Transcript
How Democratic is the EU?
Dr Andreas Rödder
Professor of Modern and Contemporary History, Johannes Gutenberg University, Mainz
Gisela Stuart
Chair, Change Britain
Chair: Hans Kundnani
Senior Research Fellow, Europe Programme, Chatham House
25 September 2019
The views expressed in this document are the sole responsibility of the speaker(s) and participants, and do not necessarily reflect the view of Chatham House, its staff, associates or Council. Chatham House is independent and owes no allegiance to any government or to any political body. It does not take institutional positions on policy issues. This document is issued on the understanding that if any extract is used, the author(s)/speaker(s) and Chatham House should be credited, preferably with the date of the publication or details of the event. Where this document refers to or reports statements made by speakers at an event, every effort has been made to provide a fair representation of their views and opinions. The published text of speeches and presentations may differ from delivery. © The Royal Institute of International Affairs, 2019.
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2 How Democratic is the EU?
Hans Kundnani
Good afternoon, welcome to Chatham House. Welcome back to those of you who are regulars. Just before I get going, some – just some housekeeping points. This event is on the record and it’s being livestreamed, so welcome as well, to those who are watching online. Please put your phones on silent and, because it’s on the record, you can tweet. We encourage you to tweet, using the hashtag #CHEvents or #CHDemTech, which is the hashtag for the project on democracy and technology in Europe, which as some of you know, I’ve been leading. We’ve been having a lot of discussions around the, sort of, technology part of that. We’ve had discussions on digital parties and on social media, and so on. Today we’re going to focus on a different aspect of democracy in Europe, and that’s the specific question of where the EU fits into the picture, as it were, of democracy in Europe.
I should explain the slight change in our speakers. Some of you would have been expecting Sarah Ludford. She unfortunately had a death in her family last night, and Gisela Stuart very kindly, at extremely short notice, agreed to step in. I just emailed her literally an hour or two ago, and couldn't think of a better replacement, so thank you very much, Gisela, for joining us [applause]. Gisela, I think, needs no introduction at all for this audience. She’s the Chair of Change Britain, which is the successor organisation to the official Leave campaign in the 2016 Referendum. She was a Labour MP from 1997 to 2017 and a Minister in the Blair Government, and she’s the Chair of Wilton Park.
Andreas Rödder, to my left, is a prolific and wide-ranging Historian at the University of Mainz, also a very influential figure in the Christian Democrats. He and I go back a long way, and in particular, we both took part, or, actually, Andreas organised a conference, five or six years ago, in Berlin, which was extremely eye opening for me about German Euroscepticism and some of the similarities and differences between that and British Euroscepticism. At some point, we may get into that. He’s also written, very interestingly – we had an ongoing conversation, actually, about German power in Europe, and your most recent book is about conservatism is a, sort of, new manifesto as it were for conservatism.
So, the essay question we’ve put is, How democratic is the EU? Obviously, this is a very live issue, in this country, in the context of Brexit. It seems to me that the Leave side of the argument, this has been one of the central arguments on the Leave side, that the EU is undemocratic, anti-democratic. The Remain side, it seems to me, has had less to say about this issue and has tended to focus on some of the other benefits of EU membership, like, above all, the economic benefits, but perhaps we can start with you, Andreas. What is the right way to think about the relationship between the EU and democracy? Is the EU democratic? Is it undemocratic? Is it non-democratic, as Peter Mayer, the Irish Political Scientist, put it? What’s the right way to think about the relationship between the EU itself and democracy?
Dr Andreas Rödder
I would say the EU is no – at least no parliamentary democracy, and at the same time, I would say it does not have a democratic deficit, and I would like to explain this, even if it seems like a contradiction to you. So, the question is, why is the EU not a democracy, why is it not a Parliamentary democracy? And I think there are at least four reasons for that. The first reason is that it consists of two threads of legitimation. The one is the intergovernmental thread, going from the electorate via the elected governments of the member states to the European Council. This is the one thread, and the other thread of legitimation is the supranational level, which means this legitimation goes from the electorate to the European Parliament to the Parliament. 3 How Democratic is the EU?
So, this is a very specific construction, these two threads of legitimation, and having said that, this leads us to the second reason. This Parliament, which forms the second thread of legitimation, is not the Sovereign of the Government, and I think this is pretty crucial, since that the Parliament decides about the Government is essential for a parliamentary system. So, what we saw was that the European Parliament tried to take over this crucial right of a Parliament in a parliamentary system, to decide on the Government, by the system of the so-called [mother tongue – 05:15], which you all know remained a very German word in the European integration history. So, what the Parliament tried to do was to transform the European Union, the whole construction into a more parliamentary system by assuming the right to designate the Government by the Parliament.
