The Sheitel Crisis

Notes

1 Book Presentation

1 . The reader who seeks a more practically oriented presentation of these issues may wish to consult Rabbi Daniel Sperber’s forthcoming manuscript, The Halachic Status of Hinduism: Is Hinduism Idolatrous? A Jewish Legal Inquiry. Because he is more of a halachist and less of a theologian, his discussion does seek to reach some conclusions, where the present project seeks to problematize not only Hinduism but the very concept of Avoda Zara as well. While my argument calls for an application of a more complex method, his argument is that Hinduism is not Avoda Zara. The two arguments are complementary, but also very distinct in nature. 2 . The Jewish-Hindu encounter, including a mention of differing views as to its antiquity and extensivity, is the subject of the complementary volume to the present publication, The Jewish Encounter with Hinduism, published simultaneously by the same press. 3 . See, for example, Nathan Katz, The State of the Art of Hindu-Jewish Dialogue, Indo-Judaic Studies in the Twenty-First Century, ed. Nathan Katz et al., Palgrave- Macmillan, New York, 2007, pp. 113–126 and the various essays collected in F rom India Till Here , ed. Elhanan Nir, Rubin Mass, Jerusalem, 2006 [Hebrew]. 4 . This includes such figures as Benjamin of Tudela and Yaakov Sapir, both of whom are mentioned in The Jewish Encounter with Hinduism . 5 . M a n y o f t h e s e p o i n t s e m e r g e i n The Jewish Encounter with Hinduism and I do not pretend to do justice to the subject in these few lines. 6 . Some of this has been done in The Jewish Encounter with Hinduism.

2 Author Presentation

1. Some friends are catching up. We may be witnessing the beginnings of a trend among Orthodox Jewish scholars who are drawn to the study of Hinduism. Alan Brill and Pinchas Giller are two names that come to mind, in addition to Daniel Sperber, already mentioned.

3 Model Case Presentation: The Sheitel Crisis

1 . As I learned when visiting the temple and standing in the darshan line with devotees. 2 . See Yosef Shalom Elyashiv, k ovetz Teshuvot, Jerusalem, 2000, vol. 1, 77, pp. 114–116. An important consideration in Rabbi Elyashiv’s earlier ruling is the testimony of an expert (whose name is not provided), who is described as the greatest expert in Indian matters. Rabbi Elyashiv’s concluding note affirms his dependency on this expert 208 NOTES TO PAGES 18–21

opinion as well as the need for further investigation on a factual basis. In fact, the seeds of the future reversal of opinion are contained in this concluding note, which eventually led Rabbi Elyashiv to obtain information based on his own independent source. At the end of the day, then, the entire issue devolves to fundamental issues of epistemology and authority: Whom can rabbinical authorities trust as expert wit- nesses on a subject that is beyond their competence, and what amounts to correct perception and knowledge of another field and—in this instance—the other? 3 . Actually, I recently heard that he did meet with a SOAS expert, prior to his departure. 4 . Fleming and Yoshiko Reed expose the problematic nature of the responses offered by Hindus questioned by rabbinic emissaries. Their answers contradict Hindu self- understanding, creating a gap that Fleming seeks to fill by pointing to the com- plexities of traditional understandings of hair and the meaning of its cutting in Hindu sources. See Benjamin Fleming and Annette Yoshiko Reed, From Tirupati to Brooklyn: Interpreting Hindu Votive Hair-Offerings, Studies in Religion/Sciences Religieuses 40, 2011, pp. 1–36. This complexity, typical of so much of Hindu religious thought, alerts us to the care that must be taken when posing questions to practitioners, based on the concerns and categories of another religious system. 5 . See http://www.nytimes.com/2004/05/17/nyregion/orthodox-jews-in-brooklyn-burn- banned-wigs.html, dated May 17, 2004. 6 . S h a l o m D o v b e r W o l p e , Yakem Se’ara Lidemama , Chish Press, Kiryat Gat, 2004 [Hebrew]. 7 . Almost none of these addressed the question of the actual practices or tried to verify for themselves what Hindu practice and belief consist of. One exception is the legal court of Rabbi Nissim Kareliz, in Benei Berak. As part of their ruling, which was more lenient than that of Rabbi Elyashiv, they received the testimony of a Jewish traveler who had spent time in India and reported on Indian customs. The witness was by no means an expert on Hinduism or an insider to it. 8 . The methodological flaws, even from the viewpoint of halachic discourse, in how rabbis went about, or rather did not go about, discerning the nature of Hindu religion are explored in Daniel Sperber’s, How Not to Make Halachic Rulings, http://www. jewishideas.org/articles/how-not-make-halakhic-rulings. 9 . The following anecdote captures the governing frame of mind. It is as funny as it is sad. In the midst of the sheitel crisis I was put in touch with a leading hassidic rebbe, who on the whole has a good grasp of contemporary reality, especially when it comes to issues of medicine and medical ethics. His opening line was: “So what is the story with Buddhism?” I replied by saying that the sheitel crisis revolved around Hinduism, to which he retorted by posing the question, most sincerely: “What’s the difference?” Given such low levels of familiarity with other religious cultures it is impossible to have a meaningful discussion of their halachic status. Consequently, assumptions and stereotypes prevail where careful thought and analysis are required. 1 0 . S e e Noda Biyehuda, Tinyana, Yore De’ah 111;180; See also 10. 11 . The conclusion of Rabbi Joshua Flug, A Review of the Recent “Sheitel” Controversy, Journal of Halacha and Contemporary Society 49, 2005, pp. 5–33 is telling. Flug, p. 33, speaks of the value of this controversy as an opportunity to explore issues that are rarely of practical relevance, such as an offering to an idol and the statistical principle of k avaua . 12 . Christianity being foremost among them. A substantial part of the present work extrapolates to Hinduism from prior views taken in relationship to Christianity. 13 . Identity of the worshipped god as an other is not the only reason for disapproving of image worship. Rabbi Yehuda Halevy seems to offer a critique of image worship that does not hinge on an understanding of another god. For him, images are means NOTES TO PAGES 21–22 209

of drawing down astral powers, but these are falsely ascribed to images and in fact do not work. See K uzari 1, 60–62. A similar understanding is also echoed by his colleague Abraham Ibn Ezra, commentary to Ex. 32, 1. See further Richard Marks’s discussion of Ibn Ezra in his forthcoming The Jewish Interest in Hinduism: A History of Ideas from Judah Halevi to Jacob Sapir . See the discussion in chapter 4 on Avoda Zara as relating to inappropriate forms of worship, alongside the primary focus on the identity of the worshipped God. 14 . Of course, the same challenge may be posed in relation to Christianity. To the extent that Christian worship involves the use of images and forms, this has fed widespread perception of Christianity as Avoda Zara. But if we approach the question from the other direction, we are challenged to contemplate how, other than through ritual, we would recognize the Christian God as one and the same as the God of Israel. See further, Alon Goshen-Gottstein, God Between Christians and Jews: Is It the Same God? Do We Worship the Same God? Jews, Christians and Muslims in Dialogue, ed. Miroslav Volf, Eerdmans, Grand Rapids, MI, 2012, pp. 50–75. 15 . This has already been achieved by some rabbinic spokesmen. See in particular the discussion of Rabbi Steinsaltz. 16 . This move is implicit in earlier writings, especially with regard to Christianity. I believe it is one of the contributions of the present discussion to make explicit and conscious the reframing of the core question in this way as a basis for a Jewish view of another religion. 17 . This could lead to the realization, or the charge, that another god is worshipped by the same means, while avoiding representation through images. This describes internal Jewish theological disputes, where the same worship is addressed to a God, vari- ously understood by different religious philosophies. Such divergent understandings could lead to the view of the alternative Jewish view as a form of Avoda Zara. See Alon Goshen-Gottstein, The Triune and the Decaune God: Christianity and Kabbalah as Objects of Jewish Polemics with Special Reference to Meir ben Simeon of Narbonne’s Milhemet Mitzva, Religious Polemics in Context, ed. T. L. Hettema and A. Van der Kooij, Van Gorcum, Assen, The Netherlands, 2004, pp. 165–197. 18 . In a more historical vein, see K. van der Toorn, The Iconic Book: Analogies between the Babylonian Cult of Images and the Veneration of the Torah, The Image and the Book: Iconic Cults, Aniconism and the Rise of Book Religion in Israel and the Ancient Near East, ed. K. Van der Toorn, Peeters, Leuven, 1997, pp. 229–248. 19 . I would say that in terms of methodology, Daniel Sperber’s rabbinic appreciation of Hinduism is largely based on his willingness to accept the authority of the Hindu interpreter, thereby absolving Hinduism from charges that are imported from the Jewish viewer’s eyes. 20 . The problem of multiple Hinduisms and the challenge of who speaks for Hinduism were addressed at length in The Jewish Encounter with Hinduism. 2 1 . I t s h o u l d b e a c k n o w l e d g e d t h a t t h i s fraagestellung may itself betray my Jewish perspective, or a philosophical perspective, and corrupt the results. Neelima Shukla Bhatt suggests to me that the recognition of a fundamental unity of the Divine and of life must be discerned through the approach to other ways of posing the question, rather than by directly posing the question of the one and the many. She suggests that if the question was framed in terms of religious difference, asking even uneducated people whether they consider the god they worship to be ultimately the same as the god of an other, they would respond that ultimately they are one. The notion of the ultimate unity of life is, according to her, more deeply embedded than the articulation of the relationship of a given god and ultimate being. 210 NOTES TO PAGES 22–24

