Turkey and Northern : An Overview

Gareth Jenkins

February 2008 February 2008 Occasional Paper February 2008 February Gareth Jenkins Gareth An Overview and Northern Iraq: and Northern Turkey The Jamestown Foundation Papers reflect the views of their authors, not those of The Jamestown Foundation. Jamestown The of Occasional those not Foundation. authors, their Jamestown of views the The reflect Papers with associated or sponsored event or conference a of result the as or Foundation Jamestown The with associated scholars and analysts by created be may papers community.These policy the to valuable be to believes Foundation Jamestown The that reports and essays are Papers Occasional ffiil r nelgne hnes epcal i rgr t Ersa n terrorism. and Eurasia to regard in especially channels, intelligence or official through available always, not is but be, should that information of source only the often is It agenda. or sources, filter bias, primary political without and delivered Jamestown’sis material indigenous Utilizing information. such to access restrict frequently that and States United the to important tactically or strategically are that societies those in trends and events about community policy broader the and policymakers educate and inform to is Foundation Jamestown The of mission The The Jamestown Foundation’s Mission tel: (202)483-8888 •fax:(202)483-8337 1111 16thSt. NW, Suite 320 Washington, DC 20036 • www.jamestown.org • * Occasional Paper Gareth Jenkins Gareth 3 Distribution of Kurdish Population Distribution of Kurdish The Jamestown Foundation is likely to continue to be some form of Kurdish political entity in northern Iraq with many of the of many with Iraq northern in entity political Kurdish of form some be to continue to likely is there form, its of However,regardless long-lasting. be to likely is PUK the KDPand the between facto control over the oil-rich province of Kirkuk. It is also unclear whether the recent cooperation fledged state. It currently remains unclear whether it will be able to extend its de jure as well as de In recent years, the Kurdistan Autonomous Region has developed many of the trappings of a fully- In recentyears, Turkish policytowardnorthernIraqhasbeendominatedbythreefactors: be anymoresuccessfulinthefuture. own citizens or the Iraqi Kurds, have not been successful. Nor is there any indication that they will its to applied whether Turkey’sthat policies, is Kurdish clear is What answers. obvious any be to Kurdish multiple even appear currently not Unfortunately,do East. there Middle the identity—or of map political the identities—into Kurdish integrate to how and identity Kurdish of question the lies heart their deep-rooted At future. foreseeable more the for other,agenda the from on remain to distraction likely are a which issues probably is PKK the term, longer the in However, northern IraqisofcriticalimportancetothePKK’s abilitytocontinueitsinsurgency. of mountains the in presence its maintaining sponsor, state a of absence continued the In 1990s. The PKK is militarily considerably weaker than when it was at the height of its powers in the early features, ifnotthename,ofastate. Fears that the creation of a Kurdish political identity could further fuel separatist sentiments • attacks for platform Workers’a Kurdistan as the (PKK) by Party Iraq northern of use The • oil the and Mosul of loss the at resentment continued and nostalgia Ottoman Recidivist • among itsownalreadyrestiveKurdishminority. into Turkey; fields ofKirkuk; Turkey andNorthern Iraq: An Overview Executive Summary 4 Occasional Paper s northern border. s northern border. Gareth Jenkins Gareth . 5 Demographics, Language and Religion Language Demographics, Language: The Kurdish language is composed of a number of different dialects. Most are mutually are Most dialects. different of number a of composed is language Kurdish The Language: regarded be should they whether on disagree linguists that different so are several and unintelligible as different dialects or separate languages in their own right. The most common dialect is what is and Iraqi Most . and Turkey in Kurds of majority the by spoken is which Kurmanji, as known who numbers large also are there although Sorani, as known is what of forms speak Kurds Iranian speak Kurmanji. In there addition, are Turkey in communities of ethnic Kurds who speak Zazaki, grasp better much a have who Kurds many also are There Gorani. speak Kurds Iranian some while political repercussions. The number of Kurds in Iraq is disputed, but is probably 5-5.5 million, or nearly 20 percent of the 20 percent or nearly 5-5.5 million, is probably but is disputed, of Kurds in Iraq number The several in majority the constitute they where country, the of north the in live Most population. total There are also believed to be over 1.5 million , where they account for percent at least of 8 the total population. However, unlike most of the other Kurds in the region, those of non-contiguous areas along the country’ Syria are divided between a number in Kurdish society has traditionally been organized according to clan. Although their receding influence in is the face of urbanization significant with and often region, the throughout modernization, society Kurdish in role important clan an plays chief—still identity—and loyalty to the clan provinces. There are estimated to be mountains in the northwest of the country population—in Iran, mostly in the approximately 5.5 million Kurds—around 8 percent of the total Kurds in any city in the world. The highest concentration of Kurds is in where Turkey, they are estimated to number around 15 eastern in live Most million. 75 of population total Turkey’s of percent 20 million—approximately Anatolia, which is also and the In southeastern most recent underdeveloped region of the country. ’s of million 3-4 Around Turkey. western of metropolises the to migrated have many years, total population of 14 million is estimated to be Kurdish in origin, the highest concentration of Population: No reliable figures are available for the total global population of Kurds, although they although Kurds, of population global total the for available are figures reliable No Population: mostly of swath a in live them of million 27 Around million. 30 of excess in number to thought are mountainous terrain covering parts Iran, of Turkey, Iraq and Syria. In each country they account page 3). the total population (see map on for a minority of The Kurds The Jamestown Foundation eiin rud 59 pret fTrs r blee t b Sni ulm.Ams al f the of all Almost Muslims. Sunni the to belong percent 10-15 Christians remaining of communities small faith. also Alevi are There be to believed are Turks of percent 85-90 Around Religion: to standardizethelanguageandpurge itofwhatareregardedasforeignborrowings. cultural homogenization pursued since the 1920s has enforced been of reinforced process by The intelligible. the mutually Turkisheasily are state’s dialects attempts various the and small relatively are differences linguistic modern dialects, Turkish local numerous are there Although Language: There arealsosubstantialLazand Arab communities. of modern Turkey. Nevertheless, Kurds are believed to be the largest minority at around 15 million. estimated to be at least 75 million. No data are available on the ethnic composition of the population Population: The 2007 census put the population of Turkey at 70.6 million. However, it is unofficially The Turks Turkey andthe Yazidis innorthernIraq. in the Alevis as such religions, syncretic follow Kurds Other Iraq. and Iran in live whom of most Muslims, Shiite include also they although Muslims, Sunni are Kurds of majority The Religion: homogenization andimposedoftendraconianrestrictionsontheuseofKurdish. cultural enforced of policy a pursued long has state the Turkey,where in This case Kurdish. the of particularly is do they than living are they which