The 2001 general election marked the beginning of a deep transfor- mation of Bulgaria’s new party system, which was set up after the onset of the country’s transition back in 1989. From a party system of a country in transition it came to grow into a party system of consolidating democ- racy. The second post-communist party system, which began to emerge after 2001, acquired the contours of a multi-party system, but at the same time it was subject to dynamic changes, which became more apparent after the 2005 and 2009 general elections in the country.

Following the failure of the liberal center, the party system once again provided room for the “in-building” or imposition of a new two-block party system, established under novel conditions now, between a left- centrist block of parties and a right-centrist block of parties, respectively. After the 2009 general election, the left-centrist block consists of the MRF and the BSP, both of which continue their joint actions in the capacity of parliamentary opposition, despite the difficulties they are experiencing, whereas the right-centrist block is made up by GERB, DSB, and the UDF, all of which are member parties of the European People’s Party. The na- tionalist right wing party Ataka is also supporting the government.

At the same time, a process of ongoing transformation of the par- ty system well into the future cannot be ruled out because of multiple unknown factors concerning the results of the performance of a young party such as GERB because it only has minimal experience in the institu- tions of central governance and its elite in the executive and legislative branches of power is both unfamiliar and unpredictable. In other words, the new two-block party configuration is in a temporary state for the time being, waiting for yet another transition towards a greater stability of the party system to take place in the foreseeable future.

April 2010 The Party System in Bulgaria 2001 – 2009 1

Contents

1. Attempts at consolidating the centrist-liberal spectrum of parties in the aftermath of the 2001 general election...... 2 2. Fragmentation and restructuring of the right-wing political space...... 9 3. The consolidation of the BSP in the left-wing political space and its participation in the government of the country...... 14 4. The 2005 general election and the establishment of the tri-partite governing coalition...... 17 5. A new transformation of the party system following the July 2009 general election in Bulgaria...... 24 2 The Party System in Bulgaria 2001 – 2009

1. Attempts at consolidating the jor political parties, making up the back- centrist-liberal spectrum of parties bone of the new post-communist party in the aftermath of the 2001 system, namely the BSP, the UDF, and the general election Movement for Rights and Freedoms (MRF), NMSII was set up in quite a speedy fash- The 2001 general election marked the ion and started its public “life” directly as beginning of a profound transformation a parliamentary formation made up of 120 in the new Bulgarian party system, estab- Members of Parliament. In other words, its lished in the aftermath of the 1989 chang- emergence resembles the establishment es, which spurred the democratic reforms of the first classical party formations in the in the country. From a party system of the United Kingdom, the USA, and other dem- post-communist transition, now it gradu- ocratic countries, which at that time were ally came to grow into a party system of a embarking on the road of their develop- consolidating democracy. ment from the institutions of representa- The first post-communist party sys- tive democracy. Only later did they grow tem, which was functioning throughout from “parliamentary represented parties” the 1989 – 2001 period of time, was into “parties of the civil society”. characterized mainly by the imposition At the same time, being returned to of the strongly polarized model of a bi- Parliament in the capacity of the largest polar party system, dominated by the parliamentary faction, NMSII penetrated Bulgarian Socialist Party (BSP) on the into the structures of the executive pow- one hand, and the Union of Democratic er as a major governing party, which – Forces (UDF) on the other. since the very beginning of its existence The second post-communist party sys- – turned it into a “party of state gover- tem, which emerged after 2001, acquired nance”, exerting strong impact on the the contours of a multi-party system, but public administration, where its principal in its turn it was also subject to dynamic human resource reserves were starting to changes, the manifestations of which be- take shape. In other words, NMSII was came markedly apparent after the two formed entirely “from the top down” at successive general elections held in 2005 the sole discretion of its leader, Simeon and 2009 respectively. Saxe-Coburg-Gotha, and completely The establishment of National Move- outside civil society, if we disregard the ment Simeon II (NMSII) as an electoral for- brief 2001 general election campaign of mation, which identified itself solely with the new formation, which was made up the personality of the former Bulgarian almost exclusively of people who were King Simeon II, raised a number of ques- newcomers to politics. tions concerning its evolution and fate as a The way in which NMSII emerged party formation. Unlike the rest of the ma- raised numerous doubts as to its capacity The Party System in Bulgaria 2001 – 2009 3 to consolidate itself as a viable party for- activists from its ranks agreed to shoulder mation. Besides, NMSII proclaimed itself to the responsibilities of their respective min- be a movement and its rhetoric sounded isterial posts.1 In this way, the government with a certain anti-party overtone, which of Simeon Saxe-Coburg-Gotha secured corresponded to the initial understanding the tacit support of the parliamentary fac- and outlook of its founder and leader – tion dominated by the BSP, apart from the Simeon Saxe-Coburg-Gotha. open parliamentary support of its coalition Given this situation, the major factors partner – the MRF. which played the role of a tool legitimiz- The government was also “favored” ing NMSII were first and foremost the per- by the fact that the MRF and its leader, formance capacities of the government, Ahmed Dogan, had accumulated signifi- also coupled with the ability to preserve cant experience in the political events tak- its entirety, internal stability, and proper ing place in the country in the wake of the interaction with its junior coalition partner 1989 changes and were thus able to com- – the Movement for Rights and Freedoms pensate to a certain extent for the fact that (MRF). Indeed, it was actually the relation- Simeon Saxe-Coburg-Gotha and some of ship with the MRF that the parliamentary his ministers had been isolated from Bul- majority depended on. garian politics for quite some time. The managerial capacity of NMSII in Another positive point for the govern- the government of the country gave rise ment was the fact that it started function- to reasonable question marks because of ing in conditions of a relative economic sta- the totally unfamiliar team which came to bilization of the country at the end of 2001 top the new government. All of them were and in a favorable international environ- people lacking experience in public admin- ment, connected with Bulgaria’s prospects istration at the level they were summoned to move forward on the road of its acces- to work. Simeon Saxe-Coburg-Gotha him- sion to NATO and the European Union. self was reluctant to take on his responsibil- The excessive expectations, which ities as Prime Minister of the country, as he the majority of Bulgarian citizens en- also lacked any relevant experience for this tertained at that time, however, were post. This is the reason why his initial inten- an adverse point for the government. tion in fact was to set up a coalition gov- These expectations had been prompted ernment with active and experienced UDF by the election campaign promises for and BSP cadres, thus securing the continu- significant changes in the living stan- ity in the country’s governance, on the one hand, and sharing the ensuing responsibili- 1 they were: Kostadin Paskalev, who was appointed Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Regional Development and Pub- ties with them, on the other. Only the BSP, lic Works, and Dimitar Kalchev, who was appointed Minister of State Administration. The former resigned from his post in 2003 however, responded positively to Simeon because of his disagreement with the policy pursued by the gov- Saxe-Coburg-Gotha’s endeavors and two ernment, while the latter held his ministerial post till the end of the government’s term of office. 4 The Party System in Bulgaria 2001 – 2009

dard and life of Bulgarians, the major- relative increase of incomes, mainly the ity of whom had come to rank among incomes of civil servants in the state ad- the “losers” from the country’s transi- ministration. The amount of foreign in- tion to a market economy, due to the vestments also marked a rise.3 grave economic shocks and meltdown The principal achievements of Simeon during the 1990s. From the very first Saxe-Coburg-Gotha’s government, how- months of the NMSII government, ever, were made on the international po- people came to realize how unrealistic litical arena, and were mainly manifested some of the populist promises made by by the fact of the successful completion of NMSII and personally by the new Prime the country’s negotiations for accession to Minister, Simeon Saxe-Coburg-Gotha, the NATO block and the European Union. were Although the NMSII government Bulgaria became a full-fledged NATO continued to pursue the line of macro- member country in April 2004, and the economic and financial stabilization, it negotiations with the EU were completed failed to deliver its exaggerated election on April 25th 2005, when the country of- promises for a significant improvement ficially signed theE U Accession Treaty and of the living standard of the Bulgarian the date of January 1st 2007 was sched- population. It was this failure namely uled as the date of its actual accession. that brought about the drop of popu- These facts served as a guarantee larity and the loss of public confidence for the government’s relative stability, in the NMSII Cabinet as early as the first despite the declining confidence rating few months of its actual governance.2 over the first years of its functioning. At the same time, however, the di- This electoral confidence was partially re- minishing confidence was not accompa- stored with the approaching end of the nied by serious economic disturbances government’s term of office.4 This fac- and crises. Moreover, during the last tor, alongside several other, such as the two years of the NMSII government’s preserved parliamentary majority and the term of office, the country saw a defi- lack of sufficient popularity by any of the nite improvement in the living standard alternative opposition parties, played the of certain strata of the population, which role of a guarantee ensuring the comple- manifested itself in the growing num- tion of the government’s full four-year ber of people belonging to the so-called term of office as provided by the coun- “middle class”. The unemployment rate try’s Constitution. This circumstance was declined and this was coupled with a extremely important for NMSII as it pro- vided the party’s legitimacy as a political

