Strategies for Advancing Anticorruption Reform in

Rotimi T. Suberu

Abstract: A vast literature documenting the structural embeddedness, grotesque scale, and devastating Downloaded from http://direct.mit.edu/daed/article-pdf/147/3/184/1831152/daed_a_00510.pdf by guest on 24 September 2021 consequences of political corruption in Nigeria threatens to overshadow the tenacity of the country’s anti- corruption “wars,” the recent gains in controlling electoral corruption, the development of a robust na- tional discourse about improving the effectiveness of anticorruption reform, and the crystallization of po- tentially viable legislative and constitutional reform agendas for promoting good governance. Especial- ly remarkable was the 2015 election of opposition presidential candidate , who ran on an anticorruption platform. Drawing lessons from those national anticorruption struggles, this essay distills several interrelated steps by which reformist political leaders and activist civil society organizations might advance anticorruption reform in Nigeria and, potentially, elsewhere. These strategies involve de- politicizing key oversight institutions, curbing presidential and gubernatorial discretionary powers, restruc- turing patronage-based fiscal federalism, expanding and entrenching current transparency laws, and pro- moting participatory constitutionalism.

A vast literature documents how Nigeria’s huge and ethnically fragmented population, overdepen- dence on unearned oil income, relatively short and unstable history of autonomous postcolonial politi- cal development, and fraught institutional structures have spawned a “fantastically corrupt” state, to use former British Prime Minster David Cameron’s apt 1 rotimi t. suberu is Professor characterization. But prodigious discussions about of Politics and International Rela- corruption’s entrenched roots, grotesque scale, and tions at Bennington College. Previ- devastating consequences in Africa’s demographic ously, he taught political science at and economic powerhouse often obscure the tenac- the University of Ibadan, Nigeria. ity of Nigeria’s anticorruption “wars” and their par- He is the author of Federalism and tial gains. These campaigns have resulted in a robust Ethnic Conflict in Nigeria (2001) and national discourse about improving the effective- has published in such journals as Journal of Modern African Studies, Jour- ness of anticorruption reform, in the crystallization nal of Democracy, Publius: The Journal of concrete legislative and constitutional agendas of Federalism, and Journal of Interna- for promoting good governance, and in occasionally tional Development. bold, if checkered, governance reforms.2

© 2018 by the American Academy of Arts & Sciences doi:10.1162/DAED_ a_00510

184 Emblematic of such constructive gov- campaign through appropriate legislative Rotimi T. ernance reform is Nigeria’s recent suc- and constitutional change and broader and Suberu cess in improving elections administration more systematic governance reform. My and mitigating a perverse legacy of chron- critique of Buhari’s anticorruption policy ic electoral corruption. This institutional is followed by analysis of the lessons and evolution toward improved electoral gov- implications for broader anticorruption re- ernance was spurred by strident domes- form of Nigeria’s recent experience in con- tic and external criticisms of the farcical taining electoral corruption and improv- 2007 general elections. Constitutional and ing electoral competitiveness and integri- statutory reforms produced more credible ty. I then suggest a scheme for advancing electoral contests in 2011 and, in particu- anticorruption reform and highlight its key Downloaded from http://direct.mit.edu/daed/article-pdf/147/3/184/1831152/daed_a_00510.pdf by guest on 24 September 2021 lar, 2015. The 2015 general elections were components. The scheme reflects not only unprecedented, producing a presidential lessons of recent electoral reforms, but also election victory for opposition candidate insights from the 2014 National Constitu- and former military head of state Muham- tional Conference Report and the 2015 Con- madu Buhari, who campaigned largely on stitutional Alteration Bill, which are broad- an anticorruption platform. ly supported (but as yet unimplemented) Institutional reforms are, however, not national constitutional reform blueprints the panacea for Nigeria’s monumental bequeathed by the departing Goodluck sociopolitical challenges. In addition to Jonathan presidency to the Buhari admin- flawed governance institutions, these chal- istration.5 Contemporary models of anti- lenges reflect the complex effects of preda- corruption control are based largely on the tory and unpatriotic political leadership, a experiences of relatively small or compara- patrimonial and ethnically fragmented po- tively homogeneous countries like Botswa- litical culture, and an extractive, oil-based na, Hong Kong, Singapore, and Taiwan. But political economy. Containing corruption the successful advancement of Buhari’s an- in Nigeria, therefore, requires not only ticorruption program could hold significant political institutional reforms, but also lessons for controlling malfeasance in oth- strong transformative leadership across er large, complex, multiethnic, and poor or political and civil society, broad-based resource-dependent countries. economic diversification and liberaliza- tion, and reorientation of deeply embed- Muhammadu Buhari’s long-standing ded social norms, expectations, and prac- reputation for asceticism and personal in- tices.3 Nonetheless, as political sociologist tegrity, his stern crackdown on corruption Larry Diamond has claimed, judicious in- as military head of state in the 1980s, and his stitutional innovations can “compensate promotion of anticorruption reform as an for some of the weaknesses” in political overriding political campaign issue raised economy and culture, “reduce the scope” high hopes among Nigerians that his elec- for political leadership abuse, and “tilt the tion victory would cauterize the country’s odds in favor of those who are committed” corruption epidemic and usher in a new era to transparent democratic governance.4 of transparent governance. Indeed, Buhari’s This essay begins with a dissection of electoral manifesto incorporated thirteen the background, key features, achieve- anticorruption pledges, including establish- ments, and shortcomings of Buhari’s anti- ing whistleblower-protection legislation; corruption policy. I highlight the adminis- promoting exemplary ethical conduct (es- tration’s failure to embed and extend the pecially the public declarations of assets) major elements of Buhari’s anticorruption among the president and his appointees;

147 (3) Summer 2018 185 Strategies for enforcing transparency, accountability, and in 2015).12 At the mass level, a survey by Advancing efficient resource management and reduc- the United Nations Office on Drugs and Anticorruption Reform in tions in the cost of governance in all Minis- Crime and the Nigerian National Bureau Nigeria tries, Departments and Agencies (mdas); of Statistics found that ordinary Nigerians strengthening the institutional autonomy paid an estimated $4.6 billion in bribes to of anticorruption bodies; and articulating a public officials between June 2015 and May coherent national anticorruption strategy.6 2016, concluding that “bribery is an estab- Following his inauguration in May 2015, lished part of the administrative procedure Buhari confirmed that $150 billion in pub- in Nigeria.”13 lic funds had been stolen and internation- Such epic and endemic corruption has

