TACKLING LIBERIA: THE EYE OF THE REGIONAL STORM 30 April 2003 Africa Report N°62 Freetown/Brussels TABLE OF CONTENTS EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS................................................. i I. INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................................... 1 II. LIBERIA’S WAR ........................................................................................................... 3 A. LURD LEADERSHIP STRUGGLES...........................................................................................3 B. WEAKNESSES OF GOVERNMENT FORCES ...............................................................................6 C. THE BATTLE FOR MONROVIA? .............................................................................................7 III. THE MANO RIVER UNION’S POROUS BORDERS ............................................ 10 A. THE OPEN SECRET OF GUINEA’S ASSISTANCE ................................................................10 B. SIERRA LEONE’S BALANCING ACT......................................................................................12 IV. THE CÔTE D’IVOIRE CRISIS ................................................................................. 14 A. TAYLOR’S IVORIAN WAR....................................................................................................15 B. PRESIDENT GBAGBO AND ANTI-TAYLOR FORCES...............................................................20 C. LIBERIANS VERSUS LIBERIANS ...........................................................................................24 D. MERCENARIES WITHOUT BORDERS ....................................................................................25 E. THE REGIONAL HUMANITARIAN CRISIS ..............................................................................26 V. CONCLUSION: PREVENTING FURTHER REGIONAL CHAOS...................... 29 A. A PEACE PROCESS FOR LIBERIA .........................................................................................30 B. A SECURITY STRATEGY FOR THE REGION.......................................................................33 APPENDICES A. MAP OF LIBERIA AND IVORY COAST ...................................................................................36 B. MAP OF REGIONAL CONFLICT.............................................................................................37 C. GLOSSARY OF ACRONYMS OF ARMED GROUPS ...................................................................38 D. INSURGENCIES AND THEIR REGIONAL SUPPORTERS............................................................40 E. ABOUT THE INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP .......................................................................41 F. ICG REPORTS AND BRIEFINGS ............................................................................................42 G. ICG BOARD MEMBERS .......................................................................................................48 ICG Africa Report N°62 30 April 2003 TACKLING LIBERIA: THE EYE OF THE REGIONAL STORM EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS There is a critical need for further international Western Côte d’Ivoire has become a magnet for action to end the civil war in Liberia – and to halt the mercenaries of many nationalities. The failure of spread of chaos beyond its borders that has both the international community to devise a regional inflamed the Côte d’Ivoire crisis and threatens wider disarmament program has given the hard-line Sierra military conflict and humanitarian disaster in much Leone fighters who fled to Liberia another chance of West Africa. The key mechanism in this respect is to sell their skills. While international attention is the International Contact Group on Liberia (hereafter focused on Iraq, a regional humanitarian crisis is Contact Group), established in September 2002. And raging throughout Liberia and western Côte the central players within that body, whose d’Ivoire. Neither the Ivorian government nor rebel cooperation is essential if effective action is to be groups have allowed the UN or other donors access taken, are its three permanent members of the to assist the tens of thousands of refugees and Security Council: the U.S., UK and France. internally displaced persons who are trapped by two brutal conflicts. The international community Liberia’s conflict has continued to spread and must act before Liberia’s conflict spreads to other consume its neighbours. The Mano River Union war West African countries. Sanctions and containment that originally encompassed Liberia, Sierra Leone policies have not stopped Charles Taylor from and Guinea has now expanded east to Côte d’Ivoire. supporting rebellions beyond Liberia’s borders. A small area in the western part of that country has Whether he has grand regional designs or simply been dragged into Liberia’s struggle, much as was cannot control his ill-disciplined forces, he remains Sierra Leone a few years earlier. The Liberian a regional security problem. contenders are using the Ivorian crisis, which broke out on 19 September 2002, as a proxy battleground. Neither Taylor nor the LURD is interested in peace, All indications are that no one is in control of the except on each’s own terms, and both have stalled situation on the Côte d’Ivoire-Liberia border. on proposed peace talks. The recent appearance on the scene of LURD-MODEL has further muddied Both sides of the Ivorian crisis have used Liberian the prospects for peace. Liberia is scheduled to elect fighters in their struggle. President Taylor a new president on 14 October 2003. If President increasingly employs rebel troops in western Côte Taylor goes ahead with elections that are deemed d’Ivoire, which he treats as a second front against the unfair, they will perpetuate the status quo. ICG has Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy consistently recommended increased international (LURD) insurgency that threatens his rule. Ivorian pressure for a ceasefire; insistence that Taylor step President Laurent Gbagbo is paying and arming just down once his term is over so that an internationally about anyone to balance Taylor’s support for his assisted and perhaps administered interim foes. His largesse enabled the formation of a new government can be established; and postponement of LURD faction, which calls itself the Movement for the October elections until conditions can be Democracy in Liberia (MODEL). It is advancing established for an open campaign unhindered by against Taylor at the same time as it challenges, for violence and intimidation. primacy in the rebellion, both the LURD leadership based in Guinea and its military wing fighting on The Contact Group has been unable to produce a Liberian soil. ceasefire. Its diplomatic pressure has, however, Tackling Liberia: The Eye of the Regional Storm ICG Africa Report, 30 April 2003 Page ii pushed Taylor to admit that conditions for free and through an international tribunal – but also indicated fair elections do not currently exist in Liberia; to that cooperation on the peace process could earn them agree to an (unspecified) delay of the ballot; and credit. probably also to a joint assessment mission of the UN, EU and the regional mission ECOWAS West Africa now bears most of the traits of Central (Economic Community of West African States) to Africa, which has been devastated by a regional war. determine what would be needed to create the To address the regional dimension, ECOWAS and appropriate conditions. Before elections could take the wider international community must deal with place, a ceasefire with the LURD (including LURD- the growing tendency of leaders in West Africa to MODEL) would surely be required, as well as a sponsor rebellions abroad to protect their positions at transition period during which human rights were home. Burkina Faso, Guinea, Liberia and Côte respected and the opposition was able to campaign d’Ivoire have all employed rebel groups either to get freely. Ideally this would be backed by a UN rid of their domestic enemies or to remove peacekeeping force on the ground during the neighbouring leaders they do not like. The mandate transition period and the elections. However, the of the UN Panel of Experts on Liberia, which will be prospect of Taylor stepping aside to allow genuinely reviewed in May 2003 along with the sanctions on free and fair elections is still remote. The Contact Liberia, should be expanded to cover the entire Group, with a strong lead from the U.S. and prior region, and Guinea’s President Lansana Conté, Security Council backing, must make clear to Taylor, President Gbagbo of Côte d’Ivoire and President LURD and LURD-MODEL that if a commitment to Blaise Compaoré of Burkina Faso in particular must achieve these conditions is not demonstrated by the be warned of sanctions – and their own potential middle of the year, substantially more serious exposure to war crimes prosecution – if they measures will be taken. continue to undermine peace in Liberia. There are two critical and interlinked elements for a successful resolution of Liberia’s crisis: the conflict RECOMMENDATIONS must be recognised as a wider regional one and addressed on that basis, and there must be effective To the Members of the International Contact coordination among the key external players, namely Group on Liberia: the U.S., the UK, France, the UN, the EU and ECOWAS. While two permanent members of the 1. Address the continuing violence within – and Security Council, the UK and France, play prominent associated