22 . The question of who holds the key to interpreting the religion is actually one of the issues that arose in the context of the sheitel controversy. Whether one relied on priests, worshippers, or the barbers would have different halachic consequences and even account for the reversal of earlier rulings, resulting in the 2004 prohibition of sheitels. See Flug, Review of the Recent “Sheitel” Controversy, pp. 19 and 22. See further Daniel Sperber’s forthcoming The Halachic Status of Hinduism. Note, however, that Hindus were only asked about the meaning of their action, not their view of God, which is the focus of my own discussion. 23 . Much of the present work is indebted to the philosophy of Advaita Vedanta . This is the Hindu voice that is most prominent in encounters with other cultures and traditions. A word is in order with regard to the other vedantic schools, those of Ramanuja and Madhva. The key differences between the schools revolve around understanding the nature of God, the absolute, and specifically whether He has body and form. The other schools identify the absolute as personal and possessing form, thereby making the starting point of a Jewish recognition of a common God harder to identify with a Jewish view of God. However, these schools too affirm the unity of God in his transcendent and immanent reality. The understanding of God’s immanence and his being all-pervading cuts across theological differences between the schools. As to the specifics of how God the supreme is understood, more theological will may be required by a Jewish interlocutor in order to affirm commonalities with these views. The discussion of the same God, in Part IV, points to some possibilities for affirming the same God also in relation to these schools. One could also draw on the diversity that can be found within historical views of the Jewish God. Despite the diversity of Hindu views, the core spiritual recognition of approaching the one Absolute Being remains the same for the different schools. For views of Visishta Advaita see John Carman, The Theology of Ramanuja, Yale University Press, New Haven, CT, 1974. That the different vedantic schools are commentarial traditions, relating to the same core scriptures, suggests that their differences are a matter of internal Hindu debate, significant as it may be, upon certain scriptural foundations that can ultimately provide a point of recognition from a Jewish perspective. See further Deepak Sarma, An Introduction to Madhva Vedanta , Ashgate, Aldershot, 2003. Note the latter’s consistent use of “monotheism” in describing this theology, however it be qualified. 24 . Balinese Hinduism is one interesting case in point. Reports suggest a greater awareness of the philosophical principles than a visit to Nepal suggests. See the April-June 2012 issue of Hinduism Today , devoted to Balinese Hinduism, and see further C. Hooykaas, Religion in Bali, Leiden, Brill, 1973. It is quite possible that the magazine represents one particular form of Hinduism in light of the editor’s understanding of how Hinduism ought to be featured. 25 . I am not the only Jewish observer to confront this particular challenge. It is alluded to in my reading of Alan Brill’s post, http://kavvanah.wordpress.com/2013/12/09/ katmandu-the-kumari-devi/ . 26 . The final part of the present work suggests a move away from “Hinduism” and a method for approaching the complex religious phenomena under discussion. 27 . On this, see Chapter 11 of The Jewish Encounter with Hinduism. 28 . After reading Daniel Sperber’s The Halachic Status of Hinduism, I recalled a conversation I had with him over a decade ago, when, in the context of discussing Christian art, he considered Christianity to not be Avoda Zara, at the same time declaring that Hinduism is obviously Avoda Zara. I expressed my doubts, at the time, concerning how we could be unequivocal in relation to Hinduism. I was therefore struck to see Sperber’s discussion, note 8, in which he includes quotes from a recently held NOTES TO PAGES 26–28 211

dialogue of the Chief Rabbinate and Hindu leaders as the kind of resource that should inform halachic thinking. I queried him as to whether his opinion had changed over time and also noted that his comment was methodological, but stopped short of viewing Hinduism in the same permissible light through which he was willing to consider Christianity. Sperber conceded his viewpoint had indeed changed and ascribed it to the dialogue. The more he got to know Hinduism, the more complex it seemed, and the harder it was for him to take an unequivocal position on its status as Avoda Zara. Clearly, his earlier views had been informed by the visuals of Hinduism, while his later views, or doubts, were informed by greater exposure to its philosophy, as expounded by some of its leading contemporary exponents. Growing complexity thus comes at the expense of clear-cut perspectives. This, however, is not a loss, but a gain, and one whose significance may become obvious only in the long run. Since then, Sperber seems to have moved beyond his own doubts, as the forthcoming manuscript The Halachic Status of Hinduism suggests. In this manuscript Sperber comes to the clear conclusion that Hinduism should not be considered Avoda Zara. The summits with Hindu leaders have played a major role in moving Sperber from one end of the spectrum to its opposite. On these summits, see Chapter 11 of The Jewish Encounter with Hinduism.

Part II Introducing Avoda Zara

1 . One possible strategy for maintaining one’s identity and even keeping some distance from another religion without resorting to tactics of delegitimation is the “same God” strategy, discussed in Part IV.

4 Avoda Zara: Introducing the Category

1 . The Bible is not familiar with this legend; it only becomes popular in Second Temple times, stamping the image of Abraham for generations. See my Abraham and Abrahamic Religions in Contemporary Interreligious Discourse: Reflections of an Implicated Jewish Bystander, Studies in Interreligious Dialogue 12,2, 2002, pp. 165–183. 2 . See Deut. 18,10–11. 3 . For a contemporary illustration of how Avoda Zara functions, even for someone who approaches it with an open attitude, see Rivka Miriam, On Two Conflicting Visits to India, F rom India Till Here , Rubin Mass, Jerusalem, 2006, pp. 41–42, 45. One sees in her own testimony to what extent Avoda Zara comes to represent all that is different, other, and foreign. Avoda Zara thus becomes the cultural and legal expression of otherness, suggesting the extent to which the category channels a fundamental sense of estrangement from the other, even as it contributes to the formation of such estrangement. 4 . Halbertal and Margalit provide a contemporary attempt to extract answers from the tradition and to present them in a theoretical framework. See Moshe Halbertal and Avishai Margalit, Idolatry , Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1992. 5 . This raises fascinating questions concerning Christianity and its status in rabbinic literature. Some readers find Christianity round every corner in rabbinic literature. I am closer to the opinion that Christianity is much more rarely discussed. See Sacha Stern, Jewish Identity in Early Rabbinic Writings, Brill, Leiden, 1994, pp. 49–50; 109–110. See also my Polemicomania: Methodological Reflections on the Study of the Judeo- Christian Controversy following the commentaries of the rabbis and Origen on the 212 NOTES TO PAGES 28–34

Song of Songs, Jewish Studies 42, 2003–04, pp. 119–190 [Hebrew]. If there is little interest in Christianity, then we may not be able to draw conclusions regarding its status as Avoda Zara in the rabbinic corpus. If, on the other hand, the rabbis recognized that the Christian God is the same as the Jewish God, this might account for the relative paucity of reference. See further in the discussion at the beginning of chapter 8. 6 . The Bible itself speaks in more than one voice. We may be able to detect a transition from opposition to Jews worshipping other gods to a rejection of other religions as such, based on their inappropriate means of worship. See John Barton, The Work of Human Hands (ps. 115,4): Idolatry in the OT, Ex Auditu 15, 1999, pp. 63–72, especially p. 68. 7 . S e e G e r a l d B l i d s t e i n , Rabbinic Legislation on Idolatry: Tractate Avoda Zarah, Chapter 1 , Phd Dissertation, Yeshiva University, 1968 [Hebrew]. 8 . While such a clear articulation of the relationship of Avoda Zara and otherness is rarely encountered in theoretical reflections on Avoda Zara, it does inform certain halachic positions. See Shut Ziz Eliezer Part 14,91; See also Part 10,1. 9 . The just cited discussion of Ziz Eliezer is a rare exception. 10 . The only rabbinic passage that comes to mind in this respect is Bavli Menachot 110a. The Talmud explains Malachi 1,11, where the greatness of God’s name is recognized by the nations, as acknowledgment that the nations call Him God of gods. While this could provide an important resource for a Jewish view of other religions and might point to some sense of a common recognition of God, this statement is quite negligible, within talmudic literature and largely beyond it. This is the only reference within talmudic literature to such an understanding and it receives very minor echoes in post-talmudic literature. (For exceptions to this claim, see Nacmanides’ commentary to Deut. 10,21. See further Malbim to Amos 3,2). Significantly, it is completely absent from later halachic discussions. The statement could have been significant for later discussions, especially given its resonance with the understanding of Avoda Zara as expounded by Nachmanides, which I shall shortly present, and with the notion of Shituf . The lack of echo points to the local exegetical quality of this statement, lacking halachic substance. More significantly, it points to the lack of any serious interest, throughout the generations, to explore the possibility that the God worshipped by Israel is in important ways the same God worshipped, or otherwise recognized, in other religions. In fact, in the talmudic context Israel and their heavenly father are juxtaposed with the God of gods, thereby reducing the likelihood of identification of “our” God with notions of divinity found in other religions. That so little is made of this statement is due in part to its already minor role in the Talmud. At the same time, it reaffirms the absolute preference given to the visible ritual deed over and against the more theoretical and philosophical concerns that might lead to alternative views of other religions. 11 . The struggle against Christianity in terms of Avoda Zara is not as old as Christianity, and it takes several hundred, maybe even close to a thousand years, before the charge is made explicitly in relation to Christianity. On such attitudes to Islam, See Marc Shapiro, Islam and the Halakha, Judaism , 42,3, 1993, pp. 332–343. It is striking to see the ease with which the charge of Avoda Zara in relation to Islam can resurface in contemporary halachic thinking. See Shlomo Glicksberg, Shut Nitzanei Aretz , Jerusalem, 2011, pp. 43–48.

5 Avoda Zara: Mental Attitudes

1 . See our following discussion of Shituf. This is a common strategy practiced among Ashkenazi Jews in relation to Christianity, since early modern times. This strategy NOTES TO PAGES 34–35 213

has been documented by Jacob Katz, The Vicissitudes of Three Apologetic Passages, Zion 24, 1959, pp. 181–186 [Hebrew]. For a recent summary, see Eugene Korn, Rethinking Christianity: Rabbinic Positions and Possibilities, Jewish Theology and World Religions, ed. A. Goshen-Gottstein and E. Korn, The Littman Library, Oxford, 2012, pp. 189–215. 2 . The rabbis formulate this approach through the following maxim “all gibing is forbidden, save gibing at idolatry” (Bavli Megila 25b, translation of Soncino Press). How fundamental this statement is can be seen by its use in a halachic ruling by one of the foremost decisors of the twentieth century. Rabbi Moshe Feinstein permits the teaching of comparative religion as part of a school curriculum, provided the teaching is carried out in a mocking mode. See Igrot Moshe , Yore Deah, Part 2, 53. That contemporary teaching of comparative religion, serving the social purposes that it does, should be combined with a mocking attitude points to the inherent weakness of the traditional rabbinic view and its inadequacy in coping with contemporary challenges. 3 . Isa. 44, 8–21, Jewish Publication Society translation. 4 . This is the thesis of Yehezkel Kaufmann who notes that the only polemic in the Bible is against fetishistic worship, but never against the existence of other gods or myths associated with them. See Yehezkel Kaufmann, History of Israelite Faith , Bialik- Devir, Tel Aviv, 1960, vol. 1, pp. 255–285 [Hebrew]. See further Yehezkel Kaufmann, The Religions of Israel: From Its Beginnings to the Babylonian Exile, translated and abridged by Moshe Greenberg, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1960, pp. 13–20. For Kaufmann, the biblical authors seem to have missed the point, hence the depth, of the religious worldview of other religions. This is misunderstood as purely the worship of stone and wood, in a parody of idolatry that is ultimately based on a partial understanding and on ignorance of the views of other religions. It therefore raises the challenge of the ultimate significance and the enduring legacy of such a view of other religions. Talking these issues through with Israel Knohl suggests that in fundamental ways the views presented by Kaufmann remain valid, despite various discoveries since, and that no alternative to Kaufmann, in understanding prophetic polemic, has emerged in the past half century. The biblical position seems to be constitutive of much of Judaism’s approach to other religions, based as it is on partial knowledge, as witnessed in the sheitel crisis. It is fascinating to contrast this default understanding with the alternative default position, suggested by Maimonides in his Guide of the Perplexed 1,36, which forces him to a theory of intermediary beings. 5 . While the following discussion focuses on biblical attitudes, it applies equally to the attitude of the classical rabbinic period. It is noteworthy that the rabbis take little notice of pagan philosophers’ attempts to make sense of their religion. See P. Athanassiadi and M. Frede (eds.), Pagan Monotheism in Late Antiquity , Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1999; One God: Pagan Monotheism in the Roman Empire, ed. Stephen Mitchell and Peter van Nuffelen, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2010; P. Athanassiadi, The Gods Are God: Polytheistic Cult and Monotheistic Theology in the World of Late Antiquity , God or Gods, Collection Eranos 15, ed. T. Schabert and M. Riedl, K ö nigshausen & Neumann, Wurzburg 2009, pp. 15–31. Unlike some of the church fathers, who felt the need to debate with philosophical justifications for paganism, the rabbis never tackle these presentations head on. For purposes of the present project, one should note, however, that the place that philosophical understanding plays within the overall economy of Hinduism is far greater than the role that it played in ancient Roman pagan culture. Thus, not only have we changed, but the object of reflection and evaluation of the present study is also very different from that encountered by the rabbis. In accounting for rabbinical silence on what should 214 NOTES TO PAGES 35–36