2 A year after the new government had come to office, the electoral impact of NMSII had dropped to 13 percent of the 3 See the data in the 2004 Yearbook of the National Statistical entire Bulgarian electorate. See: Barometer, The Political Parties Institute. in Bulgaria, July-September, 2002, FES and Institute for Political 4 See Barometer, The Political Parties in Bulgaria, January- and Legal Studies. March, 2005, FES and Institute for Political and Legal Studies. The Party System in Bulgaria 2001 – 2009 5 formation capable of offering its own al- emerged as a political formation “inside ternative in the capacity of a liberal party, Parliament” and without any support and different from the alternatives suggested social roots in civil society whatsoever, it by its major rivals from the left-wing and retained its wholeness mainly because of right-wing political environment respec- its loyalty to and identification with the tively. It is this circumstance that made personality of the leader Simeon Saxe-Co- it possible for NMSII to shape up its own burg-Gotha. In terms of its construction, specific profile of a centrist party, claim- the party was a combination of several ing to take its rightful place in the second friendly circles (representatives of the le- Bulgarian post-1989 party system. gal profession, technocrats, yuppies from Besides, the four-year term of office London and other western cities, the Ko- made it possible for NMSII to “nurture” shlukov – Sevlievsky circle, and some oth- human resources of its own both in the ers), connected with extra-parliamentary central administration and local gov- and other economic circles, which actu- ernment. In this way the party also ex- ally makes it possible to define NMSII as panded its societal base, mainly among a “clan” party. Some of the NMSII MPs the class of civil servants, many of whom were typical “political hitch-hikers”, who got their assignments precisely owing to had already changed one or more parties the governing party. This period, as well, (the UDF and the BSP included) and now was conducive for NMSII to consolidate availed of the opportunity to land into the its own party elite, which grew around band-wagon of a new one. Their pres- the figure ofS imeon Saxe-Coburg-Gotha ence in NMSII was prompted much more himself. But now the party enjoyed legiti- by personal and career-oriented interests macy not only because of its leader, but and very little (if at all) by any ideological through a number of its ministers who and/or value-oriented considerations. had managed to gain a respectably high Therefore, NMSII was a typical clien- level of public support in the meantime.5 tele organization, serving the interests With time, these NMSII functionaries of various economic lobbies and the per- came to occupy leading positions both in sonal ambitions and needs of a sizeable the newly established NMSII party and in part of its Members of Parliament. This its parliamentary faction. background and actual situation of NM- The process concerning the inter- SII predetermined the series of conflicts nal party stability and the homogeneity and repeated succession of splits within of the NMSII Party, however, turned out its parliamentary faction. They were in- to be much more complicated. Having stigated by the contradictions among the main “friendly” circles and the domi- 5 Among them were the Minister of Finance, Milen Velchev, the Minister of Economy, Lidya Shuleva, the Minister of Foreign nation of two of them – those of the Affairs, Solomon Passi, the Minister of European Integration, Meglena Kuneva, etc. lawyers and the technocrats, who were 6 The Party System in Bulgaria 2001 – 2009

highly favored by Simeon Saxe-Coburg- the 2005 general election. Each of the Gotha and had taken prominent posi- constituent parties ran the general elec- tions in the government and the NMSII tion independently, and eventually the parliamentary faction. New Time did not make it to the new It is these two principal groups that Parliament, remaining outside with un- obtained the major power resources in clear prospects as to the possibility to the institutions of state and it is this fact remain a viable part in the right-centrist that provoked the dissatisfaction of the political space. other internal party groups and individ- An important step in the transition of ual MPs. The onset of the series of con- NMSII from a non-homogenous move- flicts and the subsequent outflow from ment to a political party was its registra- the NMSII parliamentary faction began tion as a political party in June 2002. In as early as the first few months of the the declaration on the major values that government’s term of office and contin- NMSII upholds, it proclaimed to be a liber- ued right to its end, when only 97 MPs al formation, which aspires to situate itself had remained in the NMSII parliamentary in the right-centrist political environment. faction out of the 120 MPs who initially In terms of its organizational essence, made it up. The most significant conflict NMSII qualified itself as an electoral party, occurred in 2004, when 11 NMSII MPs lacking the organizational structure typi- left the parliamentary faction and set cal of the other Bulgarian parties with up a parliamentary faction of their own central, regional, and local bodies. The – the so-called New Time, headed by primary function of NMSII in this sense Miroslav Sevlievsky and Emil Koshlukov. was to organize the election process Subsequently, on the 10th of June 2004, of the party at the time of the various these MPs established a political party of elections. Initially NMSII made the deci- their own, which was of a pronounced sion to join the European People’s Party, right-centrist orientation. where the member parties are mainly of Following the 2005 parliamentary a conservative and Christian-democratic crisis, the New Time “traded” its refusal orientation, but its EPP membership was to lend support to the non-confidence hampered by the opposition of the UDF, vote tabled against the government and which is an older member party of this demanded that their party be included European supranational party. Subse- in the government and be given a min- quently, NMSII re-oriented itself to the isterial post. It is thus that the New Time Liberal International and the Liberal Eu- got included in the so-called Liberal Alli- ropean Formation (European Liberal and ance together with NMSII and the MRF, Reformist Party) and became its regular which existed only for a brief period of member party in 2003. The MRF had al- time and disintegrated shortly before ready acceded to this trans-national party The Party System in Bulgaria 2001 – 2009 7 in the capacity of a regular member and cific historical point in time, the meaning thus was able to give its valid support to of this step had first and foremost a prag- the membership of NMSII. matic and foreign political aspect, as the In other words, it was mainly due to for- liberal tradition in Bulgaria was discontin- eign political considerations and external ued after 1947, and after the post-1989 influence that NMSII accepted liberalism changes was represented only for a brief as its ideological orientation and together period of time by insignificant formations with the MRF acceded to the liberal party within the UDF. formations. Because historically the liberal In other words, the liberal political val- parties in Europe are rather non-homog- ues were yet to acquire their specific Bul- enous, having right-wing, left-wing, and garian coloring in order for them to be- centrist factions of their own, some of come a conscious orientation of the NM- which even exist as independent parties, SII elite and its entire membership. NMSII found it easy to adapt successfully After the 2001 general election, the to this model. On the one hand, it corre- first test indicative of the NMSII social sponded to the internal lack of homoge- roots and its connections with civil so- neity within NMSII itself, where different ciety were the local elections in Octo- factions of more left-wing or right-wing ber 2003. Despite the specificity of this orientation also revealed their viability. vote – a majority vote system for mayors On the other hand, it corresponded to and proportional vote system for munici- the fact that the centrist space within the pal councilors – NMSII only managed to Bulgarian party system was relatively very score some humble results, which, how- sparsely “inhabited“ and this made it pos- ever, testified to the fact that in its ca- sible for NMSII to perform a balancing act pacity of the youngest Bulgarian party it between the right-wing and the left-wing still availed of a certain circle of support- parties and find coalition partners, if need ive voters of its own. NMSII won six of be, in the two directions in compliance the mayors’ seats, of which two were in with its specific interests. larger towns, and a total of 344 munici- NMSII identified the MRF as its major pal councilors, with the support of 6.51 partner, as the latter had also self-deter- percent of the total number of voters.6 mined itself as a liberal formation and had This percentage reflected both the NM- acquired the status of an integral part of SII rating at that time, which ranged be- the governing coalition. It is in this way – tween eight and ten percent, thus mark- typical of the Bulgarian political process – ing a substantial decline in comparison that NMSII self-determined its ideological with the 2001 general election outcome. image and thus made an important step At the same time, however, this result towards its party identification from a populist to liberal formation. At that spe- 6 See the issue of the “Sega” daily from Nov. 4th 2003, p. 3. 8 The Party System in Bulgaria 2001 – 2009

showed that NMSII had begun to con- This new form of coalition cooperation solidate itself as a political formation on also created prerequisites for the emer- the local level and had partially started to gence of a new alternative for the gov- emerge in the open, outside the shadow ernance of the country around the two of its leader, Simeon Saxe-Coburg-Gotha. liberal-centrist parties. This was a novel It is at these local elections that NMSII re- factor, which at the level of governance ceived its first legitimacy in the capacity helped to break up the bipolar party sys- of a party formation. It is these 2003 local tem. This helped to make the two parties elections precisely that opened vistas for legitimate in the capacity of actual and the parliamentary representation of NM- potential participants in the country’s gov- SII at the next general election, despite ernance in the future as well, well beyond the lingering question marks concerning the 2005 general election. the issue of its further political fate. Although the MRF had been a fac- Another factor which put to the tor in the Bulgarian political process ever test the capacity of NMSII to govern since the changes in 1989, this direct the country was the interaction of the involvement in the executive branch of young party with its coalition partner – power in the capacity of an active partici- the MRF. It was the MRF that was the pant completed the process of its inte- major factor guaranteeing the reliable gration within the political system of the parliamentary majority. It was the MRF country. The MRF obtained new oppor- that was the supporting pillar of the tunities for expanding its presence in the new government and was at the same administrative apparatus on the central time an active participant in the ex- level alongside the possibility to avail of ecutive branch of power. This coalition new resources of power in order to ma- formula for governing the country was terialize the interests of its political elite tested for the first time ever in Bulgar- and its electoral base. The MRF also used ia after the 1989 democratic changes. its participation in the executive power The two constituent parties of the new to expand its impact within the struc- coalition formula made the respective tures of the local authorities after the efforts to ensure their durable interac- 2003 local elections, where it marked an tion. In this way they proved that a new impressive result, capturing 13.6 percent center of power was now established – of all ballots cast. The MRF electoral out- outside the BSP and the UDF, which thus come at these local elections can be illus- far had dominated the party system in trated with the 695 municipal councilors the country, and NMSII and the MRF returned to the municipal authorities and preserved their coalition formula intact, the numerous mayor seats in the ethni- despite the recurring internal coalition cally mixed regions of the country, the disagreements and conflicts. town of Kurdjali included. The Party System in Bulgaria 2001 – 2009 9

