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Chapter 5 RADIOLOGICAL HAZARD and SAFETY ENVIRONMENTAL DoD 51 OO.52-M CHAPTER 5 RADIOLOGICAL HAZARD AND SAFETY ENVIRONMENTAL MONITORING 5-1 GENERAL 5-3 SPECIFIC REQUIREMENTS A nuclear weapon aczident is different from other acci- Department of Defense (DoD) has an obligation to dents due to the possibility of radioactive contamination protect response force personnel and the public from at the immediate accident site and extending “beyond on-site hazards associated with a nuclear weapon the accident vicinity. The complexities of a nuclear accident and to mitigate potential health and safety weapon accident are compounded further by general lack problems. To accomplish this, the DoD establishes a of public understanding regarding radiological hazards. JHEC with the following objectives: The On-Scene Commander (OSC) must therefore, quickly establish a vigorous and comprehensive health a. Determine if radioactive contamination has been physics program to manage the health safety aspects released. of a nuclear weapons accident. A good health physics program provides for civil authority/ official involve- b. Advise the OSC of precautionary measures for ment in the cooperative development of response efforts residents and other persons in potentially contaminated and a site restoration plan, areas. c. Identify and monitor potentially contaminated 5-2 PURPOSE AND SCOPE personnel on-site, including decontamination efforts, and establish a bioassay program. This chapter provides information on health physics and guidance concerning the radiological safety and other d. Determine levels of contamination present and on- hazards associated with a nuclear weapon accident. Also site boundaries of the contaminated areas through included is information on the radiological control ground and air surveys. resources avrdable, the hazards and characteristics of radioactive materials present, and suggested methods for e. Establish dosimetry and documentation procedures detecting these hazards and protecting personnel from during personnel decontamination and restoration them. This information assists the OSC in the operations operations. under his control. The Joint Hazard Evaluation Center (JHEC) is the OSC’S organizational means to task on- f. Recommend methods and procedures to prevent site hazard and radiological data collection and analyze spread of radioactive contamination. data collected for the most accurate and complete hazard/ radiological assessment. The chapter furnishes g. Assist the Federal Radiological Monitoring and recommendations, advice, sample forms, and assistance Assessment Center (FRMAC) in coordinating and plan- to civil authorities with jurisdiction over areas affected ning the site restoration plan. by the accident. Also, weapon systems contain non- radioactive toxic materials, such as beryllium, lithium, 5-4 RESOURCES lead, propellants, high explosives, oxidizers and plastics. These hazards are discussed in Chapter 9. The JHEC a. Response Force Resources. Response forces should coordinates closely with the FRMAC. The FRMAC have a full complement of operable and calibrated radio- supports the OSC with off-site monitoring and logical monitoring equipment. Sufficient quantities of assessment. materials should also be available for replacement or 5-1 repair of critical or high failure rate components such (g) Department of Energy Mobile Accident as mylar probe faces. Replacement plans are necessary Response Group Unit (HOT SPOT). because radiation detection equipment (RADIACS) (h) Department of Energy RANGER Environ- available to initial response forces will not meet initial mental Monitoring Capability. operational needs after a large release of contamination. (i) Department of Energy Radiological Air Though response forces are equipped and trained to Sampling Counting and Analysis Lab (RASCAL). conduct radiation surveys for low levels of radioactive (j) Department of Energy Mobile Decontamina- contamination, it is difficult to do over rough surfaces tion Station. like rocks, plants, and wet surfaces. Specialized DoD (k) Defense Nuclear Agency Advisory Team. and Department of Energy (DoE) teams are better (1) DoD EOD Teams. equipped to conduct low level contamination monitor- ing, and monitoring should wait until the teams arrive. Appendix 5-A contains a list of radiological monitoring 5-5 CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS equipment used by the Services with a summary of their This concept of.operations assumes that an accident has capabilities and limitations. Additionally, personnel resulted in release of contamination to areas beyond should be cognizant of the various units in which the immediate vicinity of the accident site. The distinc- contamination levels might be measured or reported, tion between on-site and off-site is