Performance Bangladesh: Road Maintenance Evaluation Report and Improvement Project
Independent Evaluation
Performance Evaluation Report December 2014
Bangladesh: Road Maintenance and Improvement Project
This document is being disclosed to the public in accordance with ADB's Public Communications Policy 2011.
Reference Number: PPE BAN 2014-16 Project Number: 33243 Loan Numbers: 1789/1790 Independent Evaluation: PE-775
NOTES
(i) In this report, “$” refers to US dollars. (ii) For an explanation of rating descriptions used in ADB evaluation reports, see ADB. 2006. Guidelines for Preparing Performance Evaluation Reports for Public Sector Operations. Manila.
Director General V. Thomas, Independent Evaluation Department (IED) Director Bob Finlayson, Independent Evaluation Division 2, IED
Team leader E. Kwon, Principal Evaluation Specialist, IED Team members F. De Guzman, Senior Evaluation Officer, IED M. Fortu, Senior Evaluation Assistant, IED
The guidelines formally adopted by the Independent Evaluation Department on avoiding conflict of interest in its independent evaluations were observed in the preparation of this report. To the knowledge of the management of the Independent Evaluation Department, there were no conflicts of interest of the persons preparing, reviewing, or approving this report.
In preparing any evaluation report, or by making any designation of or reference to a particular territory or geographic area in this document, the Independent Evaluation Department does not intend to make any judgment as to the legal or other status of any territory or area.
Abbreviations
AADT - average annual daily traffic ADB - Asian Development Bank ADF - Asian Development Fund ADP - annual development plan CIC - corridor improvement component CPAR - Chittagong Port access road DMF - design and monitoring framework EIRR - economic internal rate of return FGD - focus group discussion FIRR - financial internal rate of return FY - fiscal year GDP - gross domestic product ha - hectare HDM - highway development and management IED - Independent Evaluation Department IEM - independent evaluation mission IRI - international roughness index KII - key informant interview km - kilometer LARP - land acquisition and resettlement plan LGED - local government engineering department MVO - Motor Vehicles Ordinance OCR - ordinary capital resources PCR - project completion report PPER - project performance evaluation report PPP - public–private partnership RHD - Roads and Highways Department RMC - road maintenance component SDR - special drawing rights VOC - vehicle operating cost
Currency Equivalents
Currency Unit – taka (Tk)
At Appraisal At Program Completion At Evaluation (October 2000) (April 2009) (February 2013) P1.00 = $0.0186 $0.0140 $0.0127 $1.00 = Tk 53.75 Tk 71.23 Tk 78.35
Contents
Acknowledgement v Basic Data vii Executive Summary ix
Chapter 1: Introduction 1 A. Project Scope 1 B. Evaluation Purpose and Process 1
Chapter 2: Design and Implementation 2 A. Background 2 B. Rationale 3 C. Outcomes and Outputs 4 D. Project Risks and Mitigation Arrangements 5 E. Cost, Financing, and Executing Arrangements 6 F. Project Outputs 8
Chapter 3: Performance Assessment 11 A. Overall Assessment 11 B. Relevance 11 C. Effectiveness 13 D. Efficiency 14 E. Sustainability 15 F. Development Impacts 16 G. ADB Performance 18 H. Borrower and Executing Agency Performance 18
Chapter 4: Issues, Lessons, and Follow-Up Actions 19
APPENDIXES 1. Design Summary 22 2. Implementation 24 3. Covenants 25 4. Policies 29 5. Economic Reevaluation 32 6. Financial Reevaluation 41 7. Socioeconomic Reevaluation 44
Acknowledgement
The guidelines formally adopted by the Independent Evaluation Department (IED) on avoiding conflict of interest in its independent evaluation were observed in the preparation of this report. Mr. Joselito Supangco, Mr. Ahmed Faruque, and Mr. Nazrul Islam assisted the IED PPER team with field evaluation, project-related documents, data and information, and the socioeconomic field survey. To the knowledge of the management of IED, there were no conflicts of interest of the persons preparing, reviewing, or approving this report.
Basic Data
Bangladesh: Road Maintenance and Improvement Project As per ADB Key Project Data Loan Documents Actual ($ million) 1789 and 1790 1789 and 1790 Total project cost 160.20 117.77 Foreign exchange cost 75.60 48.13 Local currency cost 84.60 69.64 ADB loan amount utilized 67.60 ADB loan amount cancelled 37.27
Key Dates Fact-finding 24 Feb–15 Mar 2000 Appraisal 9–22 June 2000 Loan negotiations 16–18 October 2000 Board approval 29 November 2000 Loan agreement 18 December 2000 Loan effectiveness 18 March 2001 10 September 2001 Number of extensions 3 2 First disbursement 20 Dec 2001 10 Sep 2001 Project completion Mar 2004 Mar 2004 Jun 2007 Sep 2008 Loan closing 30 Jun 2005 30 Jun 2005 15 Apr 2009 18 Jun 2008 Months (effectiveness to 57 57 99 81 completion)
Borrower: Bangladesh Executing Agency: Roads and Highways Department
Mission Data Type of Mission No. of Missions No. of Person-Days Fact-finding 1 100 Appraisal 1 140 Inception 1 30 Special loan administration 1 64 Road sector implementation issues 1 9 Environmental compliance review 1 4 Special project administration 1 2 Review 12 230 Project completion 1 6 Independent evaluation 1 12 ADB = Asian Development Bank.
Executive Summary
This project performance evaluation report (PPER) evaluates the Road Maintenance and Improvement Project in the People’s Republic of Bangladesh to assess its performance and highlight its lessons.
The Project
The project was developed in response to the Government of Bangladesh’s focus on the country’s five major road corridors. Developing and maintaining an effective road network was a key theme in Bangladesh’s Fifth Five-Year Plan, 1997– 2002. Expanding the capacity of the Dhaka–Chittagong Corridor was necessary to establish efficient transport between the country’s capital and its main port. Improving the road network was expected to lead to significant economic growth and poverty reduction in the southeast region. The project was designed to develop physical infrastructure and introduce specific policy and institutional reforms in the road subsector.
Project objectives were to (i) improve transport efficiency on existing roads nationwide by strengthening the governance of road maintenance and conducting priority periodic maintenance works; (ii) improve transport efficiency on the strategic Southeast Road Corridor by upgrading road conditions and increasing capacity; and (iii) increase private sector participation in the delivery of road infrastructure by establishing an enabling policy and legal environment and by implementing a toll road demonstration project.
The project was comprised of a corridor improvement component (CIC) and a road maintenance component (RMC). Each component had investment and policy outputs. For the CIC, the outputs consisted of constructing of 111 kilometer (km) sections of road along the Southeast Road Corridor, and establishing a policy and legal framework for toll-funded private sector operation and maintenance, and a legal framework for controlled access highways. For the RMC, the outputs consisted of adopting and implementing a policy framework for road maintenance, and periodically maintaining an estimated 250–400 km of roads for each of the 3 years from fiscal year (FY) 2002/03 to FY2004/05.
The Asian Development Bank (ADB) approved the project in November 2000. Its total cost was estimated at $160.2 million. ADB approved total funding of $94 million equivalent, comprised of $72 million equivalent from the Asian Development Fund (ADF) (Loan 1789) and $22 million from ordinary capital resources (OCR) (Loan 1790). The two loans became effective in September 2001, with a 6-month delay from the original target date for loan effectiveness. The project was completed in April 2009, about four years after the targeted completion date of June 2005. The actual project cost was $117.77 million, which was 74% of the original estimated cost. ADB had to cancel loan amounts totaling $37.27 million, representing 24% of the loan approved, which the PPER reported were derived mainly from construction cost savings.
The CIC component’s achievements were as follows: (i) a total of 113.25 km of road was constructed on the Southeast Road Corridor, exceeding the target of 111 km,
x Bangladesh: Road Maintenance and Improvement Project
and (ii) a legal framework was provided and environment outputs were enabled to support private sector participation in roads. The RMC component achieved the following: (i) sealing and overlay of a total of 369.5 km of road, which was about 30% of the original target; and (ii) a policy framework for road maintenance, which was partially achieved.
The 4-year overrun was due to: (i) delays in the contract award for the RMC subprojects due to changes in procurement arrangements envisaged at appraisal, (ii) delays in government approval for the interim operation and maintenance contract of the Chittagong Port access road (CPAR), (iii) slow progress in implementing the contract for the feasibility study and detailed design for the Dhaka–Chittagong Highway, and (iv) delays in the approval of the feasibility study by the Government Purchase Committee. The executing agency was the Road and Highway Department (RHD) of the Ministry of Communications. Procurement was implemented through eleven packages, comprising nine packages for civil works and one package each for construction supervision and the feasibility study.
Assessment
The project’s objective was to resolve problems of inadequate road infrastructure and road maintenance. These issues were resulting in chronic congestion (i.e., traffic growth outstripping capacity on strategic corridors) that was putting strains on many road sections, shortening their economic life. The poor condition of the road network made road transport services expensive and unreliable. These, in turn, reduced the mobility of labor and goods and services, constraining economic development potential and impeding poverty reduction efforts. As a result, there was an urgent need to upgrade the existing road network and expand the capacity of the Southeast Road Corridor, the country’s main highway, focusing on the Dhaka–Chittagong Corridor. This corridor links Dhaka to the country’s main port, Chittagong. The rehabilitation was expected to spur economic growth and employment opportunities in Bangladesh.
The project was expected to improve the transport network connecting urban and rural areas in order to stimulate nonfarm activities and attract private investment in the rural areas. Setting up effective maintenance systems and promoting private sector participation in roads were vital to supporting reforms to improve transport system efficiency by increasing the sustainability of investments.
ADB’s support for transport infrastructure in Bangladesh focused on upgrading road infrastructure and improving the enabling environment for private sector participation in the road subsector. ADB’s assistance was designed to reduce the road maintenance backlog by establishing a special road maintenance fund. These initiatives were designed to improve road conditions and provide sustainable funding sources to meet periodic road maintenance requirements.
Transport infrastructure in the project areas was generally improved in the CIC through the completion of civil works and the passage of key policy measures, especially those pertaining to financing road maintenance. The actual road length for which periodic maintenance works were completed under the RMC fell short of what was envisaged at appraisal. The likelihood that this shortfall will be addressed has increased following the recent approval of the Road Fund Board Act. This legislation will provide the legal basis for delivering a stream of public sector–sourced revenues to fund road maintenance. Despite these reforms, there is no evidence that this funding
Executive Summary xi will be forthcoming, or that it will be sufficient to meet asset management requirements.
The project is rated less than successful. In terms of the specific evaluation criteria, the project was rated relevant, less than effective, efficient, and less than likely sustainable:
(i) Relevance: relevant. The project’s objectives and design were closely aligned with the government’s development strategies and ADB’s country strategy in Bangladesh. It had strong economic development and poverty reduction elements. The project design for the CIC provided the necessary capacity for the sections of the Dhaka– Chittagong Highway that were subject to high traffic volumes. The project included the construction of bypasses, the piloting of private sector maintenance of roads, and the policy formulation and implementation needed to address high-priority road maintenance activities and their funding. Offsetting this result, only 30% of the RMC maintenance component was implemented, and 24% of the total loan amount was cancelled, raising questions about the relevance of the original design. The project design did not adequately reflect the differences in timelines for constructing infrastructure, relative to developing new institutional capacity.
(ii) Effectiveness: less than effective. It is difficult to evaluate the project’s effectiveness due to the absence of any baseline data that could be used to determine the level of benefits accruing to beneficiaries. The CIC achieved its intended outputs—road construction, reforms to the policy and legal framework for toll- funded private sector operation and maintenance, and the legal framework for developing controlled access highways. In comparison, the RMC outputs were only partially achieved, with two of the five project components being fully achieved and three partially achieved. The partially achieved components were: (i) the road length covered for periodic maintenance was less than forecast; (ii) the budget for periodic maintenance continued to be combined with the annual road development budget, making it difficult to confirm the availability of maintenance funds; and (iii) sources of finance of the road fund are still not secured.
(iii) Efficiency: efficient. The delayed implementation process undermined the project’s efficiency: the project had a time overrun of 108%, taking eight years rather than the original estimate of four years to reach completion. There are also concerns about lack of funding for maintenance. Nevertheless, the re-estimated economic internal rates of return at 17.1% and 17.4% for the CIC and RMC, respectively, confirm the project’s economic viability.
(iv) Sustainability: less than likely sustainable. Project sustainability relies on adequate maintenance practices and funding. The sections improved under the CIC and RMC are receiving some maintenance from the RHD, but it is unclear how sustainable this maintenance will be, given uncertainties about road funding. On 25 June 2012, the government enacted the Motor Vehicles Axle Load Control Regulations, which ban
xii Bangladesh: Road Maintenance and Improvement Project
overloaded vehicles from the country’s road network. Strict enforcement of the regulations would strengthen the sustainability of the project roads, but this effect has not yet been demonstrated by this project. In July 2013 Parliament passed the Road Maintenance Fund Board Bill, providing for the creation of a fund for proper maintenance, repair, and renovation of roads under the RHD. Offsetting these developments, the PPER noted that sources of the Road Fund Board Act, approved in 2013, have yet to be secured, and that 70% of the maintenance component under the loan was not implemented, indicating that the government has limited commitment to maintenance. There is no evidence that funding is being provided at a level that reflects asset sustainability levels. This uncertainty undermines the probability that the project’s outputs under the RMC will be adequately maintained over the project’s economic lifetime.
(v) Impact: Projected institutional reforms, such as sustainable maintenance funding for roads, were not achieved. The project’s socioeconomic impacts include shortened travel time to nearby cities, towns, and growth centers; diversified income sources as a result of increased economic opportunities; expanded trade and businesses; improved access to social services; and more social interactions within as well as outside communities. Offsetting this result, the project did not gather any baseline data that could be used to assess impacts, and it is difficult to attribute the project’s benefits to the country’s economic growth at that time. Unrealistic economic benefit forecasts presented in the RRP are unlikely to be realized. The views expressed by the local population, representatives of local councils, and various government agencies did not identify any major environmental or resettlement problems.
Issues, Lessons, and Follow-up Actions
Time dimension of reform process. Implementing policy reforms entails a complex and long-term process of change. The legislation and policy measures that were enacted required fundamental changes to the roles of several concerned institutions. These types of reforms can take longer than anticipated, adding uncertainty to the realization of actual outputs and outcomes. The full extent of reforms, especially to institutional arrangements, may extend well beyond the usual administrative life of a project loan. Also, performance targets during the operating period can entail time lags that require a longer time frame than the development period of the loan to be fully measured.
Baseline data collection is a priority. At appraisal and during implementation, greater attention should have been given to the design and monitoring framework, especially in establishing measurable indicators and their baseline values, and target values with a realistic time frame to achieve these goals. Higher priority should have been given to ensure that baseline data were collected prior to project implementation, and updated during project implementation and at completion. The absence of baseline data has made this independent evaluation of the project difficult.
ADB should closely monitor the CPAR, especially the development of vehicle parking facilities by the private sector and the periodic adjustment of tolls to cope with the increased costs of toll road operations and maintenance. The government should
Executive Summary xiii carefully consider lessons from the implementation of this pilot public–private partnership to ensure that future projects are not only attractive to the private sector, but beneficial to users as well.
Project design and risk analysis. The mitigation measures identified in the RRP to address project risks were largely unsuccessful, and the project was subject to long time delays, problems with land acquisition and procurement, shortfalls in demand, and insufficient funding for maintenance. Despite advance procurement actions, enactment of legislation for maintenance, and establishment of controlled access arrangements for the CPAR, the expected results were not achieved. In part, the problem appears to be attributable to weaknesses in the project design, in which the feasibility study and detailed design were not completed until 9 March 2008, seven years after loan approval. A greater level of upfront efforts in project preparation, particularly in the areas of preparing credible traffic forecasts and identifying road alignments, could pay large dividends. Similarly, credible solutions can be developed upfront before finalization of the loan to address perennial issues such as delays in land acquisition and procurement.
Road Maintenance Fund. The adequacy of funding for the Road Maintenance Fund is a critical risk for the CIC that needs to be monitored.
CHAPTER 1 Introduction
1. This chapter describes the scope of the project, the purpose of this project performance evaluation report (PPER), and the process taken to prepare it.
A. Project Scope
2. The Road Maintenance and Improvement Project was approved by the Board of the Asian Development Bank (ADB) in November 2000 and was developed in response to the Government of Bangladesh’s focus on the development The project of the country’s five major road corridors. Constructing and maintaining an effective road network was a key theme in road infrastructure development in Bangladesh in was designed its Fifth Five-Year Plan, 1997–2002. Expanding the capacity of the Dhaka–Chittagong to introduce Corridor, which was one of the five corridors, was necessary to establish efficient specific policy transport between the country’s capital and its main port. Improvement of the road and network under the project was expected to lead to significant economic growth throughout the southeast region and contribute to poverty reduction. The project was institutional designed to introduce specific policy and institutional reforms in the road subsector to reforms to support improvements in road maintenance, and enable a greater level of participation support by the private sector. improvements 3. The project was completed in April 2009, about four years after the targeted in road completion date of June 2005. The project completion report (PCR) was prepared in maintenance, December 2009 and it rated the project successful. The project was rated highly relevant, effective, efficient, and less likely to be sustainable.1 and enable a greater level of B. Evaluation Purpose and Process participation by the private 4. The purpose of this evaluation is to prepare an independent PPER, which has sector been scheduled for about 5 years after the project’s completion. This interval provides adequate time to assess progress in achieving the project’s effectiveness, efficiency, and sustainability objectives. The schedule provided sufficient time to assess the impact of the improvements to the roads under the project. The timing of the preparation of the PPER should enable key lessons to be identified for successful implementation of similar road projects in the country. The independent evaluation mission (IEM) that was fielded to prepare this PPER was conducted in December 2012. As part of the preparation of the PPER, an independent socioeconomic team was fielded between October 2012 and February 2013 to assess the project’s socioeconomic impacts.