Throughout this entire period of time, ond post-communist party system, de- the MRF was making efforts to expand spite the deteriorating relationships be- its electoral impact outside the ethnic tween the MRF and NMSII. Turkish population and to attract to its ranks more Bulgarians both in the party 2. Fragmentation and restructuring leadership and in the structures of the of the right-wing political space country’s governance by employing the levers of its presence in the Cabinet. The Right after the 2001 general election, the MRF also made significant endeavors to UDF – claiming to encompass the entire consolidate the liberal-centrist bloc as a right-wing political spectrum and thus far major factor in the new party system. It being the major opponent of the BSP – fell was on the initiative of the MRF that a into the grips of a prolonged internal party Liberal Alliance was set up by NMSII, the crisis. It was provoked by a series of dif- MRF and the New Time. The MRF leader, ferent factors, among which the following however, failed to convince the NMSII seem to stand apart most conspicuously: leadership that the governing coalition Firstly, while the UDF was still in power formed by the three parties should grow before the 2001 general election, it grad- into a pre-election coalition to the pur- ually started severing its connections both pose of running the 2005 general elec- with its societal base and civil society alto- tion. This failure, however, brought to gether, as a consequence of the deepen- the fore both certain tensions and sub- ing adverse trends of the party’s isolation stantial differences concerning the tactic within the limits of the elite at its top. Thus that was yet to be employed by the three it was increasingly “closing” itself within formations for the purposes of their elec- the “friendly circle” of its leader and then tion campaigns. Prime Minister, Ivan Kostov. He manifest- The efforts of the New Time to form ed himself as an authoritarian leader and a coalition on its own with the MRF for it was not by chance that his comrades the 2005 general election also proved from his own party came to dub him in- unsuccessful. Thus, the three liberal- creasingly more often “the Commander”. centrist parties ran the 2005 election on After 2001 Kostov began to eliminate his their own with the prospects for continu- major opponents within the UDF, concen- ing their cooperation in the post-election trated substantial power resources within situation, should the possibility for such his own personality and hands, and iso- cooperation actually arise. The outcome lated the party leadership from the rank- from the general election did confirm and-file members of the party. that there is room for a centrist-liberal Secondly, the UDF was affected by the bloc in Bulgarian politics, and that it can deepening and aggravating adverse pro- become a major component of the sec- cesses prompted by the clientele-prone 10 The Party System in Bulgaria 2001 – 2009

bias of the party. The fact that the UDF forms, and having set the geopolitical ori- became “a party in office” without any entation of the country towards the Euro- strong roots in society and proper inter- Atlantic structures, the UDF depleted the nal party democracy turned it into a party, reasons for maintaining the initial anti- which to a large extent was serving the communist ideological course, which first self-interests of its ruling top and it is this and foremost had provided its legitimacy self-promotion precisely that far too soon as a party and had mobilized its substan- provoked internal party clashes. Corrup- tial electoral potential. The UDF, however, tion as a typical phenomenon of imma- failed to launch on time the indispensable ture party formations and accidental party process of declaring its new ideology and leaders who have reached the top of the program renewal in conformity with the party pyramid in a post-communist envi- new realities in the country, and what is ronment, actually corroded the UDF inter- especially important – failed to accept the nally and turned it into an arena where post-1989 democratic achievements as lobbyist interests began to clash. an irreversible factor in Bulgarian politics. The analysis covering the 2000 – By maintaining the ideological slogans 2001 period of time elaborated by the of aggressive anti-communism, character- Head of the UDF Strategies and Analy- istic of the onset of the country’s transi- ses Department, Svetoslav Malinov, cor- tion, the UDF was hampering its own ad- rectly points out the symptoms of this aptation to the new realities and the new process of “clientelization”7 of the UDF. generations of voters, who grew up in the In Malinov’s opinion, “certain clientele- period after 1989. On the other hand, oriented groups within the UDF began the attempt to bring Christian-democratic to follow their own agendas” and thus ideology from “outside” and impose it on the party “reached a new distorted the Bulgarian realities failed last but not phase of encapsulation and privatiza- least because the UDF lacked the poten- tion of clientelism itself”. tial of ideas and the respective ideologists Thirdly, having governed the coun- capable of substantiating the Christian- try for a complete four-year term of of- democratic values in the specific Bulgar- fice with a stable parliamentary majority, ian conditions. This is also the reason why having laid the foundations of certain re- the Charter of UDF Values remained with- out any genuine effect whatsoever on the

7 The notion of “clientelism” has been introduced in political evolution of the party itself. studies to denote the way in which political parties turn into or- ganizations serving the interests of a narrow circle of interested What was added to these three ma- people for whom the party organization is mainly a tool meant to satisfy their personal interests and those of a strictly closed jor factors for the crisis in the UDF after group of insiders, which are of a predominantly economic na- ture. Creating a loyal clientele of their own, the parties them- 2001 were the ongoing and increasingly selves thus depend on it to pursue the interests of the party. It is in this way that a specific unity is created between the party exacerbated relations among the leaders functionaries and their clientele in the state bureaucracy and and the different factions existing within the various economic structures. The Party System in Bulgaria 2001 – 2009 11 the party itself. The immediate catalyst for left the UDF right after the 2001 general the deteriorating relations was the poor election. He established a new party for- performance of the UDF at the 2001 gen- mation and headed it himself. It was reg- eral election, followed by the loss of the istered under the name of Union of Free presidential candidate backed up by the Democrats (UFD), the orientation of which UDF, namely Peter Stoyanov, who was was the right-centrist political space. This the country’s Head of State throughout is the reason why the new party sought the 1997-2001 presidential term of of- contacts with the governing party – NMSII. fice. This is how within a short period of The social base of the UFD encompassed time in 2001 the UDF lost two crucial po- mainly representatives of the new middle litical battles, which brought about painful class in the larger towns in the country. processes both inside the party and out- During its short-lived existence in the side it – among its major proponents. This capacity of a political party, the UFD was marked the beginning of a period of disin- entirely dependent on the fate and popu- tegration of the UDF, which went through larity of its Chairman, Stephan Sofiansky, various phases after 2001 and continued who won a third term of office in the con- until and beyond the 2005 general elec- test for the mayor’s seat at the 2003 local tion. This process could not be reversed elections. At the same time, the growing even when Nadezhda Mikhailova won the problems of the mayor as well as the lack leadership party post at the UDF National of a majority in the municipal council, on Conference in 2002 in a poignant contest the one hand, and on the other, the law- with her predecessor Ekaterina Mikhailova, suits filed against some of his acts in the who has always been Ivan Kostov’s close capacity of a mayor, considerably narrowed and loyal associate.8 This disintegration the scope of the UFD impact on the eve within the UDF manifested itself in two di- of 2005 general election. The UFD failed rections: first, exacerbation of the simmer- to grow beyond the standing of a small ing internal conflicts, and second, party party, the capacity of which to overcome splits, which resulted in the formation of the 4 percent electoral threshold was quite new right-wing parties from the splinters dubious. This prompted the UFD to enter remaining after the UDF fell apart. a rather unstable and disparate coalition The first more significant conflict, which in terms of its ideological point of view, brought about the first split in the party, namely the Bulgarian National Union, the was connected with Stephan Sofiansky, other participants in which were an agrar- the then popular Sofia City Mayor, who ian formation and a nationalist one.9

8 According to the opinion polls held in the summer of 2002, 9 According to the various opinion polls, Sofiansky’s UFD con- the UDF electoral impact had dropped to 10.4 percent. The fidence rating ranged between 1 and 3 percent, and its mem- source of the data is a national representative poll held by the bership in 2003 amounted to about 15 thousand people. The BBSS Gallup International, published in the “Sega” Daily on summarized data were published in the “Trud” Daily on May August 20th, 2002. 23d 2003. 12 The Party System in Bulgaria 2001 – 2009

