Braystones Station and Crossing Concerns

(Left) Braystones station, crossing and approaches, circa 1950, compared to the current view. The station master was responsible for virtually everything, from station maintenance to ticket issue and control of the crossing. The approach of trains was also signalled to crossing users by means of a bell affixed to the side of the station building.

The railway line between Barrow and Carlisle was opened in 1850. It has sections of single-track and double- tracked lines and serves passengers as well as the nuclear fuel traffic to and from Sellafield. It is understood that the line only remains open because of its links to Sellafield and the necessity of transporting the dangerous loads around the country, with traffic extending to every nuclear site, including Hinkley, Capenhurst, Dounreay, Dungeness and Hartlepool.

The trains usually comprise a minimum of two specially designed nuclear flasks and are hauled by a variety of locomotives, including Class 37s, and Class 21s, all of which are operated by DRS, the rail company set up by the Nuclear Decommissioning Authority, specifically for the purpose. Most passenger traffic is handled by DMUs, usually one- or two-car sets, operated by Northern Rail.

The station at Braystones is currently a request halt for four services per day in each direction, except Sundays, when there is no service at all. Alongside the single-platform is a manually-self-operated level crossing. This serves to provide access to the traffic produced by the small beach-dwelling community and for holiday- makers from the nearby Haven caravan site, which overlooks the crossing. As some of the beach bungalows are permanently lived in, the crossing is fairly busy, especially in the spring and summer when visitors swell the numbers. A signalman at Sellafield, working in conjunction with another at St. Bees, controls the entire seven mile single-tracked section by means of the token exchange system which is fundamentally unchanged since the line opened 160 years ago.

The crossing is at a point where the rail speed limit is 50 m.p.h. northwards and 60 m.p.h. to the south. There is no automatic indication for crossing users of the presence of trains in the section. Users are instructed by means of a collection of signs, all threatening dire consequences should one fail to adhere to the correct procedures, to use the closed-circuit telephone attached to the crossing fencing. It has not proved to be a very friendly or intuitive system to use; there is no ready way of determining whether there is a train nearby. With the telephone system, there is no indication as to when the signaller is present, busy elsewhere, or he has gone home as trains have finished for the day. Callers are left to their own decisions from around 1930 hrs. each day, as to whether it is safe to cross or not. Sometimes, though, nuclear flask trains or track maintenance trains pass through the station as late as midnight.

In many ways, the safety of the crossing is lower now than ever, as there used to be a permanent station master, who was responsible for everything, including opening the crossing gates for vehicles and ensuring they were locked when trains were approaching. Traffic was a lot less frequent in those days, too, as there was no means of getting along the beach for non-specialist vehicles.

Visibility to the north, towards St. Bees is quite good, but the topography towards Sellafield is such that entire trains can be hidden from view by a bend, eventually appearing about 200 yards away from the crossing. With a minimum of two, and often three Class 47s at their head and a string of nuclear flask wagons – several hundred tonnes in all, there is absolutely no chance of the train being able to stop in the event of an incident blocking the line, especially from the permitted 60 m.p.h.

It seems the rails are examined quite frequently, but the infra-structure has hardly been changed since its original construction. In 2010, the crossing and its environs were in very poor condition. Residents had noted that the track was awash after rain, and the drainage gullies were ineffective following changes to the road layout. Even the legally-required fencing, of concrete post and wire stringer construction, had succumbed to the corrosive effects of the salt air. This left very sharp points and was very dangerous to young fingers. It was these concerns that led us to write to the various bodies.

Several years ago, residents individually expressed their concerns about the parlous state of the line to Network Rail, but nothing was done. As a consequence of Network Rail’s disinterest, the matter was escalated to the Office of the Rail Regulator. After some prodding, an inspector reluctantly agreed to attend to see for himself. The meeting was fixed for the 31st May, 2010. Three residents were there to meet the inspector, whose arrival coincided with a truly torrential storm.

Material was washed down from the fields behind the station and the nearby holiday caravan site, completely blocking the line where it passed through the crossing. On the seaward side of the crossing, the approach ramp was partially washed away, and the supporting rock and substructure disappeared onto the beach, 20’ below. Even after the rain had cleared, the sides of the damaged ramp kept falling into the hole, disintegrating to within 6’ of the track. The ramp provides the sole means of access for residents and services.

