Philosophy of Action

Home , Action (narrative), Action (philosophy)

Philosophy of Action Palgrave Philosophy Today Series Editor: Vittorio Bufacchi , University College Cork, Ireland Th e Palgrave Philosophy Today series provides concise introductions to all the major areas of philosophy currently being taught in philosophy departments around the world. Each book gives a state-of-the-art informed assessment of a key area of philosophical study. In addition, each title in the series off ers a distinct interpretation from an outstanding scholar who is closely involved with current work in the fi eld. Books in the series provide students and teachers with not only a succinct introduction to the topic, with the essential information necessary to understand it and the literature being discussed, but also a demanding and engaging entry into the subject.

Titles include

Helen Beebee FREE WILL: An Introduction Shaun Gallagher PHENOMENOLOGY Simon Kirchin METAETHICS Lilian O’Brien PHILOSOPHY OF ACTION Duncan Pritchard KNOWLEDGE Mathias Risse GLOBAL POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY Don Ross PHILOSOPHY OF ECONOMICS Joel Walmsley MIND AND MACHINE

Forthcoming Titles James Robert Brown PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE Pascal Engel PHILOSOPHY OF PSYCHOLOGY Neil Manson ENVIRONMENTAL PHILOSOPHY Chad Meister PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION Nancy Tuana FEMINISM AND PHILOSOPHY

Palgrave Philosophy Today Series Standing Order ISBN 978–0–230–00232–6 (hardcover) Series Standing Order ISBN 978–0–230–00233–3 (paperback) ( outside North America only) You can receive future titles in this series as they are published by placing a standing order. Please contact your bookseller or, in case of diffi culty, write to us at the address below with your name and address, the title of the series and one of the ISBNs quoted above. Customer Services Department, Macmillan Distribution Ltd, Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire RG21 6XS, England Philosophy of Action

Lilian O’Brien University College Cork, Ireland © Lilian O’Brien 2015 All rights reserved. No reproduction, copy or transmission of this publication may be made without written permission. No portion of this publication may be reproduced, copied or transmitted save with written permission or in accordance with the provisions of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988, or under the terms of any licence permitting limited copying issued by the Copyright Licensing Agency, Saffron House, 6–10 Kirby Street, London EC1N 8TS. Any person who does any unauthorized act in relation to this publication may be liable to criminal prosecution and civil claims for damages. The author has asserted her right to be identiﬁ ed as the author of this work in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. First publ4ished 2015 by PALGRAVE MACMILLAN Palgrave Macmillan in the UK is an imprint of Macmillan Publishers Limited, registered in England, company number 785998, of Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire RG21 6XS. Palgrave Macmillan in the US is a division of St Martin’s Press LLC, 175 Fifth Avenue, New York, NY 10010. Palgrave Macmillan is the global academic imprint of the above companies and has companies and representatives throughout the world. Palgrave® and Macmillan® are registered trademarks in the United States, the United Kingdom, Europe and other countries. ISBN 978-0-230-23281-5 ISBN 978-1-137-31748-3 (eBook) DOI 10.1057/9781137317483 This book is printed on paper suitable for recycling and made from fully managed and sustained forest sources. Logging, pulping and manufacturing processes are expected to conform to the environmental regulations of the country of origin. A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data O’Brien, Lilian. Philosophy of action / Lilian O’Brien, University College Cork, Ireland. pages cm. — (Palgrave philosophy today) Includes index.