The conflict ranking second in terms tov, through whom it wanted to gain its of its scope and ensuing split was be- legitimacy and to assert itself. tween the supporters of ex-Prime Min- The new party adopted a firm op- ister Ivan Kostov and the new UDF lead- position stance both against the left- ership headed by Nadezhda Mikhailova. wing parties and the NMSII governance. The contradictions escalated after the loss It took a sharply critical stance against in the contest for the mayor’s seat at the the rest of the right-wing parties, the 2003 local elections, where Nadezhda UDF and UFD in particular, and did not Mikhailova was running on behalf of the conceal its aim to replace them from the UDF. Ivan Kostov’s supporters used this right-wing environment altogether. The fact to start a campaign for her ousting major accent in the activities of DSB was from the leadership post and the return of its poignant opposition against the MRF Ivan Kostov to the leading positions in the and especially against its leader, Ahmed UDF. After the failure of this campaign, Dogan, who was accused of monopo- Kostov’s proponents re-oriented their ef- lizing the ethnic vote of the Bulgarian forts towards leaving the UDF altogether Turkish population. Despite the ambi- and setting up a parliamentary faction of tions of the new party to replace the their own, which subsequently became UDF from the right-wing party environ- the backbone of a new political party – ment, the societal base of DSB remained Democrats for Strong Bulgaria (DSB), ac- rather narrow – until the 2005 general tually founded in May 2004. election it encompassed hard-line anti- Ivan Kostov, former UDF Chairman and communists and elderly citizens in the 1997-2001 Prime Minister of the country, larger cities of the country. According to was elected leader of the new party. DSB the opinion polls, the DSB ranked only self-determined itself as a right-wing con- second – behind the BSP – in terms of its servative party, the ambition of which was share of zealots and supporters exceed- to create the image of the “New Right ing 61 years of age.10 Wing” emerging from the shadow of Within the UDF itself, the crisis pro- the UDF. The program and election docu- cesses provoked by the series of splits ments of the party revealed its aspirations did not subside. Secondary power strug- to present itself as a party, defending the gles for gaining influence over the party Bulgarian national interests with a grain continued until the 2005 general elec- of Euro-sceptic bias. The principal element tion and were generated by a number in its program, however, was the combat of ill-conceived decisions made by the for order and legality, combined with tra- party leadership and the leader Nadezh- ditional anti-communist slogans. From its da Mikhailova in person. One of these very inception, DSB was set up as a lead-

er’s party around the figure of Ivan Kos- 10 “Dnevnik” Daily from June 10th 2005. The Party System in Bulgaria 2001 – 2009 13 principal decisions was subject to a par- Bakardjiev). All of them were small-size ticularly strong criticism, namely the or marginal parties, among which only one for the party to enter a broad pre- the IMRO and “Gergyovden” enjoyed a election coalition with non-traditional relatively larger number of supporters. In parties, some of which were the parties the capacity of independent parties func- from the Alliance of Democratic Forces tioning on their own, they had no pros- (ADF), totally discredited in the eyes of pect of success whatsoever, and this was the staunch UDF supporters. This deci- the reason why on the eve of the 2005 sion gave rise to new tensions and con- general election they started looking for flicts, including resignations of leading the shelter of pre-election coalitions with UDF members from leadership posts larger right-wing parties. and grave post-election consequences The processes of disintegration of the for the party itself. Established at the UDF and the splintering of the right-wing very beginning of 1990 as an anti-com- political space brought about the pro- munist formation, the UDF had exhaust- cess of uniting right-wing parties in pre- ed its potential and shrank to the size election coalitions on the eve of the 2005 of a small party with dim prospects for general election. its future existence, with a diminishing The UFD set up a coalition with the Bul- societal base, and tortured by a grave garian Agrarian People’s Union - People’s organizational crisis. The consequence Union (BAPU-PU) – the largest agrarian of this crisis was the election for a new formation and traditional UDF ally. They UDF leader at an ad-hoc Congress of were joined by the nationalist-oriented the party, held on November 1st 2005. IMRO. The name given to this coalition The delegates to the Congress elected was Bulgarian National Union (BNU). the ex-President of the country, Peter The UDF set up the Alliance of Demo- Stoyanov, new Chairman of the UDF cratic Forces (ADF) coalition together with and he was entrusted with the difficult “Gergyovden”, the Democratic Party task of finding ways and means to take (DP), and several smaller parties – agrar- the party out of its profound crisis. ian formations and parties from the Roma Apart from the UDF, the UFD, and ethnic spectrum. DSB, several other parties managed to After unsuccessful attempts to set up a retain some influence in the right-wing coalition with the Bulgarian Agrarian Peo- political environment. They were: the ple’s Union - People’s Union (BAPU-PU) and right-wing nationalist party IMRO (led by the Democratic Party, DSB chose the road of Krassimir Karakachanov), “Gergyovden” running this general election independently. (led by Lyuben Dillov), the Democratic Party (led by Alexander Pramatarsky), and the “Radicals” Union (led by Evgenii 14 The Party System in Bulgaria 2001 – 2009

Situation in the right-wing political space on the eve of the 2005 general election

The 2001 – 2005 UDF Fragmentation

UDF Other smaller “Radicals” right-wing UFD DSB Union formations

Pre-election coalitions and parties in the right-wing political space on the eve of the 2005 general election held on June 25th

Alliance of Democratic Bulgarian Democrats Forces (ADF) National for Strong - UDF Union (BNU) Bulgaria (DSB) - “Gergyovden” - UFD - DP - BAPU – PU - IMRO

3. The consolidation of the BSP tial election in November 2001, which in the left-wing political space brought a representative of this party to and its participation in the the prestigious post of Bulgarian Head of government of the country State. Parvanov himself supported Sergei Stanishev to succeed him at the post of After the 2001 general election, parallel BSP Chairman. Thus far young Stanishev to the process of dwindling public con- had been international relations secre- fidence in NMSII and its government, tary of the party and had amassed only and as a consequence of the crisis tear- modest experience and tenure in the BSP ing apart the UDF, a gradual process of structures. This appointment was meant consolidation of the BSP began, accom- to serve as a sign for the BSP and espe- panied by an expansion of its positions cially for the public circles outside the BSP both in society and politics. This process that the party would continue its course was stimulated by the victory of the BSP on the road of its social-democratization leader, Georgi Parvanov, at the presiden- and acknowledgement of the political line The Party System in Bulgaria 2001 – 2009 15 of integrating the country with NATO and at large by accelerating its transition from the European Union. the first to the second post-1989 Bulgar- Stanishev’s appointment to the post ian party system. No doubt, this accelerat- of BSP party leader and his subsequent ed the UDF disintegration as well, because endorsement at this post at the 45th Con- the latter was a formation born by the gress of the BSP held in 2002, as well as country’s transition and was developing the decisions which the Congress then mainly on the platform of anti-commu- took, were all proof to the fact that Par- nism. The social-democratization of the vanov’s line in the party was being and BSP brought the relationships among the would be continued. This development, parties back to normal and put them on followed by the integration of the BSP in the track of the developed European de- the Socialist International in 2004, and in mocracies, whereby the left-wing political the Party of European Socialists (PES) in space gradually came to be dominated al- 2005, made the BSP internationally legit- most exclusively by the BSP, following the imate as a social-democratic formation, collapse of the Bulgarian Euro-Left party connected with the European tradition in at the 2001 general election. this family of parties. In the party itself, To the purpose of its election cam- this line irrevocably gained the upper paign, the BSP retained the presence of hand, despite the attempts of the narrow the so-called New Left in Coalition for Bul- circle around former BSP leader, Alexan- garia – a union previously set up among der Lillov, to maintain the idea about “a the BSP, the New Left, and other three new left-wing party”. In Parliament, the very small social-democratic formations, BSP gave its support to Bulgaria’s acces- the only prospects of which were either sion to NATO and lent its assistance for to merge with the BSP or remain without the successful completion of the coun- any positions in the party life of the coun- try’s negotiations for accession into the try whatsoever. The neo-communist left European Union. All this increased the relapsed into a marginal position outside standing of the BSP as a party connected the BSP, but one of its parties preserved with the European social-democratic Left its alliance with the BSP within the frame- Wing, which – for its part – resulted in the work of Coalition for Bulgaria. substantial improvement of the party’s As far as the internal party situation of image on the domestic political scene. In the BSP is concerned, after the 2001 gen- fact, this was the farewell, which the BSP eral election it was also characterized by a bid to the totalitarian past of this party, process of internal party clashes, especial- and completed its transition to a modern ly on the level of local structures, which and democratic party formation. exacerbated even further around the time This development of the BSP exerted a of the 2003 local elections. With time, consolidating impact on the party system the party leadership came on top of these 16 The Party System in Bulgaria 2001 – 2009

whirlpool trends for the party to disperse, Zhan Videnov’s government back in 1997 and on the eve of the 2005 general elec- and began to expand its public impact. tion the BSP was consolidated and ready The opinion polls recorded a gradual im- to run the general election for a new Bul- provement of the electoral positions of garian Parliament. the party and an increase in its public con- From an internal party point of view, fidence rating. This process of restored the BSP accomplished a gradual change confidence of the BSP turned it into a in its leadership – a transition towards dominant force in the left-wing political the younger generation of party activists space and the major political party there- and emancipation from the remnants of in. Unlike the right-wing political space, the activists of the ex-communist party a consolidated Left Wing managed to as- connected with Andrei Lukanov and Al- sert itself and to raise claims for taking the exander Lillov. At the same time, the soci- reins of the country’s government having etal base and especially the membership spent eight long years in opposition. of the BSP continued to be dominated On the eve of the 2005 general elec- by the elderly party members, including tion, the party system had gone through a those over 60 years of age. The delayed significant transformation, thus acquiring rejuvenation of the BSP affected both the new traits of quite a different quality in cadre potential of the party and its posi- comparison with the first post-1989 Bul- tions in the major political spheres where garian party system. it was operating, and this fact emerged In this way, on the eve of the 2005 on the surface in the pre-election plat- general election, the bi-polar party model form of the party. was replaced by the emergence of a more In the wake of 2001 and with the ap- pluralistic type of party system from the proaching 2005 general election, the BSP point of view of the participating party gradually came out of the crisis it had players and from the standpoint of ideol- been going through after the collapse of ogy and values.