be considered a burning religious issue, we do well to consider the very nature of rabbinic literature, which does not allow for sustained philosophical engagement. Rabbinic silence is also the outcome of rabbinic insularity, which does not join in direct conversation with broader philosophical trends. The upshot is that the prophetic precedent of viewing religions based on their outward appearances, rather than their philosophical understanding, continues to set the tone for a Jewish view of other religions. It could, of course, be claimed that this justifies perpetuating such attitudes when Judaism comes into contact with new religions, such as Hinduism. If the rabbis did not attempt to understand, accept, or legitimate the practices of pagan religions, why should we? From a traditional perspective, this argument makes sense, and indeed it informs much of contemporary ultra-Orthodox practice, as witnessed in the sheitel crisis. However, what is at stake is precisely the logic and hermeneutics of insularity, leading to hermeneutics of scorn and rejection. My own reading of the philosophical and religious mandate of the hour is to develop a hermeneutic that grows out of realization of the broader common ground of religions, and therefore seeks to go beyond external appearances and to attain a fuller understanding of the other, as a precondition for any evaluation. The following discussion of precedents in rabbinic attitudes to Christianity suggests that my own approach should be seen in continuity with previous rabbinic attitudes to other religions, rather than as a nov- elty. That contemporary mentality may be informed simultaneously by different and conflicting strands of tradition is a sign of how the entire domain is badly in need of rethinking and reconsideration. 6 . See Thorkild Jacobsen, The Graven Image, Ancient Israelite Religion: Essays in Honor Frank Moore Cross, Fortress Press, Philadelphia, 1987, pp. 15–32; Angelika Berlejung, Washing the Mouth: The Consecration of Divine Images in Mesopotamia, The Image and the Book: Iconic Cults, Aniconism and the Rise of Book Religion in Israel and the Ancient Near East, ed. K. Van der Toorn, Peeters, Leuven, 1997, pp. 45–72. 7 . This will be explored in greater detail later in our discussion. 8 . It is interesting to consider how the prophet is read through Indian eyes, where an understanding of idols and images, similar to the one that was common in the Ancient Near East, endures. The Indian reader is scandalized by a text from Scripture that offers what seems to be a dishonest caricature of a meaningful religious practice and that does this in a literary form (satire) that one does not expect to find in a religious book. See George Soares-Prabhu, “Laughing at Idols: The Dark Side of Biblical Monotheism (An Indian Reading of Isaiah 44: 9–20), “ A Biblical Theology for India (Collected Writings of George M. Soares- Prabhu, S.J.), ed. Scaria Kuthirakkattel, vol. 2, S.V.D., Jnana-Deepa Vidyapeeth, Pune, 1999, p. 273. 9 . I am not familiar with a scholarly view of prophetic polemic as intentional distortion. It seems to advance scholarly discussion of biblical polemics very little and therefore has not emerged as an alternative to Kaufmann’s views. 10 . In the framework of the Parliament of World Religions, Melbourne, December 2009, I organized two panel discussions on the religious imperative to represent the other faithfully. Participants, theologians of all major religions, agreed this was pioneering work and that how we portray the other is actually more fundamental than, and lies at the basis of, work in the area of theology of religions. They also agreed this is a subject that has received almost no systematic attention. 11 . Exodus 20,13. Traditional Jewish understanding limits this to legal circumstances and therefore would not apply it to contemporary interreligious relations. Such application is a fairly recent turn on the interreligious front. Note the title of Amy Jill Levine’s essay, Bearing False Witness: Common Errors Made about Early Judaism, NOTES TO PAGES 36–38 215

The Jewish Annotated New Testament, ed. A. J. Levine and M. Z. Brettler, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2011, pp. 501–504. The title appeals to a notion current in Christian circles, but one that has not found serious articulation on the Jewish side. For a contemporary application of this prohibition, see Peter Pettit, Case Study on the Arab-Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, Covenantal Conversations, ed. Darrell Jodock, Fortress Press, Minneapolis, 2008, pp. 161–167. 12 . Note the ease with which we speak of judging the other in this context. Halachic thinking develops a penchant for judgment and can inculcate a spirit of being judg- mental in relation to others. The flip side of the faithfulness to tradition that is expressed thereby is the problematic spiritual character trait of judgmentalism. In reflecting on the price we pay for viewing other religions as we do and on strategies for representing and appreciating other religions, we might consider the dynamics of judgmentalism and the traditional resources for transforming judgmentalism through judging toward merit (see, e.g., Mishna Avot 1,6). 13 . My friend Stanislaw Krajewski has also used this analogy. See his Can Another Religion Be Seen as the Other? Jewish Theology and World Religions, ed. Goshen- Gottstein and Korn, p. 142. 14 . If we relate to the words of the prophets in terms of content, we must either abide by them or dismiss them as erroneous. However, if we shift the focus from content to context, to attitude, prophetic attitudes need not be dismissed. They are ways of addressing the needs of the moment, be they educational, religious, or political. If we judge that the moment calls for it, we may have the choice of inculcating other attitudes. The attitudes associated with a view of another religion and even with its declaration as Avoda Zara may change, as conditions, understanding, and needs determine. 15 . Christianity is primarily relevant to the present discussion as the framework within which the defining attitudes to other religions, which could be extended to Hinduism, were developed. To a lesser extent, it is also relevant to our discussion by providing a precedent for engagement with Hinduism, as carried out by an Abrahamic faith that considers itself monotheistic. However, the fact that for many rabbinic authors Christianity presented the same challenges that Hinduism does makes its own efforts at coming to terms with Hinduism of more limited value. The history of Muslim views of Hinduism is also worthy of study, though I will not enter into a fuller exploration of this dimension. My own impressions are that Muslim attitudes divide between acceptance and rejection, in ways that are close to Jewish attitudes. A study of the conditions under which Muslim authors have been accepting of Hinduism may be instructive for a comparative appreciation of how strict monotheisms come to terms with Hinduism and the limits and mechanisms for theological accommodation of the other. My impression is that the more one emphasizes mystical and philosophical dimensions, rather than legal and ritualistic dimensions, in the understanding of one’s religion as well as of the other, the more the avenues open up for a positive appreciation of Hinduism. Islam therefore provides an interesting control group for some of the hypotheses of this discussion, including the potential positive effects of greater familiarity with and appreciation of spirituality and wisdom in shaping the attitude to the religious other. See the summary statements of Y. Friedman, Medieval Muslim Views of Indian Religions, Journal of the American Oriental Society, 95,2, 1975, pp. 214–221; Seyyed Hossein Nasser, Sufi Essays , George Allen and Unwin, London, 1972, pp. 138–142. 16 . More on this in The Jewish Encounter with Hinduism. 17 . Of course, this reasoning only applies to the worship dimension of Avoda Zara and its resort to images and not to its polytheistic aspect, let alone anything that would amount to recognition of a god who is indeed an “other” god. 216 NOTES TO PAGES 48–56

6 Understanding Avoda Zara: The Maimonidean Model

1 . The position is thus quite similar to that of R. Yehuda Halevi in the narrative opening of his Kuzari, where, despite favorable intention, the actual acts of the king do not find favor with God. 2 . See Gen. 20,7. 3 . See also Jonathan Cohen, The Makings of a Master Story: Maimonides’ Idolatry Narrative as an Educational Paradigm, Journal of Jewish Education 72,2, 2006, p. 137. 4 . The rabbis also seem to not have entertained such a possibility. Images are images of other gods, never of Israel’s God. The biblical basis of the prohibition of image making, however, seems to be more complex. See John Barton, The Work of Human Hands (ps. 115,4): Idolatry in the OT, Ex Auditu 15 (1999). 5 . Such a person would be defined by Maimonides as a min , heretic. See Laws of Teshuva 3,7. This is a different category than Avoda Zara. 6 . The common Jewish perspective that judges by our criteria, and therefore deems the object of worship to be something other than God, requires further examina- tion. Even if we assume the worshipper is in error, in order to worship Avoda Zara he or she must be aware of the otherness of the worshipped object. If that object is worshipped as God, or as an expression of God, it is really God, and not the object that is worshipped. Our insistence on interpreting the act of worship in accordance with our outsider’s perspective is incommensurate with prevailing halachic emphasis upon intention, rather than the externals of the act. The key talmudic discussion in Bavli Sanhedrin 61b and parallels could have generated an entirely different approach to other religions, under different social and historical conditions. It is actually quite amazing that a legal system that has made intention its hallmark and identifying feature should resort to completely external criteria when judging another religion. Clearly, the double standards at play are an expression of broader attitudes to other religions and an extension of the uncharitable mockery that is itself a characteristic of a Jewish view of Avoda Zara. Whose perspective should determine how worship is understood seems a fundamental, and completely unex- amined, question. It is to Daniel Sperber’s credit that he has constructed an entire argument, in The Halakhic Status of Hinduism, based on the internal understanding and intentionality of religious practice, as expounded by Hindus. While the point is never stated in this way, in fact Sperber applies the most important internal halachic criteria, rather than alternative criteria that are usually brought to bear in discussions of Hinduism. 7 . For what follows, see also the discussion of spirituality in The Jewish Encounter with Hinduism. 8 . See Chapter 6 of The Jewish Encounter with Hinduism. 9 . See Ashok Vohra, Metaphysical Unity, Phenomenological Diversity and the Approach to the Other: An Advaita Vedanta Position, The Religious Other: Hostility, Hospitality and the Hope of Human Flourishing , ed. Alon Goshen-Gottstein, Lexington Books, Lanham, 2014, pp. 99–115. 1 0 . L a w s o f A v o d a Z a r a 9 , 4 . 11 . To take some notable examples: the two leading halachic authorities of recent Judaism, the late Rabbi Moshe Feinstein and former Sefardi Chief Rabbi, Ovadiah Yosef, both embrace this position. While the former never even entertains the possible implications of the alternative position, Rabbi Yosef deftly evokes the other position where appropriate, while sticking to the fundamental position that considers Christianity as Avoda Zara in most of his halachic oeuvre. (The single creative exception to the NOTES TO PAGES 56–59 217

