Elections

Democrats in the Massachusetts state senate from 1976 to 2014 have a total average seat percentage of about 83 percent (compared to 55 percent nationally) with a total average

Democratic vote of about 66 percent. The bivariate results for the Massachusetts state senate are identical with the results listed above U.S. House of Representatives. The bivariate relationship between Democratic registration and the Democratic vote is statistically significant (p < .01).

There is a strong correlation (r = 92) between the independent variable and the dependent variable. Democratic registration explains about 84 percent of the variation in the vote. As Figure

4.5 indicates there are 7 counties above, no county on, and 7 counties below the positive

125 regression line. The results now differ slightly from the U.S. House in that for the Massachusetts state senate 11 counties (not all of them) have an average Democratic vote share at or above 51 percent during this time frame. Still the majority. Similar to the U.S. House again, all 14 counties during this time show a negative difference between their average Democratic registration percentage and their average Democratic vote percentage for state senate. This indicates that independents and/or Republicans are providing electoral support by voting for Democrats running for the state senate.

State Representatives Elections

Democrats in the Massachusetts House of Representatives from 1976 to 2014 have a total average seat percentage of about 82 percent (compared to 55 percent nationally) with a total average Democratic vote of about 70 percent. The relationship between Democratic registration and the Democratic vote is statistically significant (p < .01). Both the correlation coefficient and the coefficient of determination for the Massachusetts state house of representatives is slightly higher than the other two legislative bodies. There is a strong correlation (r = 93) between the independent variable and the dependent variable. Democratic registration also explains about 87 percent of the variation in the vote. As Figure 4.6 indicates there are 7 counties above, no county on, and 7 counties below the positive regression line. All but one of the counties in

Massachusetts have an average Democratic vote share at or above 51 percent during this time frame; however, even the one county—Barnstable County—is at 50 percent. Similar to the U.S.

House of Representatives and the Massachusetts state senate, all 14 counties during this time frame show a negative difference between their average Democratic registration percentage and their average Democratic vote percentage for state representative. This indicates, again, that

126 independents and/or Republicans are providing electoral support by voting for Massachusetts

Democrats.

Figure 4.4: Massachusetts Democratic Registration and Democratic Vote for U.S. House of Representatives by County, 1976-2014.

Figure 4.5: Massachusetts Democratic Registration and Democratic Vote for Massachusetts State Senate by County, 1976-2014.

127

Figure 4.6: Massachusetts Democratic Registration and Democratic Vote for Massachusetts House of Representatives by County, 1976-2014.

VII. Conclusion

In this chapter, bivariate regression analysis was employed to examine whether there is a relationship between the party registration variables and the Democratic vote in Massachusetts.

In the numerous analytical examinations conducted, the independent variables indicated statistically significant results on the dependent variable more-often-than-not. Party registration, for the most part, is moderately-to-strongly correlated to most political offices and in most counties. Regression analysis was conducted (in section V) for each of the three registration types on the Democratic vote for each of the 14 counties for each office examined.

Mathematically speaking, looking at one political office at a time, the analysis took each of the 3 registration segments times the 14 counties which equals a total number of 42 possible opportunities for statistically significant relationships. Overall, of the significant correlations, the results are arranged here by political office in order from the-least-to-the-most (total number of counties) found with statistically significant bivariate correlations between each of the three

128 different party registration types and the Democratic vote—Massachusetts Governor (12 times);

U.S. Senate (16 times); Massachusetts State Representatives (18 times); U.S. House of

Representatives (21 times); Massachusetts State Senate (23 times); and, the president (29 times).

The analysis in this chapter importantly finds that Massachusetts registered independent voters behave like Massachusetts registered Democratic voters. As found earlier with all the statistically significant bivariate results in the majority of the political offices examined—4 of 6 offices—(e.g., all three federal offices and the MA senate), both Democratic registration and also independent registration each have ALL positive correlations with the Massachusetts Democratic vote. In the Massachusetts senate, Democrats have held the majority of seats 88 percent of the time since 1948. With the exception of the competitive race for Massachusetts governor, overall, these numbers are arguably dominant and indicative of a one-party state.

In sum, Democratic registration is behaving the way we think it should. In other words, in a positive manner toward the Democratic vote; as registration goes up the vote goes up. This analysis has found also that independent registration is also behaving just like Democratic registration, also in a positive manner toward the Democratic vote; as registration goes up the vote goes up. Of the statistically significant correlations, all of the slope coefficients (b values) in

Tables 4.3 and 4.4 show a positive effect of X on Y. This provides a key insight into the paradox presented earlier. This finding is also very supportive of the partisan thesis that Massachusetts independent voters have similar electoral behavior to Massachusetts Democratic voters. They are disguised partisans that are hiding their loyalty to the Democratic Party, not only in their party

ID claims of being independents (forthcoming in chapter 7), but here through use of the rules and mechanics of state’s voter registration system.

129

To a lesser degree, another finding in terms of weakening the partisan thesis here, but in overall an important discovery is the behavior of some Massachusetts Republican voters in that at times they behave loyally to the Democratic Party instead of their own. Republican registration, unlike the other two registration segments with all positive relationships (positive slope values) have produced a mixed bag of results. At times indicating an inverse relationship with the dependent variable, as would be expected, but often times showing a positive influence on the Democratic vote in Massachusetts.

It appears that throughout these Massachusetts general elections for president, U.S.

Senate, and governor, Democratic candidates are clearly benefitting (even in a lost election) from electoral support on the ballot from voters outside of the Democratic Party. Democratic registration explains a varying degree of the Massachusetts Democratic vote, but also election specific issues, candidate characteristics, independent voters, and even some Republican electoral support helps Democrats win elections more-often-than-not in Massachusetts.

Importantly, again, political practitioners depend, in part, on party registration data as a partisan indicator in guiding election campaigns and decision-making. The next section, Chapter 5, continues this analysis of the registration-vote relationship by using multivariate regression.

130

-Chapter 5- Analysis of the Democratic Vote in Massachusetts Multivariate Analysis of the Registration-Vote Relationship

The purpose of this chapter is to continue the statistical examination of the registration- vote relationship using multiple regression analysis. Results regarding the research question and hypothesis are reported in descriptive narratives and a series of tables outlining the statistical results. This chapter, as in the previous one, focuses on the major research question and hypothesis 1 listed below. The next analysis chapter examines the second research question and its hypothesis.

I. Results

What is the effect of party registration on the Democratic vote in Massachusetts?

Hypothesis 1: There is a statistically significant correlation between changes in the Democratic vote and changes in party registration in Massachusetts.

Multivariate regression analysis of the party registration variables on the Massachusetts

Democratic vote in federal and state general elections was employed to examine the registration- vote relationship. Using SPSS, the statistical results indicate that the Republican Party registration variable has the most statistical effect in the regression model on the dependent variable for 4 of the 6 political offices examined. Why? Statistically speaking, this finding/interpretation is based on the partial slope coefficients (also called the partial regression coefficients or partial b values). The most critical piece of information produced by the regression analysis is the slope coefficient estimates (b values). The slope/regression coefficient

131 is the best available indicator of the impact of X on Y in the populations being examined. This particular statistical test/tool is a measure of the effect of an independent variable on the dependent variable. Importantly, it tells us the change in the expected (or average) value of the dependent variable resulting from a one-unit increase in an independent variable (Berry and

Sanders, 2000).

In general, all three party registration types have varying effects on the dependent variable. Republican registration, however, indicates higher numerical effects (positive or negative) in statistical impact most often in the model according to the regression coefficients for the offices of president, U.S. Senate, and both chambers of the Massachusetts legislature. Based on the same measures, Democratic Party registration has the biggest statistical effect in the model on the Democratic vote in Massachusetts for the other 2 of 6 political offices examined—

U.S. House of Representatives and Massachusetts governor.

Further, the regression coefficients are not necessarily saying that Republican voters are always voting more often for Democrats compared to the other two voter groups, or even that the

Massachusetts Democratic vote percentage is actually always higher based on changes in

Republican registration. The regression coefficient is however, as a statistical indicator, saying that a one-unit increase of Republican registration impacts the Massachusetts Democratic vote

(positively or negatively) at a statistically greater level than either of the other two registration variables. Generally speaking, this may be due, at least in part, to the much larger numbers and higher percentages of the electorate that the other two voter groups represent (Democrats and independents). In other words, from a statistical analysis standpoint it may be an example of the economic law of diminishing returns—essentially stating that if one input in the production of a commodity is increased while all other inputs are held fixed, a point will eventually be reached at

132 which additions of the input yield progressively smaller, or diminishing, increases in output

(O’Sullivan and Sheffrin 2008: 109). This may be true to some degree in this case for

Democratic and independent registration in that more registered voters do not necessarily make the same amount of statistical impact in SPSS as do with the smaller numbers/ percentages being analyzed when examining Republican registration.

On the county-level, using multivariate regression of party registration on general election results in federal and state general elections, Republican registration again has the largest effect (based on the partial slope values) on the Democratic vote most often in the statistical model and influences the highest number of counties. For instance, when looking at all

6 political offices multiplied by the 14 Massachusetts counties the total is 84 cases. Republican registration has the highest partial slope values (based on absolute value whether positive or negative) a total of 48 times. Democratic registration is next with a total of 28 times, followed by independent registration with a total of 8 times. When looking at each office, Republican Party registration influences the most counties in general elections for the offices of the president, U.S.

Senate, and both chambers of the Massachusetts legislature. Democratic registration influences the most counties in general elections for Massachusetts governor. Both Democratic Party and

Republican Party registrations are tied with 7 counties each regarding the partial slope coefficients for office of U.S. Representative.

II. Statewide General Elections for Federal Offices from 1948 to 2014

Table 5.1 presents the multivariate analysis of the relationship between the party registration variables and the Democratic vote in Massachusetts general elections for federal office. The regression results indicate statistically significant relationships for 1 of 3 offices

133 examined. For U.S. Representative, based on an analysis of 391 U.S. House races since 1948,

Democratic registration has the most effect on the Democratic vote. The dependent variable increases for every percentage change in Democratic registration (p < .05). Independent registration also has a statistically significant (p < .05) and positive relationship on the

Democratic vote. Republican registration did not produce a significant result but indicates a positive increase on the dependent variable when Republican registration increases. The combined effects of the independent variables indicate a strong relationship exists between the registration types and election results in that about 57 percent of the variation in the Democratic vote is explained.

For presidential general elections no significant relationships were found in the multivariate regressions. However, all three registration types do indicate positive effects on the

Democratic vote for president. Republican registration has the highest partial slope value. About

53 percent of the variation in the Democratic vote is explained by the registration variables. Also for U.S. Senate no significant relationships were found in the multivariate regressions. However, all three registration types, as with the presidential elections, do indicate positive effects on the

Democratic vote for U.S. Senate.

Overall, among the regression results in Table 5.1 whether statistically significant or not, when looking at the partial slope values for the federal offices, Republican registration has the largest statistical effect on the Democratic vote most often in the model. Republican Party registration has the largest b values for president and U.S. Senate. The regression indicates a positive relationship exists between Republican registration and the Democratic vote in both of these offices. Democratic Party registration has the largest b values on the Democratic vote for

U.S. Representatives, and indicates a positive relationship exists between Democratic

134 registration and the Democratic vote for this office. As discussed in chapter 4, Massachusetts

Republican voters are at times behaving as ticket splitters, and also that independent voters are often acting as hidden Democrats when voting.

Table 5.1: Multivariate Regression of Registration on the Democratic Vote for Federal Offices, Statewide, 1948-2014.

Political Independent Democratic Republican R R2 Constant Office Registration Registration Registration President .182 .840 1.639 .724 .525 -716512.546 N =17/17 (.191) (.480) (1.214) - - (1045645.773) [.268] [.873] [.568] - - US Senate .028 1.023 1.457 .601 .361 -716674.097 N =25/25 (.216) (.557) (1.235) - - (1105055.758) [.037] [.890] [.457] - - US Reps .290* .879* .723 .757 .573 -464736.723 N =34/391 (.132) (.327) (.750) - - (657496.552) [.343] [.722] [.211] - -

* p < .05, ** p < .01. All tests are two-tailed. Note: The first row of numbers are unstandardized regression coefficients (i.e., the partial slope coefficients, b values). The second row of numbers in parentheses are standard errors. The third row of numbers in brackets are standardized regression coefficients—BETA. N= Election Years/Races.

III. Multivariate County-level Analysis of Massachusetts General Elections for Federal Offices from 1976 to 2014

As performed earlier in chapter 4 (section V), bivariate regression analysis examined the registration-vote relationship for each party registration type individually on the Democratic vote in Massachusetts. This section now begins a multivariate statistical examination at the county- level in Massachusetts. This analysis is performed in order to look more closely at political changes based on voter registration and the election outcomes throughout different parts of the state in order to determine if and where changes in registration have influence the Democratic vote. Remaining focused on the major research question of the effect of registration on election results is explored. (Chapter 6 provides more in-depth analysis based on electoral geography.)

135

U.S. Presidential Elections

Table 5.2 presents the multivariate regression between the party registration variables and the Democratic vote by county in presidential general elections in Massachusetts. Based on analysis of 10 presidential elections since 1976, the results indicate statistically significant relationships for 6 of the 14 counties in the state. The correlation coefficients indicate the variables are strongly correlated. Of the significant relationships, it can be seen that in 5 counties independent registration has the most effect on the Democratic vote for president. For these counties, as the table shows, independent registration either increases or decreases the

Democratic vote for president. These counties indicate statistical significance at both the .01 and

.05 levels, and also a good amount of the variation in the Democratic vote is explained by independent registration (at or above 60 percent). In 2 counties Democratic registration has the most effect on the Democratic vote for president. For Franklin and Nantucket counties

Democratic registration has a positive relationship with the Democratic vote (p < .01). As with the independent registration variable, Democratic registration also explains about 2/3 of the variation in the dependent variable. In Suffolk County Republican registration has the most effect on the Democratic vote for president. Republican registration decreases the Democratic vote for president, on average, -3.078 (p < .05), and also explains about 62 percent of the variation in the vote.

What does all this mean? This latest finding is an instance of what we would expect regarding Republican registration and the Democratic vote. In my view, this inverse (or traditional) relationship may be a product of the fact that Suffolk County is the highest

Democratic stronghold in the state and thus the relatively few Republican voters in this county who hold true to the Republican base and its voting behavior. Also, regarding the other two

136 registration types, they are acting as we have generally seen throughout the study. In practical terms, Democratic presidential candidates have won the state of Massachusetts in 8 of the 10 general elections from 1976 to 2012. Ronald Reagan is the only Republican to win the state; first, in 1980 (by a plurality) and then again in 1984 by a much larger vote share.

Overall, among all the regression results in Table 5.2 whether statistically significant or not, when looking at the partial slope values for all 14 Massachusetts counties, Republican registration has the largest effect on the Democratic vote most often in the statistical model.

Republican registration has the largest regression coefficients in 8 counties, followed by

Democratic registration and independent registration both with the largest regression coefficients in 3 counties each.

137

Table 5.2: Multiple Regression of Democratic Vote by County for U.S. President, 1976-2014.

