DOCSLIB.ORG

Leeson Cv.Pdf

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Leeson Cv.Pdf PETER T. LEESON Department of Economics George Mason University MS 3G4 Fairfax, VA 22030 [email protected] Birthdate July 29, 1979 Citizenship USA Undergraduate Studies Hillsdale College, BA, summa cum laude, 2001 Graduate Studies George Mason University, PhD, 2005 Harvard University, Visiting Fellow, 2004 ACADEMIC POSITIONS Université Panthéon-Assas, Visiting Professor of Economics, 2018-2019 Université Sorbonne Paris Nord, Visiting Professor of Economics, 2018 Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IFN), Stockholm, Sweden, Visiting Researcher, 2011 Tilburg University Law and Economics Center, Visitor, 2010 University of Chicago, Visiting Professor of Economics, 2009-2010 George Mason University, Duncan Black Professor of Economics and Law, 2007- West Virginia University, Assistant Professor of Economics, 2005-2007 Max Planck Institute of Economics, Jena, Germany, Visiting Scholar, 2005 London School of Economics, F.A. Hayek Fellow, 2005 EDITORIAL POSITIONS Consulting Editor, European Journal of Law and Economics, 2019- 1 Scientific Committee, Journal of Public Finance and Public Choice 2018- Editorial Board, Anthem Press, Anthem Anarchist Studies, 2018- International Advisory Board, Journal of Institutional Economics, 2018- Editorial Board, Molinari Review, 2014- North American Editor, Public Choice, 2010- Associate Editor, Studies in Emergent Order, 2010-2014 Editorial Board, Journal of Private Enterprise, 2009- Associate Editor, Review of Austrian Economics, 2005- OTHER AFFILIATIONS Chairman, Board of Academic Advisors, Greater Mekong Research Center, Phnom Penh, Cambodia, 2017- Adjunct Faculty, Antonin Scalia School of Law, George Mason University, 2014- Board of Scholars, Foundation for Economic Education, 2012- Senior Scholar, F.A. Hayek Program for Advanced Study in Philosophy, Politics, and Economics, Mercatus Center, George Mason University, 2012- Associate Faculty, Center for the Study of Public Choice, George Mason University, 2011- International Advisory Board, Institutions and Political Economy Group, University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, South Africa, 2010- Associate Faculty, Center for Global Studies, George Mason University, 2010- Advisory Board, Cobden Centre, London, UK, 2009- Distinguished Scholar, Center for the Study of Political Economy, Hampden-Sydney College, 2008- Research Fellow, Independent Institute, 2008- Executive Committee, Society for the Development of Austrian Economics, 2007-2009 2 Board of Scholars, Virginia Institute for Public Policy, 2007- Senior Fellow, Mercatus Center, George Mason University, 2006- Adjunct Scholar, Mackinac Center for Public Policy, 1997- AWARDS AND FELLOWSHIPS Fellow, Royal Society of Arts, 2017 Paper of the Year Award, Journal of Private Enterprise, “A Note on the Market Provision of National Defense” (with C. Coyne and T. Duncan), 2015 Outstanding Paper Award, Journal of Entrepreneurship and Public Policy, “The Brewer, the Baker, and the Monopoly Maker” (with D. Thomas), 2013 Emerging Scholar Award, George Mason University, 2011 Distinguished Scholar Award, Association for Private Enterprise Education, 2011 FEE Best Book Prize, Society for the Development of Austrian Economics, The Invisible Hook: The Hidden Economics of Pirates (Princeton University Press), 2010 Gold Medal INDIEFAB Book of the Year Award, Foreword Reviews, The Invisible Hook: The Hidden Economics of Pirates (Princeton University Press), 2009 Best International Non-Fiction Book, The Week, The Invisible Hook: The Hidden Economics of Pirates (Princeton University Press), 2009 Best 100 Books of 2009, San Francisco Chronicle, The Invisible Hook: The Hidden Economics of Pirates (Princeton University Press), 2009 FEE Best Article Prize, Society for the