rule is his permission for a convert to pray for the well-being of his Christian parents. Here the nonidolatrous position is evoked. See Responsa Y echave Da’at Part 4, 66. 12 . On Maimonides and Christianity, see Howard Kreisel, Maimonides on Christianity and Islam, Jewish Civilization: Essays and Studies, ed. Ronald Brauner, Reconstructionist Rabbinical College Press, Philadelphia,1985, Part 3, p. 156. See also David Novak, Maimonides’ Treatment of Christianity and Its Normative Implications, Jewish Theology and World Religions, ed. A. Goshen-Gottstein and E. Korn, The Littman Library, Oxford, pp. 217–233. 13 . See my The Triune and the Decaune God. Kabbalists had to creatively manipulate the legacy of Maimonides in order to maintain the legitimacy of their own religious worldview. See Gershom Scholem, M ehoker Limekubal, Tarbiz 6, 1935, pp. 90–98 [Hebrew]. 14 . This possibility could be deduced from Maimonides’ commentary to Mishna Avoda Zara 1,13. 15 . This is the note that is sounded in the Laws of Kings 11,4, in uncensored editions. 16 . We do not know how Maimonides understood Jesus and his worship. If Steinsalz and Korn are correct in introducing geographical and cultural critique to their appreciation of Maimonides’ ruling (see chapter 8, note 23), then we may be forced to question the basis of Maimonides’ ruling. Perhaps he did not realize that Jesus is worshipped as God, rather than as a human being. 17 . Some even consider he is simply extending the talmudic worldview. See Yehuda Herzel Henkin, Shut Benei Banim , part 3, 36, p. 128. 18 . The medieval Jewish view of drawing astral forces into the image would therefore be helpful in appreciating the internal logic of image worship, though it does not offer us new parameters for a consideration of Avoda Zara . See chapter 3 , note 13. 19 . This would probably hold true also for stronger understandings of material expression, such as icons, used in the Eastern Churches. 20 . See Francis Clooney, Hindu God, Christian God, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2001, Chapter 4. 21 . See also my Judaisms and Incarnational Theologies: Mapping Out the Parameters of Dialogue, Journal of Ecumenical Studies, 39,3–4, 2002.

7 Avoda Zara between Jews and Gentiles: Nachmanides’ Model

1 . I have discussed Nachmanides’ views on these issues in great detail in my Other gods in the Teachings of Nachmanides: Conceptual Formulations and Their Consequences to Attitudes to Other Religions, By the Well: Studies in Jewish Philosophy and Halakhic Thought Presented to Gerald J. Blidstein, ed. U. Ehrlich et al., Ben Gurion University Press, Beer Sheva, 2008, pp. 25–82 [Hebrew]. 2 . This may be related to Maimonides’ concern with truth and his understanding of idolatry in terms of truth. See Moshe Halbertal and Avishai Margalit, Idolatry, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1992, Chapter 4. It may be similarly indebted to the low stakes that Maimonides places on identitarian concerns, an obvious outcome of the low place he assigns “Israel” in his overall philosophic view. See Menachem Kellner, Maimonides on Judaism and the Jewish People, SUNY Press, Albany, NY, 1991. 3 . It is fair to say that the same holds true for rabbinic literature as well. The possibility of distinguishing Jews and non-Jews with reference to the worship of other gods and Avoda Zara is a biblical notion that then resurfaces in various forms in the literature of the Middle Ages. The difference between Maimonides and Nachmanides that this section explores can thus be traced to different normative strands of the tradition. 218 NOTES TO PAGES 59–63

4 . B a v l i Sanhedrin 56 a-b. Avoda Zara is recognized by all as one of the noachide commandments. 5 . L a w s o f K i n g s 9 , 2 . 6 . The question of whether Jews and non-Jews should be judged by the same standards may already be traced to different biblical voices. See John Barton, The Work of Human Hands (Ps. 115,4): Idolatry in the Old Testament, Ex Auditu 15, 1999, pp. 63–72. Mocking and critiquing other religions due to their forms of worship assume that the same standard should apply to Jews and non-Jews. An approach that highlights the same standard privileges the understanding of God as universal God, rather than His particular affiliation and relationship with Israel. 7 . An alternative distinction raised by him, which remains relevant for contemporary Jewish discussions of Avoda Zara, is between the practice of religion in the Holy Land and outside it. I shall not enter this dimension of the discussion, as it has less bearing on a Jewish view of Hinduism. I discuss this dimension of Nachmanides’ thought in Other gods in the Teaching of Nachmanides. 8 . N a c h m a n i d e s , Commentary on the Torah, translated Rabbi Charles Chavel, Shilo Publishing, New York, 1973, pp. 291–292. 9 . See Halbertal and Margalit, Idolatry , Chapter 1 . Their presentation of Nachmanides in other terms misses the mark. See further my Other gods in the Teaching of Nachmanides, notes 4 and 24. 1 0 . N a c h m a n i d e s , Commentary on the Torah, p. 288 . 11 . See Nachmanides at the beginning of his commentary on Ex. 20,2. 12 . This verse is an ancient crux and a complicated one, precisely because of its implications for the permissibility of other nations worshipping beings other than God. The rabbis already struggled with this verse and tried to get around its plain sense. One ancient tradition, which the rabbis understand as representing the Septuagint, understands the allotting of luminaries for purposes of providing light. See Bavli Megila 9b. Another retains the plain sense of the verse, while standing its intention on its head. Indeed, God allotted the stars to the nations for purposes of worship. However, he did so in order to lead them to perdition. See Bavli Avoda Zara 55a. In the history of interpretation, it is not really until Nachmanides’ commentary that a conceptual framework is found through which the plain sense of the biblical verse can be upheld, despite the changes in theology and worldview that had taken place since the verse was first articulated. 1 3 . L a w s o f A v o d a Z a r a 2 , 1 . 14 . The relational element actually leaves room even for Israel to approach other beings, so long as this approach is carried out as an expression of God’s will. See Nachmanides on Lev. 16,8, which is discussed in my Other gods in the Teaching of Nachmanides. What for Maimonides was impossible, that God would will a gift to other beings, is recognized by Nachmanides as legitimate. 15 . This emerges from the structure of Nachmanides’ presentation, as revealed by careful analysis. However, Nachmanides does not say it in so many words. Following the presentation of Nachmanides, we shall see that his student, the Rashba, continues this train of thought, making explicit what emerges from the present analysis of Nachmanides. 16 . The Hebrew can be translated as “first,” with reference to the typology Nachmanides presents, or “earliest” in terms of the historical progression of Avoda Zara. While this text does offer a typology, it couches this typology in developmental terms. I there- as earliest, rather than first, as does Charles Chavel ראשונים fore prefer to translate NOTES TO PAGES 63–68 219

(trans.), Nachmanides Torah Commentary, Shilo Publishing, New York, 1973–1976, Commentary on Exodus p. 292. 1 7 . N a c h m a n i d e s , Commentary on the Torah, p. 292. 18 . This is consistent with Maimonides’ views on astrology. See the famous epistle to the sages of Marseille. 1 9 . N a c h m a n i d e s , Commentary on the Torah, p. 293. 20 . See toward the end of Nachmanides’ commentary on Ex. 20,2: “the Separate Intelligences are the souls of the astrological signs.” 2 1 . N a c h m a n i d e s , Commentary on the Torah, pp. 293–294. 22 . The difference is, of course, that Deut. 4,19 only refers to the heavenly bodies themselves. Nachmanides ties other forms of Avoda Zara to an astrological understanding, without a scriptural basis. The question is then whether the possible scriptural legitimization of such worship extends to all expressions of the worship of stars, or only to the direct worship, as described in Scripture, in which case the secondary manifestations of Avoda Zara would indeed have to be condemned. Hence, one is left wondering whether the change of tone with reference to the second part of the second type is an expression of greater negativity associated with this kind of worship or a judgment on the individual cases noted by Nachmanides. 2 3 . N a c h m a n i d e s , Commentary on the Torah, p. 295. 24 . It is worth noting that some elements of this view may be found, in a much less developed way, in Ibn Ezra’s commentary on the ten commandments, commenting on Ex. 20,1. Ibn Ezra refers to “believing in the Name, while joining others with Him,” using the verb from which Shituf is taken. This is not considered Avoda Zara. For a discussion of Ibn Ezra, see Richard Marks’s forthcoming The Jewish Interest in Hinduism: A History of Ideas from Judah Halevi to Jacob Sapir . 2 5 . Q u o t i n g E x . 2 2 , 1 9 . 26 . Quoting Bavli Rosh Hashana 24b. 2 7 . N a c h m a n i d e s , Commentary on the Torah, pp. 295–296. 2 8 . N a c h m a n i d e s , Torah Commentary to Duet . 10,21, p. 128. 29 . Compare chapter 4 , note 10. 30 . If other nations legitimately worship other elohim, this may be predicated on their designation as elohim . If so, only the first of the three categories mentioned in Nachmanides’ commentary on Exodus would qualify as a form of permissible worship. On the other hand, the juxtaposition of gods and graven images in the first part of the above commentary may be reversed in relation to the nations, thereby yielding recognition that along with the recognition of legitimate worship of other beings, by the nations, comes recognition of their worship through forms and images. In light of Nachmanides’ discussion in his commentary on Exodus, this would certainly amount to validation of the worship of stars, which schematically precedes the worship of images. I understand Nachmanides’ reference to a previous discussion as reference to his commentary on Exodus, against the editorial reference to another of his discussions. See my Other gods in the Teaching of Nachmanides, pp. 68–69. 3 1 . N a c h m a n i d e s , Commentary on the Torah, p. 338. Like the previous quote from Nachmanides, this one too appeals to an earlier passage in his commentary. Here too I consider this a reference to the commentary on Exodus, against the common editorial reference to another of Nachmanides’ discussions, in his commentary on Leviticus. 32 . Regrettably, at some points in Jewish history, Jews have developed what might be termed “a theology of perdition,” a theology that is more a mirror of contemporary tensions between Jews and non-Jews than an effort to fathom the depths of the divine 220 NOTES TO PAGES 68–70

