What Hath Copenhagen Wrought? A Preliminary Assessment

Robert N. Stavins and Robert C. Stowe iStockPhoto/Michael Utech Through a series of meetings among By early March 2010, there were 14 fter years of prepara- U.S. President Barack Obama, Chi- submissions from industrialized coun- tion, the Fifteenth Con- nese Premier Wen Jiabao, Indian Prime tries (including one from the EU-27), What Hath ference of the Parties Minister Manmohan Singh, Brazilian and 30 submissions from developing A(CoP-15) of the United President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, and countries. An additional 39 countries nations Framework Convention South African President Jacob Zuma, an had formally “associated” themselves Copenhagen on (UnFCCC) agreement emerged that was to become with the Accord or were supportive and commenced on December 7, the Copenhagen Accord, a three-page would presumably submit targets or ac- 2009, in Copenhagen, Den- document with two appendices, each tions when they completed their deci- mark, and adjourned some two consisting of one blank table. Industri- sion-making processes. Thus, a total of 1 Wrought? weeks later on December 19, alized (Annex I) countries that wished 109 parties (including the EU-27 sepa- after a raucous all-night session. to participate were invited to submit rately) had formally expressed support During the last 24 hours of the proposed economy-wide, quantified for the Accord (out of 192 parties to the emissions-reduction targets for inclu- convention). These included the top-12 A Preliminary conference, a small group of sion in the Accord’s Appendix I, and de- emitters, which themselves accounted leading heads of state and gov- veloping (non–Annex I) countries were for more than 70 percent of GHG emis- Assessment ernment negotiated directly, to a invited to submit “nationally appropri- sions in 2005.3 degree unprecedented in recent ate mitigation actions” for inclusion in The original, stated purpose of COP- history. Appendix II.2 15 had been to complete negotiations iStockPhoto/Portraits Unlimited

A powerplant in Iceland. The accord states that “deep cuts in global emissions are required” to stabilize concentrations such that global average temperature increases by less than 2°C.