In a certain way, this worked in 2014. It was a coup, which was fabricated by Jean-Claude Juncker and Martin Schulz, but as we saw, it did not work in 2019, and this was really crucial, since the proof of this constitutional innovation of assuming rights for the European Parliament would have been the repeating of this procedure in 2019. It did not happen, so – but the European Council took back the right to designate the Head of the Commission. So, this was, kind of, rollback of power to the European Council. And there is another argument. Even if the European Parliament had succeeded, it would have won the right to decide not about the European Government, since the European Commission is not similar to a Government in a parliamentary system, but the European Commission is what is called the keeper of the treaties, and sometimes it might be the mover of integration. But first of all, it is competing with the European Council, and as experience teaches, in times of crisis, its influence is pushed back by the Council, as we, for example, saw in the Euro debt crisis. So, you can say that the European Council still is the master of the state of emergency, and as a German this is quoting Carl Schmitt, “Being the master of the state of emergency is the same as the famous definition of the Sovereign.”
So, what we are having is a very, very complicated construction, in terms of legitimation and in terms of functioning, which is perfect fodder for Constitutional Lawyers, which means particularly for German Constitutional Lawyers, and I think this was one of the most interesting experiences for you to realise what German constitutional experts are thinking and talking about. And I’ll leave it up to you whether you prefer the German Constitutional Court’s word of the so-called staatenverbund, and we’ll get back to that, or whether you prefer the traditional wording of Samuel Pufendorf, his saying about the old holy Roman Empire, which he characterised as ‘an irregular body looking like a monster’. In a certain way this is still true for the European Union.
The third non-democratic peculiarity of the EU, I would say, is the elective franchise for the European Parliament, and the problem is not only – or the – not only the problem, but the point is not that there are different national franchises, but the specific is the principle of the so-called degressive proportionality, which means that due to the different size of member states, a member of the European Parliament for Malta represents some 70,000 inhabitants, while a member of European Parliament from Germany represents 830,000 inhabitants, which is a difference by a factor of 12. So, some say, “Okay, not a problem, this is the same principle as we have it in the Senate of the US. This is due to the principle of the representation of states.” Yes, and this indeed is true for Chambers of States, and it’s true for the European Council, it’s true for the Council of the ECP for the European Court. It’s also true for the German Bundesrat and for the US Senate, but this, the Chamber of State, is not the standard of comparison for the first Chamber, or the Chamber of Representatives.
The Chambers of Elected Representatives do not follow the principle of the representation of states, but the principle of the representation of people, and the principle is one man or one woman, one vote, which means that one vote should weigh as much as another. And this – so, it’s true for the House of – this is true for the House of Representatives in the US, it’s true for the German Bundestag, and it’s true for the 4 How Democratic is the EU?
UK, insofar all these political systems do have even constituencies. One representative, in the House of Representatives, represent some 700,000 inhabitants in the US, a member of the German Parliament represents some 250,000 inhabitants, and the same is true for the UK that you always try to have equal constituencies. So, this means that for the European Parliament, this crucial principle of representation of the people does not work, due to the principle of degressive proportionality.
So, this is the third reason, and very briefly, a fourth one is, what still is missing, even if things have changed a bit, that there is no democratic public within Europe. However, exceeding the question of democratic institutions, the question of a democratic public is substantial and is crucial for a democracy, and this is one of the other major requirements of a democracy, the European Union is lacking.
So, these are four reasons why the EU is not a parliamentary democracy, and now the question is, why do I say this is not a democratic deficit? To turn it the other way round, it would be a democratic deficit if the EU were a full-fledged sovereign state aspiring to be a democracy, but it isn’t. So, the European Union still is, and now I come back what the [mother tongue – 12:01] has judged in its major judgements about the Maastricht Treaty and the Lisbon Treaty in 1993 and 2009. So, the German Constitutional Court characterised the European Union as a staatenverbund, which is a word which must originate from German Constitutional Lawyers. However, it means that the European Union is a unique institution between the federation of states and the federal states, being neither of them. So, and for a staatenverbund, to use the German word, where the sovereignty in the end is still with the national constitutive peoples. So, this is not a problem, since it is not a full-fledged democracy.
I would like to draw one conclusion, but to make one very brief point in advance. I would say there is another point I would like to highlight, in the relationship between the EU and democracy. So, as I said, EU in itself is not a democracy, but the member states are required to be democracies, and as I would say, this is the real success story of the European Union, particularly after 1989. So, what we are always discussing are problems with minority rights in Poland or in Hungary, or the rule of law in Poland and in Hungary, we are discussing questions, corruption in Bulgaria and Romania. However, if you choose another standard of comparison, if you look to other post-communist states, if you have a look to Ukraine, if you have a look at what happened in former Yugoslavia in the 90s, or if you look at what happened in East Central Europe, after 1918, after the breaking down of the empires in East Central Europe, I would say, if you compare it to that there is much more democracy within the European Union than without it, and the problem is, we have an epistemic problem. We don’t realise avoided catastrophes as avoided catastrophes, and I think this contribution to stabilise whatever has been reached in East Central Europe after 1989, whatever has been avoided, in terms of shatter zones, as Robert Gabbard told the East Central European states after 1918, whatever has been avoided is really a historical success.