economy and providence for all humanity. As noted earlier, Deut. 4,19 has been read by some rabbinic commentators in just those terms. However, Nachmanides seems to offer a much broader view that accommodates all. 3 3 . Teshuvot Harashba ed. H. Z. Dimitrovsky, Mossad HaRav Kook, Jerusalem, 1990, vol. 1, section 37,10, pp. 215–217, my translation. The responsum reflects a dialogue the author had with a Christian author. However, the discussion, while theoretically relevant to a Jewish view of Christianity, makes no mention of the possible relevance to Christianity. I therefore see no reason to dismiss this document as in any way born of the pressures of Jewish-Christian polemic. 34 . The shift from city to state may be an influence of the arabic, where a city is called medina , the equivalent of the Hebrew state. 35 . Shift to plural in the original. may refer to our offering and abandoning of our own והמסירה במעשינו T h e H e b r e w . 6 3 deeds through faith or to the providential care of the power to whom actions and needs are entrusted. 3 7 . 2 K i n g s 1 7 , 3 3 . 3 8 . D e u t . 4 , 1 9 – 2 0 . to give unto us. I have not translated these לתת לנו Following this the Hebrew has . 39 two words, as they seem out of context and a carryover by memory, from some other biblical context. See the editor’s note. 40 . This dimension is actually downplayed in the Rashba, compared with Nachmanides. Astrological correspondence takes center stage in this presentation. Was astrology more present or familiar to him, in theory or in practice, than knowledge of angelic beings? 41 . In my Other gods in the Teaching of Nachmanides, I attempt to work out the significance, as well as the chronology, of the territorial and of the metaphysical view, within Nachmanides’ worldview. For purposes of our discussion of the possible implications of these views to a contemporary view of Hinduism, the territorial dimension is actually significant. According to one construction of this theological complex, the defining difference between proper and improper worship is not between worship as practiced by Jews as compared to worship practiced by non-Jews, but between worship practiced in the Land of Israel and worship practiced outside it. As we see from the Rashba’s text, the criteria overlap and intermingle and do not come at the expense of one another. The territorial criterion does add the consideration that whatever recognition and legitimization may be afforded to forms of worship that address beings other than God, their actual practice may be barred in the Land of Israel, due to its sanctity and proximity to divine presence. Thus, even if we were to apply the thought pattern developed by Nachmanides to Hinduism, it would still remain off limits to Jewish practitioners, or, according to the alternative theological statement, to Hindu practitioners in the Land of Israel. 42 . To the best of my knowledge, the present discussion is the first attempt to explore the significance of Nachmanides’ position to a contemporary discussion. I am not aware of any discussion that attempts to apply Nachmanides’ views of Avoda Zara to a discussion of another contemporary religion. Nachmanides speaks of nations of old and does not address any of the religions of his own day. I have not seen any discussion of Christianity, Islam, or any other world religion in light of Nachmanides’ presentation. This may be due to the genre, exegesis rather than halacha, or due to the existence of other positions that address contemporary religions directly. Nachmanides’ impact has been felt primarily through the grafting of his position to the Shituf position (see below). His thought has thus had only secondary impact on any contemporary discussion. NOTES TO PAGES 71–75 221

43 . By the nineteenth century they certainly merged. See, for example, the commentary of the Malbim on Amos 3,2 or the K etav Vekabala by R. Jacob Mecklenburg on Deut. 4,19. See already the responsum Sheilat Yavetz, by Rabbi Jacob of Emden, the eighteenth-century German halachist, Section 41. 44 . The nations attain such correspondence in relation to the ministering angels. However, they are not obligated to direct their worship to them, even if they may do so. 45 . See See Dov Schwartz, Astrology and Magic in Jewish Thought in the Middle Ages , Bar Ilan University Press, Ramat Gan, 1999 [Hebrew]. While Schwartz devotes extensive attention to other discussions of Nachmanides, especially the story of the golden calf and the scapegoat, he makes no reference to the passage from Nachmanides that provides the basis for the present discussion. 46 . The Rashba’s parable might suggest such a dimension, though this emphasis may have not been primary or even intended. 47 . See the discussion in Chapter 11 of The Jewish Encounter with Hinduism . 48 . As in all things Hindu, it is impossible to make unequivocal proclamations on this matter. The parapuja of Sankara is an important and much used prayer addressed to the absolute. In a similar vein, I have read dozens of prayers offered by the recently deceased Swami Chidananda, the disciple and successor of Swami Sivananda, and one of the greatest vedantins and spiritual luminaries of India. These prayers, offered as introductions to his own teachings and collected in numerous publications and videos, offer homage and adoration to the absolute, no less than to the particular manifestations or deities who were either celebrated on a particular feast day or close to his heart on a given day. The absolute is certainly the focus of attention and intention. Given that approaching the absolute and uniting with Him is the goal of the religious system that he expounded and stood at the very core of his teaching, approaching the absolute through prayerful salutations makes perfect sense. Still, one notes that no temples are dedicated to the absolute. All temples and the various rituals performed in them are dedicated to specific manifestations of divinity, at times understood by believers as identical with the absolute. The question of whether or not the absolute is the focus of worship and how the absolute comes into focus, even though the religion does not outwardly place Him at the center of devotion, is similar to questions posed in relation to how en sof functions in kabbalistic and hassidic literatures. For a contemporary rabbinic attempt to make sense of Hindu worship in light of this Jewish precedent, see Rabbi David Brodman’s intervention in Chapter 11 of The Jewish Encounter with Hinduism. 49 . See for example the work by Swami Sivananda, The Philosophy and Significance of Idol Worship, Divine Life Society, Shivanandanagar, 1960, available for download as http://www.dlshq.org/download/idolworship.pdf . 50 . This thesis will be developed in greater detail in a later chapter. 51 . Actually, the question of the reality of the gods is a much more nuanced question that brings us to one of the fundamentals of Hindu thought and points to one of the major differences between it and Abrahamic thought. For vedantic teaching, all created life is part of maya , illusion, and is therefore unreal. The goal of the spiritual quest is to go beyond the unreal to the Real. The gods are part of the unreal. Religion is thus torn between the real and the unreal. Different schools of Hindu philosophy will play this tension out in different forms, coming closer or farther to one of the two poles. The Hindu way of thinking of gods as simultaneously real and unreal, depending on what perspective one adopts, is very different from our way of thinking of gods as true or false. Yet, if one highlights the move from the unreal to the Real as corresponding to the move from focusing on the idol or deity to going beyond it, then 222 NOTES TO PAGES 75–77

Hinduism emerges as profoundly anti-idolatrous, despite its prevalent worship of forms. An exemplary case in point is Sri Ramakrishna who, through discrimination, cuts the image of the Divine Mother, focus of his worship and devotion, in order to go beyond the limitations placed by his own devotions and attachments. See Swami Saradananda, Sri Ramakrishna and His Divine Play, trans. Swami Chedanananda, Vedanta Society of St. Louis, St. Louis, MO, 2003, p. 311. 52 . See Chapter 7 of The Jewish Encounter with Hinduism. 53 . It is of course problematic to draw such comparisons, inasmuch as they contrast the finest of one tradition with the average or less than finest of another. We return here to the question of who speaks for Hinduism, and what are the characteristic, and finest, specimens of both traditions. I have no doubt that the finest specimens of the religious life of both traditions look much more alike than one would imagine, despite major differences in how the religion itself is constructed. Perhaps these individuals might be closer to one another than to other practitioners of their own tradition. 54 . We have already seen this understanding as part of Maimonides’ presentation in the Laws of Avoda Zara. The problem of intermediaries also provides the explanation for what is wrong with the worship of images in Maimonides’ discussion in Guide of the Perplexed 1,36. Schwarts and Schlossberg suggest that such an understanding of intermediaries in the context of Avoda Zara owes to Muslim authors. See Dov Schwarts and Eliezer Schlossberg, Sources of Maimonides’ Concept of Idolatry as Mediation, The Annual of Rabbinic Judaism 1, 1998, Brill, Leiden, pp. 119–128. It may be, then, that conceptualizing intermediaries as the core concern of Avoda Zara is indebted to Muslim concern with purity of monotheism and avoidance of shirq , associating partners with Allah. This might accout for why this notion is central for Maimonides, but absent from Nachmanides. It is interesting to consider whether authors living in Muslim countries express greater concern for the problem of intermediaries, or whether references to it in the literature should be accounted for purely on grounds of internal development. See, for example, the commentary of Rabbi Hayim ben Atar, Or Hachayim, an author writing in a Muslim environment, who places great prominence on this notion. See his comments on Genesis 14,18; Ex. 2,23; 3,9; 20,2–4; 23,20; 32,1, and more. 55 . The later, territorial, restatement of Nachmanides’ teaching does envision the destruction of all celestial ministers in the eschaton, leading to the exclusive worship of God. See Nachmanides’ commentary on Leviticus 18,25. It could be that Nachmanides would have preferred for all to worship God in the highest. That Israel is to have an exclusive relationship with God may not exclude others from God. In parts of his commentary on Ex. 20,2, not quoted here, Nachmanides identifies the points in time when the various forms of Avoda Zara came into being. Their coming into being at some point following the creation, through what is ultimately a human process, suggests this is not the divine intention proper and therefore lends support to a nonex- clusivist understanding of God’s relationship to humanity. 56 . It may be that some of the lesser gods are understood in that way. In fact, the number of deities who are the objects of major cults and have major followings is nowhere as large as the millions of gods that one often hears of (330,000,000). As Muslim writers, especially Al Biruni, have already noted, these are better considered angels, rather than gods. See chapter 12. Having read Nachmanides, we are much more sympathetic to non- Jews worshipping their angels, even considering them divinities. The kinds of divinities imagined by Nachmanides may exist in some form among the earlier vedic gods. 57 . God is obviously the one who primarily takes on form. But so do saints, and so do various other beings. The acclaimed movie by the celebrated moviemaker Deepa NOTES TO PAGES 78–80 223

Mehta, Water , makes no sense if one cannot buy into the assumption that the Cobra, one of the heroes of this movie, can take up various forms at will, thereby entering into a love affair with a married woman, while taking on the form of her husband. 58 . The only point regarding which one might argue that it is not universal is the description of God as omnipresent. This is, of course, the foundation for worshipping God in all forms, as the prayer’s conclusion suggests. Even if God is omnipresent, this does not necessitate the additional step of worshipping God in all forms, as we recognize from the history of Jewish pantheistic and panentheistic views, which share the fundamental recognition but stop short of drawing consequences for worship. 59 . The same reservation would apply to approaching the figure of Jesus as an intermediary. The issue is relevant mainly for early Christianity. See Larry Hurtado, Lord Jesus Christ: Devotion to Jesus in Earliest Christianity, Eerdmans, Grand Rapids, MI, 2003; James Dunn, Christology in the Making , SCM Press, London, 1989. 60 . See Dov Schwartz, Divine Immanence in Medieval Jewish Philosophy, Journal of Jewish Thought and Philosophy 3, 1994, pp. 249–278; Joseph Ben Shlomo, On Pantheism in Jewish Mysticism According to Gershom Scholem and His Critics , Da’at, 50–52, 2003, 461–482 [Hebrew]; Zipi Koifman, In All Your Ways Know Him, Bar Ilan University Press, Ramat Gan, 2009 [Hebrew]. 61 . The matter is never stated explicitly, but emerges from the various juxtapositions in his presentation. Note especially the juxtaposition between elohim acherim and elohei masecha , as well as the reference to images toward the end of his discussion, which are brought as support for the threefold theoretical construct, rather than in reference to specifically image-oriented worship. 62 . Note that the Rashba discusses the worship of stars, which for Nachmanides are already lower manifestations and expressions of the Separate Intelligences. I cannot see why theologically there would be a qualitative difference between the worship of stars and the worship of images. In Nachmanides’ discussion they are considered of a kind. The common conflation of reference to Avoda Zara as worship of idols or worship of stars similarly suggests they are of a kind. In discussing elohei masecha , images, Nachmaindes discusses these as an extension of elohim acherim, other gods. While the attitude is negative to both, this negativity must be contextualized in relation to Israel, which is the focus of his presenation. 63 . Conversely, where such worship is forbidden, it would matter little that the worship takes place without recourse to images. See David Berger’s concern regarding imageless Avoda Zara in an internal Jewish context in The Rebbe, the Messiah and the Scandal of Orthodox Indifference, Littman Library, London, 2001, p. 171. 64 . I am not familiar with a halachic discussion of Avoda Zara that makes explicit the theoretical discussion of the relative significance of theology and (image) worship for defining Avoda Zara. The only theoretical mention of this issue arises in Steinsaltz’ discussion (see chapter 8), which, however, is not formally a halachic discussion. In relation to Christianity it is clear that these two dimensions have interacted in ways that are not fully explicit, nor has the theoretical relationship between them been adequately explored. As already intimated earlier, one must ask to what extent the use of images has contributed to some authors considering Christianity as Avoda Zara. In terms of procedure, this would amount to a reversal of the procedures suggested here in Nachmanides’ name. For an extreme, and most problematic, case of reliance on external worship and the use of images and forms in determining the status of Christianity as Avoda Zara, see Rabbi Yehuda Herzl Henkin’s, Shut Benei Banim , Part 3, sections 35 and 36. 224 NOTES TO PAGE 81

