Published by Maney Publishing (c) W. S. Maney & Son Limited aspirations toimproveHungary’slegalpositioninthe Monarchy. Thisconflictdominated era. Conflictingviewsonacceptingorrejectingthe1867 Settlementreflectedpoliticians’ large amountofparliamentarytimefromthebeginning totheend(1918)ofDualist the criticalaspiration.DebatesonHungary’sconstitutional rightstookupaninordinately concerned withtheextenttowhichHungaryhadrights tolegalindependence,whichwas importance, becomingalmostanobsessioninpublic life. Drivenbynationalism,itwas paper aretakenfromanearlierpublication inGermanthatisreferredtonote5. removed muchfromthetextthatwasnotclearandimproveditin other respects.Anumberofsectionsthis I amindebtedtomyreaders,RobertEvans,Pynsent,Martyn RadyandAngusWalker.Theyhave a charmerwhomDeákcalledthe‘providentialman’ influence inimperialaffairs. Transylvania andCroatiawereunited,hadacquiredinternalself-governmentlimited had beenenactedasLawXIIof1867.ThroughtheSettlementHungary,withwhich three years.DeákandhispartyhadreachedaconstitutionalsettlementwiththeCrownthat majority intheHouseofRepresentativescouldlookbackwithsatisfactiononpreceding Joseph dissolvedtheHungarianparliamentonDecember101868,FerenczDeákand THE armyquestionwas a partofconstitutionalpoliticsthathastobeexplained.WhenFranz The constitutionalquestion Central Europe 06W .Mny&SnLdDOI:10.1179/174582106x147338 © 2006W.S.Maney&SonLtd The constitutionalquestion, position withintheEmpirewouldlosetheirholdoverpolitics.Thishopewasneverfulfilled. mentary supportershopedthat,withtheSettlementoutofway,concernsaboutHungary’s of beingequallyacceptabletoViennaandhisowncountry.Thegovernmentitsparlia- 1 The governmentwasheadedbytheimaginativeandentertainingCountGyulaAndrássy, Manó Kónyi, ‘Yes, wecanandshall!’(1903intheHouse) Forty-Eighter hecklers: ‘I wishonecould,butobviouslycannotremakethewholeworldonaHungariancobbler’slast.’ Baron GézaFejérváry,MinisterofNationalDefence: THE ARMYQUESTIONINHUNGARIAN University CollegeLondon,SchoolofSlavonicandEastEuropeanStudies , Vol.4,No.2,November2006 Deák Ferenczbeszédei POLITICS 1867–1918 közjogi kérdés , vol. László Péter László iv , Budapest,1897(hereafter (questionofpubliclaw)acquiredparamount 1 becausehepossessedtherarequality DFB ), p.328. Published by Maney Publishing (c) W. S. Maney & Son Limited were formedandre-formedinparliament. of thecounties,franchisereformandnationalityquestionaremostevidentexamples. constitutional questionratherthan divisions onothermattersweremorefrequentlythannotinfluencedbythe political question.Forlongperiods,theconstitutionalquestioneclipsedallelse.Furthermore, proceedings intheHouseofRepresentativesanddividedmorethananyother (305–08, 318–19). 1934 (hereafterGratz, and theindestructibilityofconstitutionalquestion. Hence theintractabilityofthisnationalistconflict,atleastunderconstitutionalgovernment, to confrontsuperiorforcesbeyondtheRiverLeitha:monarch,hisArmyandpublic. At thesametime,anysubstantialimprovementonDeák’sSettlementinHungary’sfavourhad support foritinthecountrywasweak:didnotfullymeetHungariannationalaspirations. indeed theMonarchyasawhole,wasconstitutionalcrisis. constitution. Dualist erathateventuallyledtotheappointmentofanewprimeministerconcerned had overHungarianpolitics.Arguably,twelveoutofthetwentycabinetcrises between 1867and1918wouldlikewiserevealtheremarkableholdconstitutionalquestions (eds), Fejérváry, Wekerle(1906),Khuen-Héderváry (1910),Lukács,Károlyi. on DomokosKosáry’sLatestWorkthe1848HungarianRevolution’, wider rightsforHungarythanthe1848Laws.SeeLászlóPéter,‘Old HatsandClosetRevisionists:Reflections granted Hungary.The1867constitutionalSettlement,legallyspeaking, wasnota‘compromise’;itsecured ‘personal union’withtherestofMonarchyispurefiction. It wasahomeruleofsortsthattheLaws pp. 239–540(504–07). so-called ‘purepersonalunion’. the ‘OtherLands’ofMonarchy,savemonarchhimself.Thiswasdemandfora in integrum They demandedthatthe1867Settlementberepealedandlawsof1848reinstated later the1848andIndependenceParty)werenot the ExtremeLeft,1848Partyafter1868,LeftandIndependencefrom1874, 1867 Settlementonconstitutionalgrounds.Theselastgroups(theLeftCentrebefore1874; ground betweenthe‘GovernmentParty’,asitwascalled,andgroupsthatrejected 1878, theNationalPartyafter1892,andalso‘LiberalDissidents’),representedmiddle principle the1867Settlement,andwerethus provided thebasisofpartydivisionwithinopposition.Thosegroupsthatacceptedin Settlement aswellthenatureandextentofdemandsforrevisionorrepealthat or rejecteditonconstitutionalgrounds.Again,wasthedegreeofoppositionto1867 Liberal Party).OppositionpartiescriticizedtheSettlementoritsimplementationonpolitical invariably thepartythatsupportedgovernmentinparliament(theDeákor,after1875, Magyar politikaipártprogrammok1867–1914 84 5 4 3 2 Unsurprisingly, therefore,theconstitutionalquestionprovidedbasisonwhichparties The truthaboutthe1867Settlementwasthat,apartfromfirstfewyears,political László Péter,‘DieVerfassungsentwicklung inUngarn’,HelmutRumplerandPeterUrbanitsch The cabinetsofAndrássy,Bittó, Wenckheim,K.Tisza,Szapáry,Széll,Khuen-Héderváry(1903), The claim(towhichmanyHungarianhistoriansarestillwedded) thattheLawsof1848established See theclassicdescriptionofpartystructurebyGusztávGratz, Die Habsburgermonarchie1848–1918 , achangewhich,intheirview,wouldhaveseveredallinstitutionallinkswith 4 Moreover,theprotractedcrisisof1905–06thatshookDualistsystem,and Dualizmus ), i , pp.24–31.ThepartyprogrammeswerepublishedbyGyulaMérei (ed.), 3 Ananalysisoftheseveraldozenpoliticalcrisesthattookplace , vol. vice versa , Budapest,1934(hereafterMérei, ászlóPéter Lá vii, 2 . Thedrawn-outconflictoverthe‘nationalization’ Thedefendersofthe1867Settlementwerealmost Vienna, 2000(hereafterPéter,‘Verfassungsentwicklung’), regierungsfähig regierungsfähig 5 (theModerateOppositionafter A dualizmuskora intheeyesofmonarch. SEER Pártprogr , 80,2002,2,pp.296–319 .), pp.241–363. , 2vols,Budapest, Published by Maney Publishing (c) W. S. Maney & Son Limited the HabsburgCrownand to distinguishbetweentwokindsof‘dualism’:onebeingthereciprocalconnexions constitutional question.Thisisnotquiteobviousbecauseofhistorians’tenaciousreluctance questions concerningtheArmybecamecentrepieceof monarchic unionofLandsratherthanasingleState.Inthecoursenineteenthcentury this perspectiveHungarywasalwaysseparate,indeedindependentoftherestEmpire:a the otherLandsofMonarchy,wheretheyhadexistedatall,becameetiolatedshells.From dualistic. Theauthorityofparliament wasgreatlyenhanced,yetgovernmentdidnot become sentative governmentwaspermanently establishedin1867,politicalauthoritystillremained Deák’s Settlement,condemned byfaintpraiseasa‘Compromise’.Afterthesystemof repre- in creatinganewHungarian identityandaspirations.‘Forty-eight’outlasted‘Sixty-seven’ — organized a effect ofthe1848revolution.TheIndependenceWar 1848–49, whenKossuthandGörgey unacknowledged) tectonicshiftintheHungarianviewof theirpositionintheMonarchy. a partofthemonarchicunionLands.Thiswasindeed anuncharted(and,ingeneral, Parliament laidclaimtothemonarch’s innovations between1867and1918graduallycreptup ontheearlierdualisticstructures. century theyformedamonarchicunionofLands.Aswe shallsee,Hungarianconstitutional Pragmatic Sanction,indirectlyconnectedHungarywith ‘Austria’.Infact,bythesixteenth ország 1867, byvirtueofLawXIIbecame,atleastformally, contractual.ThedualisticCrown- central Europe,basedonmedievalcustomaryrights;thelatter,largelyunregulatedbefore concerned themixedgovernment,binarystructureofauthority,called so called,betweentheOtherLandsofMonarchyandHungary.Theformerdualism balance ofsortsbetweentheCrownand first. Insum,therighttograntsoldiersservedasaconstitutionalleverthatmaintained negotiations, the tax andofferedsoldierstothemonarch.Thedietdidnotcontrolsupplybutitusedin entered intonegotiationswiththe outcome ofthissystemwasamixedorbalancedconstitution.Accordingly,theCrown royal satisfy desiderata( bound tomaintainthecustomaryrightsof which, before1867,the reservata functioned sidebyinconflictsandaccommodation.Themonarchpossessedwide the autonomouscountiesanddiet.Crown which theroyalofficewasvested,andthoseofnoble institutions hadbeenforcenturiesthedivisionbetweencustomaryrightsofCrown,in because theHungarianconstitutionwasdualistic:centralstructuralfeatureofpolitical the armyquestionformedhardcoreofconstitutionaldiscourse.Thiswaslargely influence, hasnotreceiveddueemphasisfromhistorianssincetheSecondWorldWar.Infact, The constitutionalandthearmyquestionswereintertwined,somethingthat,underMarxist The armyquestionandtheconstitution In thisprocessofdeliberateradicalmentaltransformation, onecouldnotoverstatethe relationswere,nevertheless,throughthe propositiones , whichcoveredimperialaffairs,theArmy,externalrelationsandothermattersover honvéd , requestingtaxandsoldiers,orthe diaetalis tractatus postulata armythattookontheAustrianandRussianmilitary, wasemblematic The ArmyQuestioninHungarianPolitics ország ) asbargainingcounters.Thedietfrequentlydisputedwhetherthe ország hadnoinfluence.Ontheotherhand,monarchwasduty , themonarch’spromisestorightgrievances( ország , manifestedinthe reservata at itsdietoverthetermsonwhichHungarypaid ország reservata ; alsoitdeniedthatHungaryhadeverbeen ország . ThesemedievalHungarianinstitutionsin ország , asaLand,intact.ForHungary,the ofthecommonCrown,basedon tractatus ország ország grievancesshouldbedealtwith astwodepositoriesofrights , exercisedbythelandowners, diaetalis tractatus , theotherbeingdualism, Doppelpoligkeit , knownasthe gravamina ) and in 85 Published by Maney Publishing (c) W. S. Maney & Son Limited harmonize ourlaws,throughlegislation,toguaranteethe Empire’ssecureexistence.’ Deák understoodthis.InhisEaster1865article,heclearly stated:‘wearealwayspreparedto German LiberalstostrengthentheArmysothatAustriawas abletoendureawarwithPrussia. Reichsrat werecuttingmilitaryexpenditure.Themonarch neededapoliticalleveragainstthe Prussia wouldachievesupremacyinGermany.Eversince 1861,theGermanLiberalsin autumn of1864itbecamecleartoFranzJosephthat,unlessBismarckwerestoppedbyforce, were deniedthemeansofrunninganeffectivearmy.ThencamewarwithPrussia.In dominated theReichsrat,forcedcutsinarmyexpenditure.Thegeneralscomplainedthatthey there wasalargedeficiteachyearbetween1861and1864.TheGermanLiberals,who Diploma turnedintoarepresentativebody.Thebudgetcouldstill,however,notbebalanced: liberals andthenationalistsofMonarchy. launched apresscampaigndemandingthereformofgovernmentandthisputlifein ability couldbeachievedonlythroughconstitutionalcontroloffinance.Thebankers in westernEuropethatgovernmentexpenditureshouldbepubliclyaccountable.Account- Constitutional experimentationwasnecessarybecauseofthedemandfinancialhouses the primaryaimwasnottosatisfydemandsofthisorthatsocialclassnationality. not aresponsetopressurefromthe‘German’LiberalsorHungarianSlavnationalists,and willing tohelpoutAustria.FranzJosephnowreintroducedrepresentativebodies.Thiswas tion ofitscredit.Sincetherewasnopubliccheckonexpenditure,foreignbankswereeverless borrowed tofinanceitselfanditsunwillingnesscontrolexpenditureledtheexhaus- Joseph toabandonautocraticgovernmentbecauseitcouldnolongerbeafforded.Autocracy disaster theFrencharmyinflictedonMonarchyatSolferinoinJune1859forcedFranz have somethingindispensabletopoliticalsuccess:goodluck.Thefollowingtookplace. political clouttoimposeaconstitutionalsettlementonanunwillingmonarch,buttheydid this reformwithoutasettlementwithHungary.DeákandAndrássydidnotpossessthe maintenance oftheEmpire’sinternationalposition.Itwouldhavebeendifficulttointroduce status. Theintroductionofuniversalliabilitytomilitaryserviceformaleswasnecessarythe The 1867SettlementitselfwasdrivenbythemilitarydemandsofEmpire’sgreat-power The 1867constitutionalSettlementandtheArmy demonstrates. parliament, aprecariousandshiftingbalance,asthehistoryofarmyquestionamply The systemofmixedgovernmentsurvived.PowerwassharedbetweentheCrownand parliamentary initspropersenseofbeingtheultimatesourceauthoritylegislation. for it.)Parliamentusedits support forarmyexpansion,however,asatrade-off togain such, evenduringthecrisisyearsafter1902.