significant for security and of the method of converting from one unit to and legal purposes; however, for effective collection and another. A conversion table for various measurements meaningful correlation of radiological data, the entire is provided in Chapter 11. region of contamination must be treated as an entity. b. Specialized Teams. Several specialized teams are The on-site and off-site distinction should be considered available within the DoD and DoE with substantial only when assigning areas to monitoring teams. Possible radiological monitoring, hazard assessment, and response force actions are addressed first in this concept instrument repair capabilities. Moreover, they can of operations. Only limited equipment and expertise may provide field laboratories and analytical facilities. be available to the initial response force. Specialized teams when integrated into the Service Response Force (SRF), provide adequate technical a. Initial Response Force (IRF) Actions. Within the resources to make a complete assessment of the radio- constraints of available resources, IRF action should logical hazards. Additionally, specialized DoE teams, determine the absence or presence of any radiological which have off-site responsibilities, should be integrated problem and its nature; minimize possible radiation into the SRF. Integration of specialized team operations hazards to the public and response force personnel; is accomplished best through establishment of a JHEC identify all persons who may have been contaminated as discussed in paragraph 5-5. When not required on- and decontaminate them as necessa~, provide approp- site, DoD specialized teams should assist in the off-site riate news releases; and notify officials/ personnel of radiological response-efforts. Specialized teams are: potential hazards. If responding by air, radiation detection instrumentation should be carried to ensure (1) The U.S. Army Radiological Advisory Medical that personnel and aircraft are not contaminated. Efforts Team (RAMT) is discussed in Chapter 14. should be made, during the flight, to avoid contam- (2) The following specialized teams or resources are ination; appropriate ground support should be provided discussed in detail in Chapter 20: upon landing if personnel and aircraft become contaminated. (a) U.S. Army Radiological Control (RADCON) Team. (1) Pre-Deployment Actions. (b) U.S. Navy Radiological Control (RADCON) Team. (a) Prior to departing for the accident site, (c) U.S. Air Force Radiation Assessment Team delivery arrangements should be made for an Atmos- (AFRAT). pheric Release Advisory Capability (ARAC) plot, if (d) U.S. Air “Force Air Transportable RADIAC available, to assist in determining possible areas of Package (ATRAP). contamination. AIQ4C plots will provide theoretical (e) Department of Energy Aerial Measurement estimates of the radiation dose to personnel downwind System (AMS). at the time of the accident. Also, plots will provide the (f) Department of Energy Atmospheric Release expelted location and level of contamination deposition Advisory Capability (ARAC). on the ground. A detailed discussion of ARAC is in 5-2 Appendix 5-C. As it becomes known, specific accident and the condition of the wreckage or debris may indicate data described in the appendices should be provided contamination. Anticipated questions that may be asked to the ARAC facility at Lawrence Livermore National to evaluate the release of contamination are: Laboratory. (b) If an advance party is deployed, at least one ~. Was there a high explosives detonation? trained person should have radiation detection instru- ~. Has a weapon undergone sustained burning? ments to determine if alpha emitting contamination was ~. How many intact weapons or containers dispersed and to confirm that no beta and/or gamma have been observed? hazard exists. The earlier that confirmation of released ~. Do broken or damaged weapons or con- contamination is established, the easier it will be to tainers appear to have been involved in an explosion develop a plan of action and communicate with involved or fire? civil authorities. (d) If no contamination was released by the (2) Initial Actions. accident, the remaining radiological response becomes preparations for response in the event of a release during (a) If the OSC, or an advance party, deploys by weapon recovery operations. helicopter to the accident site, an overflight of the accident scene and the downwind area can provide a (3) Actions to be taken if contamination is detected. rapid assessment of streets or roads in the area and the “Authorities should be notified and the assistance of types and uses of potentially effected property. During specialized radiological teams and the DoE Aerial Mea- helicopter operations, flights should remain above or surement
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