WITHDRAWAL to IORIBAIWA HILE the Militiamen of Maroubra Force

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WITHDRAWAL to IORIBAIWA HILE the Militiamen of Maroubra Force CHAPTER 6 WITHDRAWAL TO IORIBAIWA HILE the militiamen of Maroubra Force, fighting hard, were bein g W pushed back along the Kokoda Track towards the crest of the moun- tain range as the difficult days of August advanced, A .I .F. veterans from the Middle East were hurrying to their assistance . Since early in May th e 7th Division had been concentrated in south Queensland. There, their commander, Major-General Allen, had had them at work preparing t o meet possible invasion and training in what were conceived (largely from the lessons of Malaya) to be the elements of the new kind of warfar e in which they expected later to engage . Allen had been driving them hard in rough tropical country near Brisbane. He was an able soldier with wid e infantry experience in two wars : Gallipoli and France in the first ; North Africa, Greece and Syria in the second . In 1939 and 1940 he had raise d and trained the 16th Brigade; when it was put into the field in the Middl e East in 1940 it was the best trained of the 6th Division's formations. Allen was animated at all times by a burning loyalty to his officers and men. Except among the key men there was no knowledge that the 7th Divisio n was setting out for New Guinea when, on 3rd August, the units of the 18th and 21st Brigades were given embarkation orders . They were told— and accepted—that they were going farther north by sea as part of their training. But they moved with remarkable efficiency for, after a difficul t journey by road, the first flights of both brigades had streamlined them - selves into ships which were waiting at Brisbane and were at sea by the early afternoon of the 6th . Later the convoy split and while the ships carry- ing the 2/ 10th Battalion of the 18th Brigade sheered off to Milne Ba y those bearing the 2/ 14th and 2/ 16th Battalions of the 21st Brigade con- tinued northwards to Port Moresby . Brigadier Potts and his brigade major, Challen,' who arrived at Por t Moresby by air on 8th August, had only four clear days in which to prepare for the arrival of their 21st Brigade . And they needed every moment sinc e apparently New Guinea Force had received little warning of the brigade 's coming and had made few preparations to receive it. Potts, who had been warned what his role was to be, had his brigade staged into the Itiki are a when the battalions began to arrive on the 13th . There he was within easy distance of the end of the motor road, just past Ilolo, and th e beginning of the mountain track which led onward and upward to Kokoda . On the 15th his instructions were confirmed and amplified . He was told that an estimated 1,500 Japanese had so far opposed the Australian forces in the Owen Stanleys and that some 3,000 reinforcements had been landed at Gona on the 13th, although what proportion of fighting troop s I Lt-Col H . B . Challen, MBE, VX138. 2/8 Bn ; CO 2/14 Bn 1942-43 ; GSO1 (Liaison) I and II Corps, NGF during 1943-45 . Manufacturer 's agent ; of Melbourne; b . Daylesford, Vic, 26 Nov 1906. 194 WITHDRAWAL TO IORIBAIWA 14-17 Aug was in that total was not known ; that the Japanese obviously intended either to advance on Port Moresby or hold the Kokoda Pass to prevent a n Allied advance on Buna and Gona; that the 39th Battalion and the Papuans had withdrawn to Isurava, and that the 53rd Battalion was then movin g up the track and was due to be concentrated in the Isurava area by th e 20th. He was ordered : "21st Brigade will recapture Kokoda with a vie w to facilitating further operations against Buna and Gona." On his arrival in the forward area he was to assume command of Maroubra Force . By this time (15th August) the brigade was assembled at Itiki, th e 2/27th Battalion having arrived on the 14th . It was only as they settled in their camp area that the men began to form some idea of what lay ahead. Their camp was an open area of ground in which they could sor t themselves out, and ahead of them the mountains rose . They heard some- thing about the fighting ; the reflective purposefulness of men going into battle settled over them. They discussed and experimented with the arrange - ments and composition of the loads which they must carry and from thi s evolved a standard pack . All they could learn of the country and condi- tions before them