Brexit: How Rhetoric Became Reality

Year: 2017 Semester: 6th Supervisor: Helene Dyrhauge Group Members: Christopher Molge Andersen: #55629 Timothy Peter Murphy: #55636 Character Count: 112,348

1 Table of Contents

Chapter 1: Problem Area 3

Chapter 2: Methodology 5 2.1. Introduction 5 2.2. Quantitative Methods 5 2.3. Qualitative Methods 6 2.4. Reliability and Validity of Sources 7 2.5. Project Structure 7

Chapter 3: Theory 8 3.1. Introduction 8 3.2. Euroscepticism 8 3.3. Nationalism 11 3.4. Populism 13 3.5. Use of Theory 14

Chapter 4: Background 15

The UK’s Relationship With the EU 15 4.1. Introduction 15 4.2. British Euroscepticism 16 4.3. UKiP and Euroscepticism 20 4.4. Sub-conclusion 21

Chapter 5: Analysis (Part 1) 23 5.1. Introduction: History Revisited 23 5.2. Statistical Findings 25 5.3. The Rise of UKiP 30 5.4. The Success of UKiP 31 5.5. Sub-conclusion 36

Chapter 6: Analysis (Part 2) 38 6.1. Introduction 38 6.2. David Cameron’s Miscalculations 38 6.3. How The Conservative Party Split Impacted Voters 39 6.4. Factors external to UKiP and the Conservatives (Demographics) 42 6.5. Sub-conclusion 44

2 Chapter 7: Discussion 45

Chapter 8: Conclusion 50

Bibliography 50

3 Chapter 1: Problem Area

The United Kingdom’s (UK) withdrawal of its membership from the European Union (EU) (referred to as Brexit) in the EU Referendum that took place on the 23rd June 2016 (from here on known as the 2016 EU Referendum) has come to represent an internal division within both the EU, and the UK itself. The referendum was meant to represent British public opinion on whether the UK should remain or leave the EU and the high voting turnout (72.2%) illustrated much success in regards to democratic representation. However, empirical evidence also suggests an apparent division - along generational, educational and regional lines - among the British public, as demonstrated by the marginal difference of the outcome in the 2016 EU Referendum; with 51.9% of total votes in favour of a Brexit and 48.1% against (YouGov 2016). This division was further emphasised in the political rhetoric surrounding the most prioritised debate issues presented by the two official campaign organisations - the Remain (‘In’) camp and the Leave (‘Out’) camp (Hobolt, 2016). The rhetoric used by each campaign to win over voters was largely negative, and the ways in which the issues of the economy and immigration were framed at the national level can serve as a basis for understanding why voters chose to support Leave or Remain - where the United Kingdom’s Independence Party (UKiP) was the most united (anti-EU) political party and was influential in gaining support for the leave camps (Goodwin & Heath, 2016).

While the focus of this paper will be on the role that right wingism - in particular, the role UKiP - played in the 2016 EU Referendum, it cannot sufficiently explain the Brexit outcome on its own. As such, we have chosen to look at the ongoing division within the Conservative Party (also referred to as the Tory Party or Tories) that can be seen as a closely-related explanatory factor. As Eurosceptic views are an inherent feature within the two parties, Euroscepticism will be used as a theoretical lens through which to understand each party’s positions and interests in the referendum and how these spread throughout voters in Britain. Several conceptions of nationalism will be applied to our analysis of UKiP, and, more broadly, to those advocates of the leave camps. Through our analysis of the 2016 EU Referendum, we aim to show how

4 nationalistic sentiments and Eurosceptic views were key determinants in the Brexit outcome. In doing this, we have proposed the following research question:

How can the role of the United Kingdom’s Independent Party (UKiP) and Conservative Party explain the outcome of the 2016 EU referendum?

In order to fully address each aspect of the research question, we have selected the following sub-questions to structure our empirical analysis:

1. What factors contributed to British Euroscepticism and the rise of United Kingdom’s Independent Party (UKiP), and how? 2. How did the division within the Conservative Party contribute to the success of the Leave Camps?

5 Chapter 2: Methodology

2.1. Introduction

The purpose of this section is to identify the type of methodology that will be applied to our empirical analysis, as well as how it will be applied as such. As mentioned earlier, the aim of this paper is to explain how nationalistic sentiments and Eurosceptic views were key determinants in the Brexit outcome. As much research has been done on Brexit, we aim to use a mixed methods approach. Qualitative methods will enable us to use rich data that can provide for in-depth explanations of the phenomenon (Brexit) under observation, while quantitative methods allows us to assess such explanations through empirical testing; whether a correlation and/or causality exists between the variables (factors) under observation. As such, the quantitative inferences made can be confirmed or falsified through explanatory qualitative analysis.

2.2. Quantitative Methods

Quantitative methods incorporates both descriptive and inferential statistics, and, through the use of statistical methods, allows for the provision of more critical reviews of the data being observed. Broadly, statistics can be defined as “the art and science of collecting, analysing, presenting and interpreting data” (Anderson et al, 2011:3). As our statistical findings are based on secondary sources, the first stage - collection of data - has already been conducted and will thus be excluded from our methodological approach. Essentially, the use of statistics from secondary sources will enable us to quantify our qualitative findings, thus leading to more (conclusive) evidence-based results. The bulk of statistical data will come from both official and unofficial databases, including from the Electoral Commission, YouGov and the European Commission.

