THE ELECTORAL PERSISTENCE OF FAR-RIGHT PARTIES IN EUROPE

A thesis submitted to the faculty of San Francisco State University In partial fulfillment of AS the requirements for the Degree JoR-

Ton Master of Arts

In

Political Science

by

Anthony Benjamin Avila

San Francisco, California

May 2017 Copyright by Anthony Avila CERTIFICATION OF APPROVAL

I certify that I have read The Electoral Persistence of Far-Right Parties in Europe by

Anthony Benjamin Avila, and that in my opinion this work meets the criteria for approving a thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirement for the degree

Master of Arts: Political Science at San Francisco State University.

Nicole F. Watts,'Ph.D. Professor of Political Science

Jame^)Wartel, Ph.D. Professor of Political Science THE ELECTORAL PERSISTENCE OF FAR-RIGHT PARTIES IN EUROPE

Anthony Benjamin Avila San Francisco, California 2017

Since the financial crisis of 2008, democratic governments across Europe have seen revitalization in support for far-right political parties. A number of these new parties have managed to achieve electoral success in multiple consecutive elections despite the use of violence by its members and supporters. I argue that the continued electoral support of far-right parties can largely be attributed to the efforts of party activists in establishing electoral connections with its constituency through the provision of essential and meaningful services. I create a unique tripartite explanatory model to account for the electoral persistence of far-right parties. I employ this model to analyze Golden Dawn in Greece and Jobbik in Hungary and demonstrate how the actions of party activists can engender continued political support for even the most extreme far-right parties.

I certify that the abstract is a correct representation of the content of this thesis

o S’ — l ^ - 2_o i Chair, Thesis Committee Date ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would first like to thank and acknowledge my thesis chair Professor Nicole F. Watts at

San Francisco State University. Her continued support and encouragement throughout the writing process was instrumental in the creation of my theoretical model and her constructive criticism pushed me to strive for excellence while allowing the paper to be my own work.

I would also like to thank my co-chair Professor James Martel, whose courses instilled in me an interest in radical politics and whose passionate input was also helpful during the conception of this work.

Finally, I would like to express my deepest gratitude to my mother and father, my brother and sister, and my wife Monique for their unconditional love and support throughout my time as a graduate student. This work would not have been possible without you all.

v TABLE OF CONTENTS

List of Figures...... vii

Chapter 1: Introduction...... 1

Chapter 2: The Academic Study of Far-Right Politics...... 11

Defining Terms...... 12

Explaining the Electoral Success and Persistence of FRPs ...... 18

Proposed Model and Theoretical Framework...... 32

Chapter 3: Golden Dawn in Greece...... 39

Chapter 4: Jobbik in Hungary...... 61

Chapter 5: Conclusion...... 89

Reference...... 97 LIST OF FIGURES

Figures Page

1. Conceptual Distinction of Radical vs. Extreme Right Parties...... 18 2. Tripartite Model of FRP Persistence...... 38 3. “Cuteness campaign” ad for Jobbik candidate Janos Stummer...... 85

vii 1

Chapter 1 - Introduction

Perhaps one of the most striking political trends in the last ten years is the increasing support for far-right parties in democracies across Europe. This most recent wave of political success for such parties, which began after the 2008 financial crisis, is the latest development in a trend that began in the 1980s when the radical right re- emerged as a minor though prevalent force in Europe for the first time since the Interwar period (Art 2011; Mudde 2007). Radical right-wing parties have emerged successful in local and state elections in a vast number of countries including but not limited to

Austria, Greece, Denmark, Sweden, France, Slovakia, Finland, Belgium and Hungary

(BBC 2016). Moreover, a number of these parties continue to maintain and even increase their electoral support over multiple elections.

While scholars on the subject have sought to temper fears about the significance of this trend, there is a clear acknowledgement of the real extent to which these far-right parties engage in or are indirectly associated with violent activities targeting some of the most vulnerable groups in society (Art 2013; Mudde 2016). This point is particularly relevant when considering the fact that some of the most extreme right-wing parties have managed to gamer the necessary number of votes to enter office and maintain this electoral support in consecutive elections.

This work seeks to explain and identify the factors that contribute to the continued electoral support and success of far-right parties in Europe in the last decade. A number 2

of conditions made it apt to study this topic. First, enough time has passed since the beginning of this new wave of far-right support to assess the sustainability of these parties across multiple election cycles, making it ripe for examination. Second, the question of continued electoral support for the far-right is a relatively new and distinct academic inquiry. While a vast number of studies have addressed the initial breakthrough of these parties, few have sought to examine their variation in electoral success over time.

Moreover, of the scholars who have examined this particular question, a number of theoretical and methodological disagreements have emerged, with a lack of consensus on how to account for this variation. Finally, because this is an ongoing and developing phenomenon that poses a potential threat to liberal democracies worldwide, research on this topic may reveal policy implications for democratic leaders seeking to quell the support for the far-right while engaging with its members in office. Understanding why even the most extreme right-wing parties across Europe have been able to maintain electoral support and achieve electoral success in consecutive elections is therefore a question that holds both academic and political relevance.

Terminological and Conceptual Headaches

There are at least two key difficulties that scholars have had to deal with when studying far-right politics. The first concerns the most basic issue of defining terms and the categorization of real world examples. Scholars in this field have used a vast multitude of terms with significant disagreement over their definitions. Different researchers define and use terms like far-right, radical right, populist radical right, 3

extreme right, neo-fascist, right wing populist, and ultranationalist in varying and sometimes competing ways. This “terminological chaos” and the epistemological difficulties inherent in defining social scientific terms ultimately leads to problems of categorization and discrepancies in delineating which parties are considered to be part of the far-right family (Mudde 2007, 12). Without going into detail here, this work uses far- right and far-right parties (FRPs) as an umbrella term to refer to a family of political ideologies that are distinguished as further to the right on the political spectrum than mainstream conservatism, varying in the degree to which they profess a disdain for liberal democratic values and embrace xenophobic, nationalist or nativist sentiments or beliefs (Ignazi 2003; Mudde 2007; Art 2011). The terms “radical right” and “extreme right” typically denote the degree of these beliefs, with radical referring to a general criticism of democratic values and an advancement of illiberal or authoritarian polices and extreme referring to an outright rejection of the democratic system (Mudde 2007). I develop my own distinction based on whether the FRP regularly engages in illegal activities or actively coordinates with groups that do

The second issue relates to addressing the question of variation in FRP successes over time. Some researchers choose to approach the issue by analyzing demand-side variables like globalization, economic crises, increases in immigration, sentiments of populism and political cynicism, and income inequality, which seek to shed light on why individuals might turn to far-right politics (Ignazi 2003; Han 2014; Rooduijn 2015).

While these explanations hold definite relevance, they are problematic for a number of 4

reasons. In addition to the weak and sometimes contradictory empirical evidence for these broad factors, none of them explain why a particular FRP becomes electorally successful (Mudde 2007). Nor do they necessarily account for the continued electoral support of such a party - not all of these factors are static and may not have the same influence on voters at different points in time. This is why a number of researchers in this area of study have chosen to focus on supply-side variables and on the parties themselves in accounting for variations of electoral success (Harrison and Bruter 2011; Mudde 2007;

Art 2011).

And yet even among those who agree on this point diverge in their approach. Of the few works that have presented comprehensive explanatory models of FRP success, each have different views on what aspects of these parties should be analyzed. Some scholars stress the ideology of the party itself in relation to the ideology of other parties in the political field as instrumental in its long-term viability (Bustikova 2014; Harrison and

Bruter 2011). Others stress the activist makeup of FRPs as well as other factors like party size and cohesion (Art 2011). Others focus on political opportunity structures and the specific actions taken by party leaders and members (Mudde 2007).

Despite these differences, these works provide an extremely useful starting point for an area of study that is ripe for analysis. While demand-side accounts of attitudes in the populace are useful for understanding why people may turn to FRPs in the first place, analyzing concrete party mechanisms and activities helps to elucidate the reasons individuals might support one party over another. The most recent literature on this 5

subject focuses explicitly on parties, and to the extent they focus on different aspects of parties they analyze multiple facets of the same unit of analysis. Because of this, the different party-centric variables that have been utilized can be aggregated into a broader explanatory model that serves to simplify the way in which the questions of continued

FRP success is approached while maintaining the analytical power of each variable.

Furthermore, relevant research on state-society relations can help to make sense of and integrate the seemingly narrow analyses of party ideology into a greater context for understanding why FRPs succeed in consecutive elections. Therefore, the current state of the literature, marked by an agreement on the unit of analysis but a lack of consensus on what aspect should be considered central, actually presents a potential for the consolidation and creation of an integrated explanatory model, an undertaking that makes up a key component of this work.

Far-Right Prevalence in Contemporary Europe

One of the most pressing and significant concerns related to the recent trend in continued support for FRPs is the extent to which these parties and its members are associated with increases of violence targeting minorities and immigrants (Art 2013).

While most of the new radical right parties in Europe officially renounce violence, a number of emerging FRPs that share the similar ideological views have been either directly or indirectly associated with the use of violence, both before and after entering political office. This work analyzes in depth two such parties - Golden Dawn in Greece and Jobbik in Hungary. 6

In Greece, the extreme right party Golden Dawn emerged successful in garnering the necessary number of votes to enter parliament in 2012 in the wake of the country’s financial debt crisis (Bistis 2013). The election was followed by a noticeable increase in violent attacks on immigrants across the country, many of which are alleged to be perpetrated by Golden Dawn members and supporters (Kotsoni 2013; Ellinas 2013). In

2013, a Golden Dawn supporter was arrested for murdering Pavlos Fyssas, a Greek anti­ fascist rapper, which led to an investigation of the party and to the eventual arrest of over fifty of its members, including elected officials and party president Nikos Michaloliakos

(Ayiomamitis 2015). Party members are currently facing trial as a criminal organization for their alleged involvement and coordination of assaults on gays, immigrants, and minorities across Greece (ibid; Kotsoni 2013; Smith 2015). In Hungary, just prior to achieving electoral success for the first time in its history, Jobbik leaders initiated the creation of a paramilitary unit in 2007, an organization that explicitly focused on the unofficial policing of neighborhoods with ethnic Roma citizenry, a minority populace in the country that faces deep animosity from Hungarians (Feischmidt and Szombati 2012).

Despite an official separation of the party from the paramilitary organization in 2009, numerous studies have shown that Jobbik leaders continue to organize and affiliate with it and other extremist groups in the country (ibid; Mireanu 2013; Lestyanszky 2015).

And yet, despite each party’s association with violence and violent organizations, both have managed to achieve electoral success in at least two consecutive elections.

Golden Dawn was able to maintain its electoral support in 2015 and Jobbik even saw an 7

increase in votes in 2014 (Smith 2015; Mudde 2014). Why then have these FRPs been able to maintain electoral support and achieve continued electoral success? What factors contribute to the willingness of individuals to continue to support parties with real connections to violent activities and organizations?

The Central Argument and Methodology

I argue that FRPs are more likely to maintain electoral support when they effectively provide essential and meaningful services to its core constituency while addressing salient issues that resonate with the populace. Additionally, FRPs are more likely to persist electorally when they operate in a permissive and ideologically noncompetitive political environment and if there is a continued demand at the individual level for FRPs generally. In order to demonstrate this, I develop and posit a new tripartite explanatory model for FRP electoral persistence that looks at these various factors individually, incorporating and building upon a number of previous insights provided by scholars in the literature on the topic.

By examining various aspects of political opportunity structures and party activities at micro, meso, and macro levels of society as described above, this work incorporates and builds upon some of the most recent literature on FRPs as well as research on state-society relations in order to best account for the continued electoral success of even the most extreme right-wing parties in Europe. Where previous works have focused on various aspects of how FRPs might engender electoral support, this work 8

shows concretely how and by what means these parties establish and maintain a direct electoral connection with its supporters.

The methodological approach is qualitative in nature and utilizes both primary and secondary data available to the researcher. The analysis itself incorporates statistical data and surveys, newspaper and online articles, investigative reports, academic articles, annual NGO reports, documentary videos, as well as publications from the parties themselves, including its manifestos, public statements, and official websites.

While this work is not directly concerned on factors associated with the initial breakthrough of FRPs over the last ten years, some of the literature on this topic is utilized to the extent it serves to provide a background of the history of the parties within its respective country. These factors of course do not necessarily suffice as explanations for the continued support of these parties, given that there is no reason to assume that these factors remain static over multiple years and election cycles. However, given the complex regional rise in FRPs across Europe as well as the distinct histories of each individual country, it is essential to address the research on the initial breakthrough of each party before addressing the question of continued support. Moreover, institutional and historical factors in both Greece and Hungary are also utilized in order to highlight the various ways in which FRP leaders utilize each in their attempts to maintain their political support. Therefore, to the extent that any factor is related to the activity of the party in question in its attempts to maintain electoral support are incorporated into the analysis here. 9

Organization of the Work

The following chapters proceed as follows. Chapter 2 examines the literature related to both the terminology and classification of far-right political parties as well as the research on the variation in electoral success of such parties. In clarifying and delineating which terms are relevant and applicable to the parties in questions, this work places itself within the body of literature on the topic while attempting to add to the discussion on the distinction between the radical and extreme right. After this, I examine and critique the various explanatory models that attempt to account for the variation in

FRP electorally success over time. Then I posit a new tripartite explanatory model of

FRP electoral persistence, building upon theories developed by Migdal (1988; 2001) and

Kalyvas (2006) while incorporating several of the variables put forth in the aforementioned literature.

In Chapters 3 and 4, the work utilizes the model developed to examine the cases of Golden Dawn in Greece and Jobbik in Hungary, respectively. This represents the bulk of the work and details the concrete ways in which the actions of party activists contribute to its continued electoral success. While other works have stressed factors related to why individuals initially turn to and support FRPs, this work shows why they choose to continue to support their particular FRP, regardless of the controversies surrounding the party’s use of violence or its association with violent organizations. 10

Chapter 5 concludes the work and assesses the strengths and limitations of the explanatory model provided. I highlight a number of potential issues and attempt to respond to these concerns. I also examine the extent to which radical and extreme right parties present an internal political challenge for liberal democratic values and institutions, while also discussing the importance of this work in its illumination of the processes by which FRP activists attempt to maintain their electoral support. 11

Chapter 2 - The Academic Study of Far-Right Politics

Since 2008, a number of new far-right parties have managed to gain enough votes to enter national political offices across Europe, despite the use of violence by party activists and its connections to extremist organizations (BBC 2016). Furthermore, a number of these parties have managed to succeed in elections following its initial breakthrough, despite the fact that they have had little effect on legislative policy. The key research question to be addressed in this paper is stated as follows: why have some of the most extreme FRPs in Europe managed to maintain the support of its constituency and succeed in multiple consecutive elections over the last decade?

This work contributes to the research on this topic in three ways. First, it provides further clarification to the debate amongst scholars over how to define and distinguish the two most general variants of FRPs - radical and extreme. Second, it posits a new model for understanding the electoral persistence of FRPs after they enter office. This is analytically distinct from the inquiry into the initial breakthrough of such parties, given that the conditions that may have propelled it to office are subject to change over time and do not ensure its continued success. Lastly, it employs this model to analyze two cases of extreme right party persistence in Europe within the last five years.

Virtually every academic work on the politics of FRPs must mire through the terminological swamp that has plagued the literature. While much has been done in this regard to classify and distinguish this party family from others in the political field, 12

scholars continue to debate the choice of specific labels and definitions. This decision is not without consequence. Adopting Ignazi’s label and definition of “extreme right,” for example, will invariably lead to a selection of parties that would differ if Mudde’s

“populist radical-right” was utilized. Therefore, any assessment of the far-right politics must first analyze the varying classification models proposed by researchers.

