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Home , Alan Taylor (historian), Frederick Haldimand, Iroquois, Oliver Phelps, Red Jacket, Treaty of Big Tree

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The Divided Ground: Upper , , and the Six Nations, 1783-1815 Author(s): Reviewed work(s): Source: Journal of the Early Republic, Vol. 22, No. 1 (Spring, 2002), pp. 55-75 Published by: University of Pennsylvania Press on behalf of the Society for Historians of the Early American Republic Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3124858 . Accessed: 02/11/2011 18:25

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http://www.jstor.org THE DIVIDED GROUND: , NEW YORK, AND THE IROQUOIS SIX NATIONS, 1783-1815

AlanTaylor

In recentyears, historians have paid increasing attention to bordersand borderlandsas fluidsites of bothnational formation and local contestation. At theirperipheries, nations and empires assert their power and define their identitywith no certainty of success.Nation-making and border-making are inseparablyintertwined. Nations and empires, however, often reap defiance frompeoples uneasily bisected by theimposed boundaries. This process of border-making(and border-defiance)has been especiallytangled in the Americaswhere empires and republicsprojected their ambitions onto a geographyoccupied and defined by Indians.Imperial or nationalvisions ran up against the tangled complexities of interdependentpeoples, both native and invader. Indeed, the contest of rival Euro-Americanregimes presented risky opportunitiesfor native peoples to play-off the rivals to preserve native autonomyand enhancetheir circumstances.1

AlanTaylor is professorof historyat theUniversity of Californiaat Davis. He is the authorof LibertyMen and Great Proprietors: The Revolutionary Settlement on theMaine Frontier,1760-1820 (1990); WilliamCooper's Town: Powerand Persuasionon the Frontierof theEarly American Republic (1995); and American Colonies (2001). ! DavidJ. Weber, 'Tuner, the Boltonians, and the Borderlands," American Historical Review,91 (Feb.1986), 66-81; Richard White, The Middle Ground: Indians, Empires, and Republicsin the Region, 1650-1815 (New York, 1991). For a discussionof the relationshipof comnlp-ativeto transnationalhistory, see Ian Tyrell, "American Exceptionalismin an Ageof InternationalHistory," American Historical Review, 96 (Oct. 1991), 1031-55;George M. Frederickson,"From Exceptionalism to Variability:Recent Developmuentsin Cross-National Compaiative History," Journal of AmericanHistory, 82 (Sept. 1995),487-604; and Richard White, 'The Nationalization of Nature,"ibid., 86 (Dec. 1999), 976-86.

JOURNAL OF THE EARLY REPUBLIC,22 (Sprin 2002). O 2002 Society for Historiansof the EarlyAmeican Republic. 56 JOURNALOF THE EARLY REPUBLIC Ina recentessay, Jeremy Adelman and Stephen Aron advance a helpful distinctionbetween "borderlands" and "borders." They argue that, in North Americanhistory, native peoples tried to prolong broad and porous "borderlands,"but eventuallybecame confined within the "borders"of consolidatedregimes imposed by invadingEuro-. This paper examines the transitionof one borderland-theland of the Iroquois Indians-into two borderedlands: the Stateof New Yorkin the American republicand the of UpperCanada in the Britishempire.2 At Parisin 1783,British and American negotiators concluded the War of the AmericanRevolution, recognizing the independenceof the while reservingthe Canadianprovinces to the . Americanindependence and Canadian dependence required a newboundary betweenthe youngrepublic and the lingeringempire. The negotiatorsran that boundarythrough the GreatLakes and the riversbetween them, including,most significantly,the thirty-six-mile-longNiagara River that emptiedLake Erie into Lake . Long a criticaljuncture for overland movementeast-and-west, as well as watertransport north-and-south, the assumeda contradictorynew role as an international boundary.A naturalplace of communication,passage, and mixing became redefinedas a place of separationand distinction.Or, so it seemed,on paperto negotiatorsin distantParis and theirsuperiors in Londonand .3 Along the NiagaraRiver, the IroquoisSix Nations clung to their positionas autonomouskeepers of a perpetualand open-ended borderland, a placeof exchangeand interdependence. Recognizing their own weakness in numbersand technology, the nativessought renewed strength in their

2 JeremyAdelman and Stephen Aron, "From Borderlands to Borders:Empires, Nation- States, and the Peoples in Between in North American History," American Historical Review, 104 (June 1999) 814-41. See also Evan Haefeli, "A Note on the Use of North AmericanBorderlands," and John R.Wunder and Pekka Hamalainen, "Of Lethal Places and Lethal Essays,"and the thoughtfulreply by Adelmanand Aron, "Of Lively Exchanges and Larger Perspectives," in ibid. (Oct. 1999), 1222-25, 1229-34, 1235-39. Wunder and Hamalainenfault Adelman and Aron for inadequateattention to the agency of native peoples in borderlandrelationships. The latter accept that point but reiterate the transforming rupture ultimately effected by the United States in confining native peoples within boundaries-a point that Wunderand Hamalainenobscure. 3 For a borderlandsstudy of Canadaand the United States, see Reginald C. Stuart, United States Expansionismand British , 1775-1871 (Chapel Hill, 1988). Stuart does not examine the role of Indiansin the constructionof that borderland. A more recent work on a later, more westernportion of the borderdoes illuminatethe pivotal role of native people; see Beth LaDow, TheMedicine Line: Lifeand Death on a NorthAmerican Borderland (New York, 2001). UNDERSTANDINGBOUNDARIES 57 geographicand political position between the Americansand the British. By exploitingthe lingering rivalry between the republic and the empire, the IroquoisSix Nationshoped to remainintermediate and autonomous rather than dividedand absorbed by the rivals. The nativesconceived of their borderlandas porousat bothends to thereception of informationand trade goods andfor the free movement of theirpeople. In 1790the Six Nations spokesmanRed Jacket explained to theAmericans, "that we maypass from one to the otherunmolested ... we wish to be underthe protectionof the thirteenStates as well as of the British."A yearlater, he remindedthe Americans,"[we] do not give ourselvesentirely up to them[the British], nor leanaltogether upon you. Wemean to standupright as we livebetween both." As gatekeepersof a borderland,the Six Nationsenjoyed a leverage thatwould be lost if dividedand confined by an artificialborder defined as a precise geographicline where two Euro-Americanpowers met and assertedcontrol over all inhabitantswithin their respective bounds.4 Beforethe , the six Iroquoiannations sustained a loose confederationof villageslocated south of LakeOntario and east of LakeErie, within the territory claimed by thecolony of New York. From east to west,the Six Nationswere the Mohawk (in theMohawk valley), the Oneidaand the Tuscarora(both south of LakeOneida), the Cayugaand Onondaga(in the region), and the especially numerous Seneca (in the Genesee,Allegheny, and Niagara valleys). Culturallysimilar, they spokekindred languages of theIroquoian family and occupied villages that mixed a few traditionalbark-roofed long-houses with many, compact log cabins. Theirvillages were modest in size-rarely inhabitedby morethan 500 people-and theirpopulation aggregated to about9,000 on the eve of the war. Occupyingand cultivating the most fertile pockets of alluvialsoil, they reservedmost of theirbroad hinterland as a forestfor huntingand gathering.Of course,American settlers coveted that vast hinterland, which theyregarded as wastedupon Indians and properly rededicated to theirown farm-making.5