in country the of language dominant the of other Iraqi Shiite has often taken precedence over linguistic and ethnic identification with Sunni with identification ethnic and linguistic over precedence taken often has Shiite Iraqi other with solidarity Shiite. of Shiite be sense many to Turkmen,a for and result, identity a religious As thought half—are However,to largeclose a even Muslims, number—perhaps Sunni to addition in There is similarly no reliable information on the religious composition of the Turkmen population. most critically, Kirkuk. and, al-Din Salah Arbil, Ninawa, Dahuk, of provinces Kurdish predominantly the in particularly Iraq, northern in living Turkmen of disputed—proportion again large—and a with location, their is number overall their than important more Perhaps 500,000-800,000. or Iraq, of population the of the total [2]. However, most Western sources put the figure considerably lower at 2-3 percent of 7.5 million—around 2 percent than of the more total population number of Iraq [1]—and they perhaps up that to 3 million, claimed or approximately often 11 percent have organizations Turkmen to as “Turcomans” or “Turkomans”—has been the subject of often heated debate. Both Turkey and The size of the community of Turkish-speakers in Iraq known as Turkmen—also sometimes referred The Turkmen and Jews. Turkey andNorthern Iraq: An Overview 6 Occasional Paper Gareth Jenkins Gareth 7 Kurdish Nationalism in Turkey and Iraq Iraq and Turkey in Nationalism Kurdish Initially, Ataturk Initially, had hoped to incorporate the Ottoman governorate of Mosul, which included the oil-rich fields around the city of Kirkuk—in what is now northern Turkish Iraq—into his new the area had been included in the British mandate of Iraq and Britain refused Republic. However, to relinquish control of it. It was only in 1926, three years after the proclamation of the Turkish Republic, Ataturk that admitted defeat and agreed to the border between and Turkey Iraq, which In 1920 the victorious Allies and the Ottoman government signed the Treaty of Sèvres, which not which Sèvres, of Treaty the signed government Ottoman the and Allies victorious the 1920 In only stripped the of its Arab provinces—which were to Anatolia [4]. By the time become the treaty was signed, the Muslims Allied of mandates—but partitioned neo-colonial Anatolia had already risen in revolt Ataturk under (1881-1938). the leadership of Mustafa Kemal Kurds Anatolia, in state Kurdish independent an of creation the envisaged had Sèvres though Even fought alongside Turks in Ataturk’s resistance forces. Indeed, although modern official Turkish historiography portrays what it describes as the “War of Liberation” in nationalistic terms, main motivation of the members of the the resistance appears to have been once religious. However, the resistance had triumphed and Sèvres had been replaced by the 1923 Treaty of Lausanne [5], Ataturk reinvented the uprising as a nationalist struggle and set Anatolia about into transforming nation state. Turkish a secular rather than any concept of “nation.” The concept of Turkish The nationalism concept did Turkish of not appear until the and late then 19th mainly in century, However, [3]. nationalism response Turkish to the centrifugal nationalism of to non-Muslim the subjects. sultan’s Kurdish nationalism reaction a largely was turn, in and, later even until arise not did in both cases, nationalism was the almost of majority exclusive vast the preserve I, of War the tiny World Ottoman in intelligentsia. defeat its following collapsed Empire Ottoman the when Even locale and family clan, religion, through primarily themselves identified still Kurds and Turks both most cases, inaccessible mountains. most cases, inaccessible mountains. With With the exception of a strip of land along Iran’s northwestern border, all of a the territory substantial with Kurdish population today was once part of Although Ottoman there Empire are was references based in on 19th religion. century diplomatic the Ottoman Empire. Identity in the correspondence by both Ottoman and foreign officials to “Kurdistan,” they are to a geographical region—namely the area predominantly inhabited by Kurdish the over control central Kurdish-speaking period, Ottoman the Throughout tribes—rather entity. political nascent or actual than an tribes was very loose. Provided that they continued to sultan, the tribal chieftains enjoyed pledge a considerable degree of de their facto autonomy in what nominal were, in allegiance to the Turkmen and the predominantly Sunni Turkish Republic. Turkish and the predominantly Sunni Turkmen The Jamestown Foundation point that Kurdish nationalism gradually began to become a political force; in most cases, loyalty cases, most in force; political a become to began gradually nationalism Kurdish that point this at only was it intellectuals, nationalist Kurdish of handful a already were there Empire [6]. Although Ottoman Iraq and the Turkey,Syria namely of states: nation three subjects become to Kurdish were what former in minorities becoming the in resulted thus Lausanne of Treaty The ever since. with Turkishrankled nationalists has Kirkuk and Mosul of today.loss unchanged the remains But cooperation were offset by an awareness that—regardless of any sense of ethnic solidarity—they ethnic of sense any of that—regardless awareness an by offset were cooperation of benefits practical the themselves, groups the For countries. neighboring in groups nationalist number of Kurds were becoming exposed to nationalistic ideas and news of the exploits of Kurdish only was it now easier for Kurdish rebel groups to communicate with each other, but a much larger Turkey. Improvements in telecommunications, transportation and access to the Workers’Kurdistan in media the (PKK) meant and Party Iraq that northern of not Kurds the to shifted had nationalism century,20th late the By Iran. of case the in so less Syria, of case the in Kurdish of focus main the easily relatively governments; central respective their by suppressed were they case each in [9], success short-lived of measure a enjoyed Iran and Syria in groups nationalist Kurdish Although Kurdish languageandculturebuteventodenythat eitherhadeverexisted[8]. eradicate to only not attempt government’sTurkish the and Arabization of campaigns of part as cultures minority suppress to Iraq and Syria in governments central the by attempts to resistance through least not nationalism; Kurdish of sense a by colored least at increasingly was government secular republic [7]. However, even if it was a rarely the with sole cause, Ottomans Kurdish the opposition to of the central state Islamic the replaced and caliphate the abolished had Ataturk where over a particular region or tribe. Sometimes religion was also a major factor, particularly in Turkey primarily local in origin, such as resistance to a central government’s attempts to impose its control and Iran all rebelled against the central government. In a large number of cases, the rebellions were century,20th in the Turkey,Kurds During restive. been always Iraq had Syria, tribes Kurdish The less cooperate. was other,each it with much communicate to even differentcountries in groups for hard that very frequently meant difficulties practical recently, relatively Until government. central the to than other each to rival threat a of more Indeed, appeared often country allegiance. same the within groups tribal nationalist Kurdish all, above and, religion language, of differences by further exacerbated was fragmentation The movement. nationalist single a than rather nationalisms Kurdish effectivelymultiple were what of development the was result lived. The they which in state the in pan-Kurdish state, in practice Kurdish nationalists initially focused on opposition to the government meant that Kurdish nationalism was localized from the outset. Even if some ultimately