Defining Terms

Piero Ignazi provides a general definition and typology of the FRP family that emerged in the latter part of the 20th century (2003). According to Ignazi, the extreme right is meant to denote an ideology that is characterized by its extreme rightward position relative to the center of the political spectrum (ibid., 2). This incorporates a wide set of beliefs that include but are not limited to an admiration for strong state power, a hostility toward immigrants and foreigners, and a rejection in principle of social or racial equality (ibid., 33). It is not meant to indicate any association with the use of violence

(ibid., 224). The key feature that is said to distinguish the extreme right is its “opposition of principle” to the liberal democratic political system (ibid., 32). By this, Ignazi means that for a party to be considered part of the extreme right family, it must be “anti-system”

- its goals must be incompatible with the political system in which it operates and the efforts of its members are often attempts to undermine the legitimacy of that system

(ibid). 13

This does not necessarily mean that such parties are explicit in their rejection of the political system. Ignazi notes that since 1980, virtually every successful extreme right party has dropped the neo-fascist label and its activists speak with ostensible reverence of democratic principles (ibid., 33). Nevertheless, he argues, the very belief structure of the extreme right is inherently hostile to the values of liberal democracy, and that any deference given to the democratic system is done to mask their true intentions (ibid., 32-

33). Ignazi uses this distinction between openly anti-democratic and nominally democratic parties to create two sub-classifications of the extreme right: the traditional, classical neo-fascist or neo-Nazi parties, and the post-industrial, “non-fascist” parties that emerged after 1980 (ibid., 34).

Perhaps the biggest problem with this definition is that it is difficult to operationalize. The defining feature of the extreme right, “opposition in principle," is admittedly difficult to demonstrate empirically, given that none of the extreme right parties that have emerged in the last decade have openly advocated for the overthrow or outright rejection of the political system. Ignazi attempts to respond to this point by noting that parties need not be explicit in its opposition in order to be considered anti­ system, citing fascist parties and Bolsheviks as examples (ibid., 226). This response is ultimately unsatisfying as Ignazi does not provide a precise method by which researchers can determine the types of identifiable qualities that are necessary to classify a party as anti-system. 14

Harrison and Bruter offer their own unique classification grid for what they also call the extreme right, which they argue serves to best encapsulate the beliefs of these parties while accounting for the multiplicity of its ideological variants (2011). According to the authors, the vast number of different labels used to define these parties is

“...systematic and symptomatic of the constrained ideological choices every extreme right party has to make,” (ibid., 5). The authors suggest that extreme right party leaders construct an ideology around the most salient issues in an attempt garner votes (ibid., 19).

Therefore, the vast number of competing labels in the literature is actually the result of these various conditions and constraints that lead extreme right parties to adopt different ideological positions.

Harrison and Bruter use the term “extreme right” because of its generalizability and its comparative adaptability. They define extreme right parties as organizations that run for political office “whose main ideological identity.. .is based on a negative expression of identity via cultural or civic references, and a discursive support for a form of social or political form [sic] of authoritarianism,” (ibid., 22). According to the authors, negative expressions of identity can take two forms: populism, the idea that ruling elites are corrupt and out of touch with the authentic people, and xenophobia, a fear or hostility held toward immigrants and minorities, both of which work to establish an in-group/out- group distinction (ibid., 36). Authoritarianism is said to hold two dimensions as well, which include reactionary beliefs that value social order and harmony, and repressive beliefs in strict obedience to authority (ibid). This two-part ideological criterion 15

establishes a conceptual map that separates the extreme right into four subtypes: xenophobic-repressive, xenophobic-reactionary, populist-repressive, and populist- reactionary (ibid., 35). The authors utilize content analyses of manifestos, speeches, and interviews in order to classify a given party into one of the four subtypes.

This definition provides researchers with a clearer sense of the type of parties that qualify as extreme right. The two-part characterization of extreme right ideology

(authoritarianism and negative expressions of identity) serves as a generalized framework that encompasses most of the parties that have emerged in the last decade. However, the sub-classification schema may not be necessary for the purposes of this paper, and determining exactly where on the conceptual map to place a party is disposed to imprecision and variation given that researchers may utilize different key words as indicators of one of the four ideological dimensions in their content analyses.

Other researchers disagree over the core ideological features of the extreme right.

Mudde argues that the successful FRPs that have emerged since the 1980s should be labeled populist radical right (2007). He argues that three core features define this group: nativism, authoritarianism, and populism (ibid., 22-23). Furthermore, he chooses to distinguish between the radical and extreme right, stating that the latter denotes a party that is inherently anti-democratic and elitist, while the former represents parties that are nominally democratic though critical of liberal democratic values (ibid., 49). 16

While influential, Mudde’s definition is ultimately problematic and unnecessarily limiting. For instance, the conception of populist radical right leads him to create a number of sub-classifications1 that are not necessarily useful for addressing the continued support of these parties (ibid., 46-55). Furthermore, rather than establish clarity, Mudde inadvertently further complicates the terminological issue that plagues the literature.

Additionally, the distinction between radical and extreme right is virtually identical to

Ignazi’s distinction between traditional and post-industrial extreme right parties, and therefore also subject to the same methodological weaknesses. Furthermore, Harrison and

Barter’s definition is more general and encompasses both populism and xenophobia as a single feature of negative expressions of identity. Therefore, it appears that Mudde’s conception is unnecessarily limiting and particular.

Art builds on and qualifies the definition that Mudde gives, providing a critique and conception similar to that of Harrison and Bruter (2011). Art states that radical right parties can be broadly defined by two core features: an expression of hostility toward minorities and immigrants, which arises from a belief in the immutable differences of ethnicities as the cause of social disharmony (ethnopluralism), as well as a radical critique of liberal democratic values like pluralism, limits to executive authority, and minority rights (ibid., 11). He explicitly rejects the inclusion of populism as a core feature of the radical right. Art suggests that populism, the belief that society is divided between the authentic people and corrupt elites, is already implied in the radical critique of liberal

1 These include nonradical right-populists, nonpopulist right, Ethnoregionalists, and “borderline cases” (ibid). 17

democracy, which holds that the current political system is in need of restructuring (ibid).

Art also makes a distinction between radical and extreme right on the basis of the latter’s outright rejection of the “rules of the democratic game,” likening them to historical fascist and neo-fascist parties (2013).

For the purpose of this paper, I utilize Harrison and Bruter’s two-part definition, which is the clearest and most generalizable. I also incorporate aspects of Art and

Mudde’s definitions to the extent that they correspond to the two key features identified by Harrison and Bruter. However, the use of the term “extreme” seems too exaggerated and overly broad to apply to all FPRs across Europe. Scholars suggest using system- acceptance as the distinguishing feature between radical and extreme right parties (Ignazi

2003; Mudde 2007; Art 2013). But determining whether a party is anti-system is empirically difficult, given that virtually every FRP at least nominally accepts the democratic systems in which they operate. Therefore, I suggest distinguishing between radical and extreme right parties on the basis of whether its members regularly engage in illegal activities or coordinate with groups or organizations that do. Accordingly, an extreme right party might use violence or organize with groups that use violence against its political enemies while a radical right party would not. This establishes a clear dichotomy that is easy to identify and sufficiently differentiates the two variants of FRPs.

Furthermore, this distinction works to properly categorize fascist and neo-fascist parties, for which the glorification of violent action is an essential ideological component

(Woodley 2009). 18

For a party to be considered radical right, its ideology must be authoritarian in nature, either in its critique of liberal democratic principles or in its support of policies that value strict obedience to state authority, and must be characterized by negative expressions of identity, which may take the form of populist rhetoric, hostility toward immigrants, or an opposition to multiculturalism and minority rights (Harrison and

Bruter, 2011; Mudde 2007; Art 2011).2 For a party to be considered extreme right, it must share these core ideological features and regularly engage in illegal activities or coordinate with groups and organizations that do so on its behalf.

Figure 1. Conceptual Distinction of Radical vs. Extreme Right Parties

Explaining the Electoral Success and Persistence of FRPs

Researchers have addressed the potential reasons for why FRPs achieve and maintain electoral success in a variety of ways. While some choose to highlight and

2 Note that strong nationalism is also often associated with the radical right. I suggest that this factor is already implied in both of the core features listed here, given that belief in a strong state and expressed hostility toward foreigners in effect establishes an imagined national community (Anderson 1983). Furthermore, nationalism is also not unique to the radical right, as left-wing parties can also express sentiments of nationalism. 19

emphasize the importance of singular variables like voter attitudes or economic conditions, others attempt to establish a more comprehensive explanatory model, incorporating both demand-side and supply-side variables in order to explain why such parties succeed in certain circumstances and fail in others. The question of this work deals principally with the continued electoral success of FRPs after entering office. In order to add something new to the literature, I focus on factors that have been underutilized, specifically, meso-level and party centric supply-side elements, which help to elucidate the ways in which FRPs can establish and maintain electoral connections with its constituency. I posit a comprehensive, explanatory model for assessing the electoral persistence of FRPs, which incorporates these factors in conjunction with other variables recognized in the literature.

Minimalist Accounts

A number of scholars have attempted to account for the variation in success of

FRPs by analyzing factors external to the parties themselves. For example, Kyung Joon

Han takes a micro-level analysis of voter demographics and support for the radical right

(2016). Han argues that increased levels of income inequality differentially affects voter support for radical right parties along socioeconomic lines. Utilizing social identity theory, he suggests that class identification increases in saliency as the status of the group increases (ibid., 56). Therefore, as income inequality increases, the rich will tend to identify more with their economic class while the poor will identify with less materialistically demanding identities, like nationality (ibid). As a result, Han 20

hypothesizes that during times of increased income inequality, the rich will be less likely to support radical right parties while the poor will be more likely to support them (ibid).

Utilizing two sets of cross-national time series surveys and controlling for a wide range of other variables, Han produces statistically significant results that support his main theory (ibid., 60-61).

Lenka Bustikova takes an alternative approach and looks at how the presence of other parties in the political field affects FRPs (2014). She argues that the success of radical right parties is largely determined by the success of what she calls ‘ethno-liberal parties’ in prior elections (ibid., 1740). According to Bustikova, when ethno-liberal parties enter into a majority coalition, make substantial electoral gains, or attain policy concessions that benefit specific minority groups, issues related to social and political identities become highly salient (ibid., 1743). As a result, these achievements “magnify pre-existing grievances, fuel resentment, and create a political backlash that benefits radical right parties,” (ibid). The radical right is therefore viewed as a purely reactionary phenomenon that emerges in response to specific stimuli in the political environment.

Utilizing a dataset of cross-national party elections in post-communist countries over the last two decades, Bustikova’s produces results that are statistically significant and provide support for the backlash hypothesis (ibid., 1749).

Ignazi makes a similar assertion in the conclusion to his book, and suggests that the rise of extreme right parties across Europe since the 1980s could be thought of as a

“silent counter-revolution” to the emergence of green and left-libertarian parties that 21

challenged the established social, economic, and political power structures (2003, 201).

He goes on to list a number of party-external variables that are suggestive of the conditions under which extreme right parties are expected to succeed. The list includes low institutional election thresholds, party and ideological polarization, the inability of old parties to respond to new problems, and a decline in system legitimacy or confidence

(ibid., 202-203). Ignazi calls this last factor “the key to success and endurance,” and argues that even though emerging left-wing parties may benefit from a decline in system legitimacy, the voters who are most dissatisfied with the political system are disproportionately right leaning (ibid., 212-213). He concludes by noting that individual attitudes of social alienation, political dissatisfaction, and economic uncertainty result in a demand for extreme right parties, which offer a political vision of stability, authority, and a return to a glorified or mythological past (ibid., 254).

While each of these works are certainly important and help to explain the success of FRPs, they only account for part of the picture. None of them present a truly comprehensive account of the variation in FRP success over time. While micro-level analyses of voter profiles and attitudes may help to explain why certain individuals choose to support FRPs initially, they cannot explain why they choose one party over another. Han’s income inequality variable cannot help to explain why voters in Hungary supported Jobbik over the Hungarian Justice and Life Party in 2010, or why voters in

Greece supported the Golden Dawn over the Popular Orthodox Party in 2012. Neither can the theories presented by Bustikova or Ignazi, who both view the success of FRPs as 22

a reaction to forces external to the parties themselves. Furthermore, Ignazi’s argument that a decline in system confidence accounts for continued FRP success and that anti­ system sentiments are overrepresented in right-leaning voters does not adequately address the criticism that left-wing parties might equally benefit from this condition as well. A decline in system confidence is best understood as a political opportunity structure that potentially any political party can exploit to its benefit. The key weakness of focusing solely on demand-side variables or factors external to FRPs is that they fail to elucidate the type of work and effort that party members do in order to attract and maintain the support of individual voters. Therefore, while these factors are essential to any discussion on the success of FRPs generally, alone they cannot provide a framework that will address the question of why particular FRPs are able to maintain electoral support in consecutive election cycles.

Comprehensive Accounts

Other researchers have focused specifically on supply-side and party centric variables, either independently or in conjunction with demand-side and party external ones. These works seek to demonstrate why particular FRPs are more effective at achieving electoral success than others. By analyzing various aspects of FRPs, the makeup of its members, its explicit ideology, and the actions of its leadership, this research provides an apt set of variables that help to address the central question of this work. 23

Harrison and Bruter attempt to explain the variations in electoral success of FRPs over time by examining both party centric supply-side variables with micro-level demand-side ones (2011). The authors analyze the ideological placement of 25 FRPs on their conceptual map in conjunction with individual voter surveys in an attempt to reveal specific attitudes in the public that may attract voters to a particular ideological variant of

FRPs. One of their central arguments is that FRPs are more likely to succeed in elections when their ideological location ‘matches’ the ideological attitudes of the FAR-

RIGHTelectorate (ibid., 46). Furthermore, they examine the potential influence that intra­ party competition may have on the likelihood of FRP success. The authors suggest that multiple FRPs competing in one country will need to operate in different ideological dimensions in order to co-exist, and that new FRPs will have trouble displacing old FRPs if they locate in the same ideological space (ibid., 45).

The work consists of a number of steps. First, the authors group the 25 FRPs examined by ideology via their conceptual map. They identify key words that are suggestive of the four quadrants of extreme right ideology (repressive, reactionary, populist, and xenophobic) and use a content analysis of party manifestos, press releases, and member interviews to determine the ideological placement of each party. Next, they analyze the individual voter surveys they conducted in 10 countries, which asked a series of questions that attempted to reveal the specific attitudes of the extreme right electorate and the likelihood to vote for a FRP. Then, they test the ‘ideological match’ theory by contrasting the survey results with the actual votes given to specific FRPs. Finally, case 24

studies of three countries where more than one FRP operates are examined in order to assess the effect that the comparative ideological placement of these parties has on the likelihood of their success.

The authors findings are somewhat mixed. Considering the ‘ideological match’ hypothesis, they find that only the negative-identity dimension produced any statistically significant results related to voter attitudes and actual ballots cast for an ideologically similar FRP (ibid., 177). However, case studies of the United Kingdom and France produced support for the intra-party competition hypothesis, demonstrating how ideologically dissimilar FRPs can coexist in the same country while new FRPs struggle to survive when they operate in the same ideological space as a previously successful FRP

(ibid., 200).

Harrison and Bruter’s work attempts to clarify the contours of extreme right ideology and simultaneously account for the variation in the success of such parties.