After the deluge. The collapsed approach to the crossing. The railway line is about 2 yards to the right of the picture. The photographer was standing in almost the same place as the bystanders in the old heading picture of the station.

A resident used the supplied telephone to inform the Sellafield signaller of the danger to trains and the signaller said he would stop all traffic. However, a train had already left St. Bees heading south, towards Braystones and was thus beyond control of the signaller. A few minutes later, the train appeared under the bridge at Nethertown.

In a good impression of the cast of “The Railway Children”, the residents ran to the end of the platform waving coats, etc. Fortunately the train-driver stopped. When asked by the inspector whether he had not been informed of the blockage, the driver replied that they had received a garbled message over the radio, but had not been able to make sense of it. They had thus decided to wait till they got to Sellafield, when they could speak directly to the signaller and find out what he wanted to tell them! ‘Radio communication is useless here’, here said.

Despite all this being witnessed first-hand by the ORR official, nothing changed. Six months later, correspondence revealed that the inspector had no recollection of the driver’s response – despite it having been heard by all three of the residents, two of whom are a bit deaf!

Frustrated, an incident where a small child got onto the railway lines and walked towards Whitehaven, provoked us into querying whether the railway was legally obliged to provide and maintain fencing. (Some light railways are exempt, but speed limits and other operating conditions are imposed to maintain safety.) The question was ignored repeatedly. The ORR eventually informing residents that Network Rail were currently erecting fencing along the whole line, but at that time had only reached Barrow from Carnforth. Braystones would have to wait until 2014 at the earliest. The direct question as to whether Network Rail were obliged to provide it and should have replaced the rotten materials decades earlier was never answered, but at the end of 2012 a team arrived to erect brand new fencing and posts at Braystones.

Shortly after, there was a flurry of activity as electronic equipment was installed immediately south of the crossing. Sadly, this turned out to be just a set of three closed-circuit television cameras to monitor the crossing. Nothing was done to improve safety there per se, just a means of prosecuting anyone who decided to use the crossing against the rules. The telephone system remained a pain to use, especially in inclement weather. Under the token-exchange system, once a train has left the issuing station, the signaller has lost its whereabouts and has no idea whereabouts in the section it is. Thus he cannot give permission for a user to cross. When the issuing station is St. Bees, a user might have to wait up to nine minutes for a passenger train, or longer still for a nuclear flask train. That can seem a long time. It can also become a matter of life and death for an emergency vehicle.

The concerns we raised included the state of the crossing, the safety aspects of operating it with no indication of approaching trains, and the state of a bridge about 400 yards to the north of the station. Also included in later correspondence was a request that the crossing be illuminated after dark, utilising a proximity detection device to turn off the light once a crossing had been accomplished. We suggested that a simple two-aspect colour light signal would be simple and effective. The cost for such a system was alleged by a Network Rail official to be £147,000. When we suggested that figure was excessive, as the technology was already available and that spare cores in the communications cabling could be utilised for the purpose, we were told that there were no spare cores. Anyone who has worked in the electronics industry will know how unlikely that is to be true.

We even sent them a photograph of an example of the kind of installation we were suggesting, as there is a precedent on the outskirts of Cardiff, at Morganstown. No reply was forthcoming.

There is a culvert which was designed to keep the brook’s waters away from the bridge’s foundations, but that has not functioned for many years. The route is to become part of the National Footpaths Programme, so it will become even more difficult to determine who is responsible for the problem: the landowner, Network Rail, or National Footpaths Association.

The bridge about which we have concerns, about 400 yards to the north of the station is one of the original bridges, and is thus about 160 years old. It is of stone block construction with mortar between the blocks. Over the years the mortar has decayed and after a period of rain water pours through the gaps. Obviously this must further erode the structure and the presence of a brook, which drains an adjacent small valley, together with the storm tides, cause further erosion. As the bridge is subjected to the low-frequency vibration of 500 tonne trains, without refurbishment we see the potential for disaster.