ally laundered by the country’s public of- propelled and compounded a multifacet- Downloaded from http://direct.mit.edu/daed/article-pdf/147/3/184/1831152/daed_a_00510.pdf by guest on 24 September 2021 ficials during the preceding ten-year pe- ed and existential crisis of political order, riod.7 Nigeria’s recent history has indeed national security and intergroup coexis- included multiple instances of monumen- tence in Nigeria. By 2015, Nigeria became tal mismanagement and scandalous plun- home to two of the world’s five deadliest der. These include the embezzlement of terroristic organizations: Boko Haram and $15 billion from state coffers through the so-called Fulani militants (rampaging fraudulent arms contracts connected to armed nomadic herdsmen), both origi- the flawed military campaign against Is- nating from Nigeria’s Muslim-dominated lamist Boko Haram insurgents;8 the state- North.14 Along with Southern-based vio- owned Nigerian National Petroleum Com- lent or secessionist ethnic organizations pany’s failure to remit $18.5 billion in oil like the Niger Delta Avengers and the In- revenues to the national treasury from digenous Peoples of Biafra, the terrorist or- 2012 to 2013 (of which $3.4 billion was ganizations highlighted corruption’s role in diverted to a fictitious kerosene subsidy destroying opportunities for broad-based scheme);9 theft and misappropriation socioeconomic participation and employ- over a ten-year period (from 2005 to 2015) ment. These organizations capitalized on of $40 billion paid to the states of the Niger the environment of political elite predation Delta and the federally controlled Niger and extreme inequality, poverty, and dis- Delta Development Commission as funds content, fueling the rise of radical local in- for the amelioration of ecological chal- surgencies and hobbling the country’s se- lenges and infrastructural deficits in this curity institutions and counterinsurgency oil-bearing region;10 the 2009 jailing in the campaigns. United Kingdom of Delta State Governor Such pervasive insecurity was symptom- after he pled guilty to steal- atic of the Nigerian government’s failure ing $80 million, which investigators be- to provide a broad variety of critical pub- lieved represented only about one-third of lic goods. Nigeria’s basic public infrastruc- the public monies he embezzled through ture (including its schools, hospitals, roads, inflated contracts, kickbacks, and direct electricity system, and water supply) re- cash transfers from government coffers;11 mains decrepit, despite billions of dollars and the brazen self-dealing by the Nigerian budgeted for its improvement at federal and National Assembly, which awarded itself subnational levels. The country accounts, several opaque allowances and “running in per-capita terms, for the world’s highest costs,” making it one of the world’s high- incidents of maternal deaths, out-of-school est paid legislatures (a seat in the federal children, and multidimensional poverty or Senate attracted an estimated annual to- cumulative socioeconomic deprivations.15 tal remuneration of more than $1.5 million Nigeria also has the worst police force in the

186 Dædalus, the Journal of the American Academy of Arts & Sciences world according to the 2016 World Inter- Public Sector Accounting Standards, de- Rotimi T. nal Security and Police Index, which mea- signed to protect the budget-preparation Suberu sures indicators like the amount of resourc- process from manipulation, unauthorized es devoted to internal security, effective use alteration, or padding; and a Fiscal Sustain- of allocated resources, and public trust in ability Plan, which proposed prudential and the police.16 transparent conditions under which sub- Proclaiming its commitment to “killing national governments could receive feder- corruption before it kills Nigeria,” the Bu- al budgetary bailouts. hari administration mounted multiple anti- In addition to supporting anticorruption corruption initiatives.17 It appointed new investigations and promoting multiple ad- dynamic heads for the country’s prime anti- ministrative measures to improve public fi- Downloaded from http://direct.mit.edu/daed/article-pdf/147/3/184/1831152/daed_a_00510.pdf by guest on 24 September 2021 corruption agencies, the Economic and nancial management, the Buhari adminis- Financial Crimes Commission (efcc) and tration sought to enhance legal frameworks the Independent Corrupt Practices Com- for combating corruption. But more than mission (icpc), and established a Presi- two years after the inauguration of the Bu- dential Advisory Committee Against Cor- hari administration, these attempts to in- ruption to support the “administration in stitutionalize anticorruption reform re- the prosecution of the war against corrup- main unfulfilled, a fact that stands as one tion and the implementation of required of the most disappointing aspects of the reforms in Nigeria’s criminal justice sys- administration’s reform agenda. Thus far, tem.”18 Along with the Code of Conduct the administration has improved Nigeria’s Bureau and Tribunal, the efcc and icpc in- bilateral agreements on mutual assistance vestigated and prosecuted key government in criminal matters, extending them to in- officials or their associates, including Jon- clude the United Arab Emirates, an increas- athan’s national security adviser, former ingly important destination for resources First Lady Patience Jonathan, current Sen- looted by Nigeria’s corrupt public officials. ate President , two Supreme It also proposed executive bills for the es- Court justices, and several senators, for- tablishment of anticorruption courts and mer governors and deputy governors, and a whistleblower-protection law, which senior military officers. Despite the gov- would formalize Buhari’s popular whistle- ernment’s failure to secure any high-profile blower policy that, in June 2017, paid over $1 convictions, the anticorruption investiga- million to twenty individuals who provided tions led to the recovery of “more than U.S. information leading to the recovery of $36.8 $10 billion in looted cash and assets,” ac- million in stolen state funds.20 However, re- cording to Transparency International.19 flecting the absence of any coordinated or The administration also implemented robust executive-legislative engagement several measures to clean up the country’s on good governance, Buhari’s anticorrup- fraud-ridden public financial management. tion legislative initiatives have largely lan- They created the Treasury Single Account, guished in parliamentary rigmarole. which eliminated multiple scam-infest- ed mda accounts by consolidating gov- Indeed, although Buhari’s anticorrup- ernment finances in a single account at tion policy was applauded by the adminis- the Central Bank of Nigeria; the Presiden- tration’s domestic supporters and interna- tial Initiative on Continuous Audit, which tional partners, it not only provoked a push- purged more than fifty-three thousand back from corrupt public officials, but also ghost workers from payrolls of mdas; a attracted criticisms from independent ob- new budget portal based on International servers. According to a 2017 “Buharimeter”

147 (3) Summer 2018 187 Strategies for report by the Center for Development and be a sort of refuge . . . [and] protected hav- Advancing Democracy, a reputable -based non- en for corruption.”23 Specifically, the Bu- Anticorruption Reform in governmental organization, the anticor- hari presidency faced credible allegations Nigeria ruption policy produced “no significant of crass nepotism, cronyism, and section- change” and its credibility “seems to be alism (in favor of Buhari’s Northern Mus- withering.” Specifically, the Center found lim base) in making key appointments; as that only one of Buhari’s thirteen anti- well as of implementing statist economic corruption pledges had been “achieved”: policies (including foreign-exchange con- namely, the September 2015 release “of a trols) that created new opportunities for summary statement to the press of the Pres- rent-seeking and corruption. Most impor-

ident’s and Vice President’s assets and lia- tant, the Buhari administration stands ac- Downloaded from http://direct.mit.edu/daed/article-pdf/147/3/184/1831152/daed_a_00510.pdf by guest on 24 September 2021 bilities.” Yet even this pledge had only been cused of failing to investigate, prosecute, partially executed: the assets declarations or punish alleged acts of abuse of office of Buhari and his deputy were incomplete, among key allies, functionaries, and ap- while none of the president’s ministerial pointees of the presidency, including the appointees publicly declared their assets. chief of staff to the president, secretary to Although it acknowledged that the Buhari the federal government, inspector gener- administration made “frantic” efforts to al of police, director general of the Nation- implement six other election pledges (in- al Intelligence Agency, executive secretary volving general government accountabili- of the National Health Insurance Scheme, ty and reduction in the cost of governance), minister of justice and attorney general of these efforts were as yet fruitless, and the the Federation, and the group managing di- Center also criticized the government for rector of the Nigerian National Petroleum failing to take any actions on “fundamental Corporation. In an outrageous instance of or core issues” in the anticorruption cam- its complicity in grand corruption, the Bu- paign, including the agenda of the institu- hari administration covertly reinstated and tional autonomy of antigraft agencies.21 promoted a fugitive federal bureaucrat and Indeed, Transparency International’s 2017 former chairman of the Nigerian Pension Perceptions Index confirmed that Nigeria Reform Task Team who was under investi- was among the countries that were mak- gation for alleged involvement in a multi- ing “little or no progress in ending corrup- million-dollar pension fraud.24 It would ap- tion.”22 Nigeria’s score (27 on a scale of 100) pear that Buhari’s anticorruption stance has and rank (148 out of 180 countries) on the been compromised by two major factors: Index showed no real improvement from the unsavory political alliances that are re- the final year of Jonathan’s corrupt adminis- quired to conduct a nationwide presidential tration, and represented somewhat of a de- campaign; and Buhari’s unwillingness to cline from the country’s score (28) and rank prevent the economically underdeveloped (136 out of 176 countries) in 2016. North from capturing “economic resourc- Essentially, Buhari’s anticorruption pol- es through direct access to public office and icy, despite paying lip service to good gov- ensuing patronage networks.”25 ernance, has often been self-contradictory, Even as it overlooked or downplayed alle- shallow, and selectively enforced. Several gations of corruption within its own ranks, government actions and policies have con- the Buhari administration sensationally in- tradicted its professed anticorruption pol- terrogated the political opposition, espe- icy, leading one eminent columnist in 2017 cially members of the ousted Peoples Dem- to conclude that “the presidency itself has ocratic Party (pdp) and factional rivals of turned out, mostly by acts of omission, to the president. Indeed, many opposition pol-

