Wikipedia, Public Goods
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Lakes Port & Harbor: Infrastructure & Dredging Cost Estimate Matrix Tool
Great Lakes Port & Harbor: Infrastructure & Dredging Cost Estimate Matrix Tool and Duluth, MN/Superior, WI and Toledo, OH Case Studies Gene Clark1 and Dale Bergeron2 1 WI Sea Grant [email protected] 2 MN Sea Grant dbergeron@ d.umn.edu Defining the parameters of the Matrix Great Lakes ports, harbors and marinas are vulnerable to several potential climate change impacts. The two major impacts most relevant and potentially most costly are water level and storm intensity. Both rising and falling water levels can impact infrastructure stability and overall strength, as well as requiring additional channel dredging. A climatic change resulting in an increase in severe storms (more precipitation, higher winds and greater number of storm events) is also viewed as having detrimental affects on infrastructure. More severe storms can create larger waves, more extreme Seiche events and greater storm-surges that can damage port and harbor infrastructure requiring costly rehabilitation or replacement. In addition to infrastructure issues, an increased storm frequency and intensity will increase channel silting and sedimentation, compounding dredging problems analogous to lower water level scenarios. Climate model predictions for specific weather outcomes vary greatly throughout the Great Lakes Basin, and include both higher and lower water levels scenarios. However, all predictions seem to include an increase in both the number and intensity of major storm events. This combination can result in unanticipated water level change, larger waves, more dramatic Seiches and greater storm surges than considered in original design parameters (all of this in addition to the antiquated and sometime dilapidated state of our Great Lakes infrastructure). -
All Aboard: the Aggregate Effects of Port Development
All aboard: The aggregate effects of port development César Ducruet1, Réka Juhász2, Dávid Krisztián Nagy3, and Claudia Steinwender4 1CNRS 2Columbia University 3CREI, Universitat Pompeu Fabra and Barcelona GSE 4MIT Sloan ∗ July 3, 2019 Abstract This paper studies the distributional and aggregate economic effects of new port technologies developed in the second half of the 20th century. We show that new technologies have led to a significant reallocation of shipping activity from large to small cities. This was driven by a land price mechanism; as new port technologies are more land-intensive, ports moved from large, high land price cities to smaller, lower land price ones. We add endogenous port development to a standard quantitative model of cross- city trade to account for both the benefits and the costs of port development. According to the model, the adoption of new port technologies leads to benefits through increasing market access but is costly, requiring the extensive use of land, suggesting a reallocation of shipping activities towards cities with low land prices and thus net gains from new port technologies that are heterogeneous across cities. Counterfactual results suggest that new port technologies led to sizable aggregate gains for the world economy, with substantial heterogeneity in the effects across countries. More generally, accounting for the costs of port infrastructure development endogenously has the potential to alter the size and distribution of the gains from trade. ∗We thank David Atkin, Don Davis, Dave Donaldson, Joseph Doyle, Matt Grant, Gordon Hanson, Tom Holmes, Amit Khandelwal, Jim Rauch, Roberto Rigobon, Esteban Rossi-Hansberg and Tavneet Suri for helpful comments and discussions. -
Economic Regulation of Utility Infrastructure
4 Economic Regulation of Utility Infrastructure Janice A. Beecher ublic infrastructure has characteristics of both public and private goods and earns a separate classification as a toll good. Utilities demonstrate a Pvariety of distinct and interrelated technical, economic, and institutional characteristics that relate to market structure and oversight. Except for the water sector, much of the infrastructure providing essential utility services in the United States is privately owned and operated. Private ownership of utility infrastructure necessitates economic regulation to address market failures and prevent abuse of monopoly power, particularly at the distribution level. The United States can uniquely boast more than 100 years of experience in regulation in the public in- terest through a social compact that balances and protects the interests of inves- tors and ratepayers both. Jurisdiction is shared between independent federal and state commissions that apply established principles through a quasi-judicial pro- cess. The commissions continue to rely primarily on the method known as rate base/rate-of-return regulation, by which regulators review the prudence of in- frastructure investment, along with prices, profits, and performance. Regulatory theory and practice have adapted to emerging technologies and evolving market conditions. States—and nation-states—have become the experimental laborato- ries for structuring, restructuring, and regulating infrastructure industries, and alternative methods have been tried, including price-cap and performance regu- lation in the United Kingdom and elsewhere. Aging infrastructure and sizable capital requirements, in the absence of effective competition, argue for a regula- tory role. All forms of regulation, and their implementation, can and should be Review comments from Tim Brennan, Carl Peterson, Ken Costello, David Wagman, and the Lincoln Institute of Land Policy are greatly appreciated. -