4 , speech, Nov. 21, 1790, Papers ( Historical Society, ), Red Jacket, speech, July 10, 1791, ibid. See also the Young 21, 1791, AmericanState Indian King's5 speech, May Papers, Affairs, 1: 165. "Reportof GovernorWilliam Tryon on the of the , 1774," in E. B. O'Callaghan,ed., The DocumentaryHistory of the State of New York(4 vols., New York, 1849-51), 1: 766; HelenHornbeck Tanner, ed., Atlas ofGreat LakesIndian History (Norman,1987), 74-78; ElisabethTooker, 'The Leagueof the Iroquois:Its History, Politics, and Ritual,"in Bruce G. Trigger, ed., Handbook of North American Indians: Northeast (12 vols. to date;Washington, DC, 1978-2001), 15: 418-41; Dean R. Snow, The Iroquois (Cambridge,MA, 1994), 141-57. 58 JOURNALOF THE EARLY REPUBLIC The Warof the AmericanRevolution proved catastrophic for the Six Nations.Under severe pressure from both sides, the Iroquois divided. Most of the Oneidaand some of theTuscarora assisted the Americanrebels, but the greatmajority of theIroquois allied with the British as theirbest bet for resistingexpansionist settlers. Whatever their alliance, the Six Nationsall suffereddevastating raids that destroyed almost all their villages, especially in 1779. TheOneida fled eastward, taking refuge at Schenectady within the Americanfrontier, while the other Iroquois shifted northward into British- held Canadaor westwardto the vicinityof theBritish fort at Niagara.The raidsand flights depopulated a broadand bloody no-man's land between Niagara and Schenectady. The violent dislocationsalso promoted malnutritionand disease, combining to reduceIroquois numbers by a third, from a pre-war9,000 to a postwar6,000.6 In 1783, the war-wearyBritish governmentoffered remarkably generous terms and boundariesto the United States. The British retained Canada, but conceAedeverything south of the Great Lakes to the Americans-althoughmost of thatvast region actually belonged to Indians, includingthe Six Nations. The bordereven sacrificedthe mostimportant Britishforts along the Great Lakes, including , at the mouthof the NiagaraRiver, on thesouthwestern shore of LakeOntario. As conduits for tradeand presents from the British,the postsserved Indian interests; indeed,the natives thought of theposts as theirasset and as theirsto dispose of. Forthe United States, a nationverging on financialcollapse and unable to defend its long frontieragainst Indian raids, the peace treatywas a stunning victory. But the British-alliedIndians suffered a shocking betrayal,for the treatydid not even mentionthem, treating the nativesas merepawns passed into American control.7 Outragedby the treatyand the new border,the Indianspressured and menacedthe Britishofficials, officers, and tradersthroughout the Great Lakes,threatening violence if theytried to evacuatethe borderposts. By alarmingthe post commandants, the Indians compelled a dramaticdecision by MajorGeneral , the overallBritish commander in Canada. "Toprevent such a disastrousevent as anIndian War," he delayed turningover the forts during the summerof 1783. He also appealedto his

6 BarbaraGraymont, The Iroquois in the AmericanRevolution (Syracuse, NY, 1972), 259-91. 7 Graymont,Iroquois in theAmericanRevolution, 259-62; Colin G. Calloway, Crown and Calumet:British-Indian Relations, 1783-1815 (Norman,1987), 7-8. UNDERSTANDING BOUNDARIES 59 superiors in to renderthat retentionpermanent, by obliging the Americansto accept a broadbuffer zone, possessed by the Indians.8 Initiatedfrom fear of the Indianreaction, the proposedborderland also appealed to Canada'spremier economic interest,the mercantilefirms that tradedBritish manufactures for the furs garneredby Indianhunters around the GreatLakes. Britishposts and an Indianborderland would combine to keep American tradersand settlers away from the valuable . In early 1784 the home governmentrecognized that the peace line compromised both the security and the economy of Canada. Moreover, with growing signs that the American union of republicanstate govern- ments was faltering,the British wanted to be in a strong position for the anticipated collapse. Finally, the British governmentfound principled grounds for retainingthe posts in two American violations of the peace treaty: the states withheld payment of pre-war debts owed to British merchants and obstructed Loyalist efforts to reclaim their properties confiscated by the stategovernments.9 By catalyzingBritain's policy shift, the Indiansdemonstrated that they possessed initiativeand were more than mere pawns in an imperialgame. Far from intimidating the Indians, the British troops and their posts functioned as hostages,enabling the Indiansto compel concessions. Those concessions exposed the fallacy in the peace treaty:the insistence that an announcedand artificialboundary suddenly could separatenative peoples from their British allies. Interpenetratedand interdependentwith the Six Nations, the British traders,officials, and settlers at Niagara could not afford a rupture.'0

