47-4 09 Byman.Indd

PROOF http://taylorandfrancis.metapress.com/openurl.asp?genre=article&id=doi:10.1080/00396330500433399 The publishedversionisavailableforsubscribersorpay-per-viewbyclickingherevisiting: This isanon-printableproofofanarticlepublishedinSurvival,vol.47,no.4(winter2005),pp.117-144. Passive SponsorsofTerrorism DOI: 10.1080/00396330500433399 Survival (Cambridge, 2005). latest bookis His Institution. at theBrookings Program atGeorgetown Fellow University andaSenior attheSabanCenter for EastPolicy Middle Daniel Byman is notcon times, makingtheproblemworse. we useagainstactive sponsors,leadingtothe failureofcoercionand,at o result, a of terrorism,we lackanycomprehensive understandingoftheirrole. As a Qaeda’s success.Despite theimportanceofwhatIcall’passive sponsors’ – indeed,several arebi in Malaysia.Noneofthesegovernments areactive sponsorsofal-Qaeda Saudis unobstructedbythegovernment inRiyadh, andplanned operations with relatively li September 2001a their organisations,conductoperationsandsurvive. to fundraising,oreven thetolerationofrecruitment allhelpterroristsbuild a terrorist’s causeisbynot acting. A bordernotpoliced,ablindeye turned hindering terrorism. At times,thegreatestcontributionastatecanmaketo not necessarilydiminishtheimportantrolethatstatesplayinfosteringor decreased sincetheendofColdWar. Yet thislackofopensupportdoes Open andactive statesponsorshipofterrorismis blessedlyrare,andithas Daniel Byman Venezuela allowed theFARC tooperateonitsterritory. raised moneywithli to lobbyintheUnitedStatesuntil1997;Liberation TigersofTamil Eelam permi as Basqueseparatists,tooperatewithimpunityinthe 1980s;theUnitedStates For example,Franceallowed various MiddleEasternterroristgroups,aswell en trytosolve theproblemofpassive supportwiththesameinstruments The list of countries that tolerate at least some terrorist activity is long, and The listofcountriesthattolerateatleastsometerrorist activityislong,and Such passivityinthefaceofterrorismcanbedeadly. Inconductingthe11 ed anumbrellagrouprepresentingtheanti-Tehran Mujahedin-eKhalq vol.47no. ention hasbeenpaidalmostexclusively to active sponsors,andwe ﬁ nedtotheMiddleEastoreven tostatesruledbyaggressive dictators. istheDirector oftheCenter for Peace Studies StudiesandtheSecurity andSecurity 4 Winter 2005–06pp.117–144 le interference,enjoyed acks, al-QaedarecruitedandraisedmoneyinGermany le interference in Canada and the United Kingdom; and le interferenceinCanadaandtheUnitedKingdom; er enemies–but theirinactionproved vitaltoal- Deadly Connections: StatesthatSponsorTerrorismDeadly ﬁ nancial supportfrommany 1

PROOF 118 Daniel Byman support, however, isadi terrorist group,o passive supportifit that ’Saudisfedthe ATM machineforthe[9/11]h including al-Qaeda.FormerCIA operative RobertBaer, forexample,notes o is Saudi Arabia ArabiaSaudi andIslamicradicalism target andnotethedeadly enmitybetween Saudi Arabia’s rulingfamily, Arabia totheo 191 membersoftheHouse ofRepresentatives supportedabilltoaddSaudi directly aidthegroupitself.Passive supporthasthefollowingcharacteristics: a sanctuary, recruitorotherwise varies, withonedemocracy, amonarchyandmilitarygovernment. decline inpassive support.Finally, theregimetypeofsponsoringstate three instancesthea a regime’s desiretocrushterrorismanditsabilitydoso.Thirdly, inall all threegovernments encounteredo terrorist groupstoday:jihadist the passively supportedgroupsrepresentthetwo mostcommontypesof sponsorship ofterrorism. All threeilluminatethegeneralproblem.First, de support toagroup–suchbackingwould qualify asactive support.This the IrishRepublican Army (IRA)o Pakistan’s indirecttiestoal-Qaeda;andtheUnitedStates’ experience with capacity tocounterterrorisme before 2001).Mostimportant,thisde icant supportisoccurringwithintheirborders(e.g.Indonesiaandal-Qaeda (e.g. SpainandtheBasques)governments that arenotaware thatsignif- http://taylorandfrancis.metapress.com/openurl.asp?genre=article&id=doi:10.1080/00396330500433399 The publishedversionisavailableforsubscribersorpay-per-viewbyclickingherevisiting: This isanon-printableproofofanarticlepublishedinSurvival,vol.47,no.4(winter2005),pp.117-144. fi nition alsoexcludesgovernments thattrytoquashterrorismbutfail Active statesponsorshipinvolves adeliberate regime decisiontoassista Other observers, however, portraythekingdomas al-Qaeda’s leading This de Saudi Arabia’s relationship withal-Qaedaandotherjihadist • • • or otheractorsinsocietythathave noformala o ingly allowsotheractorsinthecountrytoaidaterroristgroup; the regimeinquestionitselfdoesnotprovideassistancebutknow- government. to develop thiscapacity;and the regimehascapacitytostopthisassistanceorchosennot enpassive supportisgiven bypoliticalparties,wealthy merchants fi nition excludesregimesthatdeliberatelyprovidegovernment ffi cial USlistofstate sponsorsofterrorism. en intheformofarms,money, trainingorsanctuary. Passive en paintedasanopenpatron ofIslamicradicalgroups, knowingly allows itude toward theterroristgroupchanged,leading to a ff erentanimal. A regimecanbesaidtoguiltyof

ff and ethnonationalist.Secondly, theproblems ectively even thoughtheyseektodoso. fl ourish withoutinterference,butdoesnot aterroristgrouptoraisemoney, enjoy fi ff nition excludescountriesthatlackthe ff er insightinto the interplaybetween er threecontrastingcasesofstate ĳ ackers’. ffi liation with the with liation 2 InJuly2003,

causes; PROOF http://taylorandfrancis.metapress.com/openurl.asp?genre=article&id=doi:10.1080/00396330500433399 The publishedversionisavailableforsubscribersorpay-per-viewbyclickingherevisiting: This isanon-printableproofofanarticlepublishedinSurvival,vol.47,no.4(winter2005),pp.117-144. further a mental organisations(NGOs). Some,probablymost,ofthecharities’ money fi fi who alsoledtheBushadministration’s interagency processonterrorist Palestinians. wide, fromKashmirandChechnya toBosnia, Afghanistan and,ofcourse,the to centres. USo Wahhabism outsidethe kingdom throughmosques,schoolsandIslamic in Sudan. the kingdom,andreportsthatSaudi Arabia triedtoassassinatebinLadin repeated denunciationsoftheal-Saud,a the al-Saud,andOsamabinLadin.Thesedefendersemphasiseal-Qaeda’s nism orIranian-backedShiafundamentalism. Muslim alternative torival ideologiessuchas Arab nationalism,commu- Saud drewonthisrelationshipandportrayed themselves asapiousSunni Muslim communitiesaroundtheworld. Throughout thecentury, theal- Iraq. Theroyal familyalsosupportedmosques,schoolsandpreachingin invitation totheUnitedStatessendforcesdefendkingdomagainst his successorsturnedtothemlegitimisemajordecisions,suchasthe1990 employees andintermarriedwithroyal familymembers.King Abdelaziz and say ineducationandotherissues.Religiousleadersbecameimportantstate as interpretedbytheWahhabis, andreligiouso gion acentrepieceoftheirrule.Thekingdomfollowed sharia(Islamiclaw) and becauseofagenuinebeliefinWahhabi teachings,theal-Saudmadereli- ticed andsoughttospreadapuritanicalversion of Islam. an alliancewiththefollowers ofMohammedibn Abd al-Wahhab, whoprac- tion. Saudi Arabia’s founder, Abdel-Aziz bin Abdel Rahmanal-Saud,forged The modernSaudiregimehasworked withreligious leaderssinceitsincep- The al-Saud’s bargain passive category. Riyadh’s tolerancedeclineda to defeatthemovement. Thevast majorityofsupport,however, fellintothe able assistancefromthepeopleofSaudi Arabia even astheSaudiregimetried al Qaedaoperative isontheSaudiwanted list.’ Arabia Charles(‘Chas’)Freemandeclared,‘You canbedamnsurethatany nancing ofal-Qaeda. nancing, declaredinJune 2003thatSaudi Arabia was the’epicenter’ forthe fl ow intothe handsofterroristorganisations.Therangecauseswas Much ofthismoney Since 1975,Saudishave spentanestimate$70billiontospread To legitimisetheirleadership,touniteSaudi Arabia’s fractioustribes, Both perspectives containelementsoftruth. Al-Qaeda diddrawconsider- er theMay2003a 3 Summingupthisperspective, formerUS Ambassador toSaudi 6 ffi David Au cials claimthatSaudi Arabia formanyyears allowed money auser, theTreasury Department’s generalcounsel fl ows through charitiesandothernon-govern- acks thatoccurredinthekingdomitself. acks onUSandSauditargetsin er 11September, andfelleven 5 4

ﬃ Passive Sponsorsof Terrorism cials hadatremendous

119 120 politics of Islamist in theworld step gingerly leaders Saudi PROOF Daniel Byman particular sympathy. Whenjihadists championtheseissues,theystandwith that deserved thesupport offellowMuslims.ThePalestinian cause enjoys is fardi helped various Islamicterroristgroups. ties. TheCIA foundthatone-thirdoftheMuslimcharitiesinBalkans operatives alegitimatejobandidentity, aswell asaccesstolocalcommuni- and modernscience. on thedefensive andisunderminedbymoderntrends suchasglobalisation West, callingforrestrictionsonnon-Muslims,andcontendingthatIslamis that ofmanyjihadists and Jewishin non-Muslims, athome.Sermonspraisejihadist Juan Zarate,aTreasury Departmento enables al-Qaedatoappealrecruitsalreadysympatheticitsworldview. and asentimentthat Arab regimesarenotlegitimate.Suchproselytising ance, theyalsoendorsethevalue ofviolentjihad Although muchofthepurposemanythesecharitiesis and, mostimportantly, beindoctrinatedinavirulent,anti-Western ethos. tions andotheractivitiesthatprovideplacesforterroriststorecruit,train also blasttheSaudisforsupportingcharities,mosques,educationalinstitu- Saudi supportforradicalIslamistsmaybesigni Motivations new radicalsandruntrainingcamps. diverted someofit.Terrorists usedthemoneytopurchaseweapons, recruit went tolegitimatehumanitarianorstandardmissionarywork, butterrorists cals o advantage ofstate-supportedproselytisingaroundtheworld’. http://taylorandfrancis.metapress.com/openurl.asp?genre=article&id=doi:10.1080/00396330500433399 The publishedversionisavailableforsubscribersorpay-per-viewbyclickingherevisiting: This isanon-printableproofofanarticlepublishedinSurvival,vol.47,no.4(winter2005),pp.117-144. The Saudisalsopromoteideasthatacceptviolence,particularlyagainst Even whenmoneydidnotgodirectlyintothehandsofterrorists,critics ensubverted localbranchesofthesecharities.NGOso ﬀ erent fromthetypeofbacking given byIran,Pakistan orothermore ﬂ uence. InSauditextbooks,theportrayal oftheworld echoes where formanyyears were viewed aslegitimatestruggles insurgencies inKashmir, Uzbekistan,Chechnya andelse- indirectly toal-Qaeda,are popularinthekingdom.Islamist tics. Jihadist counterterrorism capacity. confrontation. As aresult,the regimedidnotdevelop its a beliefthatthedangermightactuallyincreasethrough causes; asensethattheal-Qaedathreatwas limited;and include afearofo traditional statesponsorsofterrorism.Saudimotivations Saudi leadersstepgingerlyintheworld ofIslamistpoli- , extolling martyrdom,criticisingtheimitationof

causes, many of which are linked directly or causes, manyofwhicharelinkeddirectlyor ﬀ ending domestic supportforjihadist