Club Good Intermediaries∗
Club Good Intermediaries∗ Simon Loertscher† Leslie M. Marx‡ September 4, 2016 Abstract The emergence and ubiquitous presence in everyday life of digital goods such as songs, movies, and e-books give renewed salience to the problem of providing public goods with exclusion. Because digital goods are typically traded via inter- mediaries like iTunes, Amazon, and Netflix, the question arises as to the optimal pricing mechanism for such club good intermediaries. We derive the direct Bayesian optimal mechanism for allocating club goods when the mechanism designer is an intermediary that neither produces nor consumes the goods, and we develop an indirect mechanism that implements this mechanism. We also derive sufficient con- ditions for the intermediary-optimal mechanism to be implementable with revenue sharing contracts, which are widely used in e-business. Keywords: revenue maximization, excludable public goods, two-sided platforms, optimal pricing, digital goods JEL Classification: C72, D82, L13 ∗We thank seminar participants at the 34th Australasian Economic Theory Workshop, C´edric Wasser, and an anonymous referee for helpful comments. †Department of Economics, Level 4, FBE Building, 111 Barry Street, University of Melbourne, Victoria 3010, Australia. Email: [email protected]. ‡The Fuqua School of Business, Duke University, 100 Fuqua Drive, Durham, NC 27708, USA: Email: [email protected]. 1 Introduction The issue of optimal public goods provision has achieved new salience with the emergence of digital goods like e-books, downloadable songs, and movies along with new technologies that make exclusion and distribution possible at negligible marginal costs. An aspect not present in the analysis of excludable public goods or “club goods” in the age of the internet is that consumers gain access to these digital goods via an intermediary such as Amazon, iTunes, Spotify, or Netflix rather than contracting directly with the producer of the club good as they might with the owner of a country club. -
Improving Road Infrastructure and Traffic Flows IRU Resolution Adopted by the Council of Direction at Its Meeting in Brussels on 18 May 2000
Improving road infrastructure and traffic flows IRU Resolution adopted by the Council of Direction at its meeting in Brussels on 18 May 2000 The mobility of people and goods is dependent on the efficient use of existing traffic infrastructure, and the modernisation and expansion of traffic infrastructure to meet the future demand for transport services efficiently and cost-effectively. This applies in particular to roads, since road transport accounts for more than 90% of all passenger transport and more than 80% of all goods transport in most countries in terms of passengers and tonnes carried. Impediments to mobility such as traffic restrictions, road blockades, closures of certain road infrastructure sections, or congestion due to bottlenecks in road infrastructure ignore the fact that • road infrastructure investments are a vital prerequisite for improving road safety, (see annex 1) • revenues from the transport of goods by road (fuel taxes, vehicle ownership taxes, road user charges) more than cover expenditure on road building and maintenance, as do revenues from the transport by bus and coach (see annex 2) • congested traffic leads to a significant increase of fuel consumption by a factor of up to 3, (see annex 3) • on average, only 0.5% of total land surface in most countries is used for road infrastructure, (see annex 4) • the economic benefits of road infrastructure investments are 29 times its investment costs, and thus the highest of all infrastructure sectors, including other transport modes, (see annex 5) • the economic cost of impediments to road transport (congestion, border delays, traffic bans, blockades etc.) amounts to 0.5% of GDP, i.e. -
66, 13 January 2014
sanity, humanity and science probably the world’s most read economics journal real-world economics review - Subscribers: 23,924 Subscribe here Blog ISSN 1755-9472 - A journal of the World Economics Association (WEA) 12,557 members, join here - Sister open-access journals: Economic Thought and World Economic Review - back issues at www.paecon.net recent issues: 65 64 63 62 61 60 59 58 57 56 Issue no. 66, 13 January 2014 In this issue: Secular stagnation and endogenous money 2 Steve Keen Micro versus Macro 12 Lars Pålsson Syll On facts and values: a critique of the fact value dichotomy 30 Joseph Noko Modern Money Theory and New Currency Theory: A comparative discussion 38 Joseph Huber Fama-Shiller, the Prize Committee and the “Efficient Markets Hypothesis” 58 Bernard Guerrien and Ozgur Gun How capitalists learned to stop worrying and love the crisis 65 Shimshon Bichler and Jonathan Nitzan Two approaches to global competition: A historical review 74 M. Shahid Alam Dimensions of real-world competition – a critical realist perspective 80 Hubert Buch-Hansen Information economics as mainstream economics and the limits of reform 95 Jamie Morgan and Brendan Sheehan The ℵ capability matrix: GDP and the economics of human development 109 Jorge Buzaglo Open access vs. academic power 127 C P Chandrasekhar Interview with Edward Fullbrook on New Paradigm Economics vs. Old Paradigm Economics 131 Book review of The Great Eurozone Disaster: From Crisis to Global New Deal by Heikki Patomäki 144 Comment: Romar Correa on “A Copernican Turn in Banking Union”, by Thomas Mayer 147 Board of Editors, past contributors, submissions and etc. -
