DOCSLIB.ORG

Zvýšení Zabezpeˇcení Služeb Sítˇe Liane

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Zvýšení Zabezpeˇcení Služeb Sítˇe Liane Zvýšení zabezpeceníˇ služeb síteˇ Liane Diplomová práce Studijní program: N2612 – Elektrotechnika a informatika Studijní obor: 1802T007 – Informacníˇ technologie Autor práce: Bc. Vojtechˇ Šindler Vedoucí práce: Ing. Mojmír Volf Liberec 2017 Improvement security Liane’s network Diploma thesis Study programme: N2612 – Electrotechnology and informatics Study branch: 1802T007 – Information technology Author: Bc. Vojtechˇ Šindler Supervisor: Ing. Mojmír Volf Liberec 2017 P1'<>h1zi§e11i sez112in1e11s‘aim,Zemamou Se vzta— Byljsem diplomovoupr-éciplné— zékon5. 3b.,0 autorském,zejména60 ékolm’hujed?o.121/2000pralvu § Berunavédomi,ieTechnickéuniverzitav Liberci(TUL)nezasahu— jedomychautorskychprévuiitfmmédiplomovépraiseprovnitfni potfebuTUL. Uiiji—1idiplomovouprzicineboposkytnu—1ilicencikjejimuVyuEi— ti,jsemsivédompovinnostiinformovat0 tétoskuteénostiTUL; v tomtopfipadéméTULprévoodemnepoiadovat?hradunék1a— d?,kte1'évy11a1o%i1ana vytvofenid?a,aidojejichskuteénéVy"§e. Diplomovouprécijsemvypracovalsamostatnés pouiitimuvedené literaxurya na zzikladékonzultacis vedoucimmédiplomovépréce a konzultantem. Souéasnééestnéprohlaéuji.5.9tiéténziverzeprziceseshodujes e1ek— tronickouVerzi,vloienoudoISSTAG. ‘ Datum.. )_F ? % Popis:///rd////4/ Abstrakt Tato práce rešíˇ problematiku IT bezpecnostiˇ a jejího zvýšení v kontextu síteˇ LIANE. Tento problém byl rešenˇ za použití penetracníchˇ test˚utypu grey box. Na vybraných segmentech síteˇ došlo k provedení penetracníchˇ test˚u.Jejich výsledkem byl seznam nalezených zranitelností, dopad˚u a návrh˚u vedoucích k jejich odstranení.ˇ Na základeˇ výsledku penetracníchˇ test˚udošlo k zhodnocení bezpecnosti,ˇ návrhu rozvoje a proces˚uvedoucích ke zvýšení bezpecnostiˇ síteˇ LIANE. Klícovᡠslova IT security, penetracníˇ testování, asset management, patch management, vulnerability management, zneužití zranitelností, zabezpeceníˇ síteˇ Abstract This thesis solves the IT security issue and its increase in the context of the LIANE network. This problem was solved using gray box penetration tests. Selective segments of the network performed penetration tests. The result was a list of vulnerabilities, impacts, and suggestions that led to their removal. Based on the results of the Penetration Tests, the security, design and development of the LIANE network were assessed. Key words IT security, penetration testing, asset management, patch management, vulnerability management, vulnerability abuse, network security 5 Podekováníˇ Dekujiˇ vedoucímu práce Ing. Mojmíru Volfovi za neocenitelné rady a pomoc priˇ tvorbeˇ diplomové práce. Dále bych chtelˇ podekovatˇ rodine,ˇ prátel˚umaˇ koleg˚um bez jejichž pomoci bych studium nikdy nedokoncil.ˇ Nejvetšíˇ dík patríˇ slecnámˇ Bc. Janeˇ Strnadové a Haneˇ Mocové, dále pak pán˚umBc. Jaromíru Vaneˇckoviˇ a Ing. Dušanovi Krásovi bez jejichž odborné pomoci by tato diplomová práce nebyla napsána v této podobe.ˇ 6 Obsah Seznam zkratek..................................9 1 Vybrané cíle v kontextu síteˇ LIANE 12 1.1 Infrastrukturní prvky............................ 12 1.2 Produkcníˇ servery a testovací servery.................... 13 2 Metodika testování služeb síteˇ LIANE 15 2.1 Penetracníˇ testy jako nástroj IT security.................. 15 2.1.1 Black box.............................. 17 2.1.2 Grey box.............................. 17 2.1.3 White box.............................. 17 2.1.4 Nástroje sloužící k penetracnímˇ test˚um.............. 18 2.2 Metodika penetracníchˇ test˚u........................ 19 2.2.1 Cyber kill chain........................... 19 2.2.2 Použité metodiky pro úcelyˇ penetracníchˇ test˚u.......... 24 3 Detekce bezpecnostníchˇ rizik v síti LIANE 25 3.1 Reconnaissance............................... 