ﬃ In additiontodiverting money, radi- cial, notedthat‘Al Qaedahastaken 7

causes andcriticise American fi cant and widespread, but it cant andwidespread, butit , a hostileviewofUSpolicy, fi nancial assist- 8 ff

erterrorist

PROOF http://taylorandfrancis.metapress.com/openurl.asp?genre=article&id=doi:10.1080/00396330500433399 The publishedversionisavailableforsubscribersorpay-per-viewbyclickingherevisiting: This isanon-printableproofofanarticlepublishedinSurvival,vol.47,no.4(winter2005),pp.117-144. unusually candidreferencefromaregimethato problems whatsoever. declared that’we the toleranceofSaudio United States,adramaticincreasefrompreviousyears. Saudimedia,with indicated thatanastonishing97%ofSaudisholdanegative viewofthe against al-Qaedaeven a ures thatwould discredittheregime.Thishasproven aproblemforactions a measureoftoleranceforradicalactivityinorder toavoid publicmeas- its religiouscredentials,itdoesrespondtopublicopinion.Theresultwas causes, includingsupportingIslamicradicalsin Afghanistan a many Saudisbehindthem.TheSaudiregimehasbackedseveral ofthese protect thekingdomin1990, andparticipatinginpeacetalkswithIsrael. controversial decisions such asintroducingtelevision,invitingUSforces to from Saudireligiousleaders, whorepeatedlyissuedecreesbackingtheregime’s least, manyoftheirproposals forchange.Moreover, the regimeenjoyssupport also triestotakethewindout oftheircritics’ sailsbyendorsing,onthesurface at ised inSaudi Arabia, making ithardfortheal-Saudtobedislodged.Theregime sympathisers andco-optingthem.Oppositionofany stripeisnotwell organ- weathered pan-ArabismandtheIranianrevolution bybothsuppressing The Saudiregimehasahistoryofsuccessfullymanaging dissent.Theregime A limitedthreat? even a Thus, individualparticipationinjihad Afghanistan, whilemoreextremeelementsofSaudisocietylionisedthem. provide regime actively backedthisstruggle,anditencouragedotherSaudisto spread backinggiven totheanti-Sovietjihad the anti-Sovietjihad, opinion ofbinLadin’s sermons andrhetoric. al-Qaeda. Almost halfoftheSaudispolledinearly2004hadafavourable States. Thesespeci and thesecondGulfWar, andthemistreatmentof Arabs intheUnited lighting civiliandeathsduringthewar againsttheTaliban in Afghanistan the IraqipeoplethroughsanctionsduringSaddamHusseinera. dous hostilitytoward USsupportforIsraelandperceived mistreatment of Anti-Americanism inthekingdomisstrong.Polls takeninearly2003 Although theSaudiregimeisamonarchythatdrawslegitimacyfrom Support foral-Qaedaitselfappearedstronginmuchofthekingdom The strengthofthispopularviewpointcomesinpartfromthewide- er 11September. Indeed,theInteriorMinisterPrinceNayifhimself fi nancial support.ItalsopraisedmanyoftheSaudiswhofoughtin fi nd inourcountrythosewhosympathisewiththem’,an fi c grievances relatedtoterrorismbuildonthetremen-

in parttocurryfavour withIslamistsathome. 9 Saudiscompriseoneofthetopnationalitieswithin ﬃ er theorganisation’s 2003a cials, regularlycriticisedtheUnited States,high-

was widelyviewed asadmirable. 10

Passive Sponsorsof Terrorism in the1980s.TheSaudi en deniesanydomestic acks onthekingdom. er the end of er theendof 11

121 PROOF 122 Daniel Byman moreover, was toknitthesedisparatecausesintoabroaderstruggle. individuals toprocurepassportsandweapons. Part ofal-Qaeda’s mission, regimes. Moreover, theyo anti-Western themes,thevalue ofjihad rectly supportsanother. Thesegroupsshareabroadideologythatemphasises killed nationalist credentials.In addition,indiplomacyithastriedtobuyo groups thatthreatened to killregimemembersandthatchallengedits Most whomaketheseclaimsdosowithalmost nospeci have anationalfocusratherthanglobalone.Despitethedi did notappeartoposeadirectthreattheal-Saud.Mostofthesegroups retire. and theatresofoperationsthesegroups,however, aidingoneo though theyrecognisedthatwould a a minister ofdefenceandaviationpaidbinLadinal-Qaedatonotconduct of theSaudiregime,claimsthata increase ifthefamilyconfrontedorganisation.SimonHenderson,acritic The al-Saudalsomayhave perceived thatthethreatfromal-Qaedawould Fear ofretaliation defender oftheMuslimfaithful. links toal-Qaeda,was notworth thecosttoitsself-proclaimed imageasthe shu ment fundedalQaeda’. government asaninstitution orsenioro ‘9/11 Commission’)reportsthatit’foundnoevidence thattheSaudi National CommissiononTerrorist A numerous claims lead theal-Saudtoconfrontathreatmoredirectly. Indeed,thereare and otherwisedirectlychallengedtheal-Saud – activitiesthatusually their evidence.Moreover, bin Ladinfundedanti-Saudicausesearlyon fi militants whocriticisedthegovernment andco-opted others,o sure didnotshaketheal-Saud’s griponpower. In1993and1994,itdetained Islamist politicalactiviststriedtopresstheregimeforreform,butthispres- itself inthemid-1990sthroughtheirownsecuritye nancial support.Theregimealsopushedmanyseniorreligious http://taylorandfrancis.metapress.com/openurl.asp?genre=article&id=doi:10.1080/00396330500433399 The publishedversionisavailableforsubscribersorpay-per-viewbyclickingherevisiting: This isanon-printableproofofanarticlepublishedinSurvival,vol.47,no.4(winter2005),pp.117-144. acks inthekingdom.Theywere willingtoo However, Saudi Arabia didpay protectionmoneytovarious Palestinian Judging suchaclaimisdi On thesurface,manyIslamistcauses,even thoselinkedtoviolentgroups, Saudi o ing o 14 fi ve Americans andtwo Indians,theSaudiinteriorministerand With thesesuccessesinmind,theroyal familyprobablyjudgedthat ff supportforvarious Islamistcauses,includingthosewithclose ffi cialsbelieved thattheyhadeliminatedal-Qaedainthekingdom

that theSaudistriedtokillbinLadininSudan. The 16

en sharelogisticscells,drawingonthe same ffi cult, asevidenceisunderstandablysparse. er the1995bombingsinRiyadh, which , and hostilitytoward secularMuslim acks UpontheUnitedStates(the ffi ack UStargetsoverseas. cials withintheSaudigovern- ff er theterroristsmoneyeven ff orts. Intheearly1990s, ff erent objectives fi cs tosupport en through fi gures to en indi- en 13 15

ﬀ or PROOF http://taylorandfrancis.metapress.com/openurl.asp?genre=article&id=doi:10.1080/00396330500433399 The publishedversionisavailableforsubscribersorpay-per-viewbyclickingherevisiting: This isanon-printableproofofanarticlepublishedinSurvival,vol.47,no.4(winter2005),pp.117-144. al-Saud foritslinkstoterrorism. rassment occurringonadailybasis,ascriticsaround theworld blastedthe that was atthecoreofitssecurity. Moreover, itfearedthepoliticalembar- serious costsfortheSaudigovernment, endangeringavitalrelationship its toleranceformanyactivitiesrelatedtoviolence. Thefailuretoactrisked September bysteppingupcooperationoncounterterrorism andreducing not collectbasic before 11Septembertoaddressthem. problems above have longbeenknown,buttheal-Saudmadefewe largely Arab, thea the momentumgoing.Because thevictimsofNovember a November 2003a a however, a threat totheirownposition. led somemembersoftheal-Saudtorecognisethat al-Qaedaposedadirect Incapacity willing toconfrontthemdirectlywhenco-optationfailed. co-opt threatsfromNasser’s EgyptandSaddam’s Iraq–thoughwas also to Hamas,fellconsiderablyinrecentyears. The 11Septembera Qaeda and,toalesserdegree,otherIslamistgroupsrangingfromChechens Saudi Arabia’s willingnesstotoleratesupportforradicalslinkedal- An endtopassivesupport? British andotherWestern forces. them over thecourseofseveral decadesandbeingtrainedby American, even byregionalstandards,despitehavingbillionsofdollarslavishedon competent bureaucratsislow. Saudi Arabia’s militaryforcesremaininept, sively islimited.Decision-makinghighlycentralised,andthenumberof The Saudigovernment ishighlypersonalised,anditsabilitytoactdeci- crack downonterrorist surprisingly, theregimerespondedtotremendousUSpressurea controls. the two governments, thoughnotthetwo peoples,arevery close. Saudi Arabia haslongdependedontheUnitedStatesforsecurity, and American pressureontheSaudiregimetohaltanysupportfora the UnitedStatesdramatisedlethalityofal-Qaedaandgreatlyincreased ties. Saudis lackeda acks oncompoundshousingUS securitypersonnelinthekingdom.The8 E

Because thekingdomdoesnotimposetaxesonitscitizens,ito ff orts tocrackdownonsupport climbedfarmoredramatically, 18 Capacityandregimeprioritiesareintimatelylinked.Manyofthe er the12May2003 a fi nancial regulatorysystem anddidnotoversee theirchari- fi nancial datathatallowfortheenforcementof acks, where17diedandanother100were wounded, kept ack had li fi nancing inparticular. Before11September, the le popular support,even amongthosewho 20 Thescaleandlethalityofthea 17 acks where34 people diedinmultiple TheSaudishave alimitedcapacityto Passive Sponsorsof Terrorism acks were acks acks also fi acks on acks nancial en did 19 acks. er 11 ff Not orts