(Theyhadto paylessthantheirAustrianpartner Hungarian parliamentarians,unlikemanyintheReichsrat, didnotopposearmyexpansionas ian supportformilitaryexpenditure.Thispersisted throughouttheDualistera. Prussia, FranzJosephwaspreparedtoexchangegreaterHungarian autonomyagainstHungar- they providedhimwithacounterweighttotheGerman Liberals.Facedbyanaggressive attracted FranzJosephtotheideaofaconstitutionalsettlement withtheHungarianswasthat 86 6 The monarchnowrevivedadormantinstitution,theReichsrat,which1860October DFB , III , p.408. ászlóPéter Lá 6 What Published by Maney Publishing (c) W. S. Maney & Son Limited the separateconsentofHungarianparliament. the raisingofArmycontinued,however,tobeasharedright( growth pointsoftheconstitution. army provisionsofLawXII1867andtheimplementing instrumentsthatbecamethe for constitutionaldebate.Indeed,morethananyotheraspectoftheSettlement,itwas with theOtherLandscouldnotbesecured. Hungary retainedtherighttocontractoutofanyorallthem,savestatedebts,ifagreement other halfoftheEmpireonpoliticalgroundsratherthanaccountlegalobligation. regimes. Theformerwere‘publicmattersofgreatimportance’tobehandledjointlywiththe Hungarian nationalarmy,althoughsound,securedinsufficientsupportinthecountry. from Austria.Bycontrast,argumentsfortheexistingcommonratherthanaseparate of thecommontariffsystemcompetedwithdesiretoachieveeconomicindependence economy wasambivalent.Strongeconomicinterestsfavouring,forexample,themaintenance ( recognized ratherthandefined.Byandlarge,controlovertheArmyremainedreserved the SettlementLaw.Yetmonarch’srightswerecounterbalancedby were restrictedwhilethoseofthemonarchwideand‘recognized’ratherthandefinedby army matterstherightsof to economicsubjects,thecountry’sobligationswerederivedfromPragmaticSanction.In limited. provisions weremoreorlessstraightforward,thescopeforconstitutionalpoliticsherewas relationships hadlittletodowiththeSettlementLawitselfandbecauseLaw’seconomic képviselo had animpressivetwo-to-onemajority(229for,110against) onDecember151867, revealed basicattitudes.Thedebateoverthebillonstatedebt waslong,eventhoughthegovernment Hochliberalismus, StudienzurTisza-Ära(1875–1890) contentious throughouttheDualistera. decennial negotiationsoftheCustomsandCommercialUnion,likearmyquestion,were only temporaryinterest.Buttheeconomicsideofrelationship,andparticularly of secondaryimportance.Commonforeignaffairsandthemonarch’shouseholdattracted after 1867.Oneoughtnotassume,however,thatotheraspectsofconstitutionalpoliticswere than theparsimonyofReichsrat. Hungarian aspirationsproved,inthelongrun,moredamagingtoArmy’seffectiveness recognition ofthenationalidentityArmy’sHungarianunits.Paradoxicallyperhaps, voted for,43against,and2abstained, with120absent;ibid.,vol. firm support,woneasily.Atthemost importantvote,heldonAugust41868,ofthe281memberspresent 235 defence billswasstrongandthedebate intheHouseprolonged.Butend,government,with Deák’s quorum (ofthe402membersonly 105werepresent),ibid.,p.204.Insharpcontrast,interestin thethree was takenbyrisingandtheparagraphs hadtobeheldoverthefollowingsittingbecauseHouse lostits in discussingthebillonCustomsUnion.Atcloseofgeneral debateonDecember171867thevote reservata 10 9 8 7 Moreover, theSettlementLawputeconomicsubjectsandArmyunderdifferent This wasnotthecaseinarmymatters.Thereprovisionswerecomplexand,contrast Arguments aboutthestatusofArmyaremainvehicleforHungariannationalism The House’sproceedingsconcerningtheimplementinginstruments oftheSettlementin1867and1868 Ibid., pp.323–25. See Péter,‘Verfassungsentwicklung’,pp.326–27. For acomprehensivetreatmentoftheeconomic y házának naplója ) totheCrown,emperor-king,andassuchunitedforMonarchyawhole; (hereafter The ArmyQuestioninHungarianPolitics Képv. napló ország 10 , HungaryasthecontractinglegalpartnerofCrown, ), vol. 7 However,thepoliticalmotiveforchangein , Vienna,1976(hereafterGottas, vi , pp.150–52.TheHouseshowedonlylimitedinterest Ausgleich 8 Becauseobstaclestochangesineconomic 9 Theseprinciplesprovidedamplematerial , seeFriedrichGottas, ix , pp.424–26. communicata Ungarn Ungarn imZeitalterdes ország ), pp.75–161. ) andrequired Az országgyu rights,again y 87 lés Published by Maney Publishing (c) W. S. Maney & Son Limited were practicallyidenticalwiththelawspassedbyReichsratforCisleithania. fit forfront-linedutyalongsidetheArmy.The the Dualistsystem,itwasan(expensive)auxiliaryforce,andwithoutartillerynotyetentirely the under theHungarianMinistryofDefence, subordinated totheMinistryofWarinViennaratherthanHungariangovernment led byGermanandGerman-speakingofficers.TheArmy,includingitsHungarianunits,were in Hungary,wasamultinationalarmythatincludedtheHungarianregiments.Itlargely stitutional questionalive.TheImperialArmy(laterrenamedandRoyal),quartered It wasthevisiblepresenceofimperialorcommonArmyinHungarythatkeptcon- After the1867Settlement (and underthreatofwar)didnotattractmuchconstitutionalinterest. monarchic rights.Thethirdinstrument,LawXLIIof1868,onthegenerallevyintimewar honvédség of serviceandcommandwereHungarianCroatian.Allinall,theLawtreated Commander’ (notquitethe‘king’)andtolawsofcountry;itspersonnel,flag,language politicians tooksometimetoaccept. which, in1867,FranzJosephhadagreedtosetupandwhichthemilitaryAustrian civil societybasedonrightsanddutiesappliedequallytoall. support inparliament.Universalmilitaryservicewasseenasfollowingfromtheprincipleof the systemofdefenceintroducedgeneralconscription,amajorreformwhichhadstrong Ministerrates desösterreichisch-ungarischenMonarchie1867–1870 the minutesofsiximperial(common)ministerialcouncilmeetings in Péter, ‘TheHolyCrown’),pp.421–510(466). Urbanitsch (eds), Verfassungsges. Urbanitsch (eds), see TiborPapp,‘Dieköniglicheungarische Landwehr(honvéd)1868–1914’,inAdamWandruszka andPeter ‘Toward aNationalHungarianArmy’, has beensuggestedbyG.E.Rothenberg,onsomefurtherHungarian armydemands.SeeRothenberg, centred ontheacceptanceofdivisionarmyrightsreachedat theHungarianSettlementratherthan,as rather than‘annually’.Andrássy’sconflictswiththemilitaryestablishment overthereformsagreedin1868 defence lawsof1868. demands madeafter1902should not bereadintotheconflictsthathadprecededenactmentsof thethree Francis Joseph had tobeagreedannuallybyparliament. nance ofconstitutionalbalancebetweenCrownand between thetwopartsofMonarchy,fortenyears.Acriticalinnovationmainte- war-time establishmentoftheArmyandfixedannualcontingentrecruits,shared 88 14 13 12 11 Three lawsreformingtheArmywereputthroughparliamentin1868,textsofwhich Law XLIcreatedthe On thecreationof Paragraph 13LawXLof1868,cf.paragraph12XII1867 whichstipulated:‘fromtimetotime’ See LászlóPéter,‘TheHolyCrownofHungary,VisibleandInvisible’, See EdmundBernatzik, Landwehr asasubjectthatconstitutionallybelongedtothesharedratherthanreserved , WestLafayette,IN,1976(hereafterRothenberg, ), pp.688–704;‘Diek.(u.)k.Armee—GliederungundAufgabenstellung’ inRumplerand inCisleithania,whichhadtobesetupbecauseoftheprincipleparity Die Habsburgermonarchie1848–1918 Die Habsburgermonarchie1848–1918 Die österreichischenVerfassungsgesetze honvédség honvédség andAndrássy’sdifficultiesinnegotiating withthemilitaryleaders, , asecond-lineforceonwhichtheHungariansinsisted, The SlavicReview 14 OrganizedseparatelyfromtheArmy,administratively ászlóPéter Lá 13 , , vol. v , pp.489–91;seeÉvaSomogyi’sintroductoryessayand honvédség v , 1972,p.808,andthesameauthor’s , Budapest,1999,pp.xxxi–xxxviii,p.10 , Vienna1987,p.637f. honvédség ország The Army , Vienna,1911(hereafterBernatzik, wasanationalarmysubstitute.Like wastheprovisionthatenlistment tooktheoathto‘Supreme ), pp.75–78.TheHungarianarmy 12 TheLawdeterminedthe Die Protokolledesgemeinsamen SEER , 81,2003,3(hereafter 11 LawXLon The Armyof et passim Die öst. . Published by Maney Publishing (c) W. S. Maney & Son Limited between civiliansandtroopsrelationstheofficerssocietywastense. part ofit. edly theprovisionsconcerningcommonImperialArmywerefelttobeleastdesirable the incidents. incidents createdthearmyquestionandhowfaralreadyexistingproduced Furthermore, itisnotclearwhatcauseandeffect.Wecanonlysurmisehowfarthe played inHungarianpolitics.Thecausedoesnotseemtobecommensuratewiththeeffect. they musthavebeen,donotprovideasufficientexplanationoftherolearmyquestion kózéposztály moved totheforegroundofconstitutionalpolitics.Thesmoulderingdiscontentwith party realignment,theeconomic Hungarian nationalarmyhadnotasyetmadeastrongimpactontheHouse.After1875 and theproportionofHungarian officersintheArmydidnotnoticeablyimprove1870s. not beenusedintheSettlement Law orinthe1868armylaws;Kmety, the monarchin1870swasbemoaned laterbyjuristslikeKárolyKmety,whopointedoutthatthe termhad LI of1875onarmypensions.Itwent intogeneraluseintheHungarianstatutes.Whatwasa‘concession’ by XX of1873onarmyhorses(whichalsoreferstothe‘commonMinister ofWar’)andtheninthetitleLaw military toequipthemwithartilleryandothertechnology. and HelmutRumpler(eds), ‘Achilles tendon’oftheDualistsystem,‘DieStellungUngarnsin der Monarchie’,inFriedrichEngel-Jánosi and Change,StudiesinHonorofBélaK.Király and theCommonArmyinAustro-HungarianMonarchy’, S. B.VardyandA.H.(eds), easily exploitedbytheopponentsofSettlement. between soldiersandcivilianswereaconstantheadacheforthegovernment,target of relationsbetweenthecivilianpopulationand‘alien’Army,incidentsconflict elections anditsroleinenforcinglabourcontractsduringtheharvest.Thesensitivequestion been asourceofconflictundernormalcircumstances,evenwithoutits‘peace-keeping’roleat the country,overwhichHungariangovernmenthadonlylimitedcontrolwouldhave Budapest. Themaintenance ofalarge,repressivemilitaryforceunder‘German’leadershipin a Hungarianmilitaryacademy. benches. TherewassomeagitationforHungariancadetschoolsandtheestablishmentof spirit oftheArmywouldnotbe‘anti-Hungarian’wasconfinedtogovernment ers intheArmywouldincreasesothatitbecometruly‘common’. become afirst-linemilitaryforce. basis. ItwasawidelysharedaspirationonbothsidesoftheHousethat by Tisza’sLeftCentreParty,althoughbefore1875ithadnotacceptedthe1867constitutional centred onpracticalquestionsandwereconductedpoliticalratherthanconstitutionallines exchanges intheHouse,especiallyAddressandbudgetdebates.Thesefrequently first decadeafter1867theArmyand 20 19 18 17 16 15 Some disaffectionwiththeSettlementexistedinHungaryasearly1867,andundoubt- The planforaHungarianmilitary academy,infactanaspirationsince1790,wassoonshelvedfordecades The term‘commonArmy’appearedforthefirsttimeinimplementing clause,paragraph14,ofLaw The developmentofthe On theconflictsbetweenArmyandcivilianpopulation, seeTiborHajdu, Péter HanákdescribesthemutualantipathybetweenArmy and theHungarianpopulationas Gábor Vermessetoutmanyoftheargumentsonbothsidesanddescribed theincidentsinhis‘Hungary 16 , Budapest,1999(hereafterHajdu, TheArmyquarteredinHungarywasinvolvedconflict,so-called‘incidents’, The ArmyQuestioninHungarianPolitics Probleme derfranzisko-josephinischenZeit1848–1916 honvédség 20 washamperedbyfinancialstringencyandtherefusalofimperial TheconstitutionalargumentsoftheForty-eightersfora Ausgleich 18 ItwasalsohopedthattheproportionofHungarianoffic- , NewYork,1983,pp.89–101. Tisztikar andtheconsequencesofoccupationBosnia honvédség ), esp.Ch.3;seealsonote15above. 