However, the heavy emphasis on party ideology is perhaps too limiting, in that it does not account for the potential effects that specific actions of party members have on the continued electoral success of FRPs. Regardless, some of the general implications from

Harrison and Bruter’s findings are utilized and incorporated into the proposed explanatory model, specifically the intra-party competition theory, which suggests how new FRPs might work to distinguish themselves from their immediate ideological competitors. 25

Mudde uses the second half of his book to provide a comprehensive overview of the different approaches that researchers have used to explain the variation in FRP success (2007). He divides these approaches into three general categories - demand-side, external supply-side, and internal supply-side. Ultimately, while he does not engage in a robust, systematic analysis of variations in FRP support, Mudde presents an argument for the use of party centric, internal supply-side factors in assessing the continued electoral success of FRPs and is therefore integral for the purpose of this paper.

Mudde is critical of the demand-side approach, which he argues is unable to give a full account of FRP electoral persistence. For instance, he is critical of the potential influence that macro-level factors like modernization and globalization have on the likelihood of FRP successes, in that these accounts are too general and vague to provide a useful explanation (ibid., 202-205). He is also critical of the ‘ethnic backlash’ hypothesis, noting the problem of contradictory empirical results of various articles on the topic

(ibid., 211). Moreover, while he acknowledges that the micro-level factor of far-right attitudes in the electorate has proven to be the most useful in determining the likelihood of FRP success, he is critical of the assumption that ideology is central to the voting decision of individuals and of the extent to which these attitudes can account for the continued persistence of particular FRPs (ibid., 220). Mudde concludes that while demand-side variables are useful for understanding the potential conditions that may benefit FRPs electorally, they do not adequately account for why individuals cast their 26

votes for such parties and cannot explain the variation in their success over time (ibid.,

230).

In order to make up for this limitation, Mudde suggests utilizing supply-side factors in order to explain FRP persistence, arguing that the most effective way to understand the variation in the electoral success and persistence of FRPs is to examine what he calls internal supply-side factors, or aspects of FRPs themselves (ibid., 256).

Mudde asserts that ideological propaganda, party leadership, and internal organization are the three most essential factors for explaining the electoral persistence of FRPs (ibid.,

256-257, 276). Concerning ideology, Mudde notes that there is no consensus on what variant of far-right ideology is most successful (ibid., 258).3 Rather, he suggests that the extremity of ideology, how it is presented to the public, and the political context through which it is filtered can affect the likelihood of FRP persistence (ibid., 259-260). Mudde also notes how initial electoral breakthroughs and the subsequent media coverage of

FRPs can amplify its ideological message and potentially “...help transform (first-time party) voters into loyal party supporters,” (ibid., 260). When discussing the factor of party leadership, Mudde stresses that while charismatic leadership in FRPs is relevant in some cases to its success, it is not deterministic. Instead, it is the ways in which party leaders work to build the party structure and establish electoral connections with the populace that have a greater effect on the likelihood of party persistence (ibid., 263-264).

Lastly, Mudde suggests that internal party organization is central to explaining long term

3 However, he does state that radical right parties tend to fare better than extreme ones, according to his distinction of the two (ibid.,258). 27

party persistence and argues that FRPs are more likely to maintain its political support if it is able to effectively organize at the grass roots and establish local electoral strongholds

(ibid., 264, 269).

Mudde does not actually engage in a systematic employment of these factors, but argues in favor of their usage. Art actually takes up the task of utilizing both external and internal supply-side, party centric factors in an attempt to establish a general model for explaining the variation in FRP successes (2011). His central argument is that the variation in electoral success of FRPs over time is largely influenced by the internal makeup and dispersion of particular types of activists within the party, the variation of which is itself the product of both political opportunity structures and pre-existing social resources (ibid., 20-22, 30-31). According to Art, FRPs operating in a permissive political environment will attract more moderate activists with higher levels of SES and political experience and will be more likely to maintain electoral success, while FRPs operating in a repressive political environment will only attract extremists with lower levels of SES and experience and will be less likely to persist electorally (ibid., 49-51).

Utilizing comparative historical analysis, ethnographic research, and an original data set on FRP candidates for office, Art demonstrates how the type of activists that a party attracts has a causative effect on its likelihood of success or failure.

Art argues that FRP activists (supporters, members, leaders) are heterogeneous and can be divided into three distinct groups - extremists, moderates, and opportunists

(ibid., 32-33). Extremists consist of supporters who are openly hostile to liberal 28

democracy, often espousing revolutionary rhetoric and are open to the use of violence as a political weapon (ibid., 32). Hardcore racist skinheads and neo-Nazis might best epitomize this category. Moderate activists, on the other hand, are members and supporters that nominally accept the democratic order and outwardly reject the use of violence (ibid). They constitute the professional wing of FRPs, and are often more educated with higher levels of SES (ibid). Finally, opportunists are political novices who are attracted to FRPs but inexperienced and more concerned with their own careers than with the goals of the party itself (ibid., 33). Art posits that the distribution of these three groups within a FRP affects its internal development and its ability to maintain party unity, appear competent and legitimate in the public eye, and remain ideologically flexible (ibid., 30-31). Generally speaking, FRPs with more extremist activists will be less likely to achieve these aforementioned goals than those with more moderates and opportunists, and decrease its likelihood of continued electoral success (ibid., 36-39).

Art argues that the internal distribution of these activists within a FRP is itself the product of two factors. First, the attraction of particular activists is influenced by the pre­ existing social conditions within a country, namely its historical legacies and the presence of nationalist subcultures (ibid., 43). While these factors alone do not explain why one particular FRP does better than another, nor how successful parties develop after its initial success, they are useful for understanding the social and political environment in which they operate (ibid). Second, the reaction of other political parties to the entry of a

FRP into office affects the perceived likelihood of its continued success, and thus attracts 29

certain types of activists. If other parties impose a strict cordon sanitaire on the FRP immediately after its initial breakthrough and refuse to engage with its members

(“repressive environment”), it will be difficult for it to attract moderate, high SES activists, who perceive the likelihood of its success as minimal (ibid., 46). If no such cordon sanitaire is imposed or if other parties work with a FRP after it enters office

(“permissive environment”), it will likely attract more moderate and opportunist activists who are better educated with more political experience (ibid., 46).

The results of Art’s cross-national analysis generally support his hypothesis, and shows that FRPs with more moderate activists (measured by SES, education level, and occupation) operating in a permissive political environment with a nationalist subculture is more likely to persist electorally over multiple elections that FRPs with more extremist activists operating in a repressive political environment (ibid., 49-51). As such, Art provides strong support for his central argument, and offers researchers concerned specifically with the continued electoral success of FRPs a great starting point. However, the central question of this paper highlights a potential limit of Art’s model. A number of extreme right parties have managed to achieve electoral support over multiple elections despite the apparent attraction of more extremist activists. This suggests that Art’s model might be limited in scope.

I argue that the internal makeup and dispersion of party activists in a FRP is not enough to account for its continued success. In order to best explain why and how FRPs are able to persist electorally, I suggest that specific attention should be placed on the 30

ways in which party members and leaders act in attempts to establish electoral connections with voters. While a greater presence of moderate activists with more political experience in a FRP is certainly indicative of their ability to organize effectively,

I argue that extremists and politically inexperienced members can be just as capable in organizing and working to establish electoral connections with its constituency. Even a small number of politically moderate and experienced members can have a substantial influence on a FRPs ability to persist electorally, and thus the dispersion of activist types may be irrelevant.4 Therefore, while Art provides a substantial foundation that will be utilized in part, this paper attempts to expand upon the relevant research and analyze an aspect of FRPs that has gone relatively unaddressed in the literature.

Additional Theoretical and Methodological Developments

While research on FRPs specifically is of central concern to this thesis, developments in the broader comparative political literature also provide a number of useful insights that serve to further assist in the creation of my proposed model. For example, Joel S. Migdal develops an explanatory model of state-society relations, which asked researchers to examine the state through the relations of various internal and external political and social groups (2001). By redefining the state as an organization within society (despite its ostensible separateness or superiority) whose leaders seek to exert hegemonic social control over the populace, the state is understood as yet another contender in the arena of dominance and opposition (ibid). The state is therefore analyzed

4 See discussion on Jobbik and Richard Forrai, founder of the Compass Institute, in chapter 4. 31

in the context of its engagement with opposing social forces and the process in which struggles for dominance take place.

These ideas illustrate an interesting insight concerning likelihood of continual support for political parties. Party leaders and activists, once elected, are essentially state actors, and as such their continued support relies in part on their ability to compete with other organization in society and provide various services to their support base.

Therefore, we might expect the continued electoral persistence of FRPs once they enter office to be affected by their ability to establish and maintain an assortment of services for party supporters, which serve to connect individuals to the party.

Additionally, Stathis N. Kalyvas work on civil war violence provides a useful base on which to develop a comprehensive model of FRP electoral persistence (2006). In his work, Kalyvas focuses on the use of homicidal, coercive violence during civil war, attempting to identify the causes for its differential use at different points during the conflict by either state actors or insurgents (ibid). His research produces an intricate and nuanced theoretical model that accounts for the disparate use of either selective or indiscriminate violence in specific areas of conflict (ibid). Kalyvas demonstrates how the use of these different types of violence by one actor is largely contingent on the level of control exerted over a given locality by the other and the myriad of constraints and incentives that individuals face on the micro-level (ibid). 32

Of central importance to this work is Kalyvas’ methodological approach. He employs a disaggregated model of analysis, analyzing variables and conditions on the micro, meso, and macro-levels in an attempt to resolve some of the conflicting accounts produced by micro and macro historical analyses on the causes of civil war and the use of violence during such conflicts (ibid., 3-5, 10). By doing so, Kalyvas attempts to guard against the fallacy of assuming local actors operate as perfect replicas of elites while identifying the unique conditions individuals on different levels of society face in their various relationships with other groups and actors (ibid., 10-11, 390-392). This approach serves to establish a powerful model of civil war violence that integrates each distinct level of analysis to produce unique hypotheses that are buttressed by his empirical work.

Adopting this method of disaggregation is therefore ideal for researchers attempting to provide comprehensive answers to research questions that involve multiple groups, organizations, and individuals interacting in various localities and contexts.

Proposed Model and Theoretical Framework

In order to assess the continued electoral support of FRPs in Europe, I propose the use of a tripartite, party centric analysis that utilizes a number of the contributions that

Harrison and Bruter (2011), Mudde (2007), and Art (2011) developed while incorporating some of the theoretical and methodological developments provided by

Migdal (1988; 2001) and Kalyvas (2006) in their respective works. My model is primarily focused on the actions that party leaders and members themselves take in attempts to maintain the electoral support of its constituency and compete with political 33

opponents. I argue that the likelihood of continued electoral support of FRPs is largely influenced by the ability of its members and leaders to provide essential or meaningful services to its constituency. The approach is qualitative in nature and utilizes both primary and secondary sources, including party manifestos, speeches and interviews, official websites, newspaper and academic articles, investigative reports, as well as survey data and annual reports from NGOs and state agencies.

The model adopts a method of disaggregation as defined and conceptualized by

Kalyvas, and analyzes specific factors at the micro, meso and macro-level (2006). The micro-level looks at the demand for FRPs by individual voters; the meso-level demonstrates how particular FRP members and leaders establish electoral connections with this constituency; the macro-level analyzes the ways in which these members work to maintain party cohesion and compete with its political opponents. While conceptualized as distinct areas of study, each level is interconnected. Part of the goal of this work is to highlight this connectivity and demonstrate how actions taken by party activists on one level can have substantive and mutually reinforcing effects on aspects of another. By examining each level in conjunction with the other, this model aims to provide a comprehensive account of FRP electoral persistence, incorporating the most important variables recognized in the literature while integrating new factors that have gone underutilized.

The micro-level analyzes individual attitudes that demonstrate a demand for FRPs generally. As noted above, demand-side variables are problematic for a number of 34

reasons and on their own cannot account for why a particular FRP persists electorally.

However, Art notes that they are a “necessary but not essential” component of analysis that should be at least addressed when examining FRPs (2011, 12). For the purposes of this paper, I eschew any thorough inspection of this level, given the time and resources needed to engage in surveys of individuals from each country in question needed.

However, this should not be a major issue. Art states that there is a consistent demand for

FRPs across Europe generally in the expression of authoritarian attitudes, and though scholars debate over the exact percentage, there are enough in each country to make

FRPs viable political contenders (ibid., 14). Furthermore, the examination of meso-level factors reveals how the individual demand for FRPs is both present and manipulated by the actions of FRP members. Therefore, I presume the existence of this individual demand and focus my analysis elsewhere.

The meso-level focuses exclusively on party centric supply-side factors, specifically on the actions of party members and leaders in attempts to establish electoral connections with its constituency. This is a central and essential component to my model that serves as my primary contribution to the literature and represents an area of inquiry that is missing from the previous research on FRPs. Additionally, it has the potential to resolve an apparent paradox - virtually no FRPs in office is part of the governing coalition, and most fail to have any effect on the legislative process. And yet these FRPs continue to maintain electoral support. I assert that the actions taken at the meso-level can account for the continued support of a party that fails to achieve any influence on actual 35

policy.51 argue that successful FRPs will be more likely to persist electorally when its members effectively provide meaningful or essential services and goods to its constituency. This is a fundamental aspect of the viability of state institutions generally.

Migdal notes that effective social control on the part of state actors rests on the ability to construct and provide mechanisms for “personal survival.. .blueprints for action and belief in a world that hovers on the brink of a Hobbesian state of nature,” (1988, 27). I suggest that a political party may be able to craft its own alternative strategies of survival for society, which in turn would serve to link the identities of individual supporters to the collective identity of the party and its goals. These alternative strategies of survival, which I call “essential services,” can take the form of food drives organized by party members or sub-state police functions for supporters who call their local party chapter for help with issues related to theft or emergencies.

Establishing an electoral connection does not necessarily require the provision of services to guard against existential threats.6 FRPs additionally may offer what I call

“meaningful services,” which can take the form of youth programs, summer camps or music and cultural festivals. While not essential for survival, they serve to connect individuals to their community at large, and potentially to the FRP as the mediator of

5 Art states that for a party to be more likely to attract moderate activists and maintain electoral support, it must appear legitimate in its ability to work with other parties and likelihood of having an influence on public policy (2011, 38). My analysis shows how even absent of such policy achievements FRPs can maintain its support and persist electorally. 6 In many cases, such an extreme breakdown of state functioning may not be at all present. However, even in such cases, FRPs may work to undermine support for the state generally through the provision of these essential services. 36

these services. Furthermore, even actions not directed at its constituency can have a profound effect on how an FRP is viewed by its supporters. For instance, the use of violence targeted against specific groups by FRP members or supporters can work to establish a connection with potential supporters, who may view its use as either legitimate or necessary in lieu of legislative action to address specific issues. Often, FRP members themselves or extremist groups with which they are associated will intimidate or attack immigrants and minorities. This serves at least two functions. First, individuals who view issues related to immigration or minority groups as salient may view such violence as necessary, or lead them to conclude that at least the FRP is willing to do something about it. Second, targeted violence works to sustain hostilities between various groups and ensures the saliency of such issues. In this way, targeted violence can be used to manipulate and maintain the specific attitudes of voters that led them to support the party in the first place. Specific group coordinated actions can therefore have a substantive impact on the attitudes of individuals, which provides a conceptual connection between the micro and meso-levels. Overall then, examining the actions of

FRP activists in their attempts to establish and maintain electoral connections is essential to understanding the continued electoral success of the party.

