GLOBAL VALUE CHAIN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2019
Public Disclosure Authorized TECHNOLOGICAL INNOVATION, SUPPLY CHAIN TRADE, AND WORKERS IN A GLOBALIZED WORLD Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized © 2019 World Trade Organization
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This work is a product of the World Trade Organization, the Institute of Developing Economies (IDE-JETRO), the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, the Research Center of Global Value Chains headquartered at the University of International Business and Economics (RCGVC-UIBE), the World Bank Group, and the China Development Research Foundation. It is based on joint research efforts to better understand the ongoing development and evolution of global value chains and their implications for economic development. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this work are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the co-publishing partners, their Boards of Executive Directors, or the governments they represent.
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The Research Center of Global Value Chains acknowledges the financial support from the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation. iii
Contents
Foreword by Michael Spence...... v Co-publishing partners...... vi Contributors...... vii Acknowledgements...... viii Abbreviations and acronyms ...... ix
Key messages. x
Executive summary . 1 David Dollar
Chapter 1 Recent patterns of global production and GVC participation. 9 Xin Li (Beijing Normal University), Bo Meng (IDE-JETRO), and Zhi Wang (RCGVC-UIBE)
Chapter 2 Trade, value chains and labor markets in advanced economies . 45 Marc Bacchetta (WTO) and Victor Stolzenburg (WTO)
Chapter 3 Global value chains and employment in developing economies. 63 Claire H. Hollweg (World Bank Group)
Chapter 4 Technological progress, diffusion, and opportunities for developing countries: Lessons from China. 83 Satoshi Inomata (IDE-JETRO) and Daria Taglioni (World Bank Group)
Chapter 5 Understanding Supply Chain 4.0 and its potential impact on global value chains . 103 Michael J. Ferrantino (World Bank Group) and Emine Elcin Koten (World Bank Group) iv • Technological innovation, supply chain trade, and workers in a globalized world
Chapter 6 The digital economy, GVCs and SMEs . 121 Emmanuelle Ganne (WTO) and Kathryn Lundquist (WTO)
Chapter 7 Should high domestic value added in exports be an objective of policy?. 141 David Dollar (Brookings Institution), Bilal Khan (RCGVC-UIBE), and Jiansuo Pei (SITE-UIBE)
Chapter 8 Improving the accounting frameworks for analyses of global value chains . 155 Nadim Ahmad (OECD)
Appendix 1 Chapter Authors’ Conference: Final programme . 179
Appendix 2 Technological Innovation, Supply Chain Trade, and Workers in a Globalized World: Global Value Chain Development Report 2019 Background Paper Conference. 181 v
Foreword
here are different ways to analyze the global economy. The mobile-internet- and platform-centered open ecosystems, One is to view it through the lens of growth and struc- along with mobile payment systems and enabled financial services, tural change in individual economies, developed and have the potential to support inclusive growth patterns and expand developing. A second is to use the lens of global value the channels, opportunities, and accessible markets for SMEs. Data chains (GVCs), the complex network structure of flows of goods, from China’s domestic economy experience supports these trends. Tservices, capital and technology across national borders. Both are Exploiting the international potential of these platforms to expand useful and they are complementary to one another. trade and access for SMEs requires investment and infrastructure in The 2019 edition of the GVC Development Report is enor- developing countries, but also new trade regimes that increase the mously valuable, in part because it captures the underlying tech- openness of the ecosystems. In other words, the potential to sup- nological and economic forces that are transforming the patterns port growth and employment in SMEs via access to global markets of global interconnectedness. on digital platforms is as yet largely unexploited. The report notes that there are two megatrends in process. The report supports and adds to a broad range of studies that One is the growth of developing countries, the expansion of the suggest that the combination of trade and various aspects of digital middle classes in them, and the shift in the share of global purchas- transformation has contributed to job and income polarization, and ing power toward the developing economies. By itself this would that vigorous policies (by government and business) are required to produce major shifts in the characteristics of GVCs. Regional trade restore more inclusiveness to the observed growth patterns. This is rises as a share, especially in Asia. More production now goes to especially true in developed economies. Key policies are those that rapidly growing domestic markets in developing countries instead support the workforce in transitions as a growing range of tasks are of being exported outside the region. Trade is shifting from a automated and jobs shift toward a mix of tasks that are complemen- stark version of comparative advantage based on differential labor tary to the machines. costs and labor arbitrage, toward something that more closely In developing countries, especially those in the middle-income resembles the intra-industry model of trade among developed category, while the pressures on the structure of jobs and employ- economies based on product and technological differentiation. Of ment are similar to developed economies, the net impact of dig- course, that process is far from complete, and there remain ear- ital technology appears to have been positive for growth and for ly-stage, and relatively low-income developing countries for which employment. the growth models will continue to depend on accessing global There is an important caution in the report. The long-run goal demand via labor-intensive, process-oriented manufacturing. of development is of course to increase productivity, employment The second megatrend is the digitization of the underpinnings and incomes. But in the context of GVCs, attempts to artificially of entire economies and, by implication, GVCs and the global economy. This too is a process that is underway and one that has increase the domestic value-added content of exports, ahead much further to go. It is difficult if not impossible to accurately pre- of the technological deepening of the economy, are likely to be dict the endpoint, if there is one. But there are important insights counterproductive. that the second GVC report highlights. At a more macro level, while trade continues to grow, especially One clear message is that as economies move to being built in services (where there remain challenging measurement prob- in part on digital foundations, trade, GVCs and digital technology lems) the declines in trade relative to global GDP and the rising cannot be separated and dealt with as independent trends and share of intraregional trade are understood to be largely the natural forces. consequences of economic development and the early stages of For early-stage developing countries, automation will at some the digital transformation of economies, and not mainly the result point displace the labor-intensive technologies that underpinned of trade frictions and resistance to globalization engendered by the earlier Asian growth stories. That shift will occur differentially the adverse distributional features of growth patterns. by sector, with textiles and more generally the sewing trades The second GVC report is carefully researched and deep in being the least vulnerable in the short run. The message is two- insights. It does an admirable job of capturing the complexity of fold: don’t give up on the traditional growth model but move rap- a global economy in rapid transition, and especially of bringing idly to expand internet capability and the digital underpinnings into focus the major forces and trends and their impacts. and infrastructure of the economy. Michael Spence Nobel Laureate in Economics vi • Technological innovation, supply chain trade, and workers in a globalized world
Co-publishing partners