So, again, to come to an end, there is no democratic deficit if the EU sticks to what it’s called to be, a staatenverbund, and if it does not aspire to become a sovereign state, and the conclusion I would draw out of this, as from a German perspective, is that I would recommend to replace the idea of an ever-closer union, by the idea and the concept of a flexible union, by a flexible European Union, which is ready for deepening the integration, where it’s useful, and at the same time, ready for reducing it, where it has proved to be necessary. A European Union, which focuses its core tasks, such as single market and trade, European mobility, which I think is one of the major tasks Europe – the European Union can foster, or digitalisation or some other questions. And if this European Union concept, a European Union which realises that its specific institutional shape marks no democratic deficits, but can be a source of strength if it really combines the added value of supranationality, with the persistent strengths of the nations and their co-operation. This will be slightly different from the narrative of the ever-closer union, but at the 5 How Democratic is the EU?
same time, I think this could be a really productive perspective for the European Union, am I saying as a German. Thank you.
Hans Kundnani
Thank you very much Andreas, and actually, interesting how you ended there, because in some ways, it’s – a lot of this is very familiar, I think, for a British audience, you know, particularly the point you made about, you know, abandoning the idea of a closed union, this is clearly one of the things that David Cameron tried to renegotiate. And I think I’m right in saying that, you know, in Berlin or in Germany in general if you say a lot of these things, you would be seen as somewhat on the Eurosceptic end of the argument, certainly compared to a lot of other people in Germany, but I wonder if I can just – just to push you on two points, just to clarify. So, first of all, in terms of this, kind of, institutional reform that’s needed. I mean, you talked a little bit at the end there about some policy areas, you know, that might be, sort of, repatriated or moved back to the national level from the EU level, but in terms of institutional reform, unless I missed something, as I understood it, all that you think needs to happen, and basically the EU is, kind of, okay as it is, what needs to happen is this question of regressive disproportionality. In other words, and, I mean, one consequence of fixing that would be that member states like Germany would have an even greater weight, but apart from that are there institutional reforms that you think are necessary in the EU?
Dr Andreas Rödder
I would not recommend to change the franchise for the European Parliament. I think you can leave it as it is, since it is specific of the European Parliament, of the European Union. However, what I say, this is – at the same time, this means it’s not a parliamentary democracy, and I think if we just accept that the EU is no parliamentary democracy, this, I think, would be an advantage to take it and to accept it as it is, when it does not aspire to become a federal European state, which would not be a parliamentary democracy.
Hans Kundnani
So, in other words, then there are no institutional reforms that are necessary, from your point of view?
Dr Andreas Rödder
I think the question is, that the number of 27 or 28 Commissioners is a problem. So I think there could be institutional reforms, but I don’t think that the question of institutional reforms should be predominant. I think the prudent self-restriction of the European Union, on those questions and policy areas where it really creates an added value, I think this would be the perspective for the European Union.
Hans Kundnani
And that, sort of, brings me to the second point. So, all of this rests, though, on the EU not going further in integration, and this is where it seems to me you do differ from not just people in Germany, but pro- Europeans elsewhere on the continent. You’re suggesting, as I understand it, that even in the Eurozone – I mean, in the UK, for example, lots of people would say, you know, “We don’t want to be part of this further integration,” but clearly, the Eurozone needs to integrate further. You’re saying, as I understand it, there can be no further integration. 6 How Democratic is the EU?
Dr Andreas Rödder
No, no, I don’t say – I don’t mean that. What I would mean by a flexible union is a European Union, which is ready to deepen integration, where it’s necessary. So, for example, defence politics, migration politics should be crucial for the European Union, and I think this – the defence initiative, there’s this new defence initiative, which is based on voluntary contributions, I think, is – really is the right way for Europe to deal. So, what I think, is it a, kind of, deepening of integration if Europe does much more in order to create infrastructure, in terms of mobility? So, I went to Tallinn a couple of weeks ago, and what the Estonians are wishing is a direct railway connection from Tallinn to Berlin. This, I think, this, for example, is Europe at its very best. So, as I would say, if this European Union would be flexible, in order to deepen integration where it’s necessary, but also ready to reduce it where it doesn’t work, which might include the Euro, however, I wouldn’t do anything on the Euro at the moment. So, I think the problem is that Europe has embarked on this one way of the ever-closer union, and this was the idea that it just can’t be a one way, and it reminds me on Erich Honecker, who had the idea that Soviets in [mother tongue – 20:49], always – how do you say this in English?
Hans Kundnani
Always forwards, never backwards, I guess.
Dr Andreas Rödder
Yeah, saying – so, and I think this has been the wrong way.
Hans Kundnani
But, sorry, I do want to bring in Gisela, but just to push you further on this point about integration, as I understand it, what you’re calling integration is just co-operation between EU member states. You’re – because, you know, what I had in mind, when I said if further integration is, the transfer of power. So, for example, defence, if you were to go further, in terms of actually transferring powers on security, then surely, the EU does start to take on the characteristics of a normal nation state?
Dr Andreas Rödder
Yeah, so the question is, it depends on the policy area. So, I would – if it is necessary, for example, trade politics, I think the EU is a much stronger trade power than the nation states are. So that I think this is one of the success stories, apart from the trade agreement with the US, but with Japan, for example, I think it has become a success story. So, this – in trade politics, we have this transformed sovereignty. I would be open to a transformed sovereignty in question of migration, if it works, but what I would – and on the other hand, I would prefer co-operation, but a flexible union could decide which would be better and wouldn’t be pre-decided for the one transfer of sovereignty in the one and only direction.