1 ADB. 2009. Project Completion Report: Bangladesh: Road Maintenance and Improvement Project (Loans 1789 and 1790). Manila.
CHAPTER 2 Design and Implementation
5. This chapter reviews the project background, rationale, outcomes and outputs, and resource and financing assumptions underlying the project design; project risks and mitigation arrangements identified in the loan documents; and the actual implementation program. The chapter compares the projected performance of the original design with its actual performance.
A. Background
6. Bangladesh’s road network was in poor condition at the time of project preparation. This poor condition was largely due to inadequate maintenance and resulted in expensive and unreliable transport services, which, in turn, constrained movements of labor, goods, and services. Increasing numbers of vehicles, inadequate road safety measures, and weak discipline and enforcement of traffic regulations led to a high level of road accidents. Maintenance activities suffered, since total spending on periodic maintenance fell short of the required level for asset sustainability, and was insufficient to address the maintenance backlog.
7. Insufficient maintenance and rehabilitation of Bangladesh’s road network resulted in chronic congestion, with traffic growth outstripping capacity on strategic corridors. In particular, the capacity of the Southeast Road Corridor from the country’s capital (Dhaka) to its main port (Chittagong) needed expansion to promote economic growth and employment opportunities. Also, there was a need to put in place a transparent and effective maintenance system and enhance private sector participation in road infrastructure. These conditions were considered critical impediments to poverty reduction efforts.
8. Against this background, the government sought to accelerate infrastructure development by focusing on the country’s major road corridors. In 1999, the government asked ADB to improve the Southeast Road Corridor between Dhaka and Chittagong, which is the country’s most important highway. Expanding this corridor’s capacity was considered vital to accommodate rapid growth in traffic and improve transport efficiency between the country’s capital city and its main port. This corridor serves a large proportion of the country’s population in both urban and rural areas.
9. The government also asked for ADB assistance the following year, 2000, to help reduce the road maintenance backlog and institutionalize a special road maintenance fund. A third private sector component was added to the project as expanded private sector participation was needed to improve economic efficiency and reduce the required amount of public financing for road infrastructure. The project was based on various feasibility studies and reports on the environment, land acquisition and resettlement, and poverty reduction impacts. The proposed project design underpinning the loan was formulated in consultation with the government and its development partners.
Design and Implementation 3
B. Rationale
10. The project, through a combination of investment and policy elements, was designed to expand road capacity and upgrade road maintenance to achieve improvements in transport efficiency. By focusing on the country’s strategic highway, it aimed to accelerate economic development and poverty reduction. A key project A key project priority was the development of a system for periodic road maintenance. Road priority was the maintenance is essential to achieve transport efficiency. Easing the huge backlog on development of road maintenance was preferable to further increasing the capacity of road infrastructure. However, these objectives would have more chance of success if the a system for assistance provided a suitable policy and legal framework to encourage greater private periodic road sector participation. maintenance…
1. Need for Road Capacity Expansion
11. The demand for road transport increased rapidly in the 1990s, at an annual rate of 8% for passengers and 7% for freight. Between 1989 and 1997, modal share for roads rose from 57% to 75% for passenger traffic, and from 59% to 65% for freight. Over the same period, the vehicle fleet grew at an annual rate of 8%. In 2006, road transport accounted for 88% of passenger kilometers (km) and 80% of freight-ton km, compared to 1998 levels of 72% and 65%, respectively.2 Traffic growth on the major corridors outstripped capacity, resulting in congestion and reduced transport efficiency. Inefficient and unreliable road transport and a poorly developed road network limited mobility of goods and services, thereby constraining economic development.
12. The Dhaka–Chittagong Corridor, which had the strategic sections with the highest traffic levels and greatest importance to the economy, urgently needed to expand capacity to respond to the country’s increasing demand for transport infrastructure. The corridor served the majority of freight and passenger traffic. At appraisal, the traffic flow was more than 10,000 vehicles per day, with a high proportion of trucks and buses. The corridor’s capacity needed to be expanded to accommodate the traffic growth of over 7–8% per annum that was occurring at that time.
2. Road Maintenance and Funding
13. The road network administered by the Roads and Highways Department (RHD) consisted of about 20,850 km of roads in 1999.3 A substantial amount of money was being spent every year for repairs and maintenance of these roads. However, funding for maintenance remained insufficient, resulting in many roads not reaching their economic life. Unless periodic maintenance is undertaken regularly, roads will rapidly deteriorate and rehabilitation expenses can become very high. Periodic maintenance practices were inadequate due to a lack of strategic planning, financing, and execution.
14. Adequacy of funding for road maintenance was a critical issue. 4 The government financed road maintenance from the revenue budget and the annual
2 Bangladesh Sixth Five-Year Plan FY2011–2015—Accelerating Growth and Reducing Poverty. Planning Commission, Ministry of Planning Government of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh. July 2011. 3 HDM Circle. Maintenance and Rehabilitation Needs Report of 2012–2013 for RHD Paved Roads. Roads and Highways Department. 4 Road sector revenues were collected through (i) fuel taxes; (ii) customs, excise duties, and sales taxes on vehicle acquisition, spare parts, and tires; (iii) registration and annual vehicle license fees and other fees
4 Bangladesh: Road Maintenance and Improvement Project
development plan (ADP). The RHD of the Ministry of Communications regularly used project funding in the ADP to supplement its budget for periodic maintenance. Periodic maintenance work financed from the revenue budget and ADP fell short of the amount required to meet the sustainable level stated in the Annual Road Maintenance Plan (ARMP) and reduce the maintenance backlog. As a result, the government was using available funds to improve capacity by rehabilitating the existing road network, rather than expanding the road network to meet increases in demand.
15. The maintenance backlog was gradually increasing, as the available funds could not meet the 13–16% growth in demand. To reduce the backlog, the government needed to access additional sources of external and domestic funding for maintenance. In order to do so, the government needed to implement several measures, including the following: (i) a policy commitment to prepare road maintenance and periodic maintenance budgets using the Highway Development and Management (HDM-4) model under the ARMP; (ii) transparent budgeting to enable monitoring of periodic maintenance expenditure; (iii) setting the periodic maintenance budget at the level required for asset sustainability; (iv) funding the periodic maintenance budget on a permanent basis from domestic sources; and (v) adequately resourcing the maintenance directorate. ADB’s assistance to address the backlog was based on the need for the government to improve road conditions and develop sustainable sources of funding from the public and private sectors to finance the maintenance backlog and meet periodic road maintenance requirements.
3. Private Sector Participation Policy
16. Private sector participation in the road sector was limited to supplying goods, materials, equipment, and consulting services. Private contractors were engaged in toll collection, and were only permitted to provide routine maintenance. Collected toll revenues could not be used to maintain related road assets, or be set at levels that The project’s generated an economic return on investment. outcomes were to: (i) improve 17. As a result, the private sector had not invested in roads, or participated in their transport operation. With persistent traffic growth on the strategic road corridors, toll roads needed to be made more commercially attractive to private investors to encourage efficiency on the them to invest in the sector. Other constraints were the lack of both a policy and legal strategic framework to provide clarity and establish confidence among potential investors that Southeast Road they would generate a return on their investment, and private sector experience working in the road sector in Bangladesh. In 2005, the government approved a policy Corridor; (ii) framework for public–private partnerships (PPPs).5 Private sector investment in roads increase private offered opportunities to complement the government’s meager resources for road sector in road; investments. and (iii) improve C. Outcomes and Outputs transport efficiency on 18. The project’s main objectives and outcomes were to: (i) improve transport existing roads efficiency on the strategic Southeast Road Corridor by upgrading road conditions and nationwide increasing capacity; (ii) increase private sector participation in the delivery of road infrastructure by establishing an enabling policy and legal environment and implementing a toll road project; and (iii) improve transport efficiency on existing roads
related to drivers’ licenses and route permits percent; and (iv) tolls and charges on ferries and selected bridges. 5 Prime Minister’s Office, Government of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh. 2004. Bangladesh: Private Sector Infrastructure Guidelines. Dhaka.
Design and Implementation 5 nationwide by strengthening the governance of road maintenance and by The CIC was to conducting prioritized sections for periodic maintenance works, targeting areas with a high incidence of poverty. The project framework indicated that the expected improve the impacts were enhanced economic growth and reduced poverty in the project areas; the Southeast Road expected outcome was improved transport efficiency. Corridor, establish the 19. The project had two components: (i) the corridor improvement component (CIC); (ii) and the road maintenance component (RMC). Each of these components had policy and legal investment and policy elements. The CIC was designed to improve sections of the framework for Southeast Road Corridor, establish the policy and legal framework for increased private sector private sector involvement in the road subsector, and implement a toll road demonstration project for the Chittagong Port access road (CPAR). The RMC was involvement in designed to address the policy, planning, implementation, and financing requirements road, and for establishing adequate maintenance of the RHD road network. implement the
20. The project had the following intended outputs. For the CIC, the outputs were tolled construction of an 111-km section of road along the Southeast Road Corridor, and a Chittagong Port legal framework and enabling environment for private sector participation in roads, access road which included establishment of a policy and legal framework for toll-funded private sector operation and maintenance, and setting up a legal framework for controlled access highways.6 For the RMC, the outputs were the adoption and implementation of a policy framework for road maintenance, and periodic maintenance of an estimated The RMC was to 250–400 km for each of the 3 years from fiscal year (FY) 2002/03 to FY2004/05. adopt and
implement a D. Project Risks and Mitigation Arrangements policy 21. The report and recommendation of the President (RRP) primarily focused on framework for risks associated with the CIC. The main risk identified in the RRP was the level of road sustainability of the benefit streams from the CIC investment due to inadequate maintenance and truck overloading. The RRP indicated that this risk factor would be maintenance, addressed by incorporating a project component that would secure a government and periodically budget for road maintenance and undertaking policy dialogue to improve axle-load maintain about control. The RRP recognized there were risks that the maintenance policy framework 250–400 km for would not be implemented and funding for maintenance would not be secured. The RRP noted that, based on previous experience, more direct means of cost recovery each of the 3 needed to be devised, including toll collection and creation of funds reserved for road years maintenance. Traffic volumes were identified as a risk for the CIC if the government did not include adequate provision for controlling access, or if new port developments led to a significant shift in traffic levels and patterns. The former risk would be addressed through the policy component of the RMC and by having a private concessionaire operate and maintain the CPAR. The latter risk was addressed by a provision in the loan agreement to strengthen controlled access arrangements under the Highways Act and the Motor Vehicles Ordinance (MVO). The government had agreed to amend the MVO within 18 months of loan effectiveness, to strengthen its provisions in enforcing controlled access. The loan agreement provided for suspension of loan withdrawals if legal provision for access control was removed.
22. The RRP highlighted the need to pay careful attention to project formulation and design, including acquiring the right-of-way, and providing sufficient resources for
6 The CIC comprised three parts: (i) overlay and widening of the Chandina, Comilla, and Feni bypasses (52km); (ii) upgrading and widening of the Feni–Chittagong section, including construction of local bypasses (47 km); and (iii) construction of the Chittagong Port access road, an access-controlled toll road (12 km).
6 Bangladesh: Road Maintenance and Improvement Project
feasibility studies and design. The approach to implementation must take account of the capacity of road sector institutions and the private contracting industry. The RRP highlighted the need to provide adequate attention to the social and environmental aspects of road projects. The project was classified as environmental Category A due to the need for a new alignment under a subcomponent of the CIC. No details were provided in the RRP on social safeguards. The government prepared an environmental impact study (EIA), which was approved by the Department of Environment in June 2000, following a public hearing at the project site. The principal adverse social impact identified was the loss of land due to the need for land acquisition and resettlement under the CIC. ADB-financed surveys sought to address these impacts in accordance with the government’s procedures and ADB’s Policy on Involuntary Resettlement. At appraisal, the government prepared a summary land acquisition and resettlement plan (LARP). It was estimated that under the CIC component, about 58.6 hectares (ha) of land would be required and a total of 8,229 people would be affected. The risk of implementation delays was addressed by (i) completing detailed engineering prior to appraisal, (ii) taking advance action for procurement, (iii) preparing the LARP and EIA by consulting with stakeholders, and (iv) providing sufficient resources for supervision consulting services.
E. Cost, Financing, and Executing Arrangements
1. Costs and Financing
23. Initial project preparation was financed through a project preparatory technical assistance project at a total cost to ADB of $250,000, equivalent to 0.2% of the estimated project cost.7 At appraisal, the project’s total cost was estimated at $160.2 million equivalent, of which the foreign exchange cost was $75.6 million, and the local currency cost was $84.6 million equivalent. At completion, the project’s actual cost was $117.77 million equivalent, which was 27% lower than the appraisal estimates. Within this total, the actual cost for the CIC was $68.61 million equivalent, compared to the appraisal estimate of $100.83 million equivalent, an underspending of 31%. For the RMC, the actual cost was $26.8 million equivalent, compared to the estimate of $36.0 million equivalent at appraisal, an underspending of 26%. Offsetting these results, land costs increased from an estimate of $6.1 million to an actual cost of $9.6 million.
24. ADB financed about 60% of estimated project costs, totaling $94.0 million equivalent, of which $22.0 million was sourced from the ordinary capital resources and $72.0 million equivalent was sourced from the Asian Development Fund (ADF).8 The loan was denominated in a mix of US dollars and special drawing rights (SDR). As a result of the contract cost savings and deferral of maintenance under the RMC, the government requested four partial cancellations from the ADF loan, totaling 32% of the original loan amount, which ADB approved.9
7 ADB. 1996. Technical Assistance to the People’s Republic of Bangladesh for the Third Road Improvement Project (TA 2678-BAN, piggy-backed to Loan 1478-BAN). Manila. 8 This amount was equivalent to SDR 55,660,000. 9 The PCR indicated that loan cancellation amounted to $31,360,929.61 million equivalent. Following the last disbursement of the ADF loan, ADB canceled the remaining balance of $1,358,171.49 equivalent on loan closing, reducing the ADF loan amount to $51,513,601 equivalent. Following the last disbursement of the OCR loan, ADB canceled the remaining balance of $5,904,928.72, reducing the loan amount to $16,095,071.28.
Design and Implementation 7
2. Project Scheduling and Implementation
25. The project was approved on 29 November 2000 and it became effective on 10 September 2001. The targeted loan closing date was 30 June 2005 for both the ADF The project was and ordinary capital resources (OCR) loans. ADB approved the reallocation of a portion originally of the ADF loan to the further preparation of the feasibility study and detailed design scheduled to be of the Dhaka–Chittagong Expressway. The feasibility study and detailed design were implemented completed on 9 March 2008, 7 years after loan approval. The government requested an extension for loan closing five times, which ADB approved: three for the ADF loan and over 4 years, two for the OCR loan. The project was originally scheduled to be implemented over 4.0 including years, including preconstruction activities. In practice, construction took about 7.4 preconstruction years (89 months), an overrun from the plan by about 43 months (108%). activities, but 26. The main causes of the delays were: (i) protracted implementation of land construction acquisition and resettlement of affected people; (ii) protracted government approval took about 7.4 procedures for the recruitment of construction engineering firms, and an interim operation and maintenance contract for the CPAR; and (iii) the time taken to prepare years the feasibility study and detailed design for the Dhaka–Chittagong Expressway. 10 A total of 17.8 ha of land affecting 2,366 persons was acquired for the CIC, which was substantially less than the 58.6 ha and 8,229 people originally estimated in the RRP. In The delays were terms of procurement, a total of eleven packages, comprising nine civil works, and one due to each for construction supervision and feasibility study and detailed design, were protracted competitively tendered over a time frame of about 2.5 years from issuing expressions of interest to awarding the contract. Details are presented in Appendix 2. implementation of land 27. The RHD was the executing agency for the project. The Office of ADB Projects in acquisition, the RHD was headed by a full-time additional chief engineer who was the project director and reported to the RHD chief engineer. For the CIC, a full-time superintending engineer government was assigned as an additional project director and chief resettlement officer, reporting approval to the project director. The superintendent was supported by an executive engineer and procedures, and three RHD project managers responsible for day-to-day implementation. For the RMC, preparation of an additional chief engineer from the RHD was assigned as the project director for the contracts under the first-year cycle and was responsible for overseeing the selection of the feasibility subprojects, procurement, monitoring, and reporting for the second- and third-year study … cycles.11 Executive engineers, as project managers of the subprojects, were responsible for overall implementation, administration, and financial management of subprojects.
28. At appraisal, it was expected that supervision consultants would be engaged for a total of 1,058 person-months over a 42-month period. This figure was comprised of 178 person-months of international consulting services and 880 person-months of national consulting services. The consultants were mobilized in October 2001. Due to delays in project implementation, the project required additional consulting services. The actual consulting services amounted to 1,381 person-months, an increase of about 30%. This increase was comprised of 222 person-months for international experts and 1,159.1 person-months for national experts, over a 66-month period. 12 The
10 The feasibility study and conceptual design for a four-lane Dhaka–Chittagong access-controlled expressway, were prepared with funding from an ADB project completed in 2008. The study’s progress was slower than anticipated and the approval by the Government Purchase Committee for the feasibility study of the Dhaka–Chittagong Expressway was also significantly delayed. 11 Contract administration and other day-to-day implementation activities were delegated to RHD zonal offices, headed by the zonal additional chief engineer, who was supported by superintending engineers, executive engineers, and other staff members. 12 Supervision consultants’ services were extended for RMC contracts, CIC contract 4, and the time overrun of CIC contracts 2–4. These were undertaken by the consultants with no additional costs.
8 Bangladesh: Road Maintenance and Improvement Project
engagement of consultants followed ADB’s Guidelines on the Use of Consultants (2010, as amended from time to time).
29. The loan agreement had 27 covenants, of which, 17 covenants pertained to sector policies and the balance related to implementation arrangements. One of these implementation covenants concerned environmental mitigation, two pertained to resettlement, one concerned financial matters, and six were related to project performance monitoring, implementation, and financial auditing. A total of 23 covenants were complied with and four covenants were partly complied with. Sector covenants 1 and 2 on sustainable road maintenance funding and covenant 6 on performance audits were partly complied with. 13 Of particular note, the road maintenance fund has not been established and is still under review by the Ministry of Finance, there is no time-bound action plan to implement such a mechanism, and no performance monitoring arrangements have been defined or agreed. Further details are presented in Appendixes 3 and 4.