maY/JUnE 2010 www.EnvironmEntmagazinE.org EnvironmEnt 9 on a new international agreement on The original, stated purpose not for the spirited—and as suggested climate change to come into force when of COP-15 had been to above, quite unprecedented—direct the ’s first commitment complete negotiations on a intervention by key national leaders, period ends in 2012. Clearly the Copen- there would have been no significant hagen Accord is neither sufficiently de- new international agreement outcome from the Copenhagen negotia- tailed nor is its legal status sufficiently on climate change ... tions. That said, it is important to take a resolved to fill such a role. Nevertheless, critical look at the Accord, item by item. it is at least conceivable that the Accord (The numbering below is our own, not will evolve into a subsequent agreement that of the Accord itself.) or arrangement that is sufficiently ro- sions, with no preordained global cap, many or most UNFCCC member states bust to motivate meaningful action on Temperature Target and can be expected to submit what they be- climate change. While the Accord is a Emissions Reductions nonbinding, political agreement, much lieve they can actually attain. of the world apparently considers it suf- The Copenhagen Accord establishes The Accord states that, to achieve the ficiently important to merit participa- a framework for addressing two impor- convention’s goal of preventing “dan- tion in one way or another. We describe tant deficiencies in the Kyoto Protocol: gerous anthropogenic interference with the Accord’s architecture below, as well expanding the coalition of the willing the climate system,” “deep cuts in glo- as issues that remain to be addressed. and extending the timeframe of action. bal emissions are required” to stabi- First, the Accord takes an initial step lize greenhouse-gas concentrations such toward dissolving the inflexible and that the global average temperature in- highly counterproductive dichotomy creases by less than 2˚C. The Architecture of the between industrialized and developing Assessment: This temperature target Copenhagen Accord countries that arises from the Kyoto is consistent with recent recommenda- interpretation of the UNFCCC principle tions from the natural-science commu- The fundamental architecture of the of “common but differentiated respon- nity. Both the temperature target and Copenhagen Accord is one that had sibilities.” Annex I parties have bind- deep cuts in global emissions are aspi- been proposed and described prior to ing, economy-wide, emissions-reduc- rational goals, however. What the Ac- COP-15 as “A Portfolio of Domestic tion targets, and the large emerging cord or its successor agreement(s) will Commitments.”4 Under such an ap- economies (like all developing, non– actually measure are the targets and ac- proach, each nation commits and reg- Annex I countries) have no obligations tions submitted by individual nations. isters to abide by its domestic climate whatsoever. The Accord blurs this dis- An important question is whether the commitments, whether those are in the tinction by requiring commitments of submissions in aggregate will result in form of laws, regulations, or multiyear developing countries; it does not elimi- adequate emissions reductions to keep development plans. This is similar to nate the distinction because these obli- global average temperature increases the “schedule approach” proposed by gations are of a different type. within the specified bound. The answer the Australian government in spring Second, the Accord covers a longer is that the accumulated submissions of 2009 and implicitly draws upon propos- time period than the Kyoto Protocol: targets and actions will not—on their als by the Republic of Korea and oth- Any commitments would be through own—be sufficient to meet the goal.6 ers for a registry of national actions to 2020, and the Accord refers to 2050 mitigate emissions of greenhouse gases targets. This is significant because the Adaptation (GHGs).5 stock of greenhouse gases in the atmos- The portfolio-of-domestic-commit- phere builds up over a long period of Action and cooperation is required, ments approach has the virtue of relying time, and long-term planning for invest- particularly in the “least developed on domestic enforcement mechanisms, ment in capital stock is essential for im- countries, small island developing which, unlike their international coun- plementing any policy to reduce emis- States and Africa.” Developed countries terparts, actually exist. It is nearly im- sions significantly. commit to provide “predictable and sus- possible in a world of sovereign states tainable financial resources, technology to enforce an international agreement, and capacity-building to support the im- even one that is “legally binding” among The Copenhagen Accord: plementation of adaptation action…” countries that have ratified it. The sub- Assessment of Key Provisions Assessment: The added attention to missions to the Copenhagen Accord are adaptation is a significant and valuable not all currently embodied in national Almost by definition, the Accord departure from the Kyoto Protocol. Tar- law. However, given the fundamental represents the best agreement that could geting adaptation funds to the least de- design element of a completely bottom- be achieved in Copenhagen, given the veloped countries, whose contributions up set of individual country submis- political forces at play. Indeed, were it to emissions are negligible, is sensible.

10 Environment www.environmentmagazine.org VOLUME 52 NUMBER 3 “Graduation”

The Accord importantly provides specific opportunities for commitments by both Annex I and non–Annex I coun- tries, in terms of quantitative emission targets and specified actions, respec- tively. But the Accord makes no provi- sions for countries to move from non– Annex I to Annex I (actions-to-targets) status. Assessment: Ideally, a new climate regime would provide for a continuous spectrum of national circumstances and