his work has been co-published by the World Trade economies whose mission is to promote policies that will improve Organization, the Institute of Developing Economies the economic and social well-being of people around the world: (IDE-JETRO), the Organisation for Economic Co-oper- “Better Policies for Better Lives”. The OECD does this by provid- ation and Development, the Research Center of Global ing a forum for governments to share experiences and by seek- Value Chains headquartered at the University of International ing solutions to common problems. TBusiness and Economics (RCGVC-UIBE), the World Bank Group, The Research Center of Global Value Chains (RCGVC) is a and the China Development Research Foundation. global academic think tank headquartered at the University of The World Trade Organization (WTO) is an international International Business and Economics, focusing on basic and organization that deals with the global rules of trade between interdisciplinary research activities on the development of global nations. The WTO administers agreements, negotiated and value chains (GVCs) and its implication on global economies. signed by its members, which provide the legal ground rules for The World Bank is an international development institution international commerce. Their purpose is to help trade flow as established by Articles of Agreement adopted by its member freely as possible for the economic development and the welfare countries. The World Bank’s overarching mission is to reduce of its members’ citizens. The WTO is serviced by a secretariat poverty, improve living conditions, and promote sustainable and which provides expert, impartial and independent support to comprehensive development in its developing member coun- member governments, including research, analysis and statistical tries. It has established two ambitious goals to anchor its mis- information related to the role and developments of trade in the sion: end extreme poverty within a generation and boost shared global economy. prosperity. The World Bank will achieve these goals by providing IDE-JETRO is a government-affiliated research institute that loans, concessional financing, technical assistance, and knowl- conducts basic and comprehensive research on economics, edge sharing services to its developing member countries and politics, and social issues in developing countries. Through its through partnerships with other organizations. research, IDE-JETRO contributes knowledge of developing The China Development Research Foundation (CDRF) is a economies and better understanding of the regions to the gov- public foundation initiated by the Development Research Center ernment and public. of the State Council (DRC). Its mission is to advance good gover- The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Devel- nance and public policy to promote economic development and opment (OECD) is an international and inter-governmental social progress. organization comprising the world’s main industrialized market vii
Contributors
Co-editors Claire H. Hollweg Senior Economist, World Bank Group David Dollar Senior Fellow, China Center, Brookings Institution Satoshi Inomata Chief Senior Researcher, Institute of Developing Economies – Emmanuelle Ganne Japan External Trade Organization Senior Analyst, World Trade Organization Bilal M. Khan Victor Stolzenburg Assistant Professor, Research Center for Global Value Chains, Research Economist, World Trade Organization University of International Business and Economics
Zhi Wang Emine Elcin Koten Professor and Director, Research Center for Global Value Chains, Consultant, World Bank Group University of International Business and Economics (RCGVC- UIBE); Research Faculty and Senior Policy Fellow, Schar School Xin Li of Policy and Government, George Mason University Professor, School of Statistics, Beijing Normal University
Other contributors Kathryn Lundquist Statistician, World Trade Organization Nadim Ahmad Head of Trade and Competitiveness Statistics Division, Bo Meng Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development Senior Overseas Research Fellow (New York), Institute of Developing Economies - Japan External Trade Organization Marc Bacchetta Counsellor, World Trade Organization Jiansuo Pei Associate Professor, School of International Trade and Michael J. Ferrantino Economics, University of International Business and Economics Lead Economist for Trade Policy, World Bank Group Daria Taglioni Senior Economist, World Bank Group viii • Technological innovation, supply chain trade, and workers in a globalized world
Acknowledgments
he Global Value Chains Development Report is a joint (Penn State University), Gary Hufbauer (Peterson Institute for publication of the World Trade Organization (WTO), International Economics), Alonso de Gortari (Princeton and Dart- the Institute of Developing Economies (IDE–JETRO), mouth), Kalina Manova (University College London), Maurice D the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Kugler (George Mason University), Marcel Timmer (the University Development (OECD), the Research Center of Global Value of Groningen), and Felix Tintelnot (University of Chicago). The TChains (RCGVC-UIBE), the World Bank Group, and the China editors are grateful to Michael Spence for his keynote speech Development Research Foundation, based on joint research at the background paper conference in Beijing and his invalu- efforts to better understand the ongoing development and evo- able expertise and advice on the overall narrative of the report. lution of global value chains and their implications for economic The editors also thank Robert Koopman, chief economist of the development. World Trade Organization and Caroline Freund, director of the This second report draws contributions from 23 background World Bank Group’s Trade, Regional Integration and Investment papers; 16 of them were presented and discussed at the confer- Climate, for their guidance and support during the joint research ence “Technological Innovation, Supply Chain Trade, and Work- process as well as research and data contributions from the Asian ers in a Globalized World” in Beijing during March 22–23, 2018, Development Bank. organized by the RCGVC and the China Development Research The editors are grateful to William Shaw, who copy-edited the Foundation. Drafts of the eight chapters of the report were pre- report, and to Anthony Martin, Head of WTO Publications, and sented and discussed at the second Authors’ Conference in Helen Swain, WTO Publications Editor, who were responsible for Geneva on October 8, 2018, organized by the WTO. The editors the production of the report. thank the authors of background papers and individual chap- The RCGVC would like to acknowledge the financial support ters and the discussants and participants in the two conferences from the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation and National Science for insightful comments and suggestions that helped draft and Foundation of China (grant No. G0304-71733002). improve the chapters (see appendices 1 and 2 for the programs). The report’s co-editors are David Dollar, Emmanuelle Ganne, Special thanks go to our external reviewers: Jonathan Eaton Victor Stolzenburg and Zhi Wang. ix
Abbreviations and acronyms
ADB Asian Development Bank IDE–JETRO Institute of Developing Economies AI artificial intelligence IMF International Monetary Fund ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian Nations IoT Internet of Things B2B business-to-business IPR intellectual property rights B2C business-to-consumer ITC International Trade Centre CDRF China Development Research Foundation LACEX World Bank’s Labor Content of Exports CEO Chief Executive Officer LDC least-developed country CIF ost, insurance and freight LMIC low/medium-income country CMI customer-managed inventory MFN most-favored nation DRC Development Research Center of the State MNE multinational enterprise Council OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation DVA domestic value-added and Development DVAR domestic value-added ratio R&D research and development ECU electronic control unit RCGVC Research Center of Global Value Chains EDI electronic data interchange RFID radio frequency identification ESUT extended supply-use table SME small and medium-sized enterprise FATS foreign affiliates statistics SNA System of National Accounts FDI foreign direct investment STEM science, technology, engineering, and F.O.B. free-on-board mathematics FTZ foreign trade zone SUT supply and use table GDP gross domestic product TFP total factor productivity GM global manufacturing TiVA trade in value-added GSM global system for mobile communication UIBE University of International Business and Economics GTH Global Trade Helpdesk UNCTAD United Nations Conference on Trade GVC global value chain and Development HIC high-income country VMI vendor-managed inventory ICIO inter-country input-output WB World Bank ICT information and communication technology WIOD World Input-Output Tables IDB Inter-American Development Bank WTO World Trade Organization x • Technological innovation, supply chain trade, and workers in a globalized world