F. Project Outputs
1. Project Outputs of the Corridor Improvement Component
30. Output indicators presented in the project framework were: (i) road A total length of construction, (ii) a policy and legal framework for toll-funded private sector operation 113.2 km was and maintenance, and (iii) a legal framework for controlled access highways. The PPER improved, mission confirmed that all three output indicators were fully achieved. slightly more 31. Road construction: A total length of 113.2 km was improved, slightly more than the 111 km than the 111.0 km planned at appraisal. These covered the overlay and widening of the planned at Chandina, Comilla, and Feni bypasses (51.8 km); upgrading and widening of the Feni– appraisal Chittagong section (47.9 km); construction of the CPAR (13.6 km) as a pilot for PPP; and detailed design of an ensuing road sector loan (Table 1).
Table 1: Corridor Improvement Actual Costs by Subproject Contract Length Amount Number Road Section (km) ($ million) 1 Overlay and widening of Chandina, Comilla, and Feni bypasses 51.8 19.15 2 Upgrading and widening of Feni–Chittagong section 1 25.4 30.85 3 Upgrading and widening of Feni–Chittagong section 2 22.5 4 Construction of Chittagong Port access road (new) 13.6 18.81 km = kilometer. Source: ADB. 2009. Project Completion Report.
32. Policy and legal framework for toll-funded private sector operation and maintenance: The government’s policy on private sector participation was approved in March 2005, which resulted in a private concessionaire taking control of the toll collection and routine maintenance of the CPAR. The draft contract prepared by the consultant was approved in February 2006. Due to the delayed selection of the concessionaire, the civil works contractor undertook a 1-year interim contract on toll collection and operation and maintenance of the CPAR. A private concessionaire, Monico–ATT Consortium, took over after completion of the interim contract in October 2008 and is the current toll road operator.
13 This required an enactment of a new law and up to the time of the IED field visit was still undergoing final revisions by the Ministry of Communications.
Design and Implementation 9
33. Legal framework for controlled-access highways: The government introduced the rules under the Highway Act of 1925 to provide a legal provision for access control and a regulation under the MVO of 1983. This regulation was designed to enforce access control primarily at the CPAR to prevent slow-moving vehicles and pedestrians from using the highway, control roadside development, and give the RHD or a private concessionaire the authority to manage the highway. The provisions were fully implemented.
2. Project Outputs of the Road Maintenance Component
34. The output indicators presented in the project framework for the RMC were: (i) The national a policy framework for road maintenance adopted and implemented covering the land transport national land transport policy; (ii) maintenance selection system; (iii) budgeting and policy was human resources; (iv) sustainable financing sources for maintenance; and (v) sealing and overlay of priority roads within annual road maintenance plans. Of these, the first adopted and two indicators were fully achieved and three were partially achieved. The national land implemented transport policy was adopted and implemented and a road maintenance selection and a road system was developed and used. maintenance 35. Adoption and Implementation of the National Land Transport Policy: The selection system government approved the national land transport policy on 24 April 2004. This was developed redirected the RHD’s major undertaking toward road maintenance from capital and used, but projects, and established and approved a clear distinction of responsibility for road maintenance between the RHD and the local government engineering department others were (LGED). The RHD was responsible for the maintenance of the primary and regional only partially roads and a limited number of feeder roads, while the LGED was responsible for the achieved maintenance of rural and feeder roads. The RHD was further tasked to utilize a system to prioritize road maintenance using the HDM-4 model. The government then decided to merge this policy with the existing shipping policy, add policy issues related to air transport, and prepare a comprehensive multimodal transport policy.
36. Maintenance selection system: To optimally disburse maintenance funds to the road network, the RHD has employed the HDM-4 model to select and prioritize maintenance works since FY1999–2000. A report of road maintenance and rehabilitation work is prepared every year to assess whether or not the 5-year investment plan met the acceptable levels of service provision for the RHD road network.
37. Maintenance Budgeting: A periodic maintenance budget still has to be separated from the road development plan. ADB agreed with the government that the RHD be given a budget exclusively for periodic maintenance to be included in the ADP expenditures related to periodic maintenance for roads under the jurisdiction of the RHD. The government initiated a proposal to establish a separate maintenance budget in 2003, which was undertaken for FY2004. The government now provides a non- development revenue budget in the ADP for the maintenance of roads, bridges, and highways. All non-maintenance works continue to be carried out under the RHD’s annual road maintenance budget.
38. Maintenance financing: The government agreed to review the funding mechanisms of the ARMP from domestic sources and prepare and implement a time- bound action plan to meet the annual maintenance costs of all roads under the RHD to an acceptable standard. The Road Fund Board Act is expected to help improve road
10 Bangladesh: Road Maintenance and Improvement Project
maintenance financing, but at this stage there is no firm commitment from the Road sections government to meet this funding obligation. totaling 369.5 km 39. Sealing and overlay of priority roads within the ARMP: Road sections totaling were improved 369.5 km were improved under the ADB loan through periodic maintenance work through periodic under five contracts. This result was far short of its targeted level of 250–400 km each maintenance year over a 3-year period. Implementation of the RMC was significantly delayed due to the change in the procurement arrangements envisioned during appraisal, which work, short of its protracted prequalification procedures for contractors and formalities of government targeted level approval.
CHAPTER 3 Performance Assessment
40. This chapter examines the project’s performance as per standard evaluation criteria. The project’s contribution to institutional development and its socioeconomic impact are also examined.
A. Overall Assessment
41. The project is rated less than successful. The main impacts indicated in the project’s design and monitoring framework (DMF) were enhanced economic growth and reduced poverty in the project areas. As there were no baseline data it is not The project is possible to fully assess whether impacts were achieved. The project’s main outcome rated less than was improved transport efficiency in the project areas. This was only partially achieved due to lack of progress on maintenance objectives. Some progress was made successful, developing a new law permitting private sector participation and the establishment of relevant, less a road maintenance fund. However, the government has not made any progress on than effective, actually committing funds to the maintenance fund. Implementation was subject to long delays, reducing overall efficiency. The probability of the project’s sustainability efficient, and has improved following the enactment of the new law, but it is still uncertain due to less than likely the government’s lack of commitment for funding. sustainable
42. Table 2 summarizes the ratings for the four evaluation criteria and corresponding weighting given to each criterion.14 The project is rated relevant, less than effective, efficient, and less than likely sustainable.
Table 2: Overall Performance Assessment Criterion Assessment Rating (1–3) Weight (%) Weighted Rating Relevance Relevant 2 25% 0.50 Effectiveness Less than effective 1 25% 0.25 Efficiency Efficient 2 25% 0.50 Less than likely Sustainability 1 25% 0.25 sustainable Total rating 1.50 Source: Independent Evaluation Department estimates.
B. Relevance
43. The project is rated relevant. The project was aligned with the government’s development strategies and ADB’s country assistance strategies, both at project appraisal and completion. Its objectives were pertinent to address the issues affecting the poor condition of Bangladesh’s road network, the need to expand road capacity, and the insufficient financing sources for the roads’ periodic maintenance. The project’s
14 The evaluation criteria focus on the project’s performance, following the Independent Evaluation Department’s (IED’s) guidelines of four evaluation criteria: (i) relevance of the project to the government’s and ADB’s development strategies, and project design; (ii) effectiveness of project implementation, outputs, and outcomes; (iii) efficiency of its design and implementation; and (iv) sustainability of the project outputs and outcomes.
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intended impacts, outcome, and outputs were consistent with the government’s development strategies as presented in the Fifth Five-Year Plan (FYP) for 1997–2002 and ADB’s country assistance plan for 2001–2003.15 ADB’s country assistance plan for 2001– 2003 established poverty reduction as the primary objective and road infrastructure as an important instrument.16
44. In 2000, at the time of appraisal, the country’s transport network, especially along the main transport corridor, the Dhaka–Chittagong Corridor, suffered from severe and chronic congestion and insufficient maintenance. Given the scale of the funding requirements, the government needed external financing to reduce the maintenance backlog. The government also needed to put in place various mechanisms to conduct periodic maintenance on a sustainable basis, which included a policy commitment to maintain roads and to allocate funds for a periodic maintenance budget up to the level required for sustainability.
45. The project supported ADB’s country partnership strategy, 2011−2015 for Bangladesh, which aims to provide assistance within Strategy 2020’s development agenda of inclusive economic growth, environmentally sustainable growth, and regional cooperation.17 The project prioritized private sector development to accelerate growth by addressing major infrastructure constraints and skill gaps, improving the regulatory setting, and enhancing capacity for PPP and private sector investments and supporting suitable PPP projects once identified, including those in the transport sector.
46. The project design addressed the critical issues of improving road maintenance, piloting private sector maintenance of roads, and developing a policy and institutional framework to support these initiatives. Offsetting this result, the design was not sufficient to achieve the program objectives, particularly on maintenance. In the absence of an effective maintenance framework under the CIC, it is not clear why the focus of the project was on constructing new capacity, rather than increasing the effective capacity of the existing network by investing in maintenance. Other things being equal, the economic returns were more likely to be greater for investment in the maintenance of existing assets, rather than in developing greenfield capacity that could not be maintained.18 Only 30% of the RMC maintenance component was implemented, and the road maintenance framework was not operationalized. More success could likely have been achieved if technical assistance had been used to design and develop maintenance capacity before disbursing the loan, and linking disbursements to achievement of pre-agreed milestones.
47. The underlying logic in the project DMF was also weak. For instance, implementing the reform measures such as the legislation of the Road Fund Board Act took substantial time, much more than expected at appraisal, and could extend beyond the project’s implementation period. Similarly, for the nonphysical elements, even if they were achieved as planned, they would be unlikely to immediately accompany the intended outcomes. However, the project DMF assumed this outcome would be the case, and it did not recognize this potential mismatch. An example is the enhanced
15 A key element is to improve integrated multimodal transport encompassing railways, roads, and inland water transport having connectivity with the country’s neighbors. Under the Sixth Five-Year Plan, a top priority is to build transport network corridors that provide regional connectivity to the national ports of Chittagong and Mongla. Planning Commission, Ministry of Planning, Government of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh. 2011. Sixth Five Year Plan FY2011–2015: Accelerating Growth And Reducing Poverty. 16 ADB. 2000. Country Assistance Plan (2001–2003) for Bangladesh. Manila. 17 ADB. 2011. Country Partnership Strategy Bangladesh (2011–2015). Manila. 18 This conclusion is reinforced by the economic internal rates of return (EIRRs) presented in the RRP for maintenance versus new construction.
Performance Assessment 13 level of private sector participation in roads projected in the RRP. It was assumed that realization of the policy elements would mean that private sector participation in roads was promoted. In fact, although the key elements of the policy and legal framework were successfully implemented, the actual level of private participation in roads was not noticeably increased. Considering the significant gestation period and the time lags for these policy initiatives, the assumption that the policy actions would have contributed to the project performance appeared to be too presumptive. It is more likely that the realization of intended policy reforms may benefit future road projects’ performance, and therefore should be considered in the context of sector level performance rather than an individual project’s performance.
C. Effectiveness
48. The project is rated less than effective in achieving the outcomes of the project as defined in the DMF.
49. The actual outcome at the time of project completion could not be assessed against baseline targets as the DMF prepared at appraisal did not present any outcome targets or values of the vehicle operating costs (VOCs) and average journey times that could be used as a baseline for deriving estimates of savings for comparison purposes. However, the economic analysis in the RRP assumed growth rates for demand starting at 8% per year to 2007, declining to 6% from 2008 to 2012, and to 5% from 2013 thereafter. The PCR reviewed these estimates in 2007 and found that for the Chandina, Comilla, and Feni bypasses the actual growth exceeded the target in the RRP for 2007 by 2%, whereas there was a traffic shortfall of 39% for the Feni–Chittagong component, and a shortfall of 72% for the CPAR.
50. During the IEM field visit, travel times from Dhaka to Chittagong and the CPAR were observed. The RHD officials accompanying the mission validated the reduction in travel time compared to the without-project situation. However, since there were no baseline data available to the IEM, the measured reduction in travel time could not be compared with the baseline data. The PCR estimated that the project reduced travel time by 20 minutes to 45 minutes between Chittagong and major cities. These time savings could not be validated without baseline travel-time data either from the DMF or from the required baseline survey under the project performance monitoring system. Based on the road condition level of international roughness index (IRI) 2 and without- project road condition of IRI 6.0, the estimated per-km VOC savings using HDM-4 ranged from 8.5% to 12.0%, while travel-time savings per km under the same assumptions ranged from 12.3% to 25.3%. Available traffic count data collected by the IEM from the RHD validated the effectiveness of the roads in facilitating vehicle movements, especially in the more congested and heavily trafficked areas such as Chandina, Camilla, Feni, and Chittagong. Traffic volume on the CIC road sections is usually high, as it is the main corridor between Dhaka and Chittagong, with its major international port. From 2007 to 2011, actual traffic on the Chandina, Camilla, and Feni bypasses increased by 17.0% per year and on the Sitakunda–Chittagong section by 11.7%. These exceeded the annual forecast growth rate of 9.0% for the 2007–2011 period. In the Feni–Mirsarai section, traffic growth for the 2007–2011 period was only 4.5% per year, less than the 9.0% forecast growth rate. A section of the RMC roads leading to Cox’s Bazar, a major tourist area, also shows heavy vehicular traffic, where the actual traffic growth on the Chittagong–Cox’s Bazar section was 22.9%. Therefore, the project’s intended outcome for the physical construction—improved transport efficiency—has reasonably been achieved in the project areas, as measured by traffic growth, travel-time savings, and reduction in VOCs.
14 Bangladesh: Road Maintenance and Improvement Project
51. For the RMC, only 30% of the maintenance program envisaged in the RRP was implemented, and there is no evidence of improvements in maintenance as a result. Three of the five suboutputs were not achieved. These included: (i) the road length on which periodic maintenance work was implemented; (ii) the budget for period maintenance, which continues to be lumped with the annual road development budget; and (iii) sources of funding for the road fund that are still not secured. Given that improvements in maintenance were a primary objective underpinning the program, the absence of these outputs is a significant shortfall.
D. Efficiency
52. The project is rated efficient in the use of resources to achieve its intended outcomes and outputs. Procurement and implementation of resettlement plans were delayed, which meant the loans were disbursed more slowly than planned at appraisal. Actual implementation of all components took approximately 7.5 years (89 months)— an overrun of about 3.5 years, in effect more than doubling the original construction period. The PCR reported that there was a substantial shortfall in demand for the CIC, reducing the baseline benefits. Only 30% of the RMC was implemented, further reducing benefits and the derived efficiency of the loan. Offsetting this result, there were large cost savings arising from the low cost of civil works, compared to the original estimates.
53. The RRP estimated an economic return for the CIC of 37%, and this was revised downwards to 28.6% in the PCR. For the RMC, the RRP provided hypothetical estimated economic internal rates of return (EIRRs) that ranged from 118% to 462%. Despite the shortfall in demand growth identified in the PCR for the Feni–Chittagong section and the CPAR, the re-estimated benefits of the CIC were 28.6% and the RMC economic benefits ranged from 32% to 165%. The combination of assumption used in the PCR derived a compound annual growth rate for project economic benefits of 29% over 20 years, resulting in a 1,000-fold increase in real benefits over a 20-year period. This growth is far in excess of gross domestic growth (GDP) growth rates, and does not take into account likely congestion, which will negatively impact available capacity and associated traffic flows.
54. In re-estimating project benefits, the PPER team used updated information, especially traffic data. The PPER team collected data on (i) available classified traffic counts for each road section, (ii) the road condition survey conducted during the PPER mission, and (iii) 2004–2005 VOCs. The RHD is currently undertaking the four-laning work of the Dhaka–Chittagong Highway, totaling 192.30 km of road. This project involves the construction of 28 bridges, including five major bridges, three flyovers over the railway lines, and two underpasses.19 This four-laning work will likely negatively affect the traffic level, forecast at appraisal and completion, along the CIC and RMC subsections of the Dhaka–Chittagong Highway. 20 For a conservative estimation, the PPER team adjusted the traffic forecast level of appraisal and completion for the abovementioned road sections downward by 50% from 2014 onward, once the four lanes along the Dhaka–Chittagong Highway are completed. The two-lane project road will henceforth carry traffic in only one direction, while the additional two lanes will
19 In parallel with the four-laning work, the existing two lanes are being overlaid to match the road conditions of the two new lanes. Under the existing contracts for the four-laning, the contractors have been responsible for the routine maintenance of the existing highway since the start of the project. 20 The subsections affected by the four-laning work for the CIC are the Chandina, Comilla, and Feni bypasses, and the Feni–Chittagong section; for the RMC, they are the Daudkandi–Chandina bypass, end of Chandina bypass–start of Comilla bypass, and end of Comilla bypass–start of Feni bypass.
Performance Assessment 15 carry traffic in the opposite direction. The recalculation of the EIRRs reconfirms the project’s economic viability. The recalculated EIRR for the CIC subprojects was 17.1% and the recalculated EIRR for the RMC subprojects was 17.4%. This result assumes that the project infrastructure is fully maintained. Details are presented in Appendix 5.
E. Sustainability
55. The PPER assesses the project less than likely sustainable by examining (i) government ownership and commitment to the project, (ii) appropriate policies to ensure continued funding for maintenance of the project roads, (iii) appropriate policies to ensure the maintenance of required human resources, and (iv) financial viability of operating entities.