188 Dædalus, the Journal of the American Academy of Arts & Sciences iticians defected to Buhari’s ruling All Pro- litically dependent, often unprofessional, Rotimi T. gressives Congress (apc) party, presumably and beholden to the presidency, having Suberu to escape scrutiny, prosecution, or perse- lost most of its well-trained investigators cution for corruption. Widespread percep- and prosecutors when its activist found- tions of partisanship in the anticorruption ing head, , was summarily policy were further reinforced by the arbi- removed by the executive in 2007. Its cur- trary and abusive tactics of anticorruption rent head, , serves in a le- agencies, including the “unlawful detention gally dubious acting capacity: the Senate of suspects and blatant disregard of court failed to confirm his appointment on ac- orders,” with Jonathan’s former national count of apparent politically motivated al- security adviser Sambo Dasuki emerging legations by Nigeria’s Department of State Downloaded from http://direct.mit.edu/daed/article-pdf/147/3/184/1831152/daed_a_00510.pdf by guest on 24 September 2021 as a particularly conspicuous target of such Services questioning Magu’s integrity; lawlessness.26 and Buhari has been unwilling to replace However, in 2017, the most compelling him with a less politically controversial criticism of Buhari’s anticorruption policy person. The entire agency itself currently was of its shallowness. Succinctly, the poli- employs fewer than three thousand peo- cy failed to live up to its promise of address- ple, but receives more than one hundred ing underlying institutional and systemic petitions daily, leaving investigators and impediments to good governance and anti- prosecutors overstretched.28 Moreover, corruption reform in Nigeria. These imped- the efcc is hobbled by recurrent conflicts iments include the overpoliticization, insti- with the Office of the Minster of Justice tutional underdevelopment, and political and Attorney General. dependence of the anticorruption agencies; There is a fundamental tension between the wide discretionary powers of political the broad investigative, prosecutorial, and chief executives at national and subnation- preventive functions of Nigeria’s anti- al levels; the flawed design and chronically corruption agencies and the constitutional weak enforcement of current transparen- authority of the justice minister/attorney cy and fair procurement laws; and the per- general, who has the legislative authority verse and powerful incentives for decen- to take over, continue, or discontinue any tralized corruption and distributive ethno- criminal prosecution. The efcc’s politi- political contention that are inherent in the cal vulnerability and weak professionalism Nigerian system of oil-rents federalism. In- were thrown into sharp relief in July 2017, deed, the very idea of Nigeria as a political when the global Egmont Group of 156 Fi- community has little social legitimacy in nancial Intelligence Units (fius) voted to the eyes of many Nigerians. suspend, “by consensus,” membership of The continuing institutional travails of the efcc’s Nigeria Financial Intelligence the efcc under Buhari are particularly re- Unit (nfiu) “following repeated failures vealing and ironic. In his January 2018 ad- on the part of the nfiu to address con- dress to the African Union as the organi- cerns regarding the protection of confi- zation’s designated “champion” for its dential information . . . and the legal basis theme on “Winning the Fight Against Cor- and clarity of the nfiu’s independence.”29 ruption,” Buhari declared, “I cannot over- Undoubtedly, Buhari’s anticorruption emphasize the value of strong institutions. initiatives have helped reduce the hemor- . . . We must adequately empower our na- rhaging of federal government finances, sta- tional anti-corruption agencies and insu- bilize Nigeria’s inherently volatile oil-cen- late them from political influence.”27 Yet, tric economy, cauterize Boko Haram’s Is- under Buhari, the efcc has remained po- lamist terrorism, and nudge the country

147 (3) Summer 2018 189 Strategies for away from the trajectory of brazen and cat- Improvements in the quality of Nigeria’s Advancing astrophic corruption that it was on during general elections in 2011 and 2015 provide Anticorruption Reform in the Jonathan presidency. Indeed, Afro- an instructive template for advancing anti- Nigeria barometer surveys show that most Nigeri- corruption reform. Those improvements ans applaud Buhari’s anticorruption cam- followed reforms that were introduced af- paign, even as they remain divided or un- ter the elections in 2007, which interna- certain about its actual effectiveness in tional observers considered to be some curtailing malfeasance.30 Greater insti- of the most corrupt they had witnessed tutionalization is required not only to ad- anywhere in the world.33 The administra- vance and consolidate Buhari’s reforms, but tion of President Umaru Yar’Adua (2007–

also to prevent the policies’ modest advanc- 2010) set up an Electoral Reform Commit- Downloaded from http://direct.mit.edu/daed/article-pdf/147/3/184/1831152/daed_a_00510.pdf by guest on 24 September 2021 es from being eroded. tee (erc), headed by former Chief Justice Such institutionalization can draw on the Muhammadu Uwais, to ameliorate the le- experience of the country’s recent success- gitimacy crisis created by criticism of the es in controlling electoral corruption. Elec- elections. Shaping the work of the erc toral fraud, which almost always involves was “a strong pro-reform platform bring- collusion between ruling-party function- ing together opposition parties, civil soci- aries and ostensibly nonpartisan election ety organizations, development partners officials to abrogate the popular will, often and the diplomatic community.”34 Reflect- reflects and reinforces broader systemic ing a consensus among these stakeholders, corruption by placing in public office in- the erc focused primarily on making the dividuals who are demonstrably inclined Independent National Electoral Commis- to use governmental positions for person- sion (inec), Nigeria’s election manage- al gain rather than public good.31 A credi- ment body, “truly independent, non-par- ble electoral process, on the other hand, can tisan, impartial, professional, transparent empower politicians committed to anticor- and reliable.”35 ruption reform, furnish an avenue of pop- In its most radical proposal, the erc rec- ular protest and retaliation against politi- ommended that inec should cease to be a cal venality, stimulate constructive politi- “federal executive body,” and instead be- cal contestation over governance reform, come a more inclusive, representative, and offer a model of formal political design and politically autonomous agency.36 Un- and institution-building for promoting the der the Nigerian Constitution, federal ex- autonomy of critical oversight agencies. To ecutive bodies are largely appointed by the be sure, elections can also exacerbate, rath- president, in consultation with the Coun- er than reduce, corruption, especially un- cil of State (a body headed by the president der conditions of widespread poverty, poor and comprising current heads of the federal voter coordination, and chronically under- executive, legislative, and judicial branch- developed political institutions, including es, all former presidents, and all governors, weak political parties. Nonetheless, con- among others), subject to confirmation by temporary experiences in countries as di- the Senate. But the erc recommended that verse as Georgia, Nigeria, Tanzania, and the inec board be constituted through a Ukraine demonstrate that presidential elec- multilayered process beginning with the tion campaigns in particular can help not generation of nominees for membership only to highlight the fight against corrup- of the commission from the general public tion, but also to open opportunities for the and designated civil society organizations promotion of critical anticorruption legis- (including labor, bar, media, and wom- lation, strategies, and institutions.32 en’s organizations). Based on these public