15 producedlivelyandoccasionallylong Yetthese‘incidents’,importantthough Közjog , Munich,1967,p.90. , Budapest,1911,p.507n.2. 19 Thehopethatthe honvédség Tisztikar és 17 Inthe should Society 89 Published by Maney Publishing (c) W. S. Maney & Son Limited története points’ (thatis,thepartyprogramme)wasneverutteredbyTisza himself,GyulaOláh, common ArmystationedinHungaryeruptedonlythe1880s. their constitutionaloppositiontotheSettlementinto‘coldstorage’ After decaysetinwithintheDeákparty,apartyrealignmenttookplace.TheLeftCentreput acquired aseatintheHouse.Hehadplentyhis‘schwarz-gelb’backgroundtolivedown. erstwhile ConservativeSennyeygroupthatsupportedthegovernment,whenin1872he before 1848andarch-enemyofKossuth,hewaseducatedbyJesuitsinViennajoinedthe office. them as form agovernment.Sincetheydidnotrecognizethe1867Settlement,monarchregarded him. After 1886,whenthetwomenparted company,SzilágyiclaimedthatApponyihadneverreallyunderstood satisfied withassertingtheprinciple ofstateindependence,hisownaimwastherealization principle. occasions, seehis increased (civilianinsults,flagviolations,theHentziandGotterhalte incidents,andsoforth). Kossuth’s confidant,andErno recognized onlyapersonalunionwithAustria.TheywereledbyDanielIrányi,IgnáczHelfy, of Kossuth,rejectedallcommoninstitutions,demandedaseparateHungarianarmyand prominence. TheIndependentistgroups,socalledForty-eighters,asdevotedfollowers Representatives resolvestheparadoxthataSixty-sevenerbroughtarmyquestioninto Albert Apponyi,asupporterofthe1867Settlement.ThepartystructureinHouse The dominanceofthearmyquestioncoincidedwith,andlargelyexplains,riseCount The armyquestionandApponyi 1890s whenoneafteranotherattempttodistractpublicinterestfromitfailed. the armyquestiondominatedHungarianpoliticsforwellovertwodecades—evenin Hungarian districtsthatsentindependentgentrytotheHouse. returned toHungaryaftertheSettlement.TheForty-eightershadagrowingappealin the House,Tiszawasamasterof the undisputedleaderofSixty-sevenermajority.Abrillianttacticiananddebaterin governing majoritytoformtheLiberalPartyin1875.ForfifteenyearsKálmánTiszawas (hereafter in 1881underthejointleadershipofApponyiandDezso Liberals toformtheUnitedOppositionandreformedthemselvesasModerate programme. In1878,theformerConservativessplitawayandwerelaterjoinedbydissatisfied on him. Hungarian constitutionallawelevatedhimtothetoprank. YetApponyialwayshadtheedge and aloner,mastiffletlooseontheHouse,Szilágyi’ssheerintellectualforceinrecasting 90 24 23 22 21 Apponyi camefromadifferentpoliticalworld.ThesonofGyörgyApponyi,Chancellor But, after1878,Apponyicame under theinfluenceofSzilágyi,whichheacknowledgedon many The muchusedderisivephrasebyForty-eightersthatTisza See thestatisticalanalysisofErno From thebeginningof1880s,numberreported‘army incidents’inthecountrygreatly , Budapest,1908,pp.292–93. 24 nicht regierungsfähig A m.vezeto Apponyi’simpressivebearing,modulatedvoice,andhis oftenpassionateoratory Emlékirataim y réteg ), pp.52,55–56. , vol. . Apartyofprotest,theIndependentistsdidnotevenaimtogain y Simonyi,membersoftheentourageGreatExile,who i , Budapest,1922,pp.141–43.Whereas Szilágyi,Apponyiargued,was y Lakatos, ad hoc ászlóPéter Lá arrangementsandnotcarryingoutanypolitical A magyarpolitikaivezeto szögre akasztotta y Szilágyi.Aliberallawprofessor 22 y Yettheyhadnochanceto réteg 1848–1918 21 Fromthattimeonwards, 23 (hung onapeg)the‘Bihar andmergedwiththe Az 1875-ikévifuzió , Budapest,1942 Published by Maney Publishing (c) W. S. Maney & Son Limited ‘dormant’ rightsmeantforApponyionlythemodestaim ofcreatinga Hungarian military camp. Butthisdangerlookedremotein1886.Inpracticalterms,the‘revival’( that eventuallyshatteredmajoritysupportforDeák’sworkfromwithintheSixty-sevener with thepromisetofulfilnationalaspirationsturnedoutbethinendofwedge institutions andinjectthenationalspiritintocommoninstitutions’. ment partyhaddonenothing,hiswantedtousetheSettlement‘buildupournational basis ofwhattheSettlementhadalreadysecured‘inembryonicform’.Whereasgovern- because ofhispastintheopposition,todevelopinstitutionsanationaldirectionon ‘advancement’ oftheSettlement.HetoldHousethatcountryhadexpectedTisza, characteristic constitutionalinnovation,latertobetermedtheideaof‘dormantrights’or basis ofpubliclaw’). central contentionagainst‘thegovernmentalsystem’(which‘pervertedandthreatenedthe that ‘theHungarianelementshouldmakegreaterheadwayinthecommonArmy’ were theeconomic to theSettlement. back whereithadbeen:theforcesinparliamentwerelargelyseparatedbydifferentattitudes been theironlawofHungarianpolitics,afewyearsafterpartyrealignment,politicswas Settlement andwastherefore of theconstitutionalquestiononHungarianpolitics,foritunambiguouslyrecognized a coherentpoliticalprogramme,yetmanypoliticianhopedthatitwouldbreakthehold the administrationbillwhichatone pointdevelopedintoageneraldebateongovernmentpolicy. ibid., p.258. over itbytheDelegationsillusory(areferencetoadebateinMay1882 ondefencecostsinrelationtoBosnia), common ministrytobewidened(thiswasareferencetheadministration ofBosnia)andmadecontrol Mérei, the literatureonApponyiishagiographic. otherwise likedhim,as‘incurablyunadult’, Hungary. ensured thecharismaticappealofthispoliticalDonQuixoteandensuresiteventodayin his party,leavingApponyiitssoleleader. combined the‘recognition’ofSettlement,a in theSettlementandperversionofitsspirit’. had builtupbecauseofthegovernment’s‘negligenceinenforcementguaranteesgained Tisza’s policiesunderminedpublicconfidenceintheSettlementandthatnationalgrievances was audibleinthe1881electionManifestoofModerateOppositionthatcomplained Crisis, however,ApponyigavestrongsupporttoSzilágyi’sconstitutionalpolitics.Anewtone respectable Sixty-sevenerpoliticalratherthanconstitutionalquestions.DuringtheEastern his politicalcareer, 30 29 28 27 26 25 Apponyi’s conversiontoconstitutionalpoliticswasgradual.After1875,hisconcerns Once formed,thenewgrouplookedlikeapoliticalrefugeecampratherthanpartywith Barely afortnightafterSzilágyi’sresignationinMarch1886,Apponyi On March241886, Szilágyi resignedonMarch21and ApponyimadehisspeechonMarch24inthecourseofdebate on April 101884.Thecriticismbecamespecific:thegovernment had allowedthecompetenceof March 231881,ibid.,pp.254–58. Election manifestooftheUnitedOpposition(underApponyiand Szilágyi’sleadership),April131878, Not, however,outsideHungary.Hispoliticalattitudesweredescribed byC.A.Macartney,who Pártprogr. 25 , pp.251–54. Emlékirataim 28 Ausgleich Képv. napló NeverthelessSzilágyiremainedafirmSixty-sevenerandresignedfrom The ArmyQuestioninHungarianPolitics , i , pp.140–43. withAustria,thecuttingofarmyexpenditureandrequest regierungsfähig , x , p.313.Apponyiconsideredthat thespeechhadbeenabenchmarkin The HabsburgEmpire1790–1918 intheeyesofmonarch.Andyet,asifithad 27 sine quanon Inthe1884Manifestothisbecame forremaining , London1968,p.761.InHungary 29 introducedhismost 30 Thisideathat regierungsfähig felélesztés 26 —all ) of 91 , Published by Maney Publishing (c) W. S. Maney & Son Limited Law XIIof1867wasrealizedin‘creatingsolidaritybetween thenationandArmy’. entire Army’.Heproposedthatthegovernmentinitiate themeasuresbywhichspiritof ality withinit,fortheLawclearlyreferstoHungarian armyasacomplementarypartofthe united commonArmy,butdidnotenvisagetheHungarian units’completelossofindividu- a furtherclaim.LawXIIof1867‘bywhichthelegislatureconsentedtomaintenance however, theauthormanagedtogothroughstorywithouteven mentioningApponyi). Skandalum; Magyarközéletibotrányok1843–1991 people inCisleithania,thatthereexistedan common Armyshouldbeinharmony.Thencameasideswipeattheidea,harbouredbysome common institution’.ThiswasthespiritofHungarianconstitutionwithwhich with thelegislatureofMonarchy’sotherState[thatis,OtherLands],tocreatethis because thesovereignlegislationofHungarianStatefounditappropriate,inagreement because ithadbeencreatedbyalegalsourceoverandaboveHungarianstatesovereignty,‘but Army wasaninstitutionoperatedincommonwiththeOtherLandsofMonarchynot possessed unlimitedsovereigntyovereveryaspectofstatelife—includingdefence.The it followedthattheconstitutivefactorsofHungarianState(i.e.kingandparliament) Hungarian constitutionalismthatitwasnotevennecessarytoproducefurtherevidence.And coronation oathandbyhissanctioningofLawXII1867.Thiswassomuchtheessence which meant‘theunconditionalrecognitionofHungaryasasovereignState’byHisMajesty’s the House. Apponyi tospellouthisfullconstitutionaldoctrineinOctobertheJanskyAffairdebate academy, whichthegovernment,too,hadbeen(unsuccessfully)pressingfor.Eventspushed staatsrechtliche AusgleichzwischenÖsterreich undUngarn German translationwas,however, ‘alsintegrierendenTeilesdesgesamtenHeeres’;Ivan Z was notveryclear.Yethis‘postulate’(thetermisathrowback tothe constitutional king.’ king ofHungaryandthereforethespiritArmycannotbedifferentfromthat dictum: ‘Thesupremecommander,however,isnootherthanthecrownedconstitutional not bedifferentfromthatofitssupremecommander.’Apponyiturnedroundthemonarch’s Joseph’s rescript,sentearliertoreducetensioninthecountry:‘thespiritofArmycould the Forty-eighterswhodemandedsplittingofArmy.ThenhequotedfromFranz Apponyi hadafielddayintheHouse.First,hemadeitclearthathispartyheldnotruckwith Hungarian army.ThemonarchsentafriendlyrescripttoTiszahelphisgovernment. Budapest andparliamentreceivedfloodsofpetitionsthatdemandedlegislationforaseparate the retirementlistandpromotedJansky.Thisprovokedseriousdisturbancesinstreetsof the warministry(inVienna)putHungariancommanderofarmycorpsinBudapeston found theceremonyoffensive.TheHungariangovernmentcalledJansky’sactiontactless,but annual event,togetherwithanappropriatespeech).Onthisoccasion,thepressandpublic had fallenin1849defendingitagainstGörgey’sarmy(fordecadesthewreath-layingwasan stationed inHungary,laidawreathonGeneralHentzi’stombBudaCastlewhereHentzi 92 34 33 32 31 Apponyi usedasledgehammertocracknutandwhat hedemanded,inpracticalterms, Ibid.,p.192.Thephrase‘complemetary partoftheentireArmy’wasinparagraph111867XII, its On October111886, Gratz, Gratz, Dualizmus Dualizmus 31 OnMay211886LudwigJansky,abrigadiergeneral,commanderofregiment , , i 33 , p.245. i , pp.244–46.SeealsoVilmosHeiszler‘AJansky-ügy’,inAndrás Gero Thiswas,hewenton,indeeda‘postulatetobetranslatedintolife’, Képv. napló , xiii , pp.188–89. ászlóPéter Lá , Budapest,1993,pp.76–91(ausefulaccountinwhich, österreichischer Gesamtstaat , Leipzig,1911,p.116. , beforeApponyimade postulata oftheold h olger, y (ed.), 34 Der 32 Published by Maney Publishing (c) W. S. Maney & Son Limited mind. Sixty-seven systemvirtually‘collapsed’. made theconflictsoverArmyunavoidable.Thus spectacularclashofpoliticalwillsin Sixty-seveners andForty-eighters,transformedtheoutlook ofthepoliticalclassasawholeand virtue ofthe1867Settlement,alegallyindependentState. Thisnewclaim,sharedbetween the EmpireasamonarchicunionofLandsandonpresumptionthatHungarywas,by years. ThenewoutlookwasbasedontherejectionofideathatHungaryapart 1889 wasthenewconstitutionaloutlookthathademergedinimmediatelypreceding reference tothefactthatanindispensablepartofconflictoversystemdefencein politics becameaterritoryofvolcaniceruptions’. Hungary thehabituallyoptimisticliberal,GusztávBeksics,wrotethat‘after1889Hungarian towards an permanent. InCisleithania,generalsandpoliticianswereapprehensivelestthereadrift political andtemporary; transformed politics.Until1889,theconflictsinMonarchycouldstillberegardedas the debatedidnotmerelydestroyKálmánTisza’sfifteenyears’unchallengedleadership;it first threemonthsof1889wasaturningpointinthehistoryDualistsystem.Indeed, It hasbeenwidelyrecognizedthattheparliamentarydebateonsystemofdefencein The watershed:the1889GreatDefenceDebate independent HungarianState. onwards supportedbythepresumptionoflegislativesovereigntyasanattributelegally constitutional discourse.NationaldesiderataconcerningtheArmywerefromthattime to ‘legislativesovereignty’,liketheclaim‘organicdevelopment’,becamebuzzwordsin Nagy’s textbookwaswritteninaconceptualframesimilartoApponyi’sandtheclaim Empire, Nagyturnedawayfromthehistoricalmethodinfavourofanalytical.Infact, that hadarisenoutofthedebatein1889 leading ministerinretirement,lamentedthe‘fatefuleffectofperturbedpoliticalconditions’ described byDánielSzabó,‘Avédero Gottas, things wereoncemoreimproving;seehisposthumous conflicts, appeared. the firsttextbookofdogmaticlawschoolbyErno was speakingthegovernmentbenchesweresilentbut,ayearafterApponyi’sspeech,in1887, House thedoctrineofunlimitedsovereignpowertomakestatutelaw.WhileApponyi constitution) wasinnovative:neverbeforehadaSixty-sevenerpoliticianspelledoutinthe Tisztikar 39 38 37 36 35 However, wefindneitherinthecontemporaryaccountsnorhistoricalliteratureany Emlékirataim Gratz, Beksics, whodiedinMay1906,wrotetheselinesaftertheApril Pacthadbeenmade;hehopedthat Gusztáv Beksics,aleadingLiberalpublicist,arguedin1883thatthe nationnolongerhadconstitutional Péter, ‘Verfassungsentwicklung’,pp.396–98. Ungarn , pp.94–97(gooddetailsonincidents). Kemény Zsigmond,aforradalomskiegyezés 35 Dualizmus AfollowerofPaulLaband,professoratStrasbourg,leadingjuristtheGerman Armee aufKündigung , pp.72–74.Themovementamong universitystudentsandthestreetdemonstratorsare , i , p.169,andrepeatedin , i , p.407. The ArmyQuestioninHungarianPolitics 36 after1889,theywereincreasinglyrecognizedasstructuraland y tüntetések résztvevo , whichraisedthespectreof ii , p.26. 