56. At completion, some concerns were raised that may affect the project’s sustainability, such as: (i) some project road sections were already damaged at project completion, requiring maintenance work; (ii) funding for sustainable maintenance was still unsecured; (iii) the weighbridge station along the project road was not yet operational at completion and so overloaded vehicles continued to be a problem. The PPER, conducted 5 years later than the PCR, noted several new developments. It notes that the recent approval and implementation of the Road Fund Board Act may provide a legal basis for a sustained stream of revenue for financing road maintenance. Further, the recently passed Road Fund Board Law aims at raising funds for road maintenance and supervision works from road taxes, motor vehicle taxes, motor vehicle fitness, route permits, registration and license fees, road cutting and utility fees, and road penalties. Meanwhile, there continue to be serious concerns about maintenance funding. In particular, the road maintenance fund has not been established and is still under review by the Ministry of Finance. This negatively affects the project’s sustainability, and affects both the CIC and the RMC. Further concerns arise due to the poor financial performance of the CPAR component of the CIC. During the PPER, a financial internal rate of return (FIRR) on the CPAR was recalculated at -2.47%, indicating that traffic volumes from the CPAR are not sufficient to recover the operation and maintenance and investment costs.21 The PCR noted that in 2007 actual traffic volumes were only about 25% of estimated volumes.
57. While the government has taken some important steps to address the issue of sustainability, it continues to demonstrate a lack of commitment to provide a sustainable source of funding needed to maintain the project assets. Similarly, the CPAR is not generating sufficient revenues from tolls to sustain the operation. In the light of these findings, the PPER rates the project less than likely sustainable.22
21 FIRR for the PPER is lower than the appraisal FIRR but higher than the PCR FIRR. The differences in FIRRs estimated at appraisal, completion, and PPER were mainly due to updated traffic forecasts at each time. At appraisal, high levels of diverted and generated traffic were estimated for the toll road; at completion, the traffic forecasts were adjusted significantly downward, based on existing traffic. At the PPER, the normal traffic forecast was adjusted upward, considering persistently growing traffic levels of cargo and containers at Chittagong Port. Based on Chittagong Port Authority statistics, total cargo volumes comprising imports and exports from 2006 to 2011 increased by 9.8% annually, container traffic increased by 9.7% annually, and vessel calls increased by 2.8% annually. Given such a growth scenario, it is expected that CPAR traffic will continue to increase. Details are in Appendix 6. 22 The individual components’ ratings were aggregated using weights, RMC (28%) and CIC (72%), reflecting the relative importance of the component to expected overall project outcomes and the cost of each component’s ADB-funded civil works as a percentage of the total civil works cost funded by the ADB loan.
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F. Development Impacts
58. The project framework indicates that the project’s targeted goals were enhanced economic growth and reduced levels of poverty in the project areas. The qualitative performance indicators formulated at appraisal included increased competitiveness of industry and agriculture, increases in the GDP and expansion in employment and earnings, and improvement in social indicators. However, the framework had neither quantifiable targets nor baseline information for performance indicators. No poverty impact survey was conducted at PCR.
59. The project’s achievement, listed in the project framework of the PCR, was growth in the regional GDP by about 6% per year for the period 2004–2008. The PCR indicated that economic development was stimulated and employment was increased. The government’s national statistics showed that the upper level of poverty fell from 52% in 1999 to 43% in 2007. Lower-level poverty decreased from 46% in 1999 to 20% in 2005. However, the PCR did not provide any meaningful discussion on how much the reduced rate of poverty was attributed to this project. The PPER therefore finds it hardly conclusive that the country’s macroeconomic achievement during the period (in terms of GDP growth and reduced poverty rate) was attributed to the project, as claimed by the PCR.
1. Impact on Institutions
60. The RHD benefited from specific outputs that were produced under the project or loan covenants. The government’s commitment and ownership of the transport reform initiatives strengthened the credibility of the project during implementation. Some of these initiatives delineated roles for institutions and contributed to capacity development. The national land transport policy, approved in April 2004, clearly defines the responsibility of the RHD and the LGED: The RHD is responsible for national and regional highways and Type-A feeder roads, while the LGED is responsible for major parts of feeder roads.23
61. The establishment of the Road Fund Board, consisting of 13 members, paves the way for forming the self-financed Road Fund in Bangladesh. Once this framework becomes operational, it will provide the RHD with a sustainable stream of revenues to cover current road maintenance requirements and backlogs that have accumulated through the years. Also, the amended rules for enabling and enforcing access control and the policy and guidelines for private investment in highway projects, when implemented fully, will alleviate the RHD’s burden in maintaining national roads as vehicle traffic diverts to private toll road facilities. Given that the environment for developing sustainable roads was not realized by the project, the impacts on institutions were less than satisfactory.
2. Socioeconomic Impact
62. The land acquisition and resettlement plan provided compensation for losses incurred by affected persons, and rehabilitation measures that would benefit the community. The PCR reported that no resettled person was in worse condition as a result of the project and that no issues relating to indigenous peoples and/or ethnic
23 Except the “zilla roads,” which are Type-A feeder roads connecting the district headquarters or a major national road network. The zilla roads were mandated to the RHD for development and maintenances.
Performance Assessment 17 minorities arose during project implementation. The broader socioeconomic benefits generated by the project were reduced travel time to nearby cities, towns, and growth centers; increased economic opportunities to local residents and diversified sources of their income; expanded social interactions and participation in community activities; and increased participation by women in economic and social activities. Focus group discussions and household surveys were conducted as part of the socioeconomic field work for the PPER. The field assessment indicated that after the roads were improved, more people opted for professions other than agriculture, bringing new employment and trading opportunities. More people have set up small businesses, diversifying income sources to include agriculture, small trade, manufacturing industries, small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), and service institutions such as schools. New economic opportunities in the region have led to an increase in household wealth, increasing household assets and diversification of economic activities. Farmers and local producers directly sold their produce to urban-based wholesalers and retailers rather than to middlemen. The urban-based wholesalers and retailers of agricultural products now reach the production sites, reducing transportation cost and travel time.
63. The project has promoted trade and business activities significantly. Local people established small businesses, creating more job opportunities. Investors from large cities such as Dhaka and Chittagong now invest in the region, resulting in more job opportunities. Investors have built hotels and established highway restaurants catering to the needs of inter-district passengers, creating more employment opportunities. There has been a significant increase in the number of light vehicles, making it easier for farmers and local businesses to transport various products and goods, including electronic home appliances, agricultural products, and products manufactured by SMEs in the rural areas. The project roads have enabled the local people to easily access institutions and social services (Appendix 7).
64. Offsetting this result, with the improved project road conditions, large vehicles such as buses, trucks, microvans, and others can operate at higher speeds, resulting in an increased number of traffic accidents. Focus group discussions recommended that road dividers be provided to avoid the numerous head-on collisions that have become a regular occurrence and a major concern of villagers along the road. Overall, the project generated positive benefits, but the absence of benchmarks and reliable survey data makes it difficult to make a case that the project achieved its stated socioeconomic impacts.
3. Environmental Impact
65. Based on the PCR, the government prepared an initial environmental impact study, with the CPAR being the major focus of attention since it was to be built on a new alignment. Other CIC and RMC activities were on existing roads and therefore had minimal adverse impacts on the environment. On the whole, the assessment found that neither component would have significant adverse environmental impacts. The consultants prepared guidelines for an environmental management and monitoring plan. The project was found to be compliant with the mitigation measures and monitoring requirements cited in the plan.
66. This finding was also confirmed by the PPER’s socioeconomic and impact evaluation, in which the local population, representatives of local councils, and various government agencies observed that the project did not pose any major environmental problems. Currently, people living adjacent to the project roads have complained of noise and air pollution, especially during the dry season. In Chittagong, the CPAR has
18 Bangladesh: Road Maintenance and Improvement Project
functioned as a flood protection embankment, protecting the villages along the road from flash floods and subsequent waterlogging. As with the socioeconomic assessment, given shortfalls in demand, and in the absence of benchmarks and reliable survey data, it is difficult to make a case that the project achieved its stated environmental impacts.
G. ADB Performance
67. The project was initially administered by ADB headquarters. Its administration was transferred to the Bangladesh Resident Mission in January 2004. This change made it easier to monitor project implementation activities. Compliance with the loan covenants was facilitated through the resident mission's efforts, especially those pertaining to coordination with the executing agency and conduct of regular policy dialogues with the government.
68. During project implementation, ADB conducted 16 missions and provided advice on technical issues, bid evaluations, and loan administration. Some of the missions followed up on the loan covenant for the establishment, staffing, and operation of a project performance monitoring system, including baseline surveys for performance indicators and updates. As reported in several mission reports, it was expected that this requirement would be included in the executing agency’s PCR. This did not materialize and what was provided was highly inadequate. During the PPER mission the executing agency indicated that it was generally satisfied with ADB’s performance and that ADB had responded in a timely manner to their requests and inquiries. The performance of ADB is rated satisfactory.
H. Borrower and Executing Agency Performance
69. The PCR rated the performance of the borrower and executing agency satisfactory. The RHD had effectively managed physical implementation of the project, although delays occurred in approvals at various stages of procurement due to bureaucratic procedures. This affected the overall project implementation schedule and triggered the need for loan extensions. Civil works were delayed due to land acquisition and resettlement issues. The borrower made available necessary counterpart funds in a timely manner. There were no undue delays in approving payments to the consultants and contractors.
70. It was noted at appraisal that the RHD, assisted by consultants, would establish a project performance monitoring system. The key indicators for monitoring were defined in the DMF. Although limited information is available, such as traffic data, monitoring was not undertaken as envisaged at appraisal. There is no evidence that project benefit monitoring surveys were conducted on poverty, employment, earnings, and social indicators in the project area.
CHAPTER 4 Issues, Lessons, and Follow- Up Actions
71. This chapter discusses issues and lessons pertinent to the project. The lessons provide pointers for follow-up actions.
72. Time dimension of the reform process. Implementing policy initiatives entails a complex and long-term process. In general, sufficient time is needed to build political Implementing consensus, strengthen institutional capacity, and put in place necessary enabling policy initiatives conditions for reforms. The legislation and policy measures that were enacted required entails a fundamental changes among institutions, which cover a longer time horizon and add some uncertainty as to the timing of realization of actual outputs and outcomes. The complex and full extent of reforms, especially the institutional type, may extend well beyond the long-term usual administrative life of a project loan. Also, performance targets entail time lags process and as such, their effects could not be readily realized within the time frame presented in the DMF. More success would likely have been achieved if ADB had provided a greater amount of technical assistance to help develop institutional capacity for procurement and establishment of the road maintenance fund prior to the processing of the loan.
73. Baseline data collection is a priority. At appraisal and during implementation, greater attention should have been given to the DMF, especially to establishing At appraisal and measurable indicators and their baseline values, and target values with realistic time during frames. In particular, the indicators measuring socioeconomic impacts should have implementation, been carefully designed, their initial values measured and presented, and their updates monitored throughout the project period as well as at completion. Higher priority greater attention should have been given to ensuring that baseline data were collected and reported should have during project implementation. The absence of these data made independent been given to evaluation of the project considerably more difficult. the DMF
74. Private sector participation. Based on the evaluation findings, one follow-up action is proposed: ADB should closely monitor developments on the CPAR, especially on the development of vehicle parking facilities by the private sector and the adjustment of toll fees to cope with the increased costs of toll road operations and maintenance. The government should carefully consider lessons learned from the pilot PPP to make future projects more successful. Credible traffic forecasts and tolls that are set at full cost recovery are essential if the private sector is to be incentivized to participate in the transport sector.
75. Project design and risk analysis. The mitigation measures identified in the RRP to address project risks were largely unsuccessful, and the project was subject to long delays, problems with land acquisition and procurement, shortfalls in demand, and insufficient funding for maintenance. Despite advance procurement actions, enactment of legislation for maintenance, and establishment of controlled access arrangements for CPAR, the expected results were not achieved. In part, the problem appears to be
20 Bangladesh: Road Maintenance and Improvement Project
attributable to weaknesses in the project design, in which the feasibility study and detailed design were not completed until 9 March 2008, seven years after loan approval. A greater level of upfront investment in project preparation, particularly in the areas of preparing credible traffic forecasts and identifying road alignments, could pay large dividends. Similarly, credible solutions can be developed upfront before finalization of the loan to address perennial areas such as delays in land acquisition and procurement.
76.. Road Maintenance Fund. The financing and adequacy of funding for the Road Maintenance Fund is a critical risk for the CIC that needs to be monitored.
Appendixes
APPENDIX 1: DESIGN SUMMARY
Summary Design and Monitoring Framework Showing Project Achievements Against Intended Impacts, Outcome, and Outputs (IED) Performance Design Summary Indicators/Targets Assessment Project Achievements Impact Promoted economic Increased competitiveness No targets were - Reduced travel time to nearby cities and growth in project of industry and agriculture given at appraisal. growth centers, subdistrict towns, and target areas However, district towns Increased the gross fieldwork during - Increased economic opportunities Reduced poverty in domestic product and PPER activities - Diversified household income sources project target areas expanded employment indicated that the - Expanded trade and earnings impacts are - Increased private investment from other considered to have regions into the project areas Improved social indicators been generally - Increased social interactions and achieved. participation in community activities Outcome Improved transport Within project target No targets were From the economic reevaluation efficiency in project areas, achieved transport given at appraisal. conducted, net travel time savings target areas efficiency gains in terms of However, the achieved by 2012 were estimated at Tk savings in travel time, outcomes are 1,114 million ($19.3 million) for the CIC transport costs for considered to have and Tk 31 million ($0.54 million) for the passengers, and VOCs been generally RMC. By 2027, expected travel time achieved. savings were estimated at Tk 4,143 million ($71.7 million) for the CIC, and Tk 189 million ($3.3 million) for the RMC.
For reduction in VOCs for 2007–2012, the reevaluation estimated net savings at Tk 6,696 million ($115.9 million) for the CIC and Tk 1,803 million ($31.2 million) for the RMC. By 2027, net VOC savings were estimated at Tk 27,664 ($478.8 million) million for the CIC and Tk 10,038 million ($173.7 million) for the RMC.
Output 1. Road Maintenance 1.1 Policy framework Mostly achieved Savings in transport costs were not for road maintenance measured. adopted and implemented within 4 years of There were no baseline values to effectiveness, covering the recalculate the percentage change in the national land transport values of the indicators measured. policy, maintenance selection system, A national land transport policy was budgeting and human approved by the Bangladesh government resources, and an on 24 April 2004 in which the established sustainable responsibilities of the RHD and the LGED source of financing. were clearly defined.
The maintenance selection system (HDM- 4) is being used to prepare the maintenance and rehabilitation needs report for RHD paved roads. This is used to prepare the annual road maintenance budget of the RHD.
A Road Board Authority Act has been
Design Summary 23
Performance Design Summary Indicators/Targets Assessment Project Achievements 1.2 Sealing and drafted and circulated to the various overlay of priority roads ministries concerned. At end of 2012, it within annual road had not been approved and remains a maintenance plan, 2002– loan conditionality still to be achieved. 03, 2004–05 Only 369.5 km of road were sealed and overlaid from 2005–2007 as against the annual target of 250–400 km over the project duration. 2. Corridor 2.1 Road construction Most road construction subprojects were Improvement to be completed by March completed in 2007. 2004: Feni–Chittagong (47 km) Achieved Section 1: Wahedpur–Banshbaria. New construction of 4.67 km, reconstruction of 12.01 km, and overlay of 8.76 km. Road safety improved by widening concrete pavements and footpaths in four market areas, Barodarogar Hat, Hadi Fakir, Nizampur, and Suklal Hat.
Section 2, Banshbaria–Alanker Cinema Hall. New construction of 2.60 km, reconstruction of 12.067 km, and overlay of 7.795 km. Road safety improvements by widening concrete pavements and footpaths in 11 market areas. Chandina, Comilla, and Achieved - Chandina, Comilla, and Feni bypasses Feni bypasses (52 km) and overlay of two bridges, one at km 13.04 (90 m) and another at km 20.15 (160 m) on Dhaka–Daudkandi Road - Marikhail Bridge – 3 spans x 30 m - Bhatir Char Bridge – 169 m - Road safety widening of concrete pavement and footpaths in seven market areas Chittagong Port access Achieved New construction of 12.318 km and road (12 km) overlay of 1.264 km. Bridges at km 4.33, 4.34, and 4.35. 3. Legal framework and 3.1 Policy and legal Achieved The government’s overall policy on private enabling framework for toll-funded sector participation was approved in environment for private sector operation March 2005. private sector and maintenance participation in road established by third year of sector effectiveness. The government established enforcement Achieved provisions under the MVO to (i) prevent 3.2 Legal framework for slow-moving vehicles and pedestrians controlled-access highways from using the highway, (ii) control established by 18 months roadside development, and (iii) give the of effectiveness. RHD or a private concessionaire the authority to manage the highway. These were implemented. CIC = corridor improvement component, HDM = highway development and management, IED = Independent Evaluation Department, km = kilometer, LGED = local government and engineering department, m = meter, MVO = Motor Vehicles Ordinance, RHD = Roads and Highways Department, RMC = road maintenance component, VOC = vehicle operating cost. Source: Independent Evaluation Department.
APPENDIX 2: IMPLEMENTATION
Project Implementation Schedule (Appraisal, Preparation, and Actual) 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 Project Component Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4
Land Acquisition and Resettlement
Selection Consulting Services Supervision (CIC and RMC)
Corridor Improvement Component (CIC)
Pre-qualification Pre-construction Stage (CIC) Bidding, Approval & Award
C-1 Overlay and Shoulder Work Sections not Needing Resettlement of PAPs C- 2&3 Sections Needing Construction Resettlement of PAPs (CIC) BWDB Sections (7.3 km) and Overlay (1.13 km) C- 4 Other Sections
Road Maintenance Component (RMC) Selection, Design, RMC Procurement (ICB) First Year Cycle 1st Year Cycle (Recycle+Overlay) Implementation RMC 1 Implementation RMC 2 Selection, Design, Procurement (ICB) RMC Implementation RMC 3 Second and Third Year Cycle Implementation RMC 4 WORK TERMINATED 2nd and 3rd Year Cycles Implementation RMC 5 Legend: Appraisal Preparation Actual Note: Actual inclusive of liability period. ADB = Asian Development Bank, BWDB = Bangladesh Water Development Board, CIC = corridor improvement component, ICB = international competitive bidding, PAP = project-affected people, RMC = road maintenance component. Source: ADB. 2009. Project Completion Report: Bangladesh: Road Maintenance and Improvement Project (Loans 1789 and 1790). Manila.