MA Independent Democratic Republican R R2 Constant County Registration Registration Registration Barnstable .352 1.088 -.404 .787 .620 3229.435 (.498) (1.059) (.885) - - (19713.286) [.415] [.605] [-.066] - - Berkshire .774 .208 -1.453 .771 .594 18007.700 (.360) (.852) (1.425) - - (35452.101) [.620] [.056] [-.283] - - Bristol .441 -.102 1.326 .778 .606 33326.909 (.221) (.805) (1.523) - - (79528.702) [.771] [-.044] [.224] - - Dukes .185 1.059 -2.125 .797 .635 4640.178 (.586) (.527) (.978) - - (2886.398) [.128] [.778] [-.170] - - Essex .486** .102 1.029 .778 .606 -2068.887 (.107) (.516) (1.103) - - (91195.369) [.844] [.036] [.167] - - Franklin -1.841* 4.374** .627 .795 .632 11046.740 (.590) (.883) (.747) - - (8815.086) [-1.347] [2.412] [.146] - - Hampden .475 .285 -.415 .795 .632 37805.712 (.356( (.674) (1.957) - - (82918.012) [.880] [.110] [-.138] - - Hampshire .129 1.935 -3.402 .787 .620 4408.925 (.539) (1.068) (1.672) - - (22996.278) [.130] [.925] [-.313] - - Middlesex .598* .471 -.240 .777 .604 27061.774 (.171) (.924) (1.551) - - (383860.555) [.864] [.115] [-.037] - - Nantucket -.205 1.679** -.113 .797 .635 1070.500 (.298) (.403) (.623) - - (759.259) [-.156] [1.161] [-.028] - - Norfolk .575** -.249 .398 .778 .606 83281.251 (.119) (.645) (1.061) - - (104756.573) [.906] [-.070] [.068] - - Plymouth .284 .293 2.169 .781 .609 -54206.192 (.402) (.930) (1.968) - - (86860.220) [.427] [.109] [.442] - - Suffolk .990** .213 -3.078* .787 .620 89342.802* (.181) (.153) (1.075) - - (30018.975) [1.307] [.187] [-.602] - - Worcester .180 -.203 1.605 .777 .604 67291.685 (.331) (.719) (1.994) - - (118315.058) [.369] [-.060] [.532] - - * p < .05, ** p < .01. All tests are two-tailed. Note: The first row of numbers are unstandardized regression coefficients (i.e., the partial slope coefficients, b values). The second row of numbers in parentheses are standard errors. The third row of numbers in brackets are standardized regression coefficients—BETA.

138

U.S. Senate Elections

The multivariate analysis between the independent variables and the Democratic vote by county is presented in the following table. Based on an analysis of 16 U.S. Senate elections since

1976, the results indicate statistically significant relationships for half of the counties in the state.

The correlation coefficients indicate that these variables are moderately-to-strongly correlated.

Of the significant relationships, it can be seen that in Worcester County independent registration has the most effect on the Democratic vote for U.S. Senate. As Table 5.3 indicates independent registration in this county decreases the Democratic vote for U.S. Senate (p < .05), and also explains about half of the variation in the dependent variable. Democratic registration has the most effect on the Democratic vote in both Franklin and Hampshire counties. Democratic registration increases the Democratic vote for U.S. Senate (p < .05), and also explains over half of the variation in the vote. Republican registration has the most effect on the Democratic vote for U.S. Senate in 4 other counties. For these locations this X increases Y for U.S. Senate, upwards of about 7.5 percent (p < .05), and explains about half of the variation in the vote.

In practical terms Democratic U.S. Senate candidates have won the state of

Massachusetts 15 times in the last 16 general elections (2 of which were special elections). Scott

Brown, in a special election for a partial term—the remainder of Ted Kennedy’s term, is the only

Republican to win a U.S. Senate seat from Massachusetts during this time period. Overall, among the regression results in Table 5.3 whether statistically significant or not, when looking at the partial slope values for all 14 Massachusetts counties, Republican registration has the largest effect on the Democratic vote most often in the statistical model. Republican registration has the largest regression coefficients in 12 counties, followed by Democratic registration and independent registration both with the largest regression coefficients in 1 county each.

139

Table 5.3: Multiple Regression of Democratic Vote by County for U.S. Senate, 1976-2014.

MA Independent Democratic Republican R R2 Constant County Registration Registration Registration Barnstable -.625 1.783 3.364* .771 .594 -55539.917 (.747) (1.522) (1.299) - - (28248.767) [-.827] [1.125] [.616] - - Berkshire .545 .955 1.410 .434 .188 -28745.126 (.556) (1.238) (2.090) - - (50308.234) [.376] [.243] [.245] - - Bristol -.404 1.255 3.294 .444 .197 -85084.043 (.465) (1.691) (2.973) - - (160956.485) [-.664] [.511] [.518] - - Dukes 2.464 -1.189 .910 .777 .604 -6512.625 (1.383) (1.226) (1.777) - - (5657.325) [1.909] [-1.021] [.087] - - Essex -.003 .265 3.289 .503 .253 -63426.737 (.190) (.935) (1.971) - - (154214.264) [-.005] [.086] [.477] - - Franklin -1.659 4.186* 3.079 .797 .635 -6273.415 (1.019) (1.510) (1.675) - - (18917.682) [-1.384] [2.750] [.818] - - Hampden -.720 1.033 4.077 .493 .243 -86084.222 (.554) (1.037) (2.896) - - (117289.944) [-.965] [.295] [1.037] - - Hampshire -1.229 3.271* 4.664 .753 .567 -56398.293 (.790) (1.409) (3.098) - - (31752.599) [-1.292] [1.707] [.437] - - Middlesex -.246 1.888 4.514* .693 .480 -615986.609 (.214) (.919) (1.835) - - (354163.043) [-.345] [.515] [.691] - - Nantucket .108 .441 1.354 .763 .582 -93.150 (.560) (.698) (1.257) - - (1234.824) [.102] [.363] [.410] - - Norfolk -.090 .739 3.995* .643 .413 -143931.186 (.201) (1.118) (1.716) - - (171106.503) [-.130] [.180] [.629] - - Plymouth -1.000 1.746 7.444* .721 .520 -209902.466 (.584) (1.393) (2.940) - - (124345.876) [-1.567] [.665] [1.566] - - Suffolk .391 .396 -1.429 .602 .362 59752.566 (.486) (.366) (2.623) - - (68869.075) [.548] [.369] [-.327] - - Worcester -1.148* 1.403 7.492* .702 .493 -218201.868 (.461) (1.051) (2.699) - - (160132.829) [-2.000] [.330] [2.184] - - * p < .05, ** p < .01. All tests are two-tailed. Note: The first row of numbers are unstandardized regression coefficients (i.e., the partial slope coefficients, b values). The second row of numbers in parentheses are standard errors. The third row of numbers in brackets are standardized regression coefficients—BETA. U.S. Representatives Elections

140

U.S. House Elections

Based on an analysis of 209 U.S. House races since 1976, the results indicate statistically significant relationships for 8 of the 14 counties in the state. Of the significant relationships, as seen in Table 5.4, independent registration has its largest effect in Franklin County by decreasing the Democratic vote for U.S. Representative, on average, -10.791 (p < .05), for every one percentage change. Democratic registration has the most effect on the Democratic vote for U.S.

Representative in 6 counties. Democratic registration in these counties increases the Democratic vote, on average, 1.053 to 13.310 (p < .01, p < .05), and explains upwards of half the variation in the Democratic vote. In Plymouth County Republican registration has the most effect on the

Democratic vote for U.S. Representative. For this county, as the table indicates, Republican registration increases the Democratic vote for U.S. Representative (p < .05), and also explains half of the variation in the vote.

Democratic candidates have fared extremely well in general elections for the

Massachusetts delegation to the U.S. House of Representatives. In fact they have won 194 times in the 209 seat races during this time frame from 1976 to 2014. This is about a 93 percent winning percentage for Massachusetts Democrats. Overall, among the regression results in the table, statistically significant or not, when looking at the partial slope values for all 14

Massachusetts counties, both Democratic Party and Republican Party registrations equally have the largest effect on the Democratic vote most often in the statistical model. Both registrations have the largest regression coefficients in 7 counties each.

141

Table 5.4: Multiple Regression of Democratic Vote by County for U.S. Representative, 1976- 2014.

MA Independent Democratic Republican R R2 Constant County Registration Registration Registration Barnstable .302 .122 1.103 .590 .348 5300.373 (1.049) (2.193) (1.832) - - (39237.005) [.363] [.070] [.191] - - Berkshire .740 -1.617 -7.681 .570 .325 134208.740 (1.123) (2.571) (4.501) - - (104657.582) [.186] [-.143] [-.461] - - Bristol -.033 3.148* -2.772 .724 .524 -157712.816 (.373) (1.420) (2.419) - - (123779.193) [-.041] [1.006] [-.353] - - Dukes -1.166 .803 -14.292 .420 .176 33524.103 (5.488) (4.916) (8.394) - - (24748.574) [-.302] [.227] [-.453] - - Essex .141 1.490** 1.467 .690 .477 -161610.659 (.130) (.647) (1.385) - - (102532.349) [.221] [.470] [.214] - - Franklin -10.791* 13.310* -7.177 .719 .518 176535.799* (3.722) (5.396) (5.832) - - (67673.581) [-2.321] [2.240] [-.486] - - Hampden .267 .873 1.732 .622 .387 -80652.781 (.597) (1.128) (3.079) - - (124138.391) [.244] [.168] [.308] - - Hampshire .260 2.932 -2.163 .680 .463 -48332.271 (1.658) (3.186) (5.961) - - (61744.646) [.113] [.624] [-.092] - - Middlesex .167 1.419 2.947 .660 .436 -439604.411 (.217) (.931) (1.799) - - (353898.578) [.197] [.319] [.398] - - Nantucket -.090 .825 .669 .787 .620 1143.070 (.549) (.704) (1.212) - - (1256.297) [-.080] [.667] [.211] - - Norfolk .011 2.184* .692 .577 .333 -177417.475 (.187) (1.015) (1.604) - - (144363.441) [.014] [.519] [.106] - - Plymouth -.961 2.677* 5.814* .729 .532 -212466.038* (.459) (1.117) (2.361) - - (95467.390) [-1.373] [.922] [1.167] - - Suffolk -.093 1.053* -.293 .628 .394 -46976.931 (.478) (.405) (2.591) - - (72523.845) [-.099] [.713] [-.051] - - Worcester .158 .448 .613 .368 .135 64145.526 (.657) (1.422) (3.782) - - (208551.653) [.200] [.081] [.134] - - N = 19 Election Years; 200 Races * p < .05, ** p < .01. All tests are two-tailed. Note: The first row of numbers are unstandardized regression coefficients (i.e., the partial slope coefficients, b values). The second row of numbers in parentheses are standard errors. The third row of numbers in brackets are standardized regression coefficients—BETA.

142

IV. Statewide General Elections for State Offices from 1948 to 2014

Table 5.5 presents the multivariate analysis of the relationship between the party registration variables and the Democratic vote in Massachusetts general elections for state office.

The statewide regression results indicate statistically significant relationships for 2 of the 3 state offices examined. The variables are strongly correlated.

For state senate, based on an analysis of 1,360 races, Republican registration has the most effect on the Democratic vote. Republican registration has a positive relationship with the dependent variable (p < .05). Democratic registration also has a statistically significant and positive relationship on the Democratic vote for state senate (p < .01). Independent registration has a small but positive effect on the dependent variable. The combined effect of the independent variables indicates a strong relationship exists between registration and results. Based on an examination of 6,720 state representative races, Republican registration again has the most effect on the Democratic vote by increasing the dependent 3.480 (p < .01) on average for every 1 percentage change in registration. Democratic registration also has a statistically significant, positive relationship on the Democratic vote for state representative (p < .05). Independent registration has an inverse relationship with the Democratic vote. Multiple R-square indicates that a moderate relationship exists between party registration and election results.

No significant relationships were found in the multivariate regressions for Massachusetts governor; however, independent registration indicates a positive effect on the Democratic vote.

Democratic and Republican registrations have inverse effects on the Democratic vote for this office. The correlation for the model is slightly over the weak category and into the moderate range (R =.28) and also the coefficient of determination only explains about 8 percent of the variation in the dependent variable. As we have seen in this study the office of Massachusetts

143 governor is the most competitive and unpredictable among the 6 offices being examined. There is a constant back-and-forth battle in every general election to gain (or regain) control of the corner office in Boston. This exists even more than appears in the other offices being looked at.

Why? In my view, unlike the comparatively unknown, multi-member state legislature with its

200 members (and prior to 1978 it was 280 legislators), in general, Massachusetts voters easily identify the governor as the single focal point and the state’s leader for all that is right and or wrong in the Commonwealth. Voters then hold the governor directly accountable on Election

Day. Certainly legislative leaders may be known, such as the senate president or the speaker of the house, as well as the elected officials from ones’ own district, or even a legislator with a controversial or key piece of legislation (especially if gets a good amount of media coverage), but even voters (or the general public) who do not closely follow politics at all usually know the name and party of the governor.

Overall, among the regression results in Table 5.5 whether statistically significant or not, when looking at the partial slope values for the state offices, Republican registration has the largest effect on the Democratic vote most often in the statistical model. Republican Party registration has the largest regression coefficients in general elections for both state legislative chambers. Democratic Party registration has the largest effect on the Democratic vote in the statistical model based on these regression coefficients for Massachusetts governor.

144

Table 5.5: Multiple Regression of the Democratic Vote for State Offices, 1948-2014.

Political Independent Democratic Republican R R2 Constant Office Registration Registration Registration MA Governor .147 -.238 -.100 .284 .081 1168001.147 N =22/22 (.154) (.347) (.771) - - (694852.401) [.315] [-.419] [-.067] - - State Senate .036 1.087** 1.490* .763 .582 -837651.131 N =34/1,360 (.127) (.313) (.717) - - (629188.494) [.052] [1.101] [.537] - - State Reps -.202 .888* 3.480** .639 .408 -1052276.535 N =34/6,720 (.162) (.400) (.916) - - (803558.916) [-.275] [.839] [1.170] - -

V. Multivariate County-level Analysis of Massachusetts General Elections for State Offices from 1976 to 2014

Massachusetts Gubernatorial Elections

Table 5.6 presents the multivariate analysis of the party registration variables and the

Democratic vote by county in Massachusetts gubernatorial general elections. Based on 10 elections for governor since 1978, the results indicate statistically significant and strongly correlated relationships for 12 of the 14 counties in the state.

Of the significant relationships, it can be seen that in 4 counties independent registration has the most effect on the Democratic vote for Massachusetts governor. For these counties independent registration decreases or increases the Democratic vote for Massachusetts governor, on average, ranging from -1.370 to 1.043 (p < .05), for every one percentage change (p < .01 and p < .05). Independent registration in these counties explains well over half of the variation in the vote. Democratic registration has statistically significant relations on the Democratic vote in 8 counties for Massachusetts governor. As the table indicates, in these counties Democratic

145 registration increases the Democratic vote for Massachusetts governor (p < .01, p < .05).

Democratic registration also, like independent registration, explains a majority of the variation in the vote. Republican registration did not produce any statistically significant results on the

Democratic vote for Massachusetts governor. But in 9 counties Republican registration indicates a positive effect on the Democratic, which is a continuing finding and trend in this study.

Democratic candidates have won the race for Massachusetts governor 5 of 10 times in the general elections from 1978 to 2014. The political pendulum has swung evenly back-and-forth between the Democrats and Republicans during this time period. This is the most competitive office examined during this time period. Due to the reasons discussed in this study, this electoral trend will probably continue in Massachusetts.

