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Polarisation and Division October 2020 Britain’s Choice: Common Ground and Division in 2020s Britain Chapter 5 Polarisation and Division Míriam Juan-Torres Tim Dixon Arisa Kimaram Chapter 5 Polarisation and Division 50 per cent of Britons feel that this is the most divided Britain has ever been 74 per cent think that the media often makes the country feel more divided than it really is 3 in 5 Britons say they feel exhausted by division in politics 71 per cent agree that ‘for the future of our country, it is especially important that we stick together despite different views’ Page 2 Introduction In the years following the Brexit referendum, the story of a nation divided between two opposing camps took hold as conventional wisdom in Britain. The 52-to-48 per cent division in the June 2016 referendum was seen as the culmination of a profound cleavage in society – between a younger, more educated, diverse, and cosmopolitan Britain and an older, more traditional, provincial, white, and patriotic Britain. The fact that the outcome of the Brexit referendum so surprised the former group only underscored how disconnected people have become. Others contested this view, arguing that the drawn-out Brexit debate was less extraordinary: I don’t feel part of a society that’s so merely the latest chapter in the long history of Britain’s complex relationship divided I couldn’t have a constructive with its European neighbours. conversation with someone at a very personal level. Like other western democracies, Britain has seen the forces of division grow Philip, Backbone Conservative, 28, South East stronger in recent years. A large majority feel that the country has become more divided, and half of the country believes those divisions have never been so bad. To varying degrees, there is evidence for those sentiments. We have grown less trusting and understanding of each other and of our institutions. Our public debates have coarsened and, played out through the 24-hour digital news cycle, have become more combustible. It is so much easier now for minor squabbles to ignite major conflicts, fuelled by bellicose voices that have mastered the medium of viral social media platforms. We are in a time when differences are magnified by a deep distrust of ‘the system’, widening inequality, the dynamics of social media, and a greater awareness of racial injustice. Different experiences, values, and beliefs that drive political behaviour are easier to exploit in times of uncertainty and insecurity. Disparate forces have become increasingly active and effective in exploiting such differences – incendiary media commentators, extremist groups, foreign powers, and self-serving politicians who see division as their route to power. There is every reason to expect that the intensity of these forces will continue to grow in future years. But this study challenges the narrative of a Britain polarised and divided into two opposing camps. For most people, the lines that we often see as dividing us – the party we support, our political ideology, even our views on Brexit – are not central to our sense of personal identity. We tire of the divisive voices that overstate our differences. Most of us value our more widely shared identities, whether national – as British, English, Scottish, and Welsh – demographic, or based on other interests or passions. Most of us see the changes of recent decades in generally positive terms, and feel proud of how Britain has become a more open, modern, and diverse society. Times have become more fractious, but on the whole we do not believe that the differences between Britons are too big for us to work together anymore. And the divisions that opened up during the Brexit years feel less relevant after we have seen how many people from all backgrounds came together to help those most in need during the Covid-19 pandemic. The aim of this chapter is to better understand public perceptions of Britain’s divisions. The chapter first examines perceptions of division. It then explores whether the UK is a polarised country or not. We find that, while there is some ‘us-versus-them’ division (or ‘affective polarisation’) between those who more Page 3 strongly associate with their Brexit identity, this is only felt by half of the population. Few of us strongly identify with a political party or dislike others just because they belong to an opposing party. Polarisation becomes more dangerous when a division over one issue creates static identities and affective polarisation becomes entrenched. Social scientists describe this phenomenon as conflict extension: when members of the group converge across a range of issues. Fortunately, in the UK we do not yet observe conflict extension, but rather a kaleidoscopic effect. Society, as examined through the lens of the segments, is not divided into two opposing camps. Instead we come together in different formations depending on the issue at hand – much like the pieces of coloured glass in a kaleidoscope which combine in different patterns as the instrument is rotated. This chapter provides insights into a key conclusion of this report, namely that it is not inevitable that we continue down the path to a more divided society. We can choose to address the fault lines in our society. We can strengthen and reinvigorate the institutions that bring us together. We can build on our common ground, rather than diminishing it. We can work to contain the forces of division, instead of unleashing them. The voices that shape our social and political debates can let those debates play out in ways that deepen our faith in democracy, rather than undermine it. This work starts with better understanding how we see our divisions today. 5.1 Perceptions of division ‘I think we were a more united society. I think there’s always been differences, but I think the referendum was the really big one that just broke it open.’ Peter, Civic Pragmatist. 37, North West A large majority of British people describe the country as divided, although there is evidence of an improvement since the Brexit years (when as many as 85 per cent described it that way).1 Asked just before the outbreak of Covid-19, we found that: – 66 per cent felt that the United Kingdom is divided – 45 per cent saying it was somewhat divided and 22 per cent saying it was very divided – Only 13 per cent described the country as united (almost all of whom said it was somewhat united) – 21 per cent said the country was neither united nor divided The pandemic has had mixed effects on people’s perceptions. As Chapter 11 highlights, people often say it has shown us at our best and our worst. At this stage there is no clear public verdict. When asked whether their perceptions of the UK have changed (if at all) since the start of the Covid-19 pandemic, Britons respond as follows: – 32 per cent feel that we are more divided than before – 26 per cent believe that we are more united than before – 42 per cent claim that we are neither more united than divided Page 4 Figure 5.1. Perceptions of division Most Britons feel that the country is generally divided, although only a fifth feel this strongly Are we united or divided? 45 21 22 12 1 % Agree Very united Very divided Somewhat united Somewhat divided Neither united nor divided Qu. How united or divided does the UK feel to you these days? February 2020. Source: More in Common 2020. If we were to draw out the three key insights from this research on division, the first would be thatthe country sees itself as more divided than united – across all segments. The second key insight is that perceptions of unity and division are influenced by partisan factors. Those whose political side is in power are more likely to view the country as united, and those whose side is weaker and out of power see it as divided. There are nevertheless significant numbers of Conservative supporters who see the country as divided, and significant numbers of Labour supporters who see the country as united. – Supporters of opposition parties are more likely to view the country as divided – a view shared by 77 per cent of Labour supporters, 87 per cent of Liberal Democrat supporters, and 89 per cent of Scottish Nationalist Party supporters. – In contrast, 51 per cent of Conservative Party supporters see the UK as divided. – Just 49 per cent of strong Leavers see the UK as divided, compared to 86 per cent of strong Remainers. There is far less difference between ‘somewhat’ Leavers and ‘somewhat’ Remainers (among whom 57 and 68 per cent respectively see the country as divided). – Those who are disengaged politically are less inclined to see the country as divided, with 55 per cent of those who did not vote in the 2019 election saying the country is divided, compared to 65 per cent nationally. Page 5 The third key insight from the research is that the population segments provide some clearer insights into public perceptions than the lens of Brexit or party identities, since perceptions of unity and division are influenced by people’s social psychology. – While being on the ‘winning’ or ‘losing’ side influences people’s perceptions of unity and division, underlying psychological influences can also play a role. Despite having the highest Leave vote in the 2016 referendum of any segment (at 63 per cent, equal to Backbone Conservatives), Loyal Nationals are still more likely to perceive the country as divided than the national average. Some 70 per cent of them say this is the case. Loyal Nationals are most sensitive about divisions in their society, and this is a key characteristic of those with the highest tendency towards authoritarian values.
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