Network Rail sent a questionnaire to each bungalow asking for personal details so that they could compile a list of “approved users”. Since a lot of the crossing users are summer visitors only, that seemed rather nonsensical.

We asked for details of how many “near misses” there had been at the crossing, but were told that the term had a specific meaning within Network Rail and none had been logged. The system must be a real pain for the Sellafield signaller who is obliged to attend to the telephone calls from the crossing as well as his other duties. We remain convinced there must be a better system.

The beach community held a meeting in 13th April, 2013, and it was agreed that pressure to improve the crossing and its safety should be re-applied. Letters were written to Northern Rail, Network Rail, the Office of the Rail Regulator, Copeland Rail User Group, a Cumbria County Councillor, and the local MP. The only ones to reply with alacrity were Northern Rail and Copeland Rail User Group. Both were very helpful and supportive. Network Rail, the ORR and the MP all opted to ignore the letters, although Network Rail did send an acknowledgement of receipt, but thereafter did nothing further.

Following up the correspondence produced nothing from either Network Rail or the ORR, while the MP’s office said that they had not received the letter until more than a week after it had been sent. All letters were posted at a main post box in Carlisle simultaneously. Sadly, the MP’s staff were at a loss as to what they could do and, therefore, had done nothing.

Eventually we were told that an official had advised a resident that the crossing would be supplied with power- operated gates and push-button operation. The line is also due to be re-signalled in 2021.

In 2014 a group comprised of residents, the local councillor and the county councillor (a husband and wife team) met at Braystones. Present, too, were a Network Rail officer and Cumbria C.C.’s Railway Development Officer. The problems were explained yet the Network Rail officer’s view remained that continued reliance on 160 year-old safety systems were adequate. It was pointed out that just one accident involving a nuclear train, even a small one, would cost far more that installing modern safety equipment and refurbishing the infra-structure that is in such a parlous state; it would also damage the nuclear industry’s claims to be able to safely transport radioactive waste around the country – a practise that is set to increase dramatically in future. Despite that, the only decision was to hold a meeting with Network Rail, Cumbria C.C., and Sellafield management. It is our view that the problems are not Sellafield’s – but it might be an interesting legal question whether they, too, would be culpable now they have been advised of the potential and need for improvement if they continue using the line despite knowing its weaknesses.

Earlier supplied documentation from the ORR (Document #256823.03) supported resident’s views that old technology and methods may not meet current legal requirements. Systems are available that would dramatically improve safety, not just at Braystones, but at all the 90 similar sites around Cumbria. Of course, not all of those sites handle nuclear flask trains.

We conclude, therefore, that any incident at the crossing could result in prosecutions under criminal law. Health and Safety legislation includes a provision for personal culpability. We believe that any accident could render liable all those individuals we have approached with a request for improvement but have nevertheless determined to do nothing. There have been accidents and derailments on the line in recent times. Probably the most relevant was back in 1977, when a train hauling a load of tankers from Marchon Chemicals, in Whitehaven, to Port Sunlight on the Wirral, caused a metal girder bridge to collapse. Two of the beach bungalows, fortunately and purely by good chance unoccupied at the time, were demolished as the wagons crashed down onto them.

Trains have been derailed and stranded by landslides as unmaintained embankments have become unstable. Further north, the line was left hanging in mid-air by a winter storm.

One of the many landslips along the line. This was taken by a Granada Television film crew.

The journal “The Rail Engineer”, of February, 2014, on page 77, et seq, describes the consequences of the storm of the 3rd January, 2014 – the one that did so much damage to the beach properties. Just north of Workington the tide destroyed a 25 metre wave barrier of rock armour and a 70 metre stretch of 3½ metre concrete sea wall, leaving the line suspended in mid-air.

Another recent incident is reported by ITV at:

http://www.itv.com/news/border/2012-08-30/train-derails-after-hitting-landslide/

Along the beach at Braystones, residents provide substantial protection to Network Rail’s property by dint of their own self-preserving efforts. In recent decades, a track has been established along the beach to serve the residents and to provide access to the requisite service vehicles. To protect this track and the individual properties, the residents pay to maintain it and rudimentary tide barriers. By protecting their properties, the residents are also protecting the lower embankment, which, as can be seen from the above photograph, would otherwise be even more vulnerable.