What Equilibrium Concept for Public Goods Provision? I - the Convex Case
Walras-Lindahl-Wicksell: What equilibrium concept for public goods provision ? I - The convex case Monique Florenzano To cite this version: Monique Florenzano. Walras-Lindahl-Wicksell: What equilibrium concept for public goods provision ? I - The convex case. 2009. halshs-00367867 HAL Id: halshs-00367867 https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-00367867 Submitted on 12 Mar 2009 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents entific research documents, whether they are pub- scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, lished or not. The documents may come from émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de teaching and research institutions in France or recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires abroad, or from public or private research centers. publics ou privés. Documents de Travail du Centre d’Economie de la Sorbonne Walras—Lindahl—Wicksell : What equilibrium concept for public goods provision ? I – The convex case Monique FLORENZANO 2009.09 Maison des Sciences Économiques, 106-112 boulevard de L'Hôpital, 75647 Paris Cedex 13 http://ces.univ-paris1.fr/cesdp/CES-docs.htm ISSN : 1955-611X WALRAS–LINDAHL–WICKSELL: WHAT EQUILIBRIUM CONCEPT FOR PUBLIC GOODS PROVISION? I - THE CONVEX CASE MONIQUE FLORENZANO Centre d’Economie de la Sorbonne, CNRS–Universit´eParis 1, monique.fl[email protected] Abstract. Despite the large number of its references, this paper is less a survey than a systematic exposition, in an unifying framework and assuming convexity as well on the consumption side as on the production side, of the different equilibrium concepts elaborated for studying provision of public goods. -
“Free Riding” in Civil Wars? Violence, Insurgency, and the Collective Action Problem
NÚMERO 139 STATHIS N. KALYVAS MATTHEW ADAM KOCHER How Free is “Free Riding” in Civil Wars? Violence, Insurgency, and the Collective Action Problem JUNIO 2006 www.cide.edu Las colecciones de Documentos de Trabajo del CIDE representan un medio para difundir los avances de la labor de investigación y para permitir que los autores reciban comentarios antes de su publicación definitiva. Se agradecerá que los comentarios se hagan llegar directamente al (los) autor(es). • D.R. ® 2006. Centro de Investigación y Docencia Económicas, carretera México-Toluca 3655 (km 16.5), Lomas de Santa Fe, 01210, México, D.F. Tel. 5727•9800 exts. 2202, 2203, 2417 Fax: 5727•9885 y 5292•1304. Correo electrónico: [email protected] www.cide.edu Producción a cargo del (los) autor(es), por lo que tanto el contenido como el estilo y la redacción son su responsabilidad. Acknowledgements Thanks to Abbey Steele for research assistance, and to Zeynep Bulutgil, Eddie Camp, Sergio Galaz García, Adria Lawrence, Nicholas Sambanis, Jonah Schulhofer-Wohl, Justin Fox. Versions of this paper were presented at the Sawyer Seminar on Mass Killing, Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Science (CASBS); the Comparative Politics Workshop, Department of Political Science, Yale University; and the Laboratory on Comparative Ethnic Processes (LiCEP). Thanks to all the participants for their generous attention and thoughful commentary. Abstract That rebels face a collective action problem is one of the most widely shared assumptions in the literature on civil wars. We argue that the collective action paradigm can be both descriptively inaccurate and analytically misleading as applied to civil wars —which are uniquely characterized by large-scale violence. -
Public Goods in Everyday Life
Public Goods in Everyday Life By June Sekera A GDAE Teaching Module on Social and Environmental Issues in Economics Global Development And Environment Institute Tufts University Medford, MA 02155 http://ase.tufts.edu/gdae Copyright © June Sekera Reproduced by permission. Copyright release is hereby granted for instructors to copy this module for instructional purposes. Students may also download the reading directly from https://ase.tufts.edu/gdae Comments and feedback from course use are welcomed: Global Development And Environment Institute Tufts University Somerville, MA 02144 http://ase.tufts.edu/gdae E-mail: [email protected] PUBLIC GOODS IN EVERYDAY LIFE “The history of civilization is a history of public goods... The more complex the civilization the greater the number of public goods that needed to be provided. Ours is far and away the most complex civilization humanity has ever developed. So its need for public goods – and goods with public goods aspects, such as education and health – is extraordinarily large. The institutions that have historically provided public goods are states. But it is unclear whether today’s states can – or will be allowed to – provide the goods we now demand.”1 -Martin Wolf, Financial Times 1 Martin Wolf, “The World’s Hunger for Public Goods”, Financial Times, January 24, 2012. 2 PUBLIC GOODS IN EVERYDAY LIFE TABLE OF CONTENTS 1. INTRODUCTION .........................................................................................................4 1.1 TEACHING OBJECTIVES: ..................................................................................................................... -
