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View metadata, citation and similar papers at core.ac.uk brought to you by CORE provided by Érudit Article "The Moral Paradox of Adverse Possession: Sovereignty and Revolution in Property Law" Larissa Katz McGill Law Journal / Revue de droit de McGill, vol. 55, n° 1, 2010, p. 47-80. Pour citer cet article, utiliser l'information suivante : URI: http://id.erudit.org/iderudit/039836ar DOI: 10.7202/039836ar Note : les règles d'écriture des références bibliographiques peuvent varier selon les différents domaines du savoir. Ce document est protégé par la loi sur le droit d'auteur. L'utilisation des services d'Érudit (y compris la reproduction) est assujettie à sa politique d'utilisation que vous pouvez consulter à l'URI https://apropos.erudit.org/fr/usagers/politique-dutilisation/ Érudit est un consortium interuniversitaire sans but lucratif composé de l'Université de Montréal, l'Université Laval et l'Université du Québec à Montréal. Il a pour mission la promotion et la valorisation de la recherche. Érudit offre des services d'édition numérique de documents scientifiques depuis 1998. Pour communiquer avec les responsables d'Érudit : [email protected] Document téléchargé le 13 février 2017 01:34 McGill Law Journal ~ Revue de droit de McGill THE MORAL PARADOX OF ADVERSE POSSESSION: SOVEREIGNTY AND REVOLUTION IN PROPERTY LAW Larissa Katz* On what grounds can we justify the trans- Quelle justification peut-on offrir pour formation of squatters into owners? To under- transformer des squatteurs en propriétaires ? stand the moral significance of adverse posses- L’auteure propose une analogie pour sion, the author proposes an analogy. Much of comprendre l’importance morale de la the moral analysis of adverse possession has possession adversative. Elle explique d’abord proceeded on the basis that adverse possessors pourquoi l’analogie entre possesseurs are land thieves. The author first explains why adversatifs et voleurs de terre, qui sert souvent the analogy of adverse possessor to land thief is de prémisse à l’évaluation morale de la misleading. Then, she argues that there is a possession adversative, est trompeuse. Elle much closer analogy between adverse posses- soutient ensuite qu’une bien meilleure analogie sion and revolution or, more precisely, a blood- existe entre la possession adversative et une less coup d’état. The recognition of the adverse révolution ou, plutôt, un coup d’État sans possessor’s (private) authority solves the moral effusion de sang. Le problème posé par la chose problem created by an agendaless object just as sans objet est résolu par la reconnaissance de the recognition of the existing government’s l’autorité (privée) du possesseur adversatif sur (public) authority, whatever its origin, solves ladite chose, tout comme le problème moral the moral problem of a stateless people. The posé par un peuple sans État est résolu par la morality of adverse possession, seen this way, reconnaissance de l’autorité (publique) du does not turn on any particularized evaluation gouvernement présent. De ce point de vue, la of the squatter’s deserts or her uses of the land. moralité de la possession adversative ne dépend The author thus does not propose that adverse pas des mérites du squatteur, ni de l’usage qu’il possession is justified in the same way that fait du terrain. Ainsi, l’auteure ne suggère pas some argue a conscientious revolutionary is jus- de justifier le possesseur adversatif comme tified in resisting an oppressive or otherwise un- certains justifient le révolutionnaire just sovereign. Rather, the morality of adverse consciencieux parce qu’il résiste à un régime possession is found where we might least expect abusif ou injuste. La moralité de la possession it: in its positivist strategy of ratifying the adversative se trouve plutôt là où l’on s’y attend claims to authority of a squatter without regard le moins : dans la stratégie positiviste de to the substantive merits of her agenda or her ratification des revendications d’autorité du personal virtue. squatteur sans égard ni aux mérites de ses objectifs, ni à sa vertu personnelle. * Assistant Professor, Faculty of Law, Queen’s University. I am indebted to Eduardo Penȅalver, Michael Pratt, Arthur Ripstein, Malcolm Thorburn, and reviewers at the McGill Law Journal for their excellent comments and suggestions. I am grateful to Christine Ashbourne for research assistance. Larissa Katz 2010 Citation: (2010) 55 McGill L.J. 47 ~ Référence : (2010) 55 R.D. McGill 47 48 (2010) 55 MCGILL LAW JOURNAL ~ REVUE DE DROIT DE MCGILL Introduction 49 I. Three Models of Adverse Possession 52 A. A Proceduralist Approach 52 B. A Legal Moralist Approach 60 C. An Inconsistent Use Model 63 II. Revolution and Rehabilitation 72 A. Justifying Adverse Possession 75 B. Imperfect States, Imperfect Owners 78 Conclusion 80 THE MORAL PARADOX OF ADVERSE POSSESSION 49 Introduction Property law is remarkably stable over time. Innovations in the form and content of