Key messages
• The growth of global value chains has slowed since the Global the re-shoring of manufacturing production, thus reducing Financial Crisis of 2008-09 but not stopped. In fact, complex opportunities for developing countries to participate in GVCs, global value chains (GVCs) grew faster than GDP in 2017. or they may strengthen GVCs by reducing coordination and • Factoring in GVCs when studying the impact of trade on matching costs between buyers and suppliers. labor markets reveals that trade has not been a significant • Despite the aggregate gains they create, trade, automation contributor to declines in manufacturing jobs in advanced and digital technologies can cause disruption and widen exist- economies, and that job gains in services have offset job ing disparities across regions and individuals. This calls for losses in manufacturing. broad and comprehensive adjustment policies. • The emergence of GVCs has offered developing countries • While small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) are opportunities to integrate into the global economy by deliver- under-represented in GVCs, the digital economy provides new ing jobs and higher income. opportunities for SMEs to play a more active role. • The impacts of technological change and increased produc- • Open and transparent policies tend to promote GVC-led tivity on employment linked to GVCs have been offset by growth more than import-reducing policies targeted at raising growing consumer demand, and in the short term, automa- the share of domestic value-added in exports. tion will not dramatically reduce the attractiveness of low- • Using value-added trade rather than gross trade statistics wage destinations, especially for labor-intensive tasks that is crucial to understanding GVCs and their impact on jobs. require human dexterity. Efforts to continue to improve the quality of these estimates • The impact of new digital technologies on GVCs is uncertain: are strongly encouraged. they may reduce the length of supply chains by encouraging Executive summary
DAVID DOLLAR
ore than two-thirds of world trade occurs through other components of GDP. During the global financial crisis there global value chains (GVCs), in which production was naturally some retrenchment of GVCs, followed by quick crosses at least one border, and typically many recovery (2010-2011) but since then, with the exception of 2017, borders, before final assembly. The phenomenal growth has, in the main, slowed. In 2017 expansion of complex growth in GVC-related trade has translated into significant eco- GVCs was faster than GDP growth, but it is too early to say if this Mnomic growth in many countries across the globe over the last is a new trend or just a one-year blip. two decades, fueled by reductions in transportation and com- Concerning which sectors are particularly amenable to munication costs and declining trade barriers. But, at the same GVCs, over a long period we found that, the higher the technol- time, it has contributed to distributional effects that mean that ogy (knowledge) intensity of a sector, the more significant the the benefits of trade have not always accrued to all, which has, at increase of complex GVC activities. Thus, GVC linkages are espe- least in part, been a driver in the backlash against globalization cially important for high-tech sectors and it is in these areas that and the rise of protectionism and threats to global and regional we see highly complex value chains involving many countries. trade agreements. In addition, new technological developments We also distinguish between intra-regional GVC activities and such as robotics, big data, and the Internet of Things (IoT) are inter-regional ones. Activities within North American economies beginning to reshape and further transform GVCs. This second would be an example of the former, whereas China’s growing GVC development report takes stock of the recent evolution of contribution to value chains centered on the U.S. or Germany GVC trade in light of these developments. would be examples of the latter. Between 2000 and 2017, the weight of intra-regional GVC activities in “Factory Asia” came to exceed that of “Factory North America”. In contrast, the share of Update on trends in GVCs intra-regional GVC activities declined relatively in both Europe and North America and their share of inter-regional production The growth of global value chains has slowed since the global sharing activities increased, especially their GVC linkages with financial crisis. A country’s GDP (value added) can be decom- “Factory Asia”, reflecting in large part increased inter-connect- posed into purely domestic, traditional trade, in which a product edness with China. China is increasingly playing an important is made in one country and consumed in another, simple value role as both a supply and demand hub in traditional trade and chain trade, in which a good made in one country crosses one simple GVC networks, although the U.S. and Germany are still border and is used in production in the partner country before the most important hubs in complex GVC networks. consumption there, and complex value chain trade, in which GVC analysis also provides some insight into bilateral trade production crosses multiple borders. From 2000-2007, GVCs, balances and how they should be interpreted. In a world in which especially complex ones, were expanding at a faster rate than most trade consists of parts and components, bilateral trade
1 2 • Technological innovation, supply chain trade, and workers in a globalized world
balances are significantly affected by the supply and demand of nationwide and sectoral level to regional and individual outcomes third countries; and, net imports are no longer a proper measure reveals substantial heterogeneity in how aggregate effects map of the impact of an international trade shock on the domestic out. For instance, when local labor markets within countries are economy in the age of GVCs, compared to the time when final not sufficiently diversified, trade can widen regional disparities. goods trade dominated. China happens to be at the end of Regions specialized in import-competing and upstream industries many Asian value chains, taking sophisticated components from can fall behind, while areas with industries that export or benefit Japan, the Republic of Korea, and Chinese Taipei and assembling from cost savings due to cheaper imported inputs pull away. these into final products. Two-thirds of all intermediate imports Similarly, trade may work in the same direction as other drivers of information and communication technology (ICT) products, in contributing to labor market polarization. In particular, automa- coming from other countries in Factory Asia, but also with signif- tion has impacted jobs in the middle of the skills distribution, with icant contributions from Europe and North America, are used as remaining jobs concentrated at the high and low ends. Between inputs into Chinese exports. Indeed, the Chinese domestic value 1999 and 2007, the years when China was reducing barriers and content of their exports of ICT products accounts for only around entering the WTO, nearly all advanced economies had increases half of the total export value. As such, trade balances look very in employment shares for high- and low-skilled jobs, and declines different in value-added terms. For example, the U.S. trade defi- for middle-skill work (see Figure 1). cit in ICT products with China is roughly cut in half if the calcula- While trade and automation are making a country as a whole tion is made in value added terms. richer, there is a need for adjustment policies to ensure a more even distribution of these gains. This is especially the case as value chains magnify trade-induced changes in skill requirements Labor market effects of GVCs in developed and thereby raise the demand for worker flexibility and the need countries for training support. With regard to the optimal design of such policies, value chains make targeted or specific labor market One of the main controversies of globalization is its effect on interventions increasingly difficult. As input-output linkages labor markets in both developed and developing economies. cause trade shocks to spread more widely within economies, Across advanced economies, the real median wage