25 3.1.1 Nmap................................ 25 3.1.2 Nessus............................... 26 3.1.3 Výsledky reconnaissance fáze................... 26 3.2 Weaponization............................... 28 3.3 Delivery a Exploitace............................ 29 3.4 Installation a ovládnutí stroje........................ 30 3.5 Vybraná webová aplikace.......................... 30 3.6 Ukázka exploitu............................... 33 4 Vyhodnocení penetracníchˇ test˚u 37 4.1 Limity penetracníchˇ test˚u.......................... 37 4.2 Celkový pocetˇ nalezených zranitelností.................. 37 7 4.3 Nalezené zranitelnosti a bezpecnostníˇ problémy.............. 38 5 Kroky vedoucí k nápraveˇ soucasnéhoˇ stavu 43 5.1 Asset management............................. 45 5.1.1 Asset management database.................... 45 5.1.2 Asset management work flow................... 46 5.2 Patch management............................. 46 5.2.1 Databáze patch˚u.......................... 47 5.2.2 Patch management work flow................... 47 5.3 Vulnerability management......................... 48 5.3.1 Vulnerability management database................ 48 5.3.2 Vulnerability management workflow................ 49 5.3.3 Návrh databáze urcenéˇ pro asset, pach a vulnerability management 50 Prílohyˇ 60 A Obsah priloženéhoˇ CD 61 8 Seznam zkratek TUL Technická univerzita v Liberci FM Fakulta mechatroniky, informatiky a mezioborových studií Technické univerzity v Liberci DPI Deap Packet Scanning DoS Denial of Services DDoS Distributed Denial of Services XSS Cros-site scripting IPS Intrusion Prevention System NDA Non-disclosure agreement RoE Rule of Engagement FQDN Fully Qualified Domain Name ACL Acess List RCE Remote Code Execution RPC Remote Procedure Call LDAP Lightweight Directory Access Protocol PM Patch Management VM Vulnerability Management VBS Visual Basic Scripting RSS Rich Site Summary 9 Úvod V dnešní dobeˇ internetu a sociálních sítí se dostává pojem IT security stále více do popredí.ˇ M˚užemesi klást otázku procˇ se tak deje.ˇ Pokud celý tento problém prevedemeˇ na sebe, tak zajisté nikdo nechce, aby jeho soukromé údaje (napr.:ˇ rodné císlo,ˇ císloˇ bankovního úctu,ˇ adresa trvalého pobytu, . ) padly do nepovolaných rukou. K tomu, aby se tak nestalo je zapotrebíˇ dodržovat urcitéˇ postupy, které míru zabezpeceníˇ našich dat zvýší. Díky tomu bude pro prípadnéhoˇ útocníkaˇ (v obecné terminologii oznacovanéhoˇ jako hackera) daleko složitejšíˇ naše data získat. Již zmínenýˇ problém ochrany osobních dat se dá úplneˇ stejneˇ prevéstˇ na ochranu citlivých informací v korporátním sektoru. V soucasnéˇ dobeˇ se spisovny již témeˇrˇ nevyskytují a vetšinaˇ dat se uchovává v elektronické podobe,ˇ tím pádem nabývá pr˚umyslová špionáž nových rozmer˚u.ˇ Prevážnᡠvetšinaˇ spolecnostíˇ má pripojeníˇ k internetu, skrze které je možné provést pr˚unikdo firemní síte.ˇ Vyvstává zde otázka, jak takovému útoku, který by vedl k odcizení citlivých informací zabránit. Odpoved’ˇ není jednoduchá, a to predevšímˇ v dobe,ˇ kdy probíhá masivní rozvoj mobilních technologií a IOT (Internet Of Things). Práveˇ s rozvojem IOT se m˚užestát každé zarízeníˇ potenciální vstupní branou do soukromých sítí, a je pritomˇ jedno zda se jedná o malou ciˇ rozlehlou firemní sít’. Proto už priˇ samotném vytváreníˇ sítí je nutné brát v potaz možné vektory útok˚u.Je samozrejmé,ˇ že v návrhu osobních a firemních sítí jsou znacnéˇ rozdíly. V prípadˇ eˇ osobních sítí je v dnešní dobeˇ nejcastˇ ejiˇ útok veden skrze uživatelský pocítaˇ c,ˇ telefon, tablet, ciˇ pomocí tzv. social hackingu, ale jak již bylo zmínenoˇ výše, s nástupem IOT m˚užebýt veden skrze každé zarízení,ˇ které je pripojenéˇ do internetové síte.