The macro-level examines the actions of FRP members and leaders taken to maintain the party structure itself - actions not necessarily aimed at establishing a direct electoral connection. This aspect of the analysis focuses on the extent to which FRP members are able maintain party unity, appeal to potential new voters through the 37

formulation and presentation of its ideology, and compete with other political parties.

This area is almost entirely informed by previous work in the literature. It looks at how

FRP members compete with its immediate competitors and how they work to differentiate themselves ideologically from others in the political field by focusing on distinct issues (Harrison and Bruter 2011). It examines how all parties in the field responded to the initial entrance of the FRP into office and how a permissive or repressive response might have an influence on its chances of electoral persistence (Art

2011). Attention will also be given to the potential effects of increased media coverage of the party and how the amplification of its message might influence voters (Mudde 2007).

I also demonstrate how actions by specific FRP activists (even single individuals) can be instrumental in maintaining party cohesion between national and state chapters. In this way, I conceptually link the macro to the meso-level and show how the actions by party elites can work to sustain the effectiveness of electoral connection efforts.

None of these three aspects on their own can sufficiently account for the continued support of FRPs. Demand-side factors on the micro-level fail to explain why a particular FRP maintains support and macro-level factors suffer from causality and circularity issues. However, analyzing the factors from all three levels together in the aggregate produces a comprehensive account of everything related to the electoral efforts of FRPs. Therefore, I argue that this approach can serve as a powerful explanatory model for understanding the continued electoral success of FRPs. The following chapters 38

employ this model to examine two cases - Golden Dawn in Greece and Jobbik in

Hungary. The limitations of the model will be discussed in the conclusion.

Increased Likelihood of FRP Electoral Persistence

Figure 2. Tripartite Model of FRP Persistence 39

Chapter 3 - Golden Dawn in Greece

In 2013, late at night in a cafe in Athens, Greek anti-fascist rapper Pavlos Fyssas was attacked by a group of men and fatally stabbed (Charlton 2013). It was reported that moments before he died, Pavlos identified the man who had stabbed him - Giorgos

Roupakias, a strong supporter of the far-right neo-fascist party Golden Dawn (GD), who was later arrested and charged with his murder (Smith 2013). Following the murder, police arrested 69 party supporters, members and key figures in GD, including party leader Nikos Michaloliakos, under charges of murder, armed assault, and running a criminal organization (Smith 2015b; Ayiomamitis 2015).

The arrests took place only one year after the party won 7% of the Greek vote in

2012, gaining actual representation in parliament for the first time in their 20-year history

(Dalakoglou 2013, 515; Bistis 2013, 47). The party has perpetrated numerous violent attacks on immigrants, gays, and left-wing opposition groups, and GD spokesperson Ilias

Kasidiaris physically assaulted a female member of parliament on live television during a debate (Ayiomamitis 2015; Gallagher 2012; Bistis 2013; Georgiadou 2013). Despite the group’s reputation for violence, its virtually explicit neo-fascist ideology and the current criminal charges that its top leaders face, the party again managed to gain 7% of the vote in a snap election held on September 20th, 2015, receiving a total of 18 seats in parliament (Smitha 2015a). Why then, despite the multiple criminal charges levied against the party and its leaders, has GD been able to maintain its political support? 40

In order to answer this question, I focus heavily on the mechanisms of political action that the party uses to gamer and maintain its support base. Uncovering these factors will serve to explain the willingness of some GD supporters to perhaps overlook the use of violence by its activists and complicate some of the more conventional explanations for the rise in popular support of the party. Utilizing the tripartite model of continued FRP electoral success, I argue that GD has been able to maintain its political support because its activists have established a number of meaningful and essential services to its constituency while effectively navigating the national political arena. In addition to a number of attitudes held by Greek citizens that likely contribute to the support of FRPs in the country generally, examining the work done by party members and activists to establish connections with this constituency after entering office helps to shed light on how the party has been able to retain its support despite the pending criminal trial. The tripartite model is therefore able to incorporate some of the typical explanations of FRP support into a more comprehensive account of why a particular party like GD in Greece has been able to persist electorally.

A Violent Sunrise: Golden Dawn’s Neo-Fascist Roots

The ideology of GD is explicitly anti-Semitic, ultranationalist, racist, and embraces the “third major ideology of history,” a clear indication of its neo-fascist roots

(Counter Extremism Project 2017; Golden Dawn 2012).7 Despite persistent denial of the neo-fascist or neo-Nazi label, ranking members of GD have not made their admiration for

7 For a discussion of Third Position and neo-fascism, see Berlet (2016). 41

Hitler and the Third Reich a secret. Party activists and leaders frequently give the Nazi salute at their rallies and the spokesperson of the party MP Ilias Kasidiaris even has a swastika tattoo on his shoulder (Rabinowitz 2014). “We may do the Hitler salute, but at least our hands our clean,” party leader and founder Nikos Michaloliakos exclaimed before a party rally as he gave the salute (CNN 2012). Michaloliakos initially founded the

Golden Dawn magazine in 1980 following his release from prison, and was the author of an article in it titled “Hitler for 1,000 Years,” (Bistis 2013; 43). The party’s emblem, the

Greek “meandros” symbol, also bears a striking similarity to the swastika.8

In addition to its ideological admirations, GD has also gained infamy for its use of violence, and can therefore be categorized as an extreme right party.9 Just over a decade after its registration as a political party in 1983, reports began to surface of GD members and activists attacking immigrants and homosexuals (Ellinas 2013; Georgiadou 2013).

Second in command of GD Antonios Androutsopoulos was tried and convicted of attempted murder for a brutal assault on three students in 1998 (Ellinas 2013; Bistis

2013). A rise in the number of attacks by GD member and supporters targeting immigrants was noted after its electoral gains in 2012, a success that is largely attributed to its ability to capitalize off of Greek’s economic crisis, a rise in mass unemployment

8 Actual swastika flags were displayed in the first party congress of GD held in 1990 (Bistis 2013). 9 Additionally, allegations in the pending criminal trial suggest that the party is even explicitly anti­ democratic, therefore fitting with the conception of extreme right by Mudde (2007) and Art (2011). A previous GD member turned informant stated in court documents that GD leaders organized weapon training programs for members in “preparation to overthrow the Greek government,” (Baboulias 2014). 42

and the lack of an effective state immigration policy (Bistis 2013; Dalakoglou 2013;

Georgiadou 2013; Gerodimos 2013; Ellinas 2013).

Following public outcry over the murder of Pavlos Fyssas the following year, police arrested 69 GD members and supporters in 2013, the trial for which began in April of 2015 and is ongoing (Ayiomamitis 2015). However, despite the party’s neo-fascist ideology, the persistent use of violence by its activists, and the latest trial for which members are accused of running a criminal organization, GD won 7% of the popular vote again in the 2015 snap elections (Smith 2015a). This is puzzling because it seems equally plausible that the most recent criminal accusations facing GD would turn away some of its new supporters who may not have realized how violent the party actually was prior to

2012. Moreover, the factors commonly attributed to the groups rise to power do not necessarily help explain how GD has been able to maintain its political support, as these are distinct analytical questions.

I argue that GD has effectively established a number of meaningful essential services for Greek citizens which serve to account for some of the actual mechanisms utilized by party leaders to maintain its newfound political support. When examined in conjunction with other factors at the micro and macro-level, the tripartite model produces a comprehensive account of the electoral persistence of GD. On the micro-level, the party benefits from a number of attitudes held by the Greek populace concerning immigration, anti-Semitism, and austerity. However, these attitudes do not explain why individuals necessarily support GD over other FRPs in the political field. On the meso-level, I 43

demonstrate the ways in which GD activists seek to capture and retain it political support through the provision of essential and meaningful services. These include “Greeks-only” food and blood drives, youth outreach programs, and even sub-state police functioning with tacit support from sectors of the police force (Williams 2013; Bistis 2013; Amnesty

International 2014). Additionally, GD activists use targeted violence to demonstrate to its support base a willingness to address salient issues concerning immigration while engendering party solidarity and displaying an appearance of strength undeterred by the pending criminal trial (Woodley 2010). On the macro-level, GD has been able to promote its far-right and neo-fascist ideological message on a highly visible and legitimized platform. The party has also benefitted from some intimate connections with the major center-right party New Democracy (ND), despite its role in bringing GD to trial. Lastly, the acceptance of austerity measures by SYRIZA in July 2015 ceded the anti-austerity issue to GD, which became one of the only major party consistently opposed to such measures (Inman et al. 2015).

The Micro-Level:

Individual Attitudes in Greece

Multiple surveys conducted of Greek citizens suggest that there is a portion of the population potentially sympathetic to the ideology of FRPs. For example, a substantially large percentage of Greek citizens hold a number of anti-Semitic views. According to the

Anti-Defamation League’s (ADL) 2014 and 2015 global survey of anti-Semitism, an average of 68 percent of Greek citizens expressed anti-Semitic beliefs, almost double that 44

of any other country in Western Europe (ADL 2014; 2015; Rabinowitz 2014). In 2015,

90 percent of Greek respondents held the belief that “Jews have too much power in the business world,” and 85 percent held the belief that “Jews have too much power in financial markets” (ADL 2015). This suggests that a party like GD is not likely to be considered politically unviable for its explicitly anti-Semitic ideology.

Furthermore, racist attitudes and sentiments of hostility toward immigrants and foreigners are also present. In a survey of university students conducted between 2010-

2011, 35 percent of respondents held the belief that migrants were responsible for increased levels of crime in the country (Gazakis, Syrri, & Takis 2014). In a 2015 double­ survey conducted by diaNEOsis and Greek Public Opinion (GPO), researchers found that

66 percent of Greek respondents believed that immigrants increase crime and unemployment in the country (Moschonas 2016). Furthermore, this study also examined the differences in responses from Greek citizens on different sides of the political spectrum, and found that 49 percent of respondents on the right believed that racist violence is justified (ibid).

These surveys are indicative of a populace that is perhaps sympathetic to aspects of far-right ideology, but they do not necessarily explain why individuals actually chose to vote for the GD in 2012 and then again in 2015. Exit polls of the 2012 Greek elections suggest that a backlash against political elites, anger over potential austerity measures, and concerns about immigration and border security were all key to GD’s electoral breakthrough (Georgiadou 2013; Sakellariou 2014). No exit polls are available for GD 45

voter attitudes of the 2015 snap elections. However, even exit polls are not perfect indicators of every reason that an individual chooses to support one party over another.

While issues related to the financial crisis in Greece were ongoing and salient in 2015, it should not be assumed that these exact same issues compelled voters to cast their ballots for GD a second time. Finally, none of these factors explain why voters chose GD specifically rather than the People’s Orthodox Rally (LAOS), another FRP present in the political field in both 2012 and 2015. As I have argued, the actions taken by party members during their time in office are equally as likely to have an effect on its political support over time - ignoring that aspect would fail to account for all of the factors related to the continued success of FRPs.

The Meso-Level

Targeted Violence

The threat and use of violence by GD members and strong supporters is widely documented and recognized as one of the defining features of the party (Amnesty

International 2014; 2015). According to Woodley, fascist movements during the interwar period utilized violence in order to weaken the opposition physically and spiritually, engender solidarity among supporters through struggle, and project an image of strength to the populace (2009, 121). Neo-fascist movements, “...like fascists in the 1920s, [aim] to influence the direction of politics by force—to determine which identities may be considered ‘legitimate’ within a definite range of social relations,” (ibid., 128). This fits with the conception of the Extreme Right as defined in the previous chapter, and 46

constitutes an extreme form of negative expressions of identity. Immigrants and foreigners generally are the frequent targets of violence perpetrated by GD activists

(Amnesty International 2014; 2015).10 As such, this targeted violence signals to individuals that harbor strong animosity against these groups that GD is party willing to go to the extreme to address the issue of immigration in Greece. Therefore, violence in this context is used in part to establish and maintain an electoral connection with the party’s political supporters.

Figures on the number of violent racist attacks in Greece vary. Amnesty

International reported 350 documented cases between 2011-14, while Javied Aslam, chairman of the Pakistani Community and Immigrant Workers Union, claimed to have documented around 900 attacks between 2010-12 (Amnesty International 2015; Kotsoni

2013). It has also been noted that many incidents go unreported because immigrants fear deportation or punishment for their irregular status (Smallman and Mara 2013; Amnesty

International 2014, 21). Amnesty International’s report also stated that 71 “racially motivated attacks” between 2012 and 2014 were directly linked to the GD (2014, 20-21).

In 2013, 15 GD supporters attacked an Egyptian fisherman on his motorcycle (ibid). The same year, 20 GD supporters attacked a Greek Egyptian citizen’s home at 3 a.m.,

10 It should be noted that the violence of GD activists is not limited to immigrants. GD protestors physically assaulted Giorgos Koumoutsakos, MP of the New Democracy party, near the steps of Greek parliament (Adamopoulos 2015). GD supporters also reportedly attacked witnesses near the courthouse where the trial against its party was about to begin (Ayiomamitis 2015). Other attacks have targeted gay and transgender individuals (Amnesty International 2015). 47

smashing in the windows of his house and vehicle (ibid). In 2012, a Cameroon bar owner whose establishment was attacked by GD supporters withdrew his police complaint after being threatened with his life (Gilmore 2012; Amnesty International 2014). In each of these cases, the victims were able to identify their attackers as GD supporters because they wore shirts depicting the party’s emblem (Amnesty International 2014).

The use of violence and the visibility of the party emblem by GD supporters serve at least three functions. First, it instills terror and anxiety into the immigrant population who likely juxtapose the legal democratic status of the party with the illegal activities of its activists. Coupled with potential fears of their irregular or illegal status, immigrants are left with a limited set of options—remain silent about the attacks, report them to

NGOs or authorities at the risk of deportation, or simply leave the country, the last option being one of GD’s political goals (Smith 2015b). Second, it establishes solidarity among

GD supporters. It has even been suggested by state prosecutors that violence is used as a rite of passage or initiation for GD’s new members (Psarras 2014; Koronaiou et al. 2015).

Finally, it signals to the potential far-right constituency that GD is a party willing to take direct, illegal action to achieve its political goals. The anti-immigrant position of GD has clearly captured the attention and support of many Greek citizens (Psarras 2014).

Additionally, the weakness of the state’s immigration policy and its failure to adequately address the massive influx of immigrants over the last decade has allowed GD to connect with individuals who view immigration as an existential threat to the nation (Gerodimos

2013; Koronaiou et al 2015; Ellinas 2013; Dalakoglou 2013). Therefore, the use of 48

political violence against immigrants and foreigners can actually engender continued political support. Indeed, a number of GD supporters cited “militancy, fighting for the nation’s rebirth and waging an everyday war against the nation’s enemies...” as reasons for their engagement with the party (Koronaiou et al. 2015, 244). In one ethnographic case study, researchers found that the majority of GD supporters felt that “...violence against immigrants is always preventive/self-defensive and is accepted because ‘extreme circumstances require extreme measures,”’ (Koronaiou et al. 2015, 244). Given the latest wave of mass immigration into Greece during this period of national economic crisis and the inability of the state to establish an effective immigration policy, it is likely that GD’s violence against immigrants has served establish an electoral connection with at least a portion of the Greek populace (Dalakoglou 2013; Georgiadou 2013).

Policing: Functioning and Support

There is also evidence of GD supplanting police functions throughout Greece, as well as police support and collaboration. MP Ilias Panagiotaros claimed that they

“...receive more 911 calls than the police,” (Williams 2013). While unverified and presumably exaggerated, a number of reports and interview testimonies account for the veracity of the claim that GD has engaged in such functions. Athenian shop owner

Mathina claimed on camera, “If I get burgled or I have a problem in my neighborhood or at work, and I call the Golden Dawn, in zero time they are here,” (ibid). Additionally, video footage has captured at least two incidents of GD MPs and activists dressed in black carrying Greek and GD flags through open markets demanding to see the permits 49

of sellers, destroying booths they deemed to be operating illegally (Gilmore 2012;

Margaronis 2012; Williams 2013).