39 , Budapest,1883,p.289;afewyearslater,hechangedhis 38 andApponyiwrotethatthiswaswhenthe y i’, 37 A Szabadelvu IntheinterwarperiodGusztávGratz,a Korall , 2004,17,September,pp.43–60; Hajdu, y Nagy,‘theHungarianLaband’ y párt története Monarchie aufKündigung , Budapest,1907,p.8; . In 93 Published by Maney Publishing (c) W. S. Maney & Son Limited of Hungary’srighttonegotiatethenumberrecruitsraiseddecennially. Paragraph 14oftheBill,obscurelydrafted,couldbeconstruedasamountingtoweakening revisions, becameLawVIof1889,andthenewconstitutionaloutlookwasinvolvedinboth. work. with theclaimtostatesovereigntythatinsecondhalfof1880swasreadintoDeák’s 1889 hadlittletodowiththeSettlementthatDeákmadeFranzJosephandmuchmore constitutionalism, acontractbetweenCrownand voluntary reserveofficers’theobligationtopassanexaminationinGerman. rather thananagreementbetweentwolegallyindependentStates.) recognized parliament’sparticipation. royal right,incontrasttothelanguageof the Army,ministerinsisted(amidstmuchhecklingfromopposition),wasareserved But, arguedApponyi,thepresumptionoflawwasonsideparliament field daywiththisparagraph. confirmed Apponyiasthestandard-bearerofHungarianaspirationsformanyyearstocome. Hungarian constitution,whichdidnotrequirefurtherlegaldemonstration. our statelanguage’ratherthanareservedroyalright.Sovereigntywasgreatprincipleofthe however, thatthelanguageofreserveofficers’instructionwas‘apartsovereignright made itclearthathedidnotintendtoraisethequestionofarmylanguage.Thepointwas, the otheragentoflegislationhadchosennottohaveasayinmatter1867.Apponyi The monarchhadactedlawfullyinaccordancewiththearmylanguageregulationsbecause that Apponyimadeinthedefence debate. which indicatedthatthediethadnotregardedsubjectasa the gallery. Other Lands. right tobargainbutalsotheobligationseekagreementbecause ofitsdutytohelpmonarchandthe that ofLawXL1868(paragraph13). paragraph 11didnotexpresslyassignthedeterminationofarmylanguagetomonarch. state retainsitsfreedomofaction’. context inwhichSzilágyiwassoontomaketheclaimthat‘Ifagreementisnotreachedeach a leadingliberal 1867 clearlyassignedthepowertodeterminelanguageofArmymonarch,and 33 above. 94 49 48 47 46 45 44 43 42 41 40 Two majorobjectionswereraisedintheHouseagainstDefenceBillthat,after The otherobjectionconcernedparagraph25oftheBillwhichimposedon‘one-year Teofil Fabinÿ,MinisterofJustice,tookupsomeApponyi’spoints.Thelanguage March 5,ibid.,pp.213–14. The speechonMarch2,together withhisclosingspeech,werethemosteffectiveoffourspeeches On March21889 Apponyi alsoarguedthattherehadbeenreferencestothelanguage ofarmyinstructioninoldstatutelaws March 21889, Gyula HorváthwhowasabouttodefectandmoveoverApponyi’s side. The speechwasfrequentlyinterruptedbyrapturousapplausefrom hisparty,theForty-eighters,andfrom The paragraphimposedtheobligationtoserveasecondyearif candidatefailedtheexamination. See Péter,‘Verfassungsentwicklung’,pp.515–17.InDeák’sconstitutional outlook,the Tisza insistedforweeksthatitdidnot,buteventuallysurrendered andrestoredapassageidenticalwith 44 Képv. napló saidthatthelawdidnotgiveparliamentanycontroloverarmylanguage. Képv. napló , ix, , 43 p.178. ix Thegovernmenthadarguedthatparagraph11,LawXIIof , pp.178–79andseehisspeechin theJanskyDebatein1886,seenote 41 (TheSzilágyithesiswasclearlyinconflictwithDeák’s 49 Hewarned:‘Justasthe ászlóPéter Lá honvédség ország reservata wherethe1868Lawhadexpressly basedonthePragmaticSanction . ország holdsfasttoitsrights,so 42 40 Apponyihada 47 Thiswasthe Thespeech ország hadthe 45 and 48 46 Published by Maney Publishing (c) W. S. Maney & Son Limited Cisleithania wascalled‘common’inHungary). ended themarvellouslydemonstrativepracticethatsameauthority whichappearedas‘Imperial’in pp. 142–48,467–74.Inasimilarvein,theMinisterofWarbecame ‘k.undk.’in1912(thischange,sadly, Ministerrates derösterreichisch-ungarischenMonarchie1883–1895 Hungarian constitutionalaspirations,particularlyaftertheGreatDefenceDebateof1889. had beenestablishedin1867.Clearly,thesechangescouldhardlybeseenaslegallysupporting common Armyandnavyintheformwhich,onbasisofPragmaticSanction,they that thealterationofofficialstylewasnottoaffect eral declarationsofthemonarch’swill.FranzJosephmadeitclearinhis1889 were countersignedbytheaddressee,foreignminister,theyshouldberegardedasunilat- affairs’ whichnowbecame‘imperialandroyal’. of October41895extendedthischangetothe‘ministerimperialhouseandforeign ‘imperial androyal’(ratherthan‘imperial’or‘imperial-royal’).Themonarch’s Handschreiben the firstopportunity. poacher turnedgamekeeper.Notsurprisingly,FranzJosephdidhisbesttogetridofhimat (rather thanaso-calledinternalstatecontractbetweenpartners),couldneverbedescribedas Szilágyi thesisthatLawXIIof1867wasan‘independentcreation’theHungarianlegislature Tisza’a lastadministrationtobolsterupsagginggovernmentauthority.Theauthorofthe1893 Justice wasnoneotherthanSzilágyi,thegreatbeastofconstitutionalpolitics,broughtinto most tellingoutcomeofthedebateinparliamentwasthatFabinÿ’ssuccessorasaMinister in November1868. merely carriedintoeffectwhathadbeenimpliedinthenewstyleintroducedbymonarch that theMonarchy’sofficialstyle shouldexpressthe‘stateinterdependence’( country wasmovinginanotherdirection, the constitutionalideasofmonarchicunionLands,went down wellintheUpperHouse,but for themaintenanceofcommonArmy.Fullsense, thespeech,couchedinlanguageand agitation inthecountryforanindependentHungarianarmy,Andrássy producedexcellentpoliticalarguments as toguardthe the monarch’srightsshouldberespected.’ the languageofpast. of thisdoctrine,AcademicianGyo (tacitly) basedonApponyi’s‘greatprinciple’andthemuchrespectedinnovativeconstructor debate. Academiaclearlydidnotregrethisdeparture.ThedoctrineoftheHolyCrownwas of themonarch’srightsembarrassedgovernmentthathadbeenfatallywoundedin grounds. Onlyfurtherresearchcouldshedlightontheextenttowhichhisrobustdefence should appearinofficialusageas Austro-Hungarian MonarchyorEmpire. Emperor ofAustriaandapostolic KingofHungary.Also,heruledthattheLandsunitedunderhis sceptre Empire’s two‘halves’,FranzJoseph orderedinNovember1868thatthe(short)formofhisown titlebe Budapest, 1889,esp.pp.29–31,35–36,64–65. 55 54 53 52 51 50 As anoffshootofthedefencedebateTiszawassuccessfulinsecuringmonarch’s See Bernatzik, See Péter,‘Verfassungsentwicklung’,pp.508–09.BasedonAndrássy’s memorandumwhichhadargued See Bernatzik, See Péter,‘TheHolyCrown’,p.484. So wasGyulaAndrássy’slastpoliticalspeech,madeintheUpperHouseonApril51889.Alarmedby Ibid., p.216.OnMarch6,hesaidthathisdutywas‘asmuchtomaintainthemonarch’srightsunimpaired ofOctober171889whichordainedthatinfuturetheArmyandnavybestyled ország Die öst.Verfassungsges Die öst.Verfassungsges ’s’, ibid.,p.249. 54 Althoughthe1889and1895documents,incontrasttothatof1868, The ArmyQuestioninHungarianPolitics 51 Fabinÿwasoutofofficewithinamonth,ostensiblyonhealth y zo , p.53;Diószegi, y Concha,referredtoFabinÿ’sspeechasa‘mistake’. , pp.53–54;IstvánDiószegi, Andrássy GyulaGrófbeszédeavédero 50 Thiswasthelanguageofolddualiststructure: 53 Thesechangeswerenotinnovative.They Protokolle , Budapest,1993(hereafterDiószegi, EinheitundUnzertrennbarkeit , pp.147–48. Die Protokolledesgemeinsamen Zusammengehörigkeit y -törvényjavaslat tárgyában Handschreiben Handschreiben Protokolle ) ofthe ofthe 52 55 A 95 ), , Published by Maney Publishing (c) W. S. Maney & Son Limited independence ofHungaryexplainedintoLawXII1867. pp. 261,270. complement intheArmy.József Kun Barabási(ed.), every respectandasoneexample he mentionedthepromotionofHungarianlanguageand at apartymeeting(ratherthaninparliament)admittedthattheSettlement hadnotyetbeenimplementedin including theformulainitsprogramme.Indeed,onSeptember15 1903, IstvánTisza(notyetPrimeMinister) never existed(January21),ibid.,pp.41–44.TheLiberalParty,wisely, refusedtogivehostagesthefutureby xxii Liberal caucus(butnotApponyi)accepted;IgnáczDarányiinthe HouseonJanuary191895, been createdaswellinterpretedandimplementedfortwenty-eight years’,wasthepreconditionwhich out ApponyiaboutamergerbetweenhispartyandtheLiberals.The recognitionoftheSettlement‘asithad 108, 110,117.AfterWekerle’sresignation,Khuen-Héderváry,the king’scandidate,unsuccessfullysounded National Party the threemainforcesofparliamentarypolitics,governingLiberalparty,Apponyi’s class andtransformeditspoliticalculture.Historiansareyettorecognizethatfromthe1890s, group tobe other state.Butrecognitionofthecommoninstitutionswasnolongerenoughforapolitical beyond thepalebecauseoftheirdeclaredaimtoabolishinstitutionscommonwith The newclaimaffected all heldHungaryandAustriaexternallyaswellinternally,tobelegallyfullysovereignStates. Century Hungary’, 1930 (hereafter ibid., p.30. mented fortwenty-eightyears’. the recognitionofSettlement‘asithadbeencreatedaswellinterpretedandimple- the negotiationswithApponyiinJanuary1895:formonarch century movedtoaclose,withoutanyencouragementfromthemonarch,butinfatuated majority. Andrássy wastryingunsuccessfullytomediatebetweentheCrownandparliament’sgentry as theconstitutionalmonarchofAustria,couldnotsecure. the Crowninitselfwasnotenough:nationshouldaskanythingofitskingthathe, book (abrilliantdefenceoftheSixty-sevensystem),Andrássyarguedin1896thatloyaltyto Gyula AndrássyJunior,laterlabelledtheDissidents,wereallloyaltoking.Indeed,inhis determined toavoidanyconflictwiththeCrown.ThearistocratsofParty,ledbyCount half ofthesewereMagyars. the nineteenthcentury,onlyaquarterofarmyofficerswerefromHungaryandfewerthan system wasbasedonparitybetweenthetwohalvesofMonarchy,yet,evenatend accentuate theHungariancharacterofregimentsTransleithania.Afterall,Dualist shared theaspirationwithApponyi’sgrouptoestablishastrongerHungarianpresenceinand the LiberalParty,for,underspellofSzilágyiandothers’newlanguagepolitics,Liberals 96 59 58 57 56 In the1890s,SzilágyiandApponyi’sconstitutionalideaspenetrateddeepintopolitical Apponyi andhisNationalPartyplayedadecisiveroleintheunfoldingevents.As The