ˇ Je tedy velice pravdepodobné,ˇ že postupem casuˇ se metody pr˚unikumohou znacnˇ eˇ lišit. Oproti tomu ve firemních sítích je vektor˚udaleko více. Od útoku presˇ koncové stanice až k social hackingu. Proto je nutné priˇ budování síteˇ vytvoritˇ bezpecnostníˇ politiky, které budou po celou životnost v rámci firemní síteˇ dodržovány. Je samozrejmé,ˇ že bezpecnostníˇ 10 politiky by melyˇ být v pravidelných intervalech prehodnocoványˇ a v mnoha prípadechˇ i menˇ eny.ˇ Za zmínku stojí napríkladˇ velikost klíceˇ šifrovacích algoritm˚u,v roce 2015 vyšel clánekˇ Imperfect Forward Secrecy: How Diffie-Hellman Fails in Practice, který blíže popisuje jak je možné, že americká agentura NSA je schopna odposlouchávat i šifrovanou komunikaci [1]. Otázka zní jak co nejlépe zabezpecitˇ vaši sít’, zarízeníˇ ciˇ aplikaci. Bohužel, odpoved’ˇ na tuto otázku není v˚ubecsnadná. Samotná problematika tvorby bezpecnýchˇ aplikací ciˇ datových sítí by vydala na samostatnou diplomovou práci. Tato diplomová práce si klade za cíl, jak co nejspolehlivejiˇ oveˇritˇ zabezpeceníˇ a odolnost datové síte,ˇ aplikace ciˇ zarízeníˇ v˚uciˇ pokus˚um,kterým mohou být vystaveny ze strany útocník˚u,ˇ jejichž cílem je nejakýmˇ zp˚usobem aplikaci, zarízeníˇ ciˇ sít’ kompromitovat. Pod slovem kompromitovat si m˚užemepredstavitˇ tyto pojmy: • ovládnutí zarízeníˇ za úcelemˇ sberuˇ informací • zneužití výpocetníˇ síly • oslabení obrany systému predˇ dalšími útoky • etc. V soucasnéˇ dobeˇ se pro úcelyˇ bezpecnostníchˇ audit˚upoužívají tzv. penetraˇcnítesty. Penetracníˇ tester sám sebe dostává do role hackera a díky tomu je schopen docílit takového testu jako kdyby (se vaše) testovaná infrastruktura, hardware ciˇ aplikace ocitly pod reálným útokem. Má diplomová práce se presnˇ eˇ o totéž bude snažit a to v souvislosti vybraných služeb, aplikací ciˇ infrastruktury v kontextu síteˇ LIANE. 11 1 Vybrané cíle v kontextu síteˇ LIANE Je samozrejmostí,ˇ že univerzita nem˚uženést následky za chování svých student˚u,ale predstavmeˇ si scénár,ˇ který není úplneˇ nereálný, kdy student s nakaženým PC, které melˇ umístenoˇ na kolejích, prijdeˇ do ucebnyˇ TUL. Je velice pravdepodobné,ˇ že se nákaza (nejcastˇ
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Internet Infrastructure Review Vol.34
    Internet Infrastructure Review Mar.2017 Vol. 34 Infrastructure Security Ursnif (Gozi) Anti-Analysis Techniques and Methods for Bypassing Them Technology Trends The Current State of Library OSes Internet Infrastructure Review March 2017 Vol.34 Executive Summary ............................................................................................................................ 3 1. Infrastructure Security .................................................................................................................. 4 1.1 Introduction ..................................................................................................................................... 4 1.2 Incident Summary ........................................................................................................................... 4 1.3 Incident Survey ...............................................................................................................................11 1.3.1 DDoS Attacks ...................................................................................................................................11 1.3.2 Malware Activities ......................................................................................................................... 13 1.3.3 SQL Injection Attacks ..................................................................................................................... 17 1.3.4 Website Alterations .......................................................................................................................