8 AllanMacLean to Haldimand,May 13,18,1783, Reel A-681, Add. Mss. 21763,111, 118, ManuscriptGroup 21 (HaldimandPapers), National Archives of Canada(); MajorJohn Ross to Haldimand,May 14, 1783, Reel A-688, Add. Mss. 21784, 132, ManuscriptGroup 21, ibid.;Major A. Campbellto Col. BarrySt. Leger,Aug. 6, 1785,in E. A. Cruikshank,ed., "Recordsof Niagara,1784-7," NiagaraHistorical Society, Publications,no. 39 (1928),69; Haldimandto LordNorth, Aug. 30, 1783,43: 241, and Haldimandto North,Nov. 27, 1783,46: 41, both in Reel B-37, ManuscriptGroup 21, ColonialOffice 42 (NationalArchives of Canada);Haldimnrd to SirJohn Johnson, June 14, 1784, ReelA-664, Add. Mss. 21 9 21723, 131,Manuscript Group (HaldimandPapers). RobertS. Allen, His Majesty'sIndian Allies: BritishIndian Policy in the Defence of Canada, 1774-1815 (,1992), 56-57; J. LeitchWright Jr., Britain and the American Frontier,1783-1815 (Athens, GA, 1975),20-26, 36, 42-43;Lord Sydney to Gen.Henry Hope,Apr. 6, 1788,in Cruikshank,ed., "Recordsof Niagara,1784-7," 88. 10Some historians have miscast the bufferzone as originallya Britishconcept and initiative,thereby obscuring the Indianrole as catalysts.See, for example,Reginald C. Stuart, United States Expansionismand , 1775-1871 (Chapel Hill, 1988), 7, 37-38. Stuartinsists that the British "controlled Indian tribes linked with the fur 60 JOURNALOF THEEARLY REPUBLIC Americanleaders, however, continued to nurturea fantasyof division and separation.In October1784 at (in New York State) Americancommissioners, backed by armedtroops, dictated a one-sided treatyto literallycaptive Iroquois chiefs. The treatyextorted a four-mile wide stripalong the NiagaraRiver and all Six Nationlands west of the mouthof BuffaloCreek, at the southwesternedge of theNiagara corridor. It is strikingand significantthat the Americansdemanded land on the western margin of Iroquoia,rather than on the eastern, where American settlerswere encroaching. The federalcommissioners left to the stateof New Yorkthe treatiesto procurelands for settlersfrom the individual Iroquoisnations. From a federalperspective, the critical matter in 1784was to affirmthat the 1783peace treaty with the British had established a firm internationalboundary at Niagara,where Americansovereignty ran uncheckedup againstthe Britishsovereignty, without any intervening Indianborderland. A stripof federalterritory prevented the Six Nations from interposingbetween British Canada and AmericaNew York and, instead,separated the Iroquoisfrom their allies, British and native, to the west. The Niagarastrip affirmedin geographicspace the American insistence that the Treatyof Paris made the United States "the sole sovereignwithin the limits... andtherefore the sole powerto whomthe [Indian]nations living within those limits are hereafterto look up for protection."Like the 1783 peacetreaty boundary, the 1784 FortStanwix line was a politicalconcept bluntly imposed on space in provocative defianceof the socialgeography. Indeed, the line ranthrough the preemi- nent clusterof Six Nationsvillages at BuffaloCreek, and (if enforced) dispossessedthe Iroquoisof theirvillages at Cattaraugus.Of course,the Six Nationschiefs, in councilat BuffaloCreek, promptly disavowed the treatyas dictatedby force on theircaptive delegates. The price of the Americans' geographicfantasy was the alienation of-rather than reconciliationwith-the greatmajority of theIroquois.1 By keepingthe borderposts, the Britishreassured the Indiansbut angeredthe Americans:an exchangethe Britishwere willing to make duringthe 1780s. TheBritish shift initiated a stateof cold waralong the frontier,as their officers annually supplied presents of gunsand ammunition trade."It would be moreaccurate to saythat the British and the Indians both influenced and pressuredone anotherin a constantgive-and-take between their mutual and their clashing interests. " White,Middle Ground, 416-17; , "Fort Stanwix Proceedings," in Neville B. Craig,ed., TheOlden Time (2 vols.,, 1848), 2: 410 (Oct.11, includes quotation)and 425 (Oct.20, givesthe boundary). For the Iroquoisrefutation of thetreaty, see Anthony F. C. Wallace, The Death and Rebirthof the Seneca (New York, 1978), 173. UNDERSTANDINGBOUNDARIES 61 to the Indians.The Britishmeant for the well-armedIndians to give the Americanspause in theirdrive to settlethe borderland.Kept at a safe distance,the Americanscould not menacethe posts. To the west, the Indiansof the countryemployed their British munitions to resist Americanintrusions and to raidAmerican settlements. In New York,the Iroquoishoped to preservetheir lands withoutentering the war by preservingan armed neutrality, instead. Willingto sustaina coldwar, the British were by no meanseager for an escalationinto another expensive hot warwith the Americans.Instead of announcingthe post retentionas permanent,they continuedto hold desultoryand intermittent negotiations with American diplomats over the tangledissues of the furtrade, Indians, posts, debts, and Loyalists. Those talksheld out the vagueprospect that someday the British would hand over theposts. Meanwhile,the British played for time, to see if theUnited States would collapse,leaving the posts, the Indians,and the fur tradein the Britishorbit. Nor could the Americansafford to vent theiroutrage in anotherhot war. Financiallyand militarily bankrupt, the United States was barelyable to fightthe Indiansin the Ohiocountry; could not musterthe forcesto attackthe British posts; and was certainly incapable of wagingthe massivewar with the empirethat such attacks would provoke. Resenting Britishpower and their own weakness,the Americans could only hope for a diplomaticsolution.'2 To increasetheir diplomatic leverage, the Americans worked to defeat the OhioIndians and to woo theIroquois Six Nationsduring the late 1780s andearly . Bothefforts became more significant after 1788, when the American states ratified a new constitutionendowing their federal governmentwith enhanced revenues and increased power. After 1789, the new federalleaders-principally President , Secretary atWar Henry Knox, and Indian commissioner Timothy Pickering-worked at leastto keepthe Six Nationsneutral in theOhio country war. Betteryet, federalleaders hoped to enlist theiraid in pressuringand inducingthe westernIndians to makea peace.Embarking on a charmoffensive, the federalgovernment treated the Six Nationswith diplomaticrespect and generouspresents. On theNew Yorkfrontier, at Tiogain November1790 andNewtown Point in July1791, Pickering held two conciliatorycouncils with Six Nationschiefs. In early 1792, federalleaders also hosted a successfulvisit to Philadelphiaby a largedelegation of Six Nationschiefs, primarilySeneca, including Red Jacket and Farmer's Brother. That spring, the Washingtonadministration appointed Israel Chapin as the new

12 Allen, His Majesty's IndianAllies, 67-68; Calloway, Crown and Calumet, 17. 62 JOURNALOF THE EARLY REPUBLIC superintendentfor Iroquoisaffairs to reside in the Geneseecountry of westernNew York. Thechiefs regarded Chapin as theirasset: as a conduit for informationand patronageconveniently placed in their country.'3 Fora few headyyears during the early 1790s, Six Nationschiefs found themselvescourted by two ardentand generous suitors. To competewith the BritishIndian agents, Chapin matched their hospitality to chiefs and their annualdelivery of presents(mostly cloth, jewelry, gunpowder, and shot). In June1792 Chapin reported to Pickering:"be persuaded, Sir, that as long as [theBritish] are able to make[the Indians] more presents than theyreceive from us, theywill havethe most with them." Recognizing the centralityof propertyto Euro-Americans,Indians regarded generosity as the measureof theirsincerity. In 1794Chapin explained to his superiorsthat a recent shipmentof clothing"Confirmed them in oppinion of your FriendlyDisposition towards them & thatyour friendship did not appear by wordsonly but by actionsalso." The new Americanattention and presents uppedthe ante,obliging the Britishofficials to respondin kind. In April 1793 John GravesSimcoe (lieutenantgovernor of the newly created provinceof UpperCanada) sighed, "I observedwith regret the expensive dressthat the Farmer'sBrother had received at Philadelphia,as it addsto thatexpense, which it is inevitableand proper that we shouldbe at during the presentnegotiation, to supportour creditwith the Indians."Simcoe matchedthe Americanlargesse because preserving "the affections of the Indians"was "of the utmostimportance." In turn, enhancedBritish generosityinspired the chiefs to expecteven more from the Americans.In April 1794Chapin sighed, "The Expences of theIndians increase very fast. Their demandsincrease with the importance[that] they suppose their friendshipto be of to us."14 The presentsflowed unevenlyto reflectthe political geographyof Iroquoia. Duringthe mid-1780s,the Six Nationspeoples had shifted aroundin searchof thebest locations for theirpost-war villages. Abouta third (2,000) abandonedtheir crowded refugee villages near Niagara or Schenectadyto rebuildin theirformer homelands, in thebroad intervening