190 Dædalus, the Journal of the American Academy of Arts & Sciences and civic nominations, the National Judi- that financial allocations to the Commis- Rotimi T. cial Council (njc) was to prepare a short- sion do not pass through the federal exec- Suberu list of inec board members from which the utive but are made directly by the national Council of State would make the final ap- legislature. In practical terms, this amend- pointment, subject to confirmation by the ment meant that funding for inec was ap- Senate. The key innovation in this recom- propriated to “an account in the Central mendation is its attempt to dilute partisan Bank over which inec would have full con- presidential control of the electoral admin- trol.”37 Other changes ended the absolute istration body by giving the general public, discretion the president exercised over the civil society, and an independent judiciary appointment of inec’s subnational resi- important roles in making appointments. dential electoral commissioners (the pres- Downloaded from http://direct.mit.edu/daed/article-pdf/147/3/184/1831152/daed_a_00510.pdf by guest on 24 September 2021 Especially significant is the key role of the ident’s appointments were made subject to njc, which is headed and largely appointed Senate confirmation); empoweredinec by the Chief Justice of the Federation, and to exercise broad regulatory, oversight, is vested with broad autonomous powers and supervisory powers over the electoral to oversee the funding, appointment, and process (including the scheduling of elec- discipline of the judicial branch. tions and the monitoring of internal party Although the administration successfully democracy); and introduced measures to resisted the erc’s radical recommendation, streamline and accelerate electoral adjudi- the erc’s overall emphasis on creating an cation and petitions processes. impartial, inclusive, and independent elec- These changes produced a more political- tion agency inspired many changes in elec- ly independent and institutionally transpar- tion management that contributed to ma- ent inec, which adheres to contemporary jor improvements in the quality of Nigeri- standards of professionalism. Thus, the an elections. The most important was the commission explicitly committed itself to appointment of Professor Attahiru Jega, a “creating a level playing field for all politi- member of the erc and former head of Ni- cal parties and contestants and removing geria’s university teachers’ union, as chair the perception that inec functioned at the of inec. Jega’s appointment not only end- bidding of government and powerful indi- ed the tenure of an openly partisan chair, viduals.”38 Under Jega, inec introduced ex- but also marked the first time an indepen- tensive improvements in Nigeria’s electoral dent civil-society luminary–rather than a governance, including technological inno- current or retired government bureaucrat– vations such as a more credible biometric was appointed to lead the commission. Jega electoral register and smart-card readers for further guaranteed his independence by voter authentication. inec also began to co- offering to serve only one term in office, operate with external stakeholders, facili- despite a constitutional provision allowing tating the implementation of parallel vot- the president to renew Jega’s five-year ten- er tabulation by civil-society organizations ure for an additional term. and collaborating with donors, parties, civ- Aside from appointing a credible and in- ic organizations, and security agencies to dependent activist to chair inec, impor- make election-day logistics more transpar- tant changes to the constitution and the ent, efficient, and effective. Electoral Act were introduced to advance These electoral reforms did not, howev- clean-election reforms. A constitutional er, eliminate vote-buying (which was abet- amendment granted financial autonomy ted by a lax political campaign finance sys- and security to inec by making its budget tem) or violence from Nigerian elections. a first-line charge on the federal treasury, so Rather, they ended an entrenched tradi-

147 (3) Summer 2018 191 Strategies for tion of partisan collusion within the high- bilization Allocation and Fiscal Commis- Advancing est echelons of the electoral administra- sion (rmafc), Accountant General of the Anticorruption Reform in tion to manipulate or bungle the elector- Federation, and the Office of the Auditor Nigeria al process. Over the 2011 and 2015 election General. To these institutions may be add- cycles, these changes in electoral manage- ed the antigraft agencies (Code of Conduct ment produced more positive assessments Bureau and Tribunal, efcc, and icpc), Po- of Nigerian elections by domestic and ex- lice Council and Service Commission, Fis- ternal observers. The changes also led to cal Responsibility Commission, Public Pro- a reduction in the number of postelection curement Council, and Nigerian Extractive petitions, to an erosion of the pdp’s elec- Industries Transparency Initiative. Anoth- toral hegemony, and ultimately to the pres- er institution in need of political insulation Downloaded from http://direct.mit.edu/daed/article-pdf/147/3/184/1831152/daed_a_00510.pdf by guest on 24 September 2021 idential victory of an opposition party for is the Office of the Attorney General, which the first time in the nation’s fifty-five-year (as informed observers have widely recom- postindependence history. This electoral mended) should be decoupled from the par- alternation, in turn, provided an opportu- tisan, executive-appointed position of min- nity for improved governance by replacing ister of justice. Indeed, the list should ideal- a government that openly condoned cor- ly include any institutions that must remain ruption with a governing coalition profess- above partisan conflict and control if good ing an explicit anticorruption platform. democratic governance is to be enhanced.40 Thus, Nigeria’s recent experience with Like inec, all of these oversight institutions electoral reform underlines the importance should be funded as budgetary first-line of political and financial autonomy to the charges as a way of securing their political effective functioning of key oversight bod- autonomy. In addition, heads of these insti- ies. Failure to secure such autonomy or in- tutions, including inec, should be appoint- dependence has been a core institutional ed using the multilayered process proposed challenge and, indeed, harms efforts to en- by the erc, which involves participation by sure constitutionalism, electoral integrity, the public and civil society, njc, the Coun- human rights, and corruption control in Af- cil of State, and the Senate. rica, Asia, and other developing-world con- In addition to making their appoint- texts.39 Institutionally advancing anticor- ments more inclusive and apolitical, mem- ruption reform therefore requires, above all bers of oversight and anticorruption agen- else, insulating anticorruption bodies from cies should be allowed to serve an extended politicization. (for instance, eight-to-ten-year) nonre- newable tenure, rather than the current The strategy of depoliticizing the appoint- four-to-five-year renewable term. The use ment and funding of major oversight agen- of nonrenewable terms is a globally accept- cies has come to enjoy broad consensus in ed standard for reducing the risk of over- Nigeria as a means of preventing political sight agency leaders becoming beholden executives from interfering with and dele- to politicians for reappointment. Signifi- gitimizing these agencies. While the na- cantly, the idea of single tenure for execu- tional legislature, judiciary, and electoral tive political officials has been widely pro- commission already enjoyed significant po- moted in Nigeria as a formula for reduc- litical or budgetary autonomy, the 2014 Na- ing incumbent manipulations of elections tional Conference Report and 2015 Consti- and for facilitating the rotation and sharing tution Alteration Bill proposed addition- of executive political offices among ethnic al candidates for greater insulation from elites. Arguably, however, the principle of the executive, including the Revenue Mo- nonrenewable terms is far more appropri-