Overall, among the regression results in Table 5.6 whether statistically significant or not, when looking at the partial slope values for all 14 Massachusetts counties, Democratic registration has the largest effect on the Democratic vote most often in the statistical model.

Democratic registration has the largest regression coefficients in 9 counties, followed by

Republican registration in 4 counties, and independent registration in 1 county.

146

Table 5.6: Multiple Regression of Democratic Vote by County for Governor, 1978-2014.

MA Independent Democratic Republican R R2 Constant County Registration Registration Registration Barnstable -.792 2.213 .663 .757 .573 1221.635 (1.031) (2.042) (1.690) - - (33712.009) [-1.556] [2.103] [.197] - - Berkshire -.225 2.651 -.295 .697 .486 -41410.980 (.504) (1.232) (2.118) - - (48822.657) [-.185] [.732] [-.055] - - Bristol -1.370* 4.360* 1.639 .763 .582 -299770.020 (.393) (1.649) (2.174) - - (124602.390) [-3.259] [2.770] [.412] - - Dukes 1.130 -.260 -.549 .771 .594 -1117.554 (1.338) (1.176) (1.870) - - (5335.253) [1.130] [-.295] [-.069] - - Essex -.321 2.398* .604 .763 .582 -204354.988 (.142) (.771) (1.742) - - (109811.149) [-.641] [.858] [.102] - - Franklin -1.270 3.972 4.582 .753 .567 -26856.405 (1.217) (1.952) (2.658) - - (25775.207) [-1.105] [2.837] [1.224] - - Hampden -.428 2.363* .720 .781 .609 -174918.160 (.508) (.898) (2.427) - - (91029.649) [-.756] [.841] [.271] - - Hampshire -.943 2.462 4.108 .753 .567 -46740.399 (1.119) (1.881) (4.409) - - (39504.746) [-1.186] [1.529] [.503] - - Middlesex -.254 2.707* .746 .787 .619 -617232.390 (.276) (.950) (2.295) - - (350337.576) [-.418] [.844] [.141] - - Nantucket 1.043** .100 -1.157 .795 .632 -776.119 (.225) (.273) (.542) - - (458.702) [1.355] [.117] [-.575] - - Norfolk -.460* 3.800** -.635 .781 .609 -338816.171* (.140) (.785) (1.209) - - (97794.785) [-.852] [1.196] [-.138] - - Plymouth -.978* 2.723* 3.336 .757 .573 -155420.495 (.361) (.850) (2.071) - - (69517.752) [-2.566] [1.619] [1.267] - - Suffolk -.293 .923* -.079 .771 .594 -39882.022 (.413) (.353) (2.028) - - (57778.443) [-.610] [1.108] [-.030] - - Worcester -.203 3.407** .012 .778 .606 -331318.138* (.395) (.744) (2.165) - - (100651.860) [-.457] [.992] [.005] - - * p < .05, ** p < .01. All tests are two-tailed. Note: The first row of numbers are unstandardized regression coefficients (i.e., the partial slope coefficients, b values). The second row of numbers in parentheses are standard errors. The third row of numbers in brackets are standardized regression coefficients—BETA.

147

Massachusetts State Senate Elections

Based on 800 state senate races since 1976, the results indicate statistically significant relationships for 4 of the 14 counties in the state. Table 5.7 presents the multivariate analysis of the party registration variables and the Democratic vote by county in general elections. The correlation coefficients indicate these variables are strongly correlated. Of the significant relationships, it can be seen that in Nantucket County independent registration has the most effect on the dependent variable for state senate increasing the Democratic vote (p < .01). In

Hampden and Middlesex counties Democratic registration has the most effect on the Democratic vote. For these counties Democratic registration increases the Democratic vote for Massachusetts state senate (p < .01). Also in each county Democratic registration explains about 54 percent of the variation in the Democratic vote. In Berkshire County both independent registration and

Republican registration produced significant relationships on the Democratic vote for

Massachusetts state senate. Independent registration (p < .01) and Republican registration (p <

.05) both increase the Democratic vote, and also these independent variables explain about 57 percent of the dependent variable’s variation.

Democratic candidates have won in general elections for the Massachusetts state senate

653 times of the 800 seat races from 1976 to 2014. Thus Democrats have about an 82 percent winning percentage for this office. Overall, among the regression results in Table 5.7 whether statistically significant or not, when looking at the partial slope values for all 14 Massachusetts counties, Republican registration has the largest effect on the Democratic vote most often in the statistical model. Republican registration has the largest regression coefficients in 9 counties, followed by Democratic registration in 3 counties and independent registration in 2 counties.

148

Table 5.7: Multiple Regression of Democratic Vote by County for State Senate, 1976-2014.

MA Independent Democratic Republican R R2 Constant County Registration Registration Registration Barnstable -.462 4.138 -.447 .777 .604 -56477.972 (1.261) (2.635) (2.201) - - (47141.913) [-.275] [1.175] [-.038] - - Berkshire 2.923** 1.651 5.694* .757 .573 -195004.895** (.640) (1.465) (2.565) - - (59651.840) [.917] [.182] [.425] - - Bristol .870 -.656 -1.848 .630 .397 143321.535 (.485) (1.843) (3.140) - - (160679.454) [.941] [-.182] [-.204] - - Dukes 2.233 -.262 1.198 .777 .604 -9488.600 (2.420) (2.168) (3.701) - - (10912.235) [.911] [-.116] [.060] - - Essex -.183 .877 2.063 .454 .206 -50062.832 (.155) (.771) (1.651) - - (122186.793) [-.297] [.286] [.311] - - Franklin -.609 2.674 1.804 .753 .567 -2809.960 (.870) (1.261) (1.363) - - (15811.808) [-.477] [1.637] [.445] - - Hampden .437 4.321** -6.154 .734 .539 -231131.899 (.638) (1.205) (3.289) - - (132591.839) [.324] [.674] [-.887] - - Hampshire -.788 2.578 -1.173 .593 .352 2147.285 (.688) (1.321) (2.473) - - (25609.485) [-.903] [1.452] [-.132] - - Middlesex -.115 2.805** 3.319 .732 .536 -890125.040* (.191) (.820) (1.584) - - (311537.888) [-.140] [.650] [.462] - - Nantucket 1.958** -.073 .004 .781 .609 -4813.344** (.565) (.725) (1.248) - - (1293.764) [.967] [-.033] [.001] - - Norfolk .012 -.034 1.896 .283 .080 74063.594 (.228) (1.237) (1.955) - - (175957.559) [.015] [.008] [.279] - - Plymouth -.283 .499 4.286 .616 .380 -77339.579 (.536) (1.304) (2.757) - - (111447.080) [-.399] [.169] [.848] - - Suffolk .349 .522 -2.404 .654 .427 62304.066 (.294) (.249) (1.596) - - (44663.876) [.587] [.559] [-664] - - Worcester -.149 1.664 3.209 .771 .594 -207048.369 (.402) (.871) (2.317) - - (127742.466) [-.212] [.338] [.787] - - * p < .05, ** p < .01. All tests are two-tailed. Note: The first row of numbers are unstandardized regression coefficients (i.e., the partial slope coefficients, b values). The second row of numbers in parentheses are standard errors. The third row of numbers in brackets are standardized regression coefficients—BETA.

149

Massachusetts State Representative Elections

Table 5.8 presents the multivariate analysis of the relationship between the party registration variables and the Democratic vote by county in state representative general elections in Massachusetts. Based on 3,280 races since 1976, the results indicate statistically significant relationships for 4 of the 14 counties in the state. The variables are strongly correlated.

Of the significant relationships, it can be seen that in Dukes County independent registration has the most effect on the Democratic vote for Massachusetts state representative.

Independent registration increases the Democratic vote for Massachusetts state representative (p

< .05) and explains about 59 percent of the variation in the vote. In Hampshire and Nantucket counties Democratic registration has the most effect on the dependent variable. As the table indicates Democratic registration increases the Democratic vote (p < .05), and also nearly 60 percent of the variation in the vote in these counties. Republican registration in Plymouth County has the most effect on the Democratic vote. Republican registration increases the Democratic vote for Massachusetts state representative, on average, 7.655 (p < .01), and explains about 58 percent of the variation in the vote.

Democratic candidates have won in general elections for the Massachusetts House of

State Representatives 2,668 times of the 3,280 seat races from 1976 to 2014. Thus Democrats have about an 81 percent winning percentage for this office. Overall, among the regression results in Table 5.8 whether statistically significant or not, when looking at the partial slope values for all 14 Massachusetts counties, Republican registration has the largest effect on the

Democratic vote most often in the statistical model. Republican registration has the largest regression coefficients in 8 counties, followed by Democratic registration in 5 counties and independent registration in 1 counties.

150

Table 5.8: Multiple Regression of Democratic Vote by County for State Representative, 1976- 2014.

MA Independent Democratic Republican R R2 Constant County Registration Registration Registration Barnstable -.267 2.245 -2.205 .778 .606 50858.266 (.766) (1.602) (1.338) - - (28660.212) [-.341] [1.368] [-.407] - - Berkshire -.259 2.485 -2.119 .533 .284 -6323.265 (.534) (1.223) (2.141) - - (49791.115) [-.141] [.477] [-.275] - - Bristol -.152 .553 2.137 .334 .111 -1035.966 (.414) (1.573) (2.679) - - (137090.945) [-.233] [.218] [.336] - - Dukes 3.806* -2.320 .256 .771 .594 -9665.396 (1.300) (1.165) (1.989) - - (5863.313) [2.367] [-1.575] [.019] - - Essex .201 .716 1.447 .588 .346 -58151.810 (.139) (.688) (1.473) - - (109012.684) [.331] [.237] [.221] - - Franklin .673 .661 -2.191 .757 .573 8062.477 (1.319) (1.912) (2.067) - - (23985.781) [.313] [.241] [-.321] - - Hampden .025 .570 .846 .351 .123 -9230.785 (.476) (.900) (2.457) - - (99080.350) [.034] [.164] [.225] - - Hampshire -1.188 3.735* 1.553 .753 .567 -41894.402 (.725) (1.394) (2.609) - - (27021.101) [-1.055] [1.631] [.135] - - Middlesex .258 1.189 .698 .596 .355 -197578.454 (.199) (.853) (1.648) - - (324084.801) [.356] [.313] [.110] - - Nantucket -1.019 2.984* -1.141 .771 .594 2900.131 (.936) (1.200) (2.066) - - (2142.044) [-.553] [1.462] [-.218] - - Norfolk .160 .844 1.303 .540 .291 -47180.647 (.172) (.934) (1.476) - - (132855.365) [.238] [.225] [.223] - - Plymouth -.733 1.256 7.655** .763 .582 -222263.031* (.381) (.928) (1.961) - - (79282.593) [-.955] [.394] [1.401] - - Suffolk .349 .579 -2.029 .663 .440 43471.318 (.327) (.277) (1.775) - - (49675.522) [.522] [.551] [-.499] - - Worcester -.415 .808 2.434 .451 .203 -14419.205 (.295) (.638) (1.698) - - (93605.750) [-1.124] [.313] [1.140] - - * p < .05, ** p < .01. All tests are two-tailed. Note: The first row of numbers are unstandardized regression coefficients (i.e., the partial slope coefficients, b values). The second row of numbers in parentheses are standard errors. The third row of numbers in brackets are standardized regression coefficients—BETA.

151

VI. Explaining the Variance

Chapters 4 and 5 have provided a statistical account of the general elections examined.

This study uses regression analysis to sort out the independent and combined effects of the variables of interest on the Democratic vote in Massachusetts. A series of tables and figures have presented the regression estimation results. Numerous slope coefficients, significance testing, correlation coefficients, and coefficients of determination have been produced in describing and explaining a wide range of the variance in the dependent variable. Many statistically significant relationships have been indicated between party registration and the Democratic vote.

This research addresses the paradox of why independent registration continues increasing as Massachusetts becomes more Democratic in its voting. These two analysis chapters answer the major research question posed in this study: What is the effect of party registration on the

Democratic vote in Massachusetts? Importantly, the study finds that independent registration behaves like Democratic registration, in a positive manner toward the Democratic vote—as independent registration goes up the Democratic vote goes up. This provides a key insight into the paradox presented here. This finding is very supportive to the thesis that Massachusetts independent voters essentially behave like Massachusetts Democratic voters. They are behaving as closet partisans. Another important trend discovered in this study is that Republican registration often indicates a positive relationship with the Democratic vote in Massachusetts.

These findings support hypothesis 1: There is a statistically significant correlation between changes in the Democratic vote and changes in party registration in Massachusetts.

Generally speaking, regarding the finding on Republican registration, ticket-splitting appears to be happening in Massachusetts. Initially it is thought that Republican registration on the Democratic vote should result in an inverse relationship, and it does at times. But, more-

152 often-than not, the opposite happens, and Massachusetts Republicans at times are actually providing electoral support via votes to Democratic candidates in the privacy of the voting booths across the state. Why do some voters split their ballots, selecting a Democrat for one office and a Republican for another? Why do voters often choose one party to control the governor’s office while the other controls the state legislature? Among the dominate explanations in the literature for split-ticket voting are that voters at times prefer divided government to one-party control. We see this at times in Massachusetts with a Democratic- dominated state legislature and a very competitive political battle for the governor’s office between the two major parties.

From another lens, Burden and Kimball (2009) instead find that voters may not intentionally split their tickets to produce divided government. In their view, most cases of split outcomes are a by-product of lopsided campaigns that feature the incumbency advantage, the increasing importance of money to campaigns, high-quality candidates versus unknown competitors, and the blurring of party differences. The Democratic Party in Massachusetts is strong, and has been for many decades. Ticket-splitting by voters can also be that the ideological gap between some liberals and conservatives may not be great enough among some

Massachusetts voters; a strong incumbency advantage—especially of the Massachusetts

Democrats in most of the offices examined here (generally speaking there is a well-documented incumbency advantage in the American elections literature); voter apathy and minimal effort in learning about candidates—meaning that voters are choosing candidates mainly based on their party labels, familiar names, and people they know of or have heard of without actually reading about or learning about individual candidates, their positions, backgrounds, etc. All of which also benefits incumbents; which on average, again, are usually Democrats in Massachusetts.

153

In an arguably one-party state, like Massachusetts has been during the time frame of this study, voters in my view, as it also is with sports, enjoy being on the winning side.

Massachusetts has for many years had a Democratic-dominated state legislature. Again, this may be in part why the governor’s office has been such a competitive political battle going back-and- forth between the two major parties. Further, within the state’s legislature Republicans generally speaking have little real power based essentially on being greatly outnumbered, as both chambers are heavily dominated by Democrats. In this light, the sole seat of the governor’s office is a prime target for political competition in Massachusetts.

Overall, this study finds that several factors contribute to the electoral paradox in

Massachusetts. Registered Democrat Party voters and registered independent voters that actually are Democratic-leaners (as also surveyed in Chapter 7) via closet partisanship are both voting for

Democratic candidates. According to the Gallup Poll, Massachusetts is the number 1 state in the

United States in terms of the “Democratic advantage” for political candidates. Further, there are a lot of independent voters and relatively few independent candidates, so independent voters must generally choose between candidates from the two major parties. Also, the mechanics of the state’s election system of open primaries encourages independent voters to register as such.