13 HenryKnox, reportto the president,June 15,1789, AmericanState Papers, Indian Affairs, 1: 13; AlanTaylor, "Lnd and Libertyon the Post-RevolutionaryFrontier," in David Thomas Konig, Devising Liberty:Preserving and CreatingFreedom in the New American Republic (Stanford, 1995), 81-108; Wallace, Death and Rebirth of the Seneca, 172-79; White, Middle Ground,457-58. 14 Chapinto Pickering,June 2,1792, PickeringPapers; Chapin to Knox, July 17, 1792, American State Papers, IndianAffairs, 1: 242; Simcoe to AluredClarke, Apr. 21, 1793, in Cruikshank,ed., Correspondenceof Simcoe, 1: 317; Chapinto Knox, Apr. 29, and , 1794, in O'Reilly Collection, (New York HistoricalSociety, New York, NY). UNDERSTANDINGBOUNDARIES 63 territorydepopulated by the war. By 1791, about590 Oneidaand 80 Tuscaroradwelled in a tractsouth of Lake Oneida;minorities of the Onondaga(180) andCayuga (130) reclaimedvillages in the FingerLakes country;and a moresubstantial number of Senecareestablished homes in the Allegheny(300) or Genesee (800) valleys. A secondgroup of Iroquois, led by theMohawk, preferred to withdrawbehind the British line to resettle withinCanada. Numberingabout 1,350, they clusteredat Tyendinegea (150) to thenorth or (1,200) to thewest of theNiagara valley. The third,and largest, group of Iroquoisclung to villagesin the Niagara corridor,especially at BuffaloCreek (present Buffalo, New Yorkat the outletof LakeErie into the NiagaraRiver). The post-warceremonial and politicalcenter of theSix Nationsconfederacy, Buffalo Creek was a cluster of villageswith about 2,000 inhabitants,a mix of Cayuga,Onondaga, and (especially)Seneca. In thisdispersed and often fractious world of post-war Iroquoia, the Buffalo Creek chiefs had considerableprestige, some influence,but no commandover their people living at a distance.Indeed, there was considerablerivalry between the variousIroquoian village clusters,which workedagainst a commonfront in diplomacywith the outsiders,British or American.'s The threeIroquois groupings reflected varying degrees of Britishand Americaninfluence. Thosewithin Canada accepted British presents and advice(but never command). Those deep within New Yorkfelt the lureof Americanpresents and the pressureof westward-migratingAmerican settlers.By 1790this Iroquois group was already outnumbered by fourteen- to-oneby the29,000 inhabitants of New York'stwo westernmost , Ontario and Montgomery. Growingsettler numbersgave them an empoweringsense of security. On March16, 1791, IsraelChapin Jr. reportedfrom the Genesee, "People have moved into the Country consider- ably the winterpast & nothingwas talked[of] fromany fearof Indians." On theother hand, as settlerfears waned, the localIndian anxiety grew. In April, a federalemissary reported that the GeneseeSeneca anticipated a frontierwar and "wished to jointhe U[nited] States because if theytook the other side, they knew that ultimatelythey must be drivenfrom the[ir] lands."16

'1 SamuelKirkland, "A Statement of theNumber & Situationof theSix United Nations of Indians in North America,"Oct. 15, 1791, MiscellaneousBound (Massachusetts HistoricalSociety). Forthe return to theAllegheny, see Richter,"Onas, the Long Knife," 131-33; Wallace, Death and Rebirthof the Seneca, 168-69. 16 SamuelKirkland, "A Statementof the Number& Situationofthe Six UnitedNations of Indians in North America," Oct. 15, 1791, Miscellaneous Bound (Massachusetts Historical Society); Bureauof the Census, Heads of Families at the First Census of the 64 JOURNALOF THEEARLY REPUBLIC If GrandRiver was too close to the Britishand Genesee (and points southand east) too nighthe Americans, then Buffalo Creek was just right, equidistantbetween the two powers,and the specialbeneficiary of their competingpresents. Indeed, Buffalo Creek retained so manyinhabitants becauseof its privilegedaccess to the patronageof the Euro-American competitors. At Buffalo Creek in 1791 Thomas Proctorfound the inhabitants"far better clothed than those Indians were in the townsat a greaterdistance, owing entirely to theimmediate intercourse they have with the British." The Buffalo Creekchiefs, who includedRed Jacketand Farmer'sBrother, recognized the benefitsof theirmiddle position in both diplomacyand geography.17 That middlingposition eroded after September1794, when an Americanarmy defeated the hostilewestern Indians at FallenTimbers in the . The Britishlost credibilityand influencewhen their troops failed to help the retreatingIndians. Bitterlydisappointed and disillusioned,the westernconfederates divided into mutual recriminations that enabledthe Americantroops to consolidatetheir victory. That November,in Londonthe Britishgovernment also concludeda treatywith Americanemissary John Jay, resolvingthe lingeringdifferences of the postwarera. Inthe "," the British accepted the 1783peace treaty boundarythrough the GreatLakes and promised to surrenderthe border posts duringthe summerof 1796-which promisethey kept. In an importantconcession to nativeinterests, the treaty's third article guaranteed the rightof "theIndians dwelling on eitherside of thesaid boundary line" freelyto crossand recross with their own possessions.'8 The defeatof the westernIndians and the Jay Treatycost the Six Nationsmuch of theirleverage with the Americans.News of the battleat Fallen Timbersreached Canandaigua in westernNew York in October 1794, whereand when Timothy Pickering and Israel Chapin were holding anothercouncil with the chiefsof theSix Nations.The news undercut the most defiantchiefs, and strengthenedthe proponentsof compromise, leadingin earlyNovember to a comprehensivetreaty that confirmed the ascendancyof Americaninfluence over the Indians within New YorkState. Preferringcomity to confrontation,Pickering made important concessions. He rescindedthe most controversialpart of the cessionextorted at Fort