came from disconnected scraps of information, fro m the study of a single air photograph which had been made available to the brigade, from a track graph which they later proved inaccurate, an d from Major Elliott-Smith who had just come back down the track . On the 16th Lieut-Colonel Key2—quietly confident, an origina l officer of the 2/8th Battalion who had served in Libya, Greece and Crete and had taken command of the 2/ 14th just as the battalion was preparin g to leave the Middle East—got his men moving from Itiki, the first of th e 21st Brigade to start across the Kokoda Track. They numbered 24 officers and 517 men, their carrier platoon and most of the mortar platoon havin g been left behind with the normal "Left out of Battle" component of th e battalion and certain other elements which could not be used in the moun- tains. (Some of these, with portions of similar groups left by the other battalions of the brigade, were formed later into the 21st Brigade Com- posite Company.) They left the motor transport just past Ilolo and set ou t for Uberi. Many of them were carrying loads of up to 70 pounds . This was the easiest part of the track, but the mud dragged at them and thei r heavy burdens pressed them down so that soon they could feel their knee s shaking. The late afternoon, however, found them at Uberi and in high spirits . The next day tried them sorely, as they began to climb the "golden stairs" which had been cut into the long mountainside leading upward s from Uberi. The track rose 1,200 feet in the first three miles, droppe d then some 1,600 feet, rose about 2,000 feet in the last four miles . Of this stretch the 2/14th's historian later wrote : The golden stairs consisted of steps varying from ten to eighteen inches in height . The front edge of the step was a small log held by stakes . Behind the log was a puddle of mud and water . Some of the stakes had worked loose, leaving the log s 2 Lt-Col A . S . Key, VX148. 2/8 Bn and CO 2/14 Bn 1942 . Assistant sales manager; of Armadale , Vic; b. Hawthorn, Vic, 1 Jul 1906. Presumed died in 1943 while prisoner of war . (Australian War Memorial ) (Australian War Memorial ) Near Owers' Corner the road ended and the track across the Owe n Native carriers on the Kokoda Track with a two-man load Stanleys zigzagged in its sharp descent to Uberi . weighing about 70 lbs . (Australian War Memorial ) (Australian War Memorial ) Native carrier line at Eora Creek village . The four natives on th e A 25-pounder of the 14th Field Regiment . The gun was eventuall y right carrying rifles are members of the Royal Papuan Constabulary . hauled into position for firing on the Japanese at loribaiwa . September 1942 . 17-24 Aug EXHAUSTED CLIMBERS 195 slightly tilted. Anyone who stood on one of these skidded and fell with a whac k in the mud, probably banging his head against a tree or being hit on the hea d with his own rifle . Those who had no sticks soon acquired them, not only to preven t falls, but to allow the arms to help the legs, especially with the higher steps . After the first half dozen steps, it became a matter of sheer determination forcing th e body to achieve the impossible . It was probably the weight more than the climb , though the climb would have been enough to tire even a lightly loaded man . The rear companies, where the going is always hardest, took twelve hours to complet e the nine miles.3 Another officer4 of the battalion said: Gradually men dropped out utterly exhausted—just couldn't go on . You'd come to a group of men and say `Come on! We must go on .' But it was physically impossible to move. Many were lying down and had been sick. Many made several trips up the last slope helping others . We began to see some of the tremen- dous efforts the troops were going to make to help the lesser ones in. Found many of the battalion [at loribaiwa] lying exhausted, some ate, others lay and wer e sick, others just lay . Some tried to eat and couldn't . Early next morning the battalion was on the move again, less only one man (an appendicitis case) . Ahead lay the Maguli Range, a climb of two thousand two hundred feet, o f which the track report said, "Impossible for white men carrying loads ; natives may carry up to fifteen pounds ." Loads were hoisted on and the thin line of slowly movin g khaki started up the range. By five o'clock in the afternoon the last man had reached Nauro .
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