has grown import competition is less and less limited in terms of industries, slowly over the past two decades and manufacturing employ- regions, or skill levels. As a result, it can become more difficult to ment has been on the decline, while incomes of highly skilled identify the exact reason for individual displacement. Therefore, workers and owners of capital have soared. There are of course adjustment policies should not differentiate between the various many factors at work here, and not all are related to globaliza- reasons for worker displacement, such as automation or trade, tion, especially countries’ own domestic tax and transfer policies, and be less dependent on affected workers fulfilling certain but one additional factor has been big developing countries, especially China and Eastern European economies, opening up and joining the global economy. FIGURE 1 Percentage point changes in employment shares A number of studies have concluded that, in particular, the by skill level between 1995-2015 impact of Chinese import competition on the U.S. labor market, Percent especially after China joined the WTO, was a significant factor behind U.S. manufacturing employment dropping sharply after 10 2000. But these analyses have typically only provided a partial view of the overall impact on employment, by and large ignoring 5 the reality of value chains. A full view requires that we account for the fact that the development of value chains results in churning 0 across economies, as firms and countries specialize and create certain types of jobs while eliminating others. General equilib- -5 rium analyses of the so-called “China shock” that take account of GVCs find that, for the U.S., trade was not a main contribu- -10 tor to the loss of manufacturing jobs and has only minor aggre- gate employment effects. One important reason for this more -15 nuanced effect is that while some industries contracted because Southern Northern Western Total North Japan Central of increased competition, others expanded thanks to the cost Europe Europe Europe America Europe savings that GVC linkages provided, counterbalancing jobs lost in contracting industries. This is consistent with economic theory, Low skill iddle skill High skill which suggests that trade should not have a large net effect on employment. Source: OECD (2017). See chapter 2 for details. That being said, the effects vary considerably across regions and individuals with different skill levels. Moving from the Executive summary • 3
FIGURE 2 Many jobs in Viet Nam are tied to exports, directly and indirectly
25000 anufacturing Agriculture, forestry and fishery 20000 Trade 15000 Hotels and restaurants 10000 ining Transport, storage and communications 5000 Education and training; health and social work; recreational, cultural and sporting activities 0 Financial intermediation 1989 199 2000 2007 2012 Real estate, renting and business activities; Year scientific activities and technology Other services activities Electricity, gas and water supply Total JOBX Construction Direct JOBX Public administration, activities of party and membership organizations and defence Indirect JOBX 0 2000 4000 000 8000 10000 12000 Direct JOBX Indirect JOBX
Source: Hollweg (2017). See chapter 3 for details.
conditions. In addition, mobility and place-based policies could indirect exporting firms that supply inputs to the direct exporters usefully complement general labor market policies to address (see Figure 2). regional divergence. The relationship between GVC integration and level of employment though is not necessarily positive in all contexts. Imports of goods and services (backward GVC participation) Labor market effects of GVCs in developing matter as much as exports of intermediates (forward GVC partici- countries pation) to be successful in GVCs, where opening up to imports is often a pre-condition to successfully export. However, there may The emergence of global value chains has offered developing be import-competing effects in labor markets. countries new opportunities to integrate into the global econ- Evidence as well as intuition suggests that GVC participation omy. This has fundamental impacts on where jobs go, who gets will have other distributional implications. Greater participation them, and what type of jobs they are. Significant parts of the of developing countries in global trade is expected to integrate developing world are deeply involved in GVCs. Their input has not only markets for products, services, finance and technology, been initially concentrated in labor-intensive activities, which may but also, directly and indirectly, markets for labor. The hallmark have had important impacts on poverty in developing countries. of globalization is big developing countries opening up and join- For example, the boom in exports to the United States following ing global trade. In general, such economies are abundant in the US–Vietnam Bilateral Trade Agreement of 2001 was partic- unskilled labor and scarce in skilled labor and capital relative to ularly beneficial to wages of unskilled workers, reduced the skill global averages. The factor-endowment theory of trade predicts premium, and was a key driver of poverty reduction in Viet Nam that trade will reduce returns to unskilled labor in advanced econ- because it was concentrated in unskilled, labor-intensive GVC omies while raising returns to capital and skilled labor. This trend sectors, most notably textiles. has generally been observed. But the opposite trend should There is a positive association between output growth and occur in developing countries that open up: wages of unskilled employment growth within GVC sectors, which increased over- workers, clearly the most abundant factor in many developing all welfare as workers moved out of agriculture or the informal countries, should rise faster than other factor rewards. This has sector toward better paying, higher value-added jobs. Women not happened in most developing countries; rather, employment who previously had difficulty accessing this type of wage work creation and wage gains have been biased towards more skilled have filled many of these jobs. Employment and wage impacts workers. GVC expansion in developing countries is associated can happen both directly within exporting firms as well as indi- with higher relative demand for skilled workers. Characteristics rectly through these firms’ demand for goods and services from of GVCs themselves, by supporting more complex industrial the domestic economy. The extent to which GVCs interact with organization, as well as services inputs that are complementary domestic labor thus depends on the linkages of exporting firms to value chains, can be skill-biased. to domestic, input-supplying firms. The firms that export directly Automation may be threatening GVC jobs in developing account for only a small part of GVC jobs. In Viet Nam, most countries in the long term, where the routine tasks more suscep- of the job creation results from backward linkages – that is, in tible to automation are increasingly performed. Technological 4 • Technological innovation, supply chain trade, and workers in a globalized world
advancements that largely get diffused through global value firms to be full partners in global technology ecosystems and to chains are affecting how GVCs support jobs in developing coun- pursue open source innovation solutions. tries. Evidence suggests that changes in efficiency in GVCs has The question that now remains is whether firms from other negative impacts on employment linked to countries’ participa- countries, especially in less/least-developed regions, can repli- tion in the global production of products, all else equal. Tech- cate the positive experience of leveraging platforms by Chinese nological innovation has also lowered the demand for low-skilled firms as demonstrated in this chapter. And does automation of workers relatively more than compared to high-skilled workers. production even prevent initial entry based on low wages? Nevertheless, the adverse effects of changing production tech- Robotics, 3D printing, the IoT, Big Data, and cloud comput- nologies and efficiencies on employment have been offset by ing, among others, are transforming entire industries. The evi- increased consumer demand, whereby the domestic consump- dence suggests that automation reduces some of the incen- tion expenditures in large emerging economies such as China and tives for GVCs to relocate to lower-wage countries. However, it India will generate new demand for labor for the global economy is also seen that automation does not necessarily