As Finkel and Scarrow claim in terms of the state’s enrollment rules,

154

Voters operate in the political environment that they live in. States vary in their election rules, and Massachusetts voters have the opportunity—which they seize—too often register and also call themselves independents when they really are not. Actions speak louder than words.

As evident from this quantitative analysis of the registration-vote relationship,

Democratic Party registration does influence the Democratic vote in the state. However, the number of registered Democratic voters are not enough to win elections for their candidates on their own, therefore others (independent Democratic-leaners and sometimes even Republicans) are making up the difference in the variance of the Democratic vote in Massachusetts. The bivariate and multivariate regressions have provided lessons borne out by this data and analysis.

The most critical piece of information produced by these regressions is the slope coefficient estimates because it is the best available indicator of the impact of X on Y in the populations being examined. The takeaway here is that when looking at the results of each party registration segment in statewide general elections from 1948 to 2014—Democratic, Republican, or

Independent—all three indicate statistically significant relationships at times between registration and outcomes in five of the six offices examined.

Interestingly in the bivariate regressions none of the registration segments indicate a statistically significant result for the race for governor during this time frame. This study has shown the office of Massachusetts governor is the most competitive of the 6 political offices. As said earlier, the governor is the single, most focal point on the political landscape in

Massachusetts because in simple terms the governor is one person, not a legislative body of hundreds of people. Voters, and the public in general, envision the governor as the leader of the state, and therefore put the most emphasis and responsibility on the person in that office. The governor is held directly accountable for pocketbook issues such as jobs, taxes, and the general

155 health of state’s economy, as well as public safety and other key matters. In terms of general elections, unlike the presidency with the Electoral College, voters understand that they are directly electing their state leader when casting a vote for governor. This may not address voter turnout differences among these two offices, but I believe it addresses the practical reason the governor’s office is the most competitive in Massachusetts. Relatively-speaking, (aside from the president and the Electoral College), in general, people care more about the governor’s office and who is in it as compared to the U.S. Senate, U.S. House, or the state legislature. In my view,

I believe this is a major reason why party registration is not as strong in this office. As mentioned previously, candidate characteristics and election-specific issues such as the state’s economy and tax concerns matter most when voting for governor.

The bivariate results of each party registration segment in general elections at the county- level from 1976 to 2014 indicate varying degrees of significant relationships found between each registration type and each political office. For independent registration and the Democratic vote, the office of president indicates the most statistically significant relationships occurring, whereas the office of governor has the fewest number. For Democratic registration and the Democratic vote, the state senate indicates the most statistically significant relationships occurring, whereas both the U.S. Senate and governor have the fewest number. For Republican registration and the

Democratic vote, the office of president indicates the most statistically significant relationships occurring, whereas both the office of governor and Massachusetts House of Representatives have the fewest number. Also in each election year from 1976 to 2014, it can be seen that the

Democratic Party often began an election with a statistical constant at or above 51 percent, which essentially means Democratic candidates begin an election with a statistically favorable chance of winning before campaigning or other factors (such as registration changes) may influence this.

156

In general terms, all of the party registration segments and most of the political offices in this study have statistically significant relationships occurring between them, with the exception of the 1948 to 2014 statewide analysis of the Massachusetts governor’s office.

The intercept being the expected percentage of the Democratic vote with zero changes in voter registration thus tells us how a candidate who looks at the registration data can be expected to fare on Election Day, without any changes in registration. This occurred favorably (being at or above 51 percent) for Democratic candidates throughout the examined time frame: 8 times for

U.S. Senate, 2 times for governor, and once for president. In the 8 times for U.S. Senate,

Democratic candidates won the general elections every time—U.S. Senators Kennedy and Kerry alternated these victories. The 2 times for governor Democratic candidate, Michael Dukakis, won the general election both times. First, in 1982 with nearly 60 percent of the vote (about 7 percent above the constant). Second, in 1986 with about 69 percent of the vote (which is actually

4 percent below the constant of 73 percent). In 1988 the statistical constant was one percent higher than the Democratic vote percentage received by Democratic presidential candidate, which was 53 percent. Massachusetts Governor Michael Dukakis won his home state in the presidential general election, however lost the national election.

When using multivariate analysis Republican Party registration effects the Democratic vote most often, according to slope values coefficients. Again, this finding is based on choosing one party registration type of the three types examined, and at times the coefficients are close in number. On a statewide basis, Republican registration has the most statistical influence in the model in 4 of the 6 political offices—President, U.S. Senate, and the state legislature—followed by Democratic Party registration in the U.S. House of Representatives and Massachusetts governor. At the county-level, Republican Party registration again has the most effect, in terms

157 of the highest number of slope values in the most counties, in the model for the same 4 offices, and is tied with Democratic Party registration for the U.S. House of Representatives. Whereas

Democratic Party registration has the most influence for the office of Massachusetts governor.

Overall, when looking at all of the statistical regressions performed on all 3 registrations—

Democratic, Republican, and Independent—all have moderate-to-strong correlations with the dependent variable with most of the offices.

VII. Conclusion

The story here is that party registration matters. Party registration of voters is a useful piece of demographic information that is underappreciated compared to party ID (chapter 7).

Thus this research provides useable results. Again as Bruce Cain observes, registration data,

“…are not biased by candidate, election, and issue-specific factors. They are easy to work with and appealing as a measure of partisan strength…These rules of thumb become so universally accepted that they affect the decisions of all sorts of political actors” (1984: 141). Further, regarding statistical significance in general, because a relationship in a quantitative study does not produce a statistically significant result does not mean that one does not exist at all in the general population. It simply means that it does not exist within the quantitative analysis either at the 95 percent or 99 percent statistical levels of confidence.

To continue the examination in this chapter of whether there is a relationship between the party registration variables and the Democratic vote in Massachusetts, multiple regression analysis was employed. In the numerous analytical examinations conducted, the independent variables of Democratic registration, Republican registration, and independent registration all indicate statistically significant results on the Massachusetts Democratic vote more-often-than-

158 not. The quantitative analysis of bivariate and multivariate regressions indicates support for research hypothesis 1. The next section, Chapter six, provides an analysis of electoral geography by studying the trends of where political change is happening by location in the state, and what the change looks like in terms of the effect of party registration on the Democratic vote.

159

-Chapter 6- Analysis of the Democratic Vote in Massachusetts Geography of the Vote

The purpose of this chapter is to examine the geography of the Democratic vote in

Massachusetts. This analysis of electoral geography studies the trends of where political change is happening by location in the state, and what the change looks like in terms of the effect of party registration on the Democratic vote. The election mechanics are the same for all

Massachusetts counties in that they operate within the same local and statewide laws and procedures for conducting elections. Therefore, the specific purpose of this analysis is to understand the effect of party registration on the Democratic vote in each of these Massachusetts counties. This chapter examines the following research question: What is the effect of party registration on the Democratic vote geographically in Massachusetts? Using regression analysis this research question and its hypothesis are examined. Results regarding the research question and hypothesis posed in this chapter are reported in descriptive narratives and a series of tables and figures outlining the statistical results.

The next analysis chapter examines the third research question and its hypothesis. How does party ID relate to voting behavior in Massachusetts? (Chapter 7—Party ID) The several analysis chapters provide a written account that describe the events being examined, and also explain the paradox central to this study of why independent registration continues increasing as

Massachusetts simultaneously becomes more Democratic in its voting. Thus germane to the paradox being explained in this study, even as independent-majority voter counties increase so do Democratic victories.

160

I. Registration and the Democratic Vote

What is the effect of party registration on the Democratic vote geographically in Massachusetts?

Hypothesis 2: Party registration effects Democratic voting trends in Massachusetts counties.

Massachusetts party registration history of the past 67 years can be divided into three eras from 1948 to 2014. These time periods are based on the registered voting segments within the state electorate. Era one, from 1948 to 1962, the independents had the highest voter enrollment percentages in Massachusetts. Era two, from 1964 to 1988, the Democrats had the highest voter enrollment percentages. Era three, from 1990 to 2014, the independents again have the highest voter enrollment percentages in the state. Importantly, during this most recent period, since 1990 the Democratic Party in Massachusetts has enjoyed a higher combined vote share of 66 percent across the six political offices analyzed, as compared to the previous period with a combined vote share of 56 percent, when their own party had the highest numbers of enrolled voters.

Table 6.1 shows that when looking from era 1 to era 2, the Democratic vote percentage is higher in all 14 Massachusetts counties when the Democrats are the highest voter segment—as expected, as compared to era 1 when the independents were the highest registered segment.

However, during era 2 the Democrats still had 5 of the 14 counties with an overall losing vote share of less than 51 percent. Further, when looking from era 2 to era 3, the Democratic vote percentage increases in 11 of the 14 counties when the independents are the highest registered voter segment, as compared to when the Democrats themselves are the highest segment. More importantly, during this current era since 1990, the Democrats now have a winning vote percentage in all 14 counties across the state. This indicates that electoral support is coming from

161 voters outside the Democratic Party. A comparison of the Massachusetts counties based on the combined average Democratic vote share percentages across the six political offices examined during these time periods is presented next.

II. Geography of the Democratic Vote in Massachusetts Counties

Era 1: 1948 to 1962—8 election years

• Suffolk County 73% • Worcester County 58% • Bristol County 56% • Hampden County 56% • Middlesex County 51% • Hampshire County 49% • Essex County 48% • Berkshire County 45% • Norfolk County 41% • Plymouth County 40% • Franklin County 33% • Nantucket County 25% • Dukes County 23% • Barnstable County 21%

Era 2: 1964 to 1988—13 election years

• Suffolk County 79% • Worcester County 67% • Hampden County 65% • Middlesex County 63% • Norfolk County 63% • Essex County 62% • Bristol County 61% • Hampshire County 56% • Plymouth County 55% • Berkshire County 48%

162

• Franklin County 42% • Dukes County 41% • Barnstable County 38% • Nantucket County 38%

Era 3: 1990 to 2014—13 election years

• Suffolk County 82% • Hampshire County 73% • Berkshire County 71% • Franklin County 71% • Bristol County 69% • Dukes County 68% • Middlesex County 67% • Norfolk County 67% • Nantucket County 63% • Worcester County 63% • Essex County 61% • Hampden County 61% • Plymouth County 58% • Barnstable County 53%

As seen above, in the first era only 5 counties produced a winning Democratic vote share.

Then in the next period a mirror image occurred in that only 5 counties did not produce a winning percentage for the Democrats. But currently in this most recent era, as noted above, all

Massachusetts counties now produce winning Democratic vote percentages, on average. As stated before, it appears Democratic candidates are benefitting from votes outside their own party. Independent voters quite often, and even Republican voters sometimes, are selecting

Democratic candidates on the Election Day ballot.

163

III. Democratic Vote Percentages—County Trends

Table 6.1 describes how the Democratic vote share increases more-often-than-not in the state’s counties when looking from era one to era two, then from era two to era three. The total average Democratic vote percentages across the state during these eras went from 44 percent in

Era 1 to 56 percent in Era 2 to 66 percent in Era 3. In general, Suffolk County (the greater

Boston area) has consistently been the most Democratic county in the state. This county ranks first on the lists provided above, across all six offices combined in terms of the Massachusetts

Democratic vote since 1948. Why? It is most likely due, at least in part, to the fact that the greater Boston area has historically been the most racially diverse geographic area in the state.

As is well-known in the elections literature minority groups generally vote Democratic. When looking at the eras listed above, 5 counties during the time frame examined have always accounted for a winning Democratic vote in Massachusetts. Bristol, Hampden, Middlesex,

Suffolk, and Worcester counties have been geographic strongholds for Democrats. Whereas,

Barnstable County has been the least Democratic overall since 1948. In fact, the several counties comprising the Cape Cod area (Barnstable, Dukes, Nantucket, and Plymouth) during the first two eras are in the bottom half of the lists presented. Only in this most recent time period does one of these Cape counties (Dukes County) rise above the midpoint of the list.

164

Table 6.1: Democratic Vote Percentages by County for Six Offices Combined in Eras, 1948- 2014. MA Era 1 Era 2 Era 3 County 1948-1962 1964-1988 1990-2014 Barnstable 21 38 53 (+17) (+15) Diff-2 Berkshire 45 48 71 (+3) (+23) Diff+20 Bristol 56 61 69 (+5) (+8) Diff+3 Dukes 23 41 68 (+18) (+27) Diff+9 Essex 48 62 61 (+14) (-1) Diff-13 Franklin 33 42 71 (+9) (+29) Diff+20 Hampden 56 65 61 (+9) (-4) Diff-5 Hampshire 49 56 73 (+7) (+17) Diff+10 Middlesex 50 63 67 (+13) (+4) Diff-9 Nantucket 25 38 63 (+12) (+26) Diff+14 Norfolk 41 63 67 (+22) (+4)

Diff-18 Plymouth 40 55 58 (+15) (+3)

Diff-12 Suffolk 73 79 82 (+6) (+3)

Diff-3 Worcester 58 67 63 (+9) (-4)

Diff-5

Total Dem % 44 56 66

Source: Compiled by the author on the basis of results reported from Massachusetts Election Statistics . The first row of numbers are the Democratic vote percentages for the six political offices combined. The second row of symbols (+ or -) represent the Democratic vote percentage gains or losses from the prior era. The third row is the difference of gains or losses from era 2 to era 3.

165

Table 6.2 provides the descriptive statistics for the majority voter registration segments in each Massachusetts County from 1976 to 2014. The table indicates that a steady increase in the number of independent-majority counties has occurred in the state during this time frame.

Independent-majority counties early in the time frame were evenly split with Democratic- majority counties (7 of 14 counties). They have since become the vast majority of the state (13 of

14 counties)—with the exception of Suffolk County. During this time frame, in most of the independent-majority counties, the Democratic vote average percentage across all the political races on the ballot combined produced a Democratic winning share of at least 51 percent or higher. Clearly, and in accordance with the paradox being explained in this study, even as independent voters have steadily become the majority within the counties and thus across the state, Democrats remain overwhelmingly successful in general elections, on average, across the thousands of races analyzed in this study. Independent voters (and probably some Republican voters as been discussed) vote for Democratic candidates as well.

166

Table 6.2: Massachusetts Voter Registration Majorities and Democratic Vote Percentages for All Offices Combined by County, 1976-2014.

County 1976 1978 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 Barnstable I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I 48 46 35 43 48 50 51 38 45 43 46 50 57 56 56 59 74 48 63 51 Berkshire I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I 53 41 45 46 56 51 58 48 56 50 64 71 79 73 83 82 86 77 88 88 Bristol D D D D D D D D D I I I I I I I I I I I 61 60 54 65 64 75 74 59 67 63 72 70 78 77 73 75 76 53 66 67 Dukes I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I 53 42 30 52 60 69 71 52 59 54 57 70 73 78 73 72 77 71 83 75 Essex D D D D D D D I I I I I I I I I I I I I 66 60 63 67 63 77 62 56 56 50 61 63 71 65 67 69 72 50 58 55 Franklin I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I 43 44 55 48 54 54 68 47 54 67 71 69 76 75 81 81 80 72 86 81 Hampden D D D D D D D D D D D I I I I I I I I I 70 60 63 56 64 72 67 57 54 52 54 61 63 65 63 65 72 52 68 73 Hampshire I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I 66 50 65 57 66 63 72 55 70 67 73 79 74 73 79 77 80 71 82 83 Middlesex D D D D D D D D I I I I I I I I I I I I 65 66 66 71 66 77 66 57 58 57 65 66 77 72 69 76 74 61 70 70 Nantucket I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I 41 43 29 43 53 54 64 48 56 53 54 64 67 74 68 68 68 64 77 67 Norfolk D D D D D D D I I I I I I I I I I I I I 65 68 69 70 64 79 66 58 62 59 67 73 75 73 73 71 75 54 69 75

Plymouth I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I 67 64 58 61 53 64 55 45 49 53 57 62 67 68 62 65 69 45 57 54

Suffolk D D D D D D D D D D D D D D D D D D D D 77 78 83 78 81 86 79 71 79 72 81 83 87 86 87 85 89 76 84 87

Worcester D D D D D D I I I I I I I I I I I I I I 75 66 64 70 59 72 70 61 52 56 61 64 72 70 67 72 70 51 66 64 N 7 7 7 7 7 7 8 10 11 12 12 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 Source: Compiled by the author on the basis of results reported by the Massachusetts Registration Statistics and the Massachusetts Election Statistics , 1976 to 2014. The first row represents the registered voter majority segment in the county. The second row of numbers represent the Democratic vote percentage across the political offices on the ballot in each election year analyzed in this study. N = the number of independent majority counties of fourteen.