APPENDIX 3: COVENANTS
Status of Compliance with Loan Covenants Reference in Loan Covenant Agreement Status of Compliance Sector 1. Operations and Maintenance Financing. Within 2 Schedule 6, para. 8 Partly complied with. years of loan effectiveness, an expert working group, with Although the review was composition and terms of reference satisfactory to ADB, will completed, a time- complete a review of mechanisms for domestic funding of bound action plan was the full requirements of the ARMP, including the option of not established. In establishing a road maintenance fund, and submit its addition, the road recommendations to the government along with a time- maintenance fund has bound action plan for funding the full requirements of the not been established and ARMP, with the existing backlog of periodic maintenance is still under review by being separately financed. the Ministry of Finance. 2. Within 4 years of loan effectiveness, the government Schedule 6, para. 9 Partly complied with. will implement the recommendations of the expert working The road fund has still group on mechanisms for domestic funding of the full not been established. requirements of the ARMP under a time-bound action plan acceptable to ADB, such that the government will meet the annual costs of maintaining all roads under the RHD’s jurisdiction to a standard acceptable to ADB, with the existing backlog of periodic maintenance being separately financed. 3. The borrower shall ensure that all periodic Schedule 6, para. 10 Complied with maintenance expenditure under the RMC is expenditure for the project over and above the existing maintenance expenditure by the borrower. 4. The borrower shall ensure that each civil works Schedule 6, para. 11 Complied with contract for periodic maintenance under the ARMP using civil works contractors shall amount to no less than $1,000,000 equivalent and be supervised by consultants. 5. The borrower shall ensure that an ARMP satisfactory Schedule 6, para. 12 Complied with to the Bank is prepared annually. 6. Road Maintenance Policy. Within 2 years of loan Schedule 6, para. 13 Complied with effectiveness, the government will approve a national land transport policy satisfactory to ADB that will include (a) establishing road maintenance as the priority activity of the RHD; (b) clearly dividing responsibilities for feeder roads between the RHD and the LGED, with the RHD being responsible for national and regional highways and Type-A feeder roads; and (c) determining all annual RHD road maintenance expenditure in accordance with the HDM ranking of road maintenance priorities in the ARMP. 7. The borrower shall ensure that the RHD shall only Schedule 6, para. 14 Complied with have jurisdiction over feeder roads that meet the criteria of Type-A feeder roads. 8. Maintenance Budgeting. The government will Schedule 6, para. 27 Complied with ensure that the consolidation of all ADP expenditures on RHD periodic maintenance for roads for the ARMP will be completed by June 2001 in form and substance satisfactory to ADB, and will be maintained on an annual basis for no less than 5 years. 9. Within 18 months of loan effectiveness, the Schedule 6, para. 28 Complied with government will review existing maintenance expenditures under the RB, introduce a reclassification of RB maintenance expenditures by maintenance function, and ensure that
26 Appendix 3
Reference in Loan Covenant Agreement Status of Compliance periodic maintenance expenditure under the RB is assigned in accordance with the ARMP. 10. Road Maintenance Component Subproject Schedule 6, para. 23 Complied with Selection. The RHD shall ensure that the selection of roads for inclusion in the RMC shall be carried out annually, subject to criteria agreed with the Bank and subject to Bank approval. 11. Access Control. The government will ensure that Schedule 6, para. 16 Complied with access control for the Chittagong Port access road is in accordance with the amended legislation, rules, and regulations for enabling and enforcing access control. 12. The government will ensure that the RHD monitors Schedule 6, para. 17 Complied with the effect of access control measures applied to the Kumira bypass of the Dhaka–Chittagong Highway and submits an evaluation report to ADB not later than 3 years after the physical completion of the bypass. 13. Within 18 months of loan effectiveness, the Schedule 6, para. 15 Complied with government will enact amendments to the MVO satisfactory to ADB to enable enforcement of the traffic and encroachment rules established under the Highways Act. 14. Private Sector Participation. Within 18 months of Schedule 6, para. 4 Complied with. The loan effectiveness, the government will amend and approve government policy on a policy and guidelines for private investment in highway private sector projects in Bangladesh, in form and substance satisfactory to participation has been ADB. approved. 15. Within 3 years of loan effectiveness, the government Schedule 6, para. 5 Complied with will enact legislation and establish a regulatory framework satisfactory to ADB, in accordance with the government’s approved Policy and Guidelines for Private Investment in Highway Projects. 16. Within 6 years of the effective date, an expert Schedule 6, para. 6 Complied with working group, consisting of representatives of the borrower, the private sector, and NGOs, with composition and under terms of reference satisfactory to the Bank, shall have completed and submitted recommendations to the borrower on the feasibility of transferring the Chittagong Port access road to private ownership. 17. The borrower shall ensure that the operation and Schedule 6, para. 7 Complied with maintenance of the Chittagong Port access road shall be in accordance with concession to a private sector company on the basis of international competitive bidding procedures acceptable to the Bank. Environment 1. The government will ensure that all environmental Schedule 6, para. 26 Complied with. An mitigation measures identified in the SEIA are incorporated environmental into the project design and followed during project compliance review construction and O&M, in consultation with DOE and in mission noted several accordance with ADB’s environmental guidelines and the mitigation issues, which environmental monitoring plan agreed upon with ADB. were then implemented. Social 1. The government will ensure that the LARP agreed Schedule 6, para. 25 Complied with upon with ADB, other relevant authorities, and the persons affected by the project is implemented by the RHD through an agency under arrangements in the involuntary resettlement and ADB’s Handbook on Resettlement (1998, as amended from time to time). 2. The borrower shall ensure that all counterpart Schedule 6, para. 24 Complied
Covenants 27
Reference in Loan Covenant Agreement Status of Compliance funding required for the project is in accordance with the financing plan, including the cost of land acquisition, other resettlement compensation, and implementation and monitoring under the LARP utility relocation. General project management expenses shall be fully provided for through approved ADP allocations from FY2001/2002 for each fiscal year to project completion. Financial 1. Cofinancing. Within 9 months of the effective date, Schedule 6, para. 22 Complied with. DFID or at a later date as the Bank may otherwise agree, the financed the TA for borrower shall have obtained the DFID grant or shall have preparation of the land made other arrangements, satisfactory to the Bank, to find transport policy, road the amount intended to be provided by the DFID grant. fund program, and financial management. Others 1. Established, Staffed, and Operating PMU/PIU. Schedule 6, para. 20 PCR: Partly complied Project Performance Monitoring System. The RHD shall with. No adequate establish capacity for and undertake a PPMS through an monitoring on poverty initial sample survey to establish a baseline for subsequent and performance performance monitoring and annual surveys, including data indicators set out at sufficient to meet the project management need for appraisal. feedback on implementation status and early warning of impending situations that may jeopardize development IED: No baseline report objectives. was ever provided. 2. Fielding Consultants. The selection, engagement, Complied with and services of the consultants shall be subject to the provisions of this schedule and of the Guidelines on the Use of Consultants by ADB and its Borrowers (October 1998, as amended from time to time), which have been furnished to the borrower and the RHD, and other arrangements satisfactory to the Bank 3. Project Implementation. The RHD shall ensure that Schedule 6, para. 1 Complied with the Office of the Additional Chief Engineer (ADB Projects) is responsible for all components. The RHD shall also ensure that this office is headed at all times by a project director who is the Additional Chief Engineer (ADB Projects) 4. For the CIC, the RHD shall ensure that the project Schedule 6, para. 2 Complied with director is assisted by (a) an additional project director, who is a superintendent engineer and who is, inter alia, responsible for implementation of the LARP; and (b) three project managers, who are executive engineers and are responsible for day-to-day implementation of the project. 5. For the RMC, the RHD shall ensure that the project Schedule 6, para. 3 Complied with director shall, inter alia, be responsible for the oversight of subproject selection under the ARMP using HDM, procurement, monitoring, and project coordination, with day-to-day implementation being delegated to RHD zonal offices, through Zonal Additional Chief Engineers. 6. Without limiting the generality of section 4.06, the Schedule 6, para. 19 Partly complied with. borrower shall furnish to the Bank, no later than 6 months Financial audits after the end of each fiscal year, audited accounts and acceptable to ADB were related financial statements for the project, by a reputable conducted annually, and private external accounting firm acceptable to the Bank. The performance audits were same accounting firm shall also concurrently undertake also started. independent performance audits on all procurement-related activity and furnish the results of such audits to the Bank no later than 9 months after the end of the fiscal year. Such
28 Appendix 3
Reference in Loan Covenant Agreement Status of Compliance performance audits shall be undertaken twice during the duration of the project. The firm shall be engaged in accordance with terms of reference acceptable to the Bank. ADB = Asian Development Bank, ADP = annual development plan, ARMP = annual road maintenance plan, CIC = corridor improvement component, DFID = Department for International Development of the United Kingdom, DOE = Department of Environment, FY = fiscal year, HDM = highway development and management, IED = Independent Evaluation Department, LARP = land acquisition and resettlement plan, LGED = local government engineering department, MVO = Motor Vehicles Ordinance, NGO = nongovernment organization, O&M = operations and maintenance, PCR = project completion report, PIU = project implementation unit, PMU = project management unit, PPMS = project performance monitoring system, RB = revenue budget, RHD = Roads and Highways Department, RMC = road maintenance component, SEIA = summary of environmental impact study, TA = technical assistance. Source: Independent Evaluation Department.
APPENDIX 4: POLICIES
Road Sector Policy Matrix Subject Policy Developments Requirement Actually Achieved 1. Road Maintenance 1.1. National Land Within the national land transport policy, provide overall direction The government must approve a Completed. The Transport Policy with regard to road maintenance, including that (i) since most of the policy statement that all RHD government approved the road network has been built, maintaining it in future will be the major road maintenance expenditure national land transport task of the RHD, and account for the majority of its expenditure; (ii) will be determined annually on policy on 24 April the RHD will be responsible for maintaining primary and regional the basis of the HDM-4 model 2004. The maintenance roads with a limited number of feeder roads, while the LGED will be ranking of road maintenance expenditure was estimated responsible for rural roads and most feeder roads; and (iii) all RHD priorities in the annual road using the HDM-4 model road maintenance expenditure will be determined annually on the maintenance plan. and was undertaken within basis of the highway design and maintenance model ranking of road the annual road maintenance priorities in the annual road maintenance plan. Policy development must be maintenance plan. supported by the project, including consulting services for a nationally owned policy development process involving all main stakeholders, beginning with a preliminary workshop to discuss a first set of proposals attended by relevant government institutions, aid agencies (including ADB, DFID, and the World Bank), academics, and NGOs, leading to an agreed-upon policy development process that is expected to include further review, analysis, and consultation, which in turn will lead to the government’s adoption of the policy. 1.2. Budgeting In the government budget, allocations for road maintenance need to Consulting services must review Completed be (i) made distinct from those for road development, reconstruction, and identify maintenance and and upgrading; (ii) over the medium term, budgeted on the basis of development expenditures all periodic maintenance under the annual development plan, within the annual development including those domestically funded and aid supported being plan and revenue budget and separately identified and determined through the annual road assist in establishing improved maintenance plan; and (iii) over the longer term, when the existing budget headings for these
30
Subject Policy Developments Requirement Actually Achieved Appendix 4 maintenance backlog has been reduced, shifted from the annual items. development plan to the revenue budget to reflect the recurrent nature of maintenance expenditures. The government must ensure Completed consolidation of all expenditure for periodic maintenance in the annual development plan, and this must be continued for at least the next 5 years.
The government must complete Completed studies and implement budget reclassification.
The government must commit Not completed to shifting maintenance under the annual development plan to an expanded revenue budget within a stipulated period. 1.3. Maintenance Strengthen organizational arrangements within the RHD with respect To be addressed through the Ongoing Institutions to all aspects of maintenance of RHD roads to support effective DFID-funded institutional overall management of the annual road maintenance plan, development component. maintenance planning, analysis, budgeting, programming, design, implementation, and monitoring. 1.4. Maintenance Establish additional sources of road maintenance financing capable of With support from ADB, DFID, Review completed, but Financing ensuring that the annual road maintenance plan can eventually be and the World Bank, carry out a road fund not established fully financed from domestic sources on a sustainable basis. national review of options for sustainable funding of the annual road maintenance plan, with options to include establishing a road fund and funding the full costs of the plan directly under the government budget, and develop and implement an action plan for introducing a sustainable funding mechanism. 2. Private Participation 2.1. Policy and Legal Establish policy and legal framework for private sector investment in Reactivate government Completed. Policy Framework road projects, including the operation of toll roads and conducting consideration of 1998 draft approved in March 2005. maintenance on a concession basis. policy and guidelines for private investment in highways projects
Subject Policy Developments Requirement Actually Achieved in Bangladesh, and obtain government approval for a policy and guidelines satisfactory to ADB.
With ADB support, amend law As no private operator was to reflect adopted policy and in place to operate the toll guidelines for private investment road, ADB approved on 4 in highways. February 2007 a contractor to undertake a 1-year contract on toll collection and O&M for the Chittagong Port access road. 3. Access Control 3.1. Legal Establish legal provision for introduction and enforcement of With ADB support, introduce Completed Framework controlled-access highways. Provisions include (i) avoidance of rule under the Highways Act encroachment of the right-of-way by markets, bus stops, and business and regulation under the Motor frontage and driveways; and (ii) restricting slow-moving traffic, such Vehicles Ordinance, and amend as three wheelers, bicycles, and farm animals. the ordinance. ADB = Asian Development Bank, DFID = Department for International Development of the United Kingdom, HDM = highway development and management, LGED = local government engineering department, NGO = nongovernment organizations, O&M = operation and maintenance, RHD = Roads and Highways Department. Source: Independent Evaluation Department.
Policies
31
APPENDIX 5: ECONOMIC REEVALUATION
1. The economic reevaluation for the project was undertaken for both components, the corridor improvement component (CIC) and the road maintenance component (RMC), as well as for each subsection per component. The with- and without-project situations were compared to determine the effects of introducing the project roads. The project’s main economic benefits consisted of savings in vehicle-operating costs (VOCs) and time. The methodology used in this reevaluation was the same used at appraisal and the project completion report (PCR).
2. The CIC consisted of three parts: (i) overlay and widening of the Chandina, Comilla, and Feni bypasses; (ii) upgrading and widening of the Feni–Chittagong section, including construction of local bypasses; and (iii) construction of the Chittagong Port access road (CPAR), an access-controlled toll road.
3. The RMC financed a 3-year period of priority road maintenance from the annual road maintenance plan. At completion, periodic maintenance work was undertaken on the thirteen sections, which were selected according to Asian Development Bank (ADB) criteria. These sections were: (i) Daudkandi–Chandina bypass, (ii) Chandina–Comilla bypass, (iii) Comilla–Feni bypass, (iv) Comilla–Chandpur, (v) Laxmipur–Raipur, (vi) Raipur–Chandpur, (vii) Lalmai–Laksham–Sonaimuri, (viii) Begumgonj–Maijdi–Sonapur, (ix) Chittagong–Cox’s Bazar, (x) Cox’s Bazar–Teknaf, (xi) MiaBazar– Kashinagar–Harischar, (xii) Maidji–Uderhat, and (xiii) Kalurghat–Manashertek.1 Of the 13 sections, the first ten were included in the economic recalculation for the RMC, since traffic counts for the last three sections were not available to the project performance evaluation report (PPER) team.
4. The reevaluated economic internal rate of return (EIRR) for the CIC considered the economic costs and benefits over the construction period plus 20 years of operation as at appraisal. The RMC considered the economic costs and benefits over the construction period plus 10 years of operation as at appraisal. All costs and benefits were expressed in 2008 constant prices. The methodology for calculating the EIRR used the highway and design maintenance (HDM) model as at appraisal.
5. In re-estimating project benefits, the PPER team employed updated information, especially traffic data. The PPER team collected data on the available classified traffic counts for each road section, the road condition survey conducted during the PPER mission, and 2004–2005 VOCs. The HDM Circle of the Roads and Highways Department (RHD) collects and consolidates data on vehicle traffic counts, road conditions, and VOCs on a periodic basis, as part of its mandate in preparing the annual road maintenance (routine and periodic) and rehabilitation requirements for the national, regional, and local roads in its database. The latest traffic count data available on project relevant road sections was for 2011. However, the availability of traffic counts on relevant road sections was inconsistent. The HDM Circle provided the PPER mission with available average annual daily traffic (AADT) estimates based on traffic count data for 2004, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, and 2011 for national roads and 2004, 2007, 2008, and 2011 for regional roads.
6. The AADT data provided showed increasing and decreasing trends in traffic flows. Using AADT data from 2004 to 2011, it was not possible to determine a stable growth rate for each project road section. A traffic forecast was prepared using traffic growth rates by vehicle type estimated in the PCR. These were higher than those used at appraisal, although the methodology used was the same, including the assumptions made.2
1 Road sections implemented under the RMC were to be selected according to ADB criteria, one of which was that the economic internal rate of return (EIRR) be at least 20% based on a minimum 10-year evaluation period. 2 GDP growth assumption from 2010 onward was 5% and elasticity of demand for transport was 1.5 for both passenger and freight traffic. The appraisal growth rate estimates were lower than those used in the PCR, but resulted in high traffic forecasts as compared to actual traffic due to the higher baseline traffic used. The traffic growth rate estimates in the PCR are higher
Economic Reevaluation 33
7. The actual growth in the number of vehicles in Bangladesh has been very robust at 12% for the 2007–2010 period and 9% for the 2002–2010 period. Table A5.1 gives the vehicle registration statistics from 2002 to 2010, including the estimated growth rate per vehicle type. The traffic growth rates used are given in Table A5.2, which was also used for the RMC traffic forecast.
