SCIENCE VERSUS PSEUDOSCIENCE for Distinguishing Science from Pseudoscience

Science versus Austrian (and later British) philosopher of science Sir Karl Popper; we begin with his Pseudoscience conceptualization. 1 2 Scott O. Lilienfeld, Steven Jay Lynn, Popper and Rachel J. Ammirati1 According to Popper (1959), scientific claims 1Emory University, U.S.A. and 2Binghamton University, U.S.A. are falsifiable: They are in principle capable of being proven false (according to Popper, scientific claims can never be proven true; The prefix “pseudo” means “false.” Accordingly, theycanonlybefalsified).Incontrast,Popper pseudoscience is false science. Yet equating maintained, pseudosciences are impossible pseudoscience with false science is not entirely to falsify, either because their proponents (a) accurate, because most false scientific claims advance claims that are so vague that they are are not pseudoscientific. Instead, we can best untestable or (b) continually invoke ad hoc view pseudosciences as fake sciences that hypotheses—escape hatches or loopholes—that display (often intentionally, but sometimes effectively immunize their claims from refu- unintentionally) the superficial appearance of tation. Eventually, the overuse of ad hoc science but largely lack its substance (Hines, hypotheses can place claims outside of the 2002). Nevertheless, distinguishing “fake” purview of scientific testing. For example, science from both genuine science and other Popper argued that much of Freudian theory forms of false science is more easily said than is pseudoscientific, because no conceivable done (Pigliucci & Boudry, 2013). The question evidence could disprove it. For example, Pop- of how to differentiate pseudoscience from per considered Freud’s concept of the Oedipus other disciplines bears significant implications complex (the idea that young children are for clinical psychology and allied mental health romantically attracted to the opposite-sex fields, because numerous authors contend that parent) as unfalsifiable and therefore pseu- these fields’ scientific foundations are being doscientific. If a psychoanalytic researcher increasingly eroded by pseudoscientific prac- weretofindthatmostadultsrecallatime tices (e.g., Lilienfeld, Lynn, & Lohr, 2003; when they were romantically attracted to McFall, 1991, 2001). Moreover, mental health their opposite-sex parents, she could interpret consumers, practitioners, and researchers this finding as confirming Freud’s hypothesis would benefit from guidance in separating of the Oedipus complex. In contrast, if this scientific from pseudoscientific claims, largely researcher were to find that most adults do because the latter assertions can fool even not recall such a time, she could interpret this well-trained individuals (Herbert, 2002). finding as implying that adults find memories of romantic attraction toward their parents The Demarcation Problem to be so threatening that they repress them. The “demarcation problem” refers to the This “heads I win, tails you lose” reasoning, challenge of distinguishing science from non- according to Popper, renders Freudian theory science, including pseudoscience (Pigliucci & difficultorimpossibletofalsifyandtherefore Boudry, 2013). To this day, there is no uni- pseudoscientific. versally agreed upon solution to this problem. Nevertheless, few scientists believe that Pop- Perhaps the best-known attempt to resolve per’s falsifiability criterion, important as it is, the demarcation problem was offered by the succeeds as a necessary or sufficient criterion The Encyclopedia of Clinical Psychology, First Edition. Edited by Robin L. Cautin and Scott O. Lilienfeld. © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Inc. Published 2015 by John Wiley & Sons, Inc. DOI: 10.1002/9781118625392.wbecp572 2 SCIENCE VERSUS PSEUDOSCIENCE for distinguishing science from pseudoscience. retreat” to the protective belt, thereby invoking For one thing, certain pseudoscientific claims ad hoc hypotheses that could explain away the do appear to be capable of refutation. For negative findings. In doing so, these advocates example, although astrology is a prototypical tinker with the theory’s auxiliary hypotheses pseudoscience, many of its claims, such as in an effort to salvage their theory from fal- the proposition that astrological signs are cor- sification. In certain cases, strategic retreats related with personality traits, are falsifiable, arejustifiableinscience,especiallywhenthey and have been essentially falsified (Carlson, enhance the theory’s content, predictive power, 1985). Moreover, several critics have argued or both. Yet, when strategic retreats to the that contra Popper, many scientific claims protective belt are merely “pasted on” to the are difficult or impossible to falsify. Specifi- theory in desperate attempts to rescue it from