United States Takenin the Year1790: New York(Baltimore, 1966), 9; Israel ChapinJr. to ,Mar. 16,1791, Phelps andGorham Papers (New YorkState Library, Albany); Captain Bowman,Journal, Apr. 28, 1791, PickeringPapers. 17 ,Diary, Apr. 27, 1791, AmericanState Papers, Indian Affairs, 1: 155. '1 Wright,Britain and the AmericanFrontier, 92-98. UNDERSTANDINGBOUNDARIES 65 Stanwixin 1784;the United States relinquished its claimsto thelands in the vicinityof BuffaloCreek and Cattaraugus:the southernhalf of the strip alongthe Niagara River and the Shore as faras the Pennsylvania border. He made that concessionto securea tract more immediately importantto theUnited States: the northwestern "triangle" of Pennsylvania on the shoresof LakeErie. The"" gave Americans access to thatlake as it potentiallycut off theSix Nationsfrom direct communication with theIndians of the Ohiocountry. The Treatyof Canandaiguaenabled Pennsylvaniansto develop settlementsin the triangleand permittedthe FederalGovernment to erecta fortto guardthe harborat PresqueIsle. In September1795 at that new fort, Andrew Ellicott reported: "We have little or no news in thisquarter, and what little we have,is concerningMr. Jay's Treaty.The Indianscontinue peaceable, and well disposed;the military establishmenthere will havea powerfuleffect in keepingthem quiet."19 In rapidsuccession, the Battle of FallenTimbers (September 1794), the CanandaiguaTreaty (November 1794), the JayTreaty (November 1794), andthe Americanoccupation of theErie Triangle (summer 1795), set new boundsto the Six Nations. With the westernIndians defeated and the Britishin retreat,the Americanscould take command along their border withCanada. In Augustof 1796,American troops garrisoned Fort Niagara afterthe Britishwithdrew across the river to the easternshore, where they hadbuilt a newpost named Fort George. In early September, Israel Chapin Jr.(his latefather's successor as federalagent for the Iroquois) noted a new and demoralizingsense of confinementamong the Six Nations:"And the Americanshave their line of Forts all aroundthem and settlements advancingupon their Country so thatthey have given up allNational honor whichthey ever have had, and have become given to indolence,drunken- ness and . . . killing each other.There have been five murderedamong themselveswithin six months."Although Chapin exaggerated the early nadir, he anticipatedthe natives' growing sense of weakness,as the Americanadvent at Niagara initiated two decades of tensionover the proper meaningof theborder. The Indians never went meekly, but the terms of the debatekept shiftingagainst their autonomy, as each new confrontation exactedmore concessions.2

19 William N. Fenton, ed., "The Journal of James Emlen Kept on a Trip to Canandaigua,New York.. .," Ethnohistory,12 (Fall, 1965), 279-342; Savery, William, "Journal,"Friends' Library, 1 (Philadelphia, 1837), 353-67; Andrew Ellicott to Sally Ellicott, Sept. 11, 1795, in Mathews,Catharine Van Cortlandt,ed.,Andrew Ellicott, His Life and Letters (New York, 124. 20 1908), Israel ChapinJr. to JamesMcHenry, Sept. 4, 1796, O'Reilly Collection. 66 JOURNALOF THE EARLY REPUBLIC

On September21, the new Americancommandant at Niagara,Captain James Bruff, held a council with the Six Nations to explain their new situation within an Americanboundary: "Lines are fixed, and so strongly marked between us [the British and the Americans],that they cannot be mistaken, and every precaution taken to prevent a misunderstanding." Citing the boundary,Bruff announcednew restrictionson the Six Nations. He demandedthat the Iroquoiscease their profitablepractice of tracking British deserters for British rewards within the new American line. Ignoring the Jay Treaty,Bruff also insisted that the chiefs could no longer send delegations of chiefs and copies of American speeches across the border to the British agents at Fort George-without first obtaining his permission. And the captain discouraged their expectations that the Americans would continue the British practice of freely feeding Indian visitors to Fort Niagara. Bruffs speech alarmedthe Six Nations as an assault on three long-standing rights-rewards for deserters, open communication with both empires, and official hospitality to visiting chiefs.21 The Six Nations did not acquiesce quietly. In his pointed reply, Red Jacketargued that the Six Nationsremained an autonomouspeople situated between the British and the Americans:

You area cunningPeople withoutSincerity, and not to be trusted,for after makingProfessions of your Regard,and saying every thing favorable to us, you ... tell us that our Countryis within the lines of the States. This surprizesus, for we had thoughtour Landswere our own, not within your Boundaries,but joining the British, and between you and them. But now you have got roundus and next [to] the British, you tell us we are inside your Lines.... We had alwaysthought that we [ad]joinedthe British and were outside your lines.

Red Jacket understoodthat the Six Nations lost their sovereignty if the American boundary line coincided with the limits of Upper Canada, subordinatingthe Iroquoisas it separatedthem into the jurisdictionof two distinct empires:British and American. Bending, but not capitulating,the Six Nations dwelling in the Niagara corridor stopped tracking British deserters, but persistedin communicatingwith, and taking presentsfrom, British officials at Fort George.22

21 CaptainJames Bruff, speech, Sept. 21, 1796, and Bruffto unknown,Sept. 25, 1796, ibid. 22 Red Jacket,speech, Sept. 23, 1796, ibid. UNDERSTANDINGBOUNDARIES 67 Longthe keepers of a broadand porous borderland, the Iroquois of the Niagaracorridor now confronteda double set of restrictingboundaries: first, the internationalborder along the NiagaraRiver and, second,the privateproperty lines run by surveyorsdemarcating Indian reservations as enclaveswithin a settlers'world. The two sets of lineswere interdependent, as theassertion of thefirst facilitated the American pressure that established the second-which,then, reinforced the meaning of thenearby international boundary.Emboldened by Fort Niagara in American hands, settlers pressed acrossthe Geneseeriver into westernmost New Yorkby thehundreds after 1796.23 Unableto keep the intrudersout, the Senecachiefs felt obliged to negotiatewith the land speculators who held the "pre-emption right" to buy the Senecatitle to westernNew York. Makingthe bestof a badsituation, the leadingchiefs (includingRed Jacket)secured private payments and futurepensions in returnfor facilitatingthe 1797Treaty of Big Treewith the HollandLand Company. The Senecasurrendered almost all of their remaininglands, holding back eleven reservations, totaling about 200,000 acres, and includingBuffalo Creek, Cattaraugus, and Allegheny. They receiveda principalof $100,000 vestedin Americanbank stock, which yielded an annualpayment of $6,000. This initiallyseemed impressive untildivided among 1,500 Seneca to providea modest$4 apieceper year. For thatpittance, the Seneca lost theirdistinctiveness as the lastof theSix Nationswith a largehomeland, settling for theirown set of enclavesin a landscapeprimarily owned, and increasinglysettled, by whites. The Cayugaand Onondago dwelling in westernNew York got no paymentsand no securereservation, which led manyto moveout, acrossthe borderto resettleat GrandRiver.2 The new landscapeof boundaries-bothreservation and interna- tional-reduced the mobilityof the BuffaloCreek Six Nations. In their sailing vessels,the Britishformerly had allowed the Indiansfree passage across the NiagaraRiver and along the GreatLakes. Underthe new Americanregime, their skippers were rarely so generous.Undaunted, the resourcefulBuffalo Creek chiefs sought a partialsubstitute by contracting with an Americanferry-keeper, who agreed to conveythem freely to-and- fro acrossthe Niagara River in returnfor theirland grant to accommodate his homeand ferry at Black Rock. Butthis ferry-keeper could not compete with a rivalbased on the Canadianside, who couldcharge whites less by