The Second Party System on the Eve of the 2005 General Election

Right Wing Center Left Wing

UDF UFD NMSII The New Time DSB MRF BSP The Party System in Bulgaria 2001 – 2009 17

4. The 2005 general election and the The first major feature of the second par- establishment of the tri-partite ty system was its plurality and fragmentation. governing coalition At this election, the voters “rejected” the model of a party system with dominant The 2005 general election produced a parties in a position of hegemony, such categorical proof to the fact that durable as the BSP and the UDF used to be up to changes had been taking place in the Bul- 2001, which were replaced between 2001 garian party system, and these changes and 2005 by their populist alternative – were outlining the contours of the second NMSII, structured later on as a liberal party. post-1989 party system.

General Election for the 40th National Assembly Held on June 25th 2005 Overall Voter Turnout 55.76%

Percentage Parliamentary Parties and Coalitions Ballots Cast Rate Seats

Coalition for Bulgaria, the major party being the BSP 1 129 196 30.95 82 NMSII 725 314 19.88 53 MRF 467 400 12.81 34 The “Attack” Coalition 296 848 8.14 21

ADF (the major party being the UDF plus smaller partners) 280 323 7.68 20 DSB 234 788 6.44 17 Bulgarian National Union (UFD, IMRO and BAPU-PU) 189 268 5.19 13

The New Time 107 758 2.95 the election on their own – in the capac- Coalition of the Rose 47 410 1.30 ity of independent parties. The BSP was “Euroroma” Political Movement 45 637 1.25 the dominant party in Coalition for Bul- garia, whereas such a dominant party in Source: Central Electoral Commission the ADF was the UDF. In the Bulgarian National Union (BNU) there was a relative Seven major political coalitions and equitability among the UFD, IMRO, and parties made it to the 40th National As- BAPU – PU, the number of the UFD MPs sembly. It is only NMSII and DSB that ran being the smallest. Out of this coalition, 18 The Party System in Bulgaria 2001 – 2009

the UFD had no realistic chances for any parties and their motivation had shifted parliamentary representation whatsoever. towards social, economic, and other mo- The “Attack” Coalition, in its capac- tives, based increasingly on personal or ity of a new political phenomenon, was group assessment concerning the role of a union of predominantly nationalist for- a certain party, especially when that party mations, including the “Attack” party, had already spent some time in the gover- led by Volen Siderov. This coalition was a nance of the country. new political factor in the party system, The second major feature in the evolu- although it had inherited other parties of tion of the second party system, outlined a more moderate nationalist bias, such in the general election outcome, was the as the Bulgarian Business Bloc of George continuing and deepening crisis of legiti- Ganchev, for instance. macy of all political parties. The right-centrist liberal formation The trend manifested at the 2003 lo- the New Time was not returned to Par- cal elections of voter abstention from es- liament, nor was the “Coalition of the tablished parties continued at the 2005 Rose” – a formation of a social-demo- general election as well. The voter turn- cratic orientation, and the most impor- out shrank substantially in comparison tant political formation of the Roma pop- with previous elections. The refusal of ulation in the country – the “Euroroma” 45 percent of the electorate to vote was Political Movement. symptomatic. It revealed the fact that a The largest political formation among large part of those who refused to go to the seven parties and coalitions, which the polls were actually expressing their made it to the new 40th National Assem- dissatisfaction with the party elite and bly, was the BSP. It was returned to Parlia- the role of the parties at large, and were ment with about 30 percent of the overall thus manifesting their lack of confidence electoral support, followed by NMSII – en- in them. In other words, voters refused joying about 20 percent electoral support. to identify themselves with any of the Among the smaller formations, which parties running the general election. At made it to the new Parliament, the MRF the same time, what was observed was was the “largest” one, followed by the a relocation of votes – over 8 percent al- UDF (within the framework of the ADF), together – in favor of formations open- DSB, and the parties making up the Bul- ly voicing an anti-party rhetoric. These garian National Union. This new parlia- formations were both distancing them- mentary set-up mirrored the trend of selves from the established parties and differentiated electoral vote and the vot- opposing them at the same time. This ers’ re-orientation, i.e. they had departed was the typical anti-establishment vote, from the value-based and ideological mo- which reflected not only the lack of voter tives underlying their support for certain confidence, but also the negation of the The Party System in Bulgaria 2001 – 2009 19 parties in their capacity of a major com- confidence crisis, created conditions for ponent of the democratic system. internal conflicts and splits, and in the What can be added to these two fig- final account had an adverse effect on ures (45% + 8% = 53%) is also the num- the entire democratic political system, ber of dissipated votes for parties fail- and this effect subsequently manifested ing to overcome the 4 percent electoral itself as early as the next 2009 general threshold, which rounds up a figure of election in the country. about 60 percent of the electorate, who The third major feature in the evolu- in various forms refused to give their vot- tion of the second party system was the er confidence to the major parliamentary fact that for the first time ever a radical represented parties (with the exception nationalist populist formation made its of the new “Attack” party). This phe- way to the Bulgarian Parliament. This was nomenon marked the significant shrink- the “Attack” Coalition, part of which later age of the base these parties enjoyed in transformed into a party under the lead- society, and this was especially important ership of Volen Siderov. as far as it concerned the formation of a The “Attack” phenomenon had cap- new government. tured a variety of attitudes, moods and Besides, in the conditions of the non- public reactions, characterized mainly consolidated Bulgarian democracy, this with the protest against the political fail- opened a niche of prerequisites and elec- ures and the hardships people suffered toral reserve for spontaneously emerging during the country’s transition after 1989. political formations and parties, including It is these failures and hardships that had formations and parties of an anti-dem- produced a sizeable group of “losers” ocratic and anti-systemic nature, which and marginalized social strata. Their dis- could potentially destabilize the party sys- content was additionally fueled by the tem. In other words, all these phenomena dissatisfaction with the clientele nature had prepared a fertile soil for the emer- of the majority of Bulgarian parties, in- gence of parties such as the GERB Party volved with corruption, as well as the lack and the Order, Legality, and Justice (OLJ) of principles rampant among the political party at the next general election. elite, which had detached itself from the In this way, the legitimacy crisis of the daily problems people were constantly en- party system placed the second post- countering in their routine. 1989 party system at the very beginning In comparison with the previous at- of its formation on shaky grounds, which tempts to attract protest and nationalist opened possibilities for it to be provoked, votes (e.g. the George Ganchev phenom- destabilized and compromised by new enon), the “Attack” coalition was the party formations. In turn, this placed most serious challenge thus far against the parties themselves in a permanent the major democratic values, including 20 The Party System in Bulgaria 2001 – 2009