8 Shituf: Applying a Construct of Christianity to Hinduism

1 . While various passages in rabbinic literature have been read in light of the Jewish- Christian polemic, nowhere, or almost nowhere, in the Talmud or early rabbinic literature is Christianity considered in terms of Avoda Zara. See Sacha Stern, Jewish Identity in Early Rabbinic Writings, Brill, Leiden, 1994, pp. 27–28 and other discussions referenced there. The designation of Christians in polemical passages, to the extent that we are able to point with precision to whom a polemic is directed, is minim , here- tics. Anti-Christian polemic thus focuses on divergence in proper religious belief and not in religious practice. The accumulated testimony that emerges from such classical collections as R. Travers Herford, Christianity in Talmud and Midrash, Williams & Norgate, London, 1903, is impressive and in my view remains valid. My own reading of Peter Schafer’s Jesus in the Talmud, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 2007, corroborates this further. As a testimony to early rabbinic attitudes to Christianity and the New Testament, the rabbinic stories analyzed do not betray an understanding that Christianity or its founder should be viewed as Avoda Zara. Schafer himself does read at least one of the stories as pointing to idolatry, but my own reading of it is weaker. In any event, if charges of Avoda Zara do arise, they do so at a fairly late stage, associated with Babylonian story telling. The consideration of Christianity in terms of Avoda Zara is a product of the clear cognizance of Christianity as another religion and the negative assessment of Christianity, influenced by multiple factors on account of which Christianity is perceived as a religious other. Daniel Boyarin’s push- ing forward in time the separation of Judaism and Christianity accords well with the lack of reference to Christianity as Avoda Zara. Significantly, the sources analyzed by him with reference to the Jewish belief in a second God could have been related internally to terminology of Avoda Zara. Yet, they never are. See Daniel Boyarin, Border Lines: The Partition of Judaeo-Christianity, University of Pennsylvania Press, Philadelphia, 2004, and Beyond Judaisms: Metatron and the Divine Polymorphy of Ancient Judaism, Journal for the Study of Judaism 41, 2010, pp. 323–365. 2 . The classical presentation of the array of Jewish responses, including halachic ones, to Christianity, is Jacob Katz, Exclusiveness and Tolerance , Oxford University Press, New York, 1961. 3 . Christian belief in the incarnation further complicates matters, inasmuch as a human person is considered as God—a religious perspective classically opposed by Judaism. The incarnation will be excluded from the discussion of Christianity as Avoda Zara since most major treatments of the Christian God focus upon trinitarian faith, rather than upon faith in the incarnation of one of the persons of the Trinity. Nevertheless, the incarnation is an important site for Jewish reflection upon Christianity and even more so upon Hinduism. Some comparative comments will be found in the discussion. On the incarnation, see my Judaisms and Incarnational Theologies, and my The Triune and the Decaune God. 4 . Careful thought must still be given to the relationship between the various factors, on account of which Christianity is considered in terms of Avoda Zara: theology, worship, and the sense of a religious other. We are hard-pressed to suggest the precise relationship between these components and which of them is primary. Maimonides, as already noted in our discussion earlier, is a good case in point. While declaring Christianity to be Avoda Zara, he never enters a discussion that would account for why that is so. He seems to take the fact for granted, possibly based on prevailing customs and attitudes. See commentary on Mishna Avoda Zara 1,3. The reference to Deut. 4,28 might point to the worship of images as the actual characteristic of Christianity, NOTES TO PAGE 82 225

due to which it is considered as Avoda Zara. See, however, Laws of Kings 11,4, in uncensored editions. Existing custom and the immediate witness of image worship seem to have made the ruling fairly intuitive and self-evident, thereby eliminating the need for a detailed theological discussion of Christianity’s religious status. To the extent that the most condemning approach to Christianity is based on a self-evident sense of otherness, which is fed by cultural distance, these factors apply equally to Hinduism. Rabbinic attitudes expressed in the sheitel crisis may share not only the uncompromising definition of Avoda Zara characteristic of Maimonides’ attitude to Christianity, but also the cultural attitudes that are assumed by his ruling. 5 . Indeed, individual rabbinic authorities, aware of the challenge at hand, attempted such a formulation. See for example the discussion of Israel’s first Chief Rabbi, Rabbi Isaac Herzog, Minority Rights According to the Halacha, Tehumin 2, 1981, pp. 169– 179 [Hebrew]. While this discussion, and one or two similarly minded attempts (See Rabbi Chayim David Halevy, The Ways of Peace in Relations between Jews and Non- Jews, Tehumin 9, 1988, pp. 71–81 [Hebrew]), do contribute to the proposed systematic consideration, they fall short in scope and in content of the kind of careful reconsideration of Judaism’s attitude to other religions that I feel is mandated by contemporary circumstances. Rabbi Herzel Henkin’s discussion in Shut Benei Banim, part 3, 33–36 is one of the longest recent discussions, and it does attempt to review different Christian groups. However, it is seriously hampered by the author’s overall orienta- tion, which typical of many contemporary Israeli rabbis, is reactionary, compared to attitudes that were common a generation or two ago. A comparison with his own illustrious grandfather is suggestive. Compare to Rabbi Eliyahu Henkin’s homily, Ketz Hayamin, Hadarom 10, 1959, pp. 5–9 [Hebrew]. 6 . Some significant first steps in this direction are taken in Eugene Korn’s Rethinking Christianity: Rabbinic Positions and Possibilities, Jewish Theology and World Religions , ed. A. Goshen-Gottstein and E. Korn, The Littman Library, Oxford, 2012. 7 . The most recent treatment of these issues from a classical rabbinic perspective is Rabbi Shlomo Glicksberg’s Shut Nitzanei Aretz. Pp. 25–56 are devoted to the question of whether one may pray in multifaith prayer rooms in airports, and in the process the author reviews the history of attitudes to both Christianity and Islam. It is striking how readily this contemporary author dismisses the more accommodating voices, and sides, in full or in part, with opinions that consider both Christianity and Islam as Avoda Zara. This seems to be a sad turn that is representative of contemporary Israeli rabbinics. On p. 48, he recognizes the need for deeper theological investigation, but lacking such investigation, he claims one must simply rely on the authority of earlier halachists. That an author writing in the twenty-first century must actually incorporate such theological investigation into his halachic reasoning is a possibility that seems to have never occurred to him. 8 . I refer here to considered discussions that also take into account the history of rabbinic attitudes to Christianity. These constitute a very different genre than the statement or declaration. The first paragraph of the noted statement on Christianity, Dabru Emet, is obviously informed by such considerations, but does not in and of itself address the need. 9 . See Katz, Exclusiveness and Tolerance , p. 35. 10 . See Bavli Sukka 45b and Bavli Sanhedrin 63a. 11 . See the discussion in the following chapter as to who the original referent of the Tosafists’ position was—Jesus or the saints. 12 . This process has been documented by Jacob Katz, The Vicissitudes of Three Apologetic Passages, Zion 24, 1959, pp. 181–186 [Hebrew]. 226 NOTES TO PAGES 84–89

13 . Alick Isaacs, Benamozegh’s Tone: A Response to Rabbi Steinsaltz, Common Knowledge 11,1, 2005, p. 48. 14 . The following discussion is based on Rabbi Adin Steinsaltz, Peace without Conciliation: The Irrelevance of “Toleration” in Judaism, Common Knowledge 11,1, 2005, Duke University Press, pp. 41–47. 15 . On the noachide commandments, their function within a Jewish view of other religions and the limitations inherent in the category, see my Towards a Jewish Theology of World Religions: Framing the Issues, Jewish Theology and World Religions , ed. Goshen-Gottstein and Korn, pp. 11–13. 16 . Steinsaltz, Peace without Conciliation, p. 46. 1 7 . I b i d . , 4 2 . 18 . The use of “share” in the above quote can be understood in both senses, suggesting a view of potential relations between religions that may be more far-reaching than Steinsaltz himself intended. 19 . Steinsaltz, Peace without Conciliation, pp. 43–44. 20 . The assessment of majority and minority views is hard to gauge and remains impres- sionistic until further study is conducted. While for Ashkenazi authorities Steinsaltz’s statement is clearly true, it is less clear that a majority would be found for this view when the entire corpus of halachic literature is taken into account. My own impression is also that there has been a shift in this regard and that the Maimonidean position is gaining the upper hand among contemporary decisors, regardless of its prominence or otherwise throughout the centuries. While an assessment of majority and minority views can affect a halachic discussion, developing a contemporary Jewish view of world religions should not be dependent on majority/minority considerations. Halachic discussions reflect contemporary attitudes, and these were influenced by a variety of factors. Most authorities repeat earlier views, without entering into a careful consideration of what the view of another religion ought to be. Therefore, when these issues are revisited within a contemporary reevaluation of Jewish attitudes to world religions, the positions, their historical context, and their philosophical merit need to be weighed as seriously, if not more so, as issues of majority and minority views, as these may have found varying expressions in different periods and centers of learning. 21 . On this point, see also Korn, Rethinking Christianity. The consideration is also raised in a halachic discussion by Rabbi Isaac Herzog, Minority Rights According to the Halacha, p. 175, note 10. Underlying this argument is the issue of how deep the knowledge of Christianity was within a given Jewish society and to what extent dwelling among Christians provided deeper knowledge of Christian faith. On this, see Daniel Lasker, Jewish Knowledge of Christianity in the Twelfth and Thirteenth Centuries, Studies in Medieval Jewish Intellectual and Social History: Festschrift in Honor of Robert Chazan, ed. David Engel et al., Brill, Leiden, 2012, pp. 97–109. Lasker’s overview may undermine the suggestions of Steinsaltz and Korn. 22 . For one of the first times in the history of rabbinic literature I believe. See also reference to Rabbi Menashe Klein’s ruling in Daniel Sperber’s The Halakhic Status of Hinduism. 23 . This is also the position of several contemporary thinkers and scholars on the Hindu side, as expressed in the debate on “Who Speaks for Hinduism.” See Chapter 5 of The Jewish Encounter with Hinduism . 24 . Steinsaltz, Peace without Conciliation, p. 46. 2 5 . I b i d . , p p . 4 4 – 4 5 . 26 . Steinsaltz extends a strategy first developed in relation to Christianity to Hinduism. One should note that in the case of Christianity, the ritual is transparent to the NOTES TO PAGES 90–94 227