Standard Eurobarometer 85 (May 2016) is a questionnaire conducted by the European Commission on public opinion regarding the EU (europa.eu). It was conducted among the EU’s 28 member states (as well as five candidate countries and the Turkish Cypriot Community) and consisted of around 1000 face-to-face interviews per country (Ibid). As the objective was to

6 gather information on public perceptions regarding a number of national- and European- issues, the national reports from the UK have been selected particularly for our analysis of the factors contributing to increased Euroscepticism and the rise of UKiP in the first working question. The questionnaires consist of a wide range of questions covering a number of topics and, as such, only those that can help to identify (and potentially explain) the causes of Eurosceptic- and nationalist- sentiments among the British public have been selected for analysis. While the data sample (of around 1000 respondents) does not sufficiently represent the views of the whole British public, it allows for the identification of general public concerns about the EU in the UK. This is due to the use of random sampling, being unbiased in its nature.

2.3. Qualitative Methods

As mentioned, qualitative methods is useful for understanding the broader social context/phenomenon under observation. While the aim of using quantitative methods is to provide inferences based on statistical findings (facts), qualitative research allows for a more in-depth and comprehensive understanding of the research topic. In this paper, the purpose of the former is to identify a list of factors contributive to the Brexit outcome, and potentially whether a correlative and/or causal relationship exists between them. The purpose of the latter is to interpret how such factors have been constructed in the broader context in which they are situated. Through the use of rich, detailed and complex data, the role that these factors played in Brexit can be more thoroughly described. Our chosen qualitative sources will mostly comprise of journal articles, some newspaper reports (BBC, the Independent), and other academic publications (such as blog posts).

British Social Attitudes (BSA) is one survey that will be used to gain a better insight into British attitudes towards the UK. BSA is headed by NatCen Social Research, which is Britain’s largest independent social research agency, and several reports have been selected for our analysis of nationalism and Euroscepticism. The data sample of 3000 respondents allows for a more in-depth understanding of British public concerns, and is meant to supplement the (smaller) data sample obtained from the Eurobarometer questionnaire. Surveys and reports from the UK

7 Migration Watch (2015) and the Migration Observatory (2016) will also be heavily integrated in our analysis, to complement our other selected sources.

2.4. Reliability and Validity of Sources

When reviewing the sources that have been selected for our analysis, it is important to test them for both reliability and validity. Reliability involves whether or not the results obtained from the research conducted can be obtained several times if the research was to be repeated, ruling out any potential anomalies and shedding light on some external factors that may have affected the research (Hesse-Biber et al 2011:52-54). Validity refers to the correct methodological procedure being applied to research which in turn affects the accuracy of the results (Hesse-Biber et al 2011:48-51). One advantage of testing for validity is that it allows one to identify any potential bias that may have had an effect on the research be it from the author or from the sample that is being researched (Ibid). As the majority of academic literature to be used has been peer-reviewed this makes it a valid source. However, we have also made references to non peer-reviewed literature, thus the arguments drawn from these sources can be classified, to some degree, as invalid. The majority of survey data to complement our findings from the selected academic literature can be classified as valid, as similar results have been obtained in each of our survey selections.

2.5. Project Structure

In the following chapter, we introduce the notions of nationalism and Euroscepticism as our theoretical framework through which we view the political parties under observation. Through our discussion of what constitutes a ‘nation’ in today’s world, and what it means to be pro- or anti- EU, we attempt to provide a background for identifying the factors leading to British Euroscepticism, which in turn will help with understanding the voter behaviour in the 2016 EU Referendum. Once this has been provided, our background and analysis chapters follow.

8 Chapter 3: Theory

3.1. Introduction

In order to answer our research question, we have selected two main theoretical conceptions - Nationalism and Euroscepticism - as we believe that their contribution to the occurrence of Brexit have been of vital importance. We further scrutinise these theoretical orientations as a point of departure to gain an understanding into the rhetoric surrounding right-wing politics in association with Brexit, as well as to identify the changes that have occurred in mainstream political parties - namely the Conservatives - that led the leave camps to victory in the 2016 EU Referendum in the UK. In relation to our research question, they can both be directly used to explain why UKiP have received a sudden boost in support, which we in turn believe to be contributive to the leave camps winning the 2016 EU Referendum. In addition to the two main theories selected, we will also be using the concept of populism, which will help to explain how the leave camps and UKiP adapted their policies in order to manipulate voters and encourage them to join the leave camps.

3.2. Euroscepticism

Arguably one of the most important terms to look at when studying the reasons for the success of Brexit is Euroscepticism. Taggart (1998) identifies Euroscepticism as being the opposed to the EU, as traditionally seen in Western European right-wing parties (Taggart 1998: 364-385). Euroscepticism incorporates three different positions to the EU. The first of these is anti-integration, meaning that people oppose the idea of European integration and consequently oppose the EU. Secondly there are those who are not directly against European integration but rather believe that the EU is attempting to enforce integration incorrectly, this opinion is typically associated with people who are anti-immigration (Ibid). Thirdly and finally, is the view that the EU is too exclusive in its attempt at European integration by excluding the poorer nations/regions and thus favouring the wealthier ones (Ibid).