dampen the These distributional consequences of trade and other forces attractiveness of low-wage destinations, especially for labor-in- are a principal concern to policymakers. Policies also play an tensive tasks that require human dexterity. In the apparel indus- important role in mediating the relationship between GVCs and try, for example, soft materials like fabrics are difficult to handle employment in developing countries. These include policies that through automation compared to solid materials such as metal support (i) participation of developing countries in GVCs, (ii) fos- or wooden objects, and sewing/stitching can still be out of the tering positive spillovers from GVC participation, (iii) upgrading reach of “robots’ hands”. to higher value-added tasks within GVCs, and (iv) mediating neg- In this sense, automation is likely to have only a limited impact ative effects from winners, such as inequality. on developing countries’ opportunities to participate in value chains through the offshoring of production by high-income countries, at least in the short term. Foreign direct investment Technological progress, diffusion, and flows (greenfield investment) from high-income countries to opportunities for developing countries low- and middle-income countries has declined since 2010. Nev- ertheless, there are important differences across industries and The nature of technology used in products plays a major role in between production and assembly tasks within industries. The determining the governance structure of value chains and the pattern across countries also suggests that some FDI may have benefits of participation for developing countries. Standardization migrated from China to low-income and middle-income coun- through breaking production into modules with a high degree of tries in Asia and Africa and from higher- to lower-income coun- functional autonomy (limited mutual interference between mod- tries in the Europe and Central Asia region. ules) can dramatically reduce the amount of R&D, learning by While automation does not pose immediate risks to shut the doing, and the number of complementary skills needed to pro- door to labor-intensive exports from developing countries, gov- duce a good. This greatly increases opportunities for developing ernments need to develop a comprehensive digital strategy. Our country firms to participate in formerly capital-intensive industries economies are increasingly sitting on a digital foundation, one through reducing entry costs into global value chains. that is generating high-speed growth and disruptive change. However, widespread access to standardized products with The employment and investment of tomorrow will be data inten- little ability to modify technical features can lead to an exces- sive, and value in a knowledge economy is increasingly created sive supply of homogeneous products in a local market, resulting by innovative ideas and data. in intense price competition and limited technology transfer. By Not only is embracing digital technologies good for the contrast, technology that facilitates scope for product modifica- economy, but it is also good for society. The digitally powered, tion and greater interaction with lead manufacturers can help knowledge-intensive GVCs that are emerging and are likely to boost technology transfer and product upgrading by develop- dominate in the coming years have a strong potential for inclu- ing country firms. Chapter 4 illustrates this interaction between sion. As Nobel Prize winner Mike Spence points out, they have changes in technology and opportunities for developing coun- low marginal costs of production and are non-rival. Moreover, tries through developments in the automotive and cell phone they can expand markets for small businesses beyond traditional industries in China. geographies. They can also expand financial inclusion, as data The chapter argues that policies for helping domestically on e-commerce can be used as collateral, and smartphones link owned firms to become technologically standalone – what some up poorer countries to these opportunities. might refer to as “techno-nationalism” – do not necessarily deliver the expected results in terms of upgrading. The world’s most powerful technology companies, both from emerging and GVCs and digital technology advanced countries, work with global suppliers and even with competitors in “open innovation” environments. Hence, the “Supply Chain 4.0” is the re-organization of supply chains – advice to policymakers seeking to upgrade toward the global design and planning, production, distribution, consumption, technology frontier is to prioritize measures that encourage and reverse logistics – using technologies that are known as Executive summary • 5
“Industry 4.0”. These technologies emerged in the 21st century New technologies gather prodigious amounts of data. Big and are largely implemented by firms that are at the frontier of data analytics is about using data to drive useful business intel- supply chain management in high-income countries. The most ligence, answering the questions, “What just happened?”, “Why frequently mentioned supply management techniques are the did it happen?”, and “What are we going to do next?” The ability IoT, big data analytics, 3D printing, advanced (autonomous) to collect and analyze data gathered in the whole supply chain robotics, smart sensors, augmented reality, artificial intelligence, makes it possible to “run scenarios within the platform”, where and cloud computing. Through these advanced techniques, a the platform is conceived of as an overarching software solution continuous flow of information between the retailer and supplier within the supply chain control center. Besides saving time and keeps the shelves stocked and there is no longer a “back room” labor, and reducing errors, EDI enables a large amount of data in stores where inventory is kept. capture about customer behavior which can be the basis for “Supply Chain 4.0” is about transforming the model of supply supply chain analytics using either “big data” or “small data” chain management from a linear model in which instructions techniques. flow from supplier to producer to distributor to consumer, and The use of modern technology and human labor in warehouses back, to a more integrated model in which information flows in are often complements, rather than substitutes, especially in con- multiple directions. While lead firms are increasingly analyzing ditions where e-commerce is substantially increasing demand this information through “supply chain control towers,” the end for certain goods and services. E-commerce is a mechanism for effect of this development is making the goods economy more translating unpaid household shopping time into paid market responsive to consumer demand. According to a recent PwC time. Instead of consumers spending time shopping, workers in (2016a) study on the rise of Industry 4.0, a third of the more than warehouses and on delivery trucks are picking goods off ware- 2,000 respondents say their companies have started to digitize house shelves and bringing them to the consumer’s front door. their supply chains, and fully 72% expect to have done so five Most of the jobs being created involve moving goods around years from now. either in warehouses or delivery vehicles and have many of the In “Supply Chain 4.0”, the internet makes the warehouse vis- characteristics of factory work. A study using U.S. data gathered ible to the customer and within the warehouse, some technol- in the Occupational Employment Statistics of the Bureau of Labor ogies such as autonomous logistics and robotic transport can Statistics, shows that employment in the most dynamic parts of be employed to substantially improve pick-and-pack perfor- the supply chain has grown at a rate substantially exceeding that mance. Business-to-business (B2B) e-commerce consists of links of the overall economy since 2011. These sectors include ware- in supply chains – whether transactions between parts suppliers housing and storage, couriers and messengers (i.e. express deliv- and assemblers, between distribution centers and retailers, or ery), and non-store retailers (i.e. e-commerce companies). online purchases of services which in many cases support the Digital technologies and the internet are becoming the foun- supply chain. B2B commerce can be implemented either through dation of entire economies. There are huge benefits in terms websites, much like business-to-consumer (B2C) e-commerce, or of inclusive patterns of growth, innovation and entrepreneurial through electronic data interchange (EDI) which is a mature tech- opportunities, but the downside risks are much larger than was nology through which the computer systems of the buyer and initially understood. Trade and investment will be vulnerable in seller are directly connected using a common record format. the near complete absence of international agreements on the To rapidly assess and respond to changes in customer uses and prohibited abuses of the internet and data. demand, tracking and tracing throughout the supply chain is enabled through sensing technologies underlying the IoT, including radio frequency identification (RFID), Bluetooth, and The digital economy and SMEs global system for mobile communication (GSM). Applications of IoT are increasingly used to facilitate the management strategies Small and medium-sized enterprises in general have low direct of “customer-managed inventory” (CMI) or “vendor-managed participation in international trade, compared to large enter- inventory” (VMI) in which information is initially provided by a prises. This result makes economic sense as long as there are customer and then transmitted up the supply chain to the ware- fixed costs in exporting, such as learning about foreign markets house. Technologies such as RFID tags then transmit information or rules and minimum scales for shipping. In theory, the spread to the distribution center so that orders can be fulfilled. An EDI of GVCs should reduce these effects and make it easier for SMEs system causes an order created electronically by the customer to to participate in trade as the break-up of the production process be instantly duplicated without error in the vendor’s computer makes it feasible for a specialized firm to find niche markets. Yet, system, and the invoice to be similarly electronically duplicated SMEs are underrepresented in GVCs. in the customer’s computer system. Some of these processes This may be changing, however, as access to information and are being implemented through blockchain, a distributed ledger communication technology (ICT) continues to grow. For example, technology that allows multiple parties to maintain copies of the there is evidence that the internet reduces search costs, facilitat- same information in various locations, either in an open manner ing more exchange and increasing firm productivity. Cross-bor- or requiring individual entities’ permission to access the network. der e-commerce platforms are also providing new opportunities Its special feature is that historical entries cannot be altered. for SMEs and even micro firms. 6 • Technological innovation, supply chain trade, and workers in a globalized world
Using firm-level data from the World Bank’s Enterprise Sur- countries to specialize in a particular activity and join a global veys, new research finds that whether a firm has a website on production network. As a developing country moves from export the internet facilitates the participation of manufacturing SMEs of primary products to export of manufactures and services via in GVCs and trade. In particular, such SMEs are more likely to use GVCs, the ratio of domestic value added to gross export value foreign inputs for production and export their output. Further, tends to fall. Developing countries often start out at the end of ICT connectivity is found to be more important for small firms value chains, with labor-intensive assembly of parts produced than for large ones when considering whether or not a firm par- elsewhere. For some individual products, the ratio of domestic ticipates in trade. value added to gross export value can be very small, maybe only Evidence underlines the importance of ICT access for SMEs to a few percentage points. The gross exports from the country can join GVCs in the digital economy, however, access to new tech- be very large, but this is an artifact of the position in the value nology varies not only between firm size, but also regionally by chain. The country’s value added contribution to the export is level of development. Infrastructure constraints faced by devel- much smaller. Many developing countries worry about this phe- oping countries in e-commerce range from the most basic, such nomenon and aspire to increase their value added contribution as access to a steady supply of electricity, to the more complex, to exports. There are a number of reasons why this objective such as not having access to electronic payment systems or a should be approached cautiously. It may seem like simple math lack of high-speed internet cables. This is a particular problem, that a higher domestic value added share means more total not only because information communication technology (ICT) is value added exported and hence more GDP. But that simple necessary for e-commerce, but also because ICT is now consid- idea ignores the reality that imported goods and services are ered a pre-requisite for joining most GVCs. No matter the inter- a key support to a country’s competitiveness. If a country artifi- net’s functionality, regardless of lacking features such as broad- cially replaces key inputs with inferior domestic versions, the end band connection and e-commerce platforms, e-commerce can result is likely to be fewer gross exports and less, not more, total only develop if the internet is present. This is in line with empir- value added exports. ical studies showing that access to the internet improves export History provides a number of interesting lessons about this performance in developing countries across manufacturing and issue. First, in almost all countries, developed and developing services sectors through reduced search costs and decreased alike, the share of domestic value added in exports has tended to distance barriers. Furthermore, the internet has also been shown trend downwards over time. This reflects the expansion of global to increase firm productivity, especially of smaller and less inno- value chains. Even the countries best known for final products in vative firms. key sectors such as autos, machinery, and electronics rely heav- However, SMEs face a number of additional challenges inte- ily on imported inputs, both manufactures and services. Many of grating into GVCs with the digital economy. On top of lagging the iconic products in the world, such as BMW cars and iPhones, behind large firms in terms of overall digital technology use and have large amounts of imported inputs that go into final assem- capability, small businesses may also find it difficult to access bly. Developing countries have learned part of this lesson and e-commerce platforms and payment systems. National policy are generally quite open to imports of parts and components. may also be inadvertently preventing successful internationaliza- However, imported services are also a key input into manufac- tion of SMEs via GVCs. Complex customs procedures, regulatory tures, and developing countries tend to be more protectionist uncertainty and barriers to services trade all adversely affect vis-à-vis services. Both trade in services and investment in ser- SMEs and pose challenges to SME participation in GVCs, despite vices (often needed in order to trade the services) tend to be the opportunities provided by e-commerce. more restricted in developing countries, than policies towards These findings underscore the continuing need to improve manufactures. Developing countries that have more imported the ICT environment/infrastructure and to expand services such service content in their exports tend to be more persistent and as e-payment and e-commerce, all of which benefit SMEs dispro- successful exporters of manufactures. portionally, but they also highlight the lack of information regard- A second point about the ratio of domestic content to gross ing SMEs. In theory the digital economy holds potential for SME value of exports is that the early East Asian industrializers show participation in GVCs, but for effective policies to be developed, a highly non-linear trend in this variable. In the case of Japan, better data will need to be collected. this ratio fell in the early post-war period as the country opened up and began to use imported inputs. In the 1980s, however, the ratio increased as Japan became a capable producer of a Should high domestic value added in exports wide range of manufactured intermediates and parts. Since 1990 be an objective of policy? there has again been a sharp trend downwards in domestic con- tent as complex value chains developed throughout Asia. Japan Global value chains make it easier for developing countries to is an industrial powerhouse with many successful brands, and it move away from export reliance on unprocessed primary prod- is revealing that the domestic content ratio in the most recent ucts to become exporters of manufactures and services. Before year is the lowest ever recorded. Being an industrial powerhouse the development of GVCs, a country had to master the pro- does not mean that all activities take place within the border. duction of a whole product in order to export it. GVCs allow Japanese firms use imported goods and services in a highly Executive summary • 7