    [Show full text]
  • Defending Against Black Nurse Dos Attacks
    White Paper Defending Against Black Nurse DoS Attacks Juniper Networks vSRX Virtual Firewall vs. the Competition 1 Defending Against Black Nurse DoS Attacks White Paper Table of Contents Executive Summary ....................................................................................................................................................................................................... 3 Introduction ........................................................................................................................................................................................................................ 3 Three Multivector Attack DoS Methods.................................................................................................................................................................. 3 High-Volume-Based Network ICMP Attack ........................................................................................................................................................... 3 A New Low-Bandwidth ICMP Attack: Black Nurse .............................................................................................................................................4 How a Black Nurse Attack Works ..............................................................................................................................................................................4 Protection in the Architecture .....................................................................................................................................................................................4
    [Show full text]
  • Defending Against Black Nurse Dos Attacks
    White Paper Defending Against Black Nurse DoS Attacks Juniper Networks vSRX Virtual Firewall vs. the Competition 1 Defending Against Black Nurse DoS Attacks White Paper Table of Contents Executive Summary ....................................................................................................................................................................................................... 3 Introduction ........................................................................................................................................................................................................................ 3 Three Multivector Attack DoS Methods.................................................................................................................................................................. 3 High-Volume-Based Network ICMP Attack ........................................................................................................................................................... 3 A New Low-Bandwidth ICMP Attack: Black Nurse .............................................................................................................................................4 How a Black Nurse Attack Works ..............................................................................................................................................................................4 Protection in the Architecture .....................................................................................................................................................................................4
    [Show full text]
  • Stormshield Network Firewall for Your Network
    GUIDE STORMSHIELD NETWORK SECURITY USER CONFIGURATION MANUAL Version 4 Date: December 18, 2019 Reference: sns-en-user_configuration_manual-v4.0.1 SNS - USER CONFIGURATION MANUAL - V 4 IP addresses and host objects 27 Table of contents URLs 28 Ports 29 WELCOME 11 Network packets 29 Recommendations on the operating Alarms view 30 environment 11 System events view 30 Introduction 11 Logs 30 Security watch 12 ADMINISTRATORS 33 Physical security measures 12 Organizational security measures 12 “Administrators” tab 33 Human media 13 Interactive features 33 IT security environment 13 Possible operations 33 User awareness 15 Table of privileges 34 Administrator management 15 “Administrator account” tab 37 User password management 16 Authentication 37 Work environment 17 Exports 37 User access management 17 “Ticket management” tab 38 The table 38 ACCESS PRIVILEGES 18 Possible operations 38 “Default options” tab 18 ANTISPAM 39 SSL VPN Portal 18 IPSEC 18 “General” tab 39 SSL VPN 18 SMTP parameters 39 Sponsorship 19 Advanced properties 40 “Detailed access” tab 19 “Whitelisted domains” tab 41 Possible operations 19 Interactive features 42 Interactive features 19 “Blacklisted domains” tab 42 Configuration table 19 Interactive features 42 “PPTP” tab 21 ANTIVIRUS 43 Interactive features 21 Antivirus engine 43 ACTIVE UPDATE 22 Settings 43 Automatic updates 22 Analysis of ClamAV files 43 Advanced properties 22 Analysis of Kaspersky files 43 Update servers of the URL database 22 Sandboxing 44 Update servers of customized context- based protection signatures 22 APPLICATIONS AND PROTECTIONS 45 Update servers 22 View by inspection profile 45 Selecting the configuration profile 45 LOGS - AUDIT LOGS 23 The various columns 47 Private data 23 View by context 48 Collaborative security 23 Storage device: SD Card 23 AUTHENTICATION 50 Actions 24 “Available methods” tab 50 Toolbar no.