aspired to a Inevitably, the fact that it only really emerged after the Kurds had been divided between four states, to tribeandfamilystilltookprecedenceoveranyconceptof“nationalconsciousness.” Turkey andNorthern Iraq: An Overview 8 Occasional Paper Gareth Jenkins Gareth 9 The Creation of the Kurdish Autonomous Region in Northern Iraq Northern Region in Autonomous Kurdish of the Creation The Following the outbreak of the 1980-88 Iran-Iraq war, the the PUK KDP was hostile to both cooperated sides. In 1983 it agreed to with a ceasefire with the Iraqi government, but Iran. Initially, the ceasefire broke down in 1985. In 1986, then the PUK PUK and joined KDP with the the Both KDP Baghdad. in in calling government for central the all against Iraqi unite to parties opposition Iraq. In March 1975, Iran and Iraq signed Accord, what under has which become Algiers known as the Barzani. for support its withdrawing Tehran for return in Iran with disputes border its resolved Iraq PUK the Syria, by Backed (PUK). Kurdistan of Union Patriotic the formed Talabani 1975, June In March In KDP. Barzani’s and government Iraqi the both against campaign armed an launched now Barzani Massoud son his by KDP the of head the as replaced was and died Barzani Mustafa 1979, (born 1946). Four months later, in July 1979, Saddam Hussein (1937-2006) became president of the oil-rich province of Kirkuk and Barzani continued his insurrection. the oil-rich province of Kirkuk and Initially, Barzani appears to have been motivated not so much by Kurdish nationalism as a desire to desire a as nationalism Kurdish by much so not motivated been have to appears Barzani Initially, extend his personal authority and that of his tribe in northern Iraq. his However, Kurdishness and Barzani 1946, In nationalists. Kurdish of support the attracted government central the to opposition established the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP). In 1961, a combination of tribalism, Kurdish central the against uprising armed an launching him in resulted ambition personal and nationalism state. In 1965, the government officially recognized Kurdish nationality within Iraq and promised a degree of political decentralization [10]. However, the agreement was never implemented and by also but government central the by only not opposed was He insurrection. his resumed Barzani leader, tribal another and (1914-2000) Ahmad Ibrahim writer the KDP, the of members former two supporting government Iraqi the with war, civil Kurdish a was result The 1933). (born Talabani Jalal offered government Iraqi the 1974, In Barzani. to weapons providing Iran and Talabani, and Ahmad include not did region autonomous the But country. the of north Kurdish the for autonomy Barzani Mustafa Barzani (1903-1979). Although there were several rebellions under the British mandate and during the early Autonomous Region (KAR) in northern of what is now independence, the the Kurdish emergence years of Mullah called chieftain tribal Kurdish a by 1940s the in launched movement the in roots its has Iraq other Kurdish nationalists within their own borders. other Kurdish nationalists were also rivals. Even if their initial territorial goals were restricted to the countries in which they were active, both the Iraqi Kurds and the PKK were also anxious to be able to present themselves to the region’s Kurds and the wider international community nationalism. as make To matters the more complicated, primary at one focus time or of Syria, another, Turkey, Iran Kurdish and Iraq all provided assistance to Kurdish nationalist groups in neighboring states while suppressing The Jamestown Foundation was the creation of a de facto autonomous Kurdish region in the provinces of Dahuk, Arbil and Arbil Dahuk, of provinces the in region Kurdish autonomous facto de a of creation the was Saddam imposed an economic blockade on the territory controlled by the KDP and PUK. The result seized control of the cities of Arbil and Sulaymaniyah. In October 1991, amid continuing tensions, peshmerga, as known militia, Kurdish Baghdad, in continued talks as 1991, July In Saddam. with launched a ground government central operation Iraqi into the if northern intervene Iraq. would Allies the The that Iraqi guarantee no Kurdish was leadership there However, entered into negotiations 36th parallel. At theendof April 1991,theKurdsbegantoreturntheirhomes innorthernIraq. a “safe haven” in northern Iraq, which would be protected by a ban on Iraqi planes flying above the finally forced the Allies’ hand. In mid-April 1991, the Allies announced that they were establishing along Iraq’s borders with Turkey and Iran [11]. Media coverage of the resultant mountains the into fled people million 1.5 to up rebellion, the suppress to areas Kurdish into move humanitarian disaster by the victorious U.S.-led Allies. No such support was forthcoming. When the Iraqi army began to supported be would they that expectation the in revolt in KDP—rose and PUK the by Kurds—led In early March 1991, a few days after the final defeat of the Iraqi military in the 1991 Gulf War, the Kurds arebelievedtohavediedinachemicalweaponsattackonthetownofHalabja. 5,000 over 1988, March In homes. their from driven were more Many civilians. Kurdish them of majority the killed, were be people to 150,000-200,000 estimated came An what campaigns. launching Anfal the by as Kurds known the on revenge his took Saddam 1988, spring in Starting fought alongsideIranianforcesagainsttheIraqiarmy. omly ind pae gemn i Wsigo. oee, h Krih rvne remained provinces Kurdish the divided betweentherival KDP However, and PUKadministrations. Washington. in agreement peace a PUK signed the and KDPformally the that 1998 September until not was It territory. Kurdish-controlled the of all over jurisdiction claimed administrations rival the of Both Sulaymaniyah. in government own its up set PUK the 1997, January In Sulaymaniyah. recaptured PUK the 1996, October In Arbil. in proclaimed was government KDP new ASulaymaniyah. of stronghold PUK the and Arbil of control seized KDParmy, the Iraqi the the by and supported 1996, September west In east. KDP-controlled PUK-administered the between divided war,became region at autonomous were facto PUK de and the KDP and the 1994, May By short-lived. was agreement power-sharing The Barzani or Talabani. either of participation the without members, PUK KDPand of number equal an of which composed was (KRG), Government Regional Kurdistan first convened the by formally July in followed assembly be to The 1992, minority.June in Assyrian the with to assembly, the allocated in being seats five 105 the remaining of the 50 received party Each percent. 43.6 PUK the and vote the of percent 45 received KDP The parliament. regional a for held were elections 1992, May In Sulaymaniyah. Turkey andNorthern Iraq: An Overview 10 Occasional Paper Gareth Jenkins Gareth 11 The Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) Workers’ Kurdistan The However, through the mid-1990s, more aggressive battlefield tactics and a scorched earth policy— earth scorched a and tactics battlefield aggressive more mid-1990s, the through However, which included the razing of an estimated 3,500 villages—enabled military the Turkish to regain is and terrain flat fairly through mostly runs Syria with border Turkey’s countryside. the of control relatively easy to As secure. a result, PKK militants infiltrating into would Turkey travel through Kurds. The predominantly Kurdish areas of Turkey have traditionally also been the most conservative. Nevertheless, poor socioeconomic conditions and the continuing suppression of Kurdish rights— which had intensified still further in the wake of the 1980 coup—meant had no that difficulty in the recruiting from Marxist the local PKK population. By the early 1990s, it had an estimated it where point the to escalated had insurgency rural mainly still its and arms