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Consequentialism Graduate Seminar Peter Singer CHV523/PHI517 Topics and Reading Readings Identified with “CM” Are Available

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Consequentialism Graduate Seminar Peter Singer CHV523/PHI517 Topics and Reading Readings Identified with “CM” Are Available Consequentialism Graduate Seminar Peter Singer CHV523/PHI517 Topics and Reading Readings identified with “CM” are available in Blackboard/Course. Materials. Readings identified with “ER” are available on the Library’s Electronic Reserve. If you have difficulty in obtaining any of the readings, please let me know immediately at [email protected]. 1. 9/20: Sidgwick’s argument for impartial consequentialism Sidgwick is the most philosophically careful of the classical utilitarians, and C.D. Broad, J.J.C. Smart and Derek Parfit have all described The Methods of Ethics as the best book on ethics ever written. We will therefore begin the semester by examining how Sidgwick argues for impartial consequentialism. Reading: Katarzyna de Lazari-Radek and Peter Singer, The Point of View of the Universe, pp.14-22, 33-41,66-77, 94-96, 115-164. Available from the library on 3-hr reserve or electronic access available through the PU library catalogue. Henry Sidgwick, The Methods of Ethics Bk I, Ch. 1; Bk III, Chs. 11 & 13. Available from the library on 3-hr reserve or electronic access available through the PU library catalogue. 2. 9/27: Can Sidgwick’s Dualism of Practical Reason be overcome? Although Sidgwick is generally regarded as a utilitarian, and there is no doubt that his sympathies were in that direction, he was deeply troubled by his inability to show that egoism is irrational. This left him with a “dualism of practical reason” – that is, with the conclusion that both impartial consequentialism and egoistic consequentialism are rational. Katarzyna de Lazari-Radek and I have suggested a way in which this dualism can be overcome, but it would be fair to say that our proposal has not met with widespread acceptance. Essential Reading: Henry Sidgwick,The Methods of Ethics, Concluding Chapter. Katarzyna de Lazari-Radek and Peter Singer, The Point of View of the Universe, pp. 174-199. Derek Parfit, “Conflicting Reasons,” Etica & Politica / Ethics & Politics, XVIII, 2016, 1, pp. 169-186. CM Recommended Reading: Roger Crisp, “Rossian Pluralism, Egoism, and Pleasure, Etica & Politica / Ethics & Politics, XVIII, 2016, 1, pp. 124-129. CM Brad Hooker, “Wrongness, Evolutionary Debunking, Public Rules,” Etica & Politica / Ethics & Politics, XVIII, 2016, 1, pp. 138-143. CM Peter Singer and Katarzyna de Lazari-Radek, “Doing Our Best for Hedonistic Utilitarianism: Reply to Critics,” Etica & Politica / Ethics & Politics, XVIII, 2016, 1, pp. 187-195. CM . 3. 10/4: Do Findings in Cognitive Science Support Consequentialism? Guest presenter: Joshua Greene. Over the past fifteen years, research in cognitive science – much of it pioneered by Josh Greene – has provided new information on how we make moral judgments. Greene now argues that this information tends to support consequentialism. Does it? Or are facts and values strictly separate? Essential Reading: Joshua D. Greene, “Beyond Point-and-Shoot Morality: Why Cognitive (Neuro)Science Matters for Ethics,” Ethics 124 (July 2014): 695–726. ER Julia Driver, “The Limits of the Dual Process View” CM Stephen Darwall, “Getting Moral Wrongness Into the Picture” CM Joshua D. Greene, “Reply to Driver and Darwall” CM Note: the papers by Driver and Darwall, with Greene’s reply, are forthcoming in S. Matthew Liao, ed., Moral Brains: The Neuroscience of Morality, OUP, September 2016. Recommended Reading: Joshua D. Greene, Moral Tribes, Penguin, 2013. Library physical reserve. 4. 10/11: Portmore’s argument for “Commonsense Consequentialism” Guest presenter: Douglas Portmore. In Commonsense Consequentialism Douglas Portmore presents a view of rationality, morality and the connections between them that, he argues, points to a version of consequentialism that is more in accordance with commonsense than the usual impartial form of consequentialism. Essential Reading: Douglas Portmore, Commonsense Consequentialism, OUP, 2011, Chs 1-4. CM 5. 