Demand Curve
Econ 201: Introduction to Economics Analysis September 4 Lecture: Supply and Demand Jeffrey Parker Reed College Daily dose of The Far Side Keeping with the vegetable theme from Wednesday… www.thefarside.com 2 Preview of this class session • Basic principles of market analysis using supply and demand curves are central to economics • Formal conditions for “perfectly competitive” markets are strict and rarely satisfied • We discuss what supply curves and demand curves are • We define market equilibrium and why we expect markets to move there • We consider effects of shifts in curves on equilibrium price and quantity 3 “Two-curve” analysis • Why is it useful? • Two key variables (price, quantity) • One curve slopes up and the other down • Some exogenous variables affect one curve, others the other • Few affect both • Change in any exogenous variable affects one curve in predictable way: • Intersection moves SE, NE, NW, or SE • Predictable changes in price and quantity exchanged https://www.econgraphs.org/graphs/micro/supply_and_demand/supply_and_demand?textbook=varian 4 Demand function • Relates quantity of good demanded to its relative price • Quantity demanded = amount buyers are willing and able to purchase • Relative price is price of good holding all other goods constant • Reflects decision-making by potential buyers • Demand function: QD = D (P ) • Negative relationship • Downward-sloping curve • Need not be straight line https://www.econgraphs.org/graphs/micro/supply_and_demand/supply_and_demand?textbook=varian 5 Demand curves 6 Demand -
A Critique of John Stuart Mill Chris Daly
Southern Illinois University Carbondale OpenSIUC Honors Theses University Honors Program 5-2002 The Boundaries of Liberalism in a Global Era: A Critique of John Stuart Mill Chris Daly Follow this and additional works at: http://opensiuc.lib.siu.edu/uhp_theses Recommended Citation Daly, Chris, "The Boundaries of Liberalism in a Global Era: A Critique of John Stuart Mill" (2002). Honors Theses. Paper 131. This Dissertation/Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the University Honors Program at OpenSIUC. It has been accepted for inclusion in Honors Theses by an authorized administrator of OpenSIUC. For more information, please contact [email protected]. r The Boundaries of Liberalism in a Global Era: A Critique of John Stuart Mill Chris Daly May 8, 2002 r ABSTRACT The following study exanunes three works of John Stuart Mill, On Liberty, Utilitarianism, and Three Essays on Religion, and their subsequent effects on liberalism. Comparing the notion on individual freedom espoused in On Liberty to the notion of the social welfare in Utilitarianism, this analysis posits that it is impossible for a political philosophy to have two ultimate ends. Thus, Mill's liberalism is inherently flawed. As this philosophy was the foundation of Mill's progressive vision for humanity that he discusses in his Three Essays on Religion, this vision becomes paradoxical as well. Contending that the neo-liberalist global economic order is the contemporary parallel for Mill's religion of humanity, this work further demonstrates how these philosophical flaws have spread to infect the core of globalization in the 21 st century as well as their implications for future international relations. -
Theory of Public Goods
Public Goods Private versus Public Goods A private good (bread) exhibits the following two properties: exclusive: A good is exclusive if once you have purchased a good, then you can exclude others from consuming it. rival: A good is rival in consumption, in the sense that once someone buys a loaf of bread and consumes it, then that precludes you from consuming that same loaf of bread. • A rival good is depletable. A technical consequence of depletability is that consumption of additional amounts of rival goods involve some marginal costs of production. A public good (air quality) may exhibit the following two properties: nonexclusive: A good is nonexclusive if no one can be excluded from benefiting from or consuming the good once it is produced. An implication of nonexclusivity is that goods can be enjoyed without direct payment. nonrivalrous: One person's consumption of a good does not diminish the amount or quality available for others. • A nonrival good is nondepletable. A technical consequence of nondepletability is that the marginal cost of providing a nonrival good to an additional consumer is zero. • All public goods exhibit the nonexcludability property but they do not necessarily exhibit the nonrivalrous property. nonrival rival • water pollution in small body of private good excludable water, indoor air pollution pure public good/bad congestible public good/bad • users neither interfere with each • users affect good's usefulness to other nor increase good's others — mutual interference usefulness to each other of users creates negative nonexcludable (free–rider problem) externality (free–access • biodiversity, greenhouse gases problem) • noise, defence, radio signal • ocean fishery, parks • bridge, highway Aggregate Demand Curves for Private and Public Goods 1.