Accounts of tacit police support and even collaboration that have permitted GD to act as the arbiters of justice have been documented as well. Amnesty International received numerous reports of officers arresting migrant victims instead of their attackers, failing to intervene in violent attacks “despite being present,” and failing to properly file investigations into hate crimes (Amnesty International 2014; 2015). One officer was suspended from duty after footage revealed he had taken part in one of GD’s market shop raids (Ekathimerini 2012). There are even cases where the police have directed victims of crimes involving immigrants to contact GD (Smith 2012). The Internal Affairs

Directorate of the Greek Police launched their own investigation and reported that 10 officers were “found to have a direct or indirect link” with the party (Amnesty

International 2014, 31). Two of the 69 GD members and affiliates arrested following the widespread investigation into the party were police officers (ibid). There is also evidence that the police support GD politically, voting for the party at a higher percentage than the national average (Fisher 2012). Officers in Greece are assigned to voting stations based on their precinct rather than their home address, and in these locations, the percentage of votes to GD averaged 20% (ibid). Compared with the 7% national average vote for GD, it is presumed that a larger number of police voting for GD accounts for this variation.

These incidents of tacit police support and collaboration demonstrate the extent to which GD has established essential services, attempting to supplant state functions and 50

make claim to the legitimate use of violence (Weber [1919] 1946). The implicit support of GD violence by the police has also allowed party members and activists to continue engaging in violent assaults. For the victims of violence committed by GD activists, this support further enhances their fear and distrust of the Greek state and authorities.

Perpetrators of these attacks are likely emboldened by this degree of impunity and are likely to exploit it as often as possible.

Essential and Meaningful Services - “Greeks-Only” Activism and Youth Capture

While elected GD officials commonly reject or denounce the violent actions of its members and supporters, its ostensibly benevolent services provided to Greek citizens are readily purported to demonstrate the goodwill and patriotism of the party (Psarras 2014).

While limited in scope, the provision of a number of these essential and meaningful services are effective in establishing a direct connection with its constituency. As such, they serve a pivotal role in working to maintain the continued electoral support of the party.

In addition to the use of violence by party activists, GD is also known for its

“Greeks-only” food and blood drives, which were initially funded by the party’s state allowances (Bistis 2013; Williams 2013). GD MPs ran and organized the food drives, and distributions were only granted to Greeks who could either prove their citizenship or party membership, with priority given to the poor and those with disabilities (Bistis

2013). MP Ilias Panayotaros boasted that they served some 3000 Greek citizens in a 51

single day (Williams 2013). State officials have criticized the drives as discriminatory and racist, some of whom have even attempted to ban the program in some cities with mixed success (Bistis 2013). When recipients were asked what they thought about the mayor’s attempt to ban a GD food drive in the city of Piraeus in 2014, one man responded with vitriol, “I’ve been unemployed for four years. Can he find me a job? My mother is disabled. Can he find me a job?” while another responded, “Shame on him!”

('Golden Dawn: Voice o f the Greek People 2014). GD made similar efforts to organize blood drives that would only allow donations to go to Greek national citizens but was unable to have the blood that was ultimately donated partitioned in such a discriminatory manner (Dabilis 2013). The party has also attempted to establish Greek-only work programs by “encouraging” shop owners to only hire Greeks and publicizing those shops that hired immigrants (Margaronis 2012). It has even created a number of Greeks-only gyms (ibid).

GD activists have also made concerted efforts to capture and maintain the support of Greek youth through the provision of a number of meaningful services. The party has its own youth division that young supporters can join and participate in various activities enabled by the party organization (Sakellariou 2015). The youth division often participates in summer camps that include activities like military training, shooting, martial arts, football, hiking, gymnastics and boxing (ibid., 8; Deliveris & Koronaiou

2014). GD also plays a supportive role in Greece’s white power music scene, and every autumn it organizes a white power music festival in which the youth division participates 52

(Deliveris & Koronaiou 2014). Aretmis Matthaiopoulos, a current MP of the party, even played bass guitar for a white power band that wrote a song in admiration of the

Auschwitz concentration camp (Savaricas 2013).

In addition to its youth division, GD leaders also helped to establish a football club called Galazia Statia (Blue Army) in the early 2000s in one of the party’s local offices (Zaimakis 2016).11 The club was established expressly to promote Greek nationalism while serving as a recruitment tool for party membership (ibid; Savaricas

2013). The group quickly became known for its use of racist and xenophobic chants during games in addition to its giant banner depicting a swastika and the Nazi salute given by its members (Zaimakis 2016).

GD leaders have even gone so far as to create and provide elementary school level history lessons at its local offices throughout the country (Mezzofiore 2013; Deliveris &

Koronaiou 2014). In one case, just over twenty children ages 6-10 were shown

“educational videos” on Greek mythology, history, and religion, and were pictured in front of the flag of the GD (Mezzofiore 2013). These lessons are alleged to emphasize the glory of ancient Greece, the military, and depict a positive view of the two dictatorships that Greece experienced in the 20th century (Deliveris & Koronaiou 2014).

While these efforts to establish electoral connections with Greek citizens through the provision of essential and meaningful services are notably small in scale, they are not

11 One of the clubs founding members, Ilias Panagiotaros, is actually a current party MP (ibid). 53

ineffectual. Regardless of the strength of their commitment, many Greek citizens have found themselves supporting GD in order to receive these social benefits (Margaronis

2012). The food programs work to establish the party as an effective provider of benefits in times of crisis. The media coverage of GD’s community work also vastly extended its visibility, “...allowing it to claim social legitimacy while retaining its ethnocentric message,” (Ellinas 2013, 559). Moreover, while the state has established its own food drives, the demand for food far exceeded what the state could the supply (a fact on which

GD leaders capitalized [Bistis 2013]). The services and programs that target youth support have also been effective. Overwhelming support for GD by young Greeks has been widely recognized by researchers (Sakellariou 2015; Deliveris & Koronaiou 2014).

In 2012, 18-34 year olds accounted for 40% of the party’s total vote, and in 2015 was the third most popular party among 18-24 year olds (Georgiadou 2013; Sakellariou 2015).

All of these factors suggest that the work that GD activists have done to provide essential and meaningful benefits to portions of the Greek populace have served to engender continued support of the party.

The Macro-Level

Media Coverage

A number of factors at the macro-level serve to publicize and legitimize the motives and far-right ideology of GD. First, the ethno-nationalist ideology and rhetoric of 54

the GD is made highly visible by their legislative presence.12 Parliamentary speeches, televised public debates and post-election coverage have all permitted GD to publicize their image to the largest possible audience, even if depicted in a negative manner.

Moreover, the fact that GD is a democratically elected party also grants it a degree of legitimacy it never had before, a point MP Kasidiaris stated emphatically in a speech before parliament (Kasidiaris 2013).

Furthermore, party members and leaders utilize the national stage to portray its image of strength to the public, and even use violence to do so. In one notorious incident,

MP Ilias Kasidiaris physically assaulted a female MP from another party on live TV during a debate, slapping her across the face three times (Gallagher 2012; Bistis 2013).

Surprisingly, this act resulted in a rise in polled support for GD (Ellinas 2013, 559). This portrayal of power and strength is furthered by the media’s coverage of its rallies, which commonly depict a spectacle of flags, fireworks, synchronized marches, and anthems

(Smith 2015b; Margaronis 2012). Finally, as noted above, the media coverage of the food and blood drives makes its small scale meso-level provisions visible to the national audience.

Mudde suggests that this type of media coverage may help to turn first time voters into long term supporters (2007). Given the extreme nature of GD and its violent activities, coverage of the party has propelled it to both national and global recognition.

12 The ideological foundations of GD can be readily found in its manifesto, which include a rejection of “universalism-liberalism” and a new embracement of ethno-nationalist identity (Golden Dawn 2012). The manifesto also claims that the “Golden Dawn finds itself at the front lines of the struggle against the nation- killing memorandum...” and that immigrants threaten to dissolve Greek society as they know it (ibid). 55

And yet it is difficult to show empirically the extent to which this coverage has a substantive effect on its political viability. However, this is not to say that such coverage is without consequence. While increased media coverage alone is certainly not enough to account for the continued electoral support of the party, it shows that FRP leaders are aware of the potential benefits of this publicity after entering office and make conscious decisions to utilize this opportunity.

The Political Arena - Party Responses to GD Entry

The reaction of other parties the entry of GD into office is interesting, and demonstrates how a mix of permissive and repressive responses from other party leaders served to enable GD activists to sustain its electoral successes. Both major parties,

SYRIZA on the left and New Democracy on the right, have publicly decried the entry of

GD into Hellenic Parliament and voted to strip the party of its state funding (Psaropoulos

2013). Additionally, New Democracy president and former Prime Minister Antonis

Samaras helped to initiate the criminal investigation and eventual arrests of GD members

(Baboulias 2014). However, multiple delays have prevented a swift resolution from occurring, and the trial is still ongoing at the time of writing this paper. Furthermore, evidence of intraparty debate over how to treat GD suggests that despite the appearance of a strong cordon sanitaire on the party it may have benefitted from some inside support. 56

For instance, a number of New Democracy MPs have expressed sympathy for GD and its goals. In one case, former cabinet secretary and chief of staff of New Democracy

Panagiotis Baltakos was recorded on tape speaking with GD MP Ilias Kasidiaris, suggesting that the charges against the party were baseless and a ploy by Prime Minister

Samaras to gain votes for his party (Turner 2014; Baboulias 2014). He apologized to

Kasidiaris for the inconvenience to GD and stated that they had no evidence against the party (Baboulias 2014). Baltakos even helped direct GD MPs on how to vote on certain measures and openly suggested forming a coalition between the two parties (ibid).

During debates over whether to strip GD of parliamentary immunity, Kasidiaris played the tape to parliament as part of his argument to retain immunity (ibid). The fallout from this tape resulted in the resignation of Baltakos from the party. At the time, Baltakos was considered to be Prime Minister Samaras’ second hand man. This suggests that while on the surface a strong cordon sanitaire has been initiated against GD, internal debates within the major parties over how exactly to deal with the party may have an effect on the ability of GD to navigate the national political arena.13

At other times, explicit attempts by political actors to curtail the support of GD have proven unsuccessful. As noted above, one mayor attempted to ban GD’s food drives in their city, which resulted in a backlash of support for the party (Golden Dawn: Voice o f the Greek People 2014). In response to the immigration crisis, Greek state actors

13 Even one SYRIZA MP suggested a desire to work to converge with GD should the party show that it respects the democratic process (Chrysopoulos 2016). Note however that this is after GD gained entry into office for the second time. 57

initiated broad sweeping programs to address the issue, with little substantive effect

(Dalakoglou 2013). Such programs are accused of being racist and discriminatory, the most infamous being “Xenios Dias,” in which 84,000 migrants were detained between

2012 and 2013 with sweeps “...targeting everyone who [appeared] to be foreign,” (ibid.,

517). Amnesty International has also cited a number of cases of mistreatment of migrants by the police during this time frame (2014; 2015).14

According to Dalakoglou, public fears of austerity compel state leaders to offer last ditch “sources for citizen consent” to retain their support, even if such sources are controversial (2013). In this case, it meant cracking down on immigration. However, by doing so state actors inadvertently legitimized an anti-immigrant discourse, and “...the anti-migratory attacks of the Golden Dawn looked like the extension of the formal state,”

(ibid., 519). Instead of retaining their support, state actors unintentionally made it possible for other parties to gain new adherents by providing competing policies for dealing with immigration (ibid). Because GD’s use of violence is an effective mechanism for instilling terror into immigrants, and because its use gives GD an appearance of strength, Greeks who accept the anti-immigrant discourse may choose to support the party. Therefore, the macro-level interactions of state actors and GD may have inadvertently legitimized its rhetoric and its meso-level activities.

14 Furthermore, the extent to which this program in particular affected the individual attitudes towards immigrants is address in both reports, and suggests that it has served to maintain and even exacerbate anti­ immigrant animosities in Greece (ibid). In this way, macro-level activities of state actors have an effect on micro-level political attitudes. 58

Additionally, the fallout from the decision over the acceptance of austerity measure by SYRIZA in July of 2015 may have benefitted GD. After Prime Minister

Alexis Tsipras chose to accept the IMF’s latest austerity measures, GD became the only anti-austerity party in parliament (Inman et al. 2015). Therefore, GD was the last major party that Greek citizens vehemently opposed to austerity could turn to, a fact that

Greece’s former finance minister argued would lead to the continued support of the party

(Davidson 2015). This serves to connect one of the national goals of GD with the attitudes and beliefs of individual Greek citizens, and further accounts for the continued political support of the party.

Conclusion

This chapter has made a number of central claims. First, on the micro-level, a number of individual attitudes held by Greek citizens suggest that a sector of the populace is receptive to FRPs generally. On the meso-level, I demonstrate how GD in particular has been able to establish an electoral connection with its constituency in a number of ways. The use of violence by party activists directed toward immigrants and minorities works to establish party solidarity among its most hardcore members while attempting to establish an electoral connection with the portion of the populace that finds these targeted groups threatening. Tacit police support further exacerbates this problem by providing a potential source of legitimacy that individuals in Greek society can recognize. Furthermore, the provision of essential and meaningful services to portions of

Greek society, specifically to the poor and the young, also work to establish direct 59

connections with the constituency of the party. This in particular may be of central importance to the continued support of the party. Lastly, on the macro-level, I attempt to demonstrate how a number of factors serve to help GD remain politically viable. National media coverage has provided the party with heightened visibility of ideology and its posture of strength undeterred by the political process. Issue overlap between state actions against illegal immigrants and the treatment of migrants may have also served to legitimize GD. Lastly, despite the criminal trial against the party, evidence of internal support from a key figure like former cabinet secretary Baltakos of New Democracy may have further legitimized GD by demonstrating the secret willingness of individuals from mainstream parties to work with them.

It remains to be seen how GD will perform in the future, although there is reason to believe the party will continue to maintain its electoral support. The frequent delays of the criminal trial have permitted GD MPs to re-enter office and has been the source of much frustration from civil groups and families of victims of GD violence. The curtailment of state funding has also done little to stop GD from providing its essential and meaningful services to supporters. A number of new FRPs have entered the political arena in Greece since the 2015 elections, including National Front, Greek Unity, New

Right, and National Unity, a party started by Baltakos and Giorgos Karatzaferis, former president of Popular Orthodox Rally (Choros 2016; Ekathimerini 2016). However, given the national recognition of GD, its continued provision of services to supporters, and 60

current popularity polls, it seems unlikely that these FRPs will undermine its electoral support (Metron Analysis 2016). 61

Chapter 4 - Jobbik in Hungary

In 2010, Hungarian voters elected the far-right political party Jobbik, or

Movement for a Better Hungary, that secured around 17% of the popular vote and gained

47 seats (Jordan 2010; Becker 2010). The party was known for its anti-Roma and anti­ establishment rhetoric but was especially notorious for its paramilitary wing the Magyar

Gar da (Hungarian Guard), which was established by party leader Gabor Vona in 2007 in the wake of a government corruption scandal (Mireanu 2013). The Guard was banned by a court of appeals in 2009 for its engagement in vigilante style activities that impeded on the liberties of Roma citizens, an ethnic minority community in the country whose struggle to fully integrate into society has engendered animosity from ethnic Hungarians

(The Budapest Times 2009; Feischmidt & Szombati 2012). Despite this, the organization has reformed as the New Hungarian Guard and in collusion with a number of other far- right militia style groups continues to operate in loose coordination with Jobbik (Kim

2016; Saltman 2011; Fomina 2013).