1. Act (Philosophy) I. Title. B105.A35O27 2014 1289.4—dc23 2014025917 For Barry Contents

Preface viii Series Editor’s Preface xiii Acknowledgements xv

1 Introduction to Intentional Action 1 2 Causalism and Antireductionism 12 3 Volitionism and Trying Th eories 27 4 Reasons 43 5 From Mental to Motor Control 56 6 Action Explanation 77 7 Philosophical Psychology 101 8 Temptation, Control, and Autonomy 118 9 Agents 136

Bibliography 160 Index 169

vii Preface

My siblings and I were often involved in confl ict resolution when I was young. To my mind, one of the main goals was to unearth what a defendant was “really doing” on a given occasion. Did the defendant bite the foot off the Sindy doll in an attempt to amputate or did they just mistake the doll for a piece of food, as alleged? Was I really “just humming”, or was I trying to annoy the plaintiff ? Th ese questions about what intentional action was being performed and which consequences were mere side eff ects raise philosophical questions: in general, what determines that one intentional action is being performed rather than another? What makes an action intentional? What is the diff erence between an intentional action and a side eff ect? When I grew up, philosophy of action was a natural home for me. It speaks to our needs, not only to understand our human agency, but also to rationally ground our practices of assigning praise and blame. Th inking about these questions has also allowed me to explore the rich literature, not only on intentional action, but also on action explanation – what exactly is going on when we try to explain one another’s intentional actions? When I explain, or to shift to a diff erent but related concept, when I understand your intentional action, what precisely have I grasped about you and your action? Have I “stood in your shoes” and seen the appeal of amputating Sindy with a bite? Or have I, scientist in the making, applied a theory that explains your behaviour, shows it to be inevitable, perhaps, given some law or generalization that you fall under? What would it be to explain or fully understand the actions of Stalin, or Mother Teresa, or Kim Kardashian? Th ese questions, if answered, promise to shed light on a phenomenon that greases the wheels of social life – mutual comprehension – but they also promise to shed light on a more academic question – what is the status of the explanations of action that we fi nd in scientifi c psychology and sociology? Th ese modern sciences have come to exert a profound infl uence on our

viii Preface ix lives, our societies, our self-conception, and, therefore, are deserving of scrutiny. My main focus is on the nature of intentional action, or more broadly, as we will see, on intentional behaviour. Personal preoccupations aside, the question of what intentional action is, is not, I think, a core question in any other sub-discipline of philosophy, and for this reason alone, it earns its place at the centre of the book. But there are other reasons to focus on this issue – understanding intentional action allows us to better understand rational agency more generally, moral responsibility, (metaphysical) freedom, numerous ethical questions, questions in moral psychology, empirical investigation into action and agency, the nature of psychological and sociological explanation, to name but a few. Th e discussion in the book is structured so that the question of intentional action is at its centre and other questions that radiate from it are then treated – for example, what are reasons for intentional action, what is it to explain intentional actions, what mental states are necessary for intentional action, what characteristics must agents have if they are to be able to perform intentional actions, and hence, what kinds of thing count as intentional-action-performing agents. I regret that I say little or nothing about the history of the issues or how the issues are treated in traditions other than my own – analytic philosophy. And even within this tradition I focus less on certain strands than others – work that stems from Wittgenstein and fi nds expression in Elizabeth Anscombe, Peter Winch, Stuart Hampshire, Robert Brandom, Michael Th ompson, and others, is neglected for reasons of space. Other issues have been omitted because they are less directly connected to the thread of discussion that unfolds in the book. How do we know what we are doing and what is the nature of our knowledge of how to do things? Both issues enjoy lively current treatment, but the issues are only touched on here. Other issues that are touched on all too briefl y are issues of practical rationality, (metaphysical) freedom, and autonomy. Central to our understanding of the rational practical agent these may be, but the issues involved deserve book-length treatment of their own. Th e foregoing is a mea culpa . In the following paragraphs, I don’t so much apologize for omissions as off er a somewhat more principled explanation of one of the parameters of the discussion that follows: my discussion rarely touches on the cognitive neuroscience and empirical psychology of action. x Preface

Why not science?