the constitutional provisions concerning of civil society. Therefore, a new cleav- ethnic peace and the principal foreign age emerged in the party system, this policy priorities of the country. The po- time along the axis of nationalism ver- litical program of the “Attack” coalition sus Europeism, as a reaction against the and the statements made by its leading geopolitical orientation of the country, figure, Volen Siderov, in particular, openly against the consequences of its acces- reeked of racist and xenophobic appeals, sion to the international structures, which undermined the ethnic model in and in perspective – against the effects the country and the tolerant cohabita- of globalization. This was a cleavage, tion of its population. At the same time, which was expected to emerge and de- they awoke dormant and latent attitudes velop in the way similar to all post-com- among a portion of the Bulgarian popu- munist and European countries. lation against the minority ethnic groups, The fourth feature in the evolution such as the Roma people and the Turks, of the second party system was the fact as well as against the geo-political orien- that the dynamic processes in the major tation of the country in its accession to party and political camps were equally the structures of NATO and the Europe- well and clearly outlined, namely in the an Union. For the first time ever, such a right-wing, the centrist, and left-wing movement won a parliamentary represen- political environments. tation and a high national rostrum for its The parties from the right-wing po- public manifestations. litical environment sustained a serious At the same time, as a movement set defeat. On the one hand, such a defeat up in a hasty manner, the “Attack” was was the fact that the general election far too disparate, made up of people mapped out the further disintegration sharing dissimilar value orientations. Thus of the UDF, which not long ago was the it hosted popular politicians from the right major political opposition and anti-com- and left wing who co-existed there on munist force of the country’s transition. the grounds of their moderate nationalist On the other hand, a defeat was also attitudes. Extreme nationalists in the ca- the splintering of the right-wing political pacity of novice politicians, such as Volen space into several smaller parties – the Siderov, were present in the movement as UDF, the UFD, and DSB. Individually and well, and they were yet to make their de- some of them in coalitions, they man- buts in the political system. aged to capture the vote of between With the emergence of the “Attack” 5 and 8 percent of the electoral vote. movement, the rest of the democratic The most stable formation among them parties faced a new opponent, which was DSB, because superficially it was a was about to provoke their democratic new formation, but in fact it was rooted values and commitments to the notion mainly in a portion of the UDF elector- The Party System in Bulgaria 2001 – 2009 21 ate, which is made up of the supporters The crisis within the right-wing politi- of the former UDF leader, Ivan Kostov. cal space opened a niche for the emer- The UDF, being the major part of the gence of a new political entity, capable ADF Coalition, suffered the most serious of availing itself of the new political re- defeat and from a medium-size party it alities, characteristic the emergence of was brought down to a small party of the second Bulgarian post-1989 party a declining electoral impact. The 2005 system. It is this niche precisely that the general election categorically confirmed GERB Party discovered. At that time GERB once again that the UDF in its capacity of was still non-existent, but its founders a major force, representing anti-commu- were clever enough to avail of this win- nism during the country’s transition, is dow of opportunity. experiencing a process of ongoing disin- NMSII managed to score a satisfactory tegration, which also manifested itself in general election outcome and to consoli- the internal party conflicts between the date itself in the centrist political space in supporters of the party leader, Nadezhda the capacity of a medium-size party. The Mikhailova, and her opponents, mainly factors conducive for this development grouped around the ex-Bulgarian Presi- were the disintegration of the UDF and dent, Peter Stoyanov, and the ex-Prime the clashes in the right-wing parties, as Minister of the country, Philip Dimitrov. well as certain achievements made by the This festering situation within the UDF government, which resulted in the gen- brought about the further decline of its eral economic stabilization of the coun- electoral impact and portended the risk try and brought about successful moves for the marginalization of the party at in the area of foreign policy. The election the next general election. outcome made it possible for NMSII to be The Union of Free Democrats (UFD) led included in the governing coalition and by Stephan Sofiansky “hid” itself in the continue its participation in the structures Bulgarian National Union coalition togeth- of the country’s government, although at er with the BAPU-PU and IMRO. There is a a smaller scale now. At the same time, the possibility for this party to continue to ex- fate of this party was hard to predict, be- ist as a small right-centrist formation, but it cause the major factor underlying its pres- will always be closely linked to the fate of ence in the political life of the nation and its leader Stephan Sofiansky. Its prospects its relative cohesion, namely the inten- at that time, however, did not rule out its tions of the NMSII leader, Simeon Saxe- disintegration over the years to come, be- Cobburg-Gotha, remained unpredictable. cause of its strongly narrowed societal base The crucial question about the extent to and political impact accordingly, which which he would remain involved with could deprive it of all its chances for inde- NMSII, having released the post of the pendent existence altogether. Prime Minister, was still open. His possible 22 The Party System in Bulgaria 2001 – 2009

withdrawal from politics posed the dan- to three principal factors. The first factor ger of leaving a palpable vacuum within was the massive mobilization of the MRF NMSII, which would create conditions for electorate, the immigrants in Turkey with internal party in-fighting forS imeon Saxe- double citizenship included. The second Cobburg-Gotha’s legacy. factor was the inclusion of ethnic Bulgar- Being still quite a young party, NMSII ians at leading positions in the MRF par- preserved its relative unity mainly because ty slates in constituencies, where these of the administrative resources it obtained candidates for members of parliament as a party in office, on the basis of which it had a certain impact. This is the explana- later on created its societal base – namely tion concerning the parliamentary seats the extensive apparatus of civil servants. won in the towns of Varna and Haskovo, This raised the issue whether it would not where the MRF candidates were former go through internal splits, should it remain UDF activists and ethnic Bulgarians, but either without its power resources or with their victory was greatly facilitated by just a limited such resource, because NM- the personalities of the other candidates, SII continued to be a “clan“ party made up whom the MRF included in its general of various factions. In other words, NM- election party slates. Although the Bul- SII had retained its essence of a clientele garians had played no decisive role in the party with very feeble roots in civil society. political representation of the MRF over Moreover, as an electoral party according the last several years, Ahmed Dogan got to its statute, it lacked any stable organi- them more actively involved in the activ- zational structure throughout the country. ity of his party as a result of his policy of All this was leaving open the issue about “opening up” to the Bulgarian ethnos. the future evolution of the party, which – The third factor lies in the fact that the should it manage to stabilize itself in the MRF capitalized on the low voter turn- nearer future without its patron Simeon out, which is beneficial for all parties with Saxe-Cobburg-Gotha – would make it a rock-bottom mobilized electorate, such possible for it to consolidate in the cen- as the electorate of the ethnic Turks. trist political environment, given that it At the same time, certain expecta- was headed now by the most popular tions that other Turkish ethnic parties and party personalities it had at its disposal. functionaries (some of whom were on the Eventually, NMSII remained squeezed in slates of other parties running the elec- the government between the MRF and tion) would take away MRF votes were BSP, which resulted in numerous adverse totally disproved. Not less significant for effects for it as a consequence. the heightened activity of the MRF elec- At the 2005 general election, the MRF torate was the aggressive rhetoric against achieved its best election outcome ever Ahmed Dogan, launched by DSB and its after 1989. By and large, this was due leader Ivan Kostov in person and by IMRO The Party System in Bulgaria 2001 – 2009 23 as a constituent part of the BNU coalition. eral election process undoubtedly proved The strongest factor for the mobilization that the “Parvanov” line leading towards of the MRF electorate, however, was the the modernization and social-democra- anti-Turkish rhetoric of the new radical tization of the party was perfectly legiti- “Attack” formation. It is the statements mate and highly assessed. It is by virtue of its activists that created a conflict po- of the 2005 general election process and tential, which some other new parties, outcome that the new party leadership such as GERB and OLJ, for instance, con- headed by Sergei Stanishev obtained its veniently used to their advantage. legitimacy as well. The participation of the MRF in yet an- At the same time, the 2005 general other Bulgarian government made it in- election outcome invalidated the expecta- cumbent on the MRF leadership to under- tions of certain BSP leaders that the party take a balancing act between its growing would manage to assert once again its political ambitions and the restricted pos- nation-wide hegemony in the left-wing sibilities for accomplishing them within party space and in its capacity of a large the tri-partite governing coalition. At the party would possibly win the election with same time, the specific nature of the MRF an absolute majority or a result close to it. as a predominantly ethnically-based party Therefore, in the wake of the 2005 places it in the peculiar situation of a party general election the party was put to the summoned to guarantee the ethnic peace test for its capacity to pursue a coalition in the country. After the 2005 general policy, especially after the new country’s election, however, the MRF had to play government was set up. The result of this its role of a guarantor in new conditions, test would prove to be of a paramount whereby Bulgaria was now a full-fledged significance for the further legitimacy of NATO member country and a prospective the party in the capacity of a democratic member country of the European Union left-wing formation and for its further and – what is especially important – in consolidation and development, including a situation, whereby Turkey had already the expansion of its societal base. In the started its EU membership negotiations. event of any failure or collapse of the tri- The election outcome attained by the partite coalition, it was the BSP that would BSP indicated that after eight years in op- bear the major blame and suffer the grav- position and after the most severe crisis est adverse consequences respectively. it went through in the stormy 1996-1997 The formation of the new government period of time, the party had managed in the shape of a tri-partite coalition was to consolidate itself and to preserve its another “novelty” for the second post- leading positions in the left-wing politi- 1989 Bulgarian party system. The need cal environment, where the BSP is with- to find coalition forms of government out a single worthy rival. The 2005 gen- was brought about by the fragmentation 24 The Party System in Bulgaria 2001 – 2009