efficient manner. The Republic of Korea’s and Chinese Taipei’s trade faced by smaller firms compared to larger firms). The same experiences are very similar to Japan’s, but with a lag. generalizations hold true for foreign-owned enterprises, or enter- China’s recent experience is an important counter-example. prises with affiliates abroad, compared to purely domestic firms; At the beginning of economic reform there was a sharp drop for example, the foreign content of exports by foreign-owned in the domestic value added ratio as the country moved from firms in the transport sector in the United States is twice that of exporting primary products to assembling apparel and elec- domestically owned firms. But TiVA estimates, relying as they do tronics using parts produced in other countries. However, over on national supply-use and input-output tables, cannot reflect the past decade the ratio has been rising, catching the attention these heterogeneities; thus, key measures, such as the import of other developing countries. Our research indicates that this content of exports, are downward biased. trend is primarily the result of technological advance in China, Additional complexities can create significant interpretative not the result of restrictive trade policy. What is happening to challenges for users of TiVA type statistics. Because inter-coun- China now is analogous to what happened to Japan in the 1980s try input-output tables value transactions at basic, and not and the Republic of Korea in the 1990s, as their technological market, prices, many of the related TiVA analyses reveal only capability advanced. If China’s experience continues to be simi- some of the story. What is often not fully understood in the use lar to the earlier industrializers, then the ratio can be expected to of tables valued in basic prices is that they exclude the value that peak and later decline as labor-intensive activities are off-shored is added at the end of the chain by distribution sectors (in par- to lower wage locations and more imported components and ticular retail and wholesale, which often include value associated parts are used in production to keep Chinese firms competitive with marketing activities and brands). At the heart of the debate, in international markets. China’s development is likely to be influ- and indeed confusion, is that input-output tables in basic prices enced by its “Made in China 2025” industrial policy. This policy are in essence a mechanism to provide a view of production, and aims to make China a technology leader in ten advanced manu- because they remove significant distribution margins at the end facturing sectors. China has set indicative targets for domestic of the chain, they are less well equipped to provide a perspec- value added in these sectors. In semiconductors, for example, tive from the consumption point of view. This has a direct impact China currently imports 90% of usage, but plans to produce 70% on smile-curve type analyses that describe where sectors are in of usage by 2025, which would be an extraordinary shift. What value chains and how far they are from final demand. Moreover, remains unclear is what policy tools China will use. If it restricts although the basic price concept may provide a correct view of, imports or direct investment in these sectors, it will make its firms for example, the domestic value-added or services content of a less competitive, not to mention inflaming global trade tensions. country’s total exports, it provides an arguably distorted view of the same measure of a given good seen from a consumption, or free-on-board (FOB) perspective. This is because basic prices Issues in GVC measurement exclude often significant distribution margins related to trans- portation from the factory gate to the customs frontier, which The proliferation and development of global input-output tables may also reflect significant contributions from activities related to in recent years has significantly transformed our ability to inter- brand, R&D, design, and marketing. For example, the US domes- pret global production. But, important though such initiatives tic value-added content of its exports of textiles and clothing in have been, they are typically silent on the role of multinationals FOB prices was around 20% in 2016 compared to 3% using the in this new landscape. In addition, the policy debate in recent pure basic price approach. years has increasingly focused on ‘inclusive globalization’, refer- The basic price approach also limits the scope to reveal addi- ring to the growing realization that the benefits of globalization tional dependencies related to globalization, for example jobs may not have accrued to all members of society equally, even if sustained in retailers through sales of imports. A complementary only as a process of transition. accounting framework is developed in “market” prices to illus- With traditional macroeconomic statistics, it is not immediately trate the insights that can be gained through such an approach. clear, for example, which categories of workers in which countries In the United States, for example, the sale of imports supported benefit from globalization (and how) and which may have been, 9.0 million jobs. even if only temporarily, left behind. Moreover, trade in val- ue-added (TiVA) estimates, derived through the construction of a global input-output table, implicitly assume that all firms within a given sector have the same production function (input-output technical coefficients), import intensity and export intensity. This of course has never been true. We know for example that larger firms will typically have different production functions compared to smaller firms, because of economies of scale, and also higher labor productivity. And these firms will also typically be more export and, indeed, import orientated than their smaller counterparts (reflecting in part the disproportionate costs of
CHAPTER 1
Recent patterns of global production and GVC participation
Xin Li (Beijing Normal University), Bo Meng (IDE-JETRO), and Zhi Wang (RCGVC-UIBE)
ABSTRACT
Taking advantage of a new accounting method to decom- chains still remain largely regional; China is increasingly pose GDP production into pure domestic production, tra- playing an important role as both a supply and demand hub ditional trade, simple and complex GVC activities, this in traditional trade and simple GVC networks, although the chapter examines recent trends in global value chain (GVC) US and Germany are still the most important hubs in com- activities across the world. Our main findings show that the plex GVC networks; bilateral trade balances are significantly pace of GVC activities picked up in 2017 after a period of affected by the supply and demand of third countries; and slow down since 2012; intra-North American and intra-Euro- net imports are no longer a proper measure of the impact pean GVC activities declined relative to inter-regional trans- of international trade on the domestic economy in the age actions due to higher penetration via Factory Asia but value of GVCs.
• The growth of global value chains has slowed since the 2008-09 Global Financial Crisis but has not stopped. From 2000 to 2007, global value chains (GVCs), especially complex ones, expanded at a faster rate than GDP. During the global financial crisis there was naturally some retrenchment of GVCs, followed by quick recovery (2010-2011), but since then growth has mostly slowed. However, most recent data for 2017 show that complex GVCs grew faster than GDP. • Value chains remain largely regional but they are not static. Between 2000 and 2017, intra-regional GVC trade increased in “Factory Asia” reflecting, in part, upgrading by China and other Asian economies. In contrast, intra-regional GVC trade in “Factory Europe” and “Factory North America” decreased slightly relative to inter-regional GVC trade reflecting stronger linkages with “Factory Asia”. • China has emerged as an important hub in traditional trade and simple GVC networks, but the United States and Germany remain the most important hubs in complex GVC networks.