Th e subject of this essay is the conceptual framework undergirding the commonsense descriptions and explanations of action that – day in, day out – we copiously supply. It is that commonsense framework that we are taught fi rst by Mom and Dad, and whose sometimes exquisite refi nement we learn later from Proust, Woolf, and Henry James. (Wilson 1989: 14)

Philosophy of action is a sub-discipline in which our pre-scientifi c understanding of ourselves comes to the fore. But its status as pre-scientifi c does not, I believe, impugn it. In everyday settings human agents draw on a rich and diffi cult to articulate taxonomy of mental states, action, and agency. We rely on such distinctions as that between intentional actions and non- or unintentional actions, between ends and means, intentional actions and their consequences, intentional actions and attempts, intention and predictive belief, urges and intentions, etc. Th is conceptual framework arises from our fi rst-person perspective as rational practical agents and from interaction with others. It is drawn upon in our moral judgements and it is codifi ed in our legal system. I take philosophy of action to be devoted, in large part, to more clearly articulating the conceptual framework that structures our commonsense understanding and to off ering revisions and refi nements of this where necessary. Although scientifi c investigation in, for example, cognitive neuroscience may reveal in physical terms what goes on in our brains and bodies when we perform intentional actions, and although a great deal of illuminating work has been carried out in the fi eld of motor cognition in the last fi ve decades, it is not at all clear that this scientifi c investigation can be carried out prior to, or in preference to, the philosophical work of conceptual clarifi cation that I have just talked about. One reason is that we must come to a clearer understanding of the commonsense concepts that we rely on in such scientifi c investigation if we are to properly interpret its results. To give just one example, in the last few years there has been consid- erable interest in the work of neuroscientists such as Benjamin Libet. Libet’s work and the work of others has been taken to show that we do not have free will and, indeed, that our understanding of ourselves as beings whose conscious minds direct and control our intentional Preface xi actions is an illusion. Th ese are very startling claims and they have been widely reported and accepted. One of Libet’s most infl uential experiments involves asking subjects to fl ex their wrists or fi ngers when they want to and to report when (by pin-pointing the moment on a clock face) they felt the urge or intention to fl ex. Electrical readings from the scalp (EEGs) showed that brain activity associated with the initiation of action (there was a shift in so-called readiness potential) occurred before the subject’s awareness of their urge or intention to fl ex (about 350 milliseconds beforehand) (Libet 1985). Th is result has been taken by Daniel Wegner and others to show that our wills are epiphenomenal – they do not cause our movements in action. We may think that our intentions are what move our bodies in action, but they seem to be, at best, by-products of causal chains that begin before such mental elements come into play (Wegner 2002). Wegner assumes in his argument that intention – for simplicity, I will talk of intentions – must be conscious. But is that so? If not, it is possible that intentions are effi cacious in the causal chain leading to the action. Th ey may initiate the causal chain before the subjects become aware of them. But is it possible for us to have intentions of which we are not conscious? It is, at least, very controversial to assume the contrary, as Wegner does. Mele (2009a: 38) points out that some scientists and philosophers conceive of “intentions in terms of such functional roles as initiating, sustaining, and guiding intentional actions” without also supposing that the agent must be aware that she intends to A or even that she is A-ing intentionally. Consider the following:

Can an agent A intentionally without being aware of A-ing? If a driver can intentionally fl ip his turn signal without being aware of fl ipping it and a tennis pro can intentionally put himself in a position to hit a drive volley without being aware that he is putting himself in a position to do that, then the answer is yes. (Mele 2009a: 39)

If we think that the driver performs the intentional action of fl ipping his turn signal, and that his movements are guided toward some end (fl ipping), then it is not unreasonable to suppose that an intention is playing a causal role here in spite of the agent’s lack of awareness of xii Preface it. So, there is reason to think that intentions may operate without our awareness of them. Th e general point is a cautionary one: if scientists understand intention, or for that matter, any of the commonsense concepts that shape our understanding of action and agency, in an overly narrow way, then they may draw conclusions from their research that are unwar- ranted. Th e philosopher plays an important role in carefully examining concepts such as intention, intentional action, freedom, and so forth. It is only with a clearer understanding of these concepts in place that we can properly frame and assess the import of empirical work that aims to inform us about the nature of human action and agency. I will assume that this is correct in what follows and focus, almost exclusively, on the project of clarifying the conceptual issues. Th is is not because I deem important work in, for example, motor cognition irrel- evant to the philosophy of action, but because in a short book I must be selective in what I address. Series Editor’s Preface

