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ESPIONAGE, the Sequel by James Kitfield

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ESPIONAGE, the Sequel by James Kitfield Spies of all stripes have discovered that there is life after the Cold War. ESPIONAGE, the Sequel By James Kitfield f there ever was a Golden Age was loaded with sensitive technologi- collection attempts for the Defense of international espionage, the cal data. Department, the threat is growing. Cold War era was it. The super- Mak, whose case was reported in The most recent DSS report on tech- powers and their satellites and some detail by Newsweek last year, has nology collection trends, released Iallies maintained enormous spying es- pleaded not guilty to charges that he acted in January, notes that the number of tablishments, spending scores of billions as an agent for a foreign government. “suspicious” events is on the rise, as of dollars to employ thousands of profes- His case is pending, as are those of his are the number of countries involved. sional case officers, spies, and analysts family members. DSS also notes a “dramatic increase and finance their advanced equipment In pressing its charges, the govern- in incidents involving government and sophisticated infrastructure. ment claimed that the information on affiliated entities.” Even though the Cold War is over, the disk was linked to quiet “electronic- military espionage, at least, continues to drive” submarine propulsion systems. Record Numbers thrive. In fact, it never slackened at all. Access to such technology could help The National Counterintelligence Increasingly, foreign spies are hidden China achieve one of its dearest strate- Executive says a record 108 nations were among us, recruited from among the gic goals: making US Navy operations involved in trying to steal sensitive US more than 30 million foreign business- in the Taiwan Strait so perilous that technologies in 2005, the last year for men, scientists, students, researchers, Washington would think twice about which full data are available. academics, and tourists entering the coming to the aid of Taiwan in a cross- That Chi Mak may have been spying United States each year. strait conflict. for China is suggestive of another trend: Take, for example, the case of The case is notable for a number Experts say China is far and away the Chi Mak, a Chinese-born electronics of reasons. It reveals how new tools most aggressive and resourceful state engineer working for a US defense commonly associated with the technol- sponsor of technological spying. (See contractor. According to the federal ogy revolution—cell phone cameras, “The China Problem,” August 1999, government, he was part of a family wireless personal digital assistants, p. 70.) that spied together and apparently tiny computer “thumb drives,” readily The FBI estimates that there are more hoped to prosper together. The FBI available encryption software—have than 3,000 Chinese “front companies” has alleged that Mak, along with his made it far easier for foreign govern- operating in the US with the express wife and brother, can be heard on FBI ments and companies to steal classified purpose of gathering intelligence and wiretaps discussing ways to smuggle information. technology. Much of this is “dual use,” an encrypted computer disk to China. According to the Defense Security with both civil and military uses. The disk in question, the bureau added, Service, which monitors technology The FBI has stated publicly that the AIR FORCE Magazine / March 2007 71 number of Chinese counterintelligence ogy that US firms spent hundreds of their own spying operations to collect cases in Silicon Valley alone is increasing millions of dollars developing.” technologies that commercial spies do by 20 to 30 percent each year. One case began in 2004, as a seem- not gather. Globalization—characterized by the ingly innocent meeting at a Japanese free flow of data, commodities, and trade show between two men who False Flags people across porous national bor- shared a common interest in electronic Often, it is simply not clear who is ders—has allowed these cases to be- gadgets. behind the spying. come utterly commonplace. Industrial One was a Japanese employee of “In many cases, we do not know espionage and military technology theft Nikon, the other a Russian working for how much of a nexus there is between is a thriving growth industry. Consider the Russian trade representative office the private and public sectors that are that, in 2005: in Tokyo. targeting our technologies,” conceded The FBI opened 89 economic espio- Over the course of subsequent dinners Van Cleave. nage cases and was working 122 active and drinks at various restaurants—the “Most foreign governments that are cases at year’s end. Russian always picked up the tab—the involved do not discourage such theft US Immigration and Customs En- discussion turned to infrared sensor and often benefit from [it],” she testi- forcement conducted more than 2,400 technologies that Nikon was work- fied. “It’s clear, however, that the major export investigations involving viola- ing on for its cameras, but which also threat countries continue to employ state