cally, because legitimate scientists can almost falsification, such retreats become problematic. always invoke ad hoc hypotheses to rescue According to Lakatos (1975), in progressive their claims from refutation, these claims may research programs, theory tends to precede never be strictly disproven, a view known data.Thehardcoreofthetheorygenerates as the Duhem–Quine thesis after the two novel predictions that are generally corrobo- philosophers who propounded it. rated by findings. In contrast, in degenerating research programs, data tend to precede the- Lakatos ory. Negative findings—those that challenge An alternative perspective on the demarcation thetheory’shardcore—repeatedlyemerge, problem derives from Hungarian philosopher and the theory’s advocates continually invoke ofscienceImreLakatos.AccordingtoLakatos auxiliary hypotheses within the protective belt (1975), scientific theories, or as he called them in an effort to keep the sinking theory afloat. “research programs,” possess two major com- The theory is not moving forward; it is merely ponents: (a) a “hard core” of fundamental trying to keep up with the accumulating influx presuppositionsthatisintegraltothetheory of negative findings. Yet, as Lakatos noted, and (b) a “protective belt” of auxiliary (sec- because some degenerating research programs ondary) hypotheses that are not central to the do eventually right themselves by amending theorybutthathelptoprotectthetheoryfrom their protective belts (cognitive dissonance refutation. For example, the existence of the theory is arguably a potential example in unconscious comprises part of the hard core of psychology; see Greenwald & Ronis, 1978), psychoanalytic (Freudian) theory. It is difficult it is not necessarily illegitimate to cling to a to imagine calling oneself psychoanalytic in degenerating research program, just so long theoretical orientation without endorsing the as one honestly admits to oneself and others core assumption of unconscious processing. that it is degenerating. What is illegitimate is to In contrast, the existence of the defense mech- pretend that a degenerating research program anism of reaction formation (the supposed is in good scientific shape. tendency to deal with an anxiety-provoking Lakatos’ framework provides a useful way emotion, such as hatred, by transforming it of conceptualizing the difference between into its opposite, such as love) almost certainly science and pseudoscience. Specifically, from a resides in the protective belt of psychoanalytic Lakatosian perspective, we can define pseudo- theory. One could legitimately call oneself psy- sciences as degenerating research programs that choanalytic, although perhaps not an orthodox its proponents claim are progressive.Inthecase Freudian, even if one rejected Freud’s concept of pseudoscientific theories or methods, claims of reaction formation. are not supported by evidence, yet adherents According to Lakatos, when data repeatedly of these theories or methods insist that they conflict with a theory’s hard core, proponents are. As a consequence, these adherents are of this theory typically perform a “strategic deceiving themselves, deceiving others, or SCIENCE VERSUS PSEUDOSCIENCE 3 both. As helpful as Lakatos’ conceptualization dividing line between day and night (hence the is, it does not offer a strict set of criteria for equally fuzzy concepts of dusk and dawn), we demarcating progressive from degenerating can still distinguish morning from night for research programs. For example, when a the- most pragmatic purposes (Leahey & Leahey, ory’s predictions are met with mixed results, 1983). Similarly, we can differentiate clear-cut how do we decide whether it is progressive or sciences from clear-cut pseudosciences, even degenerating? Nevertheless, this may not be a though the distinction inevitably becomes fundamental flaw within a Lakatosian frame- murky in certain cases. work, because strict criteria for distinguishing According to the family resemblance per- science and pseudoscience may not exist. spective, pseudosciences are characterized by a set of useful, albeit fallible, indicators (Bunge, Pseudoscience: A Family 1984). We can think of these indicators as Resemblance View “warning signs” of pseudoscience. Although no single criterion is dispositive of a theory’s Indeed, some eminent philosophers of science status as a pseudoscience, the more criteria are (e.g., Laudan, 1983) have declared the demar- present, the more skeptical of this discipline we cation problem dead, because there appears to should typically become. Here we present 10 be no single criterion—or set of criteria consid- warning signs of pseudoscience that are useful ered jointly—that can invariably be used to dis- for distinguishing pseudoscientific from scien- tinguish

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