Development of Austrian Economics, “An-arrgh-chy: The Law and Economics of Pirate Organization” (Journal of Political Economy), 2008 Olive W. Garvey Prize, Independent Institute, “Escaping Poverty: Foreign Aid, Private Property, and Economic Development” (Journal of Private Enterprise), 2007 Hayek Prize, Fund for the Study of Spontaneous Orders, 2007 Kendrick Fund Summer Fellow, West Virginia University, 2006-2007 Israel M. Kirzner Award, George Mason University, Cooperation and Conflict: Self-Enforcing Exchange among Socially Heterogeneous Agents, 2005 3 Oloffson Weaver Fellow in Political Economy, George Mason University, 2004-2005 Ludwig von Mises Research Fellow, Review of Austrian Economics, 2002-2005 Donald Lavoie Memorial Award, George Mason University, “Trading with Bandits” (Journal of Law and Economics), 2004 James M. Buchanan Center for Political Economy Graduate Fellow, George Mason University, 2001-2004 Earhart Foundation Summer Fellow, George Mason University, 2002-2003 Wall Street Journal Award, Hillsdale College, 2001 JOURNAL ARTICLES “Trading with the Dead.” Review of Law and Economics, forthcoming. “Public Choice and Public Health” (with H. Thompson). Public Choice, forthcoming. “The Golden Age of Mercenaries” (with E. Piano). European Review of Economic History 25(3) 2021: 429-446. “Different Data Produce Different Results” (with R. Sobel). Public Finance Review 49(4) 2021: 627-630 “Kornai Goes to Kenya” (with C. Harris and A. Myers). Public Choice 187(1) 2021: 99-110. “Externality and Covid-19” (with L. Rouanet). Southern Economic Journal 87(4) 2021: 1107- 1118. “Harmful Magic, Helpful Governance.” Current Anthropology 62(1) 2021: 17-18. “Are Anarcho-Capitalists Insane? Medieval Icelandic Conflict Institutions in Comparative Perspective” (with V. Geloso). Revue d’Économie Politique 130(6) 2020: 957-974. “One Rationality to Rule Them All.” Social Science Information 59(4) 2020: 563-568. “Economics is Not Statistics (and Vice Versa).” Journal of Institutional Economics 16(4) 2020: 423-425. “Regulating Quack Medicine” (with S. King and T. Fegley). Public Choice 182(3) 2020: 273- 286. 4 “Logic is a Harsh Mistress: Welfare Economics for Economists.” Journal of Institutional Economics 16(2) 2020: 145-150. “Do We Need Behavioral Economics to Explain Law?” European Journal of Law and Economics 48(1) 2019: 29-42. “Testing Rational Choice Theories of Institutional Change” (with C. Harris). Rationality and Society 30(4) 2018: 420-431. “Witch Trials” (with J. Russ). Economic Journal 128(613) 2018: 2066-2105. “Wealth-Destroying Private Property Rights” (with C. Harris). World Development 107 2018: 1- 9. “Child Brides” (with P. Suarez). Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 144 2017: 40- 61. “Economic Origins of the No-Fault Divorce Revolution” (with J. Pierson). European Journal of Law and Economics 43(3) 2017: 419-439. “Prenups” (with J. Pierson). Journal of Legal Studies 45(2) 2016: 367-400. “An Economic Analysis of Magna Carta” (with P. Suarez). International Review of Law and Economics 47 2016: 40-46. “Market-Provided National Defense: Reply to Newhard” (with C. Coyne and T. Duncan). Journal of Private Enterprise 31(2) 2016: 83-86. “Institutionally Constrained Technology Adoption: Resolving the Longbow Puzzle” (with D. Allen). Journal of Law and Economics 58(3) 2015: 683-715. “Superstition and Self-Governance” (with P. Suarez). Advances in Austrian Economics 19 2015: 57-66. “Wife Sales” (with P. Boettke and J. Lemke). Review of Behavioral Economics 1(4) 2014: 349- 379. “Celestial Anarchy” (with A. Salter). Cato Journal 34(3) 2014: 581-596. “A Note on the Market Provision of National Defense” (with C. Coyne and T. Duncan). Journal of Private Enterprise 29(2) 2014: 51-55. “Pirates, Prisoners, and Preliterates: Anarchic Context and the Private Enforcement of Law.” European Journal of Law and Economics 37(3) 2014: 365-379. 