under militants 8,000 was Kurdish speaking on ban a though Even dark. after countryside the of swaths large controlled lifted April in 1991, other restrictions remained in place; the often brutal methods of the Turkish security forces, including widespread human rights abuses and the Turkey’s use among following strong a retained PKK the that ensured nationalists, Kurdish suspected of death squads to kill The PKK was founded in 1978 by a group of Kurdish Marxists, led by Abdullah 1948). Ocalan Its original aim was (born the creation of a Kurdish Marxist which state in southeastern Turkey, Turkey fled Ocalan region. the throughout communism of spread the for platform a as serve would in the wake of the 1980 military coup. He spent the next 18 years in the Syrian-controlled Bekaa insurgency its launched PKK The Damascus. of capital Syrian the latterly, particularly and, Valley Turkey. August 1984 with two attacks on police stations in southeastern in Following the overthrow of Saddam, Iraq officially became a federal state for the first time. The KDP and the PUK ran on a joint ticket in the January 2005 elections to the the local KAR parliament [12], in winning 104 of the assembly’s 111 seats. Concerns about a repeat of the rivalry between Barzani were and partially Talabani allayed by the election April in 2005 as of Talabani approval the following 2006 April in confirmed was he which in post a Iraq; of all of president the of a new Iraqi When constitution. the Kurdish assembly convened for the first time in June 2005, first president. Barzani was appointed the KAR’s formed a “joint supreme leadership” to administer the territory under their control. leadership” to administer formed a “joint supreme In June 2002, amid growing signs that the was a preparing discuss to groups to opposition other with invade meetings joint hold Iraq to began PUK to and topple KDP the Saddam, the of session joint a at 2002, October In campaign. military U.S. a to response coordinated possible could elections new until together work to PUK agreed and KDP the Arbil, in parliament Kurdish be held. In March 2003, as U.S. troops massed on Iraq’s southern border, Barzani and Talabani The Jamestown Foundation resulted in around 35,000 deaths, including 25,000 PKK militants, 5,000 members of the security the of members 5,000 militants, PKK 25,000 including deaths, 35,000 around in resulted No independent figures are available, but the Turkish authorities estimate that the 15 years of fighting to withdrawfromthecountry. inside Turkeyunits PKK all ordered and hostilities of cessation a announced Ocalan 1999, August to take refuge in the Greek Embassy in Kenya. He was brought to Turkey, tried and incarcerated. In attempting after captured was Ocalan 1999, February In control. its under territory the in facilities PKK the down close to began and Ocalan expelled Syria prevaricating, initially Ocalan. After for support its withdrew Syria unless invade to threatened and Syria with border its on troops 10,000 massed Turkey 1998, of fall the In sponsor. organization’smain the Syria, to attention its shifted inside Turkey,retreat in PKK the with 1998, In bases. forward and camps PKK at strike to border. Throughout the insurgency, Turkey staged intermittent military incursions into northern Iraq Turkish-Iraqithe straddle that mountains porous more considerably the and Iraq northern to Syria its insurgency. continue organization’sto the ability to importance critical of is Iraq northern of mountains the in with the PKK. As affiliated a result, ideologically the PKK’sis presence—and, and until relatively recently,2004 in apparent immunity— founded was which (PJAK), Party Life Free Kurdistan the activities in the country; not least because Tehranits is now facing its own Kurdish insurgency,on led by down cracked has [14], 1990s the during PKK the supported actively than rather tolerated Department and the EU’s lists of proscribed terrorist organizations. In recent years, even Iran, which rapid increase in bilateral trade and warm political ties. The PKK is now included on both the State a in resulting transformation, a undergone have Turkey and Syria between relations 1998, fall in in insurgency its war to went almost of countries two internationally.the isolated Since more much stage also is It 1984-99. first the during than militarily weaker considerably remains PKK the However,campaign. bombing urban an Turkeywith southeastern in insurgency rural a combining The PKK duly resumed its insurgency in June 2004, after which it has pursued a two-front strategy that theorganization wastooweakmilitarily[13]. Their objections,however, wereoverruled. insurgency from June 2004. Most of the PKK leadership opposed Turkisha resumption the of hostilities, by arguing frustrated 2004, state’s May reluctance to ease the conditions of his In imprisonment, Ocalan ordered the PKK to resume lawyers. its his by conveyed messages through cell prison his in Ocalan with communicate to able were who Iraq, northern of mountains the in arms under Despite Ocalan’s announcement of an end to hostilities, the PKK maintained around 5,000 militants forces and5,000civilians. Turkey andNorthern Iraq: An Overview 12 Occasional Paper Gareth Jenkins Gareth nally relented. 13 Turkey and Northern Iraq: 1990 to Present Iraq: Northern and Turkey fields of Kirkuk; restive Kurdish minority. among its own already • Recidivist Ottoman nostalgia and continued resentment at the loss of Mosul and the • oil Turkey; as a platform for attacks into use of northern Iraq by the PKK The • sentiments separatist fuel further could identity political Kurdish a of creation the that Fears as its currency [19]. However, However, once the refugees had returned to their homes, Turkey pursued flow a the policy for of conduit engagement main the as served Turkey Iraq. northern in region autonomous nascent the with of international aid into the enclave, the Iraqi Kurdish leadership paid Ankara several and visits to even Turkey provided them with passports to enable them to travel abroad, apparently calculating engagement would allow separatist it aspirations. to exercise influence and rein in the Iraqi Kurds’ officials even suggested that Turkish the lira Iraqi Some Kurdish enclave should Turkish adopt the When upward of half a million would it Kurdish where refugees lowlands the fled into into descend and the [17] mountains border the in cross spring to them 1991, allow Turkey to refused initially Allies the when only was It aid. with them provide to organizations relief international for easier be a safe haven in northern Iraq that it fi had formulated a plan to establish appears Turkey to have been concerned that, once allowed to cross the the refugees border, would be reluctant to return to Iraq and that the international community would quickly tire of providing the take would PKK the hemorrhage, to began border the once that, suspected also It aid. with them [18]. Turkey numbers of militants into large opportunity to infiltrate would never be implemented [16]. During the 1980s, several Turkish During politicians the publicly Ataturk 1980s, Turkish expressed had several their been regret that prepared Allies U.S.