123 PROOFviolence the Chechens’ and condemned travelled toRussia Prince Abdullah 124 Daniel Byman improvements, thekingdomremainsadeveloping nation,whereine investigating techniques,andotheraspectsofcounterterrorism.Despitethese enforcement o it isimproving.Saudisareworking with American intelligenceandlaw o incomplete, andmanyofthe kingdom’s newinitiatives have notbeentested. cial support,almostcertainly continues,theregimeisfarmoreenergetic incapacity –alldiminished. Although somesupport, particularly highly criticalofextremistsfora the conservative religiousestablishmentinthekingdom.The clericswere sympathy, perceived low risk ofa might besympathetictoananti-Western strike.The2003a measures to armed radicalsinthekingdom. lingering illusions.Saudisecurityforcesuncovered alargenetwork ofwell- outside thekingdom.Thesubsequentinvestigation furtherdispelledany any vestige ofhopethattheal-Saudcoulddivert al-Qaedaandfocusit closely cooperatingwithUSo terrorism, declaredthattheSaudisunderstoodthreattheyfacedandwere increased prohibitionsoncharitabledonationsoutsidethekingdom.The informal moneytransfers,steppedupfund-managementresponsibilityand other religionsfromschooltextbooks.Theyincreasedtheirregulationof capacity. TheSaudisexcisedmuch,thoughnotall,ofthematerialdenigrating had praisedintheearly1990s–condemnedMay a Safar al-Hawali andSalmanal-‘Awda –sheikhswhombinLadinhimself a http://taylorandfrancis.metapress.com/openurl.asp?genre=article&id=doi:10.1080/00396330500433399 The publishedversionisavailableforsubscribersorpay-per-viewbyclickingherevisiting: This isanon-printableproofofanarticlepublishedinSurvival,vol.47,no.4(winter2005),pp.117-144. acks thattargeted Americans primarily. Even former en the rule rather than the exception. Oversight of charitable giving remains en theruleratherthanexception. Oversight ofcharitablegivingremains Counterterrorism capacity remains a problem for the kingdom, though Counterterrorism capacityremainsaproblemfor the kingdom,though Taken together, themainmotivations behindSauditolerance –domestic The MayandNovember a A er thesea fi ffi ght terrorism,greatlyincreasingoverall counterterrorism cials, whoaretrainingthemontrackingterrorist acks, the Saudis implemented a number of unprecedented acks, the Saudisimplementedanumberofunprecedented Black, thentheUSspecialcoordinatorforcounter- Qaeda. Testifying inMarch2004, Ambassador Cofer kingdom, andhowtheirproselytisingbolstersal- rate Islamists,even thosenotdirectlya al-Saud recognisedtheconnectionsamongdispa- Chechens’ violence.Thesemeasuressuggestthatthe Abdullah travelled toRussiaandcondemnedthe prefers tooperateinthebackground.CrownPrince security –very publicmeasuresforaregimethat most-wanted terroristsuspectsandvisiblyincreased regime publicisedalistofnamesandphotosthe ffi cials. acks alsohelpedtheregimework with acking fellowMuslims, incontrasttopast 21 ack, limitedcostsforinaction,and acks. fi rebrands suchas acks removed acks 22

acking the the acking ffi fi ciency is nancing, nancing, fi nan- 23 PROOF http://taylorandfrancis.metapress.com/openurl.asp?genre=article&id=doi:10.1080/00396330500433399 The publishedversionisavailableforsubscribersorpay-per-viewbyclickingherevisiting: This isanon-printableproofofanarticlepublishedinSurvival,vol.47,no.4(winter2005),pp.117-144. is commi Arabia hasgonefromamajorpassive sponsorofterrorismtoaregimethat in tryingtostopitandisbuildingitscapacitydoso. As aresult,Saudi regime Qaeda, hopingtoexploitthemovement fortheir own purposes.Numerous Taliban. Inbothinstances,Pakistani leadersappeartohave toleratedal- to supportmilitantsinKashmiragainstIndiaanditsrelationshipwiththe Pakistan’s linkstoal-QaedacannotbeseparatedfromIslamabad’s e Al-Qaeda asatool:KashmirandAfghanistan September, butitse In thefaceofheavyUSpressure,Pakistan turnedagainstal-Qaedaa support foral-Qaedabecameboundupintheregime’s legitimacyathome. rule inPakistan andtofurtherIslamabad’s interestsin Afghanistan. Over time, al-Qaeda was ameansofharnessingtheglobaljihad tional manpower andtremendousfreedomofaction. ForPakistani leaders, and Afghanistan towork withtheorganisation,thusprovidingitaddi- contrast, assistedal-QaedabyallowingothermilitantsitbackedinKashmir di Like Saudi Arabia, Pakistan indirectlyfacilitatedal-Qaeda,butinafar Pakistan andal-Qaeda these areas.Even moreimportant,Pakistani o may have interactedwithal-Qaedatoadvance Islamabad’s interestsin jihadist e-Taiba andHizbulMujahideen.With thesupportofgovernment, these are Jaysh-e-Mohammad,Harkat-ul-Ansar/Harkat-ul-Mujahedin, Lashkar- regularly split,mergedandchangednames,butamong themostimportant them Islamistones–active againstIndianrulethere.Theseorganisationshave lives, Pakistan hasworked witharangeofmilitantorganisations–most Qaeda withregardtoKashmirand Afghanistan. numerous substategroups,particularlyIslamistones,towork withal- a extent ofthesetiesisconsiderable. Theseorganisationsshareanideological and theSipah-e-SahabaPakistan, bothofwhicharevirulentlyanti-Shia. The militant groupsthatfocus onPakistan itself,includingLashkar-e-Jhangvi with thePakistani religious groupsthatbackthem.Italsohasforgedties to have worked withIslamistpoliticalmovements inPakistan. access totrainingandweapons fortheirvolunteers. Equallyimportant,they ffi nity withal-Qaeda,believing intheneedforIslamicgovernment, the ff erent way. Saudi Arabia’s primarycontributionwas Since the outbreak of violence in Kashmir that has claimed perhaps 60,000 Since theoutbreakofviolenceinKashmirthathasclaimedperhaps60,000 Al-Qaeda hasinterwoven itselfwiththesejihadist

fi groups raisemoneyandrecruitmilitantsto gures active inPakistan’s policytoward Afghanistan andKashmir ed tocrushingit. ff orts tocrush theorganisationremain ffi cials knowingly allowed knowingly cials Passive Sponsorsof Terrorism fi , ght inKashmir andhave todirectitagainstIndia’s fi nancial. Pakistan, in

ﬁ organisations and tful atbest. er 11 11 er ﬀ orts

125 PROOF 126 Daniel Byman o Moreover, thePashtun-dominated movement satwell withthePakistani sented aforcethatcouldunify Afghanistan whilekeepingitclosetoPakistan. much ofPakistan’s politicalestablishment.ForIslamabad,theTaliban repre- in Pakistan itself. sectarian groupsforgedtiesin Afghanistan thatlatershapedtheiractivities with Pakistani radicalsin Afghanistan. Groups and togaincombatexperience. Al-Qaeda membersforgedpersonalties training campsin Afghanistan focusedontraining Taliban initsstruggletocontrol Afghanistan. Themajorityofal-Qaeda’s Afghanistan in1994anda successes aroundthistimeremainsunclear, butastheTaliban swept through al-Qaeda. TheextentofPakistan’s roleintheTaliban’s creationandinitial charities andotherprivate donationsthatbinLadinwas abletoin Islamabad sentmany Afghanistan becameimportantasaplacetohouse, trainandrecruitthem. the movement’s o Bin Ladinchannelledtensofmillionsdollarsayear totheTaliban, twice could have returnedto Afghanistan [in1996]hadPakistan disapproved.’ ests aswell. As the9/11Commissioncontends,’ItisunlikelythatBinLadin consolidate power in Afghanistan –andthusadvancing Islamabad’s inter- importance ofjihad religious groupsofvarying degreesof radicalismisespeciallystrong.This its particularactivitiesin Kashmirand Afghanistan. Supportfromseveral Al-Qaeda haslinkstokey elementsofPakistani societythatgobeyond The questforlegitimacy network ofcharitieshein aid intheirstruggleKashmir, helpingdirectmoneytothemfromthevast addition, binLadinhasprovidedthemwithbothmaterialandoperational regimes, andthefundamentalhostilityofIndiaUnitedStates.In also trainedmembersofthesegroupsinitscamps Afghanistan. jihadist Pakistani government worked withtheTaliban andwithinternational 055, amilitaryunitcomposedof Arab the West. Indeed,oneofthemostimportantunitstoTaliban was Brigade the Northern Alliance, nottoconductsophisticatedterrorista ﬃ http://taylorandfrancis.metapress.com/openurl.asp?genre=article&id=doi:10.1080/00396330500433399 The publishedversionisavailableforsubscribersorpay-per-viewbyclickingherevisiting: This isanon-printableproofofanarticlepublishedinSurvival,vol.47,no.4(winter2005),pp.117-144. cer corpsandintelligenceservices,whichalsohadmanyPashtuns. Equally important,al-Qaedatrainedandrecruited Afghanistan policyalsoplayed avitalroleinPakistan’s a Al-Qaeda proved animportantpropfortheTaliban, helpingitgainand In practice,supportfor Afghanistan andKashmirbegantoblur. The

organisations suchasal-Qaedatosendforeign 29 ﬃ cial budget.MuchofthismoneycamethroughIslamic

as anindividualduty, thecorruptionofmostMuslim fi ghters boundforKashmirto Afghanistan totrain fl uences throughouttheMuslimworld. Al-Qaeda erwards, themovement gainedthesupportof fi ghters loyal tobinLadin. fi ghting inKashmir and fi ghters tohelpdefeat fi ghters toKashmir. fi ghters tohelpthe itude toward itude acks against fl 24 uence.

27 28 26

PROOF http://taylorandfrancis.metapress.com/openurl.asp?genre=article&id=doi:10.1080/00396330500433399 The publishedversionisavailableforsubscribersorpay-per-viewbyclickingherevisiting: This isanon-printableproofofanarticlepublishedinSurvival,vol.47,no.4(winter2005),pp.117-144. against theorganisationareo died, andthosewhocooperatewiththePakistani government popularity, pilgrimsvisitthesiteswhereal-Qaedamembers successfully standsuptotheUnitedStates. sation, seeingitasoneofthefewMuslimmovements that middle- andupper-class Pakistanis alsosupporttheorgani- and action‘,inPakistan-expert StephenCohen’s words. Many modern-day RobinHood,amanwhocombines’bothfaith support inPakistan. ManypoorerPakistanis seehimasa response toUSstrikesinIraq. Gallup indicatedthat69%arguedforhurting Americans ‘wherepossible’ in bolstering al-Qaeda’s popularappeal. An August 2003polltakenbyHerald- the UnitedStatesinparticularisdeeplyunpopularPakistan, further it champions,particularlyinKashmirbutalso Afghanistan. Inaddition, want toseeaTaliban-style regimehere.” e-Taiba commented,’We won’t stop– even ifIndiagave usKashmir…We activists alsowant anewregimeinIslamabad. As onememberofLashkar- The resulthasbeentremendoussectarianviolence. ManyoftheIslamist challenging theregimeandexistingelites. to co-opttheIslamiststhroughconcessionsinorderprevent themfrom sations. From1977untilhisdeathin1988,Ziaul-Haq’s government tried groups inPakistan, increasingthevalue ofal-Qaeda’s tiestotheseorgani- able alternative) tocrackdownontheorganisation. support hasmadeitdi domestic Pakistani politicsfromtheiractionsin Afghanistan andKashmir. Many Islamists,includingthosenotlinkedtoviolence, donotseparate By supportingthejihadist A double-edgedsword inroads intoPakistan’s militaryandintelligenceservice. governments alsotriedtowoo theIslamists. Al-Qaeda hasmade Various secular leaderswhostressednationalismorreformbecame discred- recent years, bolsteredby thecollapseofotherpoliticalpartiesandcauses. a Muhammad Nawaz Sharif.Musharraf alsosu one Sunnigroup,Lashkar-e-Jhangvi, triedtoassassinatePrimeMinister to theirword. Even beforethepost-11September crackdown,in1999, empts a Bin Ladinandhisfollowers alsoenjoygenuine popular As inSaudi Arabia, al-Qaedaalsobasksintheglowofothercauses Successive Pakistani governments have courtedthefavour ofreligious This growthintheIslamists’ strengthhasifanythingacceleratedin er 11September. ﬃ cult fortheMusharrafgovernment (oranyconceiv-

cause, Pakistan hasweakened itsownstability. 34 en ostracised. 30 36 Successive civilian And several groupsaregood 33 32