obligations listed in the same appen- iStockPhoto/Brasil2 dix table, or for a formula that would generate differentiated national targets Logging in Amazon Rainforest. depending on the respective countries’ economic circumstances.7 If such a con- tinuous spectrum of commitments or ing actions with external financing “will estation and ” and formulaic approaches is not politically be recorded in a registry along with rel- mandates the establishment of a finan- feasible, then an explicit mechanism is evant technology, finance and capacity cial mechanism for developed-country needed for countries to transition from building support” and “will be subject funds for this purpose. one appendix to the other. Korea and to international [MRV*] in accordance Assessment: The lack of meaning- Mexico—both of which, to their credit, with guidelines adopted by the Confer- ful attention to slowing have participated creatively in the Co- ence of the Parties.” was a very significant deficiency of penhagen process—joined the OECD Assessment: This was an excep- the Kyoto Protocol and its Clean De- six months after Kyoto, but they remain tionally contentious issue in the Co- velopment Mechanism (CDM), which non–Annex I countries. Indeed, 50 non– penhagen negotiations, with the U.S. provides project-based opportunities Annex I countries now have greater in- delegation demanding “transparency” for emissions reduction in develop- come per capita than the poorest of the and strenuously resisting in or- ing countries.8 Because the least costly Annex I countries. der to protect its national sovereignty. way of sequestering carbon from the The compromise language for non–An- atmosphere is to slow the rate of or Measurement, Reporting, and nex I countries with no external financ- prevent deforestation, the omission of Verification ing was worked out in the last hours of this option from Kyoto and the CDM COP-15 and appears reasonable on its was a problem very much in need of There are three relevant regimes in face. However, if COP-15 is any guide, correction. the Accord. First, emissions reductions it will be difficult to define “guidelines” It is reasonable to anticipate that a (and financing to developing countries) for “international consultation” that are subsequent, more detailed version of the by Annex I countries will be subject to acceptable to all parties—and their do- Accord will contain strong forestry and international guidelines, which “will mestic constituencies. It is simply too land-use-change components because a ensure that accounting of such targets soon to say whether the compromises separate set of ongoing UNFCCC for- and finance is rigorous, robust and achieved in Copenhagen on the subject estry negotiations progressed quite far transparent.” Second, non–Annex I of measurement, reporting, and verifi- in this regard (prior to and during COP- countries undertaking actions with no cation will lead to a set of credible com- 15).9 In fact, if the Conference had not external financing “will be subject to mitments and subsequent actions by the been so occupied with the Accord in its their domestic measurement, reporting key nations of the world. final days, it is possible that a separate and verification, the results of which formal agreement on forestry and land- will be reported through their [N]ational use change might have been reached. [C]ommunications every two years… Forestry with provisions for international con- The Accord recognizes “the crucial Finance sultations and analysis under clearly role of reducing emission from defor- defined guidelines that will ensure The Accord quantifies targets for that national sovereignty is respected.” both near-term and longer-term “scaled Third, non–Annex I countries undertak- *measureable, reportable, and verifiable up, new and additional, predictable

MAY/JUNE 2010 www.environmentmagazine.org environment 11 and adequate funding” flows from de- Accord. However, a great deal of nego- jective, it is important that the Accord veloped to developing countries. This tiation—and careful policy implemen- or its successor facilitate or at least not funding would “enable and support en- tation—will be required to develop and discourage voluntary linkage of na- hanced action on mitigation, including manage the institutions that administer tional and multinational cap-and-trade substantial finance to reduce emissions the two funds. Success cannot, as of yet, systems that are emerging throughout from deforestation and forest degrada- be predicted. the industrialized world as the favored

tion … adaptation, technology develop- The Accord notes that markets (pri- domestic approach to reducing CO2 and ment and transfer and capacity-build- vate-sector financing) will be targeted other greenhouse-gas emissions.10 Link- ing.…” The Accord specifies $30 bil- to mitigation and implies that adapta- age can increase liquidity and enhance lion for the three-year period 2010–12, tion funding will be primarily govern- cost-effectiveness. to be divided equally between adapta- ment-to-government. This makes sense: Cap-and-trade systems with other- tion and mitigation. It then identifies a There is little incentive for the private wise incongruent design elements can “goal” of $100 billion per year starting sector to finance adaptation, and the be linked through a common emission- in 2020. private sector will be absolutely nec- reduction-credit system; the CDM is by Assessment: Identifying an accept- essary for mitigation financing. It is far the most important existing system. able approach to financial burden shar- inconceivable that the governments of The CDM, as currently constituted, can- ing has been and continues to be a major the industrialized world would come not live up to this promise, but with ap- challenge. Two features of global cli- up with sufficient foreign aid to satisfy propriate reforms, there is significant mate change make the burden-sharing these demands for financial transfers, potential.11 dialogue particularly contentious. First, but governments can—through the Although both governments and climate change is a global commons right domestic and international policy businesses in all jurisdictions where problem, and all major emitters must arrangements—provide key incentives cap-and-trade systems have been dis- participate in an emissions-reduction for the private sector to provide the cussed, planned, or implemented have regime for it to be truly effective. Sec- needed finance through foreign direct recognized the importance of system ond, the largest emitters of the past— investments. linkage, it will be up to international the industrialized nations—are not the Furthermore, such private finance negotiators to make sure future climate largest emitters of the future; the large stands a much greater chance than regimes facilitate, not reduce, progress. emerging economies of the developing government aid of being efficiently world most likely are. employed, that is, targeted to reducing Evaluation The U.S. Government, represented emissions, rather than spent by poor by Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, nations on other (possibly meritorious) Evaluation of the Accord’s imple- broke the financing logjam on Decem- purposes. mentation is to be completed by 2015, ber 17, when she announced at COP-15 The Accord states that markets including consideration of strengthen- that the would participate should be used to achieve cost-effective ing the long-term goal as the science in the approach later specified in the mitigation actions. To advance this ob- indicates. Assessment: Depending upon when the Accord is implemented, complet- ing an assessment by 2015 might or might not be reasonable. An option to strengthen the long-term goals of the Accord might be sensible, but this op- tion should note more generally that the long-term goal should be “adjusted as the science indicates,” so as not to prejudge what future scientific research may reveal.