-led the as 1990, late In republic. new his in Kirkuk and Mosul include to unable to launch the First Gulf War to drive Saddam Hussein’s army out of Turgut Kuwait, Ozal Turkish (1927-1993) President ordered the country’s military to draw up plans to invade Mosul and and Kirkuk. occupy Ozal appears to have calculated that, after his seemingly inevitable defeat by the Allies, Saddam would be unable to oppose any incursion and Allied operation that would ensure Turkey’s that support they did for not object the [15]. But Ozal failed to convince becoming already his was 1926)—who (born own Torumtay Necip General Staff of Chief Turkish military. increasingly disregard exasperated for by the Ozal’s traditions of statecraft—resigned in protest at what adventurism. he Even regarded though as the Ozal’s military subsequently drew up plans for an successor, General invasion, Torumtay’s Dogan Gures (born 1926) bluntly told Ozal that they Turkey’s policy toward northern Iraq has traditionally been shaped by three factors: Iraq has traditionally been shaped policy toward northern Turkey’s The Jamestown Foundation providing a reminder of Turkey’s military might should the Iraqi Kurds ever decide to proclaim to decide ever Kurds Iraqi the should might Turkey’smilitary of reminder a providing and PKK the against gathering intelligence for platform a both providing purpose, dual a served have bases The Dahuk. of province the Iraq in armor, including brigade, northern a of deployment in the through presence military semi-permanent a become has what established 1997 also In Turkey violations. ceasefire monitor forces—to special Turkish by Turkmens—supported and of formed (PMF) Assyrians Force Monitoring Peace a of 1997 in establishment the included This PUK. the and KDP the between war civil the during ceasefire a broker to attempted also Ankara to theKDP [20]. soldiers in firefights with the PKK. In return, TurkishTurkey alongside donated captured died PKK stores and and arms fought caches sometimes and guides, as served peshmerga Barzani’s bases, forward and camps PKK at strike to Iraq northern into incursions military staged Turkey When because least not KDP; Barzani’s with TalabaniPUK’sthe under territory the in freely relatively move to PKK control. itself the allowing was allied Turkey 1994, in out broke war civil When articles began to appear which stressed not only that the Turkmen were an inseparable part of the newspaper of part inseparable an Turkmenthe were that and only not stressed which appear studies to began articles academic of number growing A closer. regime—moved Saddam the of end probable the thus Iraq—and of invasion U.S. the as accelerated Turkmen the of rediscovery Turkey.by financed TurkishThe and controlled largely was reality,it In Iraq. in associations and disparate the Turkmenfor umbrella an organizationsbe in to Based intended was ITF the Ankara, In 1995, elements in the Turkish security apparatus had established the Iraqi Turkmen Front (ITF). as statehood toward moving Turkeywere suddenlybegantodiscoveritspreviouslyforgotten ethnickininIraq. Kurds Iraqi the that realization the with changed This arms. amongst the Turkmen, much less to establish intelligence-gathering networks or provide them with ignored the Iraqi Turkmen community. It had made no attempt traditionally Turkeyhad [21], to Turkish-speakingminority a with create countries other overt several in or Unlike covert organizations an independentstate. insisted on the right of the Kurdish region to secede from the proposed Iraqi federation and become for worryingly document most the peshmerga.Perhaps Ankara, the of responsibility the be would Security capital. Kurdish the as serving itself city the with Kirkuk, around fields oil northern the include to control Kurdish under area the of expansion the envisaged document The state. Iraqi the by federated loosely very 2002 a of establishment the foresaw which constitution draft KDPa of in PUK and adoption joint the by allayed hardly were fears Their north. the in state Kurdish the overthrow of Saddam would lead to the disintegration of Iraq and the creation of an independent preparing to invade Iraq to topple the Saddam regime. Many in Turkey had long been worried that These concerns intensified through 2002 as it became increasingly clear that the United States was full independence. Turkey andNorthern Iraq: An Overview Turkey andthe Turkmen 14 Occasional Paper Gareth Jenkins Gareth 15 After Saddam Turkey’s priority was Turkey’s post-Saddam Iraq, not the war to oust As him. a result, it wanted to deploy troops into northern Iraq to provide southward security toward Baghdad. behind Its hope was the that, with U.S. a strong military frontline presence in forces the north, and as they fought Turkish public opinion and the vast majority of the country’s policy community were, in principle, in were, community policy country’s the of majority vast the and opinion public Turkish However, participation. Turkish any to and invade to plans Washington’s to both opposed rigorously there was also an awareness acceding contemplated that, States United unless the it overthrow, participated Saddam’s in of wake the the in military if, leverage campaign, little Turkey have would to Iraqi Kurdish aspirations to statehood. By summer 2002, the Turkish General Staff (TGS) had Saddam. oust to campaign military U.S.-led the in participate to have would it that decided already Although it carefully avoided giving an Washington explicit commitment, the TGS nevertheless involvement. possible Turkey’s began to enter into detailed discussions about In a sign that Ottoman recidivism Minister Defense 2002, August In Kirkuk. and Mosul annex had to opportunity another as war coming far from disappeared, some nationalists even Sabahattin saw Cakmakoglu publicly months few declared the that A northern [22]. Iraq region the had in been interest protective “forcibly a separated” retained from Turkey that noted and 1923 in Turkey sought legal clarification of Yakis the status of Mosul Foreign Yasar later, and Minister Kirkuk to had a claim to them [23]. Turkey determine whether Through 2002, discussions inside Turkey as to whether or not it would participate in the forthcoming the in participate would it not or whether to as Turkey inside discussions 2002, Through U.S.-led coalition to oust Saddam revolved almost exclusively around the possibility victory of being followed by a the breakup U.S. of Iraq and the emergence of an independent At state. the time, the PKK had yet to re-launch its insurgency. But there were nevertheless concerns particularly that— at a time when Turkey was coming under pressure from the EU to ease some of the restrictions on Kurdish cultural rights—the creation of an independent Kurdish state in northern own Kurds to attempt to follow suit. Turkey’s Iraq would inspire In fact, the Turkmen appear to have suffered at least as much as the Kurds from the Arabization programs applied in Iraq. Hundreds of thousands were probably relocated from their traditional homelands in northern Iraq and replaced Arabs. by But not only was there little sign of “national consciousness,” but a substantial proportion—perhaps as much as Shiite half—of and tended to the identify more strongly Turkmen with their were coreligionists that Sunni Turkish-speakers. Arab population. the became rapidly assimilated into As a result, many Turkish nation but that they formed what appeared to be an ever increasing proportion of the Iraqi the of proportion increasing ever an be to appeared what formed they that but nation Turkish population. The Jamestown Foundation U.S.-Turkishto relations blow in devastating general a and dealt those also between but the Kurds, two countries’Iraqi the militaries and in Turkey between particular. suspicions When mutual the fabrication, probably bytheIraqiKurds. What is undoubtedthattheincident not onlydeepened a was it that insists TGS The sound. was intelligence the that insisted States United the time, the At disputed. hotly remains plot a such was really there not or ITF.Whether the of headquarters the ceasefire monitoring agreement between the KDP and PUK and were under operating out of Sulaymaniyah the local to assigned been had forces Turkish The Kurd. of ethnic an governor was the who Kirkuk, assassinate to plotting of suspicion on Sulaymaniyah in forces special detained Turkishtroops U.S. when 2003, 4, July on follow to was worse perspective, Turkish the From alongside notthe Turkish armybuttheIraqiKurds. of U.S. troops were subsequently deployed into northern Iraq, they fought against Saddam’s forces troops from transiting Turkey to open a second front in northern Iraq. When a much smaller number Party (AKP), which had come to power in November 2002, even prevented a planned 62,000 U.S. Development and Justice Islamist moderate the in rebellion backbench a 2003, 1, March on but, In the end, not only did the Turkish troops not participate in the military campaign to oust Saddam war: namelytopreventtheKurdsfromestablishinganindependentstate. the in participation its of purpose primary the implement to Turkey’sability weakened severely have would areas Kurdish-controlled the outside troops Turkish of deployment the Washington, with leverage some Turkeygiven have might campaign U.S.