    [Show full text]
  • Cyber Warnings E-Magazine – June 2017 Edition Copyright © Cyber Defense Magazine, All Rights Reserved Worldwide ;
    ; 1 Cyber Warnings E-Magazine – June 2017 Edition Copyright © Cyber Defense Magazine, All rights reserved worldwide CONTENTS CYBER WARNINGS Published monthly by Cyber Defense Magazine and distributed electronically via opt-in Email, HTML, PDF and From the Editor’s Desk .................................................... 4 Online Flipbook formats. Not Ocean’s 14 ............................................................... 5 PRESIDENT An Alan Turing-Inspired Solution to the Cybersecurity Stevin Miliefsky [email protected] Labor Shortage ............................................................... 8 EDITOR WHY BIOMETRICS IS A SECURITY ESSENTIAL…AND SO IS DISABLING IT ASAP .......................................... 12 Pierluigi Paganini, CEH [email protected] 5 Keys to Protecting your Company’s Online Finances 16 ADVERTISING Don’t be an Easy Target ............................................... 18 Jessica Quinn [email protected] The CIO discuss information security leadership .......... 22 KEY WRITERS AND CONTRIBUTORS WannaCry/Ransomware? Secure your Enterprise Using Charles Parker, II Blockchain-Enabled Cybersecurity................................ 24 Xuyen Bowles Doug Ramos Dixie Somers The challenges of interference within modern industrial Michael Ryan systems ......................................................................... 26 Myles Suer Narayan Neelakantan Milica D. Djekic Hacking: Cheaper than a Nando's chicken. .................. 30 Jonathan Stock Lee David Painter
    [Show full text]
  • What Organizations Don't Know About Ddos Attacks Can Hurt Them
    What Organizations Don’t Know About DDoS Attacks Can Hurt Them. The threat is real, so is the solution. DDoS (distributed denial of service) attacks are real and the threat is escalating in volume and complexity. In fact, newsworthy attacks like the following are occurring almost every week: At least five major Russian banks came under continuous DDoS attack for two days. The attack was spawned by a wide-scale botnet involving at least 24,000 computers, located in 30 countries. Major internet services including Twitter, Spotify and Amazon suffered service interruptions and outages simultaneously over several hours due to a DDoS attack. The computer systems of two prominent Boston hospitals were simultaneously crippled by a DDoS attack. The hacker wanted to take revenge on one of the hospitals for personal reasons.1 Chad Foos, IT Security Engineer for Verizon Platinum Master Agent SOVA, said, “No one is immune to this. That’s the reality of putting your business online today. They are becoming more and more common. If Twitter is vulnerable, anybody is vulnerable.” In a DDoS attack, the perpetrator infects a random army of as many as 100s of 1,000s of poorly protected computers with malware designed to target a specific network(s). This makes it impossible to prevent or stop the attack by blocking a single IP address. It is also nearly impossible to distinguish legitimate traffic from DDoS traffic. This incoming traffic overwhelms the network and either shuts it down or severely compromises it. Foos likens the attack to a few shoppers in a sea of shoplifters all trying to squeeze in a single revolving door.
    [Show full text]
  • Unraveling the Tangle of Old and New Threats
    Caught in the Net: Unraveling the Tangle of Old and New Threats 2018 Annual Security Roundup Contents TREND MICRO LEGAL DISCLAIMER The information provided herein is for general information 04 and educational purposes only. It is not intended and should not be construed to constitute legal advice. The Messaging threats increase, information contained herein may not be applicable to all situations and may not reflect the most current situation. in various forms Nothing contained herein should be relied on or acted upon without the benefit of legal advice based on the particular facts and circumstances presented and nothing 10 herein should be construed otherwise. Trend Micro reserves the right to modify the contents of this document Ransomware remains compelling at any time without prior notice. despite decline in attacks Translations of any material into other languages are intended solely as a convenience. Translation accuracy is not guaranteed nor implied. If any questions arise related to the accuracy of a translation, please refer to 17 the original language official version of the document. Any discrepancies or differences created in the translation are Critical vulnerabilities in hardware and not binding and have no legal effect for compliance or enforcement purposes. the cloud are found, number of ICS bugs Although Trend Micro uses reasonable efforts to include continue rising accurate and up-to-date information herein, Trend Micro makes no warranties or representations of any kind as to its accuracy, currency, or completeness. You agree 23 that access to and use of and reliance on this document and the content thereof is at your own risk.
