Media and Communication Open Access Journal | ISSN: 2183-2439 Volume 3, Issue 3 (2015) Special Issue Surveillance: Critical Analysis and Current Challenges (Part II) Editors James Schwoch, John Laprise and Ivory Mills Media and Communication, 2015, Volume 3, Issue 3 Special Issue: Surveillance: Critical Analysis and Current Challenges (Part II) Published by Cogitatio Press Rua Fialho de Almeida 14, 2º Esq., 1070-129 Lisbon Portugal Guest Editors James Schwoch, Northwestern University, USA John Laprise, Independent Researcher Ivory Mills, Northwestern University, USA Managing Editor Mr. António Vieira, Cogitatio Press, Portugal Available online at: www.cogitatiopress.com/mediaandcommunication This issue is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (CC BY). Articles may be reproduced provided that credit is given to the original and Media and Communication is acknowledged as the original venue of publication. Table of Contents Article Beyond Privacy: Articulating the Broader Harms of Pervasive Mass Surveillance Christopher Parsons 1-11 Article “Veillant Panoptic Assemblage”: Mutual Watching and Resistance to Mass Surveillance after Snowden Vian Bakir 12-25 Article Attaching Hollywood to a Surveillant Assemblage: Normalizing Discourses of Video Surveillance Randy K Lippert and Jolina Scalia 26-38 Article The New Transparency: Police Violence in the Context of Ubiquitous Surveillance Ben Brucato 39-55 Article First They Came for the Poor: Surveillance of Welfare Recipients as an Uncontested Practice Nathalie Maréchal 56-67 Article “Austerity Surveillance” in Greece under the Austerity Regime (2010−2014) Minas Samatas 68-80 Article Interveillance: A New Culture of Recognition and Mediatization André Jansson 81-90 Media and Communication (ISSN: 2183-2439) 2015, Volume 3, Issue 3, Pages 1-11 Doi: 10.17645/mac.v3i3.263 Article Beyond Privacy: Articulating the Broader Harms of Pervasive Mass Surveillance Christopher Parsons Citizen Lab, Munk School of Global Affairs, University of Toronto, Toronto, M6K 3R8, Canada; E-Mail: [email protected] Submitted: 23 March 2015 | In Revised Form: 16 July 2015 | Accepted: 4 August 2015 | Published: 20 October 2015 Abstract This article begins by recounting a series of mass surveillance practices conducted by members of the “Five Eyes” spying alliance. While boundary- and intersubjectivity-based theories of privacy register some of the harms linked to such practices I demonstrate how neither are holistically capable of registering these harms. Given these theories’ deficien- cies I argue that critiques of signals intelligence surveillance practices can be better grounded on why the practices in- trude on basic communicative rights, including those related to privacy. The crux of the argument is that pervasive mass surveillance erodes essential boundaries between public and private spheres by compromising populations’ abili- ties to freely communicate with one another and, in the process, erodes the integrity of democratic processes and insti- tutions. Such erosions are captured as privacy violations but, ultimately, are more destructive to the fabric of society than are registered by theories of privacy alone. After demonstrating the value of adopting a communicative rights ap- proach to critique signals intelligence surveillance I conclude by arguing that this approach also lets us clarify the inter- national normative implications of such surveillance, that it provides a novel way of conceptualizing legal harm linked to the surveillance, and that it showcases the overall value of focusing on the implications of interfering with communica- tions first, and as such interferences constituting privacy violations second. Ultimately, by adopting this Habermasian inspired mode of analysis we can develop more holistic ways of conceptualizing harms associated with signals intelli- gence practices than are provided by either boundary- or intersubjective-based theories of privacy. Keywords critical theory; democracy; Habermas; intelligence; national security; privacy; surveillance; telecommunications Issue This article is part of the special issue "Surveillance: Critical Analysis and Current Challenges", edited by James Schwoch (Northwestern University, USA), John Laprise (Independent Researcher) and Ivory Mills (Northwestern University, USA). © 2015 by the author; licensee Cogitatio (Lisbon, Portugal). This article is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribu- tion 4.0 International License (CC BY). 