ﬀ Re ered repeatedassassination Passive Sponsorsof Terrorism ﬂ ecting this ecting 31

support in support Bin Ladin Pakistan genuine popular enjoys 35

127 PROOF 128 Daniel Byman Qaeda asagenuinethreat and, a limits towhattheMusharraf government would do.Theregimedoessee al- al-Qaeda, keepingitintact enablesbinLadin’s organisation tocontinue. that supportsthemilitant groupsinKashmirisalsotheonethatworks with registered, andli States inmakingkeyarrests,includingsuchsenior has simplybecomemorecovert. support forvarious jihadist names –thoughayear laterseveral were againbanned.MuchofPakistan’s and several ofthebannedorganisationssimplyreformedunderdi in Kashmirisuneven atbest.Manyoftheradicalsarrestedwere released, a forays intohithertoinviolabletribalareasinwinter 2003and2004inan di India inKashmirwhilemovingagainstal-Qaedaproved a September, buttherewere limits.Keepingvarious groups In responsetoUSpressure,Islamabadmoved againstal-Qaedaa Changes a Province andBaluchistan. in parliament(outof342)andtakingcontrolover theNorth-West Frontier elections, theIslamistsmadetheirstrongestshowingever, gaining60seats ited byrampantcorruptionandeconomicstagnation.IntheOctober2002 government increaseditse success. Inaddition,ita edly triedtoassassinateMusharraf,andseveral timescamequitecloseto which inturnengenderedacycleofescalation.Theorganisationrepeat- least itsovert support–fortheTaliban. and KhalidShaykhMohammad.Inaddition,Pakistan endeditssupport–at halted thetilttoward Indiaandprovidedasorelyneeded destroying Pakistan’s wobbly economy. SidingwiththeUnitedStates have moved theUnitedStatespermanentlyintoIndia’s campandrisked far riskierfortheMusharrafgovernment. Angering Washington might Pakistan’s militaryinparticularbene sanctions thathadbeenimposedduetoPakistan’s nuclearprogramme. Musharraf’s government insecurityanddevelopment aidandwaived many http://taylorandfrancis.metapress.com/openurl.asp?genre=article&id=doi:10.1080/00396330500433399 The publishedversionisavailableforsubscribersorpay-per-viewbyclickingherevisiting: This isanon-printableproofofanarticlepublishedinSurvival,vol.47,no.4(winter2005),pp.117-144. empt torootoutoperatives there. ﬃ cult to walk. Because of continued popular and Islamist support for al-Qaeda, there are Because ofcontinuedpopular andIslamistsupportforal-Qaeda,thereare In exchange,hundredsofPakistani o By contrast,theMusharrafgovernment’s recordagainstgroupsactive The 11Septembera In response,al-QaedahasstruckoutattheMusharrafgovernment, Ğ er 11September le curriculumreformhasoccurred.Becausetheapparatus acked Western targetsinPakistan. TheMusharraf acks madesupportingal-Qaeda,even indirectly, ﬀ

ort againstal-Qaedaandeven mademilitary causes, particularlythoselinkedtoKashmir, er each assassinationa 38

Most religiousschoolsstillhave notbeen fi ted. TheUnitedStatespledged $3bnto ffi cials worked withtheUnited fi gures as Abu Zubaydah empt on Musharraf, empt onMusharraf, fi nancial infusion. fi ghting against ghting fi ne linethatis ff er 11 er erent 37

PROOF http://taylorandfrancis.metapress.com/openurl.asp?genre=article&id=doi:10.1080/00396330500433399 The publishedversionisavailableforsubscribersorpay-per-viewbyclickingherevisiting: This isanon-printableproofofanarticlepublishedinSurvival,vol.47,no.4(winter2005),pp.117-144. tunities arisetocaptureordestroymajoralQaedaTaleban targets’. early 2004–butoddsaretheyconsistentlywillbejustabittardywhenoppor- into thetribalareastoplacateWashington –ashedidinthefallof2003and intelligence o and equippedto US-directed crackdown.Pakistani militaryforcesarealsopoorlytrained act –particularlyassuchactionswould beseen aspartofanunpopular, have limitedin take placeinremotetribalareasorhiddencities.Pakistan’s securityforces military domestically andwants toavoid alienatingIslamistgroupsandbeingseenby tries hardertosuppressit.However, theMusharrafadministrationisweak soil withrelatively li tacitly allowed Irishrepublicanterroriststoraisemoney andorganiseonUS to Londonmakeitallthemoreironicthatformanyyears theUnitedStates America’s self-imageasa staunch opponentofterrorismanditscloseness The UnitedStates andtheProvisional IRA killing of14IrishCatholic protestersbyBritishtroops. high-pro million dollarsraisedbyNORAID. Contributionswere especiallyhigha important cial contributionsfromUScitizens.TheIrish-American diasporaprovided 1970s, NORAIDplayed a majorroleinsustainingthefamiliesofIRA prisoners move againstal-Qaedaanditsnumerousa other vitalsystems.Thus,even iftheMusharrafgovernment hadthewillto completely extirpatethemovement isdoubtful. on capacity(inthiscaseforlegalreasons),andli United Statesallowed terroriststo IRA received considerablefundingfromtheIrishNorthern Aid Commi cally. Numerousorganisationsspranguptoadvance theIrishcause. The from theUnitedStates–followed bymoneyandweapons –grewdramati- as theso-called’Troubles‘ engulfedNorthernIrelandin1969.Sympathy of theBritishfortheirbrutalruleandastrongsense ofIrishnationalism. (o grants le Throughout thenineteenthandearlytwentieth centuries, waves ofimmi- en knownas NORAID), anorganisationthatcollectedprivate A lackofcapacityisyet another problem.Muchofal-Qaeda’s activities Much ofthismoneywent forweapons, eitherdirectlyorindirectly. Inthe The modernchapteroftheIRA’s historyanditslink with America began The UnitedStateswas longahotbedofIrishresistancetoBritishrule. fi fi gures asapuppetoftheUnitedStates. As aresult,asseniorUS Irelandfor America, bringingwith them anaccumulatedhatred le British violence,suchasthe30January1972‘Bloody Sunday’ fi nancial assistancetotheIRA,includingbetween threeand ffi cial wrotein2004, ’PresidentMusharrafwillmove armyunits fl uence inmanyoftheseareas,makingithardforthemto fi ght inruggedterrain,beingshortofhelicopters and le interference.LikeSaudi Arabia andPakistan, the fl ourish duetodomesticsympathy, limits ffi liates decisively, itscapacityto le senseofthreat. Passive Sponsorsof Terrorism 40

39 ﬁ nan- ﬁ ve ve ee er

129 PROOF fugitives haven forIRA asa acted The diaspora 130 Daniel Byman nationalists inresponsetoUSpressureoreven too o sions. willing topressProtestantopponentsofnegotiations tomakeconces- cism. Inaddition,USpressuremadeherandother Britishleadersmore allowed legislationtopassthatwent againsttheBritishposition. Thatcher recognisethehungerstrikers’ demands.SpeakerO’Neillattimes of theHouseRepresentatives, demandedthat PrimeMinisterMargaret during hungerstrikesbyIRA activists,Thomas(‘Tip’)O’Neill,thespeaker it shouldbepartofnegotiationsover thefuture of thenorth.Forexample, its republicansupportersasakeytoNorthernIreland’s futureandbelieved in America. ManyIrish-AmericansopposedviolencebutsawtheIRA and political pressureontheBritishgovernment through theirpoliticalin to gaininformationfromarrestedIRA members. of operatives, anditfrustratedBritishintelligence bydecreasingtheirability and freedupalmost more costlyforpoliticians tocrackdownontheIRA’s supportnetwork. protection forIRA fundraising andotheractivities,makingitpolitically and emboldenedtheIRA.Finally, thispressurehelped generatepolitical the Britishgovernment andthelocaladministrationinNorthernIreland part ofthe1970s,FBI ignored IRA e British government posed nodirectsecuritythreattotheUnitedStates.For money oracquireweapons. Needlesstosay, theIRA’s struggleagainstthe number, asthenumberoffull-timeIRA US network providedseveral hundredweapons totheIRA ayear –alarge well asthefull-automaticM-16(andlaterM-60)andotherweapons. The US operatives helpedprocuretheIRA’s signatureweapon, the Armalite, as arms procurementandotherillicitactivitieswent throughlow-pro most publicorganisationlinkedtotheIrishnationalistcause,butmuchof http://taylorandfrancis.metapress.com/openurl.asp?genre=article&id=doi:10.1080/00396330500433399 The publishedversionisavailableforsubscribersorpay-per-viewbyclickingherevisiting: This isanon-printableproofofanarticlepublishedinSurvival,vol.47,no.4(winter2005),pp.117-144. en moved away fromhardlinepositions againstnegotiationswithIrish The diaspora’s pressureserved several purposes.Thatcher, forexample, In additiontomoney, armsandahaven, IRA supportersalsoplaced The USgovernment interfered only 44 ConstantCongressionalscrutinyandcriticism also embarrassed sought toestablishitselfasaviableresistanceforce. was particularlyvitalintheearlyyears, asthemovement operations orkilledIRA members.TheUSconnection in NorthernIreland. jobs intheUnitedStates,enablingthemtoescapejustice NORAID helpedIRA operatives vital, astheBritisho 1970s and200–300inthe1980s.Thissteadysupplywas 200,000 tospendonarmseachyear. NORAIDwas the The diasporaalsoactedasahaven forIRA fugitives. enseizedweapons astheydisrupted ff 42 fi fi orts. tfully withtheIRA’s e ghters averaged perhaps500inthe Thissanctuaryboostedthemorale 45

fi nd newidentitiesand ff set potentialcriti- ff orts toraise fi 43 le groups.