5 “Earw(h)ig: I Can’t Hear You because Your Ideas are Old” (with P. Boettke and C. Coyne). Cambridge Journal of Economics 38(3) 2014: 531-544. “Oracles.” Rationality and Society 26(2) 2014: 141-169. “God Damn: The Law and Economics of Monastic Malediction.” Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 30(1) 2014: 193-216. “Homo Economicus Lives: Some Implications for Humanitarian Assistance.” Studies in Emergent Order 7(1) 2014: 103-112. “The Costs of Conflict” (with A. Smith, D. Houser, and R. Ostad). Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 97(1) 2014: 61-71. “Human Sacrifice.” Review of Behavioral Economics 1(1-2) 2014: 137-165. “Vermin Trials.” Journal of Law and Economics 56(3) 2013: 811-836. “Comparative Historical Political Economy” (with P. Boettke and C. Coyne). Journal of Institutional Economics 9(3) 2013: 285-301. “The Amplification Effect: Foreign Aid’s Impact on Political Institutions” (with N. Dutta and C. Williamson). Kyklos 66(2) 2013: 208-228. “Gypsy Law.” Public Choice 155(3-4) 2013: 273-292. “Billionaires” (with T. Sanandaji). Industrial and Corporate Change 22(1) 2013: 313-337. “Ordeals.” Journal of Law and Economics 55(3) 2012: 691-714. “Organizing Crime” (with D. Rogers). Supreme Court Economic Review 20(1) 2012: 89-123. “The Irrelevance of Normative Considerations for Founding an Austrian Law and Economics: Reply to Marciano.” Review of Austrian Economics 25(4) 2012: 355-357. “Chicken Soup for the Out-of-Step Scholar’s Soul” (with G. Callahan). American Journal of Economics and Sociology 71(5) 2012: 1157-1169. “Sassywood” (with C. Coyne). Journal of Comparative Economics 40(4) 2012: 608-620. “Cultural Codes: An Economic Analysis.” Journal of Multicultural Discourses 7(3) 2012: 227- 233. “Wisdom, Alterability, and Social Rules” (with C. Coyne). Managerial and Decision Economics 33(5-6) 2012: 441-451. 6 “An Austrian Approach to Law and Economics, with Special Reference to Superstition.”
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Public Choice and Public Health
    Public Choice https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-021-00900-2 Public choice and public health Peter T. Leeson1 · Henry A. Thompson1 Received: 3 March 2021 / Accepted: 12 March 2021 © The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Springer Science+Business Media, LLC, part of Springer Nature 2021 Abstract Public choice scholars have attended only modestly to issues in public health. We expect that to change rapidly given the Covid-19 pandemic. The time therefore is ripe for tak- ing stock of public-choice relevant scholarship that addresses issues in public health. That is what we do. Our stock-taking highlights three themes: (1) Public health regulations often are driven by private interests, not public ones. (2) The allocation of public health resources often refects private interests, not public ones. (3) Public health policies may have perverse efects, undermining instead of promoting health-consumer welfare. Keywords Public choice · Public health · COVID-19 · Interest groups JEL Classifcations D72 · I18 1 Introduction Public health is “The health of the population as a whole, esp. as monitored, regulated, and promoted by the state” (Oxford English Dictionary, 2020). Public choice is “the applica- tion of the principles of maximizing behavior…to institutions and behavior in the political world” (Tollison, 2004, p. 191).1 You might therefore think that public health has attracted major attention from public choice scholars. But then you would be wrong. The Elgar Companion to Public Choice (Reksulak et al. 2014), an “authoritative and encyclopaedic reference work” of more than 600 pages that “provides a thorough account of the public choice approach”, contains just six pages on which the term health (or a vari- ant) appears.