Hans Kundnani
Great. Gisela, as I said, some of this, I think, is quite close to a British view from – compared to a lot of – the way that a lot of Germans think about the EU, but how do you see this, as someone who was born in Germany, but obviously is based here?
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Gisela Stuart
Yeah, and when Hans sent me an email, I actually genuinely was sitting reading a paper, which had just appeared, and it was – I got it off the internet ‘cause I thought it was interesting. It’s called, “Looking like a state, the seduction of isomorphic mimicry,” where in mimicry, you conflate looks like and substitute for does, and they say this is the technique for justifying failure. And that is what has been deafening us in this whole debate, and particularly when it comes to the Brits and the Germans, it’s – I feel I’ve spent the last 20 years talking to either side saying, “This is why you will never understand each other,” ‘cause when you use the same word, you just mean something completely different with it. So – and, you know, it is said that all Politicians’ careers end in failure. I don’t think that is entirely true, but I think all Politicians end up being defined by subject areas, which they hadn’t originally chosen, and they somehow can’t get away from them, and I have to say that when I entered Parliament in 1997 in Neville Chamberlain’s old constituency as a German, born in Munich, Europe was not the subject I wished to get involved in, and yet, I seem to be singularly incapable of shaking it off.
So, in 2001, I was sent off to Brussels to spend 15 months in the very charming company of Giscard d’Estaing, then fairly obscure French Commissioner called Michel Barnier. I don’t think anybody’s heard of the man in the United Kingdom, and we were charged with drafting a European constitution, which would bring Europe closer to the people, and literally, all the things we’re saying today, I’ve heard for the last 15 years. Tell me one subject, which you would stop doing, and I remember in 2001, there was this question of the European Union needs to stop doing things. So, I said to the Commission, “Have you ever rejected a proposal, on the basis that it was not the – that member states should do that?” and they said, “Well, actually, the only way – one we can think of was the Animal Zoo Directive, which was a British proposal, under the British Presidency, to have European standards for the temperature in zoos for maritime animals.” So, the talk of doing less in some areas is always there, but it never happens.
So, in this despair of not being able to give up this subject, I’ve, sort of, really gone back to very, very basics, as to even what do I mean by democracy? And, in that concept, I asked myself when David Cameron called the Referendum, because you have to remember, as a Bavarian, Bavaria’s a federal state, Germany’s a federal state, I don’t regard the F word as offensive. I was brought up to think that federal structures stopped the centre accumulating power. So, even when they talk about federal in the British context, I again say – but when the Germans talk federal, they mean something completely different than when you say federal. So, I thought in 2016, when David Cameron called the Referendum, I thought, “What would he have had to come back with for me to vote Remain?” And actually, it wasn’t an impossible chart sheet in that sense, because if he had come back with a deal, which said there will forever and ever be countries who are members of the Euro, the single currency, and those who are not, and this is not a question of a few countries having an opt out, it is a Europe that actually is not of two speeds, because two speeds still imply the same destination, but it is a variable configuration. I would have said, at that moment, “You know what? Let’s give this a try,” because the elephant in the room is the single currency, and this requires some changes.
So, let’s go back to the democracy bit. There’s a – whenever I want to get myself out of the Anglo Saxon- Germanic sphere, I turn to a Bulgarian called Ivan Krastev, and Ivan, he runs a think tank in Sofia called Red House, and he’s just written this book called After Europe, and he makes a very interesting observation that, you know, because I used to say to him, “My basic definition of democracy is that I can vote in those who are in charge, and what’s more to the point, I can vote them out again.” And he said to me at one stage, he said, “Yeah, but what’s the point of being able to vote your Government if you’re in Greece and they can’t determine policy?” So, I have refined my definition of democracy, to say not only do I want to be able to vote in my Government, but by voting in my Government I do wish to have a say 8 How Democratic is the EU?
about the policies and change them, as required, when they pursue it, which takes me to where I think the democratic deficit goes on. And within the European Union you cannot deny that the whole trajectory has always been towards that kind of deeper integration, which takes you to the state, because, you know, I have no problem with your staatenverbund, but the Euro requires more than staatenverbund. You cannot avoid this, and then there’s lots of talk, which never happens.
2002, I remember sitting in Brussels arguing about whether we should have a rapid reaction force, ‘cause the question of defence was always there, 50,000, small corp, you know. 15 years on we still haven’t got enough soldiers capable to call on to have a rapid reaction force, and we’ve still got hardly any countries, which are reaching the NATO target, and even we reach the NATO target, do it by some rather creative way of including the pensions and things.
So, the democratic deficit comes in where, because in the European Constitution, which I, sort of, said, “Yeah, let’s give this a try.” I thought, “What are the things, which I would require to make this work?” So, my cross on the ballot box has to mean something, when I elect the Parliament. I have not – I – sorry, I’ll refine this. The only European election I have lived through, where the European election was fought on the subject of Europe was actually, bizarrely, the last one, where the United Kingdom returned as the majority party representing it the Brexit Party. The previous European election, the biggest parliamentary representation in the European Parliament was UKIP, but that has completely passed by the, kind of – so, if I vote for the European Socialists, I do require to have some sense of what the European Socialists will stand for in the European Parliament. So, I – but, you know, when the idea of the [mother tongue – 29:37] candidate came up, I – in 2002, one of the things which we talked about was that at least have on the ballot paper, who your party would send as a Commissioner. So, you know, when the Labour Party has its closed list, there was a – and if we get more MEPs than any other party, we would ask the Government X to be the Commissioner. Sort of, some introductions.