167

IV. Regression Results of Party Registration and the Democratic Vote

Using regression analysis of the relationship between party registration and the

Democratic vote in Massachusetts Table 6.3 presents the results. In general, Barnstable County has been the least Democratic county in Massachusetts since 1976. In fact it is the only county in the state that has produced a winning Democratic vote (51 percent or higher) less-than-half of the time in the 20 general elections examined—8 of 20 elections. The regression results indicate that

Barnstable County is the geographic location in which any Democratic registration increase has the most effect on the Democratic vote. In 18 of 20 elections Democratic registration in this county has the highest slope values. Regarding where political change is happening in

Massachusetts and what it looks like—not much has changed in terms of party registration and

Democratic voting in Barnstable County since 1976.

More the Massachusetts norm, 7 of the state’s 14 counties (Bristol, Essex, Hampden,

Middlesex, Norfolk, Suffolk, and Worcester) have been solidly Democratic in their voting in every general election across the 6 offices examined since 1976. This half of the state’s counties have voted at 51 percent or higher for Democrats no matter which of the party registration variables has the largest statistical effect based on slope value. Also, of the other 6 remaining

Massachusetts counties (Berkshire, Dukes, Franklin, Hampshire, Nantucket, and Plymouth), all of these locations have also voted Democratic the majority of the time during the past 20 election years examined. In these counties the Democratic vote of 51 percent or higher ranges from 15 years to 19 years of the total 20 election years analyzed.

As outliers, conversely to Barnstable County, Suffolk County stands out as the county that remains the most Democratic in terms of voting no matter which registration segment has the most statistical effect on the dependent variable. In fact surprisingly there is a lot of variation

168 in this regard in Suffolk County since 1976. Democratic registration and Republican registration have both indicated the largest statistical effects 4 times each on Democratic voting during this time frame. Whereas independent voter registration has the largest effect in 12 of the 20 general elections. It appears that most Suffolk County voters, no matter their registration status, on average, vote Democratic more-often-than-not. In terms of the Democratic vote, both Suffolk

County and Barnstable County are similar in that not much has changed in terms of Election Day preferences since 1976.

169

Table 6.3: Regression Analysis of Electoral Geography by Massachusetts County, 1976-2014.

MA County 1976 1976 1978 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 Barnstable D D D D D D D D D D D D D I D D D D R D 10* 4 4* 5* 4 3* 7* 3 6* 3 5* 3* 3 4** 4* 4* 5* 5* 10 6* 48 46 35 43 48 50 51 38 45 43 46 50 57 56 56 59 74 48 63 51 Berkshire D D D D D R R D R D R R D D D D R D R D 6* 3** 2** 3** 3** 3 12 3* 3 3* 11 3 5* 4* 6* 6* 8 5* 10 5* 53 41 45 46 56 51 58 46 56 50 64 71 79 73 83 82 86 77 88 88 Bristol R R D D D D D R D D D D R D R R R R R R 17 -3 3** 3** 3** 2** 2** -3 3** 3** 3** 2** 3 2* 17 13 22 13 19 11 61 60 54 65 64 75 74 59 67 63 72 70 78 77 73 75 76 53 66 67 Dukes D D D D D D D D D R D D D D R D I D D D 17 13 3 8 10 -11 18 9* 4* -4 8 -6 10* 8* -12 5* 4* 3 4 6* 53 42 30 52 60 69 71 51 59 54 57 70 73 78 73 72 77 71 83 75 Essex R R D D D D D D D D D I I I I I I I D R 5 4 3** 3** 3** 2** 3** 3** 3** 3** 3** 2* 3* 3* 3** 3* 3* 2* 3* -3 66 60 63 67 63 77 62 55 56 50 61 63 71 65 67 69 72 50 58 55 Franklin D D R D D D D D R R R R D D D D D D D D 5 3 2 3 6 1 9 5 7 -8 -16 -5 8* 8* 6* 7* 9* 7* 9* 5* 43 44 55 48 54 54 68 45 54 67 71 69 76 75 81 81 80 72 86 81 Hampden D D D D D D I D D I R I R I R D D D D D 5** 3** 3** 3** 4** 2* 4* 2** 2** 3* -3 2* 3* 3** -2 3* 5** 2* 4** 1* 70 60 63 56 64 72 67 57 54 52 54 61 63 65 63 65 72 52 68 73 Hampshire R I R R R I R R R R R D R R D R R D R R 14 5* 6** 25** 15** 3 13* 9* 8** 6 8 3* -7 -6 3* 3 13 4* 9 11 66 50 65 57 66 63 72 53 70 67 73 79 74 73 79 77 80 71 82 83 Middlesex R D D D D R D D D D R R D D D D D R D D -6* 3** 3** 3** 3** 2 3** 2** 3** 3** 3 2 3** 2** 3* 3* 3* 5 4* 3* 65 66 66 71 66 77 66 57 58 57 65 66 77 72 69 76 74 61 70 70 Nantucket I I D I I I R R I R R R I D R D D D I I 1 2 1 .4 .05* 4 2 5 -3 1 -9 8 -2 -3 9 4 6 -7 7 6 41 43 29 43 53 54 64 48 56 53 54 64 67 74 68 68 68 64 77 67 Norfolk D D D D R D D D D D D D D D D R R R R D 5** 5** 4** 4** -5** 3** 4** 4** 4** 3** 4** 3** 3** 2** 3** -3 -5* -3 -4 2**

65 68 69 70 64 79 66 58 62 59 67 73 75 73 73 71 75 54 69 75 Plymouth D D D D D D D D D R I I I I D R D R R R 4** 3** 3** 4** 4** 2** 3** 3** 2** 2 3** 1** 3** 2** 2** 4 3** 3 4 4

67 64 58 61 53 64 55 44 49 53 57 62 67 68 62 65 69 45 57 54 Suffolk D R I D R R I D I D R I I I I I I I I I 3 9 2 3 10 -9 15 3 3 2 -10 1 3 3 5 6 4 2 4 3

77 78 83 78 81 86 79 71 79 72 81 83 87 86 87 85 89 76 84 87 Worcester D D D D D D D D D D D D D D R D R D R D 4** 3** 3** 3** 3** 2** 3** 3** 3** 3* 4** 3** 4** 3** -4 3** -8 3** -6 2* 75 66 64 70 59 72 70 60 52 56 61 64 72 70 67 72 70 51 66 64

Source: Compiled by the author on the basis of results reported by the Massachusetts Registration Statistics and the Massachusetts Election Statistics , 1976 to 2014. The first row represents the party label with the highest slope coefficient (b value). The second row represents the slope value (rounded up) on the Democratic Vote in the county. * p < .05, ** p < .01. The third row represents the total Democratic vote percentage in the county for all offices on the ballot in each general election.

170

Figures 6.1—6.20 further illustrate the changes presented in Table 6.3 for the Democratic vote across the offices on the ballot in each general election by Massachusetts counties. As seen in the figures, the total average Massachusetts Democratic vote across the 6 offices combined from 1976 to 2014 is 65 percent. When looking at each election year, the Democratic vote range from 1976 to 2014 is between a low of 53 percent in 1990 to a high of 76 percent in 2008.

In all of the 20 general election years examined from 1976 to 2014 more-than-half of the state’s 14 counties have voted at or above 51 percent for Democratic candidates. In 1978 there were 8 Massachusetts counties with a winning Democratic vote share. Since then, in 8 of the years examined all 14 counties have had Democratic vote shares at or higher than 51 percent.

The remaining years fall within this range from 8 to 14 counties (and of these years 4 years show

13 counties with this winning vote share). Overall since 1976 it can been seen that in the 14

Massachusetts counties Democratic candidates across the 6 major federal and state offices examined have generally fared well in November throughout these general elections years.

From the party registration perspective, which is the central thrust of this research, in every general election analyzed there are varying percentages in each Massachusetts County of voters registered as Democrats, Republicans, or independents, as well as varying Democratic vote percentages. As Table 1.3 in chapter 1 presents, Massachusetts party registration has been quite variable during the time frame of this study and so has its effect on the dependent variable as evident from the statistical results. The differences among the Massachusetts counties in this chapter are thus viewed from this registration-vote standpoint.

171

Figures 6.1 – 6.20: Average Democratic Vote for Combined Offices by County, 1976-2014.

172

173

174

Source: Compiled by the author on the basis of results reported by the Massachusetts Election Statistics , 1976 to 2014.

V. Conclusion

This analysis chapter discusses the geography of the Democratic vote in Massachusetts. It examines the trends of where political change is happening across the state by location at the county-level. What the change looks like is investigated in terms of the effect of party registration on the dependent variable. The analysis indicates support for research hypothesis 2.

This means that whether a Massachusetts voter is a registered Democrat or registered independent, and sometimes Republican, there is an effect (usually positive) on the Democratic vote in a general election. In other words, the null hypothesis that no relationship exists between party registration and election results does not hold up. The next section, Chapter seven, will continue the study of the Massachusetts Democratic vote by examining voter party identification as self-reported in survey research. It will also review the results of this exploratory study and discuss its broader research implications.

175

-Chapter 7- Analysis of the Democratic Vote in Massachusetts Party Registration and Party Identification

This analysis chapter continues to examine the paradox that as registered independent voters in Massachusetts have steadily increased since 1990 so has the electoral success of

Democratic candidates. In addition to party registration, this chapter describes and analyzes the party identification (or party ID) as self-reported in survey research of Massachusetts voters. The psychological attachment of Massachusetts voters to the Democratic Party is strong. According to Gallup (2015), Massachusetts is ranked as the most Democratic state in the nation based on voter party ID and the Democratic Party leanings of the state’s independent voters.

Results regarding the research question and hypothesis are reported in descriptive narratives and a series of tables and figures outlining the statistical results. Differences in perceptions about the political candidates between surveyed voters identified as Democrats,

Republicans, or independents is also discussed. This chapter examines the following research question: How does party ID relate to voting behavior in Massachusetts? Independent samples t- tests were conducted to examine the influence of the dichotomous party ID variables on the

Democratic vote in Massachusetts. Regression analysis has also been employed to examine the effects of party registration and party ID on the dependent variable.

Party ID is the most studied variable in political science. On the other hand, party registration is severely understudied. As this chapter shows that may be somewhat misleading and that party registration needs to continue being addressed in future research. The next chapter provides a discussion and conclusion to this exploratory study, and recommendations for further empirical research.

176

I. Closet Partisanship in Massachusetts

Gallup’s finding about Massachusetts being the most Democratic state in the nation is important because it may imply a closet partisanship exists when comparing the partisan measures of party ID against the state’s official party registration data. For example, according to

Massachusetts registration data, independents currently represent about 54 percent of the electorate (and have a total average of about 49 percent since 1990), but in the elections survey data examined, although Massachusetts independent voters have a total party ID average of about 43 percent since 1990—when questioned further if they lean toward one of the two major political parties, then the percentage of “pure independents” that do not lean toward a major party is only about 19 percent. (Table 7.4 presents the yearly and total averages discussed here from 1990 to 2014.)

Conversely, Democratic Party registration in Massachusetts is at about 35 percent, but in the daily tracking interviews conducted by Gallup, Massachusetts voters identify with the

Democrats about 51 percent of the time. Republican Party registration in Massachusetts is at about 11 percent, however, state voters identify themselves in the elections surveys as

Republicans about 30 percent of the time. The elections survey data examined here may indicate that a partisan electorate exists in Massachusetts in which most voters identify strongly with either the Democrats or Republicans. Emotional voter attachments and loyalties to one of the two major parties may be influencing election outcomes in Massachusetts, as voters “see themselves” as partisans but are not being reflected in the official voter registration numbers.

The elections surveys conducted by the Suffolk University Political Research Center and the University of New Hampshire Survey Center polls essentially suggest the same party identification breakdown of Massachusetts voters as the Gallup Poll does. These university

177 researchers find that 53 percent of Massachusetts voters say that they identify with Democrats,

28 percent identify with Republicans, and again, 19 percent say they are pure independents.

Again, this survey research data does not match with the official party registration data in

Massachusetts (as discussed in Chapter 1).

II. Results

How does party ID relate to voting behavior in Massachusetts?

Essentially this hypothesis posits that Massachusetts independents are closet Democrats.

In other words, that it does not matter whether Massachusetts voters self-identify in election surveys as Democrats or as independents because they basically view Democratic candidates favorably more-often-than-not, and that election outcomes reflect this behavior. The researcher’s hypothesis is confirmed. The analysis shows that there is a statistically significant difference between these two voting groups, and also that the majority of Massachusetts independent voters often lean toward Democratic candidates.

Testing this hypothesis involved survey polling data from 1990 to 2014 obtained from the

Roper Center at Cornell University, as well as polling data from the University of New

Hampshire and Suffolk University. These data were coded, measured in percentages, and statistically examined using SPSS. The survey data illustrates the views of Massachusetts voters toward the candidates of general elections for three groups of voters: people identified as

178

Democratic, Republican, or independent. The relevant perceptions considered are: favorability rating toward Democratic candidates, favorability rating toward Republican candidates, proportion of people who find the Democratic candidates more likeable than the Republican ones, and proportion of people choosing Democratic candidates for the elections being analyzed.

Independent samples t-tests were conducted to examine the influence of the dichotomous party ID variables on the Democratic vote in Massachusetts. T-tests are used for testing whether two groups have different means of a continuous variable (Berman 2002: 93). This test is appropriate to assess the difference in some variable between two separate groups. In this case, the two survey groups are voters identified as Democratic, and voters identified as independent.

The average of the outcome variables are computed separately for each group, and the significance of the differences between the groups are assessed through the t-test.

Table 7.1 provides the descriptive statistics for the surveyed Massachusetts voters self- identifying as independents. It presents their favorability rating average percentages toward

Democratic candidates in presidential, U.S. Senate, and gubernatorial general elections from

1990 to 2014. Generally speaking, Massachusetts independents indicate in surveys that they lean toward Democratic candidates in both presidential and U.S. Senate elections. Whereas these same survey respondents indicate that Massachusetts gubernatorial general elections, once again, are different. In these elections, independents voters in the state are more unfavorable toward

Democratic candidates.

179

Table 7.1: Surveyed Massachusetts Voters Self-Identifying as Independents : Favorability Rating Average Percentages toward Democratic Candidates in Presidential, U.S. Senate, and Gubernatorial Elections from 1990 to 2014.