192 Dædalus, the Journal of the American Academy of Arts & Sciences ate for nonpartisan oversight offices than es, rather than by respected retired judg- Rotimi T. for political offices, where longer but non- es and other institutionally independent Suberu renewable single terms (as opposed to the persons. Nonetheless, for all its challeng- current maximum of two four-year terms) es with malfeasance, the judiciary and njc could undermine political accountability have “devised inbuilt mechanisms for re- and competition. The combination of ex- moving corrupt and indolent judges” and, tended terms and nonrenewable tenure for thus, have “fared better than the executive political officeholders could increase the and legislature in the sanitization of the po- risk of collusion between politicians and litical system,” according to human rights vested economic and other interests, while attorney Femi Falana.44 Not surprisingly, also liberating politicians from incentives surveys show that more Nigerians (43 per- Downloaded from http://direct.mit.edu/daed/article-pdf/147/3/184/1831152/daed_a_00510.pdf by guest on 24 September 2021 for accountability and integrity that are in- cent) trust the judiciary than the presiden- herent in reelection concerns.41 cy (36 percent), the majority political par- A potential criticism of the proposed for- ty (29 percent), the national legislature (27 mula for depoliticizing oversight agencies is percent), local governments (25 percent), the key role envisaged for the njc, which is opposition political parties (24 percent), in- often critiqued for its perceived complicity ternal revenue service (23 percent), or po- in the judicial obstruction and corruption lice (16 percent).45 Sixty-seven percent of that have repeatedly stymied Nigeria’s an- Nigerians accept that the courts have the tigraft campaigns. Indeed, there is consid- right to make decisions that people must erable evidence of collusion between cor- abide by, and the country performs better rupt officials, senior lawyers, and judges on indices of judicial independence and le- to obstruct the effective and timely pros- gitimacy than on most other indicators of ecution of corruption cases, thereby un- public integrity.46 In essence, among all ma- dermining the Administration of Crimi- jor governing institutions, the njc remains nal Justice Act of 2015, which was institut- the most viable and credible instrument for ed to protect Nigerian society from crimes depoliticizing the appointments of key anti- through “speedy dispensation of justice.”42 corruption and oversight agencies. But Nigeria’s paucity of high-profile anti- corruption convictions has resulted from Giving the judiciary an important role in the relatively poor funding, staffing, pro- constituting oversight agencies will reduce fessionalization, and motivation of the anti- the discretionary, quasimonarchical pow- corruption agencies. Contending with bet- ers of political chief executives. Despite the ter prepared and paid lawyers hired by the constitutional entrenchment of indepen- wealthy accused, these agencies’ sheer dent judicial and legislative branches, the prosecutorial mediocrity and negligence Nigerian presidency remains a sort of super- are compounded by weak interagency co- presidency, with direct control over admin- ordination and lack of collaboration with istrative and patronage political appoint- the federal ministry of justice and security ments, security institutions, and the distri- services.43 bution of oil and other economic rents. Di- The njc, on the other hand, has emerged minishing this corruptive dominance will as a relatively successful model of judicial require not only the extrication and insula- self-regulation. Undoubtedly, the njc’s tion of key oversight agencies from direct capacity to police and punish corruption presidential control, but also direct curtail- among its own members is constrained by ment of the vast patronage powers of the the fact that it is headed and dominated by presidency. A 2011 federal government com- the sitting chief justice and serving judg- mittee, for instance, recommended either

147 (3) Summer 2018 193 Strategies for scrapping or dissolving via merger more clude rescinding constitutional immunity Advancing than one hundred of the 541 federal agen- for political chief executives while consti- Anticorruption Reform in cies, owing to their redundant and overlap- tutionally entrenching the financial, po- Nigeria ping mandates and functions. Ultimately, litical, and operational autonomy of sub- this decision aimed to streamline the gov- national legislatures and key oversight of- ernance structure in order to make it more fices such as those of the state auditor gen- cost-effective and accountable. It also pro- eral, accountant general, and attorney gen- posed the appointment of moderate-sized, eral. In addition, gubernatorial manipula- rather than bloated, governing boards for tion and emasculation of local authorities, the remaining agencies.47 including the replacement of democrati-

Reducing the spoils of the Nigerian super- cally elected councils with administrators Downloaded from http://direct.mit.edu/daed/article-pdf/147/3/184/1831152/daed_a_00510.pdf by guest on 24 September 2021 presidency will additionally involve remov- or caretaker committees appointed by the ing loopholes in current laws and adminis- governor, can be curbed by transferring re- trative regulations that give the federal chief sponsibility for conducting local elections executive powers to dispense unilaterally from weak subnational election commis- economic opportunities through practices sions to the more robust inec, and by pro- such as the discretionary allocation of crude hibiting or suspending federal transfers of oil–lifting contracts outside of competitive revenues to unelected local governments. bidding rounds, the granting of presidential import duty waivers to businesses, and con- Uniquely among African countries, Nige- trol of opaque extrabudgetary votes. Partic- ria transfers about half of all centrally col- ularly in need of reassessment is the Public lected public revenues (mainly from oil) au- Procurement Act of 2007, which, according tomatically and unconditionally to subna- to legal scholar Sope Williams-Elegbe, gives tional units of state and local governments, procurement officials “much discretion in which have the primary responsibility for making procurement decisions,” but does basic social services in education, health, not “insulate” these officials “from interfer- sanitation, and maintenance of local roads. ence by high-ranking politicians.” This per- Most of these revenues are simply distribut- petuates a public procurement system that ed using the dual principles of relative pop- is “still riddled with corruption, fraud, and ulation and equal interunit shares, rather irregularities.”48 than using a distribution system tied to so- Discretionary executive powers are most cial investments, development projects, or expansive at the subnational level, where fiscal responsibility. Under current revenue- gubernatorial privileges effectively over- sharing laws, the federally collected oil and whelm all potential sources of counter- other revenues that are legally designated vailing powers, including legislative as- for allocation to subnational state govern- semblies, the judiciary, the offices of the ments and their respective local govern- accountant general and auditor general, ments are to be shared using the following local governments, and traditional chief- principles and weights: 40 percent is allo- taincy institutions. In addition, along with cated equally to all the states or localities, the president and vice president, the gover- and 30 percent is allocated according to nors and their deputies constitute an elite relative population, while social develop- club of seventy-four public officers who en- ment needs, land mass/terrain, and inter- joy constitutional immunity from all crimi- nally generated revenues are given weights nal prosecution while holding their offices. of 10 percent each. In reality, however, the Proposals to curb these powers have been principle of interunit equality plays an out- widely publicized and promoted and in- sized role, “extending to a large portion of

194 Dædalus, the Journal of the American Academy of Arts & Sciences the 20% designated for social development subnational governments became insol- Rotimi T. and igr.”49 This distorts and politicizes the vent, with thirty-three of the thirty-six Suberu revenue-sharing system, fueling relentless states unable to pay the salaries and al- pressures for the proliferation of new sub- lowances of their employees. national administrations in order to access Capitalizing on the states’ insolvency, an equal share of the federal largesse. the Buhari government articulated a fiscal Despite the fact that they derive an av- sustainability plan that could nudge subna- erage of 80 percent of their budgets from tional governments toward more account- constitutionally mandated federal trans- able and sustainable financial behavior. In fers, Nigeria’s subnational governments order to continue to receive federal finan- are not subject to external scrutiny by the cial bailouts, the fiscal plan encouraged Downloaded from http://direct.mit.edu/daed/article-pdf/147/3/184/1831152/daed_a_00510.pdf by guest on 24 September 2021 central government and have very little in- states to commit to observing the following centive to generate revenues from–or be principles of sound fiscal governance: time- responsible to–local populations. Indeed, ly publication of reports of audited finances attempts by the federal government to im- and budget implementation performance, plement conditional grants programs for compliance with international public sec- universal basic education, primary health tor accounting standards, improvement of care, and millennium development goals independently generated revenues, imple- have largely been unsuccessful because sub- mentation of single treasury accounts, lim- national units already receive massive un- itations on personnel expenditure as a share conditional transfers from the center and of total budgeted revenue, privatization or therefore do not want to be accountable concession of inefficient state-owned en- to the federal government for how central terprises, domestication of the national Fis- funds are used. cal Responsibility Act, and the development Instead of advancing local accountabili- and maintenance of positive credit ratings. ty and transparency, Nigeria’s subnation- However, the fiscal plan did not extend al governments are mired in the extreme to general federal transfers, which contin- personalization of official powers and re- ued to be disbursed unconditionally. Fur- source allocation. Nigerian state gover- thermore, the plan was designed as a set of nors are implicated in financial misman- action points rather than as preconditions agement and profligacy, and political for federal bailouts. Consequently, the fis- patronage appointments proliferate. Gov- cal plan was not seriously implemented by ernors inflate or fabricate public procure- the states, which have continued to dis- ment contracts and pay outrageous sev- play “brazen” and “abysmal” disregard erance packages and pension allowances for transparency and accountability, ac- to themselves and other political office- cording to a policy report by Lagos-based holders. Due to their fiscal indiscipline civic organization budgit. States consid- and mismanagement, the governors have ered themselves automatically and uncon- failed to insulate their states from expo- ditionally entitled to sustenance and sub- sure to international oil-price swings via sidization through the federal oil revenue the federal oil revenue transfer system. Ni- devolution system.50 geria’s subnational governments therefore The decentralization of financial resourc- suffer from considerable financial indebt- es and political governance to a multiplicity edness and vulnerability due to the vola- of subnational states under Nigeria’s unique tile swings in their incomes. In 2015, as in- form of federalism has functioned as a ver- ternational oil prices collapsed and feder- itable instrument of ethnopolitical accom- al revenue transfers declined precipitously, modation, enabling the country to avoid a