ﬂ uence 41

PROOF http://taylorandfrancis.metapress.com/openurl.asp?genre=article&id=doi:10.1080/00396330500433399 The publishedversionisavailableforsubscribersorpay-per-viewbyclickingherevisiting: This isanon-printableproofofanarticlepublishedinSurvival,vol.47,no.4(winter2005),pp.117-144. o soldier, notingthatthisact,while deplorable,clearlyfellunderthe‘political Similarly, aUSjudgerefusedtoextraditeanIRA memberwhokilledaBritish to civil-libertiesconcerns,particularlywithregardfreedomofspeech. move thatpushedtheIRA toward Gadha level ofviolenceitperpetrateduntilcould painful fortheIRA,reducingnumberofweapons initshandsandthe procurement in America had collapsed.ThecollapseoftheUSnetwork was otic lark’ butratherariskyendeavour. Bythemid-1980s, large-scalearms indirectly linkedtoterrorism.E and supportforwidowsotherdependents,even ifthisactivitywas crack downonIRA supporters. inatory Protestantgovernment madeitharderfortheUSgovernment to perception amongIrish Americans thattheBritishwere backingadiscrim- signi part ofadministrationrhetoric. administration, whichhadmadeatoughstanceagainstterrorismstandard relationship. IRA fundraisingproved anembarrassmenttotheReagan the IRA animportantissueintheclosebilateralUS–UnitedKingdom grew inthe1980s,asBritishPrimeMinisterThatchermadeactionagainst weapons smugglingandtoallowsuspectsbeextradited fortrial.Pressure trated inthenortheastandnorthcentralpartofcountry. some Irishheritage,andmuchoftheCatholicpopulationisconcen- in theUnitedStatescanbeconsiderable.Over 40m Americans claimatleast shut downfundraisingandotheractivities.Irish-Americanpoliticalclout violent actsfrombeingtreatedaspoliticalo helped pushthroughtheSenateSupplementary Treaty, whichexcluded pressure alsoledtochangesinUSlaws.InMay1986,PresidentReagan gun-running network were arrested,aswere several otherrings.British nent SinnFéinandIRA spokesmen.Intheearly1980s,membersofaleading Starting inthemid-1970s,UnitedStatesbegantodenyvisaspromi- IRA fellanddidnotincreaseuntilthemovement began toembracepeace. e the IRA asmurderers,stressingthattheiruseofviolence actuallyharmedtheir played tothe American people,includingIrish-Americans. Londonpainted ff ff orts toadvance thenorthernIrishCatholic cause.Over time,supportforthe ense exception’ andthusthesuspectwas notsubjecttoextradition. Capacity was alsoaproblem,inthatUSlawsallowed somefundraising The USgovernment’s reinvigorated e The Britishgovernment putpressureontheUnited Statestoendthe Domestic politicsexplainsmuchofwhytheUnitedStatesdidnotactto British pressure,andtheIRA’s o In additiontodirectdiplomatic pressureontheUSgovernment, theBritish fi cant impact.Bellarguesthat‘armsprocurementwas nolongerapatri- 48 ff

orts tostopfundraisingimmediately led en brutala fi ’s Libya. ff ff ort, whileincomplete,hada enses. fi nd alternative suppliers–a Passive Sponsorsof Terrorism 50 acks, producedresults. 49

46 Thebroader 47 51

131 PROOF 132 Daniel Byman more broadlytheimageofIrelandin America. saw theIRA asanembarrassment,hurtingboththechancesforpeaceand always endorseLondon’s position,butit its supportersmadetheBritishcampaignespeciallycredible.Dublindidnot problem. LeadingIrish-American no longersawaBritishwithdrawal andaunitedIrelandaskeytothe became asourceofpressureforpeace.Bythe1980s,manyIrish-Americans changed fromthatofahostileoccupyingforce–theIrish-Americandiaspora organisations onlyfurthermagni in Pakistan, anditstiestothewell-organised andin ical standing. Al-Qaeda enjoyed asimilarlyhighlevel ofpopularsupport popular policyandonethattheregimerepeatedlyusedtoimprove itspolit- support forspreadingitsWahhabi interpretationofIslam,anextremely in thekingdom.Inaddition,al-Qaedawas abletotapintobroaderSaudi Kashmir, Chechnya, Palestine andelsewhere.Itsanti-USagendaisresonant that al-Qaedasupportsanddrawson–includingMusliminsurgenciesin able sympathyforbinLadin.SupportishighrelatedIslamistcauses Both pollingandthelargenumberofSaudisinal-Qaedasuggestconsider- among anin ment itself;andrelatively lowcostsofinaction,or even indirectbene for thegroup;asensethatgroupposesli usually occursforthreereasons,o The Saudi,Pakistani andUSexperiencessuggestthatpassive support Explaining passive support leaders todeliver peaceinthe1990s. with NORAIDandthearmedstruggle,pressedGerry Adams andotherIRA o assistance groupsplaya vitalroleforterroristorganisations.NGOsare seen asendorsingviolence. Inreality, however, NGOs and humanitarian providing aidtohumanitarian causeslinkedtotheterroristgroupisnot the nameofthesecauses, supporterso lations donotendorseamoreviolentstruggle.When thecupispassedin (the defenceofIslam,Irishindependence)even whenthesupportingpopu- several keyconstituencies,includingthatofSpeakerO’Neill. means. Thiscommunitywas well organisedandwas particularlystrongin Irish-American communitysympathisedwiththe IRA’s objectives ifnotits http://taylorandfrancis.metapress.com/openurl.asp?genre=article&id=doi:10.1080/00396330500433399 The publishedversionisavailableforsubscribersorpay-per-viewbyclickingherevisiting: This isanon-printableproofofanarticlepublishedinSurvival,vol.47,no.4(winter2005),pp.117-144. en frontsforoperatives torecruit, operatewithalegitimatecover, and The IrishRepublic’s condemnationoftheIRA andpoliticalpressureon As theIrishstrugglewore on–andastheperceptionofBritish Domestic sympathyfortheterroristgroup’s cause(oratleastsympathy Terrorist groupso fl uential segmentofthepopulation)isacommonmotivation. en playontheperceived legitimacyoftheircause fi fi gures, manyofwhomwere nota ed itsin en incombination:domestic sympathy 53

en askfewquestions.Inparticular, fi rmly rejectedtheIRA’s. Dublin fl uence. MuchoftheCatholic le threattothe hostgovern- 52 fl unil Islamist uential ffi liated fi ts. PROOF http://taylorandfrancis.metapress.com/openurl.asp?genre=article&id=doi:10.1080/00396330500433399 The publishedversionisavailableforsubscribersorpay-per-viewbyclickingherevisiting: This isanon-printableproofofanarticlepublishedinSurvival,vol.47,no.4(winter2005),pp.117-144. train andfundjihadists limited costsandincludedstrategicopportunism. Al-Qaeda’s willingnessto that couldbediverted ratherthanasadirectdanger thatmustbeconfronted. the Saudiregimeappearstohave seenal-Qaedamore asadangerousnuisance serves additionalpolicybene preferable toactively tryingtoconfrontterrorists.Whenpassive support diplomatic price–allcombinetomakethetoleration ofterroristactivity domestic costsofcrackingdownonapopulargroup,andthelimited threat againsttheMusharrafregime. proved moreaggressive againstal-Qaedaastheorganisationemergeda to helptheTaliban consolidatepower in Afghanistan. Islamabad,however, made itausefultoolforPakistan initsstruggleagainstIndiaanddesire IRA’s moreblatantactivitiesintheUnitedStatescameonlya costs begintomount.Forexample,theUSdecisioncrackdownon matic costs.Onlywhennationsmakeitanimportantbilateralissuedothe is viewed asmoreacceptableinternationally–andthushasfewer diplo- additional potentialrecruits. This enhancesthegroup’s appealbeyond violenceandgives itaccessto base amongthepopulationatlargebycreatingasympatheticcommunity. selves, thehumanitarianactivitiesenablegrouptoextenditssupport raise money. Even whenthemoneydoesnotsupport theoperatives them- limited, given thepoor Arabia’s abilitytocrackdownonal-Qaeda Passive supportcanalsobepartlyexplained byalackofcapacity. Saudi A lackofcapacity as amortaldangeruntilmuchlater. UntiltheMay2003a al-Saud andmadethisclearintheearly1990s,kingdomitselfdidnotseeit threat totheUnitedStates. Although al-Qaedawas violentlyopposedtothe the terroristgroupbygovernment thathostsit. TheIRA,ofcourse,was no government repeatedlypushedWashington. tutional competence.Many activitiesrelatedtoterrorism–proselytising, to completelycrushthemovement. and otherareaswhereal-Qaeda isactive today, makingithardfortheregime has onlylimitedin Saudi regimewas alsohandicappedbyalackofskilledpersonnel. Pakistan Islamabad’s toleranceof al-Qaeda, ofcourse,went beyond asenseof Taken together, thesefactors–thelowlevel ofperceived threat,the Because passive supportisfarlessopenthanactive support,ito Passive supportappearstorequirealowlevel ofperceived threatfrom A lack ofcapacitycanalsoinvolve legalrestrictions aswell asinsti- fl uence intheNorth-West FrontierProvince,Waziristan,

fi fi ghting inKashmiranditsclosetiestotheTaliban nancial oversight structureinthekingdom.The fi ts, itiso en particularlya fi nancing was (andremains) Passive Sponsorsof Terrorism acks on Saudi soil, acks onSaudisoil, ractive. er theBritish en

133 134 fi ndlocal cover operativesQaeda helpedal- NGOs Saudi-backed PROOF Daniel Byman US pressuremadeatleastsomee central government’s power over tribalareasuntila direct threattothekingdomitself.Pakistan madenoe was notseenascompletelyworthwhile untiltheMay2003a groups tostrikemoree local Muslims,makingthem farmorereceptive toal-Qaeda’s message. Wahhabism creatednumerous mosquesandculturalcentresthatradicalised groups active inKashmir andPakistan itself.IslamistsinSaudi Arabia willingness tolooktheother way enabled al-Qaedatotapintoarangeof – begantentatively asUSpressureskyrocketed a radical groupsabroad–andthedomesticpoliticalcoststhiswould entail Qaeda operatives movements promotingitsideologyover morenationalagendas.IRA ment’s pre-eminence,enabling itover timetodirectaswell assupport Kashmir, Afghanistan andelsewhere.Thesedollarsreinforcedthemove- global network andenablingittobackguerrilla movements inChechnya, hundreds ofmillionsdollarsfromSaudi Arabia, helpingitsetupatruly the globaljihadwere o into strongonesormadeeven more capable.Thelogisticsof Passive statesupportforterroristgroupso The impactofpassivesupport terrorism. ForSaudi Arabia, thee to theperceived costsandthreatthelevel ofdomesticsupportfor activity was aparticularlyglaringweakness. violence. USprotectionofIRA murderersonthegroundsoftheirpolitical rights ofthoseengagedinpoliticalactivity, even ifsuch activityinvolved United Statesandtoraisemoneywas bolsteredbyUSlawsgoverning the free speechandassociation.TheIRA’s abilitytoenjoyahaven inthe fundraising andeven recruiting–areattimesprotectedbylawsgoverning http://taylorandfrancis.metapress.com/openurl.asp?genre=article&id=doi:10.1080/00396330500433399 The publishedversionisavailableforsubscribersorpay-per-viewbyclickingherevisiting: This isanon-printableproofofanarticlepublishedinSurvival,vol.47,no.4(winter2005),pp.117-144. Passive s The desiretoinvest inandbuildcapacity, however, isdirectlylinked upport alsogreatlyaided actualoperations,allowingterrorist fi nd local cover fortheiractivities.Riyadh’s e ff ectively ortowork with relative impunity. Pakistan’s en runoutofPakistan. Al-Qaeda mayhave raised several thathadclosetiestotheregime,helpedal- overseas fareasier. Saudi-backedNGOs,including the kingdomsupportedmaderecruitingMuslims Saudis jointhemovement directly, buttheactivities proved vitalforrecruitment.Notonlydidmany far harderforBritaintobreakitsback. become extremelywell-armed over time,makingit fundraising in America enabledthemovement to For al-Qaeda,backingfromSaudi Arabia also ff ff ort neededtocrackdownonsupportfor ort necessary. en transformedweak groups er 11September, butit er 11September, when ff ort toincreasethe ff orts to spread orts tospread acks poseda 54