10/18. Parfit on Moral Reasons, Self-Interested Reasons, and Impartial Reasons. This class will discuss issues raised by Parfit in Chapters 53-55 of On What Matters, Volume Three. This will return us to Sidgwick’s Dualism of Practical Reason, but also raise questions about a possible distinction between impartial reasons and moral reasons. Essential Reading: Derek Parfit, On What Matters, Volume Three, Part Ten, Chapters 53-55. CM 6. 10/25. Demandingness Guest presenter (by videolink): Alastair Norcross Is consequentialism – at least in its standard utilitarian form – too demanding? We will examine the objection and some possible responses. Essential Reading: Peter Singer, “What Should a Billionaire Give – and What Should You?” New York Times Magazine, December 17, 2006. CM Katarzyna de Lazari-Radek and Peter Singer, The Point of View of the Universe, Chapter 11, pp.317-336. Alastair Norcross, “The Scalar Approach to Utilitarianism”, Chapter 2 of a book in progress. CM (Note: this chapter draws on, and adds to, the author’s previously published work, including Alastair Norcross, “The Scalar Approach to Utilitarianism” in H. West (ed.), Blackwell Guide to Mill’s Utilitarianism (Oxford, 2006), 217-32. That article is available on ER, should you wish to refer to it, but the required reading is the draft version, not the published version.) Recommended Reading: Richard Arneson, “What Do We Owe to Distant Needy Strangers?” in Jeffrey Schaler, ed., Peter Singer Under Fire, Open Court, 2009, pp. 267-293.ER Peter Singer, “Reply to Richard Arneson,” in Jeffrey Schaler, ed., Peter Singer Under Fire, Open Court, 2009, pp. 294-99. ER R. Lawlor, "The Rejection of Scalar Consequentialism", Utilitas, 21 (2009), 100- 116. ER G. Lang, “Should Utilitarianism be Scalar?” Utilitas, 25 (2013), 80-95. ER MID-SEMESTER BREAK: NO CLASS 11/1. 7. 11/8 The “Separateness of Persons” Objection. Guest presenter (by videolink): Richard Chappell In A Theory of Justice John Rawls said that utilitarianism fails to take the distinction between persons seriously. Ever since, this has been seen as an important objection to utilitarianism. But what, exactly, is the objection? Can it be met? Essential Reading: John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (revised edition, 1999) sections 5 & 30. ER Katarzyna de Lazari-Radek and Peter Singer, The Point of View of the Universe, Chapter 5, sec 4 (ii), pp. 137-140. ER Derek Parfit, On What Matters, Volume Two, Chapter 21, pp.191-212. Available from the library on 3-hr reserve or electronic access through the PU library catalogue. Richard Chappell, “Value Receptacles,” Nous 49 (2015) pp. 322-332. (The online version is available on CM). Recommended Reading: Alex Voorhoeve, “How should we aggregate competing claims?” Ethics 125 (1):64-87 (2014) ER G.A. Cohen, “Rescuing Conservatism: A Defense of Existing Value,” in R.J. Wallace, Rahul Kumar and Samuel Freeman, eds., Reasons and Recognition: Essays in the Philosophy of T.M. Scanlon, available on electronic access through the PU library catalogue. 8. 11/15: The Non-Identity Problem: Theoretical Constraints on a Solution Guest Presenter: Melinda Roberts Essential Reading: Katarzyna de Lazari-Radek and Peter Singer, The Point of View of the Universe, Chapter 12, sec 5, pp. 361-377. ER Derek Parfit, Reasons and Persons, Chapter 16, pp. 351-379. Recommended Reading: Melinda Roberts, "The Nonidentity Problem and the Two-Envelope Problem" from Melinda Roberts and David Wasserman, eds., Harming Future Persons. ER Gregory Kavka, “The Paradox of Future Individuals,” Philosophy and Public Affairs, vol. 11, no. 2 (Spring 1982), pp. 93-112. 9. 11/22 Duties Not to Harm Essential Reading: Derek Parfit, On What Matters, Volume Three, Part Ten, Chapters 56-57. Further reading to come… 10. 11/29: Uncertainty and Deontology (Presentation by Douglas Portmore; response by Michael Smith) Essential Reading: Frank Jackson and Michael Smith, “Absolutist Moral Theories and Uncertainty,” Journal of Philosophy, 103 (2006) 267-83. CM Seth Lazar, “In Dubious Battle: Uncertainty and the Ethics of Killing” (unpublished, 2016) CM Optional Reading: Ron Aboodi, Adi Borer & David Enoch, “Deontology, Individualism, and Uncertainty: A Reply to Jackson and Smith.” Journal of Philosophy, 105 (2008) 259-272. CM Yoaav Isaacs, “Duty and Knowledge,” Philosophical Perspectives, 28 (2014) 95- 110. CM Details for classes 11 & 12 will be provided later, but tentatively, class 11 will be on intrinsic value, and 12 will be on consequentialism and effective altruism. .
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