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Semi-Annual Report Ishares Asia Trust

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Semi-Annual Report Ishares Asia Trust Semi-annual Report iShares Asia Trust • iShares MSCI China Index ETF • iShares MSCI China A International Index ETF • iShares FTSE A50 China Index ETF • iShares Core S&P BSE SENSEX India Index ETF • iShares Core MSCI AC Asia ex Japan Index ETF • iShares MSCI Emerging Asia Index ETF • iShares Core CSI 300 Index ETF • iShares Core KOSPI 200 Index ETF • iShares Core MSCI Taiwan Index ETF • iShares DAX Index ETF • iShares EURO STOXX 50 Index ETF • iShares FTSE 100 Index ETF • iShares NASDAQ 100 Index ETF • iShares Core Hang Seng Index ETF (Sub-funds of iShares Asia Trust) For the Period ended 30th June 2018 Contents Report of the Manager to the Unitholders 3 Condensed Statement of Financial Position 22 Condensed Statement of Comprehensive Income 31 Condensed Statement of Changes in Net Assets Attributable to Unitholders 38 Condensed Statement of Cash Flows 41 Notes to the Unaudited Condensed Financial Statements 48 iShares MSCI China Index ETF 76 – Investment Portfolio (unaudited) – Statement of Movements in Investment Portfolio (unaudited) – Performance Record (unaudited) iShares MSCI China A International Index ETF 81 – Investment Portfolio (unaudited) – Statement of Movements in Investment Portfolio (unaudited) – Performance Record (unaudited) iShares FTSE A50 China Index ETF 84 – Investment Portfolio (unaudited) – Statement of Movements in Investment Portfolio (unaudited) – Holdings of Collateral (unaudited) – Performance Record (unaudited) iShares Core S&P BSE SENSEX India Index ETF 87 – Investment Portfolio (unaudited) – Investment Portfolio of iShares BSE SENSEX Mauritius Company (unaudited) – Statement of Movements in Investment Portfolio (unaudited) – Performance Record (unaudited) iShares Core MSCI AC Asia ex Japan Index ETF 91 – Investment Portfolio (unaudited) – Statement of Movements in Investment Portfolio (unaudited) – Performance Record (unaudited) iShares MSCI Emerging Asia Index ETF 100 – Investment Portfolio (unaudited) – Statement of Movements in Investment Portfolio (unaudited) – Performance Record (unaudited) iShares Core CSI 300 Index ETF 106 – Investment Portfolio (unaudited) – Statement of Movements in Investment Portfolio (unaudited) – Performance Record (unaudited) iShares Core KOSPI 200 Index ETF 111 – Investment Portfolio (unaudited) – Statement of Movements in Investment Portfolio (unaudited) – Performance Record (unaudited) Semi-annual Report 1 Contents (continued) iShares Core MSCI Taiwan Index ETF 115 – Investment Portfolio (unaudited) – Statement of Movements in Investment Portfolio (unaudited) – Performance Record (unaudited) iShares DAX Index ETF 118 – Investment Portfolio (unaudited) – Statement of Movements in Investment Portfolio (unaudited) – Performance Record (unaudited) iShares EURO STOXX 50 Index ETF 121 – Investment Portfolio (unaudited) – Statement of Movements in Investment Portfolio (unaudited) – Performance Record (unaudited) iShares FTSE 100 Index ETF 124 – Investment Portfolio (unaudited) – Statement of Movements in Investment Portfolio (unaudited) – Performance Record (unaudited) iShares NASDAQ 100 Index ETF 128 – Investment Portfolio (unaudited) – Statement of Movements in Investment Portfolio (unaudited) – Performance Record (unaudited) iShares Core Hang Seng Index ETF 131 – Investment Portfolio (unaudited) – Statement of Movements in Investment Portfolio (unaudited) – Performance Record (unaudited) Management and Administration 134 2 iShares Asia Trust iShares MSCI China Index ETF Report of the Manager to the Unitholders (a Sub-Fund of iShares Asia Trust) Introduction applicable to primary market creations and redemptions The iShares MSCI China Index ETF (the “MSCI China ETF”) (the (“Dealing NAV”) per unit of the MSCI China ETF was “Sub-Fund”), a sub-fund of the iShares Asia Trust (the “Trust”), HK$27.58, and there were 94,800,000 units outstanding. The was launched on 23rd November 2001 and commenced total size of the Sub-Fund was approximately HK$2.6 billion. trading under the stock code 2801 on The Stock Exchange of Hong Kong Limited (the “SEHK”) on 28th November 2001. The A summary of the performance of the MSCI China ETF(a) is MSCI China ETF is a Hong Kong unit trust authorized under given below. the Securities and Futures Ordinance (Cap. 571) of Hong Kong. The MSCI China ETF is benchmarked against the MSCI 01.01.2018 01.01.2017 01.01.2016 01.01.2015 01.01.2014 China Index. The manager of the MSCI China ETF is BlackRock to to to to to Total Return(b) in HK$ 30.06.2018 31.12.2017 31.12.2016 31.12.2015 31.12.2014 Asset Management North Asia Limited (the “Manager”) and the trustee is HSBC Institutional Trust Services (Asia) Limited MSCI China Index(c) -1.39% 55.34% 0.94% -7.88% 7.98% (the “Trustee”). MSCI China ETF NAV-to-NAV(d) -1.67% 54.10% 0.34% -8.18% 7.33% As of 30th June 2018, the MSCI China ETF invests in Chinese securities (including H-shares, Red