Institutional Venue and the Path Forward

The Copenhagen Accord was the most visible outcome of COP-15, but in the long term, it is quite possible iStockPhoto/T.MC. that another outcome will prove to be

12 Environment www.environmentmagazine.org VOLUME 52 NUMBER 3 White House official photograph White During the last 24 hours of the conference, a small group of leading heads of state and government negotiated directly, to a degree unprecedented in recent history. equally or more consequential: The de- a dichotomous distinction would sug- formal agreements. It is unlikely that the creased credibility of the UNFCCC as gest. Clearly, emerging economies such developing-country members would do the central institutional venue for inter- as China, , , Korea, Mexico, so, and thus exacerbate tensions within national climate policy negotiation and and have more in com- the G-77—which they have an interest implementation. mon—along some key economic di- in maintaining intact. The UNFCCC requires consensus mensions—with some countries in the There are other multilateral nego- (adoption by virtue of no objection) or so-called developed world than they do tiations that could be convened, as unanimity (all 192 members voting in with the poorest developing countries, well as bilateral approaches, includ- favor). Consensus failed to be achieved such as those of sub-Saharan Africa. ing, of course, ongoing talks between at COP-15. Six countries—none of The Major Economies Forum on China and the United States. In the end, them major emitters—objected to the Energy and Climate, and the G-20, can though, it is likely that formal discus- Accord,12 and thus it was “noted” by be effective venues for discussion and sions on a new climate agreement— the conference, and not “adopted.” It is perhaps could be effective venues for or set of agreements—will continue extremely difficult to obtain consensus building concurrence on the outlines of within the UNFCCC. Why? First, the among this hugely disparate group of a new climate regime that might be ex- UNFCCC has a very large constituency nations except on trivial matters. tended to the UNFCCC. Their members of support, including at a minimum The UNFCCC—and the United Na- represent 75–80 percent of the world’s most, if not all, of the G-77 (which ac- tions culture more generally—tend to emissions and hail from both the devel- tually numbers 130 countries). Thus, polarize many discussions into the de- oping and developed worlds, and thus the UNFCCC has significant interna- veloped world versus the developing their views carry some legitimacy.13 The tional legitimacy and is potentially key world. This is troubling, because the members of neither group, however, for implementation, no matter what the world is much more diverse than such construe their mission as negotiating venue may be for negotiation. Second,