-led the to troops contributing while case, any territory.In their in troops Turkishwant not did Kurds the as air by troops its resupply States United or lines supply the its for security when provide to others allowing infuriated consider either should was it that suggested TGS The control. Kurdish under areas the through ran lines supply Turkish the that meant have still would the This to areas. located Kurdish-controlled the be of should south they Iraq, in deployed be to were troops Turkish if that, insisted They proposals. Turkish the about enthusiastic than less were Kurds Iraqi understandably,the Perhaps province. on the long-term Turkish military presence in Iraq through the deployment of the brigade in Dahuk to continue to serve the Turkmen militia on an almost permanent basis, thus considerably building officers, Turkish by trained and expected were peshmerga.advisors Turkish the military Turkeyto counterweight a as serve would which by armed militia, Turkmen a of creation the for plans meant the Kurds—would also be given to the Turkmen on equal terms. For example, it formulated it which Iraq—by in minorities other the to granted rights any that insisting over.included These ensure that Kurdish aspirations remained suppressed long after to the campaign plans to contingency topple of Saddam number was a up drew also TGS The Saddam. of fall the after independence at attempts Kurdish any suppress to able be would it minority,Turkmen the of support the with Turkey andNorthern Iraq: An Overview The Sulaymaniyah Debacle 16 Occasional Paper Gareth Jenkins Gareth 17 The Question of Kirkuk The The outcome of such a referendum in Kirkuk was generally regarded as a foregone conclusion. Not conclusion. foregone a as regarded generally was Kirkuk in referendum a such of outcome The outside lay it though even but, population the of majority a for account to believed Kurds were only its the territory, government of the KAR already controlled both education and law enforcement in Kirkuk and was vigorously encouraging Kurds displaced by Saddam to return However, to in addition the to Turkey region. and the Turkmen, many Arabs in Iraq were also reluctant to being referendum see the without passed deadline The control. Kurdish to transferred officially Kirkuk implemented. At the end of 2007, a UN-brokered agreement gave the various sides a further six voted. However, However, the Iraqi Kurds continued to press for the territory of KAR to be extended to the region around Kirkuk, which include they frequently referred to as “the Jerusalem of Kurdistan” [25]. They succeeded in having a to pledge put the future status of Kirkuk and other disputed territories National Transitional the by up drawn was which constitution new the in included referendum a to Article 140 Assembly. of the constitution foresaw a three-stage process, leading a referendum in new the 2005, 15, October On 2007. 31, December by status future their on territories disputed the Iraqi constitution was approved by referendum, winning the support of 78.6 percent of those who Kurdish aspirations. Through 2003 and 2004, a string of others true, were Some Kurds. the by Iraq articles northern in Turkmen the appeared of atrocities and discrimination in the Turkish nationalist press alleging exaggerations and yet others pure fabrications, usually by sources affiliated with the But ITF. in early 2005, Turkey finally had to accept that it overestimated both the size and the homogeneity of the minority Turkmen in Iraq. In the Iraqi elections of January 30, 2005 to elect a Transitional which would Assembly, draw National up a new constitution, the ITF won just 1.1 percent of the total vote. In Kirkuk, Ankara which had long maintained was a predominantly the Turkmen city, ITF took only Ankara 18.4 finally percent abandoned of the the vote. In the months that followed, Turkmen its instruct to began and Kurds the to counterweight a as block Turkmen a forming of idea interlocutors to cooperate with other parties in Iraq, particularly the Shiite, in order to try to block Although U.S.-Turkish relations slowly improved, for many in Turkey, the incident in Sulaymaniyah Sulaymaniyah in incident the Turkey, in many for improved, slowly relations U.S.-Turkish Although in participate to failure its of result a as lost had it Washington in influence much how home drove the campaign to oust Saddam. Few expected the United States concerns now to listen to Turkey’s Kurdish state. about an independent the proudest institution in an acutely proud nation, it was an unprecedented humiliation [24]. it was an unprecedented humiliation in an acutely proud nation, the proudest institution they detained the Turkish forces, the U.S. troops had followed standard procedures by cuffing and Turkish they detained the hooding them for them, holding three days of before they were interrogations released. For finally The Jamestown Foundation against a background of increasing political tensions between the Iraqi Kurds and Turkey; this Turkey; and Kurds Iraqi the between tensions political increasing of background a against they were owed [27]. By fall 2007, many Turkish companies had begun to wind up their operations bribes to prominent figures to secure contracts, they still faced severe difficulties in collecting what high the was level of reasons corruption in main the KAR. Several the Turkish of businessmen complained One that, despite paying 2007. huge late through sour to began relations economic But or linkstothe AKP government. included several businessmen who were known to have strong Turkish ultranationalist sympathies However,Iraq. northern to goods the consumer and Turkishalso food Iraq northern in contractors exported which Turkey inside companies established also had Barzani, Massoud President KDP of relatives including Kurds, Iraqi Several Turkishand Kurds. Iraqi between conducted was trade Turkey [26]. The KAR even received around 10 percent of its electricity from Turkey. Much of the in back more thousand hundred several for employment and Iraq northern in citizens Turkishfor jobs 14,000 creating Iraq, northern in companies Turkish 1,200 be to estimated were there 2007 airports, highways, universities, housing complexes and even the new KDP headquarters. By early estimated $2 billion worth of construction contracts, including large infrastructure projects such as an secured had contractors Turkishaddition, year.In a billion $5 estimated an to grown had Iraq northern and Turkeybetween trade bilateral of volume the 2007, early By off. took really Habur through trade cross-border the that 2003 in sanctions UN of lifting the until not was it However, the Iraqisideofborderandwasabletolevyaninformaltaxongoodstransported. on passed trade the which through area the controlled KDP whose Barzani, Massoud for income of source lucrative a also was trade The goods. consumer and foodstuffs of import the and fuel, diesel particularly products, petroleum Iraqi of export the involved Habur through trade illicit the Turkey were acknowledged to be one of the main factors fuelling recruitment to the PKK. Much of southeastern in unemployment and poverty of levels high because least