Jobbik’s main ideological opponent is Fidesz, the country’s leading conservative party, whose vast influence and power posed a powerful threat the viability of Jobbik’s continued success. Fidesz secured the biggest electoral gains in 2010 and for the first time in its history gained a supermajority status in Parliament (Becker 2010; Kim 2016;

Mudde 2014). As a result, current Prime Minister Viktor Orban and other party leaders instituted a number of constitutional and electoral reforms designed to strengthen its chances during the 2014 elections (Kreko & Mayer 2015; Mudde 2014). In yet another 62

ostensible threat to Jobbik’s reelection efforts, after 2010 Fidesz appeared to be moving in on its ideological space and began to converge on a number of policy issues, both in an attempt to capture Jobbik voters and to pursue its own initiatives (Kreko & Mayer 2015).

Given Jobbik’s small presence and lack of parliamentary political experience, Fidesz has been able to co-opt its programs and could take full credit for their implementation (Biro-

Nagy & Boros 2016). Furthermore, during this period, Jobbik’s affiliate paramilitary organization and its associate groups began patrolling specific Roma communities throughout Hungary, using violence and intimidating displays of force to instill fear into the people of these neighborhoods (Mireanu 2013; Feischmidt & Szombati 2012).

And yet despite all of these potential inhibitors to its chances at electoral persistence, in 2014 Jobbik gained 20% of the vote in Hungarian parliamentary elections, making it the second largest party in the country and “.. .the most successful far-right party in the European Union today,” (Mudde 2014). In fact, Jobbik had the best showing of any opposition party in Hungary’s elections that year and gained 130,000 new voters

(ibid; Kim 2016). Why has Jobbik been able to maintain and grow its electoral support base despite its ties to violent organizations and Fidesz’ various attempts to subvert its efforts? Utilizing my tripartite explanatory model, I argue that Jobbik’s continued electoral success is the result of work done by the party itself and by activities of groups on its behalf to establish and maintain a set of meaningful and essential services for its constituency while effectively navigating the national political environment. By utilizing targeted violence against the Roma community, providing selective benefits for 63

Hungarian citizens, and maintaining ideological flexibility on a national stage, the party has been able to establish itself as a serious political option for voters. Examining the activities of its members and supporters on meso and macro-levels of Hungarian society in particular will serve as a powerful explanatory account for Jobbik’s continued electoral support.

Initial 2010 Breakthrough and Challenges Facing 2014

Current party president Gabor Vona initially founded Jobbik as a right-wing college youth association at Budapest Eotvos Lorand University in 1999. It was explicitly concerned with revitalizing radical nationalist politics in Hungary (Kim 2016). In 2003,

Jobbik was officially established as a political party, but with virtually no experience in electoral politics it failed to meet the 5% threshold required to gain parliamentary seats in the 2006 election (ibid). Jobbik’s quick rise to power in 2010 has largely been attributed to government corruption, economic decline, the work of its Hungarian Guard, and ethnic tensions between Hungarians and the Roma community (Kreko & Mayer 2015; Varga

2014; Becker 2010; Kim 2016; Jordan 2010). However, these factors should not be assumed to explain its success in 2014. Both Jobbik and Fidesz rose to power on anti­ corruption campaigns following the release of a secret recording in 2006 of then Prime

Minister Ferenc Gyurcsany of Hungary’s Socialist Party (MSVP), who admitted on tape to lying “day and night” to the country about the state of the economy (Varga 2014). The aftermath of this leaked recording led to violent protests carried out by far-right 64

extremists and ultimately led to the collapse in support of the MSVP (ibid).15 The lack of such a scandal in the 2014 elections makes it difficult to portray Jobbik’s continued electoral support as a protest vote.

Jobbik also faced other potential impediments for the upcoming 2014 elections, specifically from its immediate ideological competitor Fidesz, which maintained widespread popularity throughout the country. Fidesz’ leaders worked to stack the deck in its favor after 2010 with its constitutional and electoral reforms. For instance, using its supermajority status Fidesz reduced the number of parliamentary seats from 386 to 199 and established a new electoral system that served to buttress its position in 2014 despite losing 8% of its support since 2010 (Mudde 2014). Moreover, between 2010 and 2014

Fidesz implemented a large number of policies that were virtually indistinguishable from

Jobbik’s platform (Kreko & Mayer 2016; Biro-Nagy & Boros 2016). For instance, Fidesz passed an amendment to grant citizenship and voting rights to those with Hungarian nationality living outside of the country and in territories lost in The Treaty of Trianon in

1920, an issue frequently addressed by the far right in Hungary and one of Jobbik’s programmatic points (Pytlas 2013; Varga 2013, 798; Mares & Havlik 2016). Therefore,

Fidesz could claim to be more successful in achieving the policy goals that Jobbik itself has on its platform, potentially undercutting its support base.

15 The scandal itself was also cited as part of the impetus for the creation of Jobbik’s Hungarian Guard (ibid). 65

Lastly, the violence engaged in by a number of extremist groups affiliated with

Jobbik after the 2010 elections increased in severity and ostensibly threatened its efforts to appear legitimate and professional. Amnesty International reported on a number of cases in which Jobbik engaged in targeted marches or “patrols” of Roma villages with these militia groups and violently attack and intimidate the Roma community (Amnesty

International 2013). In one case, Jobbik’s New Hungarian Guard and two other militia groups occupied the town of Gyongyospata in 2011 for weeks, intimidating the Romani population with whips, axes, and dogs while the police failed to respond to requests for protection (Feischmidt & Szombati 2012; Amnesty International 2011). The visibility of these acts and their connections to Jobbik might have very well turned its supporters away and toward the more center-right Fidesz, especially in light of the latters policy achievements.

Jobbik’s Electoral Persistence

Despite these potential impediments, Jobbik not only maintained its electoral support but saw a 4% increase in the 2014 elections (Mudde 2014). I argue that this is best understood by examining the actions of the party and its supporters on various levels of Hungarian society now that it has gained entry in parliament and utilized the benefits of political office. In order to explain its electoral persistence, I employ my tripartite model of FRP persistence and analyze factors on the micro, meso and macro-level. 66

On the micro-level, individual attitudes of Hungarians that hold animosity against the Roma population create a potential demand for FRPs, or at least one that addresses this issue in particular. On the meso-level, Jobbik and its affiliate paramilitary groups utilize violence to engender group solidarity and portray an image of power to

Hungarians that find the Roma issue salient (Woodley 2010). Furthermore, this targeted violence works to maintain the ethnic divisions that served to generate its support in the

2010 elections. Jobbik and its affiliate groups also offer and provide a number of essential and meaningful services to its constituency, including food and blood drives, as well as police services for Hungarians attacked by Romani individuals (Saltman 2011;

Jovanovics 2012). Perhaps even more significantly, Jobbik and its supporters sponsor and organize annual music concerts, Hungarian ethnic festivals, and youth organizations and programs, which all serve to maintain strong electoral connection younger voters, who disproportionately support the party (Saltman 2011; Kim 2016; Biro-Nagy & Boros

2016).

On the macro level, Jobbik is able to effectively communicate its nationalist vision to the populace, maintain ideological flexibility, and reformulate the delivery of its message in an attempt to capture more moderate voters (Art 2011; Harrison & Bruter

2011; Toth 2015; Lestyanszky 2015). Its ideology is in part inspired by and consistent with Hungary’s historical fascist movements and thus serves to establish a symbolic and mythical connection with the country’s past (Korkut & Akcali 2015; Mireanu 2013).

Moreover, Jobbik has benefited from the work of a prominent business expert who 67

assisted in the party’s transition from grassroots to parliamentary politics, and is credited by party leaders as being instrumental in its continued success (Balint 2015). Finally, the initially permissive response of Fidesz in its lack of sustained criticism and co-optation of policies further served to enable the legitimation and continued electoral success of

Jobbik (Art 2011; Kreko & Mayer 2015).

Paramilitarism and Jobbik

Before analyzing each level in detail, a key conceptual-empirical difficulty must be resolved regarding the theoretical framework and Jobbik’s affiliate paramilitary groups.16 In 2009 a court of appeals banned the Jobbik’s Hungarian Guard, but within weeks the organization reformed as the New Hungarian Guard (Mireanu 2013). This new formation organizes and operates somewhat independent of Jobbik, coordinating with other far-right militia style organizations like the Civil Guard Association For a Better

Future (SZJPE), the Defense Force, Sixty-four Counties Youth Movement (HVIM), and the Outlaws’ Army (Fomina 2013; Jovanovics 2012; Mireanu 2013). The SZJPE is actually an offshoot of the original Hungarian Guard, and even has the word “Jobbik” in its title (Jovanovics 2012). Some of these organizations are more violent than others but all have participated together in various capacities and functions (Fomina 2013). The problem is attempting to disentangle the actions of the various paramilitary organizations

16 These groups are sometimes referred to as “quasi-paramilitaries” because while these groups dress in military looking uniforms, engage in synchronized marches and patrols, and practice martial arts and military drills they do not openly carry firearms. However, the Outlaws’ Army openly carries axes, whips, and chains (Feischmidt & Szombati 2012). The uniforms of these groups usually consist of white or black jackets with the Hungarian coat of arms or organization emblems, cargo pants, and boots. Some are more in line with traditional or medieval Hungarian attire. 68

from Jobbik. The only paramilitary group officially connected to Jobbik is the New

Hungarian Guard. To what extent can the electoral success of Jobbik be attributed to the activities of these other groups?

For the purposes of this paper, I argue that when any of these organizations act in concert with Jobbik or its party members they are acting in support of Jobbik and thus contribute to the failures and successes of the party. While party members often utilize this degree of separation between the paramilitary groups to maintain plausible deniability, a number of factors serve to support my argument. First, at least two of the groups, the New Hungarian Guard and SZJPE, are intimately connected to Jobbik - Vona continues to lead the initiation ceremony of new members for the former group and even selected one of its captains for the 2014 parliamentary national assembly election

(Lambert 2013). Furthermore, an independent report by the Athena Institute revealed a dense network of far-right extremist groups in Hungary, finding strong ties between the

New Hungarian Guard and all of the other groups mentioned above in addition to a number of other organizations, which means they all have participated in more than five events together and hold some form of an official alliance (Fomina 2013). The report showed that those groups with the strongest ties were the most ideologically homogenous and dangerous, and that the New Hungarian Guard even signed a declaration of cooperation in 2013 with the National Protection Force, HVIM, and SZJPE (ibid).

Second, the direct connection between prominent Jobbik leaders and these groups have been made public in a number of cases. The invasion of Gyongyospata in 2011 by 69

SZJPE was coordinated with the help of local Jobbik leader Oszkar Juhasz and party president Gabor Vona (Feischmidt & Szombati 2012). Several party members at one point shared overlapping membership with HVIM (Atlatszo 2014). Perhaps the most damning piece of evidence is a leaked audio tape of Jobbik MP Tamas Sneider speaking with members of the Outlaws’ Army about the clandestine collusion between the party and certain paramilitary organizations - “We have to acknowledge that a division of labor is required, and this is why it is good that there is a Betyarsereg [Outlaws’ Army] and [HVIM] because they can do what I cannot do in parliament,” (Lestyanszky 2015).

Therefore, while it might be difficult to disentangle the actions of these organizations from the direct orders of Jobbik, I maintain the argument that when these particular groups act in concert with the Jobbik or its party members, they are acting in a capacity that contributes to the efforts of the party and should be included in any analysis of its continued electoral success.

The Micro-Level: Individual Attitudes and Anti-Roma Hostilities

One issue that Jobbik is known for is its strong anti-Roma position and rhetoric.

The success of its 2010 bid has been positively linked to the existence of anti-Roma sentiments in Hungary, finding its highest levels of electoral support in areas with higher concentrations of the Roma population (Becker 2010, 37). This serves to explain the micro-level demand for a FRP in Hungary, and accounts for the connection between 70

voter attitudes concerning the Roma community and the expressed beliefs and actions of

Jobbik’s activists.

The Roma population makes up 7% of Hungary and has struggled to integrate into society, facing institutional and social discrimination in education, housing and employment (Human Rights First 2015). This in turn has led to higher levels poverty for the Roma community and increased crime rates (Feischmidt & Szombati 2012). A number of high profile murders and altercations between the Roma and Hungarian citizenry have served to maintain mutual animosity between the two groups. Surveys have revealed widespread negative attitudes held by Hungarians against the Roma population, with one study finding 60% of respondents agreeing with the statement

“criminality is in the blood of gypsies,” and 29% in another survey stating a belief in the justification of violence against the Roma {Human Rights First 2015; Budapest Beacon

2015).17

The Meso-Level:

Targeted Violence and the Sustainment o f Ethnic Conflict

It is under these conditions that Jobbik has in part found its support in local populations. Jobbik was the first party to coin and use the term “gypsy crime” in 2007 and made the issue one of its central concerns {Human Rights First 2015). This issue in particular has served as the impetus for the rise in far-right paramilitary organizations and

17 Additionally, Jobbik supporters in particular were twice as likely to accept the use of terrorism for political ends than the general public {Budapest Beacon 2015). 71

activities.18 Both the Hungarian Guard and the New Hungarian Guard’s stated purpose is to restore law, order, and security to specific areas where “gypsy crime” is present

(Feischmidt & Szombati 2012; Mireanu 2013). Amnesty International has reported a number of cases in which Jobbik leaders in coalition with these paramilitary organize marches and patrol specific Roma populated towns in full uniform (2013). Despite a legal ban on these types of patrolling after 2011, these organizations use legal loopholes to continue their activities, referring to them as “observations” rather than patrols even though leading members have admitted on camera that there was no difference between the two (Jovanovics 2012). During these patrols, members often chant anti-Roma rhetoric and engage in altercations with Romani individuals (Amnesty International 2013). In the town of Devecser, Jobbik and affiliate groups attacked the homes of Roma citizens with broken pieces of concrete and in Cegled paramilitary groups shouted death threats at citizens in Roma neighborhoods (ibid). In both cases, police allegedly did little to intervene (ibid). I argue that these activities are essential to the continued electoral support of Jobbik in that they engage individuals in violent and intimidating practices that engender group solidarity. While it is not known how many of those involved with these paramilitaries vote for Jobbik, given that Jobbik members often organize, direct, and deliver speeches prior to these marches and patrols it is reasonable to infer that they more than likely support the party (Mireanu 2013; Feischmidt & Szombati 2012). Furthermore, these activities send visible signals to the Hungarian population that find the anti-Roma

18 The SZJPE was formed in 2011 after a murder the groups falsely attributed to “gypsy crime,” (Jovanovics 2012). 72

rhetoric particularly salient. The work of these paramilitaries has allowed “Jobbik [to distinguish] itself from other political groups by finding its own practical solution” to the

“Roma issue,” (Kim 2016, 350). Jobbik and its affiliate organizations therefore establish a direct electoral connection with Hungarian citizens who believe the Roma issue is a major problem facing Hungary. Additionally, they effectively create and maintain a distinct in-group/out-group dichotomy, labeling the Roma population as an out-group subject to violence and intimidation.

The patrols in the town of Gyongyospata in 2011 best encapsulate the micro level effectiveness of paramilitary activities and the direct connection with continued electoral support for Jobbik. The town has a population of about 3,000 citizens with 11% identifying as Roma (Feischmidt & Szombati 2012). In addition to living in different geographical areas, the Roma population has faced major impediments to integration.