PROOF http://taylorandfrancis.metapress.com/openurl.asp?genre=article&id=doi:10.1080/00396330500433399 The publishedversionisavailableforsubscribersorpay-per-viewbyclickingherevisiting: This isanon-printableproofofanarticlepublishedinSurvival,vol.47,no.4(winter2005),pp.117-144. al-Qaeda –advancing itsagendaagainstIndia–becamealiability a in thestrategiclandscape.OneofIslamabad’s mainreasonsfortolerating was moredangeroustoignorethanconfront.Pakistan requiredashi in thekingdom2003demonstratedthatmovement beingtolerated alliance withtheUnitedStates.Even moreimportant, thesubsequenta diminished, inpartduetothelobbyinge ending passive support.Inbothcases,thelustreofterrorists’ methods grew enormouslya rather thanconfrontthemovement. Thediplomatic costsofsuchtolerance content toletthesleepingdogofIslamicradicalismlie,hopingexploit threat themovement posedtothekingdom.Formany years, theal-Saudwas ating radicalIslamistactivitiesand,eventually, therecognitionofgrave terrorist group. public diplomacyonthepartofvictimorchangesintargetingby States totilttowards India. September, whencontinuingsuchtolerationwould have ledtheUnited undesirable thugs. ﬁ Saudi Arabia, wherebyterroristswent frombeingseenasRobinHood tically, orboth. Another was achangeinpopularsentiment,atleast greatly increased,becausethegroupitselfbecamemoreofathreatdomes- the costsassociatedwithpassive supportgrew because outsidepressure to Musharraf’s currente against binLadin.Thiscontinued publicsupportexplainsmanyofthelimits an exception,askeyinterest groupsandmuchofthepopulacedidnotturn alienating keyalliesover theirtoleranceofterrorism.Pakistan represents with Saudi Arabia, bothgovernments alsofeared thediplomaticcostsof institutions inthefaceofavery aggressive Britishcounterterrorisme making iteasiertoencouragemoredangerousactivitiesandpreservingits IRA was alsoabletosenditsoperatives to thefreedomofUnitedStates, two decades,theIRA acquired mostofitsarmsfromtheUnitedStates.The network toconductoperationswithoutgovernment interference.Foralmost ran NGOsthathadcloselinkstoterroristgroups,helpingbuildaradical ished over time.Suchshi In allthreecasesexamined,passive supportforthe terroristgroupdimin- Why doespassivesupportdiminish? and discreditedthegovernment theyopposed–topgoalsofallterrorists. In allcases,passive supportenabledthemovement tosurvive moreeasily gures engagedinanadmirablestruggletobeingseenasdangerousand Saudi Arabia’sshi In theUnitedStates,ashi

This shi er the11September a occurredinresponsetotheincreasedcostsoftoler- ff orts against theorganisation. s occurredforseveral reasons. Onewas that insentimentmayoccur becauseofe inpublicopinionplayed amajorrolein ff orts ofothergovernments. As acks threatenedthekingdom’s Passive Sponsorsof Terrorism ff ective er 11 acks ff ort.

135 PROOF 136 Daniel Byman Arabia inMay2003greatlyspeduptheslowSaudishi embrace ofnegotiationsover violence. Al-Qaeda’s decisiontoa limited militarypunishment. varied: itcanrangefromdiplomaticpressuretothreatsofsanctionsand of in terrorist group.The American roleshi ists poseo government morewillingtoopenlyconfrontthegroup. ment. Al-Qaeda’sa and threatenedtheirpopularity. tions andotheractionsthatincreasedtheimmediatedangertoregime which thenturnedagainsttheMusharrafregime,undertakingassassina- Pakistanis toundertakelimitedcrackdownsongroupslinkedal-Qaeda, a time-honouredtactic,o sors ofterrorism. the terroristsandtomakeitpoliticallyeasierforregimesact.Suche passive supportandwoo popularopiniontoreducetheirdirectbackingfor outside governments shouldtrytoraisethecosts toregimesoftolerating straightforward conceptuallybutdi The recommendationsforending,oratleastreducing,passive supportare The limitsofcoercion ensure pricestability, andanimportant partneronahostofotherissues. in thePersian Gulf, a swingproducerofoilthathasuseditsleverage tohelp in theMiddleEastpeaceprocess,asourceofbases forUSmilitaryactivities Arabia before11September, forexample,would have alienatedasupporter table, asotherformsofcooperationwould bejeopardised.StrikesonSaudi Traditional coercive meanssuchaslimitedmilitaryforcearethusnotonthe UK relationshipwent farbeyond theBritishproblems onNorthernIreland. allies onanumberofvitalissuesinadditiontocounterterrorism –andtheUS– coercer’s partners onotherissues.Pakistan andSaudi Arabia arebothUS sors ofterrorism.Thepassive sponsorsexaminedinthisessaywere the several challengesbeyond whattheywould faceagainsttypicalactive spon- however, have adi image ofthecoercerasabully andoftheterroristsasRobinHood ment tocrackdownonsupport forterrorismmayonlyreinforcethepopular http://taylorandfrancis.metapress.com/openurl.asp?genre=article&id=doi:10.1080/00396330500433399 The publishedversionisavailableforsubscribersorpay-per-viewbyclickingherevisiting: This isanon-printableproofofanarticlepublishedinSurvival,vol.47,no.4(winter2005),pp.117-144. Change inpassive supportiso Shi Imposing neworincreasingexistingcostsonanadversary regimeis Another problemisthatacoercer’s a Coercers usingsuchinstrumentsonpassive sponsors, however, face ﬂ uence thatgovernments exerciseover othergovernments isvast and s inpublicopinion,outsidepressureandthedirectthreatterror- en overlap inpractice.Forexample,outsidepressureledthe ﬀ empted assassinationsagainstMusharrafalsomadehis erent logicthandoestraditionalcoercionofstatespon- en referredtoascoercive diplomacy. Therange 55

en directlylinkedtotheactionsof ffi cult inpractice.Whenever possible, ed inresponsetotheIRA’s gradual empts tobrowbeatorforceagovern- againstthemove- fi ack Saudi gures. For ff orts, PROOF http://taylorandfrancis.metapress.com/openurl.asp?genre=article&id=doi:10.1080/00396330500433399 The publishedversionisavailableforsubscribersorpay-per-viewbyclickingherevisiting: This isanon-printableproofofanarticlepublishedinSurvival,vol.47,no.4(winter2005),pp.117-144. al-Qaeda, the US strikes transformed bin Ladin into al-Qaeda, theUSstrikestransformedbinLadininto senior Pakistani religiousleader, toldPeter Bergen,ajournalistandexperton level ofassistancetheyprovide totheforeignpower. As aresult,regimeswould probablybecomelesscooperative, reducingthe when hefacedsigni example, the August 1998strikeson Afghanistan lionisedbinLadinatatime position byembracingratherthanrejectingradicalism. of pressureonthem,theymaychoosetotryshoreuptheirdomestic coercion and,ifforeigngovernments cuteconomic tiesorputotherforms sponsors. Regimeleaderso the movement tobepaintedasaUSandSaudistooge. commi expand fundraisingandrecruiting.Inaddition,theTaliban feltnewly As aresult,themovement’s prestigesoared,andal-Qaedawas abletogreatly if itcutallsupportforthejihadists government inPakistan, forexample,would faceconsiderableopposition and allowingthe11Septembera States overthrew theTaliban in Afghanistan, blamingitforhostingal-Qaeda conducted airstrikesonLibya in1986.Mostdramatically, in2001the United Afghanistan in1998,bombedIraq’s intelligenceheadquartersin1993,and structure targets.TheUnitedStateslaunchedcruisemissilesatSudanand military totargettheterroristsandstrikeatregimeleadershipinfra- traditional meansWashington hasusedtocoercestatesponsors:usingthe increase tiestotheradicals. aid orotherwisepushedtheregimeintoacorner, itmighteasilydecideto tary strikeswould belikelytoback were noissueinabilateralrelationshipotherthancounterterrorism,mili- indeed would beinconceivable, asmanyareotherwiseallies.Even ifthere in 1986andon Afghanistan in1998,forexample,did li power andreducegovernment incentives todoso.USstrikesonLibya strikes would increasepopularresistancetocooperationwiththeforeign terrorists butincreasedtheir sponsors’ determinationtosupportthem. Passive sponsorsalsohave theoptionofescalation bybecomingactive For passive sponsors,however, militarypressureo These di his voice againstthem.He’s aherotous,butitis America who who were tryingtocrushMuslims.Heisthecourageousonewhoraised a symbolforthewholeIslamicworld. Against allthoseoutsidepowers him ahero. ed toprotecting theirguest,fearingthatexpellinghimwould allow ffi culties areillustratedthroughacloserlook atoneofthe 56

ﬁ cant problemsin Afghanistan. As Maulanaul-Haqq,a

en fearpopularangerfarmorethanoutside acks. ﬁ re whenusedonpassive sponsors.The

in Kashmir. IftheUnitedStatescut Passive Sponsorsof Terrorism ﬀ ers li ers le damagetothe 57 TheMusharraf ﬁ rst made le helpand 58