Chips and P Chips) listed 23.11.2001 on the SEHK, A-shares and B-shares of Chinese securities 01.01.2013 01.01.2012 01.01.2011 (date of listed on the Shanghai Stock Exchange and the Shenzhen to to to inception) to Stock Exchange and depositary receipts. The Sub-Fund invests Total Return(b) in HK$ 31.12.2013 31.12.2012 31.12.2011 30.06.2018(e) in China A-shares through Stock Connect. MSCI China Index(c) 3.68% 22.50% -18.48% 13.25% MSCI China ETF Under the general taxing provision of the PRC corporate tax NAV-to-NAV(d) 3.06% 21.46% -18.87% 12.31% law, which came into effect on 1st January 2008, a non-PRC tax resident enterprise, e.g., QFII or RQFII, is subject to 10% Source: BlackRock, MSCI Barra and WM/Reuters withholding tax on PRC sourced interest income, dividends and capital gains provided that the non-PRC tax resident The MSCI China Index is a free-float adjusted market enterprise does not have its central management and control capitalization-weighted index that is compiled and published in the PRC or a PRC tax establishment. by MSCI Inc. It is designed to track the equity market performance of (i) Chinese securities (H-shares, Red Chips and Via the release of Caishui [2014] No. 79 (“Circular 79”), Caishui P Chips) listed on the SEHK (ii) B-shares of Chinese securities [2014] No. 81 (“Circular 81”) and Caishui [2016] No. 127 listed on the Shanghai Stock Exchange and the Shenzhen (“Circular 127”) by the Ministry of Finance (“MOF”) in the PRC, Stock Exchange (and effective from 1st June 2018, China the China Securities Regulatory Commission (“CSRC”) and the A-shares) and (iii) companies traded outside the country of State Administration of Taxation (“SAT”), acting with State classification (i.e. foreign listed companies) including those Council’s approval, a temporary exemption from tax on capital traded by way of depositary receipts. The difference in gains derived from the trading of A-Shares on or after performance between the MSCI China Index and the MSCI 17th November 2014 was provided to (i) QFIIs/RQFIIs; China ETF is mainly attributed to fees and expenses, and and (ii) foreign investors trading in A-Shares via Stock Connect. security misweights. As at 30th June 2018, no provision was made for taxation from Fund Activities such gains in the financial statements as the Manager believes The average daily trading volume for the MSCI China ETF that the MSCI China ETF can sustain a position for not filing a during the period was reported by Bloomberg to be tax return based on the existing tax regulations including the approximately 201,035 units. As at 30th June 2018, the MSCI above temporary tax exemptions and that the enforcement of China ETF comprised 94,800,000 outstanding units. such PRC tax on capital gains from other Chinese securities is not probable. Index Activities The MSCI China Index underwent two regular reviews during Fund Performance the period. Effective from 1st June 2018, the index includes The MSCI China ETF seeks to provide investment results, A-Shares. As at 30th June 2018, the MSCI China ETF held 329 before fees and expenses, that closely correspond to the out of 447 constituents in the MSCI China Index. performance of the MSCI China Index in Hong Kong dollar (“HK$”) terms. As at 30th June 2018, the net asset value, (a) Past performance figures shown are not indicative of the future performance of the Sub-Fund. (b) Total return represents the rate that an investor would have earned (or lost) on an investment, assuming reinvestment of all dividends and distributions. Calculated as at 30th June/31st December. (c) An investor cannot invest directly in an index and the index performance returns do not reflect management fees, transaction costs or other expenses, which would reduce performance returns of the Sub-Fund. (d) Units in the Sub-Fund are issued and redeemed at NAV. Therefore, the Sub-Fund does not publish a bid price and the Sub-Fund’s returns have been calculated from NAV. (e) This is the annualized return since fund inception. The Sub-Fund inception date is 23rd November 2001. Semi-annual Report 3 iShares MSCI China A International Index ETF Report of the Manager to the Unitholders (a Sub-Fund of iShares Asia Trust) Introduction The iShares MSCI China A International Index ETF (the “MSCI China A ETF”) (the “Sub-Fund”), a sub-fund of the iShares Asia Trust (the “Trust”), was launched on 25th January 2016 and commenced trading under the stock codes 83162 for the RMB counter and 3162 for the HKD counter on The Stock Exchange of Hong Kong Limited (the “SEHK”) on 28th January 2016. The MSCI China A ETF is a Hong Kong unit trust authorized under the Securities and Futures Ordinance (Cap. 571) of Hong Kong. The MSCI China A ETF is benchmarked against the MSCI China A International Index (the “MSCI China A Index”). The manager of the MSCI China A ETF is BlackRock Asset Management North Asia Limited (the “Manager”) and the trustee is HSBC Institutional Trust Services (Asia) Limited (the “Trustee”).
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