of the party system and the unwillingness parliamentary support of the three largest of voters to cast their ballots for a party parliamentary factions. in a position of hegemony. This was also the consequence of the normalization 5. A new transformation of the party of party life and the removal of leading system following the July 2009 mega-themes of a predominantly ideo- general election in Bulgaria logical nature. The election campaign it- self predetermined new subject matters The second party system, established for party rivalry – topics of an economic in this country after 1989, found itself nature mainly. This resulted in the strati- subject to a brand new shock following fication and dispersion of votes in the the July 5th 2009 general election. What direction of a larger number of parties, was brought up to surface as a result which – for the first time after 1989 – of this election is the apparent second imposed a new type of dialog and com- party system instability and ongoing promises. What is important is that such transformation. a dialog was held among parties which Over the last twenty years, ever since had opposed one another at the time of the country began its transition to de- the election campaign. mocracy and market economy, the ma- This is the reason why the process of jor political parties, with the exception of setting up the new government proved to the MRF, which managed to mobilize the be cumbersome, lengthy, and accompa- ethnic vote of the Turkish population to nied by moments of crisis. It was only with the maximum possible extent, failed to the third mandate to form a government, establish stable relationships with civil so- handed by the Bulgarian President to the ciety. The major reason for the ongoing MRF – the third ranking party in terms of crisis of legitimacy, which they have been parliamentary seats, that an agreement suffering from over the last two decades, was reached to set up a tri-partite coali- lies mostly in their inefficiency to perform tion by the three largest parties at the well in the capacity of governing parties, National Assembly – the BSP, NMSII, and especially as far as the principal interests the MRF. The principal factor which finally of Bulgarian citizens are concerned. Apart “brought them together”, was Bulgaria’s from the objective reasons, connected forthcoming accession to the European with the heritage they have been bur- Union, as well as the need to prevent a dened with during the transition from a possible political crisis that could have totalitarian state-owned socialist system been provoked had they failed to form a to a modern democracy and market econ- government. On the basis of this tri-par- omy, the other substantial reasons under- tite coalition, the new Bulgarian govern- lying the crisis of confidence, generating ment also gained the exceedingly massive the discontent of Bulgarian people with The Party System in Bulgaria 2001 – 2009 25 the activity of political parties, are the zens rank the most significant problems clientele attitude and corruption, which which the country is facing, in the fol- have gravely affected the entire political lowing way: corruption – 42 percent, system, the party system included. unemployment – 33.6 percent, and These phenomena precisely, which crime rate – 22 percent. surfaced in public consciousness as a The results from this survey indicate factor undermining the country’s demo- that corruption has replaced a number cratic development and economic prog- of other themes, which have dominated ress, became the underlying reason for the political agenda over the preced- the emergence of new political parties, ing years, and new political parties have whose political platforms were based on availed of this reshaped situation to reap combating corruption. The prevalence of an astounding political success within a the corruption subject matter was also very short period of time. The major for- prompted by the severe criticism on the mation among these is the Citizens for part of the European Union, after Bul- European Development of Bulgaria Party garia became its full-fledged member on (or as it Bulgarian abbreviation goes – January 1st 2007. Bulgaria’s accession to the GERB Party, or simply GERB). It was the European Union became a new ex- set up in 2007 and was headed by the ternal factor of a significant impact on popular former Chief Secretary of the both domestic politics and the activity of Ministry of Interior and then Mayor of political parties, most of which are part Sofia Municipality, Boiko Borissov. The and parcel of the European political par- party was born as a populist formation, ty families. A number of the European but it was quick to redirect itself to the Commission reports on the progress of European People’s Party and became its Bulgaria after its EU accession launched member in 2008 with the claims to come poignant criticism mainly against the no- to dominate the center-right within the torious corruption, which the country party system in Bulgaria. has failed to overcome, and against the As early as the 2007 local elections, inefficiency of its judicial system, as these the GERB Party succeeded in winning two phenomena undermine not only the good positions in local governments, confidence of Bulgarian citizens in their and thus created its prerequisites for own political institutions, but also ham- good electoral performance at the July per the effective appropriation of Euro- 2009 general election. Its actual, though pean funds for the benefit of the coun- informal, leader Boiko Borissov (the law try’s social and economic development. does not permit a mayor to be a party According to an opinion poll sur- leader at the same time) won the elec- vey held by the Market Links Agency at tions for Mayor of Sofia Municipality for the beginning of 2009, Bulgarian citi- the second time in a row, thus stabiliz- 26 The Party System in Bulgaria 2001 – 2009

ing his public clout and impact. At the of Free Democrats, along others, which 2009 general election, GERB marked were seeking their place in the right-wing a huge success by receiving about 40 political environment, namely the “Gergy- percent of the overall number of votes ovden” Movement and IMRO, remained cast and 116 seats at the National As- outside Parliament and are facing meager sembly, only 5 seats short of the abso- chances for independent existence and lute parliamentary majority. Thus GERB consequently – no significant political role consolidated itself as the dominating whatsoever. They can only survive as parts party in the right-centrist political space of some new formations, i.e. as parts of and replaced the “old” right-wing par- political coalitions, for instance. Another ties, such as the UDF and DSB, which – formation belonging to the “old” parties united in the Blue Coalition – managed – the Bulgarian Agrarian People’s Union - to receive only about 7 percent of the People’s Union (BAPU-PU) – suffered a to- votes and remained a minor parliamen- tal political collapse, although it was part tary formation of limited public impact. of the Blue Coalition. On the whole, the In other words, the 2009 general elec- so-called agrarian formations continued tion saw the ultimate marginalization of losing positions and in practice have cur- the “old” right-wing parties, which pro- rently remained in existence just as mar- liferated after the disintegration of the ginal formations within the overall make- UDF. Some of them, such as the Union up of the Bulgarian party system.

Outcome of the general election held on July 5th 2009 in Bulgaria Total number of voter turnout: 60.20%

Parties and Valid % Majority Number of Coalitions Ballots Vote parliamentary Cast MPs seats The GERB Party 1 677 870 39,71 26 116 Coalition for 747 849 17, 70 0 40 Bulgaria MRF 610 831 14,46 5 38 The “Attack” 395 656 9,36 0 21 Party The Blue 285 418 6,76 0 15 Coalition OJL 174 582 4.13 0 10 NMSP 127 340 3,01 0 0 The “LIDER” 137 684 3,26 0 0 Party The Party System in Bulgaria 2001 – 2009 27

The GERB Party took the rudder of the erously making at the time of his election country’s government on its own, and its campaign, especially as far as combating leader, Boiko Borissov, was elected Prime corruption is concerned. Minister of the Republic of Bulgaria on 5 At the same time, the new country’s July 2009. In comparison with previous government is facing numerous tests and prime ministers of the country ever since challenges in a complicated economic 1989, Borissov enjoys the greatest actual environment, connected with the con- power, despite the fact that GERB’s parlia- sequences of the global economic crisis. mentary faction – though the largest one This curbs the available resources and the at the National Assembly – is in the situ- options for maneuvering on the part of ation of a minority government party at the government which would enable it Parliament. But the support given to him to implement new projects and reforms. by the other two parliamentary factions Without any experience in government – those of the Blue Coalition and the “At- whatsoever, the Cabinet of GERB has tack” Party – is a guarantee that for a cer- embarked upon a completely “new” ter- tain period of time at least Boiko Borissov ritory laden with numerous submerged will be able to enjoy the opportunity of a rocks and mine fields in disguise. The relatively problem-free and stable gover- fate of the previous governments, which nance. At the beginning he had also the enjoyed large parliamentary majorities, support of the Order, Legality, and Justice such as those of the BSP (1994 – 1996), Party, but later it became a staunch critic the UDF (1997 – 2001), NMSII (2001 – of the government. 2005), and the latest term of office of Boiko Borissov himself is a unique the tri-partite coalition of the BSP, the phenomenon on the political horizon in MRF, and NMSII (2005 – 2009), illustrates the post-1989 era. He is a figure who has the broad fluctuations of public attitudes successfully embodied the popular psy- and moods – from extreme confidence to chological idea of a decisive politician, a extreme disillusionment. man of action, and – at the same time Even if the GERB government could – a man close to the ordinary people, succeed in meeting some of the huge quite different from all the prime minis- expectations of the voters, a question ters who inhabited the corridors of pow- remains open: whether the party would er before his own term of office. This is manage to reverse the trend of the coun- what has secured the great popularity try’s development observed thus far in a he enjoys at the beginning of his com- durable and sustainable way, and be- ing to power, but this popularity has also come at the same time the instrument generated great expectations among the conducive to the introduction of new voters, who are now looking forward to tendencies in the Bulgarian political pro- his fulfilling the promises he was so gen- cess. The instability of public moods and 28 The Party System in Bulgaria 2001 – 2009