137 138 backfiPROOF re can easily pressure Economic Daniel Byman that caneasilyback rassment proved surprisinglye way to Islamabad tochangeitsposition. by embarrassment.Ittookriskstoitsstrategicobjectives andeconomyfor toleration oftheIRA activitiesonUSsoil.Pakistan, however, was notmoved as astaunchfoeofterrorismwas challengedwhenever London criticisedits tive. Similarly, theReaganadministrationfelt,correctly, thatitscredibility humiliated theal-Saud,makingthemscrambletoatleastappearcoopera- to endsupport.ThespotlightheldonSaudi Arabia a increase thecostsfordecisionmakers.Transparency and tions maybeinorder. Theseshouldbedesignedtosway popularopinionand leaders fallintothiscategory. Ifsuchlimitedmeansfail, moreserioussanc- E turn thecorner, bolstering itscapacityisalso helpful. and takingstepsto tant, however, israisingawareness oftheconceptpassive sponsorship embarrassment and,ifnecessary, limitedeconomicpressure.Moreimpor- Governments shouldpress regimestoendpassive sponsorshipthrough fi security forcescanbeexceptionallyuseful. At times,foreignforcesmayeven fi should takeasymbolicformat economic penaltiesshouldbeintroducedasaformofcoercion.Initially, they that thepressurewillendifpassive supportersactagainsttheterrorists. larly important.Itmustbeclearwhat,exactly, thesanctions arelinkedtoand embarrass ratherthanin ght alongsidelocalallies,helping themlocate,captureorkillterrorists. ghting terrorism,assistanceintrainingandequippinglocalmilitary ff http://taylorandfrancis.metapress.com/openurl.asp?genre=article&id=doi:10.1080/00396330500433399 The publishedversionisavailableforsubscribersorpay-per-viewbyclickingherevisiting: This isanon-printableproofofanarticlepublishedinSurvival,vol.47,no.4(winter2005),pp.117-144. ective policytostoppassive sponsorshipmustoccurattwo levels. While forceiso As withmilitarypressure,economicpressureiso Indeed, militaryassistanceratherthanstrikesmaybea fi ght passive sponsorship.Ifregimesdoseektoturnthecorneron dations forchangingapassive supporterremain unproductive, and otherwisesustainitsorganisation.Iftheotherrecommen- allows adangerousgrouplikeal-Qaedatoraisemoney, recruit powerful formofsupportforterrorists,particularly whenit this essayargues,passive sponsorshipcanbean exceptionally try’s incentives tocooperate. anger thantheydocooperationandcanfurtherdecreaseacoun- ment againsttraditionalstatesponsors,o Economic pressure,however, shouldremainanoption. As fi fi re. Sanctions,oneofthemostcommonformspunish- ght itatapopularlevel. Ifthegovernment doesstartto en unrealisticorarecipefordisaster, simpleembar- fl ict signi * fi rst, sending a diplomatic signal and acting to rst, sendingadiplomaticsignalandactingto ff ective, thoughbyitselfitwas notsu fi cant economicpain.Travel bansforregime en a blunt instrument en abluntinstrument fl exibility areparticu- en provoke more er 11September ffi cient er PROOF http://taylorandfrancis.metapress.com/openurl.asp?genre=article&id=doi:10.1080/00396330500433399 The publishedversionisavailableforsubscribersorpay-per-viewbyclickingherevisiting: This isanon-printableproofofanarticlepublishedinSurvival,vol.47,no.4(winter2005),pp.117-144. States su programmes thekingdomhasintroducedincooperationwithUnited as moreobviousties.Thise Western governments shouldhighlightindirectsupportforterrorists,aswell tify stateobligationstocombatterrorismwithintheirborders. At suchaforum, gious schoolsthatareanimportantbaseforjihadists. strengthening Pakistan’s seculareducationsystem,thusweakening thereli- States canhelpPakistan tampdownunrestandsupportforterrorismby beyond thegovernment. JessicaStern,forexample,contendsthattheUnited security andintelligenceservices.Passive supportmayalsorequiregoing oping world. Moneycanalsobeprovidedtoboost thesizeandskillsof tracking, arerelatively rareingovernment circles,particularlyinthedevel- ma approach wronglyassumesthatonlydirectandrelatively obvioussupport groups aredepictedaswhatconstitutesstatesupportforterrorism.Yet this Iran’s tiestoHizbullahorSyria’s supportforvarious rejectionist Palestinian the highbarforwhatconstitutesstatesupportaterroristgroup.Too o as manyskillsrelatedtoshu reorganisation andlegalreform.Training canbeparticularlyimportant, systems thattrackterroristsandtheiractivities,toadviceonintelligence technical assistance,suchashelpingimprove databases orinformation The presumptionshouldbeongovernments todo allthattheycando. ance oftheirfundraisingandrecruitmentmakesthemfarmoreformidable. complex. E terrorism willproduceonlymodestresultsformany years. even themostdramaticturnaroundinregime’s intentionstocrush ability to capacity toabsorbUSorotheroutsideassistancemeantshoreuptheir Republic’s willingnesstocriticisetheIRA madeaprofoundimpressionon Arabia todaythanbefore 11September. failed. di the IRA amongIrish-Americans. Propagandacampaignsarenotoriously ingness towork withpeacefulopposition British e should bedoneatthepopularlevel aswell as atthegovernmental level. ffi cult, however, andUSe Bolstering capacityisamorestraightforward task.Thiscanrangefrom Diminishing popularsupport–thecoreofproblem –isfarmore Many regimesinthedeveloping world, however, have onlyalimited A Working indirectly todiminishsupportmaybeessential.TheIrish ers. Forgroupslikeal-Qaeda,andformanylesseraswell, toler- fi 60 rst stepwould betoconvene aninternationalconvention thatwilliden- Ifanything,al-Qaedamay bemorepopularinPakistan andSaudi ff ff orts toplayuptheIRA’s bloodiness,togetherwithLondon’s will- er fromalackofskilledandexperiencedpersonnel. As aresult, fi ght terrorism.InSaudi Arabia, forexample, themyriadnew ff orts toplayuptheterroristgroup’s misstepsandatrocities ff ortwould bepartofabroadercampaigntolower ff orts todemoniseal-Qaedahave conspicuously ing downpassive support,suchas fi gures, helpedcutsupportfor Passive Sponsorsof Terrorism 59

ﬁ nancial en, en,

139 PROOF 140 Daniel Byman Sponsors ofTerrorism’, Analysis Paper no.4(February2005). Saban CenterattheBrookingsInstitutionmonographonsubject‘ConfrontingPassive on mybook 5 4 1 3 2 Notes Rebekah KimCragin,DavidEdelstein,BruceHo I would liketothankStephenBrooks,MikeBrown,F. GregoryGauseIII,C.ChristianeFair, Acknowledgements unpopularity oftheUnitedStatesinSaudi Arabia, USe Irish-Americans, bolsteringtheBritishcaseconsiderably. Given thedeep and MIT’s SecurityStudiesProgram forhostingmytalksonthistopic thank Georgetown’s CenterforPeace andSecurityStudies,theWoodrow Wilson Center, and JeremyShapirofortheircommentsonearlierversions ofthisessay. Iwould alsolike to terrorism isandreevaluating themeanswe useto vention. Success,however, requiresrethinkingwhatstatesponsorshipof passive supportcanbereduced,andeven ended,throughpolicyinter- lems. TheexperiencesofSaudi Arabia andtheUnitedStatessuggestthat passive supporthasemergedasoneoftheleadingcounterterrorismprob- and conductoperations.Indeed,astraditionalsponsorshiphasdeclined, sponsorship, itplaysamajorroleinhelpinggroupssustainthemselves credibility withthekeyaudiences. Muslim authoritieswould criticisetheorganisation,asthesevoices have Qaeda’s lustremayonlyburnishit.Itwould bemoree

http://taylorandfrancis.metapress.com/openurl.asp?genre=article&id=doi:10.1080/00396330500433399 The publishedversionisavailableforsubscribersorpay-per-viewbyclickingherevisiting: This isanon-printableproofofanarticlepublishedinSurvival,vol.47,no.4(winter2005),pp.117-144. York: CrownPublishers,2003), the supposedSaudia February 2002,p.23.Forreportson October 1999 University ofSt Andrews, Scotland, Networks Dynamics ofDiaspora-SupportedTerrorist 2003, pp.67–98;RohanGunaratna, America’s Fragile Partnership with Saudi America’s FragilePartnershipwith Saudi Thomas W. Lippman, with theDevil, As quoted(derisively) inBaer, Civil War’, Michael Sco Robert Baer, terrorism’, ‘The FrenchExperienceofCounter- Jeremy ShapiroandBenedicteSuzan, pp. 24–6. ‘Blowback’, Ladin inSudan,seeMary Anne Weaver, Although passive supportissuper , unpublished dissertation, , unpublisheddissertation, Deadly Connections Survival, Foreign A Atlantic Monthly Doran,’SomebodyElse’s Sleeping withtheDevil . p. 202. vol. 45,no.1,Spring ﬀ airs empt to kill bin empt tokillbin Inside the Mirage: Inside theMirage: , January/ : , May 1998, , May1998, States thatSponsorTerrorism

Sleeping Sleeping p. 21. p. 21. (New (New ﬁ cially lessmenacingthantraditional 6 7

ﬀ man,KennethPollack, William Rosenau, pdf. statements/911_TerrFin_Monograph. h ’Monograph onTerrorist Financing’, A National CommissiononTerrorist Newsweek, ‘The Saudi–AlQaedaConnection’, Michael Isiko considerable funds. ﬁ in Saudi Arabia, buttheregimeand cause camefromPalestinians working Much ofthemoneytoPalestinian Washington Post, ‘Wahhabi StrainofIslamFaulted’, Times, Terrorists Proves Di Josh Meyer, ‘Cu 1994), Arabia gures associatedwithitalsogave p://www.9-11commission.gov/sta acks Upon theUnitedStates,

pp. 208–209,303. 28 September 2003; John Mintz, 28 September2003;JohnMintz, (Boulder, CO:Westview Press, (Cambridge,2005)aswell asa fi 11 September2003.Seealso ght it. ff andMarkHosenball, ff ing Money Flow to ing MoneyFlowto 27 June2003,p. A11. ff orts todiminishal- ective if respected ffi cult’, . This article draws This articledraws Los Angeles Los Angeles ff _ PROOF http://taylorandfrancis.metapress.com/openurl.asp?genre=article&id=doi:10.1080/00396330500433399 The publishedversionisavailableforsubscribersorpay-per-viewbyclickingherevisiting: This isanon-printableproofofanarticlepublishedinSurvival,vol.47,no.4(winter2005),pp.117-144. 9 8 18 17 16 15 14 13 12 11 10

2002) NB: University ofNebraskaPress, July 2003, p. 99. July 2003,p.99. December 2001. Journal of U.S.–SaudiRelations’, Careful WhatYou Wish For:The Future as quotedinF. GregoryGauseIII,‘Be Al-Hayat, Washington Post Saudi FundamentalisminU.S.’, As quotedinSusanSchmidt,’Spreading December 2003. U.S. NewsandWorld Report, David Kaplan,’TheSaudiConnection’, Kenneth Pollack, h of theEnemy’,Sta A National CommissiononTerrorist Policy, available at:h Washington InstituteforNearEast Simon Henderson,addressbeforethe Mamoun Fandy, Senate ForeignRelationsCommi Thomas Wilshire, ‘Testimony Beforethe 1998), Persian Gulf and StabilityintheStatesofNorthern and JerroldGreen, such techniques,seeDanielByman pp.37–8.Foranoverview of For’, Gause, ’BeCarefulWhatYou Wish pp. 40–41; Gause, ‘BeCarefulWhatYou Wish For’, Washington Post, ’A MeasureofDemocracy’, statements/sta html. org/pbei/winep/policy_2003/2003_759. Movement’, and Development oftheJihadist 39 and44;GillesKepel,’TheOrigins ’Be CarefulWhatYou pp. Wish For’, Palgrave MacMillan, 2001);Gause, the PoliticsofDissent stronger thanever before. contend thatanti-Americanismisfar numerous observers ofthekingdom before 2003arenotavailable. However, 14 March2003,p. A23 Political Tightrope’, p://www.9-11commission.gov/sta acks on the United States. ’Overview acks ontheUnited States.’Overview ,

pp. 425–46. pp. 71–94. ,

spring 2002,p.50,n.4. 19 October 2001, pp. 1 and 6, 19 October2001,pp.1and6,

Dobbs, ‘SaudiRulersWalk (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, (Santa Monica,CA:RAND, Asian A ff _statement_15.pdf, p.10. , 2October2003,p. A01. 8 June2004,p. A18. Saudi Arabia and Saudi Arabiaand Arabs atWar ff Statement No. 15, StatementNo.15, Political Violence ff Washington Post (New York: airs, p://www.ciaonet. . Polling data World Policy vol. 34,no.2, The The 15 15 (Lincoln, (Lincoln, ee’, 18 ff , _ 21 20 19 25 24 23 22