So, my difficulty is that if we go down a trajectory of losing the people, and by the way, if I even go further back to democracy, and we have this debate now in the United Kingdom, we have, you know, we are going through what, in 200 years ago, would have been a civil war, in terms of the massive tensions of powers and redefinitions of leaders in power, it’s either a balance of power, but you need to decide where your core authority comes from. Up ‘til the 19th Century, was either King or God. The American Revolution and the French Revolution required neither King nor God, so we rediscovered the people, and when we rediscover the people, we have to have mechanisms to control what otherwise would be more [inaudible – 30:44]. That’s why we’ve got political parties, we’ve got elections, we’ve got churches, which, sort of, contain. This is a very sophisticated structure, but just as like the United Kingdom at the moment, I say we’re beginning to discover than when we create something which we call a constitutional court, we should not be, ten years on, be outraged when it started to behave like a constitutional court, but that then has knock-on consequences. And I think in the European Union there’s equally been a kind of denial that when things aren’t what you precisely define them and what they mean, that has consequences.
So, looking at the European Union, my idea of the democratic one, the dangers I think it’s facing is that the Euro countries would have to become more than staatenverbund, they’d have to be. That requires the parties and for those who are not in the definition of that one, the danger I fear is that if your country’s on the periphery, who elect the Government but don’t feel they’re shaping policy, or they feel they can elect the Government, which is probably more extreme than they would normally elect because they hope that the European Commission reigns them in and stops them, e.g. some things which have developed in Poland, you will end up with an electorate that regards its entire power to be no more than to know what it objects to, and to me democracy has to have the ability to object, but it must be by far more constructive. 9 How Democratic is the EU?
Hans Kundnani
Thank you, Gisela. I want to bring in the audience, but Andreas, do you want to briefly respond to this point on the Euro? And I suppose there are two aspects to it. One is this point about whether, you know, the status quo is unsustainable, so further integration is needed, but then secondly, also, this point about the, sort of, democratic implications, because – so, I often like to mention this Wolfgang Schäuble quote, where he says, “We cannot allow elections to influence economic – to change economic policy,” in the context of the Eurozone, and is there not a way in which, particularly in the Eurozone, but perhaps more broadly in the EU, this replacement of, or rather taking areas of policy out of the space of political contestation, democratic contestation, creating rules to govern them, is this not itself inherently anti- democratic? And that’s been, sort of, exposed in the Euro crisis, hasn’t it?
Dr Andreas Rödder
Let me start with saying a word about the construction of the European Monetary Union, and the question is, whether it is a misconstruction or it is not, but it is one of those peculiar European constructions, since it’s resting on two pillars. On the other hand, the currency politics has – how do you say, vergemeinschaftet?
Hans Kundnani
Mutualised.
Dr Andreas Rödder
Mutualised…
Hans Kundnani
Or socialised.
Dr Andreas Rödder
…wherever the fiscal politics remain in the response of the single states. So, fiscal politics and currency politics are divided, and fiscal politics do underly a system of rules, of the so-called stability criteria, and all the member states of the European Union have agreed to obey these criteria of stability. So, this is at least the German interpretation of the construction of the Monetary Union. So, you have this supranational pillar with the ECB and the currency politics and the national pillar with national responsibility for fiscal politics. Now, the question is whether this is a sustainable construction, and I know that there are quite a couple of economic experts. You repeated it and said, “This is not a sustainable construction, this cannot work.” I know that Economists do say so. At least the German interpretation, and I think the German interpretation does fit to the – at least to the text of the treaty. I think it’s not a wrong interpretation to say, “Okay, this is the construction we agreed upon,” and again, to quote Constitutional Court, if the European Monetary Union would substantially deviate from this construction, it would pose the question whether the European Monetary Union would still be legitimate in Germany.” So, the Constitutional Court said if the Monetary Union would be changed substantially, heading to a transfer union or something like that to mutualisation of fiscal politics, this would require a German Referendum, and do I have to say anything about referendum here? So, this is the German 10 How Democratic is the EU?
position, and to say it again, I see the objections of economic experts. And at the same time, I see the German argument of the institutional construction of the Monetary Union, and at the same time…
Hans Kundnani
That’s talking about democracy?
Dr Andreas Rödder
…I would say if states have agreed to obey certain rules and they have become part of an institution working with sanctions, in a sort of way this is a voluntary contribution or membership of this Monetary Union. So that, at the moment, Greece, which is the example, was not able to pay its loans, and was requiring the help for – from the Monetary Union, and you know the German argument is Article 125 of the Treaty of the Functioning of the European Union, excludes that…
Hans Kundnani
Bailouts, basically.