On 16th August, 2013, a derailment of a nuclear flask train occurred near Barrow-in-Furness. So much for the prevalent, “it can’t happen” attitude. We accept that there was no risk of widespread contamination as the derailment happened at 5 m.p.h. The question is whether a nuclear flask train, which we have noted have increased in both frequency and load, becoming derailed at the line’s 50 m.p.h. speed limit, would survive intact. Even if it were to do so, the security and clean-up operations would cost far, far more than doing the right thing now. We understand that the wagons used to transport the waste are likely to be radioactive regardless of the integrity of its load, due to poor handling procedure or carelessness by Sellafield staff.

Of course, the above is not a definitive list of the accidents and incidents along the line used by nuclear trains. We are aware of several others which have been the subject of official investigations and whose details can be found by searching the archives of Network Rail and the Rail Regulators.

This was the fourth landslip in less than two years – approximately 250 yards north of Braystones station, and immediately behind a permanently-occupied bungalow. In previous slips, at Nethertown, 1½ miles to the north of Braystones, a southbound DMU became derailed. A train sent from Sellafield to rescue the passengers itself became stranded when a further landslip occurred behind it.

The aftermath of the 1977 Marchon Chemicals spill. Underneath the debris are two bungalows. The site is less than ½mile to the south of the station. Summary

Residents’ concerns include:

1) The antiquity of the signalling and train-control system. This is 160 years old and does not comply with modern safety standards. It puts crossing users at risk and would be difficult to justify in the event of an accident, especially when seen in the light of modern technological advances. These advances include radar detection of the presence of people, vehicles, and other obstructions. Such a modern system would automatically inform all parties – users, signallers, and train staff – of the status of the crossing, and is available now. 2) Failure to provide lighting at the crossing after the passage of the last scheduled train. Such a system would be automatic, cheap, and in compliance with ORR safety literature. 3) The stability of the banking on the landward side of the track. 4) The integrity of the bridge to the north of Braystones. Not just from the stream that washes its foundations, but the amount of water that seeps through the block-work. 5) The physical requirements of the operation of the crossing gates and the unreliability of the telephone communications system. 6) The state of the ballast due to poor drainage at Braystones station. 7) Failure to achieve any material safety changes at the crossing, despite several years of lobbying by Braystones Beach residents, individually and collectively. 8) A survey needs to be conducted to assess whether the angles of the embankments is suitable for the level of stability required of them. 9) Assessments need to be conducted to assess the impact of the corrosive salt atmosphere on an infra- structure now over 150 years old and which has received scant attention in that time. 10) Network Rail should undertake a more positive rôle when it comes to protecting its assets and ensuring the safety of residents and crossing users.

Conclusion

Greenpeace have published an appraisal of the consequences of an incident in a document which can be found at http://www.greenpeace.org.uk/MultimediaFiles/Live/FullReport/7848.pdf. In its conclusion the writer writes:

“Movement of nuclear materials is inherently risky both in terms of severe accident and terrorist attack. Not all accident scenarios and accident severities can be foreseen; it is only possible to maintain a limited security cordon around the flask and its consignment; the transportation route will invariably pass through or nearby centres of population; terrorists are able to seek out and exploit vulnerabilities in the transport arrangements and localities on the route; and emergency planning is difficult to maintain over the entire route.”

INDEPENDENT NUCLEAR EXPERT, JOHN LARGE, 2006

Given the very high percentage of the nuclear traffic that has Sellafield at its hub, it is, perhaps, reckless of the rail providers not to have ensured the safest of all possible systems are in place. The attitude of the ORR is beyond our comprehension. Certainly, literature website relating to the matters we refer to, is available on the ORR’s and supports our assertion that improvements could, and should, be made in order to bring an antiquated system up-to-date, in order to improve safety and efficiency of use.

On a more personal basis, we quite like our lives - and our beach bungalows, and don’t want to see them squashed under any train, nuclear or otherwise. Just one accident is all it will take, yet no-one seems able to achieve anything meaningful.