for available ath East andCentral Asia, 24March2004, Relations, Subcommi the HouseCommi Coordinator forCounterterrorism,to Testimony ofJ.CoferBlack, pp. 3–6. the BrookingsInstitution,May2003, Saban CenterforMiddleEastPolicy at U.S. RelationswiththeGulfStates Approaching Turning Point:TheFuture of See F. GregoryGause,III, Mirage relationship, seeLippman, For anoverview oftheUS–Saudi 227–8. 227–8. Qaeda’s NewThreat’, 11 September;MichaelHirsh Harvard University Press,2002) Trail ofPoliticalIslam 2003), p.114;andGillesKepel, a ShadowofTerror 8 and98;JasonBurke, CT: Yale University Press,2000) Ahmed Rashid, 2002, p.30. 2003); al-Qaedaranatleast Terrorism Rana, Mohammad Amir Relations, Subcommi House Commi Financing’, Testimony beforethe and theFight Against Terrorism Thomas J.Harrington,‘Saudi Arabia FBI Deputy Assistant Director East Journal, Impulse inSaudi Arabia’, Richard Dekmejian,‘TheLiberal htm. international_relations/108/blac032404. available ath East andCentral Asia, 24March2004, the HouseCommi Secretary JuanC.Zarate,Testimony to htm; andTreasury Deputy Assistant international_relations/108/harr032404. Relations, Subcommi available ath East andCentral Asia, 24March2004, htm. international_relations/108/zara032404. ﬁ ghters going to Kashmir before ghters goingtoKashmirbefore . (London: New Millennium, (London: NewMillennium, Passive Sponsorsof Terrorism vol. 57,no.3,Summer2003. p://wwwc.house.gov/ p://wwwc.house.gov/ p://wwwc.house.gov/ ee onInternational Taliban (New York: I.B.Tauris, ee on International ee onInternational ee onInternational (Cambridge, MA: (Cambridge, MA: ee on the Middle ee ontheMiddle Newsweek, ee ontheMiddle ee ontheMiddle Al-Qaeda: Casting Al-Qaeda: Casting (New Haven, Gateway to Gateway to The Middle The Middle The Inside the Inside the ﬁ ve camps et al., Jihad: The Jihad: The , , pp. 27– , The 10 June 10 June pp. pp. Al l ‘A

141 PROOF 142 Daniel Byman 38 37 36 35 34 33 32 31 30 29 28 27 26 40 39

http://taylorandfrancis.metapress.com/openurl.asp?genre=article&id=doi:10.1080/00396330500433399 The publishedversionisavailableforsubscribersorpay-per-viewbyclickingherevisiting: This isanon-printableproofofanarticlepublishedinSurvival,vol.47,no.4(winter2005),pp.117-144. MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, MD: JohnsHopkins University Press, Tony Geraghty, (Washington, DC:Brassey’s, 2004),p.55. the West isLosingtheWar on Terrorism Anonymous, electronic version. Osama’, Peter Bergen,‘TheLongHuntfor (Brussels, ICG,2003),p.13. View from Islamabad International CrisisGroup, November/December 2000, p.121. Culture’, As quotedinStern,‘Pakistan’s Jihad Stephen Cohen, Fair, ’MilitantRecruitmentinPakistan’. 2002, p.25. New Hideouts’, and RahimullahYusufzai, ‘Al-Qaeda’s Tim McGirk,HannahBloch, Alex Perry DC: TheBrookingsInstitution,2004). Cohen, 2002, p.32. Pakistan Tamed itsSpies?’, Tim McGirkandHannaBloch,’Has Press, 1994). (Berkeley, CA:University ofCalifornia Revolution: TheJama’at-IIslamiofPakistan Reza Nasr, an overview oftheJI,seeSeyyed Vali 1997), York: CambridgeUniversity Press, Portents ofWar, HopesofPeace Sumit Ganguly, December 2004. Terrorism in Pakistan’, C. ChristianeFair, ’MilitantRecruitment Rashid, Terrorist A budget. NationalCommissionon perhaps two-thirds ofthemovement’s and $20millionayear fromal-Qaeda, that theTaliban received between $10 A The NationalCommissiononTerrorist A National CommissiononTerrorist (Washington, DC:Brookings,2004). ‘Overview oftheEnemy’,p.11. W.W. Norton,2004), 9/11 CommissionReport acks on the United States reports acks ontheUnitedStates reports acks UpontheUnitedStates,

and Kepel, The IdeaofPakistan Taliban, Atlantic Monthly , vol. 27,no.6,November/ Foreign A The Vanguard oftheIslamic acks on the United States. acks ontheUnitedStates. Studies inCon Imperial Hubris: Why Imperial Hubris:Why The IrishWar p. 137. p. 137. The Crisis in Kashmir: The CrisisinKashmir: The IdeaofPakistan Time Europe, Jihad, ﬀ , Asia ReportNo.68 airs,

p. 64. (New York: pp. 98–103. For pp. 98–103.For vol. 79,no.6, , October 2004, , October2004, (Washington, ﬂ ict and Time, Kashmir: The Kashmir: The (Baltimore, (Baltimore, 29 July 29 July (New (New The The 6 May 6 May

46 45 44 43 42 41 50 49 48 47

A Ireland Peace Process’, States, Irish Americans andtheNorthern 152; and Adrianne Guelke,‘TheUnited York: OxfordUniversity Press,2003) Struggle: TheHistoryoftheIRA pp. xvii,28–9;RichardEnglish, CO: RobertReinhartPublishers,1999) and 421. (New York: W. W. Norton, 2002) Ed Moloney, 344. English, Irish War, Frank Cass,2000),p.185;Geraghty, Analysis ofaSecret Army 16; J.Bowyer Bell, Moloney, of theIRA, 41 and194–5;Moloney, Holland, O’Dowd, ‘The Awakening’, p.69. 161–3. Holland, Peace Process’,p.523. Americans andtheNorthernIreland See Guelke,‘TheUnitedStates,Irish with anIrishheritageareProtestant. of thefamily. Moreover, halfofthose claim anIrishheritageonbothsides result thatonlytenmillion Americans with non-Irish Americans, withthe Irish immigrantshave intermarried Moloney, Peace Process’,p.530. Americans andtheNorthernIreland 145–51; Guelke,‘TheUnitedStates,Irish Holland, Ireland Peace Process’,pp.527–32. Irish Americans andtheNorthern 2002), p.67;Guelke,‘TheUnitedStates, (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, The LongRoadtoPeaceinNorthernIreland Peace Process’,inMarianneEllio Irish-America’s KeyRoleintheIrish p. 2;NiallO’Dowd,‘The Awakening: 209; Holland, Moloney, Connection, In Connection: U.S.Guns,Money, and 2000) ﬀ ﬂ airs, uence inNorthernIreland , p. 9;JackHolland, vol. 73, no. 3, 1996, p. 524. vol. 73,no.3,1996,p.524. Armed Struggle, The AmericanConnection, The AmericanConnection, The AmericanConnection, A Secret HistoryoftheIRA, p. 181;Holland, A Secret HistoryoftheIRA, A Secret HistoryoftheIRA, p. 16. p. 16. p. 110. A Secret HistoryoftheIRA The American Connection, The AmericanConnection, The IRA, 1968–2000: The IRA,1968–2000: International International A Secret History (Portland, OR: pp. 116–17 and pp. 116–17and The American The American The American The American (Boulder, (New (New Armed Armed , pp. 16 pp. 16 (ed.), pp. pp. pp. pp. p. 16. p. 16. , The The p. p. p. p. p. ,

Peace Process’,p.532. Americans andtheNorthernIreland 421; Guelke,’TheUnitedStates,Irish Moloney, 65–6. 115–33; O’Dowd,‘The Awakening’, pp. Holland, Bell, especially Schelling, L. GeorgeandWilliam E.Simons.See Thomas C.Schelling,and Alexander cited works oncoercionarethoseof voluminous. Among themostwidely The literatureoncoercionis University Press,1987). in Terrorism Stewart (eds), in Paul C.Wilkinson and Alasdair M. James Adams, ‘TheFinancingofTerror’, in NorthernIreland.Forareview, see from runningvarious illicitactivities received signi important totheIrishcause,IRA Although diasporasupportwas (eds), Press, 1966)andGeorgeSimons (New Haven, CT: Yale University Robert Pape, bombing asacoercive instrument,see valuable work onthelimitsofstrategic (Boulder, CO:Westview, 1994).Fora Terrorism’, InstituteforInternational Barbara Oegg,‘UsingSanctionstoFight Clyde Hu a counterterrorisminstrumentisGary interest takeoneconomicsanctionsas NY: Cornell University Press,1996). An The IRA, The LimitsofCoercive Diplomacy The AmericanConnection, A Secret HistoryoftheIRA, auer, Je (Aberdeen: Aberdeen Bombing toWin fi p. 195. Contemporary Research cantly more money cantly moremoney ff ery J.Scho Arms andIn (Ithaca, (Ithaca, and fl uence uence pp. pp. p. p.

56 60 59 58 57

York: FreePress,2002),p.129. Secret World ofOsamabinLaden, Peter I.Bergen, 2003. the Arab andMuslimWorld,’ 1October Direction forU.S.PublicDiplomacyin Winning Peace: A NewStrategic Muslim World, ‘ChangingMinds, on PublicDiplomacyforthe Arab and see theReportof Advisory Group capabilities toin For ahighlycriticalreviewofUS Stern, ’Pakistan’s Jihad Culture’,p.126. review. Cambridge University Press,2005)fora States thatSponsorTerrorism See DanielByman, University Press,1991),p.6. World Alignment andRealignmentintheThird see Steven David, focus oninternalover externalthreats, world regimesaremorelikelyto For anargumentonhowdeveloping University Press,2002). Military Might American Foreign PolicyandtheLimitsof Waxman, limits, seeDanielBymanandMa For myownviewsoncoercionandits vol. 22,no.2,Fall1997,pp.90–136. Do NotWork’, A. Pape, ‘WhyEconomicSanctions Brookings Institution,2003)andRobert Shrewd Sanctions version. SeealsoMeaghenO’Sullivan, Economics, November 2001,electronic (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins (Baltimore, MD:JohnsHopkins Passive Sponsorsof Terrorism The DynamicsofCoercion: (Cambridge: Cambridge (Cambridge:Cambridge International Security Holy War, Inc.:Insidethe ﬂ ( Washington, DC: uence foreign publics uence foreignpublics Choosing Sides: Choosing Sides: Deadly Connections: Deadly Connections: (Cambridge: (Cambridge: (New (New hew hew ,

143 PROOF 144 Daniel Byman http://taylorandfrancis.metapress.com/openurl.asp?genre=article&id=doi:10.1080/00396330500433399 The publishedversionisavailableforsubscribersorpay-per-viewbyclickingherevisiting: This isanon-printableproofofanarticlepublishedinSurvival,vol.47,no.4(winter2005),pp.117-144.