ownership, for instance, are few and slow to catch on.1 But that is not to say that property law, through its long history, has produced a clear and unequivocal understanding of what these fundamental con- cepts are. The idea of ownership around which the law of property is or- ganized is itself a subject of controversy.2 Adverse possession is one aspect of property law that is caught in this controversy over the nature of ownership. Our idea of ownership influ- ences how we answer basic questions about what it takes to succeed as an adverse possessor as well as more complicated questions about the moral- ity of adverse possession. Seen one way, the law of adverse possession produces a radical transformation in the position of squatters pre– and post–limitation period, in some cases turning land thieves into owners. This approach, which I associate with the majority of American jurisdic- tions, sees adverse possession as morally paradoxical and so invites re- strictions on deliberate squatting.3 Seen another way, the law of adverse possession concerns not the ac- quisition of new ownership rights by the squatter, but rather the extinc- tion of the original owner’s superior right to possess due to her own inac- tion.4 The squatter, on this view, does not acquire a new kind of right but is successful by default. This approach, found in current English law, downplays the radical change in the squatter’s position pre– and post– limitation period, thus avoiding some of the appearance of a moral para- dox. But at the same time, the English approach ignores important con- ceptual differences between owner and possessor, treating them both simply as holders of rights to possess of differing strengths. 1 See e.g. Eduardo Peñalver & Sonia K. Katyal, “Property Outlaws” (2007) 155 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1095 at 1133. Cf. Lee Anne Fennell, “Homeownership 2.0” (2008) 102 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1047 (proposing changes to the form of ownership). 2 For a conception of ownership as an organizing idea, see Jeremy Waldron, The Right to Private Property (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991); Larissa Katz, “Exclusion and Exclusivity in Property Law” (2008) 58 U.T.L.J. 275 [Katz, “Exclusion and Exclusivity”]. For controversy as to what ownership means, see ibid.; J.E. Penner, “The ‘Bundle of Rights’ Picture of Property” (1996) 43 UCLA L. Rev. 711; Bruce A. Ackerman, Private Property and the Constitution (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977). For the Eng- lish lawyer’s perspective on the idea of ownership with respect to land, see Kent McNeil, Common Law Aboriginal Title (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989). 3 Lee Anne Fennell, “Efficient Trespass: The Case for ‘Bad Faith’ Adverse Possession” (2006) 100 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1037 at 1046 [Fennell, “Efficient Trespass”]. 4 See E.H. Burn & J. Cartwright, eds., Cheshire and Burn’s Modern Law of Real Prop- erty, 17th ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006) (relativity of title). 50 (2010) 55 MCGILL LAW JOURNAL ~ REVUE DE DROIT DE MCGILL There is a third approach to adverse possession that I will argue makes sense of the morality of adverse possession without weakening the concept of ownership at work in the law. A basic component of this third approach is still the law in some Canadian jurisdictions and until recently had currency in much of the common law world, including England and Australia.5 This is the inconsistent use test, according to which a squatter succeeds in a claim for adverse possession only where she establishes, by acts of possession that are inconsistent with the owner’s intended uses of the land, that the original owner lacks effective authority over the land.6 This standard presents a significant hurdle for most adverse possessors. A conventional reading of the inconsistent use test reflects our moral intuition that deliberate squatters are land thieves, undeserving of re- ward.7 On this reading, the inconsistent use test appears to respond to the same considerations that motivate the current consensus view in the United States. But, I will argue, it would be a mistake to construe the in- consistent use test as just a reflection of our distaste, on moral grounds, for acquisitive squatters. Rather, the inconsistent use test suggests a very different moral foundation for the law of adverse possession. On this ap- proach, the morality of adverse possession is not a particularized moral- ity, concerned with the relative deserts of the owner and squatter or the relative merits of the uses they have for the land. We are evaluating the wrong thing if we look to the nature of the use or the user to establish the morality of adverse possession. Rather, the morality of adverse possession is indirectly established through the role of adverse possession in allowing property law to serve its moral function.
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