strongestgroupintheLiberalPartyheadedbyCountIstvánTiszawas,however, , pp.13–14.GáborUgron,Forty-eighter,arguedthatauniform interpretation ofLawXII1867had See LászlóPéter,‘TheAristocracy, theGentryandTheirParliamentaryTraditioninNineteenth- See, forexample,Apponyi’sreferencesto From 1892,asMéreipointsout,eventheLiberalsincludedconstitutional desiderataintheirprogrammes, On January51892thepartyreplacedModerateOppositionwithnewname,Mérei, regierungsfähig TIKB 56 andtheForty-eightercamp,sharedanewconstitutionaloutlookinthatthey SEER ), pp.744–46. , 70,1992,1,pp.77–110(104–05). Regierungsfähigkeit becausewidelydifferentclaimscouldbeinferredfromthestate 58 Thisrequirementforholdingofficemadetensionwithin ászlóPéter Lá kormányképesség . TheForty-eighterswere,astheyalwayshadbeen, Gróf TiszaIstvánképviselo , Regierungsfähigkeit 57 Hencetheformulaestablishedin 59 Afewyearslater,however, Regierungsfähigkeit y házi beszédei , Emlékirataim , vol. , i Képv. napló , pp.76,99, i , Budapest, required Pártprogr ., , Published by Maney Publishing (c) W. S. Maney & Son Limited pp. 448–51. be realized. generated inthegentry-ledcountiesandparliamentthatHungarianarmyaspirationswould growth. worked outaplantoincreasetheannualcontingentofrecruitsinkeepingwithpopulation the Army,concernedthatMonarchywasrapidlyfallingbehindotherstatesindefence, After theturnofcentury,armyquestioncamebackwithavengeance.Theleaders The Armycrisisof1903 a collisioncoursewiththeCrown. joined theLiberalsandhewaselectedpresidentofHouse.Parliamentnowseton 1899, whenthearmyquestionwastemporarilynotinforeground,Apponyiandhisgroup party pressurewasgrowingtomergewiththeLiberalsinordergetintogovernment.In account ofthearmycrisisinRothenberg, Urbanitsch (eds), a largepartofitsarmyprogramme. college andprovidedfornewcadetschoolsamilitaryhighschool deprivedApponyi’sNationalPartyof (ed.), argument insupportofthearmydemands. by thenewvocabularyofsovereignHungarianState, demands. of Hungary.ThepressurewasnowontheLiberalstopressforatleastsomethese command (someseventywords)andthelanguageofservice(instruction)inallregiments Forty-eighters demandedaquidproquo:theintroductionofHungarianaslanguage ministry inNovember1902moderatelyraisedHungary’sdefencecontribution.Nevertheless, the conditionthatHungaryalsopassedthem. yet readytoreformtheStandingOrdersremove monarch designatedTiszaasthemantotakeover,butit turned outthattheLiberalswerenot Archduke FranzFerdinandandCountIsvánTisza(notthatthesetwoeverco-operated).The anarchy and government wasreplacedbySzéll’s.Hisgovernment,whenitcouldnotendparliamentary government putoutsidethelaw).Thisoccurredforfirsttimein1899,whenBánffy When neithertheAppropriationnoranenablingbillhadbeenpassed, (another misnomer),thatauthorizedthemtocollecttaxesandmeetpublicexpenditure. time (whichhappenedfrequently),theywerecoveredbyanenablingbill,called When governmentscouldnotputtheAppropriationBill(budget)throughparliamentin tering. Instead,bytheendofApril1903,theyputhisadministrationinto(dogLatin) with aliberalprogrammeofsorts,hopedthattheIndependentistswouldtiretheirfilibus- obstrukció 65 64 63 62 61 60 See Péter,‘Verfassungsentwicklung’, pp.452–53. Gustav Kolmer, See WalterWagner,‘Diek(u)kArmee,GliederungundAufgabenstellung’, inWandruszkaand Although thepassingofLawsXXIIandXXIII1897whichraised theLudovicatolevelofastaff Gusztáv Beksics’slastchapter,‘Harminczév’,intheten-volume ‘millenaryhistory’,SándorSzilágyi At everyturninthelongcrisisbetween1902and1912,claimto statesovereigntyprovidedthecritical A magyarnemzettörténete 63 . Theurbane,affableKálmánSzéll,afterWekerletheonlyLiberalprimeminister 65 ThearmyexpansionbillswentthroughtheReichsratonlywithdifficulty,andon WhentheLiberalsfailedtorespond,Forty-eightersbegancarryout 61 Apponyi’sreputationwasgrowingintheLiberalParty ex lex Die Habsburgermonarchie1848–1918 Parlament undVerfassunginÖsterreich obtained,wasaskedtoresignbythemonarch,underinfluenceof The ArmyQuestioninHungarianPolitics , vol. x , 1898,reflectedthisoptimism,pp.807–08. The Army , , pp.131–38. v 64 , pp.142–633(493);seealsothe notalwaysreliable ThetwoarmybillsintroducedbytheSzéll , viii obstrukció , Vienna,1914(hereafterKolmer, 60 , whichTiszaplanned.Thenin aninexplicableoptimismwas 62 andwithinhisown ex lex obtained(the indemnitás Parlament ex lex 97 ), . Published by Maney Publishing (c) W. S. Maney & Son Limited tenure wascutshortbytheconsequencesofFranzJoseph’sCh could notrestoreorderintheHouse,heresignedAugust,wassoonreappointedbuthis Khuen-Héderváry whowasallowedtemporarilytoshelvethetwoarmybills.Sincehestill June 1903,FranzJoseph,inordertoendparliamentaryanarchy,appointedCountKároly performed forthebenefitofboth against ‘one-sidedaspirations’thatshownounderstandingofthegreattasksArmy army orderonSeptember16,whichincensedtheHungarianpublic.FranzJosephwarned enemies.’ Army shallremain,asastrongforcethatdefendstheAustro-HungarianMonarchyagainstits politicians. TheoperativepassageoftheOrderread:‘Commonandunifiedasitnowis,my passage) withareferencetoevery Hungary. that werecommontotheMonarchyasawhole,Austriapossessedsamerights on toinferfromtheHungarianlawthatinanyalterationofmanagementsubjects the monarch’sreservedrightinmaintainingcompleteunityofArmy.Hethenwent Delegations-Gesetz and11ofLawXII1867,althoughusingdifferentterms,providedfor Cisleithania, ErnstvonKoerber,explainedintheReichsratthatbothparagraph5of parliament, theKoerber-Tiszadebateinvolved‘Austria’andHungary.Theprimeministerof quences werepartoftheconstitutionaldiscourse,instrictsense,involvingCrownand was whyApponyiandapartofhisgrouplefttheLiberalParty. rescript tothePrimeMinisterKhuen-HéderváryplacateSixty-sevenermajority. ment together,couldalterthisposition.’ right’. Thesubsequentsentenceexplained:‘Legislation,[agreedby]theCrownandparlia- ‘the lawfulinfluenceofparliamentappliedtothisquestionasanyotherconstitutional whilst reassertinghisrighttodeterminethelanguageofArmy,madeconcessionthat by theLiberals.TheCommittee’sreportwassubmittedtoking,afterwhich reforms asheconsideredpermissible.ThisledtotheappointmentofCommitteeNine his successorsunimpaired,hewaspreparedtoimplement‘inmyroyalpower’ Although FranzJosephreiteratedhisdeterminationtotransmitthemonarch’sarmyrights moved towardstheSzilágyithesis. pp. 704–06. zur Verteidigungderösterreichisch-ungarischenMonarchiegegen jedenFeind.’Kolmer, Herrn verbürgtsind.Gemeinsamundeinheitlichwieesist,soll meinHeerbleiben,diestarkeMacht geeignet wären,mögewissen,daßIchniederRechteundBefugnisse michbegebe,welcheseinemobersten Aufgaben, welchedasselbezumWohlebeiderStaatsgebieteder Monarchiezuerfüllenhat,lockern pp. 494–95; tion ofthePrimeMinisterKoerber), 98 71 70 69 68 67 66 Ch It was,however,alltoomuchforCisleithania.WhiletheCh The OrdercreatedsomuchexcitementinBudapestthatthemonarchsentaconciliatory On September231903. Had thetext,approvedby monarch, used‘king’ratherthan‘Crown’FranzJosephwould have TIKB ‘Királyi hatalmambólfolyó.’ On September221903,ibid., ‘Mein Heerinsbesondere,dessengediegenesGefügeeinseitigeBestrebungen, inVerkennungderhohen ¢ opy wasthevillageinGaliciawheremonarch,attendingmanoeuvres,issuedan , 66 71 i , pp.749–51;Bernatzik, TIKB Itisdifficulttoseewhat,ifany,exceptioncouldbetaken tothespeechon , i , pp.730–31. TIKB , i , pp.731–32. i , pp.734–36and Die öst.Verfassungsges. viii Staatsgebiete Volksstamm , pp.512–21. ászlóPéter Lá 69 Theconcessiondidnotamounttomuch ofthe‘greatwhole’shockedmostHungarian ii . Theuseofthisphrasecoupled(inanother , pp.95–97;Kolmer, , p.706,fortheeight-pointprogrammeseeibid., ¢ opy Order. Parlament ¢ opy Orderanditsconse- (thesecondinterven-

Franz Joseph,

Parlament 68 sucharmy 70 andthat , viii 67 , Published by Maney Publishing (c) W. S. Maney & Son Limited to appointAndrássy also tosimilardemandsmadebytheCzechsandCroats.) Themonarchwasthenprepared would otherwisefacefurtherdemandseventuallyleading toaseparateHungarianarmyand ian regiments,ademandwhichFranzJosephrepeatedlyrejected. (Hewellunderstoodthathe the demandtointroduceHungarianaslanguageofcommand andserviceintheHungar- as PrimeMinister.Hiseffortstoconstructacoalitiongovernment,however,cameunstuckon eighter andtheSixty-seveneroppositionparties.ThekingdesignatedGyulaAndrássyJunior the House,kinghadtonegotiatewithleadersofCoalitionformedbyForty- innovation, althoughitstilldominatedpolitics. Indeed, aftertheautumnof1903,armyquestiondriedupasasourceconstitutional mentary government constitutional crisis.AfterTiszahadgoneforbrokewiththeStandingOrdersrevisions major languageconcessionsfromthemonarch,politicalsituationworsenedintoa expansion planandasanevergrowingsectionofthepoliticalclassdemanded(unobtainable) party, butwithoutanabsolutemajority. Ibid., Europe) onlythroughinfraction of theexistingStandingOrders, of thearmybillsfromorder theday. occasion whichledArchdukeFranzFerdinandtoreferTiszaas ‘dieserPatent-Hochverräter’. be usedratherthan‘Crown’,seenote70above.November181903, see mistake toattributemuchweight.’ expression, thedilettanteutterancesofa“distinguishedforeigner”towhichitwouldbe minister brushedoffthestatementofhisAustrianoppositenumberas:‘touseanEnglish creation withwhichKoerber’sstatementwasinconflict.AndsotheHungarianprime like mostLiberals,acceptedtheSzilágyithesisthatSettlementLawwasanindependent pushed through.HeimpressedtheHouseinhisresponsetoKoerber’sspeeches.Tiszahad, determination torevisetheHouse’sStandingOrderssothattwoarmybillscouldbe Committee ofNineinwhichFranzJosephmademinorconcessions;thestickwasTisza’s Franz Joseph’slastbet,withacarrotandstick.Thewasthearmyprogrammeof unprecedented; nogovernmenthadlostofficeinthismannerbefore.IncameIstvánTisza, was subsequentlydefeatedonaproceduralmotionbytheHouseandresigned.This critical responsetoitintheHouseonSeptember23wasnotconsideredrobustenough.He basis oftheconstitutionalarrangementframedbyDeákin1867,butKhuen-Héderváry’s of officebytheadversevoteelectorate. lost, hisgovernmentbecameinJanuary1905thefirstevercentralEuropetobeforcedout Tisza whenhetookoverintheautumn. The twobillsalreadyshelvedbyKhuen-HéderváryinJunecouldnotbebroughtback enough toprovideanacceptablequidquoproforthehigherannualcontingentofrecruits. sent Tiszaaletterofcongratulation. als tobecomein1905jointleaderwithFerenczKossuthoftheForty-eightersHouse) 75 74 73 72 Since theLiberals,afterthirtyyearsofuninterruptedtenureoffice,losttheirmajorityin The armycrisisdeepenedafter1903.CommitteeofNineprogrammedidnotoffer In theelectionsheldinJanuary, the Independentists,ledbyKossuthandApponyi,becamelargest Tisza couldcarryouttherevision oftheHouse’sStandingOrders(asincomparablecaseselsewhere in Neither Khuen-HédervárynorTiszacouldhaveformedagovernment withoutthe(temporary)removal Tisza thenreferredtopoint8oftheNeunerprogrammwithslight ‘amendment’thattheword‘king’ ad interim versus The ArmyQuestioninHungarianPolitics mixedconstitutionratherthansolelyconflictoverarmyrights. beforeagreementwiththemajorityofHouse,which 72 Amongothers,Apponyi(soontodefectfromtheLiber- iii 73 , pp.413–16. However,themonarchdidnotabandonarmy 75 Thebasisoftheconflictnowbecameparlia- TIKB , iii TIKB , pp.227–36. , ii , pp.98–100.Thiswasthe 74 and 99 Published by Maney Publishing (c) W. S. Maney & Son Limited House passedamotionofnoconfidence formed aCoalitiononarmydemands.ThisplanwasrejectedbytheCoalition. along: theCoalitionwasapapertiger. crisis. HenryWickhamSteed, prematurely in of thepoliticalclass,continuedtoresisthimformonths,FranzJosephdissolvedparliament made clearthatthegovernmentintendedtofindasuccessorbasedonmajoritysupport, between theCrownandparliamentwaslaidbare.AlthoughroyalletterFejérváry tary support.Thecabinetnolongerservedasabuffer;forthefirsttimesince1867,conflict appointed atemporarygovernment‘whichstoodoutsidetheparties’; Budapest. TheconsequentconstitutionalcrisisaffectedthewholeMonarchyandbeyond. political conflictbetweenkingandparliamentwasnotresolvedbyfurthernegotiationsin Budapest, 1909(hereafterLányi, stiff termsonwhichtheCoalitionwasinvitedtoassumeofficeinApril1906.SándorWekerle Indeed, FranzJoseph,havingsuccessfullyreassertedhisrighttoappointthegovernment,set that, theCoalitionhadtoacceptofficewithoutanyconcessionsbeingmadebyking. reform wouldhaveunderminedtheascendancyofgentryinpolitics.Inordertoforestall by however, afterthedissolutioninFebruary1906,thatking’sgovernmentwouldintroduce after aprematuredissoloutionhehadtocallanotherwithinthreemonths.Itbecameclear, law, parliamentwaselectedforfiveyears.Thekinghadtherighttodissolveparliament,but The Coalitionsurrenderedafterthebasicruleofconstitutionwasabouttobebroken.By The swingofthependulum War, forthemilitaryoccupationofHungary. monarch. Hehad,however,anemergencyplan,‘CaseU’,workedoutbytheMinistryof take officeontheking’sterms.Apoliticalcompromisewasstillmainoptionfor substantial extensionofparliamentaryfranchisetoputfurtherpressureontheCoalition Fejérváry resignedandwasreappointedinOctoberwithaprogrammethatincluded Vienna, 1969,pp.85–126;Péter Hanák, österreichischen Heeres-undKriegsgeschichte von1645bis1938 445–66. KurtPeballandGünther E.Rothenberg,‘DerFall“U”’,in des gemeinsamenMinisterratesösterreichisch-ungarischenMonarchie 1896–1907 22 atBadIschl.SeeÉvaSomogyi’sintroductoryessayandthe minutes ofthemeetingsin contra the chamber.InanotherresolutionHousedeclaredprorogation ofparliamentunconstitutional,see rescript thathadsuspendedthesittingsbeenreadoutandgovernment andmostoftheLiberalshadleft pp. 579–83. 