Viewing the History of Science As Compiled Hindsight Lindley Darcien

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Viewing the History of Science As Compiled Hindsight Lindley Darcien Viewing the History of Science as Compiled Hindsight Lindley Darcien hen I was invited to give a should be aware of the need to pre- talk on AI and the history of serve records of their activities. This article is a written version of an science, I declined the sugges- Pamela McCorduck’s entertaining and invited talk on artificial intelligence (AI) tion that I discuss the place of AI in journalistic account of AI, Machines and the history of science that was pre- the history of science. The field is too Who Think (1979,) will be the first of sented at the Fifth National Conference on new, developing too rapidly, to try to many chronicles of this field. Profes- Artificial Intelligence (AAAI-86) in assess its place in the history of sci- sional historians will soon follow the Philadelphia on 13 August 1986 Included ence just yet. Some aspects of AI are journalists. is an expanded section on the concept of an abstraction in AI; this section responds applied and more like engineering The difficulty in preserving pro- to issues that were raised in the discussion than science. Some aspects, those in grams and the hardware on which which followed the oral presentation which AI researchers aim at modeling they run will make the historians task The main point here is that the history human intelligence, merge into cogni- even more difficult than the usual of science can be used as a source for con- tive science. Those researchers trying problem, for example, of coping with structing abstract theory types to aid in to understand intelligence, human or scientists who cleaned out their files solving recurring problem types. Two theo- otherwise, are forging a new area that and threw away their notebooks. ry types that aid in forming hypotheses to might or might not ultimately be Those of you working in the field solve adaptation problems are discussed: called scientific. I don’t believe it is should be careful about preserving selection theories and instructive theories. profitable to argue over whether a material. Consider donating your Providing cases from which to construct theory types is one way in which to view field deserves the honorific title of papers to university or corporate the history of science as “compiled hind- “science.” Each field needs to develop archives, and be aware that future gen- sight” and might prove useful to those in its own methodologies, which are erations will likely want to trace your AI concerned with scientific knowledge shaped by the needs and problems steps of thinking and implementing. and reasoning within the field, without succumbing One scientist whose work I have tried to the disease of physics envy. If some to trace cleaned out his files every five of the many characteristics attributed years. Another researcher destroyed to science are useful within a new his notebooks when he retired. Be- field, then they should be considered. cause we cannot date a key discovery Some fields, for example, might find on the basis of information in this re- controlled experimentation useful; searcher’s notebooks, which are the others might strive for quantitative best historical source, we are left with results; and still others might find the- trying to reconstruct what he said in ory-driven methods of use. However, his classes during this period to see if adopting methods simply to obtain he discussed as yet unpublished the label scientific and not because results in his lectures. Would you they are demanded by the problems want to count on your students’ lec- seems to me to be misguided. ture notes to substantiate your claim Although I believe it is too early to that you made a discovery? Certain try to assess AI’s place in the history large projects, such as the space tele- of science, it is not too early to begin scope, hire a historian at the outset so preserving records for the historians that appropriate records can be kept who will be writing the history of AI. and interviews done as the project AI is an exciting and rapidly develop- proceeds. Scientists interviewed many ing field. Those persons shaping it years later might or might not accu- SUMMER 1987 33 some remarks about AI that are worth recalling. Schank discussed the some- Although I believe it is too early to try to assess times tenuous connection between AI AI’s place in the history of science, it is not too and the rest of computer science. He said that AI is a methodology applica- early to begin preserving records for the historians ble to many fields other than computer who will be writing the history of AI. science because it is “potentially, the algorithmic study of processes in every field of inquiry. As such the future rately remember what happened and (not the social or artificial]. I am inter- should produce AI anthropologists, AI when. Having a historian involved in ested in scientific knowledge and rea- doctors, AI political scientists, and so the early stages is a good way to record soning. My topic deals with the ways on” (Schank 1983, p. 7). I would add to AI work on large projects. in which AI and the history and phi- this list AI historians and philosophers losophy of science can profit from The Babbage Institute and the of science. Smithsonian Institution have strong interacting. Successes already exist Students educated in computer sci- with such an interface, and I would interests in the history of computing, ence as undergraduates who then spe- like to suggest additional points of but they have done little yet on the cialize in AI as graduate students learn history of AI. Arthur Norberg of the potential contact. a lot of skills, maybe some mathemat- Babbage Institute told me that they When I was invited to speak, I was ics, but they might be exposed to very will be happy to advise anyone with asked to be entertaining and provoca- little actual knowledge, scientific or tive. Because I am normally rather archival material in AI about appropri- otherwise, or to problems examined by ate places for storage. A major exhibit matter-of-fact and, I guess, sad to say, a researchers in other fields. I think this on the information revolution is bit dull, such a task isn’t especially lack of training in knowledge-rich easy for me. AI has some very bright, scheduled to open at the Smithsonian fields accounts in part for so many of Institution in 1990. Currently, nothing clever, and entertaining people who the toy problems and games that have on AI is scheduled to appear in this give very lively talks. I can’t hope to been the domain of much AI work. Al match their liveliness and wit. Also, exhibit. efforts that address real, rather than In contrast, the Computer Museum being provocative requires one to take toy, problems, especially scientific in Boston has an exhibit entitled, dogmatic stands so that others will ones, are of much greater interest to “Artificial Intelligence and Robots,” disagree. Philosophical training has those researchers in other fields sharpened my ability to see both sides opening in the summer of 1987. Oliver attempting to make connections with of an issue and dulled my ability to be Strimpel is the curator working on the AI. exhibit. The museum already has dogmatic. However, in an effort to sat- The work in expert systems has Shakey and other artifacts and is inter- isfy this request, let me attempt to been all for the good in getting Al ested in acquiring still more. It is also make a few provocative remarks before researchers involved with real-world interested in collecting programs, getting on to the serious--and I hope knowledge and reasoning. Some Al either in listings or in other usable not too dull--points. systems have been driven by researcl forms, for their archives. For the To give an overview of what is com- problems and needs in other areas exhibit, they need rugged, state-of-the- ing, first I will make some provocative, including science. Such success art AI systems which might be of introductory remarks. Then, I will dis- requires those involved in AI to learr interest to the public and which could cuss fruitful interactions between AI about other fields and become con withstand museum use. and the history and philosophy of sci- cemed with the research problems ant The AI field is fortunate to have its ence. Next will come a discussion of reasoning strategies in various conten key founding fathers still alive. It is an important idea developed in AI, fields. Graduate programs in AI shoulc certainly time for professional histori- namely, abstraction. This idea will be have less training in computer science ans--those trained in oral history applied in a discussion of abstractions More of the students’ time should bc methodology--to begin collecting that I have found by analyzing the his- spent in research fields where AI tech audiotapes and videotapes, deciding on tory of science as well as an illustra- niques can be applied and where the key historical questions that need to tion involving two types of theories needs of these fields can drive the be asked, and filling in the gaps in doc- from the biological sciences--selection development of new areas of AI. The umentation. The American Associa- and instructive theories. The conclu- history of science has been marked b! tion for Artificial Intelligence might sion is a summary of the compiled successful interfield interactions lead wish to fund such a project, just as hindsight provided by the examples ing to new developments (Darden ant many of the scientific societies have discussed and suggests ways in which Maul1 1977).
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