    [Show full text]
  • Peter J. Boettke
    PETER J. BOETTKE BB&T Professor for the Study of Capitalism, Mercatus Center at George Mason University, & University Professor of Economics and Philosophy Department of Economics, MSN 3G4 George Mason University Fairfax, VA 22030 Tel: 703-993-1149 Fax: 703-993-1133 Web: http://www.peter-boettke.com http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/cf_dev/AbsByAuth.cfm?per_id=182652 http://www.coordinationproblem.org PERSONAL Date of birth: January 3, 1960 Nationality: United States EDUCATION Ph.D. in Economics, George Mason University, January, 1989 M.A. in Economics, George Mason University, January, 1987 B.A. in Economics, Grove City College, May, 1983 TITLE OF DOCTORAL THESIS: The Political Economy of Soviet Socialism, 1918-1928 PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE Academic Positions 1987 –88 Visiting Assistant Professor, Department of Economics, George Mason University 1988 –90 Assistant Professor, Department of Economics, School of Business Administration, Oakland University, Rochester, MI 48309 1990 –97 Assistant Professor, Department of Economics, New York University, New York, NY 10003 1997 –98 Associate Professor, Department of Economics and Finance, School of Business, Manhattan College, Riverdale, NY 10471 1998 – 2003 Associate Professor, Department of Economics, George Mason University, Fairfax, VA 22030 (tenured Fall 2000) 2003 –07 Professor, Department of Economics, George Mason University, Fairfax, VA 22030 2007 – University Professor, George Mason University 2011 – Affiliate Faculty, Department of Philosophy, George Mason University FIELDS OF INTEREST
    [Show full text]
  • ROGER W. GARRISON Curriculum Vitae (Fall 2011)
    ROGER W. GARRISON Curriculum Vitae (Fall 2011) BUSINESS ADDRESS AND PHONE: HOME ADDRESS AND PHONE: Department of Economics 2017 Country Squire Road Auburn University Auburn, AL 36830 Auburn, AL 36849 (334) 826-7416 (334) 844-2920 FAX: (334) 844-4615 PERSONAL DATA: Email: [email protected] Married: Karen Lynn (Harrison) Website: http://www.auburn.edu/~garriro One child: James Eric (1991) DEGREES: Ph. D. 1981 Economics University of Virginia M.A. 1974 Economics University of Missouri at Kansas City B.S. 1967 Electrical Engineering University of Missouri at Rolla FIELDS OF RESEARCH: Major Fields: Macroeconomics, Monetary Theory Minor Fields: Capital and Interest, History of Economic Thought PERMANENT ACADEMIC POSITION: Department of Economics September 1996 - Professor Auburn University September 1988 - September 1996 Associate Professor Auburn, Alabama September 1981 - September 1988 Assistant Professor September 1978 - December 1980 Instructor VISITING ACADEMIC POSITIONS: London School of Economics May/June 2003 First Visiting Hayek Fellow (Suntory London, England and Toyota International Centers for Economics and Related Disciplines) Department of Economics January-May 1981 Adjunct Assistant Professor New York University and Post-Doctoral Fellow NON-ACADEMIC POSITIONS AND MILITARY SERVICE: July 1973 - December 1974 Research Associate, Department of Bank Supervision and Structure, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, Kansas City, Mo. April 1967 - April 1971 Commissioned Service (Captain), United States Air Force Rome Air Development Center, Griffiss AFB, Rome, New York. ROGER W. GARRISON PAGE 2 COURSES TAUGHT: TEACHING HONORS: Principles of Macroeconomics (mass lectures) 1988: Named Mortar Board Favorite Principles of Microeconomics (mass lectures) Professor Economics and Society Money and Banking 1989: Inducted into Omicron Delta Kappa History of Economic Thought Intermediate Macroeconomics 1997: Delivered Ludwig Lachmann Business Conditions Analysis (MBA program) Memorial Lecture (Johannesburg, Macroeconomics I (Ph.D.
    [Show full text]
  • Exchange, Production, and Samaritan Dilemmas
    Munich Personal RePEc Archive Exchange, production, and Samaritan dilemmas Boettke, Peter George Mason University 2010 Online at https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/33199/ MPRA Paper No. 33199, posted 06 Sep 2011 15:13 UTC Exchange, Production, and Samaritan Dilemmas ∗ + Peter Boettke and Adam Martin Libertarians are surprisingly comfortable with basic income policy and related proposals. The classic statement, of course, is Milton Friedman’s ‘negative income tax’ proposal from Capitalism and Freedom (1962). Though the demand for a “basic income policy” is different in the sense that it is usually associated with an unconditional guarantee to an income to each citizen in the absence of a means test and any work requirement, the negative income tax proposal was designed to be administratively cost cutting with respect to welfare policies while operationalizing the intent of a basic income policy to provide citizens with the financial floor required for human dignity. Charles Murray (2006, 2008) has defended it as a potential compromise between libertarians and liberals as a measure replacing the welfare state. Hayek (1944, 1960), while lambasting proposals to engineer the overall pattern of income distribution, defends the idea of a minimum income floor, one of the primary aims of basic income advocates. And libertarian economists have long recognized that, given the existence of redistribution, simple cash transfers are preferable to the bureaucratic machinery necessary for rationing specific goods. We take issue with this conciliatory attitude. Though it is beyond the scope of this short essay to present anything like a comprehensive appraisal of basic income policy ∗ University Professor of Economics at George Mason University, and BB&T Professor for the Study of Capitalism at Mercatus Center.