Democratic Presidential U.S. Senate Gubernatorial Candidates Elections Elections Elections Favorable 51 49 27 Neutral 11 11 16 Unfavorable 35 34 34 Don’t Know Candidates 3 6 23 Respondents N= 2,651 3,184 5,382

Source: Compiled by the author on the basis of Massachusetts election surveys from 1990 to 2014. Included for analysis are the National Election Pool State Election Day Exit Polls for Massachusetts obtained from the Roper Center at Cornell University; The Boston Globe Polls conducted by the Survey Center at the University of New Hampshire; and, The Boston Herald Polls conducted by the Political Research Center at Suffolk University. Note: The column percentages read vertically within each election type.

Table 7.2 provides the descriptive statistics for the surveyed Massachusetts voters self- identifying as Democrats. It presents their favorability rating average percentages toward

Democratic candidates in presidential, U.S. Senate, and gubernatorial general elections from

1990 to 2014. Massachusetts Democrats in general also indicate in surveys that they prefer

Democratic candidates in both presidential and U.S. Senate elections more often than in gubernatorial general elections. There is nearly an even 50/50 split regarding the race for governor.

Table 7.2: Surveyed Massachusetts Voters Self-Identifying as Democrats: Favorability Rating Average Percentages toward Democratic Candidates in Presidential, U.S. Senate, and Gubernatorial Elections from 1990 to 2014.

Democratic Presidential U.S. Senate Gubernatorial Candidates Elections Elections Elections Favorable 84 73 48 Neutral 6 8 13 Unfavorable 9 14 17 Don’t Know Candidates 1 5 22 Respondents N= 3,027 4,354 5,960

180

Table 7.3 provides the descriptive statistics for the surveyed Massachusetts voters self- identifying as Republicans. It presents their favorability rating average percentages toward

Democratic candidates in presidential, U.S. Senate, and gubernatorial general elections from

1990 to 2014. Generally speaking, Massachusetts Republicans indicate in surveys that they are more unfavorable toward Democratic candidates in these general elections than are the other two voter segments discussed. However, as we have seen from the SPSS statistical analysis of the relationship between registration and election results, Massachusetts Republicans do at times choose Democrats when they are in the election booth.

Table 7.3: Surveyed Massachusetts Voters Self-Identifying as Republicans: Favorability Rating Average Percentages toward Democratic Candidates in Presidential, U.S. Senate, and Gubernatorial Elections from 1990 to 2014.

Democratic Presidential U.S. Senate Gubernatorial Candidates Elections Elections Elections Favorable 19 31 16 Neutral 12 7 13 Unfavorable 68 56 48 Don’t Know Candidates 1 6 23 Respondents N= 1,616 2,063 2,692

181

SPSS T-tests

Analysis employing t-tests of the general elections survey data for president indicates a statistically significant relationship exists between the voter groups identifying themselves as either Democrats or independents and the Massachusetts Democratic vote. T-test results indicate a mean difference of about 33 percent between the Democratic and independent voter groups.

The Democratic group of voters has a mean of about 84 percent, whereas the independent group of voters has a mean of about 51 percent. The standard deviations for the Democratic and independent groups is about 7 percent and 4 percent, respectively. Also, according to the

Levene’s test on the Democratic vote, the equality of variances are not assumed, therefore the null hypothesis, that no relationship exists, can be rejected. The two-tailed t-test results indicate that there is a statistically significant difference between these two voter groups (p = .000).

Analysis of the general elections survey data for U.S. Senate candidates from

Massachusetts indicates a statistically significant relationship exists between the voter groups identifying themselves as either Democrats or independents and the dependent variable. T-test results indicate a mean difference of about 24 percent between the Democratic and independent voter groups. The Democratic group has a mean of about 73 percent, whereas the independent group has a mean of about 49 percent. The standard deviations for the Democratic and independent groups is about 6 percent and 12 percent, respectively. Also, according to the

Analysis of the general elections survey data for Massachusetts governor indicates a statistically significant relationship exists between the state’s voter groups identifying themselves

182 as either Democrats or independents and the Democratic vote. T-test results indicate a mean difference of about 21 percent between the Democratic and independent voter groups. The

Democratic group has a mean of about 48 percent, whereas the independent group has a mean of about 27 percent. The standard deviations for the Democratic and independent groups is about 21 percent and 11 percent, respectively. Also, according to the Levene’s test on the dependent variable, the equality of variances are not assumed, therefore the null hypothesis, that no relationship exists, can be rejected. The two-tailed t-test results indicate that there is a statistically significant difference between these two voter groups (p = .000).

Overall, the general elections survey data (that questioned thousands of Massachusetts voters) examined from 1990 to 2014 indicates that although Massachusetts independent voters have some different views than Democratic respondents and Republican respondents, the independent voters in Massachusetts still lean toward Democratic candidates more often than

Republicans or pure independents. In my view, again, this is based on closet partisanship.

Massachusetts independent voters, more-often-than-not act as hidden Democrats. Of note, generally speaking, elections research surveys do not ask respondents questions about individual legislators in the U.S. House of Representatives or the Massachusetts legislature. Thus, those offices were not included in this statistical analysis.

Table 7.4 presents the registration and party ID percentages for Massachusetts since

1990. Democratic registration began this era at about 43 percent and has declined about 8 percent overall to currently be at 35 percent in 2014. Democratic Party ID however actually shows a slight increase during this time frame actually reaching as high as 50 percent in 2006. Republican registration and Republican Party ID have both remained under 20 percent from 1990 to 2014.

The leading voter segment is clearly independent registration and independent identification.

183

Independent registration, on average, from 1990 to 2014 is nearly four times higher than

Republican Party registration, and more than 10 percentage points higher than Democratic

registration. The percentages are much closer between Democrats and independents regarding

party identification. Although in reality most of those self-identified independents actually are

Democratic-leaners. Self-identified independents are also almost 3 times more in number than

are self-identified Republicans.

TABLE 7.4: Party Registration, Party Identification, and the Democratic Vote Percentages of the Massachusetts Electorate, 1990-2014. Democratic Democratic Republican Republican Independent Independent Democratic Year Registration Identification Registration Identification Registration Identification Vote 1990 43 34 13 17 44 49 56 1992 40 38 14 19 46 44 62 1994 40 36 13 19 47 45 57 1996 39 39 14 17 47 44 64 1998 38 41 13 17 49 42 68 2000 36 44 15 18 49 38 74 2002 36 43 15 18 49 39 72 2004 37 42 14 15 49 43 70 2006 37 50 13 15 50 36 72 2008 37 46 12 13 51 41 75 2010 37 35 11 13 52 42 58 2012 36 43 11 15 53 43 71 2014 35 36 11 15 54 50 64 Avg. 38 41 13 16 49 43 66 SOURCE: Compiled by the author on the basis of results reported by the Massachusetts Registration Statistics ; the Massachusetts Election Statistics , and, the National Election Pool, State Election Day Exit Polls for Massachusetts, 1990 to 2014, obtained from the Roper Center, Cornell University. UMass Lowell 2014 elections survey.

As Table 7.4 indicates the average Democratic vote share from 1990 to 2014 is 66 percent.

Again as discussed previously, Democratic Party candidates are receiving votes from all of the

Massachusetts voter segments.

Figure 7.1 shows the percentage of Massachusetts voters from 1990 to 2014 registered

and identifying with each of the two major parties, as well as the percentage of Massachusetts

voters registered as independents and identifying as independents. The figure draws from total

184 averages found in prior table. The proportion of voters registered as Democrats is 38 percent which is comparable to the proportion who identify as Democrats at 41 percent. The gap of 3 percent is identical for Republicans, but the proportions are smaller. The proportion of voters registered as Republicans is 13 percent comparable to the proportion who identify as Democrats at 16 percent. Interestingly, for both major parties, the proportion of independents exceeds the proportion of registered partisans. This leads to a percentage registering as independent at 49 percent that is quite a bit higher than the percent self-identifying as independent at 43 percent.

Figure 7.1: Massachusetts Party Registration and Party ID compared to the Democratic vote, 1990-2014.

SOURCE: Compiled by the author on the basis of results reported by the Massachusetts Registration Statistics ; the Massachusetts Election Statistics , and, the National Election Pool, State Election Day Exit Polls for Massachusetts, 1990 to 2014, obtained from the Roper Center, Cornell University. UMass Lowell 2014 elections survey.

When examining the survey data for party registration and party identification patterns in

Massachusetts several key points are illustrated. The majority of independent voters are not all pure independents, but instead are spread across Republicans, Democrats, and independents, especially when the leaners are correctly classified as partisans. Also, while most Massachusetts

185 independent voters consider themselves pure independents, in reality the majority of this voting segment includes strong partisans among them that lean Democratic. It is helpful in understanding Massachusetts independent voters by having their party identification and their party registration to broaden the picture of Massachusetts voters. The figure also indicates that the Massachusetts Democratic vote is a product of more than one voter segment alone. For instance, Democratic Party voters alone are not producing the total Democratic vote in the state.

The other two Massachusetts voter groups being examined—independents and Republicans—are also, at times, voting for the Democratic candidates in Massachusetts general elections.

Table 7.5 presents the party ID percentages for Massachusetts compared to the rest of the

United States since 1990. I am highlighting the differences between Massachusetts and the rest of the country. Democratic Party ID in Massachusetts is higher during this time frame than the national average at about 41 percent compared to 33 percent across the rest of the country.

Massachusetts voters self-identify as independents about 43 percent of the time on average since

1990, whereas the rest of American voters identify as independents about 33 percent of the time.

Republican identification by voters, on the other hand, is lower in Massachusetts at about 16 percent on average since 1990 compared to about 28 percent nationally—the largest gap between

Massachusetts and the rest of the country. In my view, these findings are not a surprise. Again, as seen in the survey data, as well as the registration data, Massachusetts during this time frame has clearly been a heavily Democratic state.

186

TABLE 7.5: Massachusetts Party Identification Percentages compared to the rest of the nation, 1990-2014.

MA MA MA US US US Year Party ID Party ID Party ID Party ID Party ID Party ID Democrat Republican Independent Democrat Republican Independent 1990 34 17 49 33 31 29 1992 38 19 44 33 28 36 1994 36 19 45 32 30 34 1996 39 17 44 33 29 33 1998 41 17 42 33 28 32 2000 44 18 38 33 28 30 2002 43 18 39 31 30 30 2004 42 15 43 33 30 30 2006 50 15 36 33 28 30 2008 46 13 41 36 25 32 2010 35 13 42 33 25 35 2012 43 15 43 33 25 36 2014 36 15 50 32 23 40 Avg. 41 16 43 33 28 33 SOURCE: Compiled by the author on the basis of party ID results reported by the National Election Pool, State Election Day Exit Polls for Massachusetts, 1990 to 2014, obtained from the Roper Center, Cornell University. UMass Lowell 2014 elections survey. U.S. survey data for 1990 to 2014 yearly totals from Pew Research Center aggregate files. Survey results are based on a 7 point party ID scale of measurement.

As Table 7.5 shows there has been a lot of variation between Democratic Party ID and independent ID in Massachusetts during the last several decades. They have often alternated having the higher share of self-identifying voter segments. Republican identification conversely has not reached a level above 19 percent. To further present this issue Figure 2 graphically illustrates that Democratic Party ID and independent ID are both higher than the national averages. In Massachusetts, Democratic Party ID is about 8 percent higher than the rest of the nation, and independent ID is about 10 percent higher than the rest of the country. On the other hand, the widest gap is seen between Republican Party ID in Massachusetts and Republican

Party ID across the rest of the nation. Massachusetts Republican voters are about 12 percent fewer than the national average of Republican voters.

187

Figure 7.2: Massachusetts Party Identification compared to the rest of the nation, 1990-2014.

SOURCE: Compiled by the author on the basis of party ID results reported by the National Election Pool, State Election Day Exit Polls for Massachusetts, 1990 to 2014, obtained from the Roper Center, Cornell University. UMass Lowell 2014 elections survey. U.S. survey data for 1990 to 2014 yearly totals from Pew Research Center aggregate files.

Evident from the figure above, since 1990 both self-identifying Democratic and self-identifying independent voters in Massachusetts outpace their counterparts nationally, as well as the

Republican Party identifiers in Massachusetts and the rest of the nation. Republican identification in Massachusetts indicates the largest gap of 12 percent less than Republican voter

ID across the rest of the nation.

III. Regression Analysis of Party Registration and Party ID on the Democratic Vote

Political science literature has shown for many years that a voter’s party ID is a strong predictor of their voting behavior and attitudes. When examining party registration and party ID on the Democratic vote in Massachusetts from 1990 to 2014, both Democratic registration and

Democratic ID indicate positive and strong correlations with the total Democratic vote across the

188 combined offices examined. Both are also statistically significant with the dependent variable:

Democratic registration (p < .05) and Democratic identification (p < .01). Republican registration and Republican identification indicate weak correlations with the total Democratic vote across the combined offices examined in the study since 1990. Republican registration, as discussed previously, indicates a slightly positive relationship with the dependent variable. Whereas

Republican identification indicates an inverse relationship with the Democratic vote. Neither voter status indicates statistical significance. Regarding independent registration and independent voter ID, independent registration indicates a moderate correlation and a positive relationship with the Democratic vote in Massachusetts. Whereas independent identification reflects a strong correlation and a slightly inverse relationship with the Democratic vote (p < .05).

The upcoming narratives provide a direct comparison between party registration and party identification in each of the 6 political offices examined in the study. From 1990 to 2014,

Massachusetts Democrats have an overall winning percentage in five of the six offices examined.

Analysis of this time frame indicates a total yearly average Democratic vote percentage across these six offices of 66 percent. The point here is that the next section provides a direct, head-to- head comparison between party registration and party ID, using SPSS. The statistical measure used is the slope value (also regression coefficient or b value), which is the best statistical indicator of which variable has the most impact on the Massachusetts Democratic vote within each office examined. The most critical piece of information produced by these regressions is the slope coefficient estimates (b values). The slope/regression coefficient is the best available indicator of the impact of X on Y in the populations being examined. The slope coefficient can be viewed as a measure of the effect of an independent variable on the dependent variable.

189

U.S. President

When looking at presidential general elections held in Massachusetts since 1990,

Democratic registration and Democratic ID both indicate strong correlations with the Democratic vote. The slope value is higher for Democratic registration than it is for Democratic ID.

Republican registration indicates a moderate correlation with the Democratic vote and

Republican ID indicates a strong correlation with the Democratic vote. The slope value is higher for Republican ID than for Republican registration. Independent registration indicates a strong correlation with the Democratic vote and independent ID indicates a moderate correlation with the Democratic vote. The slope value is higher for independent registration than it is for independent ID. Party registration effects the dependent variable more often than party ID based on the slope values. During this time frame Democratic presidential candidates won the state in all of the 6 general elections held in Massachusetts since 1990—with an average Democratic vote share of 61 percentage. Of note, in 1992 even with a 48 percent Democratic vote share, Bill

Clinton still won the state’s popular vote and all of its electoral votes against George H.W. Bush and Henry Ross Perot on his way to becoming president.