147 (3) Summer 2018 195 Strategies for repeat of its 1967–1970 civil war and pre- egy. Although such bold, institutionally re- Advancing venting the kind of extended and violent formist political leadership has been large- Anticorruption Reform in disintegrative ethnopolitical contention ly lacking in the Buhari administration, as Nigeria that has afflicted other large, multiethnic political economist Kingsley Moghalu has African countries like the Democratic Re- asserted, “there is no avoiding the imper- public of the Congo and the Sudan. But the ative of a rational constitutional design of current Nigerian system of fiscal federal- Nigeria’s federal system for stability and ism is economically dysfunctional and un- prosperity.”52 sustainable. It has encouraged irresponsi- Because the constitution already endows ble subunit financial behavior, which has in the national assembly with broad powers to

turn undermined the delivery of basic so- frame the “terms and manner” of the fed- Downloaded from http://direct.mit.edu/daed/article-pdf/147/3/184/1831152/daed_a_00510.pdf by guest on 24 September 2021 cial services at the grassroots level and re- eral revenue distribution system (subject inforced social discontent. These flaws have to the observation of certain basic “alloca- spawned intensive agitation for a restructur- tion principles”), incorporating the fiscal ing of the Federation, or for a return to some sustainability plan into the federal revenue version of Nigeria’s pre–civil war system of sharing system should not require elabo- three-unit, centrifugal, ethnoregional fed- rate constitutional amendment.53 Further- eralism. A judicious and practical response more, insulating the Office of the Accoun- to these demands would be to enforce, ex- tant General of the Federation and the tend, and institutionalize the current fis- rmafc from presidential control would cal sustainability plan through appropri- endow these institutions with the indepen- ate amendments to federal revenue alloca- dence, legitimacy, and capacity to develop, tion laws, thereby transforming the current fine-tune, and administer a reformed reve- federal revenue distribution system into a nue-sharing system. This would prevent the conditional grants scheme that rewards ef- conditional revenue-sharing system from ficient service delivery and good economic degenerating into a scheme for federal exec- governance at the subnational level. utive meddling in subnational affairs or for An impetus for such fundamental feder- undermining the constitutional autonomy al fiscal reform lies in the violent ethnic and of the states. Promoting subnational fiscal regional insurgencies, widespread political responsibility, efficiency, and transparen- agitation for constitutional restructuring, cy should advance rather than subvert sub- and diverse reform proposals that are di- national autonomy. rected against the current system of corrupt intergovernmental relations. These stir- Transparency remains elusive in Nigeria rings reflect a “broad consensus amongst despite the government’s underwriting of Nigerians . . . that our federation has been schemes like the Freedom of Information dysfunctional, more unitary than federal, Act, Nigerian Extractive Industries Trans- and not delivering public goods to the gen- parency Initiative, and the Open Govern- erality of our people,” as Nasir el-Rufai, ment Partnership. The Freedom of Infor- governor of and chairman of mation (foi) Act of 2011, for instance, has the ruling apc’s Committee on True Feder- been met with resistance from federal mdas alism, has claimed.51 Nonetheless, vision- and subnational governments, in which an ary civic and political leadership is required official culture of secrecy, stonewalling, and to transform diffuse discontent and pro- deception thrives. The Act has been hob- tests over the failures and flaws of the cur- bled by poor funding of foi units, low in- rent federalism into a coherent and viable stitutional capacities of mdas for digital legislative and constitutional reform strat- record keeping and dissemination, weak

196 Dædalus, the Journal of the American Academy of Arts & Sciences sanctions against noncompliance, and the ling individual acts of presidential trans- Rotimi T. assignment of oversight for foi implemen- parency and more on getting the National Suberu tation to the political Office of the Minis- Assembly to fulfill its constitutional obli- ter of Justice and Attorney General. While gation to implement legislation mandat- it has bemoaned the Nigerian public’s un- ing public access to assets declarations. A derutilization of the foi Act, the Office has law providing for the publication of public not addressed the failure of government officials’ assets declarations will be a pow- agencies proactively to make information erful tool of anticorruption reform, com- publicly available, or their systematic and plementing the foi Act while reinforcing brazen denials of foi requests from civic or- government’s current whistleblower pol- ganizations, which discourage citizens’ use icy. The law will support and facilitate the Downloaded from http://direct.mit.edu/daed/article-pdf/147/3/184/1831152/daed_a_00510.pdf by guest on 24 September 2021 of the Act. Civil society activists who fought work of the anticorruption commissions, determinedly against all odds for the estab- engage and empower citizens to check the lishment of the foi Act believe that trans- primitive accumulation of public function- ferring oversight for the Act to the proposed aries, enhance a sense of participation in independent apolitical Office of the Attor- governance, and build a stronger sense of ney General would advance implementa- citizenship. tion of the law. Governmental transparency would also Building a stronger sense of citizenship is be advanced by a constitutional amend- critical to anticorruption reform in Nigeria. ment or the enactment of a law–which Analysts agree that the monumental scale of the National Assembly is constitutional- political corruption is emblematic of weak ly required to formulate–making the as- civic attachment to the very idea of Nigeria sets declarations of public officials readily as a cohesive political community.55 This “available for inspection by any citizen of fragility reflects the scale and strength of Nigeria.”54 Even without such a law, popu- Nigeria’s sometimes-clashing ethnic iden- lar expectations regarding political leaders’ tities, official entrenchment of discrimina- transparency and integrity have encouraged tory ethnic indigeneity practices, and the several politicians to make their assets dec- absence of a fiscal social contract based on larations public. The most famous of such public taxation (rather than extractive oil politicians was President Yar’Adua, who revenues), with the country generating an publicized his assets declarations, first as abysmally low 6 percent of its gdp from Katsina State governor (1999–2007) and taxation. Indeed, as Bill Gates emphasized subsequently as president. President Jona- in his forthright address to Nigeria’s nation- than’s blunt refusal to follow Yar’Adua’s ex- al and subnational leaders in March 2018, ample, among other acts of ethical derelic- in the absence of “effective and transpar- tion, contributed to Jonathan’s growing un- ent investments” in education, health, and popularity and eventual defeat in the 2015 broad-based economic opportunities, the election. President Buhari’s seemingly half- country’s governments are now trapped in hearted commitment to the public declara- the world’s most extreme instance of a “low tion of his own assets and of those of his ap- equilibrium fiscal situation” in which in pointees, and his inability or unwillingness “return for low levels of service people pay to sponsor an executive bill on public access low levels of tax.”56 But compounding the to assets declarations, is a disappointing as- fragility of Nigerian civic engagement and pect of his anticorruption policy. national identity is the absence of a broad- Even so, public agitation regarding asset ly legitimate national compact–such as a declarations should focus less on compel- popularly ratified constitution–that could