9 Taggart identifies two types of Euroscepticism. Firstly, hard Euroscepticism involves a direct anti-EU viewpoint and when looking at party politics there is typically an anti-EU policy embodied in the key issues of the party. Hard Eurosceptics traditionally want to see their nation withdraw their EU membership due to them being against European integration (Taggart 2002: 7). Taggart establishes two criteria for identifying a hard Eurosceptic party; the first being if a party is a single issue anti-EU party, hence clearly epitomising its negative stance towards the EU. The second of the two criteria is not as clear cut and involves looking at the language and “discourse” of the party in relation to the EU. Here, a party can be classed as being “hard Eurosceptic” should it criticise the EU as being an opposition to the party’s political orientation i.e. a right winged party may see the EU as being too socialistic in its political agenda (Ibid). This is also known as conditional support for the EU, however the aims of the party being so afar from those of the EU that it is near impossible to reach any common viewpoints. In both cases the hard Eurosceptics do not believe that the EU represents the best interests of the country that they are in (Ibid).

The second typology is soft euroscepticism where there is not a wish to withdraw EU membership and is not opposed to the EU as such. Rather, soft Eurosceptics incorporates policies that are misaligned with those of the EU, hence creating a conflict between the two. Here it is believed that national interest is not in equilibrium with the general EU interest (Taggart 2002: 7-10). Thus, rather than wishing to withdraw EU membership, soft Eurosceptic parties may have the aim of altering various EU policies on a range of issues including immigration and the economy. European integration and the blurring of borders within the EU is a big issue for Eurosceptics therefore Taggart has classed those who do not oppose the EU as such but are not in favour of further integration as soft Eurosceptics. This is because it opposes the EU that integration should be increased (Ibid).

This distinction between hard and soft Euroscepticism is useful in our research as it allows us to distinguish between the different levels of Euroscepticism as well as being able to classify the political parties (and individuals within them) as being either hard Eurosceptic, soft Eurosceptic or pro-EU. For our analysis of the contribution of the impact of right wing politics on Brexit we

10 will primarily be using hard Euroscepticism as UKiP is an example of hard Eurosceptics; although we will also look at the role of soft Eurosceptics. In addition, we will be using a combination of hard and soft Euroscepticism in our analysis of the Conservative Party in looking at how Brexit has divided a party that has traditionally been known as being pro-EU since the UK joining the EU in 1973. Ultimately, Euroscepticism is when there is a clash between the interests of a political party and those of the EU, be it minor or major issues (here the difference between hard and soft can be seen clearly).

In furthering our understanding of Euroscepticism, we look at Usherwood and Startin’s (2011) work on how the Eurosceptic way of thinking has gone from being what is described as a passing phenomenon to a more persistent and ever present concept (Usherwood and Startin 2011: 2-15). This particular literature will put Euroscepticism into context in terms of looking at the developments and changes that it has undergone along with the EU changing and ever-pressing for European integration. This will be further explained in both the background and analysis chapters. The reason for selecting Euroscepticism is that it is vital in understanding how the 2016 EU Referendum was constructed and why Britain opted to leave - due to the fact that it seeks to explain what issues people have with the EU and why.

Our reasoning for choosing Usherwood and Startin’s work in conjunction with Taggart’s is to put the latter’s into perspective. As Taggart has a clear cut definition of what hard and soft Euroscepticism is, there is little room for how the concept of Euroscepticism may have changed since it began. This is where Usherwood and Startin come in; although they acknowledge that Euroscepticism is becoming ever more prominent, they highlight that it has undergone many changes since formation and that this is due to continue as the EU also undergoes changes over time (Usherwood and Startin 2011: 2-15).

It can be argued that Usherwood and Startin’s perspective of Euroscepticism is a critique of Taggart’s as the former mentions that many different definitions (including Taggart’s) of Euroscepticism fail to shed light on how the concept came about as well as how it has changed along with the EU changing (Ibid). This point is underlined in their work “Euroscepticism as a Persistent Phenomenon” (2011) where they mention that after the Maastricht Treaty was signed,

11 the EU underwent a change in terms of it’s integration policies, making it more inclusive, and as this is one of the major issue amongst Eurosceptics, it must be accounted for when considering Eurosceptic theory (Ibid). Here it is highlighted that it was not until Margaret Thatcher’s Bruges speech of 1988 that the Eurosceptic way of thinking became mainstream (Ibid). This is because Thatcher became the first EU leader to challenge the change in EU integration policy and the direction in which the Union was headed. This gives us a rough timeframe as to when mainstream Euroscepticism became more widespread, allowing us to pinpoint any major changes in Eurosceptic rhetoric. For example much literature has been published with focus on the role of individual political parties and their contribution to Euroscepticism (Ibid). Once more, we wish to underline the importance of seeing Euroscepticism as a fluid concept that cannot be limited to one permanent definition and will be considered whilst using Taggart’s work on hard and soft Euroscepticism.

3.3. Nationalism

In conjunction with Euroscepticism we will be looking at nationalism and how it can be situated in both right wing politics in Britain, as well as in UK-EU relations. While nationalism can be defined as being a sentiment of belonging to a nation, many definitions and interpretations of the term have been developed through history. Smith (2010) identifies five ways in which nationalism can be seen which are: 1. A process of formation of nations 2. A sense of belonging to a nation 3. The language and symbolism of a nation 4. A social and/or political movement in the best interests of a nation 5. The ideological perspectives of a nation

We have opted to adapt a more modernised use of the term; that of social and political movement (point 4) (Smith 2010: 5-24). However this will not be an exclusive definition as other aforementioned definitions and aspects of nationalism will also be incorporated, particularly in reference to national identity. In using nationalism as a theoretical point of departure, we are

12 looking at the notion as more of a social movement thus leading to a distinction between nationalism and patriotism which is typically seen as pride in one’s country. Poole (2008) identifies one distinction between the two in that patriotism typically has positive connotations whereas nationalism is more associated with negative ones (Poole 2008: 1-3) If one is to look at nationalism as a social movement it can be argued that a growing sense of national identity and pride is what has caused the movement to grow in Britain. National identity involves shared values and political and moral viewpoints including those on the EU, immigration and the economy and this establishes common ground on which people can unite (Ibid).