Table A5.1: Vehicle Registration Statistics 2002–2010 Vehicle Type 2002–03 2003–04 2004–05 2005–06 2006–07 2007–08 2008–09 2009–10 2007–10a 2002–10b Bus/Minibus 31,848 33,302 34,388 35,349 36,526 37,906 39,088 40,059 2.8% 2.9% Microbus 16,244 17,359 18,826 20,998 23,637 26,484 30,056 34,148 13.6% 9.7% Trucks 50,786 52,951 55,082 57,399 59,674 61,717 65,064 71,424 7.6% 4.4% Jeep 11,009 11,172 11,386 11,704 12,090 12,506 13,028 13,625 4.4% 2.7% Car 66,393 69,461 72,254 75,728 80,453 87,142 96,137 106,291 10.4% 6.1% Auto 84,693 94,120 99,930 104,432 111,046 122,092 135,875 148,982 Rickshaw 10.5% 7.3% Motorcycle 239,884 257,086 281,599 316,847 366,031 433,287 501,825 567,553 14.4% 11.4% Total 500,857 535,451 573,465 622,457 689,457 781,134 881,073 982,082 12.1% 8.8% Notes: a = growth rates b = growth rates Source: Statistical Yearbook of Bangladesh 2010, Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics.
Table A5.2: Traffic Growth Rates (%) 2007–2011 2012–2016 2017 onward Vehicle Type PCR & PPER Appraisal PCR & PPER Appraisal PCR & PPER Appraisal Motorcycle 7.0% 6.6% 6.6% Auto Rickshaw 7.0% 6.6% 6.6% Cars 9.0% 6.0% 7.5% 5.0% 7.5% 5.0% Trucks 9.0% 6.0% 7.5% 5.0% 7.5% 5.0% Buses 9.0% 6.0% 7.5% 5.0% 7.5% 5.0% PCR = project completion report, PPER = project performance evaluation report. Source: Asian Development Bank database.
8. The PPER traffic forecast for the CPAR utilized the traffic data collected by the toll road operator from 2007 to October 2012. The 2012 traffic was used as baseline data for the PPER forecast and the traffic growth rates as given in Table A5.2 were applied.
9. The RHD is currently undertaking the four-laning work of the Dhaka–Chittagong Highway, totaling 192.30 kilometers (km). This four-laning work involves the construction of 28 bridges, including five major bridges, three flyovers over the railway lines, and two underpasses. The project is funded by the Government of Bangladesh/Japan Debt Cancellation Fund of about Tk 31,836 million. At completion of the four-laning work (expected in 2013), the entire Dhaka–Chittagong Highway will be four lanes. In addition, the existing two lanes will be overlaid to match the road conditions of the two new lanes. Under the existing contracts for the four-laning, the contractors have been responsible for the routine maintenance of the existing highway since the start of the project. This four-laning work is affecting the CIC and RMC subprojects located on the Dhaka–Chittagong Highway:
Corridor Improvement Component (i) Chandina, Comilla, and Feni bypasses (ii) Feni–Chittagong section
Road Maintenance Component (i) Daudkandi–Chandina bypass (ii) End of Chandina bypass–start of Comilla bypass
but used lower baseline traffic, resulting in lower traffic forecasts. Using the PCR growth rate estimates, the resulting PPER traffic forecast was lower since the 2011 actual traffic was lower.
34 Appendix 5
(iii) End of Comilla bypass–start of Feni bypass
10. The four-laning work is expected to be completed by the end of 2013. For a conservative estimation, the PPER team adjusted the traffic forecast downward for the abovementioned road sections by 50% from 2014 onward, considering that vehicle traffic will utilize four lanes (or two lanes in each direction). The revised traffic forecasts along the CIC, including the CPAR, are given in Table A5.3.
Table A5.3: Traffic Forecast for CIC Road Sections, Including CPAR, 2004, 2009, 2014, and 2019 Appraisal and PPER Estimates Auto Micro Mini Large Small Medium Heavy Total Year Source Motorcycle Rickshaw Car Utility bus bus Bus Truck Truck Truck Total - All Traffic A. Chandina, Comilla, and Feni Bypasses 2004 Appraisal 1,801 845 1,208 1,756 716 4,408 106 10,840 10,840 PPER 993 1,210 1,136 1,019 1,218 1,884 2,704 837 5,112 660 14,570 16,773 2009 Appraisal 2,598 1,218 1,742 2,532 1,032 6,357 153 15,632 15,632 PPER 1,165 3,657 1,113 249 1,669 233 2,736 664 6,923 300 13,887 18,709 2014 Appraisal 3,444 1,615 2,309 3,357 1,368 8,427 202 20,722 20,722 PPER 571 3,504 711 633 855 816 1,433 1,189 4,182 231 10,050 14,125 2019 Appraisal 4,449 2,087 2,983 4,337 1,767 10,887 261 26,771 26,771 PPER 785 4,824 1,021 908 1,227 1,172 2,057 1,708 6,003 332 14,428 20,037 B. Feni–Mirsari Section of Feni–Chittagong 2004 Appraisal 3,697 1,746 1,190 2,856 714 6,462 397 17,062 17,062 PPER 227 3,325 489 365 1,456 579 1,484 323 6,562 462 11,720 15,272 2009 Appraisal 5,332 2,517 1,716 4,119 1,030 9,319 572 24,605 24,605 PPER 866 5,831 1,170 384 1,465 882 2,226 591 8,682 1,014 16,414 23,111 2014 Appraisal 7,068 3,337 2,275 5,460 1,365 12,353 758 32,616 32,616 PPER 607 3,073 837 158 788 777 884 798 4,491 482 9,215 12,895 2019 Appraisal 9,132 4,311 2,939 7,055 1,764 15,959 980 42,140 42,140 PPER 836 4,230 1,202 226 1,132 1,115 1,269 1,145 6,447 692 13,229 18,294 C. Sitakunda–Chittagong Section of Feni Chittagong 2004 Appraisal 3,290 1,190 1,227 2,988 714 7,062 514 16,985 16,985 PPER 587 1,464 488 409 830 1,336 385 538 1,712 20 5,718 7,769 2009 Appraisal 4,744 1,716 1,769 4,309 1,030 10,184 742 24,494 24,494 PPER 692 5,886 576 180 1,639 809 364 633 1,215 23 5,439 12,017 2014 Appraisal 6,289 2,275 2,345 5,712 1,365 13,499 983 32,468 32,468 PPER 564 3,142 836 203 540 338 383 411 546 20 3,276 6,982 2019 Appraisal 8,125 2,939 3,030 7,380 1,764 17,441 1,270 41,949 41,949 PPER 777 4,325 1,200 291 776 485 549 591 783 28 4,703 9,805 D. Chittagong Port Access Road 2004 Appraisal 353 189 294 141 209 4,786 226 6,198 6,198
PPER - Economic Revaluation 2009 Appraisal 509 273 424 203 302 6,903 329 8,943 8,943 PPER 347 604 9 37 1,766 2,416 2,763 2014 Appraisal 674 362 562 270 400 9,150 436 11,854 11,854 PPER 381 958 9 50 2,560 3,578 3,959 2019 Appraisal 871 467 726 348 517 11,822 563 15,314 15,314 PPER 525 1,376 13 72 3,675 5,136 5,661 CIC = corridor improvement component, CPAR = Chittagong Port access road, PPER = project performance evaluation report.
Source: Bangladesh Roads and Highways Department database.
35
36 Appendix 5
11. The appraisal and PCR did not have traffic forecasts for the RMC roads. The actual roads covered under the RMC were different from those identified at appraisal. The PCR also did not give the traffic forecasts for the RMC subprojects, although an economic evaluation was prepared. The PPER prepared traffic forecasts for the RMC subprojects, for which traffic counts were obtained from the RHD. These are shown in Table A5.4.
Table A5.4: Traffic Forecast in AADT for RMC Road Sections (2004, 2009, 2012, 2019 and 2027) Motor- Auto Micro Mini Large Small Medium Heavy Year cycle Rickshaw Car Utility bus bus Bus Truck Truck Truck Total Daudkandi–Chandina Bypass 2004 127 354 486 388 602 1,176 2,654 570 3,441 163 9,961 2009 261 1,356 1,49 251 1,814 655 2,597 773 5,635 300 15,139 7 2012 319 1,655 1,91 321 2,317 837 3,317 987 7,197 383 19,244 2 2019 249 1,294 1,57 264 1,906 688 2,728 812 5,920 315 15,750 3 2027 415 2,158 2,80 470 3,399 1,227 4,866 1,448 10,558 562 27,910 5 Chandina–Comilla Bypass 2004 993 1,210 1,13 1,019 1,218 1,884 2,704 837 5,112 660 16,773 6 2009 1,165 3,657 1,11 249 1,669 233 2,736 664 6,923 300 18,709 3 2012 1,004 6,168 1,24 1,104 1,492 1,424 2,500 2,076 7,298 403 24,712 2 2019 785 4,824 1,02 908 1,227 1,172 2,057 1,708 6,003 332 20,037 1 2027 1,310 8,044 1,82 1,620 2,189 2,090 3,668 3,045 10,707 591 35,085 2 Comilla–Feni Bypass 2004 613 904 775 654 865 1,411 2,804 460 6,433 223 15,142 2009 235 1,056 287 72 422 180 811 298 2,858 189 6,408 2012 287 1,289 367 92 539 230 1,036 381 3,650 241 8,111 2019 224 1,008 302 76 443 189 852 313 3,003 199 6,608 2027 374 1,681 538 135 791 337 1,520 558 5,355 354 11,643 Comilla–Chandpur 2004 1,054 1,333 400 392 491 963 951 537 1,162 148 7,431 2009 491 3,761 570 14 649 663 1,161 414 618 - 8,341 2012 599 4,590 728 18 828 846 1,483 529 789 - 10,412 2019 469 3,590 599 15 681 696 1,220 435 649 - 8,354 2027 782 5,986 1,06 27 1,215 1,242 2,175 776 1,158 - 14,429 8 Laxmipur–Raipur 2004 520 519 90 142 112 405 336 202 224 70 2,620 2009 532 1,820 236 75 249 280 336 254 612 - 4,395 2012 822 6,844 612 164 632 801 777 1,188 1,285 - 13,124 2019 1,286 10,705 1,00 271 1,040 1,318 1,279 1,954 2,113 - 20,971 6 2027 2,144 17,850 1,79 483 1,855 2,350 2,280 3,485 3,769 - 36,011 5 Raipur–Chandpur 2004 495 509 29 65 28 145 87 86 139 68 1,651 2009 678 1,293 244 57 184 223 205 236 622 - 3,743 2012 1,125 3,960 121 135 216 1,087 861 1,289 1,518 - 10,313 2019 1,759 6,195 200 223 355 1,788 1,417 2,120 2,497 - 16,554 2027 2,933 10,329 356 397 634 3,189 2,526 3,782 4,454 - 28,601 Lalmai–Laksham–Sonaimuri 2004 217 213 273 288 250 219 516 328 915 23 3,242
Economic Reevaluation 37
Motor- Auto Micro Mini Large Small Medium Heavy Year cycle Rickshaw Car Utility bus bus Bus Truck Truck Truck Total 2009 236 1,572 255 5 340 338 682 389 581 - 4,399 2012 152 1,326 356 148 434 395 675 705 849 - 5,041 2019 238 2,074 585 244 714 649 1,111 1,160 1,397 - 8,174 2027 398 3,459 1,04 435 1,274 1,158 1,981 2,069 2,492 - 14,309 4 Begumgonj–Maijdi–Sonapur 2004 412 1,002 167 192 229 335 668 266 596 36 3,903 2009 570 1,044 251 370 370 615 533 477 471 7 4,707 2012 696 1,275 320 472 472 785 681 610 601 8 5,920 2019 1,089 1,994 527 776 776 1,292 1,120 1,003 989 14 9,580 2027 1,815 3,324 939 1,385 1,385 2,304 1,997 1,789 1,765 25 16,728 Chittagong–Cox’s Bazar 2004 220 291 93 218 438 254 430 150 422 28 2,544 2009 643 708 211 453 1,052 286 604 374 823 19 5,173 2012 447 1,387 311 205 943 599 560 907 1,421 35 6,815 2019 699 2,169 511 338 1,551 985 921 1,493 2,338 58 11,063 2027 1,165 3,617 912 602 2,766 1,757 1,643 2,662 4,170 104 19,399 Cox’s Bazar–Teknaf 2004 128 837 61 97 658 73 155 148 302 2,459 2009 896 1344 38 294 507 456 33 43 195 3 3,809 2012 603 695 223 396 350 211 217 381 413 - 3,488 2019 944 1,087 366 651 577 347 357 626 679 - 5,634 2027 1,574 1,813 653 1,161 1,028 618 637 1,117 1,211 - 9,812 AADT = average annual daily traffic, HDM = highway development and management, RHD = Roads and Highways Department, RMC = road maintenance component. Note: AADT data for 2004, 2009, and 2011 (baseline) were from HDM Circle, RHD. AADT for 2012, 2019, and 2027 were estimated using 2011 as baseline and growth rate as given in Table A5.2. Source: Roads and Highways Department database. Bangladesh.
12. The 2004–2005 VOC inputs to the HDM-4 model were provided by the HDM Circle. The resulting VOC per km estimate by vehicle type and road condition was used to estimate VOC savings by vehicle type. For the CIC roads, except for CPAR, the computed VOC and VOC savings per km by vehicle type assumed an international roughness index (IRI) of 6 for without-, and 2 for with-project situation. For the CPAR, aside from the difference in road condition (IRI values of 4 for the without-project situation and 2 for the with-project situation), the without-project situation assumed a road length of 20 km (road to the port via the internal city road) compared to the with-project situation of a shorter route of 13.58 km or a difference of 6.42 km. 1 The computed VOC by road condition and IRI is shown in Table A5.5.
Table A5.5: Economic Vehicle Operating Cost per km, by IRI Value and Vehicle Type, in Taka/km Motor- Auto Micro Mini Large Small Medium Heavy IRI Road Condition cycle Rickshaw Car Utility bus bus Bus Truck Truck Truck IRI 6 Without Project 2.57 2.57 9.46 18.98 11.70 12.30 19.38 10.25 16.09 24.75 IRI 2 With Project 2.35 2.35 8.62 16.69 10.49 11.25 17.49 9.11 14.39 23.46 HDM = highway development and management, IRI = international roughness index, PPER = project performance evaluation report, RHD = Roads and Highways Department. Source: PPER estimates using HDM-4. Basic 2004–2005 operating cost data were provided by RHD’s HDM Circle, 2012.
1 HDM-4 estimates the VOC based, on among other factors, the road condition as expressed in IRI values indicated below: Paved Roads Roughness (IRI, m/km) Road Condition Primary Roads Secondary Roads Tertiary Roads Good 2 3 4 Fair 4 5 6 Poor 6 7 8 Bad 8 9 10 Source: HDM-4 software guide.
38 Appendix 5
13. The estimate of the project’s actual economic costs was based on the actual financial costs for civil works, land acquisition and resettlement, design and construction supervision, and project administration. Land acquisition and resettlement costs were allocated only to CIC subprojects, while design and construction supervision and project administration were allocated to both CIC and RMC projects. Interest costs during construction were not considered an economic cost. Based on PCR estimates of economic costs, it was calculated that economic costs comprise about 80% of financial costs. This calculation was used to adjust the financial costs of CIC and RMC subprojects to economic costs. Since data on the actual cost incurred per year for each subproject were not available, the actual implementation periods for the CIC and RMC contracts were used to distribute the costs over the implementation period of each subproject under a specific contract.
14. The routine and periodic maintenance costs for each subproject were included as part of the subproject maintenance cost and estimated using 2004 prices at Tk 40,000 per km, although the four- laning contract for the Dhaka–Chittagong Highway included the routine maintenance of said highway inclusive of the CIC and RMC subprojects on the alignment. The periodic maintenance costs for the subprojects on the Dhaka–Chittagong Highway were advanced to 2013 instead of the planned 2016 overlay. The routine maintenance cost for the CPAR was already included in the contract price of the toll collector and the periodic maintenance cost was assumed, as in the PCR, to be undertaken in 2016. For the RMC projects outside of the Dhaka–Chittagong Highway and Chittagong–Teknaf road, the periodic maintenance cost was assumed to be undertaken in 2018. The RHD had scheduled the overlay of the Chittagong–Teknaf road for 2013. The estimated periodic maintenance cost at 2004 prices was estimated at Tk 3.52 million/km.
15. The EIRR was estimated based on the subproject cost and benefit streams. The bulk of the project’s costs were incurred in 2003–2006 for the CIC and in 2005–2007 for the RMC.
16. The recalculated EIRR for the CIC subprojects, taken as one component, was 17.1% (see Table A5.6). The recalculated EIRRs for each CIC subproject are given in Table A5.7:
Table A5.6: Recalculation of EIRR for Total Corridor Improvement Component (Tk million, 2004 prices) Capital Maintenance Travel Time Year Cost Cost Total Cost VOC Savings Savings Total Benefits Net Benefits 2002 385.54 385.54 - (385.54) 2003 1,293.31 1,293.31 - (1,293.31) 2004 983.25 983.25 - (983.25) 2005 1,437.17 1,437.17 - (1,437.17) 2006 1,106.37 1,106.37 - (1,106.37) 2007 377.65 377.65 823.54 155.21 978.75 601.10 2008 72.65 4.53 77.18 964.75 179.38 1,144.13 1,066.95 2009 4.53 4.53 1,209.50 189.66 1,399.16 1,394.63 2010 4.53 4.53 1,171.53 185.53 1,357.05 1,352.52 2011 4.53 4.53 1,209.90 194.82 1,404.72 1,400.19 2012 4.53 4.53 1,316.91 209.34 1,526.25 1,521.72 2013 4.53 4.53 1,414.92 224.79 1,639.71 1,635.18 2014 4.53 4.53 839.85 120.99 960.84 956.30 2015 4.53 4.53 902.39 129.92 1,032.32 1,027.78 2016 52.29 52.29 969.60 139.52 1,109.12 1,056.82 2017 4.53 4.53 1,041.82 149.82 1,191.64 1,187.10 2018 4.53 4.53 1,119.42 160.88 1,280.30 1,275.77 2019 4.53 4.53 1,202.81 172.76 1,375.57 1,371.04 2020 4.53 4.53 1,292.41 185.53 1,477.93 1,473.40 2021 4.53 4.53 1,388.69 199.23 1,587.92 1,583.39 2022 4.53 4.53 1,492.15 213.95 1,706.10 1,701.57 2023 4.53 4.53 1,603.32 229.76 1,833.08 1,828.55 2024 4.53 4.53 1,722.79 246.74 1,969.53 1,964.99 2025 4.53 4.53 1,851.16 264.98 2,116.13 2,111.60
Economic Reevaluation 39
Capital Maintenance Travel Time Year Cost Cost Total Cost VOC Savings Savings Total Benefits Net Benefits 2026 4.53 4.53 1,989.10 284.56 2,273.66 2,269.13 2027 4.53 4.53 2,137.33 305.60 2,442.93 2,438.40 EIRR 17.1% NPV $2,513.19 EIRR = economic internal rate of return, NPV = net present value, VOC = vehicle operating costs. Source: Reports and recommendations of the President, project completion reports, and project performance evaluation report calculations.