tions of the Arms Export Control Act, had applications in advanced weapons organs—including their intelligence International Traffic in Arms Regula- systems. services—as well as commercial en- tions, the Trading With the Enemy Act, In February 2005 the Nikon employee terprises, particularly when seeking the and other laws. was persuaded to give his new friend a most sensitive and difficult-to-acquire According to the American Society prototype device designed to stabilize technologies.” for Industrial Security, economic and light signals in long-distance fiber-optic The leading state sponsors are an open industrial espionage cost US businesses networks, in exchange for a few hundred secret and include India, Pakistan, Iran, an estimated $59 billion. dollars and some presents. Japan, France, and Israel. DSS reported 971 suspicious con- As was eventually reported in the Rus- By nearly all accounts, however, the tacts, an increase of nearly 43 percent sian publication Defense and Security, top two “threat nations” are in a class from a year before, though part of this the Tokyo police had long considered by themselves. Thus, US intelligence may be attributable to “greater threat the Russian trading office a wholly officers and investigators spend much awareness.” owned subsidiary of Russian military of their counterintelligence energies The top five, unnamed, “collecting intelligence. Eventually, Japanese law looking particularly into the activities countries” were responsible for 57.4 enforcement saw to it that the Japanese of China and Russia. percent of all technology collection man was fired from his job and that the But for an investigation by the Japa- activity. Russian quietly returned to Moscow. nese magazine Shukan Bunshun, the State-sponsored spying activity The lines have blurred between indus- suicide of a Japanese consul in Shanghai nearly doubled from the year before, trial and economic espionage conducted in 2004 might have been attributed to to 30.6 percent of the technology col- by foreign governments and intelli- loneliness or thwarted career ambitions. lection attempts. gence agencies, and spying instigated Instead, the investigation revealed that Little wonder that some experts have at the behest of private companies or the Japanese official was in a relation- characterized the trend as the greatest individuals. ship with a hostess in a karaoke bar. foreign intelligence challenge since A number of foreign governments Chinese intelligence officers reportedly the Cold War. Or as one former Rus- have created quasi-official organiza- threatened to make the relationship sian intelligence officer commented to tions, such as the Russian trade office, public unless the man divulged the a reporter on the ubiquity of data theft to tap into and help direct the technology secrets of Tokyo’s diplomatic encryp- and industrial espionage, “Everyone is theft being conducted by the private tion system. stealing from everyone else.” sector. The Japanese consul hanged himself Foreign theft of sensitive technologies Meanwhile, foreign intelligence ser- instead. has “eroded the US military advantage vices continue to aggressively conduct The case reveals why many experts be- by making dangerous technology avail- able to our adversaries,” Michelle Van Cleave, the former national counterin- telligence executive, testified in 2005 before Congress. Prime Targets Sensitive US technologies that un- derpin the economy and contribute to military superiority, she said, remain prime targets of foreign intelligence services, companies, and private in- dividuals. Such spying and theft “has undercut the competitiveness of US industry by allowing foreign firms to acquire, at little or no cost, technol- 72 AIR FORCE Magazine / March 2007 lieve industrial espionage and technical industrial espionage] in cases where successful spying made efforts to keep data theft have become a quasi-official something that would normally take it at arm’s length “futile.” part of Beijing’s foreign and industrial 10 years to develop takes them two or Likewise, there is ample evidence policy, dating back to the 1980s and three,” said David W. Szady, then chief that Washington’s old adversary Mos- the “863 Program” launched by former of FBI counterintelligence operations, cow remains hyperactive in the fields leader Deng Xiaoping. Designed to put in 2005 to the Calgary Herald. of industrial espionage and sensitive China on a fast track to technological DSS provided a telling case study data theft. equality with the developed nations, of how this technology theft can work, In one case, British defense contractor the 863 Program focused on achieving citing an example involving a Near BAE Systems learned in 2002 that one breakthroughs and shortcuts across a Eastern nation. An employee of a Near of its employees was passing stealth wide spectrum of military and industrial East defense firm, working on a joint cruise missile secrets to the Russians. technologies. program with a US defense contrac- Former BAE engineer Ian Parr is now Once critical technologies—or entire tor, connected his computer to the US serving 10 years for spying.
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