MAY/JUNE 2010 www.environmentmagazine.org environment 13 the Kyoto Protocol remains in effect Clearly, emerging economies foundation was laid for a broad-based through the end of 2012, and the CDM such as China, India, coalition of the willing to effectively is unlikely to be replaced whole-cloth. address the threat of global climate Biennial climate-reporting mechanisms Brazil, Korea, Mexico, and change. Only time will tell. established in the convention (to which, South Africa have more in unlike Kyoto, the United States is a common—along some key Robert N. Stavins is the Albert Pratt Professor of Busi- party) are incorporated into the Copen- ness and Government at the Harvard Kennedy School, a Research Associate of the National Bureau of Eco- hagen Accord. economic dimensions—with nomic Research, a University Fellow of Resources for Assuming that the UNFCCC re- the Future, and the Director of the Harvard Project on some countries in the so- International Climate Agreements. Robert C. Stowe is mains the primary venue for expanding called developed world than Executive Director of the Harvard Environmental Eco- the outline of the deal developed in the nomics Program and Manager of the Harvard Project on International Climate Agreements. Copenhagen Accord, the essential chal- they do with the poorest lenge confronting negotiators over the developing countries, such as next year will be to integrate or harmo- those of sub-Saharan Africa. Notes nize the Accord with the ongoing sub- stantive discussions in the two “Ad-hoc 1. The 1997 Kyoto Protocol list of the industrialized countries and the emerging market economies of Central Working Groups” (AWGs) set up at and Eastern Europe. The precise reference should be to COP-13 in Bali, Indonesia: One on the out—could turn out to be a sound foun- “Annex B” of the Kyoto Protocol; “Annex I” refers to the UNFCCC document of 1992. But the two lists overlap future of the Kyoto Protocol (KP), the dation for a portfolio of domestic com- almost completely, and “Annex I” is universally used to other on “Long-Term Cooperative Ac- mitments, which could in turn be an ef- refer to both. tion” (LCA). Complex interests and re- fective bridge to a longer-term arrange- 2. For the text of the Accord, see: http://unfccc.int/ resource/docs/2009/cop15/eng/l07.pdf. lationships have essentially deadlocked ment among the countries of the world. 3. Copenhagen Accord submissions data from these two forums. If this happens, we may look back upon the UNFCCC and the U.S. Climate Action Network. The climate change policy pro- Copenhagen as an important moment— Emissions data from the World Resources Institute Climate Analysis Indicators Tool; includes land- cess is best viewed as a marathon, not both because global leaders took the use changes. These top 12 include the EU-27 but no a sprint. The Copenhagen Accord—de- reins and brought the negotiations to member states separately. The 17 members of the Major Economies Forum on Energy and Climate (MEF) include pending upon details yet to be worked a fruitful conclusion, and because the these 12, plus South Africa. France, Germany, Italy, and the United Kingdom are MEF members, separately from the EU. 4. http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/publication/19637. 5. For a presentation of a comprehensive and potentially effective architecture for global climate policy, see the Harvard Project’s Discussion Paper by Olmstead and Stavins: http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard. edu/publication/19553. 6. For example, the World Resources Institute (WRI). See: http://www.wri.org/stories/2010/02/adding- countries-emission-reduction-targets. 7. For an important realization of such an ideal, see Bosetti and Frankel’s Harvard Project Discussion Paper: http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/publication/19568. 8. The CDM has approved a small number of projects involving afforestation or , as contrasted with avoided deforestation, which is more difficult to implement on a project basis. The Harvard Project has addressed these and related issues in its research: http:// belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/publication/18634. 9. See UNFCCC reports on COP-15: http://unfccc. int/resource/docs/2009/awg10/eng/17.pdf, pp. 18-32 (AWG-KP report on COP-15, Jan. 28, 2010; pp. 34-37 and elsewhere (AWG-LCA report on COP-15, Feb. 5, 2010). 10. See Harvard Project Discussion Paper: http:// belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/publication/18580. 11. See the Harvard Project’s Issue Brief on CDM reform: http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/ publication/19523. 12. Bolivia, Cuba, Nicaragua, Sudan, Tuvalu, and iStockPhoto/Alex Nikada iStockPhoto/Alex Venezuela. 13. The G-20 turned its attention to climate change China, one of the biggest emitters of GHGs, was constrained in its position at Copenhagen policy, from a nearly exclusive focus on finance, in its by domestic pressures surrounding economic growth. Pittsburgh meeting in September 2009.

14 Environment www.environmentmagazine.org VOLUME 52 NUMBER 3