23 Charles Williamson, "Descriptionof the Settlement of the Genesee Country,"in O'Callaghan, ed., Documentary the State New York,2: 1141. 24 History of of Wallace, Death and Rebirthof the Seneca, 179-83. 68 JOURNALOF THE EARLY REPUBLIC refusingto carryIndians for free. In an 1802treaty with the Stateof New York,the Seneca surrendered more land along the river in returnfor a ferry monopolycontrolled by the statebut mandated to providefree passage to Indians. The state,however, neglected its end of the bargain,leasing the ferry withoutstipulating the free Indianpassage. Not until 1807 did the statepass a lawvacating the former lease and obliging the new ferry-keeper to honorthe right of the Senecato freepassage.25 Thenew boundary also curtailed the power of theSix Nationsfreely to tradeto the Britishside of the border.In May 1802 at BuffaloCreek an Americancustoms collector seized the goods of a petty trader,Mrs. ElisabethThompson, of Fort Erie village on the westernshore of the Niagara. IsraelChapin Jr. characterizedThompson as a "lameWidow woman,who... hasbeen fiddling among the Six Nationsfor a livelyhood." She appealedto bothIndian sympathy and self-interest. Critical of thecold competitivenessof the invadingsociety, natives liked the opportunityto patronizea poor white woman-especiallybecause she chargedlower prices than did the Americantraders. Those traderscomplained that Thompsonviolated American customs regulations in crossingthe new borderto conducther old tradeat BuffaloCreek. Their complaint induced the customscollector to act-and the Indiansto react. Chapinreported, "TheIndians, thinking it wasaltogether oppression in the traders,thought they mightassist their old friendwho was sellinglow for cash in hand." They broke open the governmentwarehouse, liberated her goods, and spiritedthem to safetyacross the river in UpperCanada.26 TheSeneca insisted that their sovereignty gave them control over trade into their reservation,but the new Americansecretary of war, ,trumped that sovereigntywith his nation'scontrol over the boundary. Denouncingthe "glaringoutrage on the laws of the United

25 Red Jacket,speech, Oct. 30, 1799, Reel C-1194, RecordGroup 1 E3 (UpperCanada State Papers),39:14 (NationalArchives of Canada);Charles D. Cooper, Oliver Phelps, and Ezra L'Hommedieuto Gov. GeorgeClinton, July 12, 1802, and Red Jacket,speech, Aug. 19, 1802, both in A1823, AssemblyPapers, 40, IndianAffairs, 1780-1809 (New York State Archives, Albany);New York Statetreaty with the Seneca, Aug. 20, 1802, AmericanState Papers, IndianAffairs 1: 664; ElishaJenkins to ErastusGranger, Oct. 22, 1806, in Charles M. Snyder,ed., Redand Whiteon theNew YorkFrontier: A StruggleforSurvival (Harrison, NY, 1978), 36; chap. 72, "AnAct relativeto the Purchaseof the CayugaReservation... and for other Purposes,"Mar. 27, 1807, in [New York State], Laws of the State of New York, Containing all the Acts Passed at the 30th, 31st, and 32nd sessions of the Legislature (Albany, 1809), 89. 26 Secretaryat WarHenry Dearborn to IsraelChapin Jr., June 15, 1802, and Chapinto Dearborn, July 6, 1802 (includes the quotations), O'Reilly Collection; to Oliver Phelps, Aug. 17, 1802, Phelps and GorhamPapers. UNDERSTANDINGBOUNDARIES 69 States,"Dearborn demanded the Seneca pledge never again to interferewith Americancustoms officers. He threatenedto withholdthe value of the liberatedgoods from their annuity payment. Given the Indian dependence on thatannuity for their clothing, it gavethe government a powerful handle to compelSix Nationscompliance. The chiefs formally apologized for their action,grudgingly conceding that the boundarygave federalcontrol over theirtrade with Canada.27 While constrainingthe Indians,the boundaryempowered especially unscrupulouswhite settlers to preyon nativeproperty. In 1812Red Jacket bitterlycomplained that the settlerscommitted twice as many theftson Indiansas theydid on the whites. Between1805 and 1810 the Tuscarora dwellingnear Fort Niagara counted seventeen cattle and two horsesstolen by settlers. The thievesexploited the nearbyborder to conveythe rustled animalsinto Upper Canadafor ready sale beyond the jurisdictionof Americanmagistrates. In effect, the settlerencroachment and nearby nationalboundary combined to facilitatethefts. Thosethefts compounded the growingsense of socialclaustrophobia felt by theIndians. Worse still, Americanauthorities and missionaries gradually and reluctantly concluded that it would be easier to move the Indianswest than to protecttheir reservationsfrom their most ruthless neighbors. seemed a humanitarianmeasure to New York'sleaders-if not to the Indians,who preferredthe enforcement of theirtreaty rights.28 In 1802some of thoseaggressive whites also endowed the state of New York with a murdercase to assertits legaljurisdiction over the Seneca. Prosecutionundercut native sovereignty as it reiteratedthe new statusof the NiagaraRiver as thejurisdictional boundary for both the UnitedStates and New York. On July25, 1802,a Senecaknown to settlersas "Stiff-Armed George,"or "SenecaGeorge," got intoa drunkenfracas outside a tavernin the frontiervillage of New Amsterdam(now Buffalo) adjacentto the BuffaloCreek reservation. Pursued and beaten, George pulled a knifeto stab two whitemen, one fatally(John Hewitt). Underpressure from the local magistrates,the Senecachiefs reluctantlysurrendered George for

27 Secretaryat WarHenry Dearborn to IsraelChapin Jr., June 15, 1802, and Chapinto Dearborn,July 6, 1802 (includes the quotations), Collection. 28 O'Reilly ErastusGranger, notes, Oct. 11, 1810, and Red Jacket,speech, Feb. 13, 1810, in Snyder, ed., Red and Whiteon the New YorkFrontier, 31, 40; Red Jacket, speech, July 8, 1812, in E. A. Cruikshank,ed., DocumentaryHistory of the Campaign on the Niagara Frontier in 1812 (, CAN, n.d.), 110. For the removal agitation, see Christopher Densmore, Red Jacket: IroquoisDiplomat and Orator(Syracuse, 1999), 88-89; Laurence M. Hauptman,Conspiracy of Interests: Iroquois Dispossession and the Rise of New York State (Syracuse, 1999), 144-61. 70 JOURNAL OF THE EARLY REPUBLIC incarcerationin the OntarioCounty jail at Canandaigua,pending trial. In general, natives dreadedprolonged imprisonmentas worse than a violent death. They also distinguished,in Red Jacket'swords, murders "committed in cool blood" from killings while intoxicated,which they blamed on the alcohol ratherthan the drinker.29 The Seneca chiefs fromBuffalo Creekwere alreadyon theirway to the New York state capitol at Albany to discuss a land cession. Their spokesman,Red Jacket,protested George's arrestand trialas incompatible with the Senecastanding as a sovereignpeople:

Did we ever make a treatywith the stateof New-York,and agreeto conformto its laws? No. We areindependent of thestate of New-York. It wasthe will of the GreatSpirit to createus differentin color;we have differentlaws, habits, and customs from the white people. We shall never consentthat the government of this state shall try our brother.