    [Show full text]
  • Moving-Target Defense Against Botnet Reconnaissance and an Adversarial Coupon-Collection Model
    1 Moving-target Defense against Botnet Reconnaissance and an Adversarial Coupon-Collection Model Daniel Fleck1, George Kesidis2, Takis Konstantopoulos3, Neda Nasiriani2, Yuquan Shan2, and Angelos Stavrou1 1. CS Dept, GMU 2. School of EECS, PSU 3. Dept. of Math, Univ. Liverpool fdfleck,[email protected] fgik2,nun129,[email protected] [email protected] Abstract We consider a cloud based multiserver system consisting of a set of replica application servers behind a set of proxy (indirection) servers which interact directly with clients over the Internet. We study a proactive moving-target defense to thwart a DDoS attacker’s reconnaissance phase and consequently reduce the attack’s impact. The defense is effectively a moving-target (motag) technique in which the proxies dynamically change. The system is evaluated using an AWS prototype of HTTP redirection and by numerical evaluations of an “adversarial” coupon-collector mathematical model, the latter allowing larger-scale extrapolations. I. INTRODUCTION Two very significant, high-volume botnet based DDoS attacks were witnessed in Fall 2016 [7], [9]. The Dyn attack was launched by IoT-device bots (compromised using factory default credentials) against Oracle DNS service. Since 2016, other significant attacks have involved, e.g., the Mirai, Hajime and BrickerBot botnets, which largely consist of IoT devices (compromised typically via known exploits)1. Indeed, many (not just legacy) IoT devices cannot be secured. Thus, infrastructure based defenses need to be mobilized against such DDoS attacks. Such arXiv:1712.01102v3 [cs.CR] 26 Apr 2018 defenses can be situated at the attacker-side network edge (e.g., egress filtering, intrusion detection), within the network (e.g., Akamai Prolexic), or on the premises of the targeted victim (enterprise based defenses, e.g., reactive dispersive autoscaling, challenge-response, and anomaly detection).
    [Show full text]
  • The 2017 Security Threat Landscape
    EXECUTIVE SERIES The 2017 Security Threat Landscape 2017 was rife with global ransomware attacks, large-scale vulnerability threats, debilitating BEC scams, the rise of cryptocurrency risks, ever-evolving IoT threats, and a continued stream of data breaches. How did businesses fare in their midst? And what should companies do to manage their enterprise risk in 2018? The Paradox of Cyberthreats in 2017 greater in 2018. We’ve seen Dirty COW, for instance, cause grief among 5,000 users in more than 40 countries prior to its discovery Though the ransomware volume did plateau in 2017 as we in 2017.4 With the help of external researchers via our Zero Day expected, the threat continued to wreak havoc on a massive scale Initiative (ZDI), we discovered and disclosed a record number of 1 worldwide. 1,008 new vulnerabilities in 2017, only a small percentage of these were and will continue to be weaponized in exploit attacks. The 327 1,078,091,703 time from disclosure to exploitation has decreased dramatically though, significantly impacting the landscape. 247 200 631,128,278 Adobe 150 Foxit 100 Microsoft Google 2016 2017 2016 2017 50 Apple Figure 1. More ransomware families emerged in 2017 but fewer major players despite the said rise 0 Ransomware attacks impacting business operations continued to 2016 2017 increase in 2017. Ransomware attacks from WannaCry to Petya Figure 2. A variation in vulnerability count direction was seen resulted in production line downtime at Honda, Nissan, Renault, Increases in both the overall number of zero-day vulnerabilities and even Cadbury. The likelihood and impact of these attacks (disclosed without a patch available) and that specifically affect increased 10 times with the convergence of capable ransomware supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) systems were and the wormlike capabilities of the EternalBlue exploit.