U.S. Senate

Since 1990, Democratic registration indicates a moderate correlation with the Democratic vote and Democratic ID indicates a strong correlation with the Democratic vote. The slope value is higher for Democratic registration. Republican registration indicates a strong correlation with the Democratic vote and Republican ID indicates a moderate correlation with the Democratic vote. The slope value is higher for Republican registration. Independent registration indicates a weak correlation with the Democratic vote and independent ID indicates a strong correlation

190 with the Democratic vote. The slope value is higher for independent ID. Party registration effects the Democratic vote more often than party ID based on the slope values. During this time frame

Democratic candidates for U.S. Senate from Massachusetts won the seat in 10 of 11 elections held in Massachusetts since 1990. Only Republican Scott Brown won in a Special Election in

2010. The average Democratic vote percentage since 1990 in the race for U.S. Senate from

Massachusetts is 62 percent. As discussed in chapter 4, it was during this time frame since 1990 that U.S. Senators Kennedy and Kerry were dominant in their general election victories. Since they held the seats, now Democrat Elizabeth Warren and Democrat Ed Markey have filled them.

U.S. House of Representatives

When looking at U.S. House of Representative general elections held in Massachusetts since 1990, Democratic registration and Democratic ID both indicate strong correlations with the

Democratic vote. Both are also statistically significant (p < .05) with the dependent variable. The slope value is higher for Democratic registration. Republican registration and Republican ID both indicate weak correlations with the Democratic vote. The slope value is higher for

Republican ID. Independent registration and independent ID both indicate moderate correlations with the Democratic vote. The slope value is higher for independent registration. Again, party registration effects the dependent variable more often than party ID based on the slope values.

During this time frame Democratic candidates for U.S. House of Representatives from

Massachusetts have won the majority of seats in all 13 general elections held since 1990. The average Massachusetts Democratic vote percentage in the race for U.S. House since 1990 is 76 percent. During this time frame the majority of the Massachusetts delegation in Washington, DC, and many of the state’s best-known politicians serving in Congress were all Democrats.

191

Massachusetts Governor

In Massachusetts gubernatorial general elections since 1990, Democratic registration indicates a moderate correlation with the Democratic vote and Democratic ID indicates a strong correlation with the Democratic vote. The slope value is higher for Democratic registration.

Republican registration indicates a weak correlation with the Democratic vote and Republican ID indicates a strong correlation with the Democratic vote. The slope value is higher for Republican

ID. Independent registration and independent ID both indicate moderate correlations with the

Democratic vote. The slope value is slightly higher for independent registration. Party registration effects the dependent variable more often than party ID based on the slope values.

During this time frame Democratic candidates have won election as Massachusetts governor in only 2 of the last 7 general elections since 1990. Only Democrat Deval Patrick won the corner office in 2006 then again, by a plurality (of 48 percent), in 2010. The average Democratic vote in the race for Massachusetts governor since 1990 is 45 percent. The race for Massachusetts governor is the only office examined with losing percentage since 1990. The reasons this particular office is an outlier in this study, when compared to the other 5 offices examined here, have been discussed previously (see chapters 4 and 5).

Massachusetts State Senate

Democratic registration and Democratic ID both indicate strong correlations with the

Democratic vote in Massachusetts state senate general elections since 1990. Both are also statistically significant (p < .01) with the dependent variable. The slope value is higher for

Democratic registration. Republican registration and Republican ID indicates a weak correlation with the Democratic vote and Republican ID indicates a moderate correlation with the

192

Democratic vote. The slope value is higher for Republican ID. Independent registration and independent ID both indicate strong correlations with the Democratic vote. Independent registration is statistically significant (p < .05) with the dependent variable. The slope value is higher for independent registration. Party registration, again, effects the dependent variable more often than party ID based on the slope values. During this time frame Democratic candidates for

Massachusetts state senate have won the majority of the seats in all 13 general elections held.

The average Democratic percentage in the Massachusetts senate is 70 percent since 1990.

Massachusetts House of Representatives

When looking at the Massachusetts House of Representatives general elections since

1990, Democratic registration and Democratic ID both indicate strong correlations with the

Democratic vote. Both are also statistically significant (p < .01) with the dependent variable. The slope value is slightly higher for Democratic registration. Republican registration indicates a weak correlation with the Democratic vote and Republican ID indicates a moderate correlation with the Democratic vote. The slope value is higher for Republican ID. Independent registration and independent ID both indicate strong correlations with the Democratic vote. Independent ID is statistically significant (p < .05) with the dependent variable. The slope value is higher for independent registration. Party registration effects the dependent variable more often than party

ID based on the slope values. During this time frame Democratic candidates for the state house of representatives have won the majority of the seats in all 13 general elections held. As in the state senate, the average Democratic percentage in this chamber is also 70 percent since 1990.

193

IV. Party Registration and Party ID in Massachusetts

Each of the 3 party registration types and each of the 3 party ID types were directly compared across the 6 political offices to see which partisan measure (registration or ID) has the most effect on the Democratic vote. Overall, the statistical results indicate that party registration effects the Democratic vote more often than party ID in Massachusetts. Using SPSS, comparing each registration type against each party ID, registration type produced a stronger impact on the

Democratic vote 67 percent of the time; whereas party ID type produced a stronger impact on the

Democratic vote 33 percent of the time. Further, Democratic registration has the highest b values in 6 of 6 offices examined when directly compared to Democratic ID. Republican registration has the highest b values in 1 of 6 offices examined when directly compared to Republic ID.

Independent registration has the highest b values in 5 of 6 offices examined when directly compared to independent ID.

Whether voters are self-identifying in a telephone survey, or an Election Day exit poll, or even when officially registering (knowing that in Massachusetts they can choose either a

Democratic or Republican primary ballot, and still remain an independent in the general election), a Massachusetts voters’ partisanship is easily hidden within these measures. I believe the truest measure is vote choice—election results clearly indicate partisanship in Massachusetts.

V. Conclusion

To examine whether there is a relationship between the independent variable of party identification on the Democratic vote in Massachusetts, the statistical t-tests using SPSS were employed. The quantitative analysis indicates support for research hypothesis 3. The scope of this study is centered on party registration, and as stated earlier, party registration is a useful

194 piece of demographic voter information that is empirically underappreciated since most election polls use party ID. Party identification is a product of survey research. In my view, voters can hide their true party attachments within both measures of partisanship—both by registering as independents then voting Democratic more-often-than-not, and also by self-identifying in surveys as independents, yet when pushed to respond further as actually being leaners, or closest

Democrats. Analysis of Massachusetts party ID essentially indicates that most independent voters will choose one of the two major parties when prompted, and that the degree of voter independence in Massachusetts may be exaggerated. The next section, Chapter eight, will summarize the results of this exploratory study and discuss its broader research implications.

195

-Chapter 8- Discussion and Conclusion

Partisanship plays a key role in voting in American elections. It may be the most important concept in understanding American voters, and consequently campaigns and elections

(Campbell 2008: 213). This exploratory study examines partisanship via the registration-vote relationship and brings new knowledge of political change regarding party registration and its influence on general election results in Massachusetts. Other than party registration studies focused on voter turnout, we are lacking empirical knowledge on the effect of voter enrollment on party success at the ballot box. By examining registration and its effects on the dependent variable , more insight into the federal and state general elections over the past 67 years has been empirically analyzed. The election results provided in this study illustrate the strong partisanship effect in the Bay State. Based on these strong patterns of Democratic partisanship, Massachusetts voters do not truly exhibit independence, nor are they impartial thinkers in the electoral contests between the Democratic and Republican parties—except in regards to Massachusetts gubernatorial elections. This final chapter summarizes the results of this exploratory study, and discusses its broader research implications, limits, and recommendations for further empirical examination.

I. Overview of the Research Study

196

Senate, and the State House of Representatives—during the 35 general elections within the study’s time frame of nearly seven decades. Party registration has been quite variable over time in the state, and it is the unit of analysis in this quantitative, correlational study. For example, since 1990, the advent of a voter enrollment shift, or seemingly apparent partisan dealignment, from the Democratic and Republican parties toward independent voters has occurred, as they have steadily widened their segment of the electorate. Registered independents increased to over half the electorate in 2008, and currently represent nearly 54 percent of it—among the highest percentages in the nation.

The key findings in this study: 1) of the statistically significant bivariate results—both

Democratic registration and independent registration each have all positive correlations with the

Massachusetts Democratic vote. In Massachusetts, independent voters behave like Democratic voters. Also, in the majority of the political offices examined, independent registration behaves like Democratic registration, in a positive manner toward the Democratic vote—as independent registration goes up the Democratic vote goes up. This provides key insight into the paradox presented here; 2) Republican registration, surprisingly, often indicates a positive relationship

197 with the Massachusetts Democratic vote; and, 3) Party registration effects the Massachusetts

Democratic vote more often than party identification.

II. Party Registration on the Massachusetts Democratic Vote

Given the lack of previous scholarly research on the topic of party registration, this current study contributes insight to this void in the literature. Very few studies have been conducted on the relationship between party registration and the party vote specifically. This is important, in part, because political practitioners often turn to party registration data to determine whether a given district is marginal, heavily Democratic or Republican, and then rely on such a determination as a guide to a range of decisions. By analyzing how registration influences results in Massachusetts elections, this study provides critical information to parties, candidates, and voters seeking to maximize their electoral decision-making.

In the numerous analytical examinations conducted, the independent variables of

Democratic registration, Republican registration, and independent registration all indicate statistically significant results on the Massachusetts Democratic vote more-often-than-not. The quantitative analysis of bivariate and multivariate regressions indicates support for research hypothesis 1. The story here is that party registration matters. Party registration of voters is a useful piece of demographic information that is underappreciated compared to party ID. Thus this research provides useable results. As discussed earlier, registration data are not biased by candidate, election, and issue-specific factors. They are easy to work with and appealing as a measure of partisan strength. Rules of thumb become so universally accepted that they affect the decisions of all sorts of political actors (Cain 1984: 141). Further, regarding statistical significance in general, because a relationship in a quantitative study does not produce a

198 statistically significant result does not mean that one does not exist at all in the general population. It simply means that it does not exist within the quantitative analysis either at the 95 percent or 99 percent statistical levels of confidence.

Regarding hypothesis 2, chapter 6 discusses the geography of the Democratic vote in

Massachusetts. It examines the trends of where political change is happening across the state by location at the county-level. What the change looks like is investigated in terms of the effect of party registration on the dependent variable. The analysis indicates support for research hypothesis 2. This means that whether a Massachusetts voter is a registered Democrat or registered independent, and sometimes Republican, there is an effect (usually positive) on the

Democratic vote in a general election. In other words, the null hypothesis that no relationship exists between party registration and election results does not hold up.

Independent-majority counties early in the time frame were evenly split with Democratic- majority counties (7 of 14 counties). They have since become the vast majority of the state (13 of

14 counties)—with the exception of Suffolk County. During this time frame, in the independent- majority counties, the Democratic vote average percentage across all the political races on the ballot combined produced a Democratic winning share of at least 51 percent or higher. Clearly, and in accordance with the paradox being explained in this study, even as independent voters have steadily become the majority within the counties and thus across the state, Democrats remain overwhelmingly successful in general elections, on average, across the thousands of races analyzed in this study. Independent voters (and probably some Republican voters as been

199 discussed) vote for Democratic candidates as well. Overall since 1976 it can been seen that in the

14 Massachusetts counties Democratic candidates across the 6 major federal and state offices examined have generally fared well in November throughout these general elections years.

Regarding hypothesis 3, chapter 7 examines whether there is a relationship between party identification and the Democratic vote in Massachusetts. Statistical t-tests and regression analysis was employed. The quantitative analysis indicates support for research hypothesis 3.

Again, the scope of this study is centered on party registration, and as stated earlier, party registration is a useful piece of demographic voter information that is empirically underappreciated since most election polls use party ID. Party identification is a product of survey research. In my view, voters can hide their true party attachments within both measures of partisanship—both by registering as independents then voting Democratic more-often-than-not, and also by self-identifying in surveys as independents, yet when pushed to respond further as actually being leaners, or closest Democrats. Analysis of Massachusetts party ID essentially indicates that most independent voters will choose one of the two major parties when prompted, and that the degree of voter independence in Massachusetts may be exaggerated.

200

Democratic vote 67 percent of the time; whereas party ID type produced a stronger impact on the

Independent registration has the highest b values in 5 of 6 offices examined when directly compared to independent ID.

Whether voters are self-identifying in a telephone survey, or an Election Day exit poll, or even when officially registering (knowing that in Massachusetts they can choose either a

III. Study Implications

This exploratory study presents new data on party registration and election results and is therefore, a new contribution to the field of voting and American elections. The findings have implications for the study of electoral politics which examines the political attitudes and behaviors of voters, parties, and candidates that encompass the electoral settings within our

201 system of representative government. As noted earlier, the scholarly literature on party registration is quite sparse, (as evident in Chapter two). Therefore, this current analysis provides an original, insightful contribution to add to this limited base of empirical knowledge. From a practical standpoint, it would appear to be of interest to scholars, candidates, political parties, media, and the general public to help determine—what wins elections.

The quantitative analysis highlight the statistically significant association of party registration and party identification with the Democratic vote in Massachusetts. Responses to election survey questions also indicated strong partisan attachments between voters and

Massachusetts Democratic candidates. The dissertation findings also highlight the increasing importance for the need for more studies of voters and how their characteristics influence election results, campaign efforts, other voters, and party and/or candidate decision-making.

Results of the quantitative analysis indicate that various party registrations show statistically significant associations with Democratic voting in the state.

IV. Limitations of the Study

The research process undertaken in this current study will now be examined. There are limitations in this study, as in other scientific works, but these limits should be addressed in future scholarly research. Selection of Massachusetts, as a case study, and its general elections may limit the generalizability of the findings of this current research. However, this analysis uses the case of Massachusetts and its major federal and state general elections as a prime example of the voting paradox already discussed. Analyzing Massachusetts may also be viewed, possibly, as an outlier. Ideologically, the state has, for quite some time, been seen as extremely liberal, and

202 also financially costly in terms of its elections. However, again, it serves as a leading example to investigate the major research question(s) and the political puzzle addressed here.

Further, although there is no sampling and/or variation across U.S. states, this analysis does draw a large sample from within the entire set of possible elections during the study’s time frame. For example, state elections for Attorney General, Secretary of State, Treasurer, Auditor,

Governor’s Council, County Sheriff, and others, are excluded in favor of the major offices and races that are being included in this study. The general elections for U.S. President, U.S. Senate,

U.S. House of Representatives, Massachusetts Governor, State Senate, and the State House of

Representatives are within the scope of this large-N study. Further, variation certainly does exist among the examined decades, election years, different offices, changing voters, and the thousands of races being analyzed, which will have implications for other U.S. states.

Only a limited number of variables were selected and analyzed in this dissertation. The reason for this parsimonious approach is to isolate the influence of voter registration on the dependent variable in this exploratory study. Many other variables are already empirically known to influence elections and they are well-documented in the literature. However, this current study now adds a new contribution that had not been undertaken previously. Also, primary elections are not analyzed in this study. However, the size of the research population, the number of general election years examined, and the importance of the public offices analyzed illustrates the strength of this current study.

203

V. Recommendations for Future Research

This study is designed to begin to fill the knowledge gap on party registration and election results in federal and state general elections. Based on the literature review and the results of this study the researcher identifies several ideas for future research.

• Conduct an in-depth, empirical analysis specifically focused on the Massachusetts race for governor (or any of the individual offices examined). Of all the political offices in the state examined in this current study, the gubernatorial elections are the most competitive. During the time frame analyzed here, this office in particular has equated to the lowest average Democratic vote percentage, and a nearly equal amount of election victories for both major parties.