Citingthe severalmurders of Senecaby whitesthat had been resolved by giving presents,rather than by demandingexecutions, Red Jacket insisted, "We now cravethe sameprivilege in makingrestitution to you, thatyou adoptedtoward us in a similarsituation."30 GovernorGeorge Clinton replied that settling a murderwith presents was "repugnant"to the laws of New York,which he meantto enforce throughoutits bounds. The nationalgovernment also disappointedthe Senecaby decliningto intervene.In 1801a newRepublican administration led by ThomasJefferson had sweptthe Federalistsfrom national power. Unlikethe Federalists, who had asserted national supremacy over the states, the JeffersonianRepublicans generally favored states rights and proved reluctantto interveneon behalf of Indiansdwelling within state boundaries. Unlikethe national Federalists, who were willing (in theshort term) to treat Indiansovereignty with politic respect, the JeffersonianRepublicans were eager, whereverpossible, to dissolve diplomaticrelations and subject nativesas individualsto the lawsof particularstates.31 At Canandaiguaon February22, 1803, a trialjury convicted Seneca Georgeof murder,establishing New York'scriminal jurisdiction over the Iroquois. But neitherthe jurors nor the governorand legislatorsof New

29 IsaacChapin Jr. to HenryDearborn, Aug. 1, 1802,O'Reilly Collection; Red Jacket, speeches,Aug. 18, 20,1802,in A1823Assembly Papers, 40 (IndianAffairs, 1780-1809). 30 RedJacket, speech at Canandaigua, quoted in WilliamLeete Stone, Life and Times of Red-Jacket(New York, 1841), 175. 31 LeonardD.White, The Jeffersonians:A Study inAdministrative History, 1801-1829 (New York, 1956), 496-512. UNDERSTANDINGBOUNDARIES 71 Yorkthought it wiseto completethe process with an execution. The grandjurors petitioned the governorto suspendthe executionand call on the legislaturefor a pardon.Declaring that George acted in self-defenseand that "theWhite inhabitants of BuffaloeCreek have committed wanton & unprovokedattacks on severalof the Indiansof the SenecaNation, which probablyhave occasionedthe deathof the deceased[John Hewitt]," the grandjurors suggested that both "policy" and "justice" called for a pardon. The UnitedStates secretary of war,Henry Dearborn, agreed that a pardon would "havea goodeffect on the mindsof the IndianNations generally." On March5, GovernorClinton suspended the execution and recommended a pardonbecause of "extenuatingcircumstances which attendedthe commissionof the crime"and "considerationsof a politicalnature for extendingthe mercyof governmentto the culprit." A week laterthe legislatorspardoned Seneca George, with the proviso that he leavethe state permanently.Having established their legal precedent, the New Yorkers could affordto be magnanimous.Executing Seneca George would have been gratuitous-andmight have provokedrevenge killings by his kin. Onceagain, the Iroquois compelled a compromisefrom the new keepers of the border-butevery compromise marked a furthershift in thebalance of powerin theAmericans' favor.32 Duringthe August 1802 meeting with the Seneca chiefs in Albany,the Governorpressed for anotherland cession: a one-mile wide strip of shorelinebeside the Niagara River, as wellas theislands in themiddle. The New Yorkerswanted to promotecommerce along the river; facilitate a new federalfort at BlackRock, at the mouthof BuffaloCreek, as a counterto FortErie on theBritish shore; and discourage contacts by the Six Nations withinthe United States with their kin across the water at GrandRiver. The New Yorkersalso sought to strengthentheir claim to the islands,which the Britishcounter-claimed. And intrding a stripof NewYork territory would push theBuffalo Creek reservation back from the internationalboundary,

32 GeorgeClinton to HenryDearbor, Aug. 21, 1802, AmericanState Papers, Indian Affairs,1: 667; Dearbornto Clinton,Feb. 14, 1803,and Ontario County Grand Jurors to New YorkState Legislature, Feb. 25, 1803,Assembly Papers, 40 (IndianAffairs, 1780- 1809); People v. George, a Seneca Indian,Feb. 22, 1803, OntarioCounty Courtof Oyer & Terminer,Record Book for 1797-1847,20 (OntarioCounty Archives, Hopewell, NY); Charles Z. Lincoln, ed., State of New York:Messages From the Governors, Vol. 2: 1777- 1822 (Albany,1909), 531; chap.31, "AnAct to pardonGeorge, a SenecaIndian," New York State, Laws of the State of New Yorkpassed at the Twenty-SixthSession of the Legislature(Albany, 1803), 64. 72 JOURNALOF THE EARLY REPUBLIC further weakening their residual claim to be a people in between the Americans and the British.33 The New York state Indian commissioners secured half of their prize-the shorelinebut not the islands. GovernorClinton boasted that he had removed "from their minds the unjust prejudices which had been excited against the erection of a fortressin that quarter."The Seneca, he insisted, accepted that the Black Rock fort would serve "for our mutual protection and defense." By defining the defense of New York and the Buffalo CreekIndians as "mutual,"Clinton expected to alienatethem from their kin withinthe Britishlines. By intrudinga fortbetween Buffalo Creek and the Britishline, the Americansmeant to divide and isolate the two great centers of the Six Nations-Grand River and Buffalo Creek-in anticipa- tion of a futurewar with the British.34 That conflict came in June 1812, when the United States declaredwar on GreatBritain and preparedto invade Canada. The federalIndian agent, ErastusGranger, bluntly warned the Buffalo CreekIndians that they risked exterminationif they helped the British, but he promised security if they kept out of the war. Grangerobserved, "TheUnited States are strongand powerful; you are few in numbersand weak, but as our friendswe consider you and your women andchildren under our protection."Long accustomed to avid competitionfor theiralliance, the Buffalo Creekchiefs did not like being treatedas inconsequential-but they could not arguewith the relative numbers.35 The Buffalo Creekchiefs agreedto send a delegationto GrandRiver to preach a Six Nations unity in neutrality. The delegated chiefs sadly conceded that they spoke from a position of weakness:

The gloomy Day, foretoldby our ancients,has at last arrived;-the Independenceand Glory of theFive Nations has departed from us;-We find ourselvesin the handsof two powerfulNations, who can crushus whenthey please. They are the same in everyrespect, although they are now preparingto contend... Neither one nor [the] other have any affectiontowards us.