Since the country’s transition to democracy in 1989, Roma citizens faced discrimination in housing accommodations, employment, and education, all of which serve to entrench the community in poverty, many of whom turn to criminal activities and get into violent confrontations with Hungarian citizens (ibid., 24-25, 32). Combined with an unwillingness to address these issues by the town’s mayor, Jobbik managed to effectively move in and capture the electoral support of the Hungarian populace here.

Following a dispute over where to relocate a number of Roma families after their homes were destroyed in a flood, Hungarian citizens of the town began to express objections to the potential proximity of these families to their neighborhood. Jobbik’s 73

local leader Oszkar Juhasz became aware of the situation and Vona himself was approached by one of the Hungarians citizens asking for help (ibid). On February 22,

2011, an older Hungarian in the town committed suicide and Juhasz claimed the man took his life because of the relocation dispute and a fear of gypsies, who were alleged to have attacked the man the day before his death, though there is contention over the validity of this assertion (Mireanu 2013; Whelan 2013).

In response to this event, Jobbik organized a rally on March 6, in which Vona addressed a crowd of about 2,000 calling for people to “demonstrate against gypsy terror,” (Feischmidt & Szombati 2012, 16). While SZJPE had begun patrolling the village a week earlier, Jobbik’s event brought heightened interest in the situation, and the

Outlaws’ Army and the Defense Force joined the patrols. Paramilitary members harassed

Roma residents, including children, following them day and night as they moved about the town (ibid). The Outlaws’ Army would carry axes, whips, and dogs and were a particularly intimidating presence. Hungarian residents who supported these actions often provided residence for the members of paramilitaries from out of town (ibid). During these patrols police reportedly did little to intervene in the intimidation of residents and did not prevent the groups from operating throughout the village (ibid).19

The Defense Force announced that it was planning to establish a paramilitary training camp close to the homes in which the Roma had been relocated, and three days

19 The situation caught the attention of Amnesty International, and together with Human Rights First and the European Roma Rights Centre wrote a joint letter to Viktor Orban asking for the government to intervene and ensure things did not get worse (European Roma Rights Centre 2011). 74

later the mayor resigned (ibid., 18). An American philanthropist had 200 Roma citizens bused out of town until the situation de-escalated (ibid). On April 26, 2011, the first and only major violent event occurred after paramilitary members re-entered the village and got into brawl with local Romani citizens, a number of whom were hospitalized (ibid;

Mireanu 2013). The Hungarian national police intervened and the patrols ceased to be a regular occurrence, though sporadic marches still occur (Mireanu 2013). In June,

Jobbik’s local leader Juhasz won the town mayoral election, securing 33% of the vote and effectively capitalizing off the work of the patrols (Feischmidt & Szombati 2012).

A number of interpretations have been offered on this event. Feischmidt and

Szombati view the work of the paramilitaries and Jobbik’s success as the result of exploiting ethnic tensions sustained by discrimination against the Roma community and a lack of local political efforts to address these issues (2012, 34-5). Mireanu suggest that the activities of the paramilitaries were self-legitimizing, combining security practices with spectacular displays of attire and national symbols to establish a connection to the country’s history that “[allowed] the patrols to articulate their discourse and perform a successful securitizing move even in the absence of any concrete action,” (2013, 91-2).

While both of these accounts are enlightening, I argue that the practices and actions of these groups serve to establish a direct electoral connection with Hungarian citizens who hold anti-Roma views while simultaneously demarcating an in-group/out-group dichotomy. Hungarian individuals who find the issue to be particularly salient themselves get involved with these paramilitaries and attempt to actualize the beliefs and goals of 75

Jobbik’s anti-Roma discourse. Given that this issue is closely associated with Jobbik and given the presence of its leaders in the town prior and during the patrols, I assert that these activities served to ensure the continued electoral support of the party. Furthermore, these violent and intimidating actions of paramilitary organizations also work to stoke and maintain ethnic divisions between the two groups. Therefore, these activities also sustain the conditions and individual micro-level attitudes that were associated with

Jobbik’s initial rise to power. While the party’s leaders claim they wish to resolve the issue of “Gypsy crime,” they in fact collude with extremist groups to ensure that the animosity between Hungarians and the Roma population is continued. Thus, the violent interactions between small groups and organizations on the localized level help in part to explain Jobbik’s continued electoral support.

Essential and Meaningful Services

In addition to the use of targeted violence against specific groups in society,

Jobbik also provides a number of essential and meaningful services for its supporters that also serve to engender its continued electoral support. The activities of Jobbik and its affiliate organizations resemble that of GD in Greece. The paramilitary patrols in

Hungary discussed in the last section can also be thought of as substitute police functions in that they claim to provide law and order in areas of high crime with a lack of official police action. One year after the events in Gyongyospata, members of the SZJPE distributed flyers in the town of Magyarbanhegyes during its patrols there that encouraged citizens who were affected by harassment or violence from “’certain’ locals 76

or strangers” to directly contact the local leader of the group (Jovanovics 2012). In towns located in the northeastern part of the country where Jobbik finds its greatest support, there was a phone number citizens could call to report “Gypsy crime” to the original

Hungarian Guard (Saltman 2011). These security functions have been met with mixed responses from official police and security forces, in some cases tacitly supporting the groups and in others shutting them down (Amnesty International 2013; Jovanovics 2012;

Feischmidt & Szombati 2012).

Jobbik and its affiliate groups have also been known to provide a number of emergency and donation based social functions to the Hungarian populace. The

Hungarian Guard has distributed food and clothing to the poor and homeless, helped to protect the homes of Hungarians after floods, and donated blood to the Red Cross

(Saltman 2011; Whelan 2013). These activities Jobbik officials are more comfortable taking part in and posting on their website (Jobbik). All of these actions were covered by media organizations that support Jobbik and published these deeds on their own websites

(Saltman 2011). There are two unaccredited academies associated with Jobbik that provide various monthly seminars in over 12 counties, including Budapest (ibid; Biro-

Nagy & Boros 2016) There is even a taxi company called Jobbtaxi that provides service to Hungarians with nationalist views, boasting cheap prices and a selection of nationalist music (Kispal 2010). One of its drivers stated on camera that he refused to give rides to communists and social liberals (Iterson 2013). While this last company appears to operate outside of Jobbik’s official organization, the creation and maintenance of these essential 77

social and security services for its supporters establishes a real and direct connection with the party’s electorate and demonstrates Jobbik’s effectiveness and viability as a political organization.

Perhaps Jobbik’s most effective social functions have been those that target and incorporate the involvement of Hungary’s youth. Saltman notes that after the country’s transition to democracy in 1989 a decline in state organized youth groups occurred that had connected the young to the political process (2011). He suggests that this enabled far- right organizations to provide avenues for youth involvement in community organizing and cultural development, albeit within the ideological framework of the radical right

(ibid). Jobbik itself started as a youth group and after becoming a political party established its own youth wing, the Ifjusagi Tagozat (IT) that according to its Facebook page claims more than 45,000 members as of June 2014 (Garcia-Montero 2014). A

Jobbik MP assistant heads the organization and claims to organize weekly events that include sports competitions, karaoke, and concerts (ibid). The youth wing’s dedicated website posts numerous pictures of these and other events, including camping trips and leadership seminars, and a number of key party members often make appearance

(Jobbik.IT).

Jobbik also caters to the youth and families during its annual May Day picnic event at Hajogyar, where thousands of Hungarians come to watch nationalist bands perform, listen to political speeches from various individuals (including prominent party members), and bring their children to play various games and activities {Hungarian 78

Ambience 2013). The provisions for children include bounce houses, face painting, and petting zoos (ibid). Vona gave a speech promoting his book in 2013 and was reportedly met with a standing ovation (ibid). Journalists have attended the event and been accosted by men with swastika tattoos who poured beer on them after asking, “what are these Jews doing here?” (Whelan 2013).

In addition to Jobbik’s own direct efforts, HVIM also organizes a similar weeklong cultural event called Magyar Sziget (Hungary Island). What began in 2001 became one of Hungary’s biggest family friendly events, in which multiple nationalist bands perform, speeches and presentations are given, and cultural activities like folk- dance, archery, horse-back lessons, and hand crafts are provided for people of all ages

(Saltman 2011; Contrarian Hungarian 2011). Mixed with these family-friendly activities are Nazi and neo-Nazi memorabilia, books, and t-shirts for sale, and Nazi salutes at the festival from fans and bands are not uncommon (Contrarian Hungarian 2011).20 Some of the more violent paramilitaries like the Outlaws’ Army are often in attendance in addition to numerous Jobbik party members, including Vona and Juhasz, who all have given speeches and presentations (ibid). The musicians that are booked are often nationalist groups that attract viewers from all over Europe, like Sweden’s singer Saga whose racist and inflammatory lyrics were cited as an inspiration for Anders Breivik, the right-wing extremist who massacred over 70 people in Norway in 2011 (ibid; Flynn 2011). HVIM

20 Chris Hurst, a former party member of the radical right British Nationalist Party, was photographed giving the Nazi salute at the festival (Flynn 2011). 79

also organizes its own nationalist summer camp for children of all ages and even helped to establish a nightclub in Budapest (Saltman 2011).

All of these provisions have proven to be immensely successful in securing and maintaining the votes of younger Hungarians. Jobbik’s popularity among 18-30 year olds is polled around 26%, making it the most popular political party in this age group and

Jobbik’s most consistent support base (Biro-Nagy & Boros 2016; Szabo [ed] 2013). I argue that the work Jobbik and its affiliate organizations have done to provide social and cultural goods to the Hungarian youth explains part of the reasons for the party’s continued electoral support. In addition to its concerts and festivals, Jobbik offers

Hungarian youth an avenue through which they can become involved in politics and in their own communities. These provisions serve as more than mere entertainment and serve as valuable social and political spaces that connect individuals to their community and to the dense organizational network of Jobbik as the patron of these events.

Therefore, in conjunction with the wider efforts of the party to provide essential services like security and other donation based social goods to the electorate, Jobbik effectively establishes and maintains a set of meaningful services that are regularly utilized by citizens, all of which help to account for the party’s continued electoral support.

The Macro Level:

Professionals, Ideology, and Inter-Party Relations 80

Art argues that the continued electoral success of FRPs can be attributed to its ability to maintain unity, appear legitimate, maintain ideological flexibility, and attract moderate, well-educated professionals (2011). Mudde suggests that the presentation and delivery of a FRPs ideology is central to its continued support (2007). Harrison and

Bruter argue that FRP leaders must effectively distinguish the party from its nearest ideological competitors (2011). These aspects will help to highlight the ways in which

FRPs are able to maintain its meso-level efforts and sustain the organization’s viability on the national stage in the face of institutional barriers and political opposition.

Incorporating these factors will therefore give greater explanatory depth to this work while utilizing contemporary research methods.

Professional Expertise - Richard Forrai and The Compass Institute

Art suggests that the typological makeup of party activists can help determine whether a radical-right party will maintain its political success, with parties containing more competent members enabling it to adapt to electoral politics (2011, 20). One of the most instrumental individuals associated with Jobbik is Richard Forrai, a public policy consultant. While not an actual member of the party, an investigative report by Fabok

Balint accounts for his role in the party and states that he has played an essential and indispensible part in Jobbik’s transition to parliamentary politics and continued electoral success (2015). Forrai was a private financial analyst working for an IT company when he emailed Jobbik after reading an interview with Vona, inspired by the vision of the party and willing to offer his help. In 2009 he was brought onto Jobbik’s “economic 81

policy working group,” in which he produced technical data driven analyses of economic programs like pensions and foreign loans (ibid). In 2010 after the party’s successful parliamentary elections, Forrai was introduced to Vona and would become one of the party chairman’s closest and most trusted confidants (Biro-Nagy & Boros 2016; Balint

2015).

Forrai was tasked with a team to help transition the party to parliamentary politics, which was particularly difficult given that Jobbik members had virtually no experience outside of grassroots organizing. Forrai stated working for the party was like working for a startup company, with everyone taking on numerous roles ad hoc and doing as much as possible (Balint 2015). His task in particular was to coordinate and supervise the new party MPs and deputies in research and analysis of state budgets (ibid).

He also worked regularly with local party chapters, providing data analyses of various local economic policies (ibid).

One of Forrai’s main contributions to the party came in 2011 when he personally established the Compass Institute, a think tank and party driven polling group initially conceived of by Vona that employs a number of handpicked professional analysts by

Forrai (ibid; Biro-Nagy & Boros 2016). The data produced by the Compass Institute was used to direct and reformulate campaign strategies in light of survey responses garnered from the public, and was successfully utilized to win a by-election campaign for the party in Jiszavasvari in 2012 (Balint 2015). Party leaders initially skeptical of opinion polling came to realize the power and value of the practice and have come to rely on the 82

Compass Institute to determine both their national and local campaign strategy21 and give the organization the bulk of its funding (Biro-Nagy & Boros 2016, 260; Balint 2015).

Given Jobbik’s inexperience in parliamentary politics and lack of technical or professional experts in the party, Forrai’s contributions have proven to be essential in helping to maintain Jobbik’s continuing political and electoral support since 2010.

Testimonies from various prominent party leaders, including Vona, attest to this view

(Balint 2015). The work done by Forrai and the polling institute have enabled the party to adapt to national politics, maintain tight connections between local chapters and the national party organization, and engage in effective electoral campaigns. Therefore, the continued electoral success of Jobbik can in part be attributed to the work of competent professionals working in conjunction with and on behalf of the party.

Ideology - Visibility, Flexibility and Delivery

Jobbik unique focus on “gypsy crime,” its adaptability to salient issues, and its campaign strategies have all helped to maintain and grow its electoral support base. The party has effectively utilized the heightened visibility of its position to further the communication of its ideology to the wider Hungarian public. Initially, much of Jobbik’s visibility was attributed to the original Hungarian Guard, which has been argued to partially explain its electoral success in 2010 (Varga 2014). Since then the party has extended its visible presence and the transmission of its ideological views through a

21 See discussion on “cuteness campaign” below. 83

variety of media sources, including magazines, websites, Facebook, and YouTube channels. A number of these publications have increased their production since 2010 and some of them even benefit from donations from Jobbik’s party foundation (Biro-Nagy &

Boros 2016, 258; Athena Institute 2013). Hazai Palya (“Home Turf’), a magazine started in 2011 publishes 1 million copies a month with the “goal of addressing a wider audience” than the party’s radical base, often supplementing sympathetic Jobbik political coverage with tabloid-esque stories and glossy imaging (Biro-Nagy & Boros 2016). This increase in the media output of Jobbik publications suggests that the party has been able to use its benefits from its 2010 election to effective advance the visibility of its message.

Harrison and Bruter suggest that FRPs are more likely to succeed when they are flexible in their ideological focus, can adapt to salient issues, and operate in a political field where no other FRPs share the same ideological issue space (2011, 19, 45).22 Prior to Jobbik, the only other serious FRP in the country was the Hungarian Life and Justice

Party (MIEP) that Jobbik ran with on a joint ticket in 2006, failing to meet the 5% threshold (Kim 2016). However, MIEP was narrowly focused on anti-Semitic issues and failed to broaden it support base outside of Budapest (Mares & Havlik 2016). Jobbik on the other hand, while sharing similar ideological foundation and anti-Semitic views, was able to broaden its support by focusing on the “Roma issue.” Jobbik claims on its website that it is the only party willing to defy “political correctness” and address the issue of

“Gypsy crime” in the country (Jobbik). Supporters of Jobbik have stated that they are

22 Art and Mudde also make similar arguments in their respective works (2011; 2007), 84

attracted to the party for this very reason and because they believe it’s the only party willing to seriously and practically address this issue, especially in light of the work of the Hungarian Guard and affiliated paramilitary organizations (Kim 2016; Varga 2016;

Iterson 2013). However, Jobbik also addresses a number of other salient issues like government corruption, and often look for new evidence of such to utilize in their rhetoric (Balint 2015; Daily News Hungary 2014). Thus, Jobbik establishes itself in a unique issue space that has proven to be salient for a number of voters who believe this issue to be real and unaddressed by other political parties.