The key components involved in nationalism aside from a strong sense of national identity include the use of symbolism; i.e. the use of flags and other representative symbols to represent national pride (Smith 2010: 5-24). In addition, new symbols are often created or old ones used in order to portray this sense of nationalistic pride. Another component of nationalism is the importance of reinforcing the culture, language and even ethnicity that is typically associated with a nation (Ibid). This is partly why nationalism is often critical of foreign entities and people as they are seen as a threat to a nation’s identity as they differ from what is seen as the norm. One major issue here is immigration as many people with nationalistic ideals feel that the free movement within the EU and lack of control of borders is threatening not just to their country but also their national identity in the sense that these “foreigners” are trying to change or even damage it. This perceived threat blurs the lines between nationalism and Euroscepticism as the EU is trying to enforce integration within the EU which arguably conflicts with national identity of the various nations; this combination of nationalism and Euroscepticism is what will formulate the analysis chapter and ultimately allow us to answer our research question.

In order to fully understand the selected concept of nationalism, one must first address the “us vs them” dichotomy, which is a viewpoint typically associated with ethnic nationalism; where “us” represents those native to a state and “them” is non-natives (Muller 2008: 1-10). If we take this and apply it to Britain then the “us” would be native Brits and the “them” would be immigrants, with our focus being on Central and Eastern European immigrants. According to Muller (2008), ethnonationalists see each nation as being a clear cut state in which people can only belong to

13 one, thus in the case of immigration, there would not be the possibility of assimilation as the immigrants do not belong to this new nation (Ibid). In other words, nationality is tied to blood and cannot change in a lifetime (Ibid).

To summarise, we will be underlining how the role of nationalism and national identity was implicit in the rise of Euroscepticism and how this aided the leave camps to win the Brexit vote. As nationalism is not explicitly referred to, we integrate it in our analysis and discussion chapters specifically in relation to nationalistic sentiments - namely, the five interpretations previously mentioned.

3.4. Populism

To complement the two main theories in this paper, the theoretical concept of populism will be incorporated primarily in reference to the first subquestion but also the second one. Populism can be seen as a political technique that is used by politicians to attract voters. According to Akkerman (2003), populism derived in the 1950s and the basic principles involve tapping into public opinion in order to create policies that fit these public opinions and in turn attract a larger electorate (Akkerman 2003: 148 - 151). A notable trait of these so-called populist parties is that they identify different social groups within wider society and target their perspectives in order to gain publicity and their vote (Ibid). Typically, these are the more marginalised and socially exposed groups like the working class/underclass, the unemployed, and young people, as they are more likely to have malleable interests (Ibid).

Populism is very typically associated with right wing politics and political parties, such as UKiP, due to their approach to policies on immigration, or rather anti-immigration (Akkerman 2003: 148 - 151). As will be further explained in our background chapter, UKiP started off as a single-issue Eurosceptic party and through the use of populist anti-immigration policies attracted a much larger voter base that accounted for 12.6% of the vote at the 2015 general election ( Electoral Commission 2015). Akkerman identifies two main types of populist voters; those who have “anti-immigration” views as was mentioned above, as well as protest voters, who are not satisfied with the current government and wish to see some (radical) change (Akkerman 2003: 148 - 151).

14 Despite the typical association of populism with right wing parties, it must be noted that there is also a type of populism used by the more mainstream parties know as “respectable populism” (Akkerman 2003: 148 - 151). This is different from the approach adopted by right wing parties who seek radical change and it typically involves just altering the party’s traditional viewpoints to something more modernised; incorporating a larger electorate (Ibid). The example given here is that of Tony Blair’s New Labour and how he helped to create a wider consensus amongst the party by ultimately making it less partisan and thus more available to the wider public (Ibid). In the analysis we will look at this respectable populism in relation to the Conservative Party and how they attempted to employ it as a political strategy but it did not have the desired outcome.

3.5. Use of Theory

As the theory that has been selected has now been explained, we will now briefly clarify how it will be specifically applied and utilised in order to answer our research question as a whole as well as our two sub questions individually. In the background- and first analysis- chapter (subquestion 1), we look at what factors contributed to the rise of UKiP and Euroscepticism and for this we will look more into the history of Euroscepticism and how it has developed through the years, taking Usherwood and Startin (2011) as a point of departure. In addition we will be stating why UKiP can be associated with Taggart’s hard Euroscepticism and the link between this and UKiP being a single issue anti-EU party. This will be be further backed up by a look at nationalistic sentiments in the UK as we hypothesise that an increase in nationalism in the UK - such as a strong sense of national identity - has led to increasing support for UKiP and an increase in Eurosceptic thinking, thus contributing to the rise- and relative success- of UKiP. This will in turn be used to support the claim that UKiP played a big role in the occurrence of Brexit. Populism will also be used throughout this subquestion in order to gain an understanding as to how UKiP moulded it’s policies by taking advantage of public concerns. The theory in this sub-question will be used in conjunction with journal articles and survey data in order to support the claims that will be made on UKiP and Euroscepticism.