9 10 • Technological innovation, supply chain trade, and workers in a globalized world
lobal value chains, where firms specialize in a particu- based on whether it crosses national borders or not. Value-added lar set of activities in one country to produce parts and creation is only classified as a GVC activity when the embodied components for other countries, have spread the pro- factor content in a product crosses a national border for produc- duction process across countries; their share of world tion purposes (Box 1.1). production and trade has expanded greatly over the past three The chapter is organized as follows. Section 1 describes Gdecades. In the years immediately after the global financial crisis, the changing pattern of global production activities and GVC however, the expansion of GVCs significantly slowed, according participation across countries and industries based on global to GVC production measures reported in the 2017 GVC develop- inter-country input-output (ICIO) tables constructed by Asian ment report. At the same time, the world has seen the emergence Development Bank, which covers 62 economies and 35 indus- of populist, protectionist movements in many advanced countries. tries up to 2017. Section 2 demonstrates the changing distribu- The looming trade tension between the United States and its tion of value-added production activities along typical global major trading partners, especially China, the second largest econ- value chains, as more developing countries have been integrated omy in the world, will have significant consequences for growth into the global production network. Section 3 uses network opportunities in developing countries, but also, in a world of high analysis to demonstrate the topology of the global production levels of interdependence, developed economies. network structure of traditional trade, simple and complex GVC The first chapter of this report updates trends in GVC pro- activities, and their evolution between 2000 and 2017. Section 4 duction and trade activities in both developed and developing analyzes the multilateral nature of bilateral trade and focuses on economies by technology (knowledge) intensity and income three sensitive bilateral trade relations (US-China, US-Germany, level, according to the production decomposition method pro- US-Japan) to demonstrate the roles third countries have played posed by Wang et al (2017). This approach classifies the embod- in determining bilateral trade balances in the age of global value ied factor content in a product into GVC and non-GVC activities chains. Section 5 concludes.
BOX 1.1 A production decomposition to identify and measure GVC activities
In Wang et. al. (2017), production activities are divided into there is no cross-country production sharing; the difference 4 broad types depending on whether they involve produc- between the two is whether they satisfy either domestic or tion sharing between two or more countries. The first type foreign final demand. The last two types are cross-country is value added produced at home and absorbed by domes- production sharing activities; the differences between the tic final demand without involving international trade. No two are whether they satisfy partner country or other coun- factor content crosses national borders in the entire produc- tries’ final demand, and the number of times factor content tion and consumption process. The second type is domestic crosses national borders. Domestic and import input-output value added embodied in final product exports, that is, tra- coefficient matrixes in ICIO tables are used to distinguish ditional trade: products are made completely by domestic domestic and foreign factor content in various production factors and factor content crosses a national border once activities. The classification and relation among the four for consumption only. The third type is domestic value types of production are depicted in Figure 1.1. added embodied in a country-sector’s intermediate trade According to this decomposition method, GVC activities that is used by the partner country to produce its domestic as a share of total production activities can be used to mea- products consumed locally, or is foreign value added that sure the intensity of each country-sector’s participation in is imported directly from partner countries and used for cross-country production sharing activities. Essentially, this domestically consumed products. Factor content is used in approach measures the percentage of production in a par- production outside the home country and crosses a national ticular country-sector that has been engaged in global pro- border once for production. Therefore, it is referred to duction networks. The forward GVC participation indicator as “simple GVC activities”. The last type is value added is based on a decomposition of GDP production; it shows embodied in intermediate exports/imports that is used the percentage of production factors employed in a coun- by a partner country to produce exports (intermediate or try-sector that have been involved in cross-country produc- final) for other countries. In this case, factor content crosses tion sharing activities. The backward participation indicator a national border at least twice, so is referred to as “com- is computed based on a decomposition of final goods pro- plex GVC activities.” Production activities in the first two duction; it shows the percentage of final products produced types are entirely conducted within national borders, and by a country-sector coming from GVC activities. Recent patterns of global production and GVC participation • 11
FIGURE 1.1 Decomposition of production activities1
Production of Value-added or GVCs Final products roduction sharing between two or ore countries
Pure Domestic Traditional Trade GVCs No border Cross border Cross border crossing for consumption for production air cut ortugal wine in nter ediate trade e change or ngland cloth
Simple GVCs Complex GVCs Cross border once for production Cross border hinese steel in building at least twice i hone uto
1. The changing pattern of global production 10% increase in complex GVC activities led the growth. However, activities and GVC participation2 rising trade tensions between the United States and its major trading partners, especially China, has introduced tremendous GVC activities as a share of global GDP fell from 2011 to 2016, uncertainty in the global economy recovery process. Determin- as the share of purely domestic production activities rose (see ing whether the recovery of cross-country production sharing Figure 1.2, which is an update of Figure 2.3 in the 2017 GVC activities in 2017 has started a new trend requires more years of Development Report based on the newly released ICIO tables data and further analysis. by the Asian Development Bank). This continues the downward A first step is to measure the impact of the recent, sharp trend in GVC activities shown in the 2017 GVC report based changes in commodity prices on nominal growth rates of pro- on data through 2014. However, the growth of global trade duction activities shown above. The global prices of crude oil surpassed the growth of global GDP for the first time in nearly and other bulk commodities have gone through a “super circle” six years in 2017, and there were signs of a recovery of GVC since 2000. For example, the per barrel crude oil price (dated activities. Brent) fluctuated dramatically during 2000-2018, rising from less The nominal growth rate of all types of production activi- than 30 US dollars in 2000 to over 110 dollars in 2011, falling to ties (the four activities are defined in Box 1.1) fell sharply during less than 50 dollars by 2016, and then rebounding to about 70 2012-2016, with a much sharp slowdown in cross-country, pro- dollars since early in 2018. Because crude oil and other bulk com- duction-sharing GVC activities. The decline was the steepest for modities are important intermediate inputs in global production, complex GVC activities, followed by simple GVC activities, tra- these price fluctuations may affect the relative nominal growth ditional trade and domestic production activities; the average patterns of different types of value-added creation activities annual changes for these four types of activities during 2012- measured in current US dollars shown in Figure 1.3. 2016 were -1.65%, -1.00%, -0.28% and 1.49% respectively (indi- It appears, however, that the more rapid decline in the nom- vidual year data are reported in Figure 1.3, which is an update inal value of GVCs than other activities as a share of GDP from of Figure 2.5 in the 2017 GVC report). Thus, the limited increase 2011-2016 was not due simply to price changes. Figure 1.4 shows in global GDP from 2012-2016 was almost entirely accounted the growth rate of the volume of world merchandise trade, world by the growth of pure domestic production; international trade real GDP and their ratio during 1995-2017. For each year when contributed very little during this slow recovery period. In 2017, global real trade growth was faster than global real GDP growth, the growth rate of global trade exceeded that of global GDP, a complex GVC activities had the highest nominal rate of growth 12 • Technological innovation, supply chain trade, and workers in a globalized world
FIGURE 1.2 Trends in production activities as a share of global GDP, by type of value-added creation activity, 1995-2017 Percent