not Habur, through trade late 1990s, the Turkish authorities were increasingly reluctant to clamp down on the growing illicit hard hit by the abrupt decline in trade following the imposition of the UN sanctions regime. By the an increasing volume ofsemi-licit and illicit trade. The economyofsoutheastern Turkey hadbeen However,1995. along 14, with the April legal of trade through 986 Turkey’sNo. sole border Resolution gate with Council Iraq at Security Habur had come UN under 1996 December in launched through routes the mountains along smuggling the border.centuries-old using It had it increased under the of oil-for-food much program which regime, was sanctions UN the of height the Saddam’s at even of wake the in Kurds, Iraqi the overthrow economic ties boomed on the ground in northern Iraq. There had been some and illicit trade Turkey between tensions political the Despite the Arabs and Turkmen favoranegotiatedsettlement. while referendum a for pushing still Kurds Iraqi the with impasse, the to solution a find to months Turkey andNorthern Iraq: An Overview Cross-Border Trade 18 Occasional Paper Gareth Jenkins Gareth 19 Losing Patience with the KAR Losing Patience Turkish Chief of Staff General Yasar Buyukanit held a press conference to announce that the Turkish Turkish the The that first indication announce that was Turkey losing patience to with the KAR conference came April on 12, 2007, press when a held Buyukanit Yasar General Staff of Chief Turkish military cross-border a launch to government AKP the from order the awaiting merely was military Iraqi Kurdish control. In response to Turkish pressure to clamp down on the PKK presence in northern Iraq, Kurds the have Iraqi long maintained that they lack the military capabilities to be able to hunt points continually Turkey down However, terrain. difficult extremely is what and in organization the destroy told has and Iraq northern in impunity relative with around move to able are militants PKK that out should they PKK, the eradicate to Mountains Qandil the into go cannot they if that, Kurds Iraqi the under are which areas from supplies non-lethal source to ability and movements its restrict least at supplies from northern Iraq. The PKK’s headquarters and main training camps are situated in the inaccessible Qandil Mountains, Mountains, Qandil inaccessible the in situated are camps training main and headquarters PKK’s The around 40 miles south of the Turkish But border. it also has temporary camps and forward bases the PKK has been able to use Although it no longer has a state sponsor, much closer to the border. its still considerable financial resources to buy weapons on non-lethal the its of black most secures it market—particularly army—while from Saddam’s of units to belonged formerly which stocks Through 2007, both the Turkish government and the TGS were becoming increasingly frustrated by the Iraqi failure Kurds’ to prevent the PKK infiltrating into Turkey from its bases in northern anger was directed at Barzani. Turkey’s most of now the Iraqi president, Talabani With Iraq. proposal to open a new gate at Ovakoy was resolutely opposed by the Iraqi Kurds. proposal to open a new gate at Ovakoy Even though it was aware of the importance of the government had Turkey the made no attempt cross-border to take advantage Turkey, southeastern of the lifting trade to the local economy in 2003 from trade bilateral in boom The KAR. the with ties economic strengthening by sanctions of tension, political of time a At businesspeople. private of initiative the of product the all was onward the northern with Turkish trading authorities were which often companies from either calls heed delayed to refused the government truck The traffic completely. through Habur or closed the gate Iraq to open a second border gate so that they just was did which not Ovakoy, at gate new a have open to was made government to the proposal only The funnel Habur. all of their goods through around area the But terms. economic in sense no made Ovakoy at gate new A Habur. from miles 10 it was predominantly inhabited by Turkmen. The AKP government appears that to the local Turkmen would have thus be calculated able to levy their own taxes on trade. Not the surprisingly, time, not so much over Kirkuk as the PKK. time, not so much The Jamestown Foundation only a symptom of the failure of Turkey’s attempts to assimilate its Kurds but also serves as a as serves also but pretext for its failure to confront the issue of Kurds Kurdish identity, enabling successive its governments to assimilate to attempts Turkey’sof failure the of symptom a only not is PKK the extent, large a minority.To Kurdish restive still Turkey’sown for independence political of form some to aspirations their of repercussions possible the about fears and nostalgia Turkey’s policy toward the Kurds of northern Iraq has been based on a mixture of residual Ottoman protested, theymadenoattempttoopposethe Turkish operation. into Iraq to strike at PKK forward bases close to the Turkish-Iraqi border. Although the Iraqi Kurds decade, a than more Turkishin operation ground substantial first the in crossed 2008, commandos of what was to be a series of air raids against PKK bases in the Qandil Mountains. On February 21, first the staged TurkishF-16s 2007, December early In limited. be would action military any that Turkey with actionable intelligence on PKK bases in northern Iraq in return Minister Recep for Tayyipa Prime Erdogan and Turkishbetween WashingtonPresident Georgein undertaking W.meeting a Bush, the at United 2007, States agreed November to provide of beginning the At unsustainable. killed in PKK attacks in less than a month, the public pressure on the Turkish government became been had soldiers Turkish40 nearly after 2007, mid-October By backfired. tactics in change The bases innorthernIraq. organization’s the against incursion military a launching from it prevent Washingtonwould that confident respond, to Turkey’sinability demonstrating by victory propaganda a secure then and casualties high inflict to been have to appears intention The militants. 100 over using operations launch to began PKK the 2007, September However,in abandoned. been rapidly had practice the and helicopters, Cobra of use the through military,particularly Turkish the by operations pursuit or to inflict a high number of casualties. But the larger units had also been highly vulnerable to hot briefly staged a series of mass attacks with as many as 500 militants in order either to seize territory However, in early fall 2007, the PKK abruptly changed tactics. During the early 1990s, Ocalan had stage across-borderoperation. to the pressure put AKPunder could Turkish in casualties increase an rhetoric, ultranationalist by dominated campaign a in that, fear for Turkey,inside apparently operations its back scaled PKK to deliver on his threat. Nevertheless, in the run-up to the Turkish general election in July 2007, the country. As a result, neither the Iraqi Kurds nor the PKK leadership expected Buyukanit to be able the of region peaceful most the was what destabilizing of fear for Iraq northern into incursion any Turkeyagainst warned long had States United The Iraq. northern in bases PKK against operation attempt toequateanyadvocacy ofKurdishrightswithsupportforterrorism. Turkey andNorthern Iraq: An Overview The PKKChanges Tactics The Road Ahead 20 Occasional Paper Gareth Jenkins Gareth 21 successful. Nor is there any indication that they will be any more successful in the future. successful. Nor is there any indication In many ways, the current standoff between Turkey and the Iraqi In Kurds many Turkey over ways, the the between PKK current is standoff probably a distraction from other, more deep-rooted issues which are likely to remain the on foreseeable the future. agenda At for their heart lies the question of Kurdish identity Kurdish identity—or even multiple