100 82 81 80 79 78 77 76 In June1905,TiszawasreplacedbyBaronGézaFejérváry.Forthefirsttime,FranzJoseph octroi See The policyoptionsofthegovernment,includingmilitaryone, werediscussedinaKronratonAugust Proposed byDezso Ferencz Kossuth’smotiononJune211905,ibid.,pp.466–68. Prime MinisterFejérváryintheHouseonJune211905, The king’slettertoBaronFejérváryofJune181905,ibid TIKB Lányi, The Times asubstantialextensionofthefranchisebeforenextparliamentaryelections.This , iii Fejérváry , pp.430–35. ex lex , January30,February1,8,15,March 6,14,23,April7,101906. , pp.316f,408f,415f.TheUpperHousealsocondemnedtheFejérváry government. y Bánffy,ibid.,pp.469–75.Theresolutionwaspassed with militaryassistanceinFebruary1906.Thatwasaturningpointthe Fejérváry The Times ), pp.15–20. Magyarország története 82 ászlóPéter Lá correspondentinVienna,turnedouttoberightall 79 anddeclaredthegovernmentunconstitutional. 81 Becausethepoliticians,supportedbybulk (SchriftendesHeeresgeschichtlichen Museums4), Képv. napló . , p.579;BertalanLányi, , vol. vii ,

, Aus dreiJahrhunderten.Beiträgezur I, Budapest,1978(hereafter i , pp.461–63. , Budapest,1991,pp.lxxi–lxxiii, nem. con 77 ithadnoparliamen- . onlyaftertheking’s A Fejérvárykormány 76 Die Protokolle Theacute 78 MT the per 80 ), , Published by Maney Publishing (c) W. S. Maney & Son Limited headed thegovernment,FranzJoseph’spersonalchoice, commit itselftothehigherannualrecruitment, proper settlement,whichsuspendedtheconstitutionalcrisis.TheWekerleministrydidnot question waslefthangingevenaftertheApril1906pact,atemporarytruceratherthan with theCrowninprevioussummerwouldhavesecuredthembetterterms.Thearmy parliament wasoncemoredissolvedin election). AftertumultuousscenesintheHouse,sittingshadtobesuspendedandMarch, tion oftheappointmentFejérváry(whichhadfollowedratherthanprecededageneral out in1914,thearmyquestionwasstillhangingoverpolitics. to Hungary. ten yearsofconflict,forcedthroughtheHousewithoutmonarchmakingconcessions the newmajority,armybill,whichraisedannualcontingentofrecruits,was,after Tisza, whowasnowinthechair,throughwhichStandingOrdersweretoughenedupby brought thearmycrisistoanend.InJune1912,byaparliamentarycoupengineered Khuen finallyresignedinApril.ThekingforthwithappointedLászlóLukács,whosetenure Franz Ferdinand’simmediatesuccessionscaredthewitsoutofmostHungarianpoliticians. appointed Khuen,whoenjoyednoparliamentarysupport. parliamentary politicsbacktothefirmsupportersof1867Settlement.InJanuary1910,he army-language reform.In1909,thekingusedcrisisofWekerlegovernmenttoshift passed, althoughwithdifficulty,in1903) however. Thearmybillthatraisedtheannualintake(andReichsrathadalready 1908–1913, Kónyi-LónyayPapers,X(hereafterNaplója),intheLibrary ofUCLSSEES,p.5. MT king toldAndrássythathehadappointedWekerlebecause‘nobody elsewasavailable’,IstvánDolmányos, Magyarország and thenbeggedFranzJosephtogivewayononepoint. obstruction. And,asbefore,themajoritybegantowaver.InMarch1912,Khuenresigned As before,theIndependentistminoritydemandedconcessionsandbackedtheirdemandby to anyoftheCoalitionparties. biae... theycanthenfacetheconsequences’. . abdicate . with thosewhowanttocurtailoneofmymostimportantmonarchicrights,Iamprepared authorized theprimeministertoleakinBudapestthat‘shouldevenSixty-sevenersside Sixty-sevener House. Dualizmus (hereafter pass thebillonannualcontingent ofrecruits. XVIII of1888thatwastoreduce themonarch’sarmyrightstocallupreservistswhenparliament didnot 1985 (hereafter 91 90 89 88 87 86 85 84 83 , vol. Ibid., pp.684–702. Kristóffy, TIKB See note64above. TIKB TIKB See Andrássy’saccountofhisaudiencewiththeking,CountJulius AndrássyJunior’spoliticaldiary Wekerle joinedAndrássy’sConstitutionPartyonApril81906,the dayofhisappointment. József Kristóffy, vii , , , , Parl. korm. ii iv iv iv /II, Budapest,1978,pp.610–11(adigatAndrássywhohaddeclined totakeofficeonhisterms). ), Budapest,1927,pp.348,356.Apponyi, , pp.238–39. , pp.86,188–90,424–26. , p.650.Theso-calledrecruitresolution crisis,whichconcernedanewinterpretationofLaw , pp.55–65;AlbertDeák, 91 Magyarország Asaresult,Tiszabecamehatedmaninthepoliticalclass.Whenwarbroke Tisza ), p.30;Kristóffy, Magyarország KálváriájaAzosszeomlasPolitikaiemlékek,1890–1926 ), pp.132–34.OnFranzFerdinandandtheconstructionof cabinet,seeGratz, 87 The ArmyQuestioninHungarianPolitics Theking’sgamblehadpaidoff.Hewasnotyetoutofthewoods, , pp.677–79,hethoughtitwasonly afalsealarm; 84 Parliamentwaspainfullyawarethatcomingtoasettlement Magyarország A parlamentikormányrendszerMagyarországon ex lex 88 wasresubmittedintheHouseMay1911. , pp.654–55;GáborVermes, . Thegeneralelection,however,produceda 85 Emlékirataim nordidparliamentabandonthedemandfor 90 Thisblackmailworked.Theprospectof 83 aSixty-sevenerwhodidnotbelong , 89 86 ii Theflabbergastedagedmonarch Thiswas,however,notarepeti- , pp.161–62.Althoughayearlaterthe TIKB István Tisza , iv , pp.664–66. , (hereafterKristóffy, ii , Budapest,1912, , NewYork, 101 Published by Maney Publishing (c) W. S. Maney & Son Limited monarch. Delegations-Gesetz assigneddispositionovertheArmy‘exclusively’( 11 LawXIIof1867‘recognized’themonarchicrightas‘constitutional’,paragraph5 The discrepancyoverthemonarch’sarmyrightswasparticularlyglaring.Whileparagraph were setoutdifferentlyintheHungarianSettlementLawandDecemberConstitution. forms thanwearetoday,noticedwithdismaythattheobligationsofcontractingparties politics: There areseveralpossibleexplanationsforthearmyquestion’sdominanceoverconstitutional Conclusions discourse, basedonthedoctrineofstatesovereignty( oftheMonarchydiminishedandunder influenceofthenewconstitutional other ‘half’ down byForty-eightersintheHouse:‘Yes,wecanand weshall.’ to, butalascouldnotremakethewholeworldtomeetHungarian desiderata,hewasshouted Fejérváry asMinisterofNationalDefencein1903observed tongueincheekthathewished As regardstheoutcomeofconflict,expectationsin theHousewereunrealistic.When Demands fortheexpansionofuseHungarian languagehadstrongpopularappeal. Army: itsGermancharacterwasanaffronttotheHungarian claimtonationalindependence. subsequent Koerber-Tiszadebate. became manifestintheconflictovermonarch’sarmy OrderissuedfromCh contradicted eachother.Theclashbetweentheoldand thenewviewonconstitution mentary influence’.Fromthatpointonwards,theAustrian andtheHungarianlawsflatly the SettlementLawsufferedreinterpretation,‘constitutional’cametomean‘subjectparlia- December Constitutionaswhereitdidnot.Onthecriticalpointofarmyrights,after Settlement werereinterpretedinBudapestasmuchwherethetextmatchedthatof differences exacerbatedtheconflictbutdidnotcreateit.Hungary’srightsunder1867 determined ‘towrestnational demands’fromtheCrown.Incidentally,nationalmovements Arguably, forcenturies,thediscrepanciesbefore1867hadbeenmuchgreaterthanafter. pancies betweenthedynasty’sand or balancedconstitutionratherthanparliamentarygovernment,therealwaysexisteddiscre- for itsproperfunctioning.BecausewithinthemonarchicunionHungarypossessedamixed Lands ratherthanaunionoftwoindependentStates,didnotrequireidenticallegalprovisions virtue oftheconstitution.TheempireHabsburgs,seenin1867asamonarchicunion the Hungarianclauseretaineditsoriginalstructurallydualisticsense:monarchic much. Or,toputitdifferently,thegapbetweentwotextswasnotunbridgeableaslong the twotextsassubstantivelyidentical,differencesofformulaedidnotseemtomatterthat Settlement cameintoforceinallrespects.Foraslongthepoliticalwillexistedtointerpret Constitution wasseeninHungaryassatisfyingwhattheHungarianlawrequiredand ‘their content’hadbeenconsentedtobytheOtherLands.TheenactmentofDecember its clausesregardingthetreatmentofcommonmatterswouldcomeintoeffectonlywhen importance shouldnotbeexaggerated.Paragraph69oftheHungarianlawstipulatedthat 102 94 93 92 (1) AtthetimeofKoerber-Tiszadebate,observers,moresensitivetoconstitutional By theendofnineteenthcenturypoliticalwillinHungarytoco-operatewith (2) EvidenceaboundsfortheexistenceofstrongHungarian nationalistsentimentaboutthe On January281903, See Péter,‘Verfassungsentwicklung’, pp.257–58. Bernatzik, 92 Difficultiesoverthedifferencesundoubtedlyexistedfromstart,buttheir Die öst.Verfassungsges. Képv. napló , , p.443. xi , p.76.ZoltánPapandotherswere thehecklers. ország ászlóPéter Lá ’s viewsontheirrespectiverightsandobligations. magyar állameszme 94 Theoppositionwas ausschliesslich ), thetextual ¢ opy andthe reservata ) tothe 93 by Published by Maney Publishing (c) W. S. Maney & Son Limited Tisztikar pp. 160–64(realnuggetsembeddedinaridMarxistsoil);Rothenberg, century, Werbo the ‘nationalintelligentsia’whosesocialoutlookwassimilartogentry’s.Insixteenth of parliament(andparticularlytheopposition)wasformedbylandedgentryand why ittooktheformofarmyquestion. accept thatthedrivingforceofconstitutionalpoliticswasnationalism,butonestillhastoask Nationalism explainstoomuchandatthesametimelittle.Itbegsquestion:onemay nationalism byitselfcannotprovideanadequateaccountfortheconflictoverArmy. Constitutional innovationinHungarywascarriedoutbyreferencetopre-existingrights.Yet legislation, nationalindependence,legalsovereignty,wereallprojectedintomedievalhistory. Hungarian nationalistdemandswereclaimedashistoricrights.Thenewconcepts,theState, the Europeanbalanceofpoweremboldenedradicalnationalists.Aselsewhereinregion, The defeatofRussiabyJapanandthe1905revolutionthatknockedtemporarilyout became morevigorousnearlyeverywhereintheMonarchyaroundturnofcentury. mention prejudiceagainstthemaswellthelanguage barrier. improved aftertheturnofcentury, seepp.271–75. közjogász professor GejzaFerdinándyallegedly lefttheArmyonthesegrounds,seeÖdönPolner, A magyarparlamentiellenzéktörténetébo Army. the preserve ofaristocraticandgentryfamilies.Butthesefamilies avoidedthe half ofthesewereMagyar.TheresteitherSwabianorSouthSlavorigin. officers in1902only27percentwerefromHungaryand,asIpointedoutearlier,fewerthan the Germanlanguage,didnotoffergoodjobopportunitiesforgentry.Ofarmy the armyquestiondid.Theappealofdemandsalsoreachedfarbeyondgentry. memories