33 Hauptmann,Conspiracy of Interests,133-34. 34 CharlesD. Cooper,Oliver Phelps, and EzraL'Hommedieu to Gov. GeorgeClinton, July 12, 1802, and Red Jacket,speech, Aug. 19, 1802, both in A1823, Assembly Papers,40 (Indian Affairs, 1780-1809); New York State treatywith the Seneca, Aug. 20, 1802, John Tayler to HenryDearborn, , Aug. 23, 1802, and George Clinton to Dearborn,Aug. 21, 1802, all in AmericanState Papers, Indian Affairs, 1: 664, 666-67. 35 ErastusGranger, speech, July 6, 1812, in Cruikshank,ed., DocumentaryHistory of the Campaignon the Niagara Frontier in 1812, 105. UNDERSTANDINGBOUNDARIES 73

In reply,the GrandRiver spokesman, John Norton, recognized the plight of the BuffaloCreek Indians: "The Americans have gained possession of all yourCountry, excepting the smallpart which you havereserved. They have envelopedyou:-it is out of yourpower to assist us,-because in doingso,-you wouldhazard the Destruction of yourfamilies." But Norton rathermyopically insisted that the GrandRiver Six Nationsremained free withinthe British line: "Our Situation is verydifferent. You knowthat the preferringto live underthe protection of theKing, rather than fall underthe poweror influenceof theAmericans,-induced us to fix ourhabitations at this place." To defendtheir autonomy, the GrandRiver Indians would upholdtheir alliance with the British:"If the King is attacked,we must supporthim, we aresure that such conduct is honourable."36 A monthlater, both the Americans and the Britishworked to keepthe Iroquoisdivided and apart. In publiccouncil, Red Jacketsought another chanceto appealto GrandRiver. Grangerdisparaged the idea,'They will onlyfill yourheads with idle talk, and poison your minds against the United States."But, to appeasethe insistent Buffalo Creek Iroquois, he reluctantly agreedto allowa smalldelegation, no morethan five chiefs. On the other shore,the British commander, Major General , further restricted the contact,to just two chiefsand a matterof minutes. Unablefreely to conversewith the Grand River Indians under arms in theBritish service, the two BuffaloCreek chiefs returned home in frustration.37 Theepisode demonstrated that the imposed border had divided the Six Nations,subordinating each side to a rivalempire. Division and war proved disastrousfor the Six Nationsin bothalliances. In 1812and early 1813 the GrandRiver warriors helped repel the Americaninvasions of the . FrustratedAmerican officers broke their former promises and cajoledthe Buffalo Creek warriors into joining the war. Despitetheir best efforts,the Six Nationwarriors could not alwaysavoid combat with one another,in a warthat served none of them.They inflicted especially heavy casualtieson oneanother during the slmmer of 1814. Afterthe Americans and the Britishmade peace in late 1814,they both lost interestin the Six Nationsas allies. Instead,both empires viewed the Indiansfundamentally as obstaclesto economicdevelopment. Once keen to keep the Iroquois

36 CarlBenn, The Iroquois in the Warof 1812 (Toronto, 1998), 29-66; CarlF. Klinck and JamesJ. Talman,eds., TheJournal of MajorJohn Norton, 1816 (Toronto, 1970), 286- 91. 37 Red Jacket and Erastus Granger, speeches, July 8, 1812, in Cruikshank,ed., DocumentaryHistory of the Campaignon the Niagara Frontier in 1812, 110-13. 74 JOURNALOF THE EARLY REPUBLIC securelywithin their boundaries, after 1815 New York's leaders pressed for theirremoval west.38 Fromthe end of the AmericanRevolution in 1783through the Warof 1812, the Americanscontended to realize and master the boundary imaginedby the peace treatythat concluded the first conflict. For the Americans,securing that boundary required subordinating the Iroquois Six Nationsand discouraging their ties withthe British side. The processwas reciprocal,for once the Americansgained a secureperch on the Niagara River, they could consolidatetheir ascendancyover the Indians by restrictingmovement, regulating trade, demanding land cessions, and enforcingcriminal jurisdiction. After 1796, the Indiansgradually lost the leveragethey had previously exercised to prolongtheir autonomy within a perpetualborderland. Formerly, in RichardWhite's phrase, "a middle ground,"Iroquoia became a dividedground-with harsh consequences for the nativepeople who had so long and so ablyresisted that development against overwhelmingodds. The diminutionof Iroquoiaserved to consolidatethe UnitedStates as a nation-statewith pretensions to a secure northernborder and to the allegianceof its owncitizens, who could see the benefitsof nationhoodin frontierfarmland and boundary . In Iroquoia,as throughoutNorth America, the limitationof nativepeoples withinthe boundariesof nationand the subordinatelines of reservations helpedconstitute the United States.39 Thatsaid, Six Nationspeople never accepted their division by boundary orthe denialof nativesovereignty implicit in thatboundary. To this day, Indianactivists especially defend ArticlemI of the Jay Treaty,which guaranteestheir rightsfreely to pass and repassover the international boundary. During the 1920s, restrictiveAmerican immigration and naturalizationlaws led Six Nationspeople, under the leadershipof Chief ClintonRickard (Tuscarora), to organizethe IndianDefense Leagueof America. Winning a test case in 1927 (McCandlessv. Diabi) the Indian Defense Leagueinstituted a celebratorymarch across the borderat the NiagaraFalls Bridge, a marchthat has become an annual tradition. In 1995 ChiefRickard's granddaughter, Jolene Rickard, wrote that the marchgave her"a senseof freedom,[of] my inherentright to movefreely in Iroquoian territoriesand that is whatthe fight is all aboutfor Indian people. It made me realizethe border checkpoints I passeveryday as a Tuscarorawoman. It takes guts to keep crossingthose bordersand to not let those barriers

38 Benn, Iroquois in the Warof 1812, 86-174. 39 Eric Hinderaker,Elusive Empires: ConstructingColonialism in the Ohio Valley, 1673-1800 (New York, 1997), 267. UNDERSTANDINGBOUNDARIES 75 becomeour 'Indian' prison." The native challenge to boundaryrestrictions suggeststhat the Canadian-American border will remain a contestedground -with new possibilitiesof fluidity,as well as renewedpressures from officialsfor greaterclosure.4

40 MarianL. Smith, "The INS and the Singular Status of North AmericanIndians," AmericanIndian Cultureand ResearchJournal, 24 (1997), 131-54; Jolene Rickard,"The IndianDefense League of America," Notes, 1, no. 2 (1995), 48-54, (quotation at 53).