    [Show full text]
  • Anarchism and Austrian Economics
    View metadata, citation and similar papers at core.ac.uk brought to you by CORE provided by Munich Personal RePEc Archive MPRA Munich Personal RePEc Archive Anarchism and Austrian economics Peter Boettke George Mason University 2011 Online at https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/33069/ MPRA Paper No. 33069, posted 30. August 2011 16:16 UTC Anarchism and Austrian Economics Peter Boettke I. Introduction It is a great honor for me to give the Cuhel Memorial Lecture at the Prague Conference on Political Economy for 2011. Franz Cuhel rightly holds an honored place in the development of the pure theory of the Austrian school of economics.1 Ludwig von Mises credits Cuhel (1907) with providing the first presentation of a strict ordinal marginal utility analysis. The confusion in choice theory that eventually lead to the purging of the human element in the economic analysis of decision making would have been avoided had Cuhel’s ordinal presentation of marginal utility analysis been more widely accepted. Instead, it was for Mises (1949) and later Rothbard (1962b) to develop that presentation and offer it as an alternative to the neoclassical theory of microeconomics that developed after John Hicks’ (1939) Value and Capital. The implications, I would argue, are far greater than the technical issues of ordinal versus cardinal utility and the subsequent debate among ordinal utility theorists of marginal utility analysis and demonstrated preference versus marginal rates of substitution and indifference curve analysis, etc. The implications of the debate in choice theory go to core of how we view the individual that we study in economics.2 The University Professor of Economics at George Mason University, and BB&T Professor for the Study of Capitalism at the Mercatus Center.
    [Show full text]
  • Beyond Individualism and Spontaneity: Comments on Peter Boettke and Christopher Coyneଝ Michael D
    Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization Vol. 57 (2005) 167–172 Beyond individualism and spontaneity: Comments on Peter Boettke and Christopher Coyneଝ Michael D. McGinnis ∗ Department of Political Science, Woodburn Hall 210, 1100 E. 7th Street, Indiana University, Bloomington, IN 47405-6001, USA Received 30 January 2004; received in revised form 1 May 2004; accepted 7 June 2004 Available online 26 February 2005 Abstract This paper builds on the work of Boettke and Coyne that locates the research of Elinor and Vincent Ostrom and their Workshop colleagues within a broad intellectual tradition of long duration. It is argued that the Ostroms and the rest of the Workshop have made rather substantial departures beyond these intellectual forebears than may be evident from Boettke and Coyne’s overview. Specific focus is placed on two of the major points that they discuss: methodological individualism and spontaneous order. © 2005 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved. JEL classification: B4 Keywords: Elinor Ostrom; Vincent Ostrom; Methodological individualism; Spontaneous order I want to thank Peter Boettke and Christopher Coyne for writing this excellent back- ground paper locating the research of Elinor and Vincent Ostrom and their Workshop colleagues within a broad intellectual tradition of long duration. I have been associated with the Workshop for a little over ten years now, and it is reassuring to realize that I am ଝ Prepared for presentation at the Academic Conference in Honor of the Work of Elinor and Vincent Ostrom, George Mason University Law School, November 7, 2003. ∗ Tel.: +1 812 855 8784/0441; fax: +1 812 855 2027. E-mail address: [email protected].
    [Show full text]
  • 1 an Austrian Approach to Law and Economics, with Special Reference
    1 An Austrian approach to law and economics, with special reference to superstition* Peter T. Leeson Abstract This paper has two purposes. First, it considers what the components of an “Austrian” law and economics might consist of. I argue that Ronald Coase’s conception of law and economics precludes the economic analysis of legal institutions and, in particular, the beliefs that support them. In doing so, Coase’s conception precludes an Austrian law and economics. In contrast, Richard Posner’s conception of law and economics makes such analysis the core of its study. In doing so, Posner’s conception provides a productive foundation for an Austrian law and economics. Second, to illustrate what some aspects of an Austrian law and economics might look like in practice, I consider several examples of the economic analysis of beliefs of import for the law. I focus on objectively false beliefs, or superstitions, and argue that some such beliefs are socially productive. JEL codes: B53, D8, K00, K49, Z12 Keywords: Austrian-Chicago synthesis, law and economics; Coase; Posner; superstition; beliefs; economic analysis of law * Email: [email protected]. Address: Department of Economics, George Mason University, MS 3G4, Fairfax, VA 22030, USA. I thank Pete Boettke and Chris Coyne for helpful comments and discussion. I also thank the Mercatus Center at George Mason University for financial support. 2 1 Introduction A hallmark of the Austrian approach to economic science is its emphasis on individuals’ beliefs.1 This emphasis derives from the importance the Austrian approach attaches to subjectivism. According to that approach, to understand observed patterns of human decision making and its results, you must understand the “meanings” humans attach to their actions and the problem situations they confront.