147 (3) Summer 2018 197 Strategies for bind the various Nigerian peoples together. operation required to combat entrenched Advancing Rather, successive Nigerian constitutions corruption. Anticorruption Reform in have been imposed by unelected colonial or Nigeria military elites, with civilian representatives Civic organizations have indeed been playing a largely advisory (rather than sov- central to Nigeria’s modest anticorruption ereign) role, and with no direct participa- achievements. The country’s civil society tion by the citizenry at large. Consequently, has played invaluable roles in investigat- no credible formal national contract exists ing and publicizing political scandals, ad- to rival informal, corrupt, and exploitative vocating for new anticorruption laws and social contracts between patrons and cli- institutions, promoting compliance to

ents in ethnically defined constituencies. those anticorruption instruments, mobi- Downloaded from http://direct.mit.edu/daed/article-pdf/147/3/184/1831152/daed_a_00510.pdf by guest on 24 September 2021 Several proposals have been advanced for lizing domestic public awareness regard- addressing the challenge of constitution- ing the deleterious effects of corruption, al illegitimacy, including one to convene and harnessing international resources for a sovereign national conference of Nige- the fight against corruption. Organizations rian ethnic and social groups, similar to like the Civil Society Network Against Cor- the conferences that were held with mixed ruption, Socio-Economic Rights and Ac- outcomes in several francophone African countability Project, and budgit, as well as countries in the 1990s. A less controver- online media platforms like Premium Times sial suggestion, supported by the Citizens’ and Sahara Reporters, are at the forefront Forum for Constitutional Reform, a broad of current advocacy for transparency and coalition of Nigerian civil society groups, accountability in Nigeria. Civic coalitions would subject future constitutional reforms like the Transition Monitoring Group and or amendments to robust public vetting, in- the Nigeria Civil Society Situation Room cluding extensive public hearings or consul- have been prominent in elections moni- tations and referenda. In response to civil- toring and reform, contributing to the de- society demand for participatory consti- velopment of the Nigerian electoral pro- tutionalism, the House of Representatives cess as a potential mechanism for pro- convened public sessions on constitutional moting competitive electoral alternations review in each of the country’s three hun- that can sanction grand political corrup- dred and sixty legislative constituencies in tion and generate reformist political coali- 2012, while the Senate in 2013 approved a tions and leaderships. These civic struggles proposal to incorporate referenda into fu- against corruption have informed the anti- ture constitutional amendments. corruption institutional reforms enunciat- Key aspects of anticorruption reform ed in this essay and can help them contin- should be assimilated into a broader pro- ue to advance. To summarize and to con- cess of constitutional review involving ex- clude, the reforms would entail: tensive public participation. Such partici- 1) Creating genuinely apolitical anticor- patory constitutionalism could advance ruption and oversight agencies by entrench- anticorruption reform by enhancing the ing the financial and operational autonomy legitimacy and effectiveness of state in- of these institutions from national and sub- stitutions, counteracting the perception national political executives. Appointees to that multiethnic Nigeria is a fraudulent these agencies would be selected through a British colonial contraption, deepening multilayered process involving not only the a commitment to constitutionalism and executive and the legislative branches, but the rule of law, and providing an opportu- also the general public, civil-society orga- nity for the collective action and civic co- nizations, and the judiciary.

198 Dædalus, the Journal of the American Academy of Arts & Sciences 2) Instituting further curbs on discre- 4) Strengthening current transparency Rotimi T. tionary powers of political executives by laws by transferring responsibility for over- Suberu reforming current procurement practic- sight of the foi Act to a depoliticized and au- es, reducing the array of public agencies tonomous Office of the Attorney General, offering opportunities for patronage polit- and by enacting a law to grant public access ical appointments, rescinding the immu- to officials’ assets declarations. nity from criminal prosecution enjoyed 5) Mobilizing extensive public partici- by incumbent executives, and promoting pation in future constitutional change, in- autonomous, democratically elected local cluding through the use of constitutional governance bodies. referendums, as a way of building social

3) Restructuring the Nigerian system of legitimacy for Nigeria’s constitutional in- Downloaded from http://direct.mit.edu/daed/article-pdf/147/3/184/1831152/daed_a_00510.pdf by guest on 24 September 2021 unconditional federal revenue distribu- stitutions and repairing the fragile sense of tion into a conditional grants scheme in national political community. order to make subnational governments accountable, transparent, responsible, and efficient in their use of revenue transfers.

endnotes 1 Robert I. Rotberg, The Corruption Cure: How Citizens and Leaders Can Combat Graft (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2017), 136; Stephen Ellis, This Present Darkness: A History of Nigerian Organized Crime (New York: Oxford University Press, 2016); and Daniel Jordan Smith, A Cul- ture of Corruption: Everyday Deception and Popular Discontent in Nigeria (Princeton N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2007). 2 See Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala, Reforming the Unreformable: Lessons from Nigeria (Cambridge, Mass.: The mit Press 2012). 3 See Rotberg, The Corruption Cure, 290–309. 4 Larry Diamond, “Issues in the Constitutional Design of a Third Nigerian Republic,” African Af- fairs 86 (343) (1987): 226. 5 See Rotimi Suberu, “Managing Constitutional Change in the Nigerian Federation,” Publius: Jour- nal of Federalism 45 (4) (2015): 552–579. 6 Center for Democracy and Development, Buharimeter: PMB Performance Report (Abuja: Center for Democracy and Development, 2017), 3. 7 Muhammadu Buhari, “Nigeria Committed to Good Governance and Fighting Terror,” The Washing- ton Post, July 20, 2015, https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/nigeria-committed-to-good -governance-and-fighting-terror/2015/07/20/8c1acd00-2e21-11e5-8353-1215475949f4_story.html ?utm_term=.826756e78e68. 8 “Nigeria’s Vice President Says $15 bln Stolen in Arms Procurement Fraud,” Reuters, May 2, 2016, https://af.reuters.com/article/africaTech/idAFKCN0XU0CY. 9 Sanusi Lamido, “Unanswered Questions on Nigeria’s Missing Oil Revenue Billions,” Financial Times, May 13, 2015; and William Wallis, “Nigeria: The Big Oil Fix,” Financial Times, May 26, 2015. 10 John Ofikhenua, “Kachikwu: $40 b Down the Drain in Niger Delta,” The Nation (Lagos), Au- gust 26, 2016. 11 Jim Boulden, “How Corrupt Nigerian Politician Was Brought to Justice in the uk,” http://www .cnn.com/2012/05/09/world/africa/ibori-mpa/index.html.