It is not easy being a student of philosophy these days. All the diff erent areas of philosophy are reaching ever-increasing levels of complexity and sophistication, a fact which is refl ected in the specialized literature and readership each branch of philosophy enjoys. And yet, anyone who studies philosophy is expected to have a solid grasp of the most current issues being debated in most, if not all, areas of philosophy. It will be an understatement to say that students of philosophy today are faced with a Herculean task. Th e books in this new book series by Palgrave are meant to help all philosophers, established and aspiring, to understand, appreciate and engage with the intricacies which characterize all the many faces of philosophy. Th ey are also ideal teaching tools as textbooks for more advanced students. Th ese books may not be meant primarily for those who are yet to read their fi rst book of philosophy, but all students with a basic knowledge of philosophy will benefi t greatly from reading these exciting and original works, which will enable anyone to engage with all the defi ning issues in contemporary philosophy. Th ere are three main aspects that make the Palgrave Philosophy Today series distinctive and attractive. First, each book is relatively short. Second, the books are commissioned from some of the best- known, established and upcoming international scholars in each area of philosophy. Th ird, while the primary purpose is to off er an informed assessment of opinion on a key area of philosophical study, each title presents a distinct interpretation from someone who is closely involved with current work in the fi eld. Philosophy of action is perhaps the unsung hero of contemporary philosophy. Th e pivotal question of what constitutes an intentional action raises a myriad of philosophical problems, from personal identity and free will to autonomy and moral responsibility. Th is suggests that philosophy of action is at the cross-roads of all the main

xiii xiv Series Editor’s Preface areas of philosophy: metaphysics, epistemology, philosophy of mind, philosophy of psychology and ethics all assume that we have a fi rm grasp of the idea of “agency”, and what it means for an agent to act in a certain way. Lilian O’Brien’s book will be of relevance to any philosopher, notwith- standing their specifi c research interests. While guiding us through the crucial issue of what constitutes “intentionality”, and how this should be distinguished from other concepts such as what is “voluntary”, “deliberate” or “purposeful”, Lilian O’Brien also reminds us that understanding what is behind our actions is a fundamental issue that anyone working in any area of philosophy needs to refl ect on. Philosophy of action is one of those topics that should be taught in every department of philosophy. Lilian O’Brien’s book covers all the bases in this exciting but neglected fi eld of philosophical research, and the clarity of her writing makes this a perfect teaching tool for anyone wanting to introduce students to this area of philosophy.

Acknowledgements

Although many people have given me invaluable help in writing this manuscript, I will mention just a few here. My thanks to Giuseppina D’Oro, Laura Ekstrom, Roisín O’Gorman, Seán Enda Power, James Ryan, Markus Schlosser, Constantine Sandis, Joel Walmsley, and my colleagues in Philosophy at UCC for stimulating discussion, feedback, and support. I am grateful to the students who have taken my courses at Vassar College, Th e College of William and Mary, and at University College Cork for their questions and insights. I would like to thank my colleague and the series editor, Vittorio Bufacchi, for his patience and encouragement, and for very helpful feedback on an earlier draft. My thanks to Rebekah Rice for agreeing to read an early draft, and to Brendan George, Priyanka Gibbons, and Melanie Blair at Palgrave Macmillan. I started thinking about issues in the philosophy of action while taking a seminar with Jaegwon Kim early in my graduate school career. I am very grateful to have had such an excellent introduction to the issues. I cannot thank Antti Kauppinen enough for his support – both personal and professional – throughout the writing process. I am very grateful for his insightful criticism of earlier drafts, which inspired signifi cant improvements. Aleksi and Nina arrived during years when this book should have been fi nished. I am indebted to them for making everything more fun and more meaningful.