and Kurdish identities—into the political map of how the Middle East. to integrate Unfortunately, there do not currently appear to be Kurdish any Turkey’s policies, whether obvious applied to its answers. own citizens What or the is Iraqi Kurds, have clear not been is that only short-term damage on the PKK. only short-term damage on the PKK. However, there However, is little doubt that the sense of solidarity many Iraqi Kurds feel toward the Kurds is a Turkey of major impediment to the ability of the Kurdish authorities in northern Iraq to crack down on the PKK, particularly given the recent increase in public authorities discontent at with the the high Kurdish levels of corruption and their failure also difficult to to with argue the logic case of that, Turkish the if no one provide else is prepared to do so, it basic services. But it is has the right to take action against an organization which is killing its Although citizens. Turkey is able to communicate with the KRG through numerous “back channels,” it has been unwilling to communicate with it officially for fear that it would be regarded as recognition of the KRG’s political authority in northern Iraq, which could further fuel separatist the ambitions. Iraqi Kurds’ inflict to likely are Iraq northern into incursions military KRG, the with engages Turkey unless Yet, For their part, the two main Iraqi relations with other political Kurdish actors in the region. The factions Kurdish nationalist rhetoric has have often been been notoriously pragmatic used in to mask their tribalism and the personal ambition of their leaders, of even their fellow at Kurds. It the is still cost too early of to say whether the the last lives decade of relatively harmonious cooperation and between the the PUK KDP will be permanent; it is also unclear whether 16 years supersedes that consciousness national truly a in resulted has KAR the in independence facto de of the Iraqi Kurds. whether it has really taken root among and tribal loyalty, The Jamestown Foundation 16 airbase atIncirlikforattacksonIraq. 15 14 subsequently leftthePKK. 13 future statusofKirkuk. 12 11 10 into Iran. 9 8 7 6 of_Lausanne 5 4 Macmillan, 2008),p.67. 3 of theUN Working GrouponMinoritiesinGeneva, 2 1 17 September 1999. re-absorbed and government central the of forces the by defeated being before year one than less Iran even succeeded in creating their own statelet. Known as the Republic of Mahabad, it survived who, throughtheirisolationinthemountains,hadforgotten their Turkishness. Turks”“mountain were but exist not did Kurds Officially,the Kurdish. speak to or “Kurd” word not though primarily,exclusively, was religiousincharacter. SeeJenkins,PoliticalIslamin Turkey,Revolt pp.93-4. Said Shaykh the nationalists, Kurdish of generations later by Treaty_of_Sèvres after Saddam’s invasion of Kuwait and would later allow Allied warplanes to use the Turkish the use to warplanes Allied allow later would and Kuwait of invasion Saddam’s after the from attack under when Iran Turkish in military. Author’s refuge interviewwithGen.DoganBeyazit,Istanbul,March1997. take and border Turkish-Iranian the of side Iranian Even the KAR’s eventual boundaries remain the subject of bitter dispute, not least in relation to the community tointervene. Author interviewswithIraqiKurds, Turkish-Iraqi border, April 1991. leaders had calculated in advance that the resultant humanitarian crisis would force the international

Gareth Jenkins, Political Islam in Turkey: Running West, Heading East? (New York:Palgrave (New East? Heading West,Running Turkey: in Islam Political Jenkins, Gareth Iraqi Turkmen Front.http://www.kerkuk.net/kurumsal/?dil=2057&metin=19 In 1946, in the confusion following the end of World War II, Kurds around the city of Mahabad in the use to even forbidden was it 1989, in Turkey in arrived first author the when example, For appropriated been often has it 1924. Although of Revolt Said Shaykh the was serious most The Iraqbecameafullyindependentstatein1932,Syria1946. the of http://wwi.lib.byu.edu/index.php/Treaty_ text Treatyat full found The be can Lausanne of http://wwi.lib.byu.edu/index.php/Peace_ at found be can Sèvres of Treaty the of text full The Presentation of the The exodus appears to have been largely spontaneous. However, at least some of the Kurdish the of some least at However, spontaneous. largely been have to appears exodus The Turkey had closed the Kirkuk-Yumurtalik oil pipeline as part of the UN-imposed sanctions regime The KAR currently remains the federal state’s only clearly defined region with its own assembly. DavidMcDowall, A ModernHistoryoftheKurds(London:I.B. Tauris, 1996),p.318. UnlikeIran,whichimmediately openeditsborderstoamuchlarger numberofrefugees. Author’s interview with former Land Forces Commander General Muhittin Fisunoglu, Istanbul, Author’sFisunoglu, Muhittin General Commander Forces Land former with interview The Iranian authorities would allow PKK militants to operate from temporary camps on the on camps temporary from operate to militants PKK allow would authorities Iranian The uhrs neves ih K sucs SpebrOtbr 05 Sm o te dissenters the of Some 2005. September-October sources, PKK with interviews Author’s Turkey andNorthern Iraq: An Overview Iraqi Turkmen Human Rights Research Notes 22 May 27,2005.

Foundation to the 11 th session

Occasional Paper Gareth Jenkins Gareth 23 Author interviews with businessmen active in northern Iraq, Turkey, September-November Figures taken from a survey of economic ties between Turkey and Iraq conducted by Serpil Most significantly prior to 1974 but also, albeit to a lesser extent, Azeri the minority in Most of the Turkish officer corps were infuriated that the Turkish special forces had not resisted Turkish officer corps were infuriated that the Turkish Most of the Author’s Author’s interviews April with concerns Turkish officials, 1991. Turkey’s southeastern Turkey, Author’s interviews with Turkish military officials, Diyarbakir, June military interviews officials, 1997 Author’s Turkish with Diyarbakir, and Sirnak, February Bill Park, Turkey’s Policy Towards Northern Iraq: Problems and Perspectives, Adelphi Paper No. Paper Adelphi Perspectives, and Problems Iraq: Northern Towards Policy Turkey’s Park, Bill Author’s interviews with Turkish government officials, Ankara, 1992-93. government officials, Turkish interviews with Author’s

Massoud Barzani quoted in Turkish Daily News, December 31, 2004. Daily News, December Turkish Massoud Barzani quoted in “Eyes on Turkey,” Middle East International, no. 691, January 10, 2003, pp. 14-15. Middle East Turkey,” “Eyes on

and died fighting rather than meekly surrendering. All of the Turkish officers involved in the were probably not without foundation. The author spoke with PKK militants amongst the refugees refugees the amongst militants PKK with spoke author The foundation. without not probably were April 1991. border, Turkish-Iraqi in the mountains. 2007. Yilmaz and published in the daily Milliyet on April 5-11, 2007. April 5-11, and published in the daily Milliyet on Yilmaz 27 incident subsequently took early retirement. incident subsequently took early 25 26 23 24 22 Press for the International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2005) 374 (Oxford: Oxford University 1998. 21 Iran. 19 20 18 About the Author

Gareth Jenkins has been based in Istanbul since 1989, working as journalist, author and analyst. He writes extensively on political, economic and security issues related to Turkey and the surrounding region. In 2001 he published a monograph on the political role of the Turkish military, entitled Context and Circumstance: The Turkish Military and Politics. His book on political Islam in Turkey, entitled Political Islam in Turkey: Running West, Heading East? (Palgrave Macmillan), will be published in spring 2008. Mr. Jenkins is a regular contributor to Jamestown publications.