• Compare the party registration-party vote relationship in both primary elections and general elections. Primary elections are not analyzed here due to the large size of the research populations already being examined in this study; the amount of data for number of general election years; the number of races examined (8,535); and, the importance of the public offices analyzed. These factors illustrate the strength of this current study. However, although independent voters appear partisan in their voting behavior in Massachusetts, a limit here is that we do not know which primary party ballots they choose.

• Increase the number of variables analyzed. Only a limited number of variables were purposely selected and analyzed in this dissertation. The reason for this parsimonious approach is to examine the influence of voter registration specifically, the main variable of interest, on the dependent variable in this exploratory study. Many other variables influence election outcomes,

204 and they are well-documented in the scholarly literature (such as incumbency status, money, educational level, parties, candidates, issues, endorsements, and other demographic factors).

These factors all play important roles along with partisanship, however, this current study now adds a new contribution that had not been undertaken previously.

• Examine the party registration-party vote relationship in other U.S. states. This current study examines this relationship in Massachusetts and brings new knowledge of political change regarding party registration and its influence on general election results. Selection of

Massachusetts, as a case study, and its general elections may limit the generalizability of the findings of this current research. However, this quantitative analysis uses the case of

Massachusetts and its major federal and state general elections as a prime example of the voting paradox already discussed. Voter registration in Massachusetts is similar to thirty other U.S. states and the District of Columbia (State Secretaries of State 2015), in that the enrollment status of a voter includes their official party choice. But, again, what sets Massachusetts apart for the purpose of this study is the exemplar example it sets with its analytical paradox.

• Examine the possible reasons why some Massachusetts counties for numerous decades retain their amount of voting Democratic or not. There is variation among the Massachusetts counties in terms of their Democratic voting, however, two counties are outliers. Suffolk County (i.e., the greater Boston area) has consistently been the “most Democratic” county, ranking first, across all six offices combined in terms of the Democratic vote since 1948. On the other hand, Barnstable

County (i.e., Cape Cod) has been the “least Democratic” county overall since 1948.

205

VI. Conclusion

Elections are a cornerstone of democracy, and the United States has more of them than any other country in the world (Teixeira 1992: 15). Therefore, it is vital to continue increasing our empirical knowledge base in this research area. Public officials make numerous decisions that affect people’s everyday lives. Lots of factors affect elections. Therefore, the scientific study of what influences American elections is important. This examination looks specifically at how the independent variable of political party registration by voters influences the general election results in one key state, Massachusetts.

The state of Massachusetts serves a prime example of the empirical puzzle of both a highly partisan (Democratic) electorate along with a concurrently high number of registered, independent voters. In fact, Massachusetts is ranked among the highest states in the nation in terms of voters registered as independents, or as many have called it, abandoning parties. At present about 54 percent—over half of the state’s electorate—are registering their electoral independence, therefore, studying this exemplar situation brings new knowledge to American politics. Massachusetts is a model state in order to study this specific issue. By increasing our empirical knowledge of this specific area of elections, we gain valuable information and understanding for voters, parties, and candidates that encompass the electoral settings within our system of representative government.

This quantitative examination has answered the research questions posed in the study.

What is the effect of party registration on the Democratic vote in Massachusetts? This analysis has essentially shown that the thesis posited here is correct. Partisan individuals, not pure independents, have the most influence in Massachusetts general elections. From a geographic standpoint, the comparison of the state’s counties based on the combined average Democratic

206 vote share percentages across the six political offices examined during these time periods since

1948 illustrate where specifically the change in terms of the Democratic vote is happening, and not happening, in the state. This analysis has shown, for instance, that Suffolk County has consistently been the most Democratic Massachusetts County, ranking first, across all six offices combined in terms of the Democratic vote since 1948 as opposed to Barnstable County being the least Democratic overall since 1948. Further, regarding the political change in this state and what it looks like, Massachusetts continues to be an interesting political laboratory to study because it is known nationally as one of the most Democratic, “blue” states in the country, yet its voter registrations look more competitive, or “purple,” than “blue.” However, as this analysis has shown, partisanship, in spite of an ever increasing number of Massachusetts voters registering as independents, still reigns.

In general, the Commonwealth of Massachusetts continues to produces numerous presidential candidates, high-profile U.S. Senate races, and competitive gubernatorial races.

Overall, the state is an important contributor in American elections. Also, in examining whether there are differences in the choices about the candidates between people identified as Democrats and people identified as independents, the quantitative analysis of thousands of voters indicate that there is a statistically significant difference between these two voting groups. The analysis finds that most Massachusetts independent voters lean and vote Democratic.

Partisanship in Massachusetts elections continues to influence general election results.

Therefore, party registration data can continue being employed, at least in part, to understand partisan strength by political candidates, parties, and voters. By studying party registration figures, political candidates will continue assessing their prospects for winning elections and voters will continue trying to pick winning candidates. Party registration data are relatively easy

207 to understand and is appealing as a measure of partisan strength which are not biased by candidate, election, and issue-specific factors. Party registration data, viewed as indicators of expected voting outcomes, thus develops as informational guides to political actors—such as candidates, parties, and voters—to the extent that they consequently affect decision-making about campaigns and elections, and possible federal and state election outcomes.

208

Bibliography

Aldrich, John H. 1995. Why Parties? The Origin and Transformation of Political Parties in America . Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Ansolabehere, Stephen, and James M. Snyder, Jr. 2002. “The Incumbency Advantage in U.S. Elections: An Analysis of State and Federal Offices, 1942-2000.” Massachusetts Institute of Technology Press.

Bartels, Larry M. 2000. “Partisanship and Voting Behavior, 1952-1996.” American Journal of Political Science 44(1): 35-50.

_____. 2002. “The Impact of Candidate Traits in American Presidential Elections.” In Leaders’ Personalities and the Outcomes of Democratic Elections, ed. Anthony S. King, 44-69. New York: Oxford University Press.

Berman, Evan M. 2002. Essential Statistics for Public Managers and Policy Analysts, 1 st Ed. Washington, DC: CQ Press.

Berry, William D. and Mitchell D. Sanders. 2000. Understanding Multivariate Research: A Primer for Beginning Social Scientists. 1 st Ed. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.

Brewer, Mark D., and Jeffrey M. Stonecash. 2009. Dynamics of American Political Parties. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Burden, Barry C. and David C. Kimball. 2009. Why Americans Split Their Tickets Campaigns, Competition, and Divided Government. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.

Burnham, Walter Dean. 1970. Critical Elections and the Mainsprings of American Politics. New York: W. W. Norton & Company.

Cain, Bruce. 1984. The Reapportionment Puzzle. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Campbell, Angus., Gerald Gurin, Warren E. Miller, and Donald E. Stokes. 1954. The Voter Decides. Evanston, Illinois: Row, Peterson and Company.

Campbell, Angus., Philip E. Converse, Warren E. Miller, and Donald E. Stokes. 1960. The American Voter. New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc.

Campbell, James E. 2008. The American Campaign: U.S. Presidential Campaigns and the National Vote. 2nd ed. College Station: Texas A&M University Press.

Costantini, Edmond., and Charles Dannehl. 1993. Party Registration and Party Vote: Democratic Fall-Off in Legislative Elections. Legislative Studies Quarterly. XVIII, 1, Feb. 29-50.

209

Converse, Philip E., 1964. “The Nature of Belief Systems in the Mass Publics.” In Ideology and Discontent, ed. David E. Apter. New York: Free Press. 206-261.

_____. 1976. Dynamics of Party Support: Cohort Analytical Party Identification. Sage Publications, Inc.

Dalton, Rusell J. 2013. The Apartisan American: Dealignment and Changing Electoral Politics. 1st Ed. Washington, DC: CQ Press.

Delli Carpini, Michael X., and Scott Keeter. 1996. What Americans Know About Politics and Why It Matters. New Haven: Yale University Press.

District of Columbia Board of Elections. 2015. https://www.dcboee.org (Accessed September 22, 2015).

Denney, Lawerence . 2015. Secretary of the State of Idaho. http://www.sos.idaho.gov/ (Accessed September 22, 2015).

Dole, Charles F. 1891. The New American Citizen. Boston: D.C. Heath.

Downs, Anthony. 1957. An Economic Theory of Democracy. New York: Harper and Row.

Finkel, Steven E. and Howard A. Scarrow. 1985. “Party Identification and Party Enrollment: The Difference and the Consequences.” The Journal of Politics 47(2): 620-642.

Fiorina, Morris P. 1981. Retrospective Voting in American National Elections. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Franklin, Charles H. and John E. Jackson. 1983. “The Dynamics of Party Identification.” American Political Science Review 77 (December 1983): 957-73.

Gallup, Inc. 2015. http://www.gallup.com/poll/151943/record-high-americans-identify- independents.aspx (accessed October 10, 2015).

Galvin, William Francis. 2012. Secretary of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts. http://www.sec.state.ma.us/index.htm (accessed September 22, 2015).

Gelman, Andrew and Gary King. 1990. “Estimating Incumbency Advantage without Bias.” American Journal of Political Science 34 (4): 1142-1164.

Green, Donald, Bradley Palmquist, and Eric Schickler. 2002. Partisan Hearts and Minds: Political Parties and the Social Identity of Voters. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Green, Donald, and Bradley Palmquist. 1990. “Of artifacts and partisan instability.” American Journal of Political Science 34: 872-902.

210

_____. 1994. “How Stable is Party Identification?” Political Behavior 16(4): 437-466.

Hershey, Marjorie Randon. 2011. Party Politics in America. 14th ed. Pearson Education, Inc.

Hess, Robert D. and Judith V. Torney. 1967. The Development of Political Attitudes in Children. Chicago: Aldine Press.

Hyman, Herbert. 1959. Political Socialization. Glencoe, IL: The Free Press.

International Encyclopedia of the Social and Behavioral Sciences. 2015. Elsevier B.V. https://www.elsevier.com/books/international-encyclopedia-of-the-social-and-behavioral- sciences/wright/978-0-08-097086-8

Jacobson, Gary C. 2009. The Politics of Congressional Elections. 7th Ed. New York: Pearson Education, Inc.

Jennings, M. Kent, and Richard G. Niemi. 1974. The Political Character of Adolescents . Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Johnson, Janet Buttolph, H.T. Reynolds, and Jason D. Mycoff. 2008. Political Science Research Methods, 6 th Ed. Washington, DC: CQ Press.

Keith, Bruce E., David B. Magleby, Candice J. Nelson, Elizabeth Orr, Mark C. Westlye, and Raymond E. Wolfinger. 1992. The Myth of the Independent Voter. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press.

Key, Jr., V. 0. 1949. Southern Politics in State and Nation. New York: Knopf.

_____. 1966. The Responsible Electorate. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Key, Jr., V.O., and Frank J. Munger. 1959. “Social Determinism and Electoral Decision: The Case of Indiana.” in in American Voting Behavior , eds. Eugene Burdick and Arthur J. Brodbeck, 281–299. Glencoe, IL: Free Press.

Krebs, Timothy B., 1998. “The Determinants of Candidates’ Vote Share and the Advantages of Incumbency in City Council Elections.” American Journal of Political Science 42(3): 921-935.

Lewis-Beck, Michael S., William G. Jacoby, Helmut Norpoth, and Herbert F. Weisberg. 2008. The American Voter Revisited. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.

Lupia, Arthur. 1994. “Shortcuts versus Encyclopedias: Information and Voting Behavior in California Insurance Reform Elections.” American Political Science Review 88(1): 63- 76.

211

Magleby, David B., Candice J. Nelson, and Mark C. Westlye. 2011 The myth of the independent voter revisited. In Facing the challenge of democracy: Explorations in the analysis of public opinion and political participation, eds. Paul M. Sniderman and Benjamin Highton, 238-63. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Martin, Mark. 2015. Secretary of the State of Arkansas. http://www.sos.arkansas.gov/Pages/default.aspx (Accessed September 22, 2015).

Massachusetts House of Representatives. 2015. http://www.mass.gov/legis/ (Accessed October 22, 2015).

Massachusetts Secretary of the Commonwealth, Elections Division. 1948-2014. Massachusetts Election Statistics PD43. Boston: Commonwealth of Massachusetts.

Massachusetts Secretary of the Commonwealth, Elections Division. 1948-2014. Massachusetts Party Registration Statistics. Boston: Commonwealth of Massachusetts.

Massachusetts Senate. 2015. http://www.mass.gov/legis/ (accessed October 22, 2015).

Mayer, William G. 2007. “The Swing Voter in American Presidential Elections.” American Politics Research 35: 358.

_____. 2008. “What Exactly Is a Swing Voter? Definition and Measurement.” in The Swing Voter in American Politics, ed. William G. Mayer, 1-31. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press.

_____. 2012. Lecture on Party Identification at Northeastern University, Boston, MA on September 25, 2012.

Miller, Warren E. 1991. “Party Identification, Realignment, and Party Voting: Back to the Basics.” American Political Science Review 85(2): 557-568.

Miller, Warren E., and J. Merrill Shanks. 1996. The New American Voter. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Nie, Norman H., Sidney Verba, and John R. Petrocik. 1976. The Changing American Voter. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Neuman, W. Russell, George E. Marcus, Ann L. Crigler, and Michael MacKuen. Editors 2007. The Affect Effect: Dynamics of Emotion in Political Thinking and Behavior. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

O’Sullivan, Arthur, and Steven M. Sheffrin. 2008. Prentice Hall Economics, Principles in Action. Pearson Prentice Hall. Boston, Massachusetts.

212

Petrocik, John R. 1974. “An Analysis of Intransitivities in the Index of Party Identification.” Political Methodology. 1: 31-47.

Pollock III, Philip H. 2012. The Essentials of Political Analysis. 4th Ed. Washington, DC: CQ Press.

Roper Center for Public Opinion Research, Cornell University. 2015. Permission approved by Roper, signed May 8, 2015.

Rosenblum, Nancy. L., 2010. On the Side of the Angels: An Appreciation of Parties and Partisanship. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Snyder, Jr., James M., and Michael M. Ting. 2002. “An Informational Rationale for Political Parties.” American Journal of Political Science 46(1): 90-110.

State Secretaries of State. 2015. Secretary of State official websites for individual states. (Accessed October 10-25, 2015).

Stokes, Donald E., and Warren E. Miller. 1962. “Party Government and the Saliency of Congress.” Public Opinion Quarterly 26: 531-46.

Suffolk University Political Research Center. 2015. http://www.suffolk.edu/academics/1094.php (Accessed October 10-25, 2015).

Teixeira, Ruy A. 1992. The Disappearing American Voter. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press.

University of New Hampshire Survey Center. 2015. http://cola.unh.edu/survey-center/election- polls (accessed November 15-20, 2015).

U.S. Department of Justice. 2015. The National Voter Registration Act of 1993 (accessed November 22, 2015). http://www.justice.gov/crt/about-national-voter-registration-act

Webster, Merriam. 1994. Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary. 10 th Ed. Springfield, MA: Merriam-Webster Incorporated.

Wattenberg, Martin P. 1996. The Decline of American Political Parties. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Weisberg, H.F., Greene, S.H., 2003. The Political Psychology of Party Identification. In: MacKuen, M.B., Rabinowitz, G. (Eds.), Electoral democracy. University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor, pp. 83–124.

213