attitudes, and the instability of the po- or in the left-wing environment. NM- litical elite, which to a large extent has SII accepted the role of a right-centrist been brought about by these fluctua- party, while the role of the MRF was tions precisely, hamper the development left-centrist. Furthermore, the two for- of the party system and both its stabili- mations have repeatedly discussed the zation and consolidation. It is these fluc- establishment of a Liberal Alliance in the tuations and instability over the last few capacity of an electoral coalition, which years that resulted in the emergence of could secure a more durable interaction political formations such as the “Attack” between the two of them. Party, the Order, Legality, and Justice Par- This idea, however, and the suc- ty, and in the emergence of GERB itself. cessive attempt for the formation of But they likewise contributed to the dis- a “centrist party field” collapsed alto- integration of the liberal political center, gether after the two terms of office of which had already been formed around NMSII (NMSP) and the MRF. But the MRF NMSII and the MRF. managed to retain its electoral positions In the 2001-2009 period of time, on the basis of the ethnic vote cast by right up to the 2009 general election, the Turkish ethnic population, whereas what could be observed were the out- NMSP gradually lost its electoral posi- lines of the formation of a particular tions and collapsed below the 4 per- center within the party system, mainly cent electoral threshold at the July 2009 based on the electoral and parliamen- general election. On the one hand, this tary positions of NMSII (now renamed outcome came as a result of the loss of to National Movement for Stability and voter confidence in NMSII (NMSP) after Prosperity) and the MRF. Both parties two successive terms in office and its governed the country in a coalition in domination over the executive branch the first post-2001 government and of power, and on the other, it is espe- were coalition partners again in the tri- cially due to these two parties’ partici- partite 2005 – 2009 government headed pation in the tri-partite governing coali- by the BSP. At the same time, both par- tion, which effaced the individual image ties are members of the European family of NMSII (NMSP) on the background of of liberal parties. After 1989, a number the other two parties dominating the of attempts have been made to estab- coalition, namely the BSP and the MRF. lish such a political party center, capable Another reason for the collapse of of playing the balancing role in the po- the “centrist party” idea were the di- litical process and serving at the same visions within NMSII, which brought time as a bridge for the establishment about the split of a substantial number of smaller and bigger coalitions, either of MPs and party activists, who subse- in the right-wing political environment, quently left the party altogether. They The Party System in Bulgaria 2001 – 2009 29 set up a new party – Bulgarian New namely the GERB Party, started revealing Democracy, which, however, was com- to the public a number of weaknesses, pletely marginalized after the July 2009 infringements, and most importantly – general election. The highly contested corruption practices, committed by the real estate and property acquisitions of government of the tri-partite coalition. the NMSII leader, Simeon Saxe-Coburg- And because it is corruption that has Gotha, additionally created an adverse replaced all other issues as the problem public attitude towards the party, which focusing the current public concerns, was widely seen as a project conceived the BSP in its capacity of a leading party and implemented by the former Bulgar- in the former tri-partite coalition is tak- ian King. To top it all, tensions arose be- ing the brunt of public discontent to the tween NMSII and the MRF, which under- highest possible extent. mined for good the possible interaction The ideological identity of the BSP is and more durable presence of the two turning into another serious problem for parties in the political life of the coun- the party, which – during its term of of- try in the capacity of actual liberal allies. fice put its stakes on a number of mea- The MRF visibly distanced itself from sures, which are typical of neo-liberal NMSII and went on to look for closer co- and right-centrist parties, namely: the operation and interaction with the BSP. introduction of the 10 percent flat tax The situation in the left-centrist politi- rate, the implementation of monetarist cal space is also quite problematic. The approaches for the strengthening of the major party in there – the BSP – suffered country’s financial stability, etc. A num- a grave election defeat at the June 2009 ber of these measures were introduced general election, and scored its poorest under the impact of BSP’s coalition part- result ever since the onset of democracy ners, especially on the part of NMSII. This in 1989. This provoked a profound cri- damaged the image of the BSP as a left- sis within the party and brought about wing and socially-oriented party, which – internal party clashes. The position of despite all the efforts it had made in the the party leader, Sergei Stanishev, has area of improving the social status of the been seriously undermined and despite population – provoked the discontent of the fact that he withstood the pressure a sizeable portion of its societal base at exerted by his opponents in the party the end of its term of office. This was leadership, over the next few years he the reason why a new left-wing forma- will find it quite difficult to lead his party tion was established by BSP activists who effectively. For the first time after 1989, left the party before the general elec- the BSP is facing the prospect of losing tion. Although the clout of this forma- its electoral impact, clout, and positions, tion is insignificant at the time being, we especially after the new party in office, cannot rule out a possible development 30 The Party System in Bulgaria 2001 – 2009

when either this new formation or an- party system in this country in its newest other new left-wing party, opposing the form of development. “right-wing line” pursued by the BSP, What lies in store in the coming years could gather momentum and respective is the domination of the right-centrist electoral impact, thus undermining the parties and especially the domination of electorate of the BSP. the GERB Party, around which in certain After the failure of the liberal center, periods of time and for quite different the new conditions opened room for motives rather disparate formations will the “building in” of a “two-block” set- be gravitating, including “Attack”, on up or arrangement in the party system the one hand, and the remnants of the between a left-centrist block of parties old right wing – DSB and the UDF, on and a right-wing block of parties. Af- the other. The “old right wingers” will ter the July 2009 general election, the be making attempts to expand their own left-centrist block of parties is made up political environment, even by increas- by the MRF and the BSP. Although they ingly distancing themselves from GERB, find it difficult, these two parties con- particularly when the governing party tinue their joint actions as a parliamen- begins to lose some of the initial confi- tary opposition. The right-centrist block dence the voters have invested in it. of parties is made up by the GERB Party, The right-centrist block of parties DSB, and the UDF, all of which are mem- currently enjoys a considerable preva- ber parties of the European People’s lence in the political environment. This Party (EPP). Depending on the specific domination is also particularly due to the situation, other two parties can join this crisis, which can currently be observed block, namely: the right-populist party within the left-centrist block, mainly “Order, Legality, and Justice” (OLJ), and within the BSP and the MRF. This signifi- the nationalist “Attack” Party. They cantly weakens the opposition capacity both lent their support to Borissov’s of the left-centrist block and makes it Cabinet at the beginning of its term of possible for the right-wing parties to re- office and although the “Attack” is still inforce and endorse their priorities both the most loyal supporter of GERB, the in the field of the legislative and execu- OLJ has turned into a staunch opposi- tive branches of power. tion of the governing party. At the same time, an ongoing trans- Only time will show what type of re- formation of the party system cannot be lationships will develop between these ruled out on account of the numerous two blocks of parties – either polemical unknown factors concerning the future on the level of dialog, or confrontational, results from the governance of GERB and this is what will determine the out- we are yet to see, as it is a completely line, image, and nature of the second “young” party with practically little expe- The Party System in Bulgaria 2001 – 2009 31 rience of governing the central authori- and the right-centrist party environment, ties and institutions of power and with thus consolidating the two-block party an unknown and unpredictable elite in system with relatively equitable partners the areas of governance and legislature. within each of the blocks, namely: the Whether the transformation we have left centrist BSP plus the MRF and other been witnessing will be more significant left-wing formations, on the one hand, or of a more limited nature after GERB’s and the right-centrist GERB Party plus term of office comes to an end is early to DSB and the UDF and other right-wing predict, but it is apparent that changes formations, on the other. are inevitable because of the fact that Therefore, until the next general elec- Bulgaria has a young and consolidating tion due to take place in 2013, and af- democratic party system, the foundations ter the 2011 presidential elections in the of which are still in the process of falling country, dynamic processes will be ob- into their proper place. In other words, served within the Bulgarian party system, the new two-block party system is in a which is far from consolidated as yet. At temporary state at the time being and is the same time, this will be accompanied looking forward to an effective transition by frequent changes in the correlations to a party system of greater stability. among the political forces. A number of The stability of the second party sys- factors, such as economic instability, so- tem in the post-1989 period, the foun- cial structures in development, lack of a dations of which can provisionally be well established elite, etc., coupled with said to have been laid in 2001, and the human factors, such as poor administra- possible transformations it well may un- tive capacity, the lack of quality politicians, dergo in the future depend on two major and the poor democratic political culture factors. Firstly, they depend on the effec- of the population, will continue to affect tive performance of the governing GERB the evolution of the party system over the party and its ability to preserve the public coming years as well. support it enjoys after its first year in of- fice in a difficult economic situation.S ec- ondly, they depend on the consequences of the crisis processes taking place within the BSP and the left-centrist political en- vironment as a whole. It is these processes that will deter- mine whether the hegemony of the right-centrist block will turn out to be the more durable factor, or a certain balance will be restored between the left-centrist 32 The Party System in Bulgaria 2001 – 2009

The Party System following the July 2009 General Election in Bulgaria

Right Wing Center Left Wing The “Attack” The GERB Party Party

OLJ UDF NMSII (NMSP) MRF DSB BSP

About the editor: Georgi Karasimeonov, Professor, Doctor of Philosophical Sciences, is Head of the De- partment of Political Science at the “St. Kli- ment Ohridski” Sofia University, Director of the Institute for Political and Legal Studies, and Editor-in-Chief of the “Political Stud- ies” Journal. Between 1991 and 1998 he was Chairman of the Bulgarian Association The study is part of the book “The Party System 2001-2009” for Political Sciences. (available in Bulgarian language only) soon to be published with the kind support of the FES office in Sofia, 2010 Contact point: [email protected] The 2001 general election marked the beginning of a deep transfor- mation of Bulgaria’s new party system, which was set up after the onset of the country’s transition back in 1989. From a party system of a country in transition it came to grow into a party system of consolidating democ- racy. The second post-communist party system, which began to emerge after 2001, acquired the contours of a multi-party system, but at the same time it was subject to dynamic changes, which became more apparent after the 2005 and 2009 general elections in the country.

Following the failure of the liberal center, the party system once again provided room for the “in-building” or imposition of a new two-block party system, established under novel conditions now, between a left- centrist block of parties and a right-centrist block of parties, respectively. After the 2009 general election, the left-centrist block consists of the MRF and the BSP, both of which continue their joint actions in the capacity of parliamentary opposition, despite the difficulties they are experiencing, whereas the right-centrist block is made up by GERB, DSB, and the UDF, all of which are member parties of the European People’s Party. The na- tionalist right wing party Ataka is also supporting the government.

At the same time, a process of ongoing transformation of the par- ty system well into the future cannot be ruled out because of multiple unknown factors concerning the results of the performance of a young party such as GERB because it only has minimal experience in the institu- tions of central governance and its elite in the executive and legislative branches of power is both unfamiliar and unpredictable. In other words, the new two-block party configuration is in a temporary state for the time being, waiting for yet another transition towards a greater stability of the party system to take place in the foreseeable future.

April 2010