Dr Andreas Rödder
Excludes bailouts, yeah, and the German position is – I know the British, there is no rule in a state of emergency, but the German position was Article 125 excludes bailouts. Even if it does, we did help Greece, and at the same time, it was clear that this was combined with a kind of conditional help for Greece. I say this is the German position, at least, and I see the position that you can say the Greek Government was not able, any longer, to judge about its own budget. At the same time, the German position is there are con – if you want our help, these are the conditions, and you know that Wolfgang Schäuble, in 2015, this would have been the alternative, would have been to leave the Euro, and this is what Wolfgang Schäuble, in 2015, wanted. I think it would have been better if Greece would have left the Euro, not – if this would have been done in a fair way and not as kicking out the Greeks from the Euro.
Hans Kundnani
Yeah, very interesting. It’s just striking that on this partic – in this particular respect, the British, sort of, conventional wisdom is in favour of more integration than the German conventional wisdom, actually, even though, obviously, the Brits want to have nothing to do with it, but nevertheless, I…
Gisela Stuart
Can I just make one observation? If anybody who wants to…
Hans Kundnani
…must bring in the audience.
Gisela Stuart
…pursue this, read Mervyn King’s book, The End of Alchemy, where essentially he looks at what currency is, ‘cause, you know, we talk about these things, it’s not about sector rules, what – and he goes back to the 11 How Democratic is the EU?
history of, you know, the Bank of England, 1684 and the Sovereign Strike Bill. The Sovereign says, “I am the ultimate underwriter of your currency,” and the Merchants in the Bank of England say, “And we provided the liquidity.” And his argument is that the currency requires a Sovereign to underwrite, and then you’ve got the demands of international trade and democracy, and there will come a point – Greece, you can do like student loans in England, where you can say, “Well, we haven’t really written it off, but, you know, by the time you reach 50 and you haven’t repaid it, you know, we forget about it, it’s okay.” Italy, I’m afraid you can’t do this anymore. Then you will have to face up to who is the Sovereign in this currency, and Germany doesn’t want to be the Sovereign, which I fully understand, but if Germany isn’t going to do it, who is it going to be? And that requires a deeper integration.
Dr Andreas Rödder
I – yeah, I perfectly agree that this is the problem. What we are facing with the Euro is, kind of, muddled through. I think if we were back to 1988, we wouldn’t start the Euro – the Monetary Union again. However, now it’s there, and I see your point with this, a kind of limbo we are in, between the German idea what – of what Germany has agreed and what others, as you say, what is necessary. At the moment, it – this, kind of, limbo goes on, and I’m completely aware of what you say. It might – this crisis might emerge, and this might be the crucial point where the European Union has to decide whether to continue the Monetary Union or not. And I see that economic experts say what you said, that it has to embark on a transfer union, but I would not exclude that there might be a political decision to say it doesn’t work, and we make it the other way round.
Hans Kundnani
Very interesting. We must take questions and comments, so let’s start at the back there, and please say your name and affiliation.
Gerard Vincent
Gerard Vincent, I’m a Member of Chatham House and a Europhile, disappointed Europhile. We’ve talked about a number of things. I think many of them would be not recognised by much of the population who have a simpler view about democratic accountability. We always get these phrases about unelected bureaucrats and so on. So, just to give an example, which I regret, we had the Referendum, it was preceded by a negotiation, and the Referendum was to leave, result was to leave. Throughout Europe, as far as I could see, that was stated as being a lose-lose situation; it was a failure. Now, on the UK side, you could see accountability. Cameron went, Osborne went, Clegg went, Corbyn had to be – had to go through re-election. You could – you can see how failure leads to accountability in a democratic state. I didn’t detect any accountability in Europe. I didn’t see where the buck stopped for this fai – their admitted failure, and I’ve got nothing against any individual, and Mr Juncker or whoever, but surely, it would’ve impressed not people in this country, but people throughout Europe, there is some accountability if someone had accepted the buck stopped with them.
Hans Kundnani
Great, thank you. The gentleman at the front.
John Preston
My name is John Preston, I’ve been variously… 12 How Democratic is the EU?
Hans Kundnani
There’s a microphone.
John Preston
…Chairman of the European Society at Oxford – ooh, I’ll start again. My name is John Preston and I’ve been variously Chairman of the European Society at what was then the Oxford College of Technology, and then, much later on, London Southbank, and I’ve enjoyed that sort of European work. I want the panel to let me know how compatible sovereignty is with democracy, because history shows that countries that are very proud of their sovereignty, break away from international institutions because they say it impinges on their sovereignty, and then they then go on, as in pre-war Germany and Japan, to make war, and we’re not entirely sure if you could rightly call it the United Kingdom. I think it’s mainly England at war with itself trying to get somewhere that’s equal a bit of a muddle. So, sovereignty and democracy, how compatible are they and how should countries organise themselves and therefore, the European Union?
Hans Kundnani
Thank you. There was another one here somewhere. Yes, the gentleman at the front.
Byron Fry
My name is Byron Fry, a Member of the Chatham House and IDA, Ireland and Irish Inward Investment Agency. Dr Rödder, I was hoping if you could elaborate a bit on the integration of defence forces and, I suppose, being – coming from a neutral country, the necessity for doing that relative to doing that through an organisation such as NATO instead?