mayhavebeen,theycouldnotpushedacountrytothebrinkofcivilwar,as essential attributeoftheHungarian‘nationalgenius’.Importantthoughthesetraditionsand outdated noblemilitia.Eversince1790thegentryhaddemandedreturnofitsarmyasan unhappily lostitsownarmyintheeighteenthcentury,except property —astipulationinthelawonPromissoryNotesof1843.Thisproudgentryclasshad social standing;itwasevenexemptedfromthebailiff’sauthoritywhenherequisitioned Kossuth’s halfacenturyearlier.Thenoble’sswordwasmorethananaccessorytothebearer’s much intoApponyi’spoliticalvocabularyintheearlytwentiethcenturyasithaddone pamphlets stillusedWerbo interested incraftsortrade,norcultivatingthearts).Latenineteenth-centurypolitical ( There arewell-documentedcasesof‘frustrated’younggentlemen leavingtheArmy. of the‘nationalintelligentsia’inArmycropup speechesinparliamentconstantly. language barrierwasaserioushandicap.Complaintsaboutthelackofpromotionprospects the Magyarswhoentereddidnotgetveryfar:onlyafewpassedthroughstaffcollege.The katona nemzet 98 97 96 95 (3) PerhapsthenatureofHungarianpoliticalclassprovidesanswer.Thecharacter (4) AplausibleexplanationfortheHungarianlanguagedemandsisthatArmy,basedon Hajdu, This complaintwasfrequentlymade intheHouse.EvenleadingpoliticianslikeGáborBarossand law Compare Dolmányos, In March1903thesubjectwasventilatedbyForty-eighters in theHouse,seeIstvánDolmányos, honvédség 98 , pp.62–63. , Budapest,1941,p.15(onFerdinándy). Allinall,somethingmustbewrongwiththisexplanation. Researchcarriedoutin Tisztikar , wheretherewasnolanguageproblem,attractedthegentry stilllessthanthe ) whoseprivilegeswerebasedonmilitaryvirtue:‘unletteredbutbrave’(not y czy hadestablishedtheconventionofviewingnobilityasawarriorclass , p.258.Theprestigeofthe The ArmyQuestioninHungarianPolitics Parl. ellenzék y czy’s imagery.The‘shieldofChristianity’toposfounditswayas y l 1901–1904 , p.161. , Budapest,1963(hereafterDolmányos, honvédség wasverylowafter1868although itgreatly The Army 97 Onlythehussarswerea insurrectio , pp.127–28;Hajdu, honvédség , ahopelessly Parl. ellenzék Három magyar 95 . Infact, Mostof 96 They 103 ), Published by Maney Publishing (c) W. S. Maney & Son Limited unjustifiably. out mightwellhaveblamedtheirfailureonlanguagedifficultiesandprevailingattitudes in keepingthegentryyouthawayfromArmy.Thosewhoenteredandthendropped military schoolswasprobablymoreimportantthantheattitudesandGermanlanguage a bigottednationalist.’ Hungarian, aGermanorRomaniancouldbedistinguishedwithcertaintyiseithernaive twice beforeheattributesnationalitytoanofficer.Hewrites:‘Anybodywhothinksthata rapidly lostgroundintheArmyfavourofurbanmiddleandlowerclasses.Hajduthinks social andnationalchangesintheHungarianofficercorpsofMonarchy.Thenobility with traditionalexplanations.Hajdu’sbookoffersacomprehensivestatisticalanalysisofthe recent yearsbyTiborHajduandIstvánDeákhasproducedresultsthatcannotbereconciled proportion ofMagyarofficersintheArmy. turned awayfromcadetschoolsbecauseoftheirpoorGerman.Thesemeasuresimprovedthe progress ofthelanguage.In1881,HungarianDelegationrequestedthatcandidatesnotbe language inthecurriculumandsubsequentlyforregularreportsstatisticsabout Ludovica Academy,astaffcollege.In1875,theyaskedforgreateruseoftheHungarian establishment ofoneormoremilitaryhighschoolsinHungaryandlaterdemandedthe were widelyavailable.From1874onwards,HungarianDelegationresolutionsaskedforthe positive discriminationtoalleviatethedearthofqualifiedapplicantsfromHungary.Bursaries preceding it).Itsreligiousorethnictolerance,towardsJewsforinstance,wasremarkable. attempt todescribetheHabsburgArmyasaninstitution‘beyondnationalism’(ratherthan Beyond Nationalism,ASocialandPoliticalHistoryoftheHabsburgOfficerCorps1848–1918 officers, lowin1867,wassteadilyincreasingfromthe1890sonwards.IstvánDeák’swork, select) anationalidentitywouldlargelydependoncircumstances.TheproportionofMagyar The Armywas‘moreethnicityblindthanbiased’ others. Germans werepromotedinlargenumbersbecausetheybettereducatedthanthe promotion wasbasedonhighertrainingcoursesratherthansocialornationalbackground. the incessantcomplaintsofHungarianpoliticiansbutisneverthelesstrue’.Allinall, nationality biasinitspromotions,itwasfavourofMagyarofficers.Thiscontradicts and werehardlyinterestedinjoiningtheArmy. Army laterimproved:Hajdu, világháború elöttésután’, youth stayedawayfromtheArmy, ‘Azértelmiségszámszeru Recent researchdoesnotquite bear outtheseviews.Hajduwrotethatinthe1870sand1880s gentry ‘The ArmyQuestioninAustria andHungary’, Apponyi, ‘aversetothedrudgeryandstrictdisciplineofmilitary service’stayedawaytheArmy,Apponyi, militärischen Geisthaben’,AndrássyJunior, Franz Josephcomplainedin1908‘daßdieUngarenkeinekriegerische Nationsind,daßsiekeinen 104 104 103 102 101 100 99 The militaryauthorities,goadedonbyHungarianpoliticians,introducedmeasuresof Andrássy Seniorcomplainedin1889thatthegentryyouthwere keen tobecomestateorlocalofficials See Hajdu’sstatisticalanalysis, Ibid., pp.187–89. Ibid., p.188. István Deák, Ibid., p.159. 102 104 Perhapsitwasnotsomuchthegentryputtingpressureonpoliticiansfor Beyond Nationalism 99 Valóság Howanofficerinthesupra-nationalArmyselected(orrefusedto Tisztikar , vol.23,1980,7,pp.21–34(25). However,thegentry’spresencein Tisztikar , Oxford,1990,pp.172–78. , pp.269–71. , pp.164–79. Naplója ászlóPéter Lá Andrássy Gyulagrófbeszédeavédero The MonthlyReview 103 , p.181(Andrássydisagreed);‘Ouryoungmen’,wrote Thehardtrainingandthedisciplinerequiredin 101 and‘iftheJointArmydisplayedany y gyarapodásánakkövetkezményei azelso , 16,1904,July-Sept.,pp.1–33 (16). y javaslat tárgyában , isabold , p.63. 100 y Published by Maney Publishing (c) W. S. Maney & Son Limited question wastheeconomicinterestsoflargelandowners. thy, andtheirfiercestopponentswerethe‘mercantilists’(theTiszagroup). under Széll,theClericalsandevenDissidentsof1904)wereall‘agrarian’atleastinsympa- Forty-eighters, Apponyi’sNewLiberals,beforeandaftertheyjoinedthegovernmentparty the Italianwinetariffin1902).Thosegroupswhowerepressingarmydemands(the for agriculturespilledoverintoarmydebates(therewasmuchbitterness,example, stages oftheCoalitiongovernment.Frustrationoverinsufficientlyprotectivemeasures succession ofpoliticalcrisesbeforethetariffquestionrecededintobackgroundinlater Could theformerexplainlatter?Agriculturaltariffsandarmyquestionproduceda tilists’ aswellthearmydemandsofoppositiondevelopedsimultaneouslyinparliament. unfavourable conditionsinagriculture.Theconflictbetweenthe‘agrarians’and‘mercan- much success. army reformsbutthepoliticiansurginggentryintelligentsiatojoin—without Apponyi’s viewonthearmy the NewLiberalsdefectedfromLiberalPartybecauseofking’srefusaltoaccept Apponyi’s NationalParty,after1899theNewLiberals.However,wheninNovember1903 army demands.Significantly,thepartyof‘agrarian’interestsandpolicies no morethananoverlap.Manyagrarians,includingleadingfigures,werelukewarmtowards Hungary havedrawnattentiontothelegalformalism,‘extraordinaryskill’ to askhowfaritconcernedthepoliticsofinessential.Observersandscholarsoutside two questions. exclude thepossibilitythatfurtherresearchmightdemonstratesomeconnexionbetween did nothelpthecampaignforhigheragriculturaltariffs—oncontrary.Yetweshould remained inthegovernmentparty. no uniform.’ more ignorantscarcelybelieveduswhenwetoldthem,that,asEnglishgentlemen,had paraphernalia. BritishtravellersnoticedthisfeatureofHungarianmores.Pagetwrites:‘the was abarrenexercise.Appearanceswerenonethelessimportant,notjustinconstitutional this perspective,thearmyquestion,indeedHungarianconstitutionalpoliticsingeneral, convulsions overtitles,hyphens,flags,badges,uniformandthelanguageofcommand.From tial andritualasasubstitutefor‘realadvances’.Hungarianpoliticsperiodicallywentthrough gery’) ofHungarianjuristsandpoliticianstheirpreoccupationwiththeformal,insubstan- Wickham Steed, barren constitutionalquibblingwhich bulkssolargelyinHungarianpubliclife’, welcomed theprospectofintroduction ofuniversalsuffrage,sinceitwould‘counteractthe mania for magyar”, theHungarianisfondoftrappings.’ symbols andsoforthwasafightforrealthingsincircumstances wheresymbolsformedpartof 110 109 108 107 106 105 (5) Theemergenceofthearmyquestionin1880scoincidedwithrecurrent (6) Sincethearmyquestionapparentlydidnotconcernhardeconomicinterests,wehave It wouldbepossibletoargue,however,asApponyidid, Emlékiratai Arthur J.Pattersen, John Paget, ‘the extraordinaryskillofMagyarpoliticallawyersintheinterpretation ofconstitutionalprecepts’.Henry See Hanák, The ‘bourgeoisradicals’of

108 1899–1906 MT Hungary andTransylvania The HabsburgMonarchy ArthurPattersonnotes:‘Asanationalproverbtrulyobserves, “Sallangosa , vii The Magyars:TheirCountryandInstitutions /I, p.529. , Budapest,1934,pp.165–66. The ArmyQuestioninHungarianPolitics Huszadik Század reservata , London,1913,p.49.AsaViennacorrespondentof 106 , 2vols,London,1855, Onapracticallevel,thepursuanceofarmydemands , theagrariangrouprefusedtofollowApponyiand frequentlyarguedcogentlythatthedrivingforceofarmy 109 i , p.419. , 2vols,London,1869, 110 thatthefightingforarmy The Times 105 par excellence , September51905. Butthelinkwas 107 i , p.37. (or‘pettifog- The Times was 105 , he Published by Maney Publishing (c) W. S. Maney & Son Limited Magyars’. magyarise them,justastheexistinglanguageofcommand didnotgermanisethemorthe the seventy-oddwordsandphrasesdrilledintoRomanian andSlovakrecruitswould language ofcommandinallregiments.‘Yet,nobodythought (asIhavearguedelsewhere)that ‘strugglers’ werequitewillingtosettleformuchless:theintroductionofHungarianas point duringthecrisisafterturnofcentury,allgroupsincludingevenfront-line had tolearn).Thischangewasdemandedbytheopposition(notLiberals).Butatany Hungarian (Hungarianbeingoneofthe Hungarian (itwouldnothave‘magyarized’them)andmostofthemalreadyknewsome purely orpartlyMagyar,wouldpossiblyhaveforcedallofficerstoacquireasmatteringof Hungarian asthe out and,tomyknowledge,wasneverdemandedinparliament.Amandatorychange language qualifiedasasecondlanguage.)Butsuchchangecouldnothavebeencarried than German.(Instructionwasgiveninthe‘regimentallanguage’anda20percentminority Hungarian, althoughthechangewouldhavelargelybeenatexpenseoflanguagesother would havebeenaneffectivemeasuretoforcenon-Magyarofficersandrecruitslearn introduction ofHungarianasthesole a closerlookatwhatthedemandsactuallyinvolvedoffersdifferentpicture.Themandatory that theconnexionbetweentwopostureswasevidentinagreatmanyspeeches.However, turned down,Lányi, have radicallyincreasedtheuseof Hungarianas Emlékiratai the armybeenHungarianafter 1867,theassimilationofnon-Magyarswouldhaveprogressed steadily, p. 197(Skedherequotesfroman early TSversionofthispaper);aslatethe1930sApponyithought that,had behaviour intheuseofsymbolsatHabsburgcourtandalsoArmyitself. the inessentialmighthaveconstitutedaresponsetoformalism,rigidcodesof worth askingthequestionwhetherextenttowhichHungarianpreoccupationwith Political activistsinstinctivelyunderstandtheimportanceofcontentionoversymbols.Itis would betheacknowledgementthatsymbolsareessentialdevicesofsocialmobilization. opponent atafuturedate.AbetterdefenceofwhatIhavecalledthepoliticsinessential the argumentinwhicheachsidecollectedeventrivial-lookingassetstobeusedagainst between thelargelanguageblocs,particularlyinTransylvania. suggested thattheMagyarswereactuallylosinggroundtonationalitiesinmixedareas settled intothemidstofMagyars.Butpamphletsandatleastonestudy,byPálBalogh, Magyarization wassuccessfulonlyintowns,amongJewsandisolatedGermangroups ‘threatened’ bynumerousothernationalgroupsonallsides,didnotdiminishafter1867. regiments oftheArmyintoinstrumentsmagyarization.TheinsecurityMagyars, Hungarian armydemands.Accordingly,politicianstriedtoturnthe tionist Forty-eighter that thosegroupswhowereinthefrontlineof‘struggle’forarmydesiderata,obstruc- Seton-Watson, pp. 64–65. (Claims toparliament’ssovereigntyregularlycroppedupinthisobstructionist debate.)SeeHajdu, code ofbehaviourexpectedevenfromreservistofficers,November 20–271902, 106 113 112 111 (7) Contemporaryobserversabroadthoughtthatthenationalitypolicyprovidedkeyto Alan Sked, Pál Balogh, The longdebateintheHouseonPálNessy’sandothers’immunity casesillustratedwelltheformalistic , 113 ii , p.198.OnJuly11905,thePrime MinisterFejérváryofferedparliamentmeasuresthatwould The DeclineandFalloftheHabsburgEmpire,1815–1918 Racial ProblemsinHungary A népfajokMagyarországon Dienstsprache Fejérváry küzdo , pp.29–31. y k (thestrugglers)werealsothemostchauvinistmagyarizersand fortheforty-sevenregiments,ofwhichonlytwenty-onewere , Budapest,1902,pp.949–52.Balogh’sstatisticswereusedbyR.W. , London,1908,pp.396–97. Regimentssprache ászlóPéter Lá Regimentssprachen Regimentssprache inalltheregimentsraisedHungary , anofferthattheleadersof Coalition inmostregiments,whichofficers , London,1989(hereafterSked, 112 Debatesinparliamentreveal Képv. napló , ix , pp.36–185. 