Our second subquestion goes on to take an in-depth look at the Conservative Party and how it was very divided on the issue of the UK’s membership in the EU. We aim to research the extent

15 to which this divide within the party was influential in the outcome of the referendum. This will be done once more through Eurosceptic theory, giving us an idea of whether hard or soft Euroscepticism was prominent in the party. Furthermore, we will look at the history of the Conservative Party (starting in the background chapter) and how the it has changed from being the political party in the UK that was mostly in favour of the EU, to being very split on their opinions of the EU. We seek to find out what the underlying causes of this split was and look at the roles of individuals within the party that caused the divide as well as attempting to identify any external factors (besides Euroscepticism and nationalism) that can be seen as a factor in the split. The results that we find in our analysis chapter will then be discussed in detail in the following discussion chapter and be looked at in conjunction with further rhetoric surrounding Brexit.

16 Chapter 4: Background

The UK’s Relationship With the EU

4.1. Introduction

In order to identify and explain the factors that define British Euroscepticism it is necessary to look at the historical context in which they were situated, as well as how they developed over time. As a point of departure, we will look at Winston Churchill’s views on European integration (inferred from several of his key speeches and addresses during the late 1940s and early 1950s) and Margaret Thatcher’s Speech to the College of Europe on September 20, 1988. In conjunction with providing this context, we simultaneously discuss how each event was influential in contemporary Eurosceptic thinking in the UK - and England more specifically - in relation to three dominant approaches that seek to explain what drives Euroscepticism, which have been the focus of much past and contemporary literature. Specifically we use the identity-oriented approach (Goodwin and Milazzo 2015) to explain how immigration - as one of the main debate issues during the 2016 EU Referendum - drives nationalistic sentiments and, in turn, how it has been influential in determining support for- and opposition to- the EU. References to the third - utilitarian - approach will also be made in order to explain other factors that can potentially inspire support for the EU, as well Eurosceptic attitudes. Furthermore, we use the political-oriented approach (Goodwin and Milazzo 2015) to explain how domestic political organisations - in this case UKiP and the Conservative Party - tap into public considerations to gain electoral success. The latter approach will be briefly discussed at the end of the chapter in association with (and as an introduction to) the first subquestion, which will further analyse the rise and success of UKiP prior to- and during- the referendum; namely how the party utilised and, to some degree, manipulated public concerns over immigration and the economy to present negative images of the EU - thus pushing for the UK’s exit from the bloc.

17 4.2. British Euroscepticism

Among most, if not all, EU member states Britain has a long and embedded tradition of Euroscepticism (Goodwin and Milazzo 2015) that can be traced back to end the end of Second World War in 1945 (Gowland and Turner 2000). Winston Churchill’s views on European integration during the mid-1940s to the mid-1950s indicate that he was, to some degree, a supporter of European integration; although he was opposed to Britain being governed by a federalist European system (Ibid). His advocacy for European integration is most noticeable in his address at the University of Zurich (September 19, 1946) where he called for ‘United States of Europe’. However, it is noteworthy that, throughout the aforementioned time period he “portrayed Britain as a sponsor of rather than a participant in the new Europe” (Gowland and Turner 2000:2). Arguably, he placed more emphasis on the interests of the Britain’s Commonwealth and Britain’s ‘special relationship’ with the United States, rather than European integration (Gowland and Turner 2000). Although there has been much scholarly debate on Churchill’s position toward European integration, we draw parallels to an extract from one of his Cabinet notes on November 29, 1951 where - shortly after his return as British Prime Minister - he stated the following:

“I am not opposed to a European Federation including (eventually) the countries behind the Iron Curtain, providing that this comes about naturally and gradually. But I never thought that Britain or the British Commonwealth should either individually or collectively, become a part of a European Federation, and have never given the slightest support to the idea....Our first object is the unity and consolidation of the British Commonwealths and what is left of the British Empire. Our second, the ‘fraternal association’ of the English speaking world; and third, United Europe, to which we are a separate closely- and specially-related ally and friend”.

(Churchill cited in Gowland and Turner 2000:28).

18 From his statement it can be inferred that, at the time, Churchill’s vision for Europe was different from that of other member states in that he was opposed to Europe becoming a federal state - an idea that some federalists supported and of which has been widely contested till present day. Following the end of the Second World War and a period of decolonisation, Britain’s Empire started to slowly fall apart and, as such, Churchill prioritised cooperation among the commonwealth to maintain relations with Britain’s old colonies, as a foreign policy objective.

This type of thinking was further emphasised in Thatcher’s Speech to the College of Europe (“The Bruges Speech”) in 1988. During the 1960s and 1970s, the Conservatives saw the European Economic Community (EEC) as means through which to reduce economic decline, while Thatcher saw the European Community (EC) as threat to her domestic project of ‘rolling back the frontiers of the state’ (Menon and Fowler 2016). Thus, when Britain joined the EEC in 1973, it was signing up for a common market rather than for a further political union through a European federal state. In this regard, Eurosceptic thinking has been a consistent feature of British politics (Goodwin 2016).