Hans Kundnani
Were there any other questions, before I go back to the panel? I guess I’ll do that. Gisela, do you want to start? So, we’ve got accountability, sovereignty and, I guess, the EU versus NATO on defence, and I guess the accountability question in particular comes back to what we talked about, in terms of that this way in which you, sort of, have a permanent grand coalition in the European – as this European Government, as it were. And so back to Gisela’s point about, sort of, you want to be able to vote out government, you want to be able to change policies as well, but you want to be able to kick the bums out, right? Gisela.
Gisela Stuart
Yeah, and, you see, I really – to properly answer that question, you need to go back to the fundamentals which led to where we are today, and that is the post-World War Two settlement was to come as a structure, which deals with the dark underbelly of nationalism and ideologies and what that leads to, and you’ve got to stop – want to stop Germany and France ever going to war again. And part of that structure was, you required economic stability and you were trying to create the, sort of, kind of, wisdom structure, you know, the guardians of the treaties, who, in exchange for not exciting you too much about ideology and elections and all these kinds of things, would provide you a better tomorrow. The economically better tomorrow was the driving force for taking out the excitement of ideological battles, because there was this assumption, and a very European assumption, that there is such a thing as a right answer, which you don’t contest, you find it. It’s a very Jesuitical concept, that as long as you sit in the horseshoe and talk about it long enough you find it, whereas the Brits, sort of, say, “Well, let’s see what is the most 13 How Democratic is the EU?
appropriate answer at this stage.” You go yay or nay, or as we argue for three years and don’t arrive at a conclusion, but, and that takes the defence one, part of that deal, which is very often forgotten, is that the original Common Market economic stability and the better tomorrow was intrinsically linked with that the security was provided for by NATO.
The defence element and the economic element actually went hand-in-hand, and on the defence one, I know it’s not just, you know, the Irish, I think the Austrians have got great problems, the Finns have got great problems. They, kind of, say, “If you want a mutual defence clause in Europe, European level, we join NATO,” and I think we need to go back to, if the system of the bureaucratic not punishing failure other than, you know, they do – the commissions tend to get removed, but what I would introduce is that an out – you know, if you wanted to make it more accountable, I would say an outgoing commission, any proposals, which in the life of one commission haven’t come to fruition. It’s gone.
I mean, at the moment, all you can remove any idea is negotiate them to death, because, you know, the Patent – and I remember the Patent Directive. I mean, how long has that been going on for? By the time you finally agree, it’s not worth having anymore. So, there are bits where rather than punishing failure, because I think that system is a bit too far, you could have stops and say, “And this is the new Commission which comes in and the new Council is set up, and your new Parliament, and you will be able to show what you have produced and what you haven’t produced, and that gives us some.” But on the defence, I tell you, I think the real biggest problem is that it’s the displacement activity of that we argue about political accountability, when what we’re losing all across Europe is the most basic capability. I mean, the Germans and the Dutch are doing some very interesting stuff together, which is totally outside the European Union framework. The – what Britain and France has done, under the Saint-Malo Agreement, completely outside the EU stuff.
So, my hunch is that the real developments on defence are happening and they’re happening on an inter- government level, and to argue over the EU dimension, I think, is a distraction.
Hans Kundnani
Andreas?
Dr Andreas Rödder
As regards to the question of accountability, I think what you expected from a European Commission, which can be held accountable for the promises during an electoral campaign, I think it’s, kind of, illusion about the European Union, since we have completely different electoral campaigns, since we don’t have a common European public. What is debated, during the electoral campaign for the European Parliament in Poland, is completely different from what is discussed in Spain. And I would say this is not what I would expect from the European Union. I’m content with less on the European level. It’s not – all that I’ve underlined for me is not the Head of a Government of United States of Europe, I would expect. So, insofar, as long as there is no – nothing like a European public, I think we won’t have that, and as I said, I wouldn't expect it. So, the second question, how compatible is sovereignty and democracy? So, at least from a German constitutional viewpoint, sovereignty has two aspects. The one is the sovereignty of the people and the other is the sovereignty of a state. I think you meant – more meant the question of the sovereignty of a state and how far this is compatible with democracy.
So, I would say different from the British taking back control, on the continent and particularly in Germany there is much more sympathy for this idea of shared sovereignty, and what I would say that this 14 How Democratic is the EU?
idea of shared sovereignty, which has become part of this specific construction of the European Union, is historically new. So, I think this is really a new phenomenon, which has emerged, say, with the European community after 1950, and even more with European Union after Maastricht. I would say this is a historically specific and new development, and to – as regards the question of defence, I completely agree what you said about NATO. The problem is that the reliability of NATO is deteriorating, I think we need to face that as Europeans. I think we can’t, we shouldn't abandon NATO, of course, but Europeans need to stand for themselves. So, I think this new defence initiative resting on a, kind of, voluntarily contribution is a right way of doing it, but I wholeheartedly support what you said that in the end European, a really European defence politics rests on co-operation of governments and of nation states. And this is what I say, there is no alternative between, it’s not an alternative between the EU and Brussels on the one hand or the nation states and their co-operation on the other hand. I think a strong European Union would realise that Europe, as a whole, only can be strong if its nation states are strong, and so, as I would say, look to the Élysée Treaty between Germany and France. It’s besides the European integration, European institutions, but it’s no damage to the European institutions.