    [Show full text]
  • 2017 Annual Security Roundup: the Paradox of Cyberthreats
    2017 Annual Security Roundup: The Paradox of Cyberthreats TrendLabsSM 2017 Annual Security Roundup Contents TREND MICRO LEGAL DISCLAIMER The information provided herein is for general information and educational purposes only. It 5 is not intended and should not be construed to constitute legal advice. The information contained Ransomware brings about bigger herein may not be applicable to all situations and may not reflect the most current situation. Nothing global outbreaks despite fewer contained herein should be relied on or acted major players upon without the benefit of legal advice based on the particular facts and circumstances presented and nothing herein should be construed otherwise. Trend Micro reserves the right to modify 10 the contents of this document at any time without prior notice. Adaptable threats exploit known vulnerabilities in new ways Translations of any material into other languages are intended solely as a convenience. Translation accuracy is not guaranteed nor implied. If any questions arise related to the accuracy of 13 a translation, please refer to the original language official version of the document. Any discrepancies Amid growing awareness of the or differences created in the translation are not threat, BEC scams are still on the binding and have no legal effect for compliance or enforcement purposes. rise Although Trend Micro uses reasonable efforts to include accurate and up-to-date information 16 herein, Trend Micro makes no warranties or representations of any kind as to its accuracy, Cryptocurrency’s meteoric ascent currency, or completeness. You agree that access to and use of and reliance on this document and inspires new mining malware and the content thereof is at your own risk.
    [Show full text]
  • Ji BAN(Qoej'\ÉX!CO
    Jl?ji BAN(QoEJ'\ÉX!CO COMITÉ DE TRANSPARENCIA ACTA DE LA SESIÓN ESPECIAL 09/2020 DEL 04 DE MARZO DE 2020 En la Ciudad de México, a las trece horas del cuatro de marzo de dos mil veinte, en el edificio ubicado en avenida Cinco de Mayo, número veinte, colonia Centro, demarcación territorial Cuauhtémoc, se reunieron María Teresa Muñoz Arámburu, Titular de la Unidad de Transparencia; Erik Mauricio Sánchez Medina, Director Jurídico; y Víctor Manuel De La Luz Puebla, Director de Seguridad y Organización de la Información, todos integrantes del Comité de Transparencia; así como Sergio Zambra no Herrera, Subgerente de Análisis Jurídico y Promoción de Transparencia, en su carácter de Secretario de este órgano colegiado. --------------------------------------------------------------------------------­ También estuvieron presentes, como invitados de este Comité, en términos de los artículos 4o. y 31, fracció n XIV, del Reglamento Interior del Banco de México (RIBM), así como la Tercera, de las Reglas de Ope ración del Comité de Transparencia del Banco de México, publicadas en el Diario Oficial de la Federación el dos de junio de dos mil dieciséis, (Reglas), las personas que se indican en la lista de asistencia que se adjunta a la presente como "ANEXO 1", quienes también son servidores pú b I icos de I Ba neo de México.-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------­ Al estar presentes los integrantes mencionados, quien ejerce en este acto las funciones de Secretariado del Comité de Transparencia manifestó que existe quórum para la celebración de la presente sesión, de conformidad con lo previsto en los artículos 43 de la Ley General de Transparencia y Acceso a la Información Pública (LGTAIP); 64, párrafos segundo y tercero, de la Ley Federal de Transparencia y Acceso a la Información Pública (LFTAIP); 83 de la Ley General de Protección de Datos Personales en Posesión de Sujetos Obligados (LGPDPPSO); 4o.
    [Show full text]
  • Rise of the Machines: the Dyn Attack Was Just a Practice Run December 2016
    Rise of the Machines: The Dyn Attack Was Just a Practice Run December 2016 Authors James Scott, Sr. Fellow, ICIT Drew Spaniel, Research, ICIT Copyright © 2016 Institute for Critical Infrastructure Technology – All Rights Reserved Upcoming Event Learn More about the concepts discussed in this publication at the 2017 ICIT Winter Summit. Registration is Now Open – www.ICITWinterSummit.org 1 Contents Contents ........................................................................................................................................................ 1 Introduction .................................................................................................................................................. 3 A Simplification of the Internet .................................................................................................................... 4 Protocols ....................................................................................................................................................... 5 ISO OSI ..................................................................................................................................................... 5 TCP/IP ...................................................................................................................................................... 6 Anatomy of a Distributed Denial of Service Attack ................................................................................. 7 Constructing a Botnet ..........................................................................................................................
    [Show full text]