    [Show full text]
  • Pirates and the Uses of History
    © ephemera 2010 reviews ISSN 1473-2866 ephemera www.ephemeraweb.org theory & politics in organization volume 10(2): 194-198 Pirates and the uses of history Martin Parker review of: Gabriel Kuhn (2010) Life under the Jolly Roger: Reflections on golden age piracy. Oakland, CA: PM Press. (PB: pp. 272, $20.00, ISBN: 9781604860528) Peter T. Leeson (2009) The invisible hook: The hidden economics of pirates. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. (PB: pp. 288, £11.95, ISBN: 9780691150093) When research, teaching and writing about history is being done, it is usually justified with reference to the problem of induction. Though induction is called a ‘logic’, it is really a guess about probability. If the sun has risen every day for all of my life, then it will probably rise tomorrow. There is no necessary reason implied here, no deduction from principles, simply a guess based on spotting a pattern and then predicting it into the future. So the largely descriptive practice of history becomes articulated as a search for patterns which trail from then to then, from the crow’s nest of now. Not always, because it could be justified as a literary or cultural practice which is being done for its own sake, or for commercial reasons of selling books and TV series, but when a loftier reason is called for it would usually be about ‘learning’ from history. If you don’t know your past, you are doomed to repeat it. How can we know where we are going if we don’t know where we’ve been? In theory then, when it comes to wars, revolutions or financial collapses, we can go back and look at what happened and use it to shape our actions now with the benefit of hindsight.
    [Show full text]
  • New Contributions to the Entrepreneurial Theory of Social and Cultural Change MISES: Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy Law and Economics, Vol
    MISES: Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy Law and Economics ISSN: 2318-0811 ISSN: 2594-9187 Instituto Ludwig von Mises - Brasil Casas, Vicente Moreno New contributions to the entrepreneurial theory of social and cultural change MISES: Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy Law and Economics, vol. 8, e202081269, 2020 Instituto Ludwig von Mises - Brasil DOI: 10.30800/mises.2020.v8.1269 Available in: http://www.redalyc.org/articulo.oa?id=586363381013 How to cite Complete issue Scientific Information System Redalyc More information about this article Network of Scientific Journals from Latin America and the Caribbean, Spain and Journal's webpage in redalyc.org Portugal Project academic non-profit, developed under the open access initiative www.misesjournal.org.br MISES: Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy Law and Economics São Paulo, 2020; 8 e-ISSN 2594-9187 ORIGINAL RESEARCH ARTICLE New contributions to the entrepreneurial theory of social and cultural change Vicente Moreno CasasI 0000-0003-1194-4851 Loyola University, Dos Hermanas, Seville, Spain Abstract: This paper combines the theoretical framework developed by Coyne and Boettke (2009) about an entrepreneurial theory of social and cultural change, with the contributions of Huerta de Soto (2010) about the impossibility of economic calculation in socialism. With this synthesis, the entrepreneurial theory of social and cultural change is reinforced to (1) refute any political action aimed to achieve social and cultural changes, and (2) to claim the entrepreneur as the driving force of all social phenomena. The paper concludes that, as in the market sphere, the government cannot effectively implement policies oriented to social and cultural change, since it cannot acquire the knowledge necessary to plan society and social relationships.