So, I would say a strong European Union does not have a problem with really nation state co-operation and it does not have to fear it. So, I would – no, this is no – neither, no – not one or the other, but the prudent combination of nation state co-operation and supranational integration, as you asked before, I think a prudent combination, which does not fear that nation state co-operation would weaken the European Union. This, I think, is the wrong alternative, and the prudent European Union – prudent Europe would stand both.
Hans Kundnani
How much of this discussion do you think has to do with different conceptions of democracy, because – and in particular, different conceptions in different EU member states, because, you know, Gisela was talking about the, sort of, Jesuitical approach on the one hand versus, I suppose, an Anglo-American approach, which is about, sort of, fighting things out, you know, and the Referendum, sort of, demonstrates this, and the EU, it seems to me, embodies a, sort of, a much more consensual notion, as Gisela was indicating, which fits much more neatly, it seems to me, with how German democracy works.
Dr Andreas Rödder
Yeah, I’m not right sure whether this is a question of concepts or democra – of democracy or whether it’s more a question of geopolitics and of historical experience. You know, if you said it’s a consensual model, if you asked for pre-war Germany, so the German experience and never to be isolated in Europe and never to stand against the other Europeans and never to wage war, it’s so deeply seated within the German DNA after 1945, that I sometimes think that it’s rather – this question of historical experience, historical lessons, Germans seem to have learned than a question of concepts of democracy.
Hans Kundnani
Yes, but it’s clearly routed in history, but as a German who knows Britain quite well and has spent some time here, do you not – I mean, you made this point about shared sovereignty. You know, this is something, which I think it goes back to the question, and this is something which Brits struggle with, I think, partly because of the way that we have a very unitary political system, where sovereignty – we have quite a simple conception of sovereignty. And there’s a bit of a tension between, you know, are the people Sovereign or is Parliament sovereign, and that’s playing out right now, obviously, but it’s relatively simple, 15 How Democratic is the EU?
compared to this idea of, sort of, multi-level governance, which I think in Germany you’re much more comfortable with.
Dr Andreas Rödder
Yeah, on the one hand, much more comfortable with. What is interesting, if you talked to a German constitutional expert about the term of sovereignty, it would just be the question of, is the sovereignty with the people or with anybody else and not the question of sovereignty of the states in international relations. So, German constitutional experts are deeply focused on this question of constitutional sovereignty and not sovereignty, in terms of international sovereignty.
Hans Kundnani
State sovereignty, yes.
Dr Andreas Rödder
Yeah, state sovereignty, yeah.
Hans Kundnani
Gisela, you wanted to jump in.
Gisela Stuart
About 12 years ago there was an article in Prospect and it was on the Japanese author’s byline, and it was the most perceptive analysis of the difference between the Brits and the Germans. I then subsequently discovered it was written by a British Diplomat, who couldn’t put his name to it, and essentially, what he said, seafaring nations know that you can never control the waves. The best you can do is ride them. So, you end up with structures, which allow you to respond to unexpected circumstances in the most appropriate way, at any given time, and he said, “And that’s the Brits.” The Germans, they have their forests, they have their rules, they have their roots, they require the framework, and this is always so funny, the really big difference that, you know, the Germans will happily say, “But this is how the single currency rules are,” open brackets, “Unless Germany and France breaks them, then we’ll change the rules, but then we’ve got the rules again.” So, there’s – I think there’s a different approach to rules that for the Germans, it’s what defines the parameters, which shapes you. It’s a bit like in a building shaping you, whereas for the Brits they are, kind of, how you get through today, tomorrow and the day after.
Dr Andreas Rödder
Just…
Hans Kundnani
Please, yeah.
16 How Democratic is the EU?
Dr Andreas Rödder
Perfectly true, and I would like to add one certain historical experience. Since, I think, particularly constitutional history in Germany is deeply aware that there has been one crucial sin in German history, you know, when the famous German constitution expert Carl Schmitt wrote in July 1934, when Hitler had killed his entourage from the SR, Carl Schmitt wrote a famous article with the headline, The Fuhrer schützt das Gesetz, The Fuhrer protects the law, and this is what German constitutional experts know what must never happen again. And so, this stripped the Germans of this pragmatism, and the lessons Germans learned out of that, that this must never happen again and this means, for a German – from a German perspective, that rules particularly must work in a state of emergency, and this explains much of the German behaviour in the Euro crisis.
Hans Kundnani
Yes, and that’s the exact quote that I remember from that conference, by the way.
Gisela Stuart
And at the danger of overrunning, and of course, Peter Hennessy, the great constitutional expert, who is, you know, who deserves a sainthood in my book, he said that this week in the United Kingdom we had a principle, which was called ‘the good chap theory’, which meant that some rules you – good chaps knew you never questioned and you never broke, and he said, “This week, we’re seeing the end of the good chap theory.” So, the process of the UK leaving the European Union may curiously either make us more European in the way we operate or more American, but yet to be seen.
Hans Kundnani
That’s a great place to end. Thank you very much for your questions. Thank you so much to both of our heroic panellists, and Gisela for stepping in at the last minute, Andreas for coming to London, even though you have a cold. So thank you very, very much, and thank you very much for coming [applause].