theology. That is, the theology comes through the ritual in a clear way. Accordingly, the possibility for error and misinterpretation is reduced, making the move from ritual to theology credible. By contrast, the vedantic position is often a superimposi- tion on a ritual that is not transparent to this worldview. If so, making this theological move is literally a leap of faith, leaping from the ritual, in faith that Vedanta offers a correct interpretation, to the realm of faith and understanding. The gap between faith and action is even greater in relation to Buddhism. 27 . It is interesting that the kabbalistic tradition that informs his own theological thinking may be described in the same words. The differences between kabbalistic and trinitarian or Hindu understandings are more in the realm of action than in the realm of theological difference. At least so it would seem to the outsider. See my Triune and Decaune God. See also David Novak, Jewish-Christian Dialogue: A Jewish Justification , Oxford University Press, New York, 1989, pp. 50–51. 28 . The argument is structurally similar to one contemporary author’s approach to Hinduism. See our discussion of Matityahu Glazerson in Chapter 9 of The Jewish Encounter with Hinduism . 29 . As an aside, teachers in Rabbi Steinsaltz’s yeshiva have been among Orthodox travel- ers to India. One wonders what the reciprocal relationship between Rabbi Steinsaltz’s ruling and his students’ practice could be. 30 . Steinsaltz, Peace without Conciliation, pp. 45–46. 31 . On the implications of such a view to a construction of “true” and “truth,” see my forthcoming article The Truth Beyond and Beyond Truth: Religious Truth in Teachings of the Breslav Tradition and Their Contemporary Interreligious Application. 32 . Steinsaltz, Peace without Conciliation, p. 47. 33 . Nathan Katz makes a similar suggestion, based on the work of David Novak in relation to Christianity. Katz recognizes the formidable challenge that Avoda Zara represents in terms of a Jewish view of Hinduism and concedes that dealing with it is beyond his own expertise. His application of Novak’s discussion of Christianity to Hinduism is sound, but lacks the authority associated with Steinsaltz and the firsthand command of the halachic sources used by Novak. See Katz, The State of the Art of Hindu-Jewish Dialogue, Indo-Judaic Studies in the Twenty-First Century, ed. Nathan Katz et al., Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 2007, pp. 117–118.

9 Shituf: Critical and Constructive Reflections

1. . The two readings and the key texts are conveniently summarized in Appendix III, Tosafot on “Association”’ (Shituf), in David Berger’s The Rebbe the Messiah and the Scandal of Orthodox Indifference, Littman Library of Jewish Civilisation, London/ Potland, OR, 2008, pp. 175–177. 2 . See Bavli Sanhedrin 63a and parallels. 3 . We noted this already with reference to Rabbi Herzog, who refers to Jesus as a human elevated by imagination to the status of Divine. Emphasis on Jesus’ humanity, and a thorough misreading of how Christian faith and worship operate, due to the pro- jection of a Jewish ritually oriented perspective on Christian faith, can be found in Rabbi Henkin’s, Shut Benei Banim , Part 3, sections 35 and 36. 4 . See chapter 6, note 6. 5 . Seeing things from the believer’s perspective does not mean one recognizes the validity of faith claims of another religion. It only means one recognizes that the believer’s worship is not consciously addressed to a being other than God. Even 228 NOTES TO PAGES 95–101

if the believer upholds a mistaken notion of God, it is He, and He alone, that is worshipped. 6 . Sheilat Yavetz , responsum 41. 7 . There has been very little attempt to make sense of the permissibility of Shituf for non-Jews, other than the appeal to Nachmanides’ cosmic structure. Steinsaltz’s translation of this position into a Jewish theory of tolerance would make tolerance the ideal. This does seem to make a secondary ideal into the primary one, without articulating what the real spiritual vision underlying permissibility of Shituf for non- Jews, as well as the prohibition for Jews, is. 8 . The point here is not to cast Jesus as an intermediary in the sense that intermediaries serve in common Jewish constructs of Avoda Zara. Rather, I refer here to Jesus’ function and instrumentality in terms of spiritual process. 9 . I owe the inspiration, though not the content, of the following paragraph to David Novak’s Maimonides’ Treatment of Christianity and Its Normative Implications, Jewish Theology and World Religions, ed. A. Goshen-Gottstein and E. Korn, The Littman Library, Oxford, 2012, p. 219, note 5. 1 0 . B a v l i Bava Batra 110a. עבודה שהיא זרה לך . 1 1 12 . Conceptually, identitarian concerns may lead to martyrdom more than concerns about the veracity of an alternative religious system. If one follows the path of another religion, one ceases to be Jewish, even if in terms of truth it may matter little whether the one God is being worshipped through one monotheistic faith or another. It would be interesting to explore Jewish attitudes to Islam in light of this identitarian dimension. I refer both to the persistence of views of Islam as Avoda Zara (See chapter 4, note 11 ) and to attitudes to forced conversion to Islam, compared with those found in relation to Christianity. (On Maimonides’ Epistle on Martyrdom, Igeret Hashemad , see Haym Soloveitchik, Maimonides’ “Iggeret Ha-Shemad”: Law and Rhetoric, Rabbi Joseph H. Lookstein Memorial Volume, ed. Leo Landman, Ktav, New York, 1980, pp. 281–319; David Hartman, The Epistle on Martyrdom, Discussion, Crisis and Leadership: Epistles of Maimonides , texts translated and Notes by A. Halkin, Discussions by D. Hartman, Jewish Publication Society, Philadelphia-New York, 1985, pp. 46–90; Yair Lorberbaum and Haim Shapira, Epistle on Martyrdom in the Light of Legal Philosophy, Dine Yisrael, 25, 2008, pp. 123*–169*). Concerning the latter discussion, it is also worth reviewing it in light of “same God” discussions and in consideration of the place of image worship as determining the identity of the worshipped God. 1 3 . B a v l i Sanhedrin 74a. 14 . More on Swami Swaroopananda and the Tel Aviv Sivananda Yoga Center in The Jewish Encounter with Hinduism , Chapter 10. 1 5 . I n The Jewish Encounter with Hinduism, Chapter 10 , I share the spiritual pedagogy of a Jewish swami, Swami Vijayananda, who gave spiritual direction to many Jewish and Christian seekers who came to him in the ashram of Anandamayi, in Haridwar. Swami Vijayananda discouraged Jewish and Christian seekers from engaging in Hindu devotions, expressed toward idols and images. The grounds are not philosophical. Vedanta accommodates worship. They are, rather, psychological. Worshipping God through images is part of the Hindu psyche and foreign to the Jewish psyche. He himself became a swami while never becoming formally Hindu, nor worshipping in the ways that Hindus do. He offers his own experience as a model for Western seekers to follow. 16 . In completely theoretical terms, one might have been able to relieve some of the tensions by appeal to Meiri, whom we shall study presently, whose views are not based on a distinction between Jews and non-Jews. However, in this instance, it seems to me NOTES TO PAGES 102–105 229

that a Shituf-based approach does far greater justice to the sensibilities and complexi- ties of the situation. 17 . This may not be strictly related, but it is worth noting in this context that in the Catholic Church too the proclamation of sainthood is only undertaken once the can- didate has died. Thus, no special devotion or worship is shown to a living person. 18 . Note how the Chazon Ish works his way around this issue, by affirming the appli- cability of Avoda Zara to someone who worships the soul of a deceased person. See Chazon Ish , Yore De’ah , Hilchot Avodat Kokhavim, 62, 22. While this description may be apt for various forms of ancestor worship, it seems inadequate as a reference to Jesus, who is in any event not an explicit subject of the Chazon Ish’ s discussion. 19 . Unless Jews are ready to accept Christian claims about and descriptions of Jesus as a person as historical facts that form the basis for Christian worship, halachic discourse might explore the possibility of viewing Jesus not as a person, but as an ideal. Further along we will discuss the Chazon Ish’s exclusion of imaginary beings from the realm of Avoda Zara. This opens an interesting way of rethinking attitudes to both Christianity and Hinduism. In many cases what is being worshipped is not the person, but the ideal expressed through that person. In the case of Jesus, such a move would be the exact opposite of the movement affirming Jesus’ historical person and his Jewish identity. The two movements could be reconciled. 20 . See Esther Rabba 7,5. While the plain sense of the story says nothing of Avoda Zara, Mordechai’s refusal to bow to Haman does suggest that this is an ancient feature of Jewish identity, and therefore representative of this particular worldview. 21 . Ezekiel 29,3; 8. Contemporary readers find in these verses boastfulness and a self-suf- ficiency, but not claims of divinity, though of course these are grounded in the structure of Egyptian religion, and can therefore not be dismissed. See Moshe Greenberg, Ezekiel 21–37 , Anchor Bible, Doubleday, New York, 1997, p. 610. 22 . This is part of what has led to David Berger’s criticism of some developments within the Lubavitch movement. See Berger, The Rebbe, the Messiah, etc. 23 . This view is briefly alluded to in David Novak, Les juifs et les chré tiens ré v è rent -ils le m ê me Dieu? Le christianisme au miroir du juda ï sme, ed. S. Trigano, In Press É ditions, Paris, 2003, p. 126. 24 . This discussion does not account for worship of other human beings. As alluded, kings have also been worshipped in India’s history. This may be tolerated through a more mechanical and formal application of the principle of Shituf, but cannot be integrated into the present theological understanding of Shituf. Moreover, as acknowledged above, it is more problematic in terms of Jewish sensibilities, given the political aspects of the worship. No less alien are phenomena such as the worship of a young virgin, k umari , as an incarnation of the goddess, in Nepalese Hinduism. (Such worship in the framework of navaratri celebrations or other festivals is temporary and transitory with reference to the object of worship, and therefore more symbolic and less institutional.) It reminds us of the multiple forms of Hinduism, some less spiritual than others, and ultimately of the difficulty of articulating a Jewish view of all of Hinduism. 25 . In this reading, Shituf presents a patient view of historical growth, much the same way that vedantic teaching views lower expressions of the religious life. Steinsaltz clearly opted for an alternative understanding, in affirming that theological differences will remain in the eschaton. The pedagogic view must assume that tolerance of Shituf is part of a historical process that will be fulfilled in the eschaton, if not sooner. 26 . Later in the discussion we will appeal to testimony of Sugunendra Swami, who justified his continuing use of images on grounds of human, psychological frailty and the process of spiritual evolution. 230 NOTES TO PAGES 106–108

27 . It is interesting to consider the implications of my suggested theology of Shituf to the notion of religious truth. For classical understandings of Shituf, it is best viewed as permissible or tolerated error. According to my view, worship through Shituf is different, but not necessarily erroneous. In this, I carry a viewpoint associated above with Nachmanides into the theological appreciation of Shituf. 28 . Recognition of a patient divine pedagogy with the rest of humanity and legitimation of Shituf on theological grounds cannot be divorced from other issues fundamental to a philosophy of religion. These issues are as relevant to internal differences as they are to a view of other religions. The famous debate between Maimonides and the Rabad concerning the status of someone who is misled by Scripture into a mistaken idea of God is here relevant. See Hilchot Teshuva 3,7. Maimonides is the champion of the view that correct understanding of God is essential to a proper relationship with Him, and ultimately to salvation. The view that tolerates imperfect religious understanding could be understood as founded upon the recognition that proper knowledge of things spiritual, in particular of God, is not the most important thing. There may be other aspects of the spiritual life that are more vital for our ultimate well-being than the knowledge we possess. Proper action, formation of personality, love, charitable actions, and more may present themselves as worthy alternatives to proper knowledge. While grounding his argument in the possibility that Scripture might mislead believers into wrong understandings of God, Rabad could also be seen as a proponent of a patient divine pedagogy. See Rabbi A. I. Kook, Orot Harambam on Maimonides’ Laws of Idolatry. According to such an understanding, while it is important to uphold true teaching, there is time for this higher teaching to be attained, but through a lengthy process of human perfection and education.