147 (3) Summer 2018 199 Strategies for 12 Paul Adams, “State(s) of Crisis: Subnational Government in Nigeria,” Africa Research Briefing Advancing Note No. 1602 (London: Africa Research Institute, 2016), 2. Anticorruption 13 Reform in United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime,Corruption in Nigeria: Bribery, Public Experience and Re- Nigeria sponse (Vienna: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2017), 5–6. 14 Institute for Economics and Peace, Global Terrorism Index 2015 (Sydney; New York; and Mexico City: Institute for Economics and Peace, 2015), 4. 15 Oxfam International, Inequality in Nigeria: Exploring the Drivers (Oxford: Oxfam International 2017), 15. 16 Institute for Economics and Peace, World Internal Security and Police Index 2016 (Sydney; New York; and Mexico City: Institute for Economics and Peace, 2017), 5. 17 Muhammadu Buhari, “Special Guest of Honor’s Remarks,” in Presidential Advisory Commit- Downloaded from http://direct.mit.edu/daed/article-pdf/147/3/184/1831152/daed_a_00510.pdf by guest on 24 September 2021 tee Against Corruption, International Workshop on the Role of Judges in the Fight Against Corruption: A Compendium of Papers (Abuja: Office of the President, 2016), 40. 18 Presidential Advisory Committee Against Corruption, Report: August 2015–July 2016 (Abuja: Of- fice of the President, 2016), 10. 19 Transparency International Secretariat, “Nigeria Must Strengthen Anti-Corruption Bodies and Increase Transparency on Asset Recovery,” June 16, 2016, https://www.transparency .org/news/pressrelease/nigerian_must_strenghthen_anti_corruption_bodies_and_increase_ transparency. 20 Ismail Akwei, “20 Nigerians to Get Over $1m Whistleblower Reward for Recovered $36.8m,” Af- rica News, August 6, 2017, http://www.africanews.com/2017/06/08/20-nigerians-to-get-over -1m-whistleblowing-money-from-recovered-368m//. 21 Center for Democracy and Development, Buharimeter, 4–8. 22 Transparency International, “Corruption Perceptions Index 2017,” February 21, 2018, https:// www.transparency.org/news/feature/corruption_perceptions_index_2017?gclid=EAIaIQob- ChMIxKWGmdis2gIVRrnACh25sQ3WEAAYASAAEgLWmfD_BwE. 23 Biodun Jeyifo, “Why Are the People Not Clapping their Hands? Because Predatoriness Has Not Stopped!” The Nation (Lagos), October 15, 2017. 24 “The Unending Maina Scandal,” This Day, January 26, 2018; and Yusuf Alli, “Maina Scandal: Ex-efcc Chair, Ex-igp, Two Heads of Service, Implicated,” Sahara Reporters, October 29, 2017. 25 Zainab Usman, The Successes and Failures of Economic Reform in Nigeria’s Post-Military Political Settle- ment, University of Oxford Global Economic Governance Program Working Paper No. 115 (Oxford: University of Oxford Global Economic Governance Program, 2016), 46. 26 Center for Democracy and Development, Buharimeter, 8. 27 African Union, “President Buhari of Nigeria Launches the au Theme of the Year 2018 on Fight- ing Corruption in the Continent,” Press Release, Directorate of Information and Communi- cation, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, January 29, 2018. 28 Femi Falana, “Why Government Loses Corruption Cases,” Sahara Reporters, April 12, 2017. 29 “Co-Chairs’ Statement–24th Plenary of the Egmont Group of Financial Intelligence Units,” Egmont Group, Macao, South Africa, July 7, 2012, https://egmontgroup.org/en/content/co -chairs%E2%80%99-statement-24th-plenary-egmont-group-financial-intelligence-units. 30 Oluwole Ojewale and Josephine Appiah-Nyamekye, “In Nigeria, Perceived Corruption Re- mains High Despite Praise for President’s Anti-Graft Fight,” Afrobarometer Dispatch No. 187, February 8, 2018. 31 Ray Fisman and Miriam Golden, Corruption: What Everyone Needs to Know (Oxford: Oxford Uni- versity Press, 2017), 53.

200 Dædalus, the Journal of the American Academy of Arts & Sciences 32 United States Agency for International Development, Practitioner’s Guide for Anti-Corruption Pro- Rotimi T. gramming (Washington, D.C.: United States Agency for International Development, 2015), 29. Suberu 33 Rotimi Suberu, “Nigeria’s Muddled Elections,” Journal of Democracy 18 (4) (2007): 95–110. 34 Peter Lewis and Michael Watts, The Politics of Policy Reform in Nigeria (Washington, D.C.: The World Bank, 2015), 1. 35 Federal Republic of Nigeria, Report of the Electoral Reform Committee (Abuja: Federal Republic of Nigeria, 2008), 25. 36 Ibid., 28. 37 Attahiru Jega, “Enhancing Electoral Integrity,” AfricaPlus, May 18, 2017, https://africaplus .wordpress.com/ Downloaded from http://direct.mit.edu/daed/article-pdf/147/3/184/1831152/daed_a_00510.pdf by guest on 24 September 2021 38 Ibid. 39 Michael Davis, “Strengthening Constitutionalism in Asia,” Journal of Democracy 28 (4) (2017): 155. 40 Diamond, “Issues in the Constitutional Design of a Third Nigerian Republic,” 217. 41 Fisman and Golden, Corruption, 197–198. 42 Federal Republic of Nigeria, National Assembly, Administration of Criminal Justice Act, 2015 (Lagos: Federal Government Printer, 2015). 43 Falana, “Why Government Loses Corruption Cases.” 44 Femi Falana, “Allegations of Corruption in the Justice Delivery Sector: Implications for the Rule of Law and Democracy,” Sahara Reporters, December 6, 2016. 45 Rick Stapenhurst, Kerry Jacobs, and Oladeji Olaore, “Legislative Oversight in Nigeria: An Em- pirical Review and Assessment,” Journal of Legislative Studies 22 (1) (2016): 1–29. 46 Carolyn Logan, Ambitious SDG Goal Confronts Challenging Realities: Access to Justice Is Still Elusive for Many Africans, Afrobarometer Policy Paper No. 39, March 2017, 13; and Index of Public Integ- rity, “Nigeria,” http://integrity-index.org/country-profile/?id=NGA&yr=2017. 47 Federal Republic of Nigeria, White Paper on the Report of the Presidential Committee on Restructuring and Rationalization of Federal Government Parastatals, Commissions and Agencies (Lagos: Federal Gov- ernment Printer, 2014). 48 Sope Williams-Elegbe, “A Comparative Analysis of the Nigerian Public Procurement Act Against International Best Practice,” Journal of African Law 59 (1) (2015): 85–98. 49 World Bank, Nigeria Economic Report No. 1 (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 2013), 24. 50 budgit, State of the States Policy Brief April 2017 (Lagos: budgit, 2017), 13–15. 51 Nasir Ahmad el-Rufai, “Next Generation Nigeria: What is Restructuring and Does Nigeria Need It?” Africa Program Meeting Transcript, Chatham House, London, September 21, 2017, 3. 52 Kingsley Moghalu, “Osinbajo and the National Question,” This Day, July 3, 2017. 53 Federal Republic of Nigeria, Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 (Lagos: Federal Gov- ernment Printer, 1999), sec. 162. 54 Ibid., 3rd Schedule, pt. I. 55 See, for example, Chidi Anselm Odinkalu, “As Buhari Fights Corruption Without a Strategy,” Premium Times, December 20, 2016; Francis Fukuyama, Political Order and Political Decay: From the Industrial Revolution to the Globalization of Democracy (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2014), 225; Richard Joseph, Democracy and Prebendal Politics in Nigeria: The Rise and Fall of the Sec- ond Republic (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987); and Peter P. Ekeh, “Colonial- ism and the Two Publics in Africa: A Theoretical Statement,” Comparative Studies in Society and History 17 (1) (1975): 91–112. 56 “For the Records: Bill Gates’ Speech that Rattled Nigerian Government,” Premium Times, March 27, 2018. 147 (3) Summer 2018 201