In 1979, the European Monetary System was created to bring about currency stability through the co-ordination of member state’s monetary policies. To do so, an Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) was created to improve trade and develop the Single Market, leading the way to a single European currency. As Britain was the only EEC member not to join the ERM, its views on becoming part of a federalist European system were further made clear. On top of this, under the leadership of Thatcher, Britain threatened to halt EU budgets in 1984 after feeling it had been mistreated due to structural inequalities; despite being the third poorest EEC member, it was expected to contribute the most to the EU budget. This led to Thatcher negotiating an EU budget rebate in the Fontainebleau Summit (1984). Thus, Britain’s objection to join the ERM and the Fontainebleau Summit set the stage for future discussions - including Thatcher’s policies - on further European integration.

As mentioned in our discussion of Euroscepticism in the theory chapter, her Bruges speech was influential in mainstream Eurosceptic thinking (Usherwood and Startin 2013). Her views were similar to that of Churchill in the sense that she argued for a more united Europe, emphasising

19 both Britain’s close ties with the continent and the need for future cooperation between the two. Furthermore, she stressed that all members of the then European Community must cooperate in trade and defense in order to enhance the Community’s interests and achieve its objectives. In this sense, Thatcher can be seen as supportive of some aspects of European integration - in line with Taggart’s view of soft Euroscepticism. For example, in support of the free market project, she signed the Single European Act (SEA) on February 17, 1986, which came into effect on July 1, 1987.

However, she was critical of the Community in several other aspects. In her first guiding principle for the future of Europe, she emphasised the notions of independency and sovereignty; namely, that the centralisation of power in a ‘European conglomerate’ would jeopardise the Community’s objectives (Thatcher 1988). In this sense, she highlighted the importance of each state’s individual identity and opposed the idea of a European ‘identikit’ (Ibid). Referring to how the Soviet Union centralised power prior to the fall of the Iron Curtain, she argued that Europe could only move forward by doing the opposite: “we have not successfully rolled back the frontiers of the state in Britain, only to see them re-imposed at a European level with a European super-state exercising a new dominance from Brussels” (Ibid). Thus, future cooperation - through a common purpose - could only be achieved by preserving the national pride and identity of each Community member. As mentioned in the theory chapter, it is this sense of uniqueness that is often a feature of Euroscepticism - reinforcing the ‘us’ versus ‘them’ dichotomy.

Much literature that has attempted to identify and explain the causes of Euroscepticism find that they are embedded within three competing approaches (Hooghe and Marks 2005; De Vreese and Boomgaarden 2005; Goodwin and Milazzo 2015). In line with Thatcher’s first guiding principle, the first - ‘identity’ - approach stresses the importance of cultural issues - such as immigration and perceived threats to identity, culture and values - as influential in determining Euroscepticism (Goodwin and Milazzo, 2015). From this perspective, the EU can be conceived as “a polity overarching established territorial communities, and considers how public opinion is constrained by citizens’ conceptions of their identities” (Hooghe & Marks, 2005: 420). Thus,

20 anxieties over European integration is more about a “pooling of national sovereignty and communities” (Goodwin and Milazzo, 2015:5) because it brings different peoples and cultures together. It is within this a system of multi-level governance that national self determination is undermined and the boundaries between distinct national communities are blurred (Hooghe & Marks, 2005).

While Thatcher was an advocate of free and open enterprise through the European Single Market (1992) - outlined in her third guiding principle - she argued that frontier controls were necessary to protect British citizens “from crime and stop the movement of drugs, of terrorists and of illegal immigrants” (Thatcher 1988). Such thinking is useful for understanding the undergoing negotiations between the UK and the EU. In negotiating the terms of Brexit, Theresa May - the current British Prime Minister - wants the UK to have access to the Single Market but, at the same time, control over its borders (for the aforementioned purposes) (May 2016).

The second - ‘utilitarian’ - approach to Euroscepticism emphasises concerns in terms of the economic costs and benefits of EU membership. From this perspective it is assumed that this ‘cost-benefit’ analysis can explain public support for the European integration in terms of income and occupational skills (De Vreese and Boomgaarden 2005) . This approach is useful for understanding Thatcher’s - and more broadly the UK’s - support for trade liberalisation and opposition to protectionism, outlined in her third- and- fourth guiding principles. As trade liberalisation benefits those with higher human capital and disadvantages those with less (Hooghe and Marks 2005), it is expected that in capital-rich member states unskilled workers are likely to be Eurosceptic while skilled workers (such as managers and professionals) are likely to be pro-EU (Ibid). As will be shown later on in our analysis, such considerations can explain the divisive outcome of the 2016 EU Referendum in terms of socio-demographic differences between poorer regions that favour decentralisation and more prosperous regions (e.g. London) that favour centralisation. Access to the Single Market would, for example, only benefit those Britons who are economically secure, higher educated, higher skilled and socially mobile; those on the opposite end of the spectrum would likely face competition from the Single Market and, thus, tend to be Eurosceptic (Goodwin and Milazzo, 2015).

21 While supportive of closer economic, political and strategic cooperation between Britain and the Community, it can be argued that, in many ways, Thatcher was the first leader leader to directly challenge the direction in which the EU was headed (Usherwood and Startin 2013). Prior to this, by the mid- to late 1980s, EU member states seemed to reach a broad consensus on the value of economic integration exemplified in the EU’s single market project (Ibid). Thus, it can be argued that the emergence of opposition to the EU has its origins in the discourse surrounding the points made by Thatcher in 1988. This point is further illustrated by looking at the British opposition to the Maastricht Treaty in 1992. Known as the Maastricht Rebels, they were a group of Conservative MPs who - supported by Thatcher - sought a referendum on the Maastricht Treaty in 1992 to prevent its implementation, challenging the then Prime Minister John Major’s views of deeper European integration. As elaborated below, it was the Maastricht Rebels that led to the formation of the Anti-Federalist League, which eventually became UKiP.