    [Show full text]
  • Peter Boettke's New Comparative Political Economy As Libertarian
    The Journal of Private Enterprise 26(1), 2010, 85-101 Peter Boettke’s New Comparative Political Economy as Libertarian Scholarship Daniel J. D’Amico* Loyola University Abstract This paper attempts to survey and partially resolve a debate amidst factions within the broader tradition of libertarian political economy. While natural rights theorists and Public Choice economists are often at odds concerning the proper way to analyze the role of government in society, each framework can be used in conjunction with one another. Personal accounts are presented to demonstrate how these frameworks may be complements to one another for students interested in promoting a progressive research agenda focused upon social change towards a free society. The research and mentorship of Peter Boettke is presented as an ideal example of such successful applications. JEL Codes: A23, A14 Keywords: Natural rights; Public Choice; Peter Boettke I. Introduction: Libertarian Political Economy Since the recent financial crises, free market theory and libertarian political philosophy have received more public attention than in previous years. There seems to be a growing form of social anxiety amongst those who are dissatisfied with government but lack the knowledge and/or the means to affect social change. I do not mean to imply that these popular movements are the most sophisticated or the strongest arguments for liberty today. I only mention them because they share a common basic worldview in favor of personal liberty and skeptical of government largess. I also want to draw attention to the fact that their anxiety seems to stem, not so much from the content of their ideology, but rather from their inability to bring about the social changes prescribed therein.
    [Show full text]
  • Is the Transition to the Market Too Important to Be Left to the Market?
    Other articles Blackwell Publishing Ltd IS THE TRANSITION TO THE MARKET TOO IMPORTANT TO BE LEFT TO THE MARKET? Peter J. Boettke and Peter T. Leeson1 Most models of Central and Eastern European transition fail to appreciate the de facto organising principles that governed life in the Soviet-type system. Concentration has instead been focused on the de jure pronouncements of what constituted these systems. It is this misidentification, we contend, that has caused the major problems for economists devising strategies for reform. Proper appreciation of the de facto realities underlying Soviet-type economies sheds light on the crucial role that market forces must be allowed to play in the process of transition. Introduction competing hypotheses on the causes and consequences of the collapse of socialism have been Official economic statistics reveal that Russia’s circulating: inherent contradictions of socialism, economic system has continually contracted since Western military pressure, bad luck (and corruption) 1989. Indeed, by the end of 1996 the Russian economy in the selection of leaders, and poor economic was about half its size in 1989 – a steeper fall than the management which could be repaired head the list. US experienced during the Great Depression of the One hypothesis about the socialist world of Eastern 1930s. The Russian people have endured great and Central Europe and the Soviet Union, however, economic hardship over the past decade with an has not made the list. And it is from the perspective estimated 22% of the population now living below the of this hypothesis that we consider the question official poverty line.
    [Show full text]
  • The Encyclopedia of Public Choice Volume I the Editors
    The Encyclopedia of Public Choice Volume I The Editors CHARLES K. ROWLEY, Duncan Black Professor of Economics, George Mason University and General Director, The Locke Institute; and Dr. Dr. h.c.mult. FRIEDRICH SCHNEIDER, Department of Economics, The University of Linz Advisory Board JAMES M. BUCHANAN, Buchanan House, George Mason University BERNARD GROFMAN, Department of Political Science, University of California, Irvine ARYE L. HILLMAN, Department of Economics, Bar-Ilan University MARTIN PALDAM, Department of Economics, Aarhus University WILLIAM F. SHUGHART II, Department of Economics, University of Mississippi ROBERT D. TOLLISON, Department of Economics, Clemson University DENNIS C. MUELLER, Department of Economics, University of Vienna MICHAEL C. MUNGER, Department of Political Science, Duke University PETER C. ORDESHOOK, Humanities and Social Sciences, Cal Tech GORDON TULLOCK, School of Law, George Mason University HANNELORE WECK-HANNEMANN, Institut Fur Finanzwissenschaft, Universitat Innsbruck The Encyclopedia of Public Choice Editors CHARLES K. ROWLEY The Locke Institute, and George Mason University and FRIEDRICH SCHNEIDER Johannes Kepler University of Linz, Institute of Economic Policy KLUWER ACADEMIC PUBLISHERS NEW YORK, BOSTON, DORDRECHT, LONDON, MOSCOW eBook ISBN: 0-306-47828-5 Print ISBN: 0-7923-8607-8 ©2004 Kluwer Academic Publishers New York, Boston, Dordrecht, London, Moscow Print ©2004 Kluwer Academic Publishers Dordrecht All rights reserved No part of this eBook may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, recording, or otherwise, without written consent from the Publisher Created in the United States of America Visit Kluwer Online at: http://kluweronline.com and Kluwer's eBookstore at: http://ebooks.kluweronline.com We dedicate ‘The Encyclopedia of Public Choice’ to the memory of Duncan Black 23 May 1908 to 14 January 1991 The Founding Father of Public Choice TABLE OF CONTENTS Preface .
    [Show full text]