Table A5.7: Results of EIRR Recalculation for CIC, Appraisal, PCR, and PPER (in %) Length Economic Internal Rate of Return Description (in km) Appraisal PCR PPER Widening of Chandina, Comilla, and Feni bypasses 51.76 35.9% 36.9% 26.6% Feni–Mirsarai section of Feni–Chittagong 25.44 31.1% 46.5% 29.4% Sitakunda–Chittagong section of Feni–Chittagong 22.46 15.9% Chittagong Port access road 13.58 15.4% 13.1% 12.2% All CIC subprojects 113.24 37.0% 28.6% 17.1% CIC = corridor improvement component, EIRR = economic internal rate of return, km = kilometer, PCR = project completion report, PPER = project performance evaluation report. Source: Reports and recommendations of the President, project completion reports, and project performance evaluation report calculations.
17. Of the 13 subprojects, the recalculated EIRR for the RMC subprojects excluded the MiaBazar– Kashinagar–Harischar, Maidji–Uderhat, and Kalurghat–Manashertek roads, for which traffic counts were not available. The PCR did not recalculate the EIRR for the RMC projects as a whole. For the 11 subprojects in the RMC, the EIRR was 17.4% (see Table A5.8). The recalculated EIRRs for each RMC subproject are given in Table A5.9.
Table A5.8: Recalculation of EIRR for Total Road Maintenance Component (Tk million, 2004 prices) Capital Maintenance Total VOC Travel Time Total Net Year Cost Cost Cost Savings Savings Benefits Benefits 2005 568.09 568.09 - (568.09) 2006 568.09 568.09 - (568.09) 2007 568.09 568.09 - (568.09) 2008 16.03 16.03 310.14 4.93 315.07 299.04 2009 16.03 16.03 314.46 5.39 319.84 303.81 2010 16.03 16.03 348.40 6.02 354.42 338.39 2011 16.03 16.03 399.90 7.19 407.08 391.05 2012 16.03 16.03 429.68 7.72 437.40 421.37 2013 141.43 141.43 461.68 8.29 469.97 328.53 2014 77.08 77.08 334.00 6.43 340.44 263.36 2015 16.03 16.03 358.86 6.91 365.77 349.74 2016 16.03 16.03 385.57 7.42 392.99 376.96 2017 16.03 16.03 414.27 7.97 422.24 406.21 2018 358.42 358.42 445.11 8.55 453.67 95.25 2019 16.03 16.03 478.25 9.19 487.43 471.40 2020 16.03 16.03 513.85 9.86 523.72 507.69 2021 16.03 16.03 552.11 10.59 562.70 546.67 2022 16.03 16.03 593.22 11.37 604.59 588.56 2023 16.03 16.03 637.39 12.21 649.61 633.58 2024 16.03 16.03 684.85 13.12 697.97 681.94 2025 16.03 16.03 735.86 14.09 749.94 733.91 2026 16.03 16.03 790.66 15.13 805.78 789.75 2027 16.03 16.03 849.54 16.24 865.79 849.76 EIRR 17.4% EIRR = economic internal rate of return, VOC = vehicle operating costs. Source: Project completion reports, and project performance evaluation report calculations.
40 Appendix 5
Table A5.9: Results of EIRR Recalculation for RMC, PCR, and PPER (in %) Length EIRR Description (in km) PCR PPER Daudkandi–Chandina bypass 28.69 33% 15.1% End of Chandina bypass–start of Comilla bypass 12.69 29.9% 30% End of Comilla bypass–start of Feni bypass 34.62 13.4% Comilla–Chandpur 50.5 166% 18.0% Laxmipur–Raipur 16 62% 20.5% Raipur–Chandpur 27 38% 19.9% Lalmai–Laksham–Sonaimuri 38 56% 15.1% Bagumgonj–Maijdi–Sonapur 13.5 144% 36.9% Chittagong–Cox’s Bazar 62.5 93% 20.2% Cox’s Bazar–Teknaf 37 78% 8.6% All RMC 320.5 17.4% EIRR = economic internal rate of return, km = kilometer, PCR = project completion report, PPER = project performance evaluation report, RMC = road maintenance component. Source: Project completion reports, and project performance evaluation report calculations.
APPENDIX 6: FINANCIAL REEVALUATION
1. The Chittagong Port access road (CPAR) was intended to provide a new express access road between Chittagong’s northern approaches and Chittagong Port, the primary and major international port of Bangladesh. CPAR was originally intended as a build, operate, and transfer project, but the estimated financial internal rate of return (FIRR) was too low to attract private sector participation. Subsequently, it was transformed into the first limited-access toll road to be operated and maintained by the private sector in Bangladesh.
2. The subproject’s FIRR was re-estimated using the latest traffic statistics available and compared with the FIRRs estimated at appraisal and at project completion. The major assumptions used in recalculating the FIRR were the following:
(i) Capital costs were comprised of actual capital expenditures incurred during the construction of the CPAR, including civil works and equipment, but excluding interest expenses during construction. (ii) Operation and routine maintenance costs were based on the contracted cost as given in the contract for operation of the CPAR between the government of Bangladesh and the concessionaire, a joint venture of Monico Limited and Asian Traffic Technologies, Ltd. (iii) The periodic maintenance cost and year of implementation was as given in the project completion report (PCR). (iv) The toll collection revenues were based on actual traffic using the CPAR from 2007 to October 2012 as provided by the concessionaire through the Roads and Highways Department (RHD) office in Chittagong. The average annual daily traffic (AADT) increased by 10.3% per annum from 2007 to 2012. In the appraisal report, the total estimated AADT in 2009 was 8,942, while the actual AADT was only 2,763 or a difference of 6,179 (69.1%) below the appraisal estimate. In the preparation of the traffic forecast, the traffic growth rates used were the same as the estimated growth rates by vehicle type given in the PCR. This was determined to be the most reasonable estimate given that Chittagong Port’s capacity utilization was reaching its design levels.1 Table A6.1 gives the traffic growth rates used in the traffic forecast. Table A6.2 gives the actual AADT for the CPAR from 2007 to 2012 and Table A6.3 the traffic forecast from 2013 to 2027 by vehicle toll class. The toll rates charged by vehicle class are given in Table A6.4.
Table A6.1: Traffic Growth Rates Used for the CPAR, 2013–2027, in % Vehicle Type 2012–2016 2017 onward Motorcycle 6.6 6.6 Auto Rickshaw 6.6 6.6 Cars 7.5 7.5 Trucks 7.5 7.5 Buses 7.5 7.5 CPAR = Chittagong Port access road. Source: Roads and Highways Department, Bangladesh.
1 The Study Design, Layout Plan, Costing, and Project Appraisal Report for Techno-Economic Feasibility Study of a Deep Sea Port in Bangladesh, Pacific Consultants International (PCI), Japan, in association with AEC, Thailand, and DECON, JPZ & DEVCON, Bangladesh, November 2008.
42 Appendix 6
Table A6.2: Actual and Forecast AADT for the CPAR by Vehicle Class per Toll Rate Charged Actual AADT, 2007–2012 Class I Class II Class III Class IV Class V Class VI Microbus/ Small Medium Large Heavy Truck/ Year MC/AR Car Truck Truck Truck Tanker Total 2007 338 431 4 27 13 1,293 2,106 2008 377 480 4 32 7 1,436 2,336 2009 347 604 9 37 18 1,749 2,763 2010 287 663 6 23 19 1,527 2,524 2011 328 710 5 41 74 1,730 2,887 2012 336 829 8 43 31 2,184 3,431 a.g.r. (0.14%) 13.99% 14.32% 10.21% 18.46% 11.06% 10.26% AADT = average annual daily traffic, AR = auto rickshaw, CPAR = Chittagong Port access road, MC = motorcycle. Note: a.g.r. = annual growth rate (estimate by the Independent Evaluation Department). Source: Roads and Highways Department—Chittagong, December 2012.
Table A6.3: AADT Forecast, 2013–2027 Class I Class II Class III Class IV Class V Class VI Microbus/ Small Medium Large Heavy Truck/ Year MC/AR Car Truck Truck Truck Tanker Total 2007 338 431 4 27 13 1,293 2,106 2008 377 480 4 32 7 1,436 2,336 2009 347 604 9 37 18 1,749 2,763 2010 287 663 6 23 19 1,527 2,524 2011 328 710 5 41 74 1,730 2,887 2012 336 829 8 43 31 2,184 3,431 2013 358 892 8 47 33 2,348 3,686 2014 381 958 9 50 36 2,524 3,959 2015 407 1,030 10 54 39 2,714 4,253 2016 433 1,108 10 58 42 2,917 4,568 2017 462 1,191 11 62 45 3,136 4,907 2018 493 1,280 12 67 48 3,371 5,270 2019 525 1,376 13 72 52 3,624 5,661 2020 560 1,479 14 77 55 3,896 6,081 2021 597 1,590 15 83 60 4,188 6,532 2022 636 1,709 16 89 64 4,502 7,017 2023 678 1,837 17 96 69 4,839 7,537 2024 723 1,975 19 103 74 5,202 8,096 2025 770 2,123 20 111 80 5,593 8,697 2026 821 2,283 21 119 86 6,012 9,342 2027 875 2,454 23 128 92 6,463 10,036 AADT = average annual daily traffic, AR = auto rickshaw, MC = motorcycle. Source: Independent Evaluation Department.
Table A6.4: Actual Toll Rates Charged by Vehicle Type Vehicle Class Toll Category Vehicle Description (in Taka/Vehicle Class) I Motorcycle, auto rickshaw, tempo 5 II Microbus, car, pick-up 15 III Small truck 20 IV Medium truck 25 V Large truck, large bus 30 VI Heavy truck, tanker 50 Source: Monico Limited and Asian Traffic Technologies, Ltd., December 2012.
Financial Reevaluation 43
3. The recomputed FIRR for the CPAR is -2.47%. This is lower than the appraisal estimate of 4.8%, but higher than the PCR recomputation of -4.3%. The difference between the PPER recomputation and the appraisal result can be attributed to the actual lower traffic used, which was 69.1% lower than forecast. The base toll rates assumed at appraisal were also higher than the implemented toll rates. Since the concessionaire is just collecting the tolls and undertaking routine maintenance of the road on a fixed contract, it has no control over the toll rates, which the government sets. It was not possible to trace the cause of the difference in the PCR results, since the PCR did not show the actual and forecast traffic used. In analyzing the revenue streams for both the PCR and the Independent Evaluation Department (IED), the PCR traffic forecast was lower than the actual traffic attained. For example, the 2012 PCR estimate of revenues was Tk 46.79 million, while the actual 2012 realized revenues totaled Tk 53.04 million or a difference of TK 6.25 million. Table A6.5 shows the details of the recomputation of the CPAR FIRR.
Table A6.5: Recomputation of the CPAR Financial Internal Rate of Return Operating & Capital Maintenance Periodic Toll Net Year Cost Cost Maintenance Total Cost Revenues Revenues 2003 311.68 311.68 (311.68) 2004 331.22 331.22 (331.22) 2005 636.14 636.14 (636.14) 2006 488.08 488.08 (488.08) 2007 131.93 20.00 151.93 31.28 (120.65) 2008 20.00 20.00 34.68 14.68 2009 20.00 20.00 42.24 22.24 2010 20.00 20.00 37.52 17.52 2011 20.00 20.00 42.99 22.99 2012 20.00 20.00 53.04 33.04 2013 20.00 20.00 57.02 37.02 2014 20.00 20.00 61.29 41.29 2015 20.00 20.00 65.88 45.88 2016 20.00 41.83 61.83 70.81 8.98 2017 20.00 20.00 76.12 56.12 2018 20.00 20.00 81.82 61.82 2019 20.00 20.00 87.95 67.95 2020 20.00 20.00 94.53 74.53 2021 20.00 20.00 101.62 81.62 2022 20.00 20.00 109.23 89.23 2023 20.00 20.00 117.41 97.41 2024 20.00 20.00 126.20 106.20 2025 20.00 20.00 135.66 115.66 2026 20.00 20.00 145.82 125.82 2027 20.00 20.00 156.74 136.74 FIRR (2.47%) CPAR = Chittagong Port access road, FIRR = financial internal rate of return. Source: Independent Evaluation Department.
APPENDIX 7: SOCIOECONOMIC REEVALUATION
1. The socioeconomic evaluation used various instruments, including a household survey, focus group discussions (FGDs), key informant interviews (KIIs), a survey of drivers and passengers, and reviews of secondary data and information. Using structured questionnaires, the household survey was conducted in the project areas to collect data on the socioeconomic situation that prevailed before and after the completion of the project.
2. The project roads, totaling 113.28 km between Comilla and Chittagong districts, intersect 97 mouzas located in 5 upazillas1 in 3 districts: Chandina and Comilla Sadar in Comilla District; Feni Sadar in Feni District; and Mirsarai, Sitakunda, and Chittagong City Corporation in Chittagong District.2 The socioeconomic and poverty impact evaluation examined sample households residing not only along the project roads, but within 2km of them. A total of 570 households were randomly selected for the household surveys from the 27 mouzas (15 mouzas along the project roads and 12 mouzas within 2 km of them). The total number of sample households within 2 km of a project road is 50% of the number of sample households from the mouzas along the project road.
Table A7.1: List of Selected Mouzas Along the Project Road Within 2km of the Project Road District Upazilla Mouza Name Number of HH Mouza Name Number of HH Comilla Chandina Tircho 162 Kashimpur 85 Nautala 168 Asadnagar 96 Keramkhal 107 Comilla Sadar Amtali 127 Asrafpur 110 Lalbagh 117 Chhota Gopalnagar 117 Feni Feni Sadar Zerkachhar 59 Safiabad 67 Ilaspur 60 Madhuai 66 Jatrasiddhi 51 Mirganj 56 Chittagong Mirsarai Purba Mayani 109 Chhota Kamaldaha 97 Sitakunda Dakshin Terail 131 Saidpur 116 Nayakhali 222 Lot 8 Kumira 93 Sitakunda Bara Kumira 106 Ward 12 103 Chittagong City Ward 10 175 Ward 25 99 Sitakunda Uttar Salimpur 187 Chittagong Sadar Ward 26 262 HH = household, km = kilometer. Source: Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics database.
3. The following occupations were included in the sample of the household surveys, FGDs, and KIIs: villagers, businessmen and traders, farmers, passengers, shopkeepers, social elites such as teachers, religious leaders, local council members, students, day laborers, government officials, and private sector companies collecting tolls on the Chittagong Port access road. To ensure that all upazillas in the project roads were covered, a purposive sampling method was used.
4. The study adopted a “before-after” approach to assess changes in socioeconomic indicators before and after the project. Villagers’ perceptions about the changes in socioeconomic indicators and about their access to transport facilities, markets, employment, and service institutions were analyzed to capture the socioeconomic and poverty impact of the project road. Key indicators used to measure the socioeconomic and poverty impact included: employment, earnings, female employment and wages, travel costs and time, environment, available social services, and other related activities.
1 Upazilla is the third level of administration of local government after divisions and districts (zila). 2 Mouza is the lowest administrative unit in Bangladesh and its boundary can be easily identified. On the other hand, the boundary of villages is somewhat unclear in many cases and difficult to define. As such, the study preferred to consider mouza as a survey unit. A typical village is comprised of several mouzas.
Socioeconomic Reevaluation 45
A. Changes in Socioeconomic Indicators
5. Diversification of household income and expenditure. The improved roads have increased economic opportunities and diversified household income sources. Participants in the FGDs and KIIs in Comilla, Chandina, and Feni reported that the local population was mainly engaged in agriculture before the roads were improved.3 In recent years, more people are opting for occupations other than agriculture owing to the increased accessibility to cities and business hubs, which have brought about new employment and trading opportunities for the population in the project area. More people have set up their own small business. Major income sources include agriculture, small trade, manufacturing industries, small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), and service institutions such as schools (Table A7.2).
Table A7.2: Main Occupation in the Project Area: Before and After the Project 2005 2012 Agriculture Small and Medium-sized Enterprises (SMEs) Small trade Day Laborers Rickshaw/Van Puller Doctors Shopkeepers Drivers Farmers Government Officials Livestock raiser Private Services Rickshaw/Van Puller Shopkeepers Source: Household Survey and Focus Group Discussion, November 2012.
6. A large number of the respondents in the project areas mentioned that the improved roads have increased their access to income opportunities. Of the 380 sample households along the project road, 93% of the respondents said that their incomes have increased since the project. 4 A change in their expenditure patterns has also been noticed since the road improvements. Household expenditures along the project road sections in basic social services such as health care and education have increased by 29% and 24%, respectively (Table A7.3).
