sign in sign up
<<
Home , Apophatic theology, Essence, Rational animal

The Negative Way

We’ve identified a lot of ’s attributes. But, can we REALLY say anything positive about what God is like? That is, in addition to saying what God is NOT, can we say anything about what God IS? Notice that many of the attributes that we’ve already identified are really only negative claims about what God is NOT:

(1) Infinite = NOT limited in any way (2) Immutable = UN-changing Note that the prefixes in-, im-, and (3) Eternal = NOT in e- are all negating prefixes. (4) Immaterial = NOT made of

John Scottus Eriugena (800-877 AD) and (1135-1204 AD) that these are the ONLY sorts of things we can say about God. God is so unlike anything that we can conceive of, that positive God-talk is impossible. We can only know about God in the negative way (the ‘via negativa’ in ; ‘apophatic’ in Greek).

1. Eriugena: Strictly speaking, Eriugena that God is “ineffable”; that is, unable to be described by words. He writes,

“Have we not said that the ineffable can be properly signified by no word, no name, that is, by any sensible sound, [and] by no thing signified?”

His for this is that is opposed to God—but every term has an opposite. So, for instance, we can’t say that God is good, because “evil is opposed to goodness.” We can’t even apply negative terms to God; e.g., we can’t say that God is eternal, because “temporality is opposed to eternity.” And so on.

[Objections: First, Eriugena seems to be assuming that, e.g., goodness cannot exist without evil (for, he says he’s worried that, if God is good, then evil must be “co-eternal” alongside God). But, this seems false. Second, what if evil is a privation of good? In that case, evil is not a thing at all, and therefore does not seem to be opposed to goodness. (Though, this may not work for all terms; e.g., temporality does not seem to be a privation of eternality.) Third, Eriugena’s claim seems self-defeating. Eriugena has applied a name to God by calling Him ‘ineffable’. Yet this seems, according to his view, unacceptably “opposed” to ‘effability’. In any case, let’s move on to his solution.]

So, what do we do? Eriugena suggests that God so thoroughly surpasses all of our terms, that the best we can do is say that he is BEYOND them. So, for instance, he says that God is not good. Rather, he is “supergood”; “that is, more than goodness”:

1

Here are some of the traits that Eriugena attributes to God. God is:

 Supergoodness (“more than goodness”) Note that in the Greek, the prefix is ‘hyper-‘,  Supertruth (“more than ”) which we still use in English. So, if you prefer,  Supereternality (“more than eternity”) interpret Eriugena as calling God ‘hypertruth’  Superwisdom (“more than wisdom”) (hyperalethia), ‘hyperwisdom’ (hypersophia), etc.

Objection: Wait. Didn’t Eriugena say that God is ineffable? That means that we can’t say ANYTHING about God. But, here we find Eriugena calling God ‘supergood’, ‘supertrue’ and all sorts of things. So, apparently God is NOT ineffable (i.e., indescribable)!

Reply: Eriugena points out that positive and negative theology sort of BOTH got it right, and are not in tension with one another. For instance, positive theology says God is truth; negative theology says that God is not truth. Eriugena’s theology is a hybrid of the two. He says God is ‘supertruth’. It is a positive term (i.e., it does not have a prefix like non-, in-, im-, e-, or a-), but it has a negative (i.e., it DENIES that God is truth, since He is MORE THAN truth).

However, in the end, this leaves God fairly ineffable, since, e.g., if we assert that God is “more than truth” this doesn’t seem very informative. It doesn’t really tell us what He IS. Of ‘superessential’, he writes,

“He is , affirmation; he is not essence, [negation]; he is superessential, simultaneously affirmation and [negation]. For on the surface it is without negation; in meaning it has negative force. For he who says, He is superessential, does not say what He is, but what He is not; for he says that He is not essence, but more than essence. But what that is which is more than essence, he does not express, asserting that God is not anything of those [things] which are, but is more than those things which are: but what that may be, he defines in no way.”

2. Maimonides: Maimonides first notes that, if we were trying to describe God positively, it would have to be done in one of 5 ways:

(1) Complete ; e.g., ‘human’ = ‘’ ; ‘bachelor’ = ‘unmarried male’

But, God’s essence can’t be fully defined.

(2) PART of a definition; e.g., ‘animal’ (of humans) ; ‘male’ (of bachelors)

But, God has no parts, so His essence can’t be composed in this way.

