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Sudan: Rejected Asylum Seekers Country Policy and Information Note Sudan: Rejected asylum seekers Version 3.0 August 2017 Preface This note provides country of origin information (COI) and policy guidance to Home Office decision makers on handling particular types of protection and human rights claims. This includes whether claims are likely to justify the granting of asylum, humanitarian protection or discretionary leave and whether – in the event of a claim being refused – it is likely to be certifiable as ‘clearly unfounded’ under s94 of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002. Decision makers must consider claims on an individual basis, taking into account the case specific facts and all relevant evidence, including: the policy guidance contained with this note; the available COI; any applicable caselaw; and the Home Office casework guidance in relation to relevant policies. Country information COI in this note has been researched in accordance with principles set out in the Common EU [European Union] Guidelines for Processing Country of Origin Information (COI) and the European Asylum Support Office’s research guidelines, Country of Origin Information report methodology, namely taking into account its relevance, reliability, accuracy, objectivity, currency, transparency and traceability. All information is carefully selected from generally reliable, publicly accessible sources or is information that can be made publicly available. Full publication details of supporting documentation are provided in footnotes. Multiple sourcing is normally used to ensure that the information is accurate, balanced and corroborated, and that a comprehensive and up-to-date picture at the time of publication is provided. Information is compared and contrasted, whenever possible, to provide a range of views and opinions. The inclusion of a source is not an endorsement of it or any views expressed. Feedback Our goal is to continuously improve our material. Therefore, if you would like to comment on this note, please email the Country Policy and Information Team. Independent Advisory Group on Country Information The Independent Advisory Group on Country Information (IAGCI) was set up in March 2009 by the Independent Chief Inspector of Borders and Immigration to make recommendations to him about the content of the Home Office‘s COI material. The IAGCI welcomes feedback on the Home Office‘s COI material. It is not the function of the IAGCI to endorse any Home Office material, procedures or policy. IAGCI may be contacted at: Independent Chief Inspector of Borders and Immigration, 5th Floor, Globe House, 89 Eccleston Square, London, SW1V 1PN. Email: [email protected] Information about the IAGCI‘s work and a list of the COI documents which have been reviewed by the IAGCI can be found on the Independent Chief Inspector‘s website at http://icinspector.independent.gov.uk/country-information-reviews/ Page 2 of 29 Contents Policy guidance........................................................................................................ 4 1. Introduction...................................................................................................... 4 1.1 Basis of claim ........................................................................................... 4 2. Consideration of Issues ................................................................................... 4 2.1 Credibility.................................................................................................. 4 2.2 Particular social group.............................................................................. 4 2.3 Assessment of risk ................................................................................... 4 2.4 Protection ................................................................................................. 5 2.5 Internal relocation..................................................................................... 5 2.6 Certification .............................................................................................. 5 3. Policy summary ............................................................................................... 6 Country information................................................................................................. 7 4. Returns statistics ............................................................................................. 7 5. Exit / entry procedures..................................................................................... 7 5.1 Exit ........................................................................................................... 7 5.2 Entry......................................................................................................... 9 6. Treatment of returnees .................................................................................. 11 6.1 On arrival................................................................................................ 11 6.2 Persons of interest / allegations of difficulties on return ......................... 14 6.3 Returns from Israel................................................................................. 21 Annex A: Letter from British Embassy, Khartoum, 29 September 2016 ............... 23 Annex B: Letter from the British Embassy, Khartoum, 8 April 2013...................... 25 Annex C: Letter from the British Embassy, Khartoum, 19 February 2015 ............ 27 Version control and contacts................................................................................ 29 Page 3 of 29 Policy guidance Updated: 28 July 2017 1. Introduction 1.1 Basis of claim 1.1.1 Fear of persecution or serious harm by the state because the person has unsuccessfully claimed asylum in the UK. Back to Contents 2. Consideration of Issues 2.1 Credibility 2.1.1 For further guidance on assessing credibility, see the Asylum Instruction on Assessing Credibility and Refugee Status. 2.1.2 Decision makers must also check if there has been a previous application for a UK visa or another form of leave. Asylum applications matched to visas should be investigated prior to the asylum interview (see the Asylum Instruction on Visa Matches, Asylum Claims from UK Visa Applicants). 2.1.3 Decision makers should also consider the need to conduct language analysis testing (see the Asylum Instruction on Language Analysis). Back to Contents 2.2 Particular social group 2.2.1 Rejected asylum seekers returned to Sudan do not form a particular social group (PSG) simply by virtue of having made an unsuccessful asylum claim in the UK. This is because they do not share a common characteristic that cannot be changed and do not have a distinct identity which is perceived as being different by the surrounding society. 2.2.2 For guidance on assessing membership of a particular social group, see the Asylum Instruction on Assessing Credibility and Refugee Status. Back to Contents 2.3 Assessment of risk 2.3.1 In the country guidance case of IM and AI (Risks – membership of Beja Tribe, Beja Congress and JEM) Sudan CG [2016] UKUT 188 (IAC) (14 April 2016), heard on 28 and 29 July, and 4 November 2015, the Upper Tribunal (UT) gave general guidance on the position of returned rejected asylum seekers. It found that there was no risk of persecution for rejected asylum seekers per se (paras 216 to 226). 2.3.2 The UT found that: ‘In HGMO (Relocation to Khartoum) [HGMO (Relocation to Khartoum) Sudan CG [2006] UKAIT 00062 (03 August 2006)], the Tribunal concluded that neither involuntary returnees nor failed asylum seekers… were as such at real risk on return to Khartoum… [and] it was not argued before [this] Tribunal that involuntary returnees would be at risk for Page 4 of 29 that reason alone…Had this been a general practice, the information would have filtered out’ (paras 220 and 222). 2.3.3 The UT in IM and AI also found that ‘[i]t is our firm conclusion that a failed asylum seeker, including an individual that had been subject to investigation by the immigration authorities on return, would not be at risk of further investigation by [National Intelligence and Security Service] NISS on that basis alone.’ (para 225) 2.3.4 Evidence available since the hearing and promulgation of IM and AI in 2015 and 2016 respectively, when taken in the round, does not establish that rejected asylum seekers per se are at risk of harm on return (see Treatment of returnees). 2.3.5 The state may, however, take an adverse interest in a person returning to Sudan who is known or is suspected to have a political profile and / or are linked to activities that are perceived to be critical of the government (see Persons of interest and the country policy and information note on Sudan: Opposition to the government). 2.3.6 For further guidance on assessing risk generally, see the Asylum Instruction on Assessing Credibility and Refugee Status. Back to Contents 2.4 Protection 2.4.1 As the person fears persecution or serious harm from the state, they will not be able to avail themselves of the protection of the authorities. 2.4.2 For further information on assessing the availability or not of state protection, see the Asylum Instruction on Assessing Credibility and Refugee Status. Back to Contents 2.5 Internal relocation 2.5.1 As the person fears persecution or serious harm from the state, internal relocation will not be reasonable. 2.5.2 For further guidance on internal relocation, see the Asylum Instruction on Assessing Credibility and Refugee Status. Back to Contents 2.6 Certification 2.6.1 Where a
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