4.3. UKiP and Euroscepticism

The third - ‘political’ - approach suggests that public opinion about the EU is strongly influenced by domestic politics, where referenda serve as a means for voters to display their (dis)content with the incumbent party of government or politicians (Goodwin and Milazzo, 2015). The political approach is useful in explaining how domestic political organisations and political ideology mediate identity- and utilitarian- considerations; namely, national governments and domestic parties will seek to tap into public consideration to gain electoral success (Hooghe & Marks, 2005), as UKiP and the Conservative Party did prior to the 2016 EU Referendum. However, the extent to which each party was able to convince the public of which considerations - the economy or immigration - were of higher salience differed to a high degree, as will be shown in the analysis chapter.

UKiP can be seen as a single-issue Eurosceptic political party that is be associated with the right wing of the political spectrum. In 1991, Alan Sked founded the Anti-Federalist League (AFL), a political group that opposed the Maastricht Treaty. The AFL was what, through its key members, developed into UKiP in 1993, where the primary political aims were of hard Euroscepticism and limiting immigration to the UK (Ford and Goodwin 1994: 12-13). Here it has been inferred that

22 Nigel Farage who was leader of UKiP between 2006-2009 and 2010-2016 learned from the political strategy of the Liberal Democrats, in the sense of taking domestic, local and parliamentary by-elections (Ibid). Farage also helped UKiP develop their policies to focus on the fusion of Europe and immigration. This shift in policy helped UKiP to mobilise far more voters from different social groups, arguably the most influential one being the blue-collar, old, white and male voter with limited education (Ibid). In the 2015 general election UKiP gained a significantly high 12.6% of votes from the British public despite only winning a single seat in the British Parliament; this was a sharp increase from the 3.1% of votes it won in the previous election (electoral commission 2015). UKiP has also had recent history of success at the European Parliament, being the most voted for party at the 2014 European Parliament election with 26.6% of the votes and winning them 24 seats.

4.4. Sub-conclusion

To briefly conclude, we have shown that Britain has long been somewhat sceptical about the benefits of European integration. These can be traced back to the views of Thatcher and Churchill who placed emphasis on Britain’s unique history and identity in relation to the other European states. Most notably, their support for future economic integration can be seen in Churchill’s ‘Zurich Speech’ and Thatcher’s ‘Speech to the College of Europe’, respectively. In the sense that they were both advocates of the Franco-German project, along the lines of future economic and strategic cooperation, it would seem incorrect to label them as hard Eurosceptics.

Rather, it is our view that Churchill can be categorised as a soft-Eurosceptic because, while in favour of some aspects of European integration, he opposed the idea of further political unionisation through the establishment of a European federal system. In this regard - and in line with the premises of soft-Euroscepticism - he saw the national interests of Britain as misaligned with those of the Franco-German project; namely, he prioritised cooperation and coordination among Britain’s Commonwealth and its ‘special relationship’ with the United States. Similarly, we would classify Thatcher as a soft-Eurosceptic, albeit to a higher degree. Notably, in her Bruges Speech she portrayed a critical stance on European integration, seeing the European Community (EC) as threat to her domestic project of ‘rolling back the frontiers of the state’

23 (Menon and Fowler 2016). Most significantly, this led to the formation of the Bruges group in 1988, who originally promoted a less centralised European structure. Furthermore, her negotiations for an EU budget rebate in the Fontainebleau Summit (1984) indicated she was unwilling to submit certain EU regulations and policies. Of historical importance was Thatcher’s objection to the Maastricht Treaty (1992) that led to the formation of the Maastricht Rebels, which later became the Anti-Federalist League and later, UKiP. Also of importance was the 1975 Referendum on UK membership in the EEC, to be discussed in the following chapter. Both the texts and events discussed throughout this background chapter indicate that British Euroscepticism is entrenched both in its ‘unique’ history (compared with other European states) as well as how this history has been portrayed by its leaders - thus Churchill’s and Thatcher’s argumentation for not wanting further political unionisation. As will be shown in the following chapter, we argue that British Euroscepticism has developed from such core principles - namely those centered around economic integration - to more novel considerations - those of identity and immigration concerns, regarding European integration.

24 Chapter 5: Analysis (Part 1) British Euroscepticism and the Rise of UKiP

5.1. Introduction: History Revisited

As highlighted in the theory chapter, Euroscepticism can be seen as a fluid concept and, as such, it cannot always be located within one particular orientation. Rather, as mentioned in our background chapter, it is shaped by the context in which it operates (Usherwood 2016). Broadly speaking, the driving forces behind Euroscepticism can be noticed in feelings of dissatisfaction and disengagement, nationalism and identity politics, economic and social marginalisation (Ibid).

The first aim of the chapter is to analyse the British position on the (ongoing) immigration debate, from a historical perspective. Next, it briefly discusses how the 1975 Referendum on Britain’s membership in the European Economic Community (EEC) helped to shape present British Euroscepticism. We then look at which of these feelings are most prevalent in modern day Euroscepticism in the UK. Here, we refer to both academic literature and statistical findings from the Migration Observatory (2016). Finally, we take a brief look at how UKiP utilised the political strategy of populism regarding such concerns; enmeshing the debate over the economic (dis)advantages of UK membership in the EU with anti-immigration and identity related sentiments.