Table A7.3: Household Expenditures of Sample HHs (%) Expense item Along the Project Road Within 2km of the Project Road Food (15.59) (13.17) Heath care/ 28.67 30.03 Medical Clothes 15.14 24.24 Education 23.80 63.26 Water (22.07) (4.12) Electricity (0.15) 23.99 Gas (12.91) (13.10) Transportation (2.26) 11.88 Recreation (13.57) 7.17 HH = household, km = kilometer. Source: Household Survey, November 2012; Commodity Price Index from the Bureau of Bangladesh Statistics.
7. Household wealth. Household wealth has also increased since the road improvement (Table A7.4). Changes in household wealth are also positively related to diversified economic activities in the
3 Focus group discussions and key informant interviews in Comilla, Chandina, and Feni districts. 4 Household survey, November 2012.
46 Appendix 7
project areas. Ownership of mobile phones has had a tremendous impact on boosting local economic activities. Farmers and local producers of agricultural products can directly market and sell their goods to urban-based wholesalers and retailers, eliminating the need for middlemen. The improved roads have allowed the urban-based wholesalers and retailers of the agricultural-based products and vegetables to reach rural farmers at the production sites, reducing transportation cost and travel time in project areas in Comilla, Feni, and Chittagong.
Table A7.4: Household Wealth of Sample HHs in the Project Mouzas Along the Project Road Within 2 km of the Project Road HHs Asset 2005 2012 % 2005 2012 % TV Number of hh who had 202 300 49 105 148 41 (% of total sample hh) 53.18 78.95 55.26 77.89 Motorbike Number of hh who had 11 22 100 9 23 156 (% of total sample hh) 2.89 5.79 4.74 12.10 Car Number of hh who had 2 5 150 0 0 - (% of total sample hh) 0.53 1.31 Truck Number of hh who had 2 4 100 0 0 (% of total sample hh) 0.53 1.05 Sewing Number of hh who had 12 32 167 13 23 77 machine (% of total sample hh) 3.16 8.42 6.84 12.10 Mobile Number of hh who had 160 347 117 74 182 146 phone (% of total sample hh) 42.11 91.31 38.95 95.79 Goat/lamb Number of hh who had 21 23 10 12 15 25 (% of total sample hh) 5.53 6.05 6.31 7.89 Cow/buffalo Number of hh who had 67 89 33 36 63 75 (% of total sample hh) 17.63 23.42 18.95 33.16 Solar home Number of hh who had 3 4 33 0 0 - system (% of total sample hh) 0.79 1.05 hh= household, km = kilometer. Source: Household Survey 2012.
8. Trade and Business. Trade and business activities have expanded significantly since the road improvements. Local people established small shops and restaurants, creating more job opportunities in the project areas. Improved roads have also allowed investors from large cities such as Dhaka and Chittagong to invest in the area, resulting in increased land prices and job opportunities. Investors from outside have set up hotels and restaurants catering to the needs of inter-district passengers using these roads. These highway restaurants have also created employment for locals, mostly youth.
9. Apparel industries, beverage factories, agricultural and food processing plants, among others, are the business investments set up by large investors. Participants in the FGDs have noted that the price of land has increased over the last few years due to the improved roads.5 Booming land markets have also been attributed to the higher demand for land. Many investors have purchased large pieces of land, causing land prices to go up. New companies resell these lands as smaller residential plots to mostly wealthy residents of nearby cities or district towns.
10. Because the improved roads allow vendors to quickly supply products and goods, shops in the villages now sell a variety of goods and products that were not available before. Suppliers can now directly reach village shops with their own vans to deliver their products and goods. This has reduced transport costs for small traders in project villages. There has been a significant rise in the number of shops and customers at the local markets and haat bazaars located on roadsides, attracting and facilitating trade among villagers. Wholesale markets for vegetables have been found in several places along the roads. These roadside wholesale markets supply much-needed vegetables for consumers of
5 Focus group discussion in Chandina in Comilla District, November 2012.
Socioeconomic Reevaluation 47 large cities such as Dhaka and Chittagong (footnote 4). This increased economic activity resulting from the improved roads has greatly benefitted vulnerable farmers whose livelihoods largely depend on agriculture.
11. Transport use and cost. People in the project area now have access to different kinds of vehicles for local and long-distance travel since the road was improved. While the number of households using motorized vehicles has increased, the amount of foot travel has fallen (Table A7.5).
12. There has been a significant increase in the use of auto rickshaws, specifically three-wheelers run by compressed naturalized gas (CNG), to travel to nearby villages and cities. Before the project, local communities would wait longer for crowded buses. Four-wheeler tempos, about the size of a microvan, are also widely used in the region to visit relatives and travel to nearby market places and service institutions. Improved roads have allowed local transport entrepreneurs to introduce these types of vehicle. Many auto rickshaws are owned by their drivers, while many of the more affluent members have also started new ventures to rent their auto rickshaws on a daily basis to local drivers. This has helped new forms of transport business to flourish in these regions.
13. The introduction of various motorized vehicles has had an impact on the choice of the mode of transportation to travel to nearby places. More people now avoid walking to markets. Instead, they use more convenient and faster auto rickshaws or tempos.
Table A7.5: Mode of Transport of Sample HHs (% of Total Sample) Along the Project Road Within 2 km of the Project Road Mode of Transport 2005 2012 2005 2012 Foot 35 31 31 29 Non-motorized 3 3 7 7 Bicycle 3 3 1 4 Motorbike 2 3 7 8 Private Vehicle 3 3 2 1 Bus 32 40 31 48 Minibus 3 6 1 3 Tempo/CNG 3 18 1 21 Battery-run Auto 3 5 1 1 HH = household, km = kilometer. Source: Household Survey, November 2012.
14. Travel time. Travel time was reduced between project upazillas and major cities, district towns, and the capital. Before, people spent 3 hours to travel the 66 km from Chandina to Dhaka but now they can do so in 1.5 hours (Table A7.6). All bypasses in Comilla and Feni that were improved under the project made the road accessible, facilitating traffic flow and reducing travel distance, resulting in decreased travel time. Before the construction of the bypasses, traffic gridlock occurred frequently at the Chandina bus stand, and in Comilla and Feni City. Participants of the FGD in Chandina confirmed that the travel time between Chandina to the nearest district towns, regional business hub, and the capital have been significantly reduced. The CPAR has also reduced the travel time for trucks, container movers operated by freight, and forward service providers.
Table A7.6: Travel Time between Chandina and Comilla, Feni, Dhaka, and Chittagong Before Distance (km) Cities (hours) After (hours) Comilla 20.87 2 0.3 Feni 76.00 3 1.3 Dhaka (Capital City) 65.55 3 1.5 Chittagong 155.58 4 2.0 km = kilometer. Source: Focus group discussion in Chandina in Comilla District, 17 November 2012.
48 Appendix 7
15. Accessibility to the port. The FGDs and KIIs with transport operators, freight and forward services providers, drivers and businessmen in Chittagong, Comilla, Feni, and Dhaka have shown that the port access roads have reduced travel time to the port. Respondents of the KII in Chittagong noted that the port access roads have decreased traffic congestion to some extent. However, many respondents of the KII have said that the CPAR remains underutilized and many heavy vehicles still ply the roads running through the Chittagong city center. Inaugurated on 16 October 2008, the access road was expected to reduce traffic gridlock in the city center significantly by diverting heavy vehicles from the Chittagong Port, Chittagong export processing zone, and different terminals at Patenga. The officials of the Chittagong Port Authority said that a good number of heavy vehicles avoid the CPAR and use the busy port connecting road to avoid paying tolls, thereby contributing to traffic congestion in the Chittagong city center.
16. Transportation of goods and products. Since the project, there has been a significant increase in the number of light vehicles, which makes it easier for farmers and local businesses to transport various products and goods, including electronic home appliances, agricultural products, and products manufactured by SMEs in the rural areas along the project roads. Before the project, 33% of the households along the roads had difficulties transporting goods to the nearest market places (Table A7.7). Some 16% of the respondents along the project road sections indicated that they had experienced problems finding light vehicles to transport their products to the nearest district towns or large wholesale markets where they could potentially get better prices. Some 7% of the respondents along the project roads had difficulties transporting electronic home appliances and goods such as refrigerators and televisions due to the unavailability of adequate light vehicles.
Table A7.7: Difficulties in Transporting Goods and Products before the Project (%) Type of Goods and Products Along the Road Within 2 km of the Road Agricultural products 36 37 All types of goods 1 1 Construction materials 3 1 Cotton 0 1 Crops 2 4 Electronics 7 5 Goods to the nearest markets for sale 33 26 Fish 1 2 Products manufactured by SMEs 16 20 Medicine/medical products 3 1 km = kilometer, SME = small and medium-sized enterprise. Source: Household Survey, November 2012.
17. Agriculture. Although the number of SMEs continues to grow in the project areas, most still rely on agriculture for their livelihood. The improved roads have contributed to increased productivity by allowing farmers to use new agricultural technology (Table A7.8). Some 88% of the total sample households responded that they used tractors for cultivation after the roads were improved. Before the project, only about 50% of the respondents used tractors. The declining use of animal traction and hand plows is also evident since the roads were improved.
Table A7.8: Methods Used for Cultivation of Crop Land Along the Road Within 2 km of the Road Agricultural Methods Used 2005 2012 2005 2012 Tractor 13 (50%) 23 (88%) 25 (49%) 12 (67%) Animal traction 9 (35%) 1 (3.8%) 19 (37%) 1 (5.6%) Hand plow 4 (15%) 2 (7.6%) 7 (14%) 5 (2.8%) Total Responded 26 26 51 18 km = kilometer. Source: Household Survey, November 2012.
Socioeconomic Reevaluation 49
18. The use of non-motorized vehicles to transport agricultural products has decreased since the project. Some 13–28% of the respondents had to use passenger buses to transport their products to the nearest markets due to the lack of motorized vehicles (Table A7.9). Since the road improvements, only 1% of the respondents along the project road use buses to transport their produce. Participants in the FGD said that they can easily hire pick-up vans, small trucks, or auto rickshaws to transport their products since the roads were improved. Villagers indicated that transporting agricultural products by passenger bus was inconvenient as they often had to load their goods on the bus’s roof. With the improvement of roads, farmers can now access several types of motorized vehicles such as pick-up vans and mini trucks owned mostly by local transport operators. A large number of farmers still use non- motorized rickshaws to move their products to the nearest markets as these are more cost efficient for small farmers who can hardly afford to rent a pick-up van.
Table A7.9: Vehicle Types Used by HHs to Transport Farm Produce to Markets (%) Along the Road Within 2 km of the Road Vehicle Type 2005 2012 2005 2012 Hand carry 3 0 0 0 Locally made motorized pick-up van 0 1 0 0 Bus 28 1 13 0 Auto rickshaw 7 16 0 40 Pick-up van 0 11 0 14 Rickshaw 10 10 38 14 Truck 0 4 0 0 Mini truck 3 0 0 0 Rickshaw van 48 58 50 31 HH = household, km = kilometer. Source: Household Survey, November 2012.
19. Employment. There has been a noticeable increase (about 79–86%) in employment opportunities in the project mouzas since the roads were improved (Table A7.10). Factories along the project road sections have created job opportunities for women who were previously unemployed. New industrial plants, such as apparel factories established in project areas, have brought new employment opportunities to the region. Many new service institutions, such as nongovernment organizations (NGOs), have started their operations in the project areas, thereby benefitting local people by creating more employment opportunities.
Table A7.10: Responses on Employment Opportunities after the Project (%) Project Mouzas Yes No Along the project road 86 14 Within 2 km of the project road 79 21 km = kilometer. Source: Household survey and Focus Group Discussion, November 2012.
20. Self-employment among women is very common in the region. Many women have started small businesses and enterprises in their homes, producing such items as handicrafts or processed foods. These initiatives not only help generate income, but also ensure that the women can now enjoy financial independence thereby enhancing their status in the household. As a result, women can now participate in household decision making. The sample households in the project area responded positively about the increased employment opportunities offered by various service institutions in the region since the roads were improved (Table A7.11).
Table A7.11: Responses of Sample HHs on Increased Access to Employment (%) Project Mouzas Yes No Along the project road 51 49 Within 2 km of the project road 54 46 HH = household, km = kilometer. Source: Household Survey, November 2012.
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21. With the improvement of the roads, women in project mouzas now have access to employment opportunities in agro-based small industries, brickfields, SMEs, educational institutions, garment factories, NGOs, and hospitals (Table A7.12). The respondents within 2km of the project road said that women have better work opportunities in garment factories and the education sector (25% and 29% each). Respondents along the project roads said that women have increased opportunities to work in various SMEs (23%).
Table A7.12: Responses on Employment Opportunities for Women (% of Sample HH Heads) Within 2 km of the Sectors and Service Institutions Along the Road Road Agro Industry 3 3 Brickfield 4 3 Business 0 1 Day Labor 10 4 Education Sector 18 25 Farming 7 3 Garment Factory 25 29 Industry 23 18 NGO 6 9 Nursing 1 5 Private Services 3 2 HH = household, km = kilometer. Source: Household Survey, November 2012.
22. Access to service institutions and business centers. The absence of adequate service institutions remains a common phenomenon in rural Bangladesh. Rural populations often experience a number of barriers in accessing existing service institutions and social services. The absence of road connections is one of the major challenges to accessing the social and financial services offered by a limited number of service institutions. The improved roads in Comilla, Feni, and Chittagong have enabled a large portion of the population in the region to easily access a number of service institutions and social services, including hospitals, health care centers, wholesale markets, educational institutions such as schools and colleges, NGOs, government agencies, and information service providers.
23. The project areas have also witnessed the establishment of various service institutions such as schools, health care facilities, commercial banks, microfinance NGOs, shops and markets, roadside restaurants, and filling stations. Large microfinance providers such as BRAC, Grameen Bank, and ASA have started to offer various social and financial services for the poorest segment of the population in the surveyed project mouzas. The fieldwork shows that people in the project areas now have more access to various service institutions and information service providers (Table A7.13).
Table A7.13: Responses on Access to Service Institutions/Business Centers (%) Within 2 km of the Service Institutions/Business Center Along the Road Project Road Schools 47 48 Hospitals 63 66 Markets 74 74 Factories/Industrial Plants 29 26 km = kilometer Source: Household Survey, November 2012.
24. Access to markets. Market accessibility has also increased with better road connections. The local population now has easier access to the nearest marketplaces, including wholesale markets established along the roads. Participants in the FDG pointed out that the improved roads made it easier than ever to reach the nearest wholesale markets for vegetables. These markets attract buyers from large cities such as Chittagong and Dhaka, who purchase large amounts of agricultural products and
Socioeconomic Reevaluation 51 vegetables. This allows small and medium farmers with limited sources of income to negotiate better prices for their products.
25. Access to government services. The FGDs held in Chandina and Feni showed that the improved roads have enabled many community members to easily travel to the government offices in town. The roads made it easier to participate in government meetings.
26. Access to educational institutions. It is difficult to find a correlation between school attendance and the improved roads, as the government in Bangladesh has continued to provide a range of incentives to encourage parents to send their children to school, which has resulted in increased school attendance. However, the roads have made it easier for the local youth, particularly young women, to attend colleges located in the nearby cities or district towns due to the availability of better transport services and reduction in travel time. The bypass roads in Chandina in Comilla and Feni have significantly reduced travel times where most undergraduate-level educational institutions are located.
27. Access to health care services. Common diseases in Bangladesh include fever, typhoid, colds, flu, and jaundice. Health care facilities such as hospitals and clinics are available in the nearby upazilla, town, or district town. Before the roads were improved, it took much longer to reach the upazilla or district towns to receive these medical services. Participants in the FGDs and key informant interviews noted that traveling to the nearest health care facility was less time-consuming mainly due to the improved roads. Travel time to the major health care service providers in the nearest cities such as Feni, Comilla, and Chittagong has been reduced. Furthermore, it is now easy for the population to transport patients who need emergency medical attention to hospitals.
28. Access to financial services. The fieldwork shows that a large number of households currently have access to various financial services, including microcredit. These service institutions provide a range of financial services, including support for microenterprises, and benefit a large population in the project areas. The penetration of increased financial service institutions into the region is also evidenced by the increased economic activities in the project area.
29. Land prices. Land prices have risen significantly since the project. Higher land prices change a land-use pattern. Investors from large cities have bought large pieces of land alongside the roads, which tends to reduce the amount of land available for agricultural purposes. However, these lands are reserved potentially for manufacturing industries, which in turn will bring new economic opportunities, including employment for the local population. Some real estate investors have purchased large amounts of land along the roads in the project areas and developed it for residential plots (footnote 3).
30. Environment. Consultations with the local population and KIIs with representatives of local councils and various government agencies revealed that the project has not posed any major environmental problems. However, some local inhabitants living adjacent to the roads complained about noise pollution and excessive dust, especially during the dry season. In Chittagong, a FGD revealed that the Chittagong Port access road worked as a flood protection embankment, protecting the villages along the road from flash floods and subsequent waterlogging. Before the project, some of the villages near the toll collection plaza of the CPAR were flooded every year. Since the roads were built, using land owned by the government and along the Bay of Bengal, the CPAR has not contributed to any significant reduction in agricultural lands. Only a few farmers were affected.
31. Road accidents. Many participants in the FGDs in Chandina and Feni indicated that large vehicles such as buses, trucks, container trucks, and microvans could run faster due to the improved quality of the roads, resulting in an increased number of traffic accidents. The participants in the FGDs and KIIs recommended that road dividers be provided for in the road maintenance and improvement plan for highways with a lot of vehicular movement. Due to the increased number of vehicles on the
52 Appendix 7
roads, head-on collisions have been a regular phenomenon and a major concern for the villagers living along the road sections. There is no proper mechanism to collect accident data.
32. The traffic control mechanism for these road sections was found to be weak. The roads also do not include speed controls, posing a risk for the local population in crossing the roads. Many participants in the FGDs residing along the road sections said that it has become much more difficult to cross the roads due to the increased traffic. This has made villagers reluctant to engage in business and agriculture activities across the roads, limiting their ability to engage in income-generating activities. Many have, therefore, suggested building low-cost pedestrian bridges over the roads.