In addition to staking out its issues, Jobbik has effectively changed the way it presents itself and its views to the Hungarian populace. In 2013 the party initiated what became known as the “cuteness campaign.” Television ads, billboards, and social media posts depicted party members smiling cheerfully while posing with kittens, puppies, and baby goats in an attempt to broaden its appeal to more voters in the run up to the 2014 elections (Toth 2015; Biro-Nagy & Boros 2016; Garcia-Montero 2014). Vona announced this change in messaging to his party members at parliament in a speech given before the legislature in 2013, asking “his MPs to rid their rhetoric of its radical edge,” (Biro-Nagy

& Boros 2016, 245). This shameless attempt to repackage the party’s extremist ideology and platform was laid bare in the release of secret audio recordings in 2015 of MP Tamas

Sneider who admitted to fellow party and Outlaws’ Army members that nothing regarding their radial vision had changed, but that the party had to appear calm and kind in order to win over the electoral support of elderly pensioners, women, and moderates 85

(Lestyanszy 2015; Biro-Nagy & Boros 2016; Toth 2015; Hungary Today 2015). This is the same party with members and elected officials who themselves have Nazi tattoos and associate with neo-Nazis (Toth 2015).

^ U M M O U M f f U a egyetemi oktatd, jetenteg doktori Uinulmanyokat folytat, tudom&nyos es karttativ civil szerveze- tek tagja. 2009*ben csatlakozott a Jobbikhoz, melynek szakmai pm

d< ^ M#8Var

poigarai biztonsSgosabb, tiszt^bb es ^ ^ elhetdbb korulmenyeket erdemelnek. - ^

Figure 3. “Cuteness campaign ” adfor Jobbik candidate Janos Stummer (right).

The strategy appears to have worked. Jobbik saw a 4% average growth in popularity between 2010 and 2014 in voters between the ages of 40 and 59 (Biro-Nagy &

Boros 2016, 252). While not indicative of actual turnout nor of a necessary connection to the effects of the campaign strategy itself, it might be tentatively stated that in addition to the work done on the micro and meso levels, Jobbik’s political salient political vision has remained popular among a strong number of citizens and since gaining office have managed to effectively communicate its message in a manner to not only maintain its electoral support but expand it as well. The effective message delivery of Jobbik’s ideology serves to complement the practical work it does on the lower levels.

A Permissive Political Environment - The Jobbik-Fidesz Relationship 86

Art suggests that the initial response of other political parties to the entry of FRPs into elected office can potentially shape the long-term viability of such parties, with a more permissive, non-critical environment enabling their continued support (2011). In this case, it appears that Jobbik has in fact benefited from such an environment and has been able to effectively establish the party structure at the national level. The main ideological competitor of Jobbik is Fidesz, Hungary’s mainstream conservative party

(Biro-Nagy & Boros 2016). Fidesz has been notably uncritical of Jobbik, or rather has not sustained any serious campaign of criticism against it (ibid). This could be the result of

Orban not taking the party seriously. Kreko suggests that Fidesz might be unwilling to heavily criticize Jobbik because of the ideological proximity between the two and the genuine overlap in policy goals that are shared (Kreko 2015). Since 2010, Fidesz has implemented 8 out of 10 of policies that were explicitly stated on Jobbik’s “promise list,” and have agreed on other policy issues as well (ibid; Biro-Nagy & Boros 2016).

This is not to say that the parties have engaged in open cooperation, or that the two share the same political vision. Jobbik has been highly critical of Fidesz, attempting to label the party as part of the mainstream establishment and claim that it, along with the

Socialist Party, has engaged in corruption and failed to deliver to the Hungarian people

(Daily News Hungary 2014). Fidesz on the other hand did not seem to worry about these attacks. Instead, Orban and Fidesz co-opted Jobbik policies and implemented them without explicitly acknowledging the overlap. Fidesz has also adopted a stronger tone in its rhetoric concerning immigration, with Orban suggesting refugees entering the country 87

“be treated as criminals” and erecting a border fence along the country’s Serbian border

(Rohac 2015).23

Commenters have suggested that Fidesz is attempting to capture Jobbik voters who support the policies of the party but are wary of its more radical elements, and suggest that it has been at least partially successful (Frayer 2015). However, it appears that Fidesz’ policy convergence with Jobbik may have actually worked to legitimize the platform of the latter. In 2014, Fidesz saw an 8% drop in its electoral support since 2010 while Jobbik saw a 4% bump (Biro-Nagy & Boros 2016). Exit polls have also shown that one-fifth of Jobbik voters in 2014 stated they were previous Fidesz supporters (ibid;

Simon 2015). This suggests Fidesz is perhaps inadvertently helping Jobbik to legitimize its message and ideology through its convergence on policy and rhetoric. In conjunction with its efforts on the micro and meso levels, Jobbik’s benefit from professional assistance, its salient message and communication strategy, and Fidesz’ uncritical approach have all enabled the party to maintain and grow its electoral support.

Conclusion

Jobbik presents an important case study on the continued support of contemporary

FRPs. Its intimate connection between party professionals and paramilitary organizations make it particularly difficult to disentangle the actions taken by the party itself to maintain electoral support and the work done on behalf of the party to do the same.

23 Kreko and Mayer note the irony here in that Fidesz is hardening its rhetoric while Jobbik is softening its own (2015). 88

However, analyzing the overlapping activities of these two sets of actors on different levels of society helps produce a comprehensive account of the FRPs continued electoral support. On the micro level, individual attitudes held by Hungarians engender the demand for a FRP. On the meso-level, Jobbik-affiliated paramilitaries in loose coordination with the party utilize targeted violence and intimidation against the Roma population to establish an electoral connection Hungarians who view the Roma issue as salient, Furthermore, Jobbik and its affiliated organizations provide a number essential and meaningful services and functions to its supporters, and have proven particularly effective in securing the vote of the youth through its various programs and festivals. On the macro level, the party has substantially benefited from the work of technical professionals, an effective ideological propaganda strategy, and Fidesz’ policy convergence and lack of sustained criticism. 89

Chapter 5 - Conclusion

In democratic countries across Europe the years between 2008 and 2017 were marked by the presence of a wide number of far-right parties vying for political support.

High profile cases like Golden Dawn in Greece, the National Front in France, and the

Austrian Freedom Party were the subject of intense media coverage and academic interest, elevating what were once fringe organizations and ideas to widespread recognition. Furthermore, the election of Donald Trump in the United States and the emergence of the “alt-right”24 highlight the international ubiquity of far-right movements in the second decade of the 21st century and the significant impact they have had on

Western democracies. Given the persistent nature of the FRP family and its continued electoral efforts, determining why these parties vary in success over time is likely to remain a salient concern for researchers and policy advocates alike.

This variation in FRP efforts has been the subject of scholarly debate, with a wide range of theoretical and methodological approaches advocated by different researchers.

Some scholars focus on highly specific variables like voter SES profiles, which are useful for explaining why individuals vote FRPs generally but cannot account for the variation in success or failure of a particular party. Even recent comprehensive accounts of FRP success offered by academics, which stress party-centric variables in addition to demand-

24 The alternative right, a phrase coined by white nationalist Richard Spencer, is best understood as an umbrella concept used to rebrand far-right ideologies (including neo-fascism/Nazism, the neo-reactionary movement, and white separatism) as mere alternatives to Republican conservatism (Florido 2016). 90

side and party-external ones, diverge in methodology and over what variables on which to place central emphasis.

The central purpose of this thesis has been the construction and employment of a new comprehensive, explanatory model to account for the variation in continued support of FRPs over time. This model utilizes aspects of various works in the literature, incorporating the methodological developments of Mudde (2007), Art (2011), Harrison and Bruter (2011) as well as Migdal (1988; 2001) and Kalyvas (2006). I argue that FRPs are more likely to persist electorally when there is an individual demand for such parties generally, when leaders and activists establish essential or meaningful services for its constituency, and when they maintain party unity and ideological flexibility in a permissive, noncompetitive political environment.

Chapters 3 and 4 are dedicated to the employment of this model to explain the continued electoral success of Golden Dawn in Greece and of Jobbik in Hungary. Both cases demonstrate how, despite various obstacles, party leaders worked to establish and maintain various meaningful and essential services for their respective constituencies while effectively navigating the national political stage. There are a number of interesting similarities and distinctions between these two cases. For instance, the two parties diverge on the division of labor between its more violent factions. Jobbik leaders attempted to professionalize the party after entering office by cleaning up its radical image and nominally cutting ties with its paramilitary group in a transparent effort to garner the support of moderates. Golden Dawn leaders made no effort to professionalize 91

itself and maintained a closer connection to its extremist elements, a factor that likely enabled the current criminal case to be levied against the party. And yet both parties appear to have benefitted from similar socio-political contexts. Both countries experienced a rise in public anti-establishment and anti-immigrant sentiments, and leaders from both parties were able to effectively capitalize on a number of opportunities in the national political environment to present their party as a viable option for citizens.

Perhaps the most significant similarity between the two cases and the one most central to my thesis is the way in which leaders and activists from both parties attempted to maintain its electoral support through the provision of essential and meaningful services. Both parties established youth programs, food-drives, summer camps, music and cultural festivals, most of which provide an ostensibly neutral medium through which party leaders can connect with their constituency. Even the use of targeted violence by party supporters and activists worked as a tool for engendering continued political support to the extent that its use resonated with a segment of the population and built solidarity and party unity among its most hardened supporters.

These meso-level findings serve to underscore the utility the party-centric, supply-side variables as advocated by Art (2011) and Mudde (2007). Additionally, these findings also highlight the value and usefulness of the literature on state-society relations in accounting for FRP persistence. The interplay of competing political organizations and the interpersonal relationships that party leaders and activists work to develop with their constituencies illuminates the processes by which even the most violent and extremist 92

organizations establish electoral connections with everyday people. Furthermore, both of these methodological approaches eschew the limitations of micro and macro-level accounts of FRP support, neither of which on their own adequately explain why one FRP in particular is able to persist electorally. Future researchers and analysts should invest in efforts to utilize these developments, which serve to reveal the actual mechanisms by which FRP activists attempt to build and maintain their political support base.

Limitations of the Model

The tripartite model of continued FRP success is not without its limitations. As a qualitative explanatory model, it is difficult to operationalize certain variables. For example, the model does not account for how variation in the effectiveness of efforts to provide essential or meaningful services has on the outcome of continued FRP support. It may be the case that in some circumstances a FRP provides a wide range of services but are not widely utilized by citizens or suffer from poor organization. Alternatively, a FRP might only provide one or two services but are so well organized and effective that they serve to engender continued support. Thus, measuring the precise influence of meso-level factors is an issue.

This point serves to underscore a potentially greater limitation with the model in its ability to account for the electoral failure of FRPs over time. The model posits a number of conditions that in their totality are said to increase the likelihood of continued

FRP support. However, it does not explain how variations in these conditions might 93

affect the outcome or likelihood of continued support. For example, if both the micro and meso-level conditions for continued FRP success are met but aspects of the macro-level are not, there is no method to determine the how well the party might perform in future elections.

I argue that despite these potential issues, the tripartite model is both a useful and analytically robust tool that can provide a comprehensive explanatory account of FRP electoral persistence. Neither of the aforementioned limitations undermine the central claim of this work. Again, the model asserts that FRPs are more likely to achieve continued electoral success if they provide meaningful or essential services and if they maintain unity and ideological flexibility in a permissive, noncompetitive political environment where there is an individual demand for FRPs generally. The cases studies in chapters 3 and 4 support this theory and reflect the various ways in which FRPs successfully maintain electoral support as suggested by the model.

Furthermore, even if variation exists on multiple levels of the analysis, the use of the tripartite model will ultimately result in the illumination of the factors that were dispositive of a FRPs continued success in any given case. Because the model is grounded in the academic literature, incorporating and building upon multiple methods developed and employed in previous scholarly works, its usage will result in a comprehensive account that reveals what aspects proved central to the electoral persistence of a FRP. Therefore, the tripartite model serves as a powerful explanatory tool that can help to account for the continued electoral success of FRPs over time. 94

The Future of the Far-Right in Europe

Media coverage and conventional wisdom on the rise of FRPs across Europe tend to portray the situation as dire. The conditions of the current political climate are often compared to those that followed the Great Depression and the first wave of far-right nationalist parties that swept Europe in the 1930s. The research in this thesis also suggests that emergence and persistence of FRPs pose a fundamental threat to liberal democracies. Focusing almost exclusively on these parties leaves the impression that their strength is rising and their persistence suggests a growing trend toward far-right influence and entry into mainstream politics.

Some researchers have sought to temper these concerns. Mudde argues that the idea that FRPs are on the rise across Europe since the 2008 financial crisis is partly overstated and sensationalized, noting that “...far right parties have gained support in only eleven of the twenty-eight EU member states, and increased their support substantially in a mere five,” (2016, 21). Furthermore, both Mudde and Art highlight the fact that the majority of these parties remain marginal players in national politics, with members often lacking political experience and organizational capabilities (Mudde 2016;

Art 2013). Both scholars underscore the strength of democratic institutions throughout

Europe today as opposed to the 1930s, and demonstrate that FRPs have not substantially affected the structure of party systems throughout Europe (Mudde 2014; Art 2013). 95

Even in light of these points, academics and journalists have recognized that the entrance of FRPs into office is a cause for concern. Every conceptual definition of the radical or extreme right notes that a key feature of these parties is that its activists seek to undermine or subvert basic liberal democratic principles, especially when it comes to equal protections for minorities and immigrants. As such, regardless of their effect on actual policy, FRPs represent a pressing internal threat to liberal democracies across

Europe. Many have skinheads, neo-Nazis, and holocaust deniers within the party itself and actively use violence to intimidate and harm their political enemies (Art 2013). As demonstrated in this thesis, FRPs often associate with various other extremist organizations and serve to support and embolden their activities. Additionally, the development of highly organized party structures and the provision of meaningful and essential services to supporters increases the likelihood that these parties will remain electorally viable over time. As such, FRP leaders and activists have worked to embed themselves in their respective countries, resulting in a potentially long-term problem for advocates and defenders of liberal democracies in Europe (Rooduijn 2015).

This work is important because it helps to explain the potential causes for the continued support of FRPs in Europe over the last decade. While typical explanations for this rise tend to attribute their success to the effects of economic crises, they do not account for the continued support of them or why individuals make a “conscious political choice” to support these groups over others (Koronaiou 2015, 239). Indeed, FRP leaders and activists are doing something that contributes to their success. By examining the 96

processes by which party activists and leaders attempt to establish electoral connections with their constituents through the provision of meaningful or essential services, the tripartite model can illuminate the ways in which even the most extreme right parties can maintain its political support. When GD supporter Maria Kirimi was asked about how she felt about the ideology of the party, she said, “’I heard Michaloliakos say on TV that their sign isn’t Hitler’s sign but a patriotic one.. .it does upset me a bit. But I haven’t heard of anyone else giving out food,’” (Margaronis 2012). The potential for FRPs to rise in popular support, no matter how extreme, is not to be underestimated. 97

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