In order to understand the British position on immigration some historical context - excluded from the background chapter - should be provided, because such views on immigration are often embedded in state’s histories and socio-cultural circumstances (Jackson et al, 2001). Large-scale immigration has long been present in the UK, with the majority of immigrants being New Commonwealth citizens who came from India, Pakistan, Bangladesh and the Caribbean. Hence, previous UK integration models centred around ‘race-relations’, whereas now the picture looks different with immigration becoming more temporary and diverse in nature - namely it stems from the newer A8 EU member states - which will be elaborated in section 5.3. Due to a high increase of Commonwealth citizens coming to the UK, the 1962 Commonwealth Immigrants Act saw a tightening of immigration. Although historically it was not a dominant feature in political

25 and media debate, recent decades have shown that the issue has risen to prominence (Saggar and Sommerville 2012).

At the international- and national- levels, the immigration debate within Europe is centered around contesting discourses emerging from the various perceptions, attachments and definitions of the issue. In Europe, the dominant discourses view and present immigration as a security threat (Boin et al. 2015), while public opinion in the UK suggests that there is a general trend of British hostility toward immigration accounting for around 3/4 of the population (Saggar and Sommerville 2012:4). Therefore, the United Kingdom opted out of the Schengen Agreement (1985) and Schengen II (1990) “because its island status greatly eases immigration control and because the United Kingdom negotiates further integration with the goal of advancing its self-interest, not Europe's construction’’ (Juss 2005: 775).

When Thatcher became Party leader of the Conservatives in 1975, she insisted on tougher immigration policies, emphasising the ‘cultural’ threat posed by immigrants, as well as suggesting the party seek to end immigration. However, when Cameron became the new Conservative leader in 2010, he most remained silent on the issue for the first year-and-a-half due to criticism by the more liberal middle-class. Although the Conservatives began to indirectly readdress the issue, it was of little salience in their 2010 manifesto - in contrast in to the party’s previous manifestos. This point is significant for understanding Cameron’s failure in drawing voter support for the remain camps, which is elaborated on in chapter 6.

Using Churchill’s and Thatcher’s views on European integration as a point of departure from which to understand the nature of political debate over UK-EU relations, British Euroscepticism was further reflected in the 1975 Referendum on whether Britain should remain or leave the EEC. According to Andrew Glencross (2016) this event resulted in a 40-year “neverendum”. In their analysis of data from the British Election Study (BSE) on over 30,000 respondents, conducted during the time of the 2015 general election, Goodwin and Milazzo (2015) find that since the early 1970s the average Briton has been (significantly) less enthusiastic about the EU and European integration than citizens of other member states (although this gap has decreased over time). Although in many regards - as will be shown - the (two-third) majority of the British

26 public wanted Britain to remain in the EEC, “mass pro-Europeanism was clearly absent” (Goodwin and Milazzo 2015:2). It can be argued that British Euroscepticism is exceptionalist in that its approach to European integration is different from mainstream Western European tradition (Glencross 2016:7). As highlighted in Churchill’s and Thatcher’s views on European integration, the UK’s inability to “perceive sufficient benefits from pooling sovereignty” was why the UK did not originally join the Franco-German project (Ibid). Thus, the outcome of the 1975 Referendum can be seen as a vote for a common market rather than a political union (through a European federal superstate).

In chapter 6, we show that it was David Cameron’s miscalculation of this cost-benefit analysis that cost the him the election and that was a major factor in the Brexit outcome (Glencross 2016). As will be discussed in further detail, his emphasis on the economic implications of EU membership led to further uncertainty and scepticism - within the Conservative Party and among the British public - about what it would mean for the UK to remain in the EU (Ibid). Furthermore, it was his lack of emphasis on identity- and immigration- related considerations that swayed public support toward a non-mainstream party - UKiP - that sought to address such issues (Ibid). This allowed for UKiP to politicise the debate on immigration and identity, which was influential in their rise and, to some degree, success in the 2016 EU Referendum.

5.2. Statistical Findings

Based on the previous considerations, traditional British Euroscepticism can be to said to have developed from its origins in one of the core principles in the 1975 Referendum - the economic implications of EEC membership - toward more novel considerations; namely those pertaining to (national) identity and immigration. Thus, it can be argued that, the widespread public scepticism and uncertainty about the UK’s membership is rooted in such cultural concerns.

Figure 1 shows that the salience of immigration - compared to the economy - has risen to prominence particularly from the early 2000s, which is related to the EU’s enlargement to include the A8 member states in 2004. Following the 2008-2009 financial crisis, the economy was arguably prioritised as the highest salient issue. However, at the time of the 2016 EU referendum (in June 2016), double the number of respondents (48%) prioritised immigration as

27 the most salient issue above those (24%) who prioritised the economy. Furthermore, data from the Standard EB85 (May 2016) is supportive of such findings. When asked about the two most important issues facing the UK (QA3a), once again double the number (38%) of respondents prioritised immigration compared to those who prioritised the economy (19%). The former finding is identical to that found in figure 1 while the latter is 5 percentage points less (24% prioritised the economy in May 2015). Consequently this has led to a preference for reducing immigration among the British public, as shown in figure 2.

Figure 1