1. Introduction trate, and modify data. Their operations are so deeply integrated with one another’s that it is challenging, if The Snowden revelations have shown the extent to not impossible, to analyze one member without analyz- which American, Australian, British, Canadian, and New ing them all a single group. The breadth of these sig- Zealand signals intelligence agencies operate across nals intelligence agencies’ activities has called into the Internet. These agencies, collectively known as the question whether they are intruding on the privacy of “Five Eyes” (FVEY), have placed deep packet inspection people all over the globe, including the privacy of their equipment throughout telecommunications networks own citizens. around the world to collect metadata and content This article begins by recounting of a series of mass alike. They have engaged in sophisticated signals de- surveillance practices conducted by the FVEY agencies. velopment operations by intruding into non-public These practices reveal the extent of the FVEY agencies’ commercial and government networks to access, exfil- surveillance activities which, in aggregate, exceeds the Media and Communication, 2015, Volume 3, Issue 3, Pages 1-11 1 surveillance capabilities of any particular corporation “non-targeted” persons for extensive amounts of time. or single state. Next, the article engages with how The implications of such surveillance are taken up in boundary- and intersubjectivity-based theories of pri- subsequent sections, when analyzing the effectiveness vacy register harms associated with the FVEY mem- of individual and collective theories of privacy to re- bers’ signals intelligence activities. Whereas boundary- spond to these modes of surveillance, as well as when based theories can account for some of the harms ex- analyzing how a Habermasian critique of surveillance perienced by targeted individuals they are less able to more holistically accounts for harms linked to the register harms associated with the surveillance of glob- aforementioned surveillance practices. al populations. In contrast, theories focused on the in- The FVEY alliance collects communications data tersubjective characteristics of privacy register how from around the world at “Special Source Operations”, capturing the global population’s electronic metadata or SSOs. Some surveillance programs associated with weakens the bonds needed for populations to develop SSOs temporarily store all communications traffic routed the requisite relationships for fostering collective to these locations. These communications are also ana- growth and inclusive lawmaking. However, these inter- lyzed and filtered to pick out information that is ex- subjective theories of privacy are less capable of re- pected to positively contribute to a SIGINT operation. A sponding to individual harms than liberal theories of pri- Canadian program, codenamed EONBLUE, operated at vacy. Ultimately, neither of these approaches to privacy over 200 locations as of November 2010 and was re- are holistically responsive to legally-authorized mass sponsible for such analyses. Other agencies, such as surveillance practices conducted by the FVEY nations. DSD, may also have used the EONBLUE program (CSE, The concluding sections of this article argue that 2010). Similarly, the United States runs deep packet in- privacy ought not to be used as the primary critique of spection surveillance systems that parallel some of the FVEY agencies’ mass surveillance practices given EONBLUE’s capabilities (Gallagher, 2013a; Bamford, the deficiencies associated with liberal and intersubjec- 2008). In the case of the United Kingdom, GCHQ’s TEM- tive privacy theories. Instead, critiques of signals intel- PORA program monitors at least some data traffic pass- ligence surveillance practices can be grounded on why ing into and out of the country (MacAskill, Borger, Hop- these practices erode boundaries between the public kins, Davies, & Ball, 2013). All of these countries share and private spheres, to the effect of eroding the au- data they derive from SSO-located surveillance pro- tonomy that underpins democratic processes and insti- grams in near-real time; no single alliance member can tutions. The erosion of these boundaries may be regis- effectively detect and respond to all of the Internet- tered as privacy harms or—more broadly—as related threats that are directed towards any of these intrusions on communicative and association rights nations, nor can they comprehensively track the activi- that are essential to democratic models of govern- ties of individuals around the world as they use tele- ment. These intrusions are made worse by the secrecy communications systems without the FVEY agencies of the laws and rulings authorizing the FVEY’s surveil- pooling and sharing their collated data. The very capaci- lance practices. The paper ultimately argues that a Ha- ties of the “national” programs operated by each of bermasian grounded critique can identify privacy these member nations