111 Tisztikat Decline ), , Published by Maney Publishing (c) W. S. Maney & Son Limited the prominenceofarmyquestion. State amongthenationalitiesratherthantoserveasapracticalmeasuremagyarizethem. reforms wereintendedtoimpressthenon-Magyars,improveprestigeofHungarian to reinforcethearmydemandsratherthanbeingaimbehindthem.Insum, plausible toassumethatmagyarizationwasdeployedinparliamentasarespectableargument for onegeneration,theremighthavebeenparliamentarypeacesomeyears.Itismore Since somepoliticalbargainsbetweenHungaryandthedynastyhadlastedinpastatleast probably havebeenmadebysmallgroups—thoughthatmightremainedineffective. ‘strugglers’ andbyFranzJosephasonlyafirststep.Onitsfulfilmentotherdemandswould the Tiszasystem.Butparliamentary 12 and13oftheSettlementLawwereusedtocounter royal fulfilment ofsomenationaldesiderata.Thearmyrights the more soldiersthecryroseinparliament:‘onlyreturn forcompensation’( for centurieslargelyconsistedof the supplyofmoneyhadbeenforlongatcentreCrown- with thegrievancesanddesiderataofnobility.Providingsoldierstoalesserextent and the soldiers coulddamagethemachineryofMonarchy. out tobeinadequate.Norwasiteffectiveasaconstitutional guarantee. meet recurrentexpenditurefromothersources.Parliament’s controlofpublicfinanceturned contributed lessthanhalfoftheState’sannualincome.Governmentcould,forawhile,easily could onlydelayandtheforceitreleasedwasself-destructive.InDualistera,directtaxes government. Thegrantingofsupplyretaineditsroleasaconstitutionallever,althoughit institutions andhabitsweredeployedincounterbalancingthepowersofCrownits Fejérváry governmentwhileinoffice,whichwouldhavebeenlegallypossible);theancient constitution didnotworkveryeffectively(therewasnoattempt,forinstance,toimpeachthe politics backintooldtracks.Sincethemodernliberalinstitutionsgraftedontoancient parliament. Allthismayhavebeennecessarytomaintainthe1867Settlement,butitforced majority principle.ThegovernmentwaspoliticallymoredependentontheCrownthan creation of‘thesystem’basedonanetiolatedcountyandcorruptelections‘perverted’the by theintroductionoffranchise.Butgrowth‘partyabsolutism’underTisza, of thediet,transformedin1848tobecomeaparliament,strengthenedwithpopularelement constitution inwhichthepowersofCrownhadbeenforcenturiesbalancedbyrights structural dualismwouldhavedisappeared.ButHungarystillpossessedamixedorbalanced destroy thisstructuraldualism.Hadparliamentarygovernmentbeenintroducedin1867, establishment ofan‘independentandresponsible’ministrygreatlymodifiedbutdidnot Decline nationality question.‘Atheartit was probablyaconstitutionaloneinthestrictersenseofterm’, Sked, 116 115 114 (8) Thecountry’spoliticalcultureanditsinstitutionalrequirementshadmuchtodowith Undoubtedly thedemandtomagyarizelanguageofcommandwasseenby In contrast,evenatemporarygapintheannualauthorization byparliamenttocallup Ibid., pp.432–33. See Péter,‘Verfassungsentwicklung’, pp.253–55. Alan Skedobservedthatthearmy questionshouldnotbeseenasaby-productofnationalismor the , p.197. ország dietovertherequestsofCrownfortaxesandrecruitsinreturndealing The ArmyQuestioninHungarianPolitics diaetalis tractatus obstrukció 114 Ashasbeenarguedearlier,politicsinHungaryhad wastheessentiallever.Itspractice(andeven —freebargainingbetweentheroyalofficials 116 WhenevertheCrownrequested ország reservata ország enshrinedinparagraphs relationship. (paragraph11)and ellenérték 115 ), the The 107 Published by Maney Publishing (c) W. S. Maney & Son Limited the promised socialreforms.FerenczKossuth,indespair,pleadedforthere-establishmentof Party werefightingforuniversalsuffrageandgavesupporttothegovernmentinreturn intelligentsia’, theindustrialworkingclasses,theirtradesunionsandSocialDemocratic towns wasfeeble.ThebusinessclasseskeptawayfromtheCoalition.new‘radical the lowerclasses,especiallyincountryside.Butsupportcapitalandlarger of resistance.TherewasplentysupportfortheCoalitioninHungarianintelligentsiaand the saddle,inoutlyingterritorieswithnon-Hungariannationalities,therewerefewsigns breaking, wasanoldpractice)andsealedthebuilding.Wheregentrywerenotfirmlyin local gentrythenoccupiedthecountyoffice,brokecommissar’schair( of salariesanddismissedelectedofficialsintheking’snamewithmilitaryassistance.The old practice).Theirinstallationcreatedevenmoredisorder:theysuspendedthepayment passed after1867.Thegovernmentthensentroyalcommissarstorestoreorder(acenturies- other electedassemblyincentralandeasternEuropewas abletostandupthegovernment parliament rejectedeventheArmy’smodestrequestfor more recruitsforoveradecade.No the maintenanceofitsgreat-powerstatusrequiredalarger andbetterarmy.TheHungarian a prolongedstalemate.TheHabsburgEmpirewasrapidly fallingbehinditsrivalsmilitarilyand intercede andtoprotectHungary. for theCoalition.TheMass,AbbotMolnárannounced, wastoentreattheVirginMary of theHousewhenTisza’s a leadingClerical,(whoinDecemberhadbeenphotographed sittingaloftthebrokenbenches their traditionalguerrillawarof Coalition leaders.Thecountiesresistedtheimplementationofgovernmentmeasureswith back ontheinstitutionsofpast.Thekingappointed tilted evenmoretowardstheCrown.Theopenconflictin1905inducedbothsidestofall preferred toleavethepresidentofHouseweak–otherwisepoliticalbalancewouldbe reluctant toclampdownonthe‘strugglers’sincethatmightweakenparliament;they dualism ofHungarianpolitics.Labouringunderamixedconstitution,theLiberalswere by gainingitsmajoritycorruptelections. response totheperversionofparliamentarism:governmentviolatedmajorityprinciple even destroyedthem.However,theycouldclaimthatwhatweredoingwasonlya put pressureontheHouse’smajority,drovegovernmentsinto They preventedbillsfrombeingpassed,mountedstreetdemonstrationsandpetitionsto its centralfeature.The‘strugglers’didnotallowthemajorityprincipletoprevailinHouse. more thethreatofit)wasnotanaberrationsystembut,assomeparticipantsobserved, royal rescriptofdissolution. a ‘royalcommissarplenipotentiary’wassentbythemonarchtoparliamenthandover of theReichsrat(which1867Settlementhadprovidedfor),assistedbya already inahole,wentondigging.Whenitrefusedtonegotiatetermswiththerepresentatives 108 118 117 In thearmyquestion(andonlyinquestion) Crown couldnotbesatisfiedwith Remedies forparliamentaryobstructioncouldnotbefoundeasilybecauseofthestructural Gratz, The Times nádor , anarchdukepalatine,tomediatebetweenCrownandcountry. Dualizmus , January221906. , ii , pp.112–14. 118 coup TheHousewasempty.IntheBasilica,however,MgrMolnár, tochangetheStandingOrdershadfailed)celebrateda Mass vis inertiae ászlóPéter Lá ratherthanwiththeformsofferedbylaws homo regius ex lex , disabledandsometimes to negotiatewiththe 117 honvéd TheCoalition, széktörés battalion, , chair- Published by Maney Publishing (c) W. S. Maney & Son Limited stable formofgovernment. although thereisabalanceineveryconstitution,nobalancedconstitutionas coup was neverthelessreadilyacceptedasa‘progressive’liberalstate. difficult initsrelationswithAustriaandforbeingunjusttreatmentofnationalities, politics intheEuropeanpress.In1900,Hungary,sometimescriticizedabroadforbeing — adependencethatsealeditsfate.ThecrisisbroughttoomuchpublicitytoHungarian sorry state.TheMonarchytherebybecameutterlydependentontheGermanhighcommand the Warbrokeoutin1914,Army,afterlongyearsofdelaysexpansion,wasa Hungarian aspirationsengagedintheirownformofresistancethe‘zde’movement.When reforms intheMonarchywereabandoned.InBohemiaCzechnationalists,inspiredby 1906 and1910)wereprematurelydissolvedbyFranzJosephinto was highconstitutionally,andevenhigherpolitically.After1901,allparliaments(in1905, to thatextentatanytimebeforetheFirstWorldWar.Butpricecountryhadtopay Hungary itselfwasnowconsideredtobeadangeroussourceofinstability. army demandsturnedouttobedisruptivetheMonarchyandEuropeanpeace.Indeed, constitutional crisisdestroyedthereputationofHungarianpoliticiansalloverEurope.Their Monarchy thatwasitselfanessentialcounterweighttothegrowingpowerofGermany.The crisis, thecountrywasseenbyoutsidersasamainstayofstabilitythatbolsteringup undeserved, andincontrasttoAustria,sufferingasitwasfromtheeffectsofBadeni collapsed and,intheforeignpress,becamecomparabletoRussia’s. public ‘discovered’theoppressionofnationalities.Hungary’sreputationasaliberalstate of thepopulationremainednon-Magyars.BehindconstitutionalcrisisEuropean command. Outsiderssawthisasforcedmagyarization,yet,Ihavepointedout,overhalf even aftertakingoffice,didnotabandontheplantointroduceHungarianaslanguageof Tisza’s parliament weshallneverknowbecausetheHabsburgMonarchydisintegratedsixyearsafter eighty-five yearsasyettothrowoff. Hungary. TheTreatyformedanincubusontheHungarian psyche,whichithasaftersome Nearly athirdofHungariansfoundthemselvesinthe newstates.Trianontraumatized infested withproblemsofnationalminoritiesgreater than Hungaryhadenduredearlier. regions ofHungary,toitsneighbourscreatedaset new multi-nationalstatesthatwere Western Powersintheirzealtotransferallnon-Magyars, evenfromthenationallymixed affected thetermsofTrianonPeaceTreatyin1920.At theendofFirstWorldWar oppression intheliteratureonmodernnationalism.Thechangecountry’simage ministries ofwesternEurope.Hungarybecameanoverusedparadigmaticinstancenational C London, 2004,pp.6–8. h 122 121 120 119 ernová inOctober1907consolidatedthenewdarkassessmentofcountryforeign The politicaldamagecausedbythearmycrisiswasincalculable.Cautiousattemptsatliberal The Times László Péter,‘Introduction’in Péter andMartynRady(eds), See GézaJeszenszky, Compare JohnStuartMill, in1912mutilatedparliament’sbargainingpositionwiththeCrown.Naturallyenough, coup . , November11907. Az elveszettpresztizs The ArmyQuestioninHungarianPolitics 119 Representative Government WhetherthependuluminHungarywouldhaveswungbackto , Budapest,1994,ch.3. , 1861,ch.V. British-Hungarian Relationssince 1848 120 ex lex Thisacceptancewasnot . Tisza’sparliamentary 122 The‘massacre’of 121 TheCoalition, 109 , Published by Maney Publishing (c) W. S. Maney & Son Limited makeweight betweenthetwostatesofHabsburgMonarchy. a constitutionalbalanceofsortsbetweentheCrownandparliamentaswellpolitical rights ofthe damage. Fromtheperspectiveofamixedconstitution,whichHungarysustained,army disruptive force,generatedthearmycrisisinMonarchywithuntoldconsequentpolitical From theoutlookofliberalconstitutionalism 110 All inall,ourassessmentofthearmycrisiswillbedependentonchoiceperspective. ország workedafter1867forhalfacenturyasanefficientlevertosecure ászlóPéter Lá ország ’s armyrights,anunpredictable