2

(3) ‘Accidental’ properties; i.e., descriptions of a thing that do not identify its essence.

(Side Note on Essential vs. Accidental Properties: If one loses an essential —i.e., a property that is a part of one’s very nature, essence, or definition— then they would cease to exist. In words, wherever you exist, you necessarily have all of your essential properties. For instance, you are necessarily human. In contrast, an “accidental” property is one that a thing COULD lose and still continue to exist. It is NOT a part of your very essence, or nature. For instance, being seated, sighted, or a student—these are all contingent, or accidental, properties of you.)

E.g., Maimonides is a philosopher. (Though it was possible for him to not be one.)

But, God does not have any accidental properties, since everything about Him is necessary. Also, having an accidental property entails the capacity for change— since one could lose it—and, as we have seen, God is immutable. (Side note: This explains why Aquinas thinks 2 perfect would have to differ in essence)

(4) Relational properties; e.g., Chad is in James Blair at noon, is Alysia’s brother, etc.

But, God can’t have spatio-temporal , because He is not in space or time. Nor can He have relations to creatures, since all such relations require some mutual trait to be shared in common between the two things related. But, God shares no trait in common with anything else.

You might say, “Wait. Surely, both God and creatures EXIST, and so must be related at least in THAT way.” But, Maimonides denies even this. First, the mere fact that two things EXIST does not entail that they can be compared. For instance, compare the 10-foot height of the ceiling to the flavor of pepper. You can’t! He writes,

“If the two terms belong to different classes, no relation at all is possible between them … It makes no if the two classes are under the same category. For instance, there is no thinkable relation between a hundred cubits and the pungency of pepper … There is also no thinkable relation between knowledge and sweetness, or kindness and bitter taste, though all these are in the category of . How then could there be any relation between God and any creature, when there is that immense difference in the nature of , greater than which no difference can ever be.” (52)

Second, and more importantly, ‘existence’ cannot really be applied to both creatures and to God, for, “God, however, must exist, and everything else may exist … and therefore [the] correlation is unthinkable.” That is, the term ‘existence’ in ‘necessary existence’ and ‘contingent existence’ don’t really refer to the same thing.

3

(5) Actions—specifically, as causes of effects; e.g., Maimonides wrote this book.

A-ha! Here, Maimonides finally says that we CAN describe God in this way. So, God can rightly be said to be the Creator of the world. But, note that this doesn’t even get close to telling us what God really IS, or what He is like.

God’s essence is existence: Maimonides endorses the view of both and Aquinas and says that God’s essence isn’t the sort of thing that needs existence ADDED to it (like ‘triangularity’ or ‘humanity’ do). Rather, His essence IS existence. However, even here, Maimonides takes this to be a sort of negative claim, for what we are really saying is that “He therefore exists without existence.” (i.e., without existence being received or ADDED to His essence, which is the way that all other things have existence)

Even the claim that God is ONE troubles Maimonides. For, then, it seems like number is something ADDED to God. But, God cannot be enumerated, nor can He have anything added to His essence. He is absolutely simple. So, Maimonides says that, “He is one without unity.” Elsewhere, “and similarly [He] lives without life, is powerful without power, and knows without knowledge.” Whoa… Heavy, dude… He explains further,

“These subtle , which almost pass the comprehension of our , are not readily expressed by words. Words are altogether one of the main causes of error, because whatever language we employ, we find the restrictions it imposes on our expression extremely disturbing. We cannot even picture this except by using imprecise language. When we desire to indicate that the is not plural, all we are able to say is that He is one, although both, ‘one’ as well as ‘many,’ are terms of quantity. We must therefore compress our meaning and guide the to the proper understanding of our by saying ‘one, but not by unity.’ … One cannot really employ the terms … any more than one can say of sweetness that it is either crooked or straight, or of a sound that it is salty or unseasoned.” (ch. 57)

The result is that Maimonides is thoroughly committed to the ‘Via Negativa’. We can only speak negatively about God. He says, “we can apprehend only that He is, not what He is. It is therefore meaningless that He should have any positive attribute.” (ch. 58)

However, this does not result in complete , since even negative terms can help to give us some positive sense of what something is, if only indirectly. For instance, if we’re playing 20 Questions, and I ask, “Is a vegetable? Is it a mineral?” and you answer “No” to both questions, I can infer that the thing to be guessed is a living thing.

4