10 Thinking of Hinduism in Light of Meiri

1 . A list of such authorities may be found in David Berger’s, Jews, Gentiles and the Modern Egalitarian Ethos: Some Tentative Thoughts, Formulating Responses in an Egalitarian Age, ed. Marc Stern, Rowman and Littlefield, Lanham, 2005, p. 100. Note also the list in Eugene Korn’s Rethinking Christianity: Rabbinic Positions and Possibilities , Jewish Theology and World Religions , ed. A. Goshen-Gottstein and E. Korn, The Littman Library, Oxford, 2012, pp. 198–199. 2 . I suspect that rather than a partial or corrupt reading of Meiri, we simply have here a poor reference to support Steinsaltz’s views. Rather than refer to the Tosafists, whose views are difficult to document and follow, Steinsaltz offers the broader views of Meiri as support for his own application of the narrower views of the Tosafists. If so, not much should be made of Steinsaltz’s reference to Meiri. 3 . Haym Soloveitchik has attempted an account of this by appeal to Meiri’s literary style that does not conform to the norms of medieval talmudic learning. Only with the rise of secondary halachic literature that organizes sources by themes, in the past 50 years, does Meiri’s clear style and patterns of organization receive a new and enthusiastic hearing. See Haym Soloveitchik, The Bet ha-Behira of R. Menahem ha-Meiri: Its Nature and Fate, Studies in Jewish History Presented to Joseph Hacker , ed. Y. Ben-Naeh et al., Zalman Shazar Center, Jerusalem, 2014, pp. 253–259. The suggestion that Meiri’s time has only now come may be made with reference to his interreligious thought as well. 4 . The extension to non-Jews is particularly relevant for understanding the background of Meiri. For an overview of talmudic attitudes, see Sacha Stern, Jewish Identity in Early Rabbinic Writings , Brill, Leiden, 1994, pp. 22–39. NOTES TO PAGES 108–111 231

5 . Meiri’s halachic oeuvre is similarly characterized by his lack of reference to individual authors by name and his preference for epithets. However, in the case of other religions, Meiri does not refer to individual religions by specific designations, but rather relates to them all under the broad umbrella of nations bound by religion. For the designation of Christians as a nation, see already Maimonides’ commentary to Mishna Avoda Zara 1,3. 6 . Modern Meiri scholarship is much indebted to the pioneering work of Jacob Katz. See Jacob Katz, Exclusiveness and Tolerance, Oxford University Press, London, 1961, pp. 114–128. Katz related to Meiri within a broader presentation of Jewish views of Christianity. As Meiri lived in a Christian society, it makes sense to consider his references to other religions as relevant to Christianity. Nevertheless, Katz’s framing of Meiri’s views in relation to Christianity did much to limit continuing discussion of Meiri to the specifically Christian context, rather than to a broader consideration of Jewish attitudes to other religions. 7 . See discussion in the following. 8 . See Moshe Halbertal, “Ones Possessed of Religion”: Religious Tolerance in the Teachings of the Meiri, Edah 1,1 2000. Halbertal’s analysis is of crucial importance to our discussion. It is the only major scholarly discussion that explores the significance of the category of “possessing religion” to Meiri’s thought, thereby contextualizing it in a broader philosophical and theoretical framework that is broader than previous discussion. 9 . It is striking to contrast Meiri’s notion of progress, and how humanity moves from idolatry to higher forms of knowing God, with Maimonides’ description wherein the starting point of humanity is actually one of proper knowledge of God, rather than of ignorance, and idolatry is the product of historical process. While Meiri could in theory consider latter-day progress to be a later chapter in a story whose beginning is told by Maimonides, it seems the differences between the two thinkers are deeper, as my presentation indeed suggests. 1 0 . K a t z , Exclusiveness and Tolerance , p. 124, notes that Meiri composed his treatise on repentance following an exchange with a Christian priest. Daniel Lasker, Christianity, Philosophy and Polemic in Jewish Provence, Zion 68, 2003, pp. 313–333 [Hebrew], notes the broader sharing that creates community-like bonds between Jews and Christians in Provence. Yaakov Elman has recently attempted to account for the uniqueness of Meiri’s position in light of personal and experiential considerations, rather than in terms of the internal unfolding of halachic tradition. See Yaakov Elman, Meiri and the Non Jew, New Perspectives on Jewish-Christian Relations , in Honor of David Berger, ed. E. Baumbgarten and J. J. Schacter, Brill, Leiden, 2012, pp. 265–296. 11 . David Novak seems to read Meiri this way. See David Novak, The Image of the Non Jew in Judaism: An Historical and Constructive Study of the Noahide Laws, Edwin Mellen Press, New York and Toronto, 1983, Chapter 12. 12 . See Moshe Halbertal and Avishai Margalit, Idolatry, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1992. On the covenantal model, see pp. 9–36. 13 . See Leviticus 18. On historicity and ideology in this depiction see the note by Edward Greenstein, The God of Israel and the Gods of Canaan: How Different Were They?, Proceedings of the Twelfth World Congress of Jewish Studies, Division A, Jerusalem, 1999, p. 58. 14 . The moral argument is not exclusive to Meiri’s position. Some recent treatments of Judaism’s relationship to other religions have appealed to the moral factor, even while failing to mention Meiri’s position. See the discussions of Rabbis Herzog and Halevy ( chapter 8 , note 5). It is conceivable that Meiri did influence these writers’ 232 NOTES TO PAGES 111–113

awareness. Their silence in relation to Meiri could stem from the understanding that Meiri avoids the theological issue with which they attempt to deal. 15 . Indeed, some have attempted to minimize the import of Meiri’s work, due to the fact that he has not broken new ground in terms of actual comportment in relation to non-Jews. See E. E. Urbach, Rabbi Menahem Ha-Meiri’s Theory of Tolerance: Its Origin and Limits, Studies in the History of Jewish Society in the Middle Ages and in the Modern Period, Presented to Jacob Katz, Magnes Press, Jerusalem, 1980, pp. 34–44 [Hebrew]. Urbach’s reading has been refuted even within the framework of the first reading of Meiri. See Gerald Blidstein, Maimonides and Meiri on the Legitimacy of Non-Judaic Religions, Scholars and Scholarship: The Interaction between Judaism and Other Cultures , ed. Leo Landman, Yeshiva University Press, New York, 1990, pp. 27–35. 1 6 . Bet Habechira Avoda Zara 27a. 1 7 . Bet Habechira Avoda Zara 15b. 1 8 . S e e Bet Habechira Gittin 62a. 19 . For additional descriptions of idolatrous rituals, offered to the sun, moon, stars, trees, stones, as well as of magical practices of necromancy and the drawing down of astral powers upon statues, see Bet Habechira Avoda Zara 6b and 26a. 20 . As a rule of thumb, appeal to biblical sources, at the expense of exclusive reliance upon talmudic sources, will yield or is related to a more tolerant attitude to other religions. It is therefore worthwhile exploring the rhetoric of authors in order to guage to what degree biblical reasoning informs their halachic discussion. See Eliyahu Henkin’s Ketz Hayamin ( chapter 8 , note 5). David Berger, Jews, Gentiles and the Modern Egalitarian Ethos, p. 108, note 44, makes the astute observation that when a contemporary authority proves his point directly from the Bible, it is clear that unusual concerns are at work. 2 1 . Bet Habechira Avoda Zara 22a. 22 . Does this correspond to one of the noachide commandments, namely the obligation to set up courts of law that would ensure a society’s moral governance? 2 3 . Beit Habechira, Avoda Zara , 26a. 24 . Concerning the identity of this philosopher, see Halbertal, Ones Possessed of Religion, p. 18. 25 . It is worth nothing that throughout his great oeuvre, Meiri repeatedly refers to Judaism in terms of “religion,” to teachings of Torah as “teachings of religion,” and to principles of theology as “principles of religion.” The broad use of the term “religion” leads to viewing Judaism as a particular instance of a much broader phenomenon and allows Meiri to apply the same criteria within. This has many far-reaching consequences, which cannot be elaborated upon in the present context. It also lends support to the second reading of Meiri, to be explored below. 26 . This is rabbinical hyperbole that highlights the number of potential transgressions that would be accumulated during such an act and that are nevertheless permitted, given the poor standing of the Am Ha’Aretz . However, the expression is justified by the case that follows that really would permit killing him to save others. 2 7 . Bet Habechira Pesachim 49b. 28 . Meiri actually offers us a theory that allows us to view all religions as sharing in the same enterprise, thereby establishing fraternal relations between their members. See Bet Habechira Bava Metsia 2a. 29 . I will suggest below that the moral criterion can be expanded to the spiritual life in its entirety. When we add to the moral dimension a consideration of the higher fruits of spirituality in the lives of followers of a given religion, we may say that God can be NOTES TO PAGES 113–116 233

known in a given religion through the traces that His knowledge and worship leave in the lives of believers. 30 . This understanding of Meiri received excellent presentation by Halbertal (see note 8). It is worth noting the impact of Halbertal on a modern Orthodox historian-thinker, who struggles to identify a viable contemporary Jewish position and who seeks to integrate the far-reaching consequences of Halbertal’s work in his own thinking. See Berger, Jews, Gentiles and the Modern Egalitarian Ethos, p. 93ff. 31 . Blidstein, Maimonides and Meiri on the Legitimacy of Non-Judaic Religions. 32 . This is very much a Muslim sensibility, highlighting as it does revelation as the ground for religion. On Jewish authors operating in a Muslim intellectual milieu who view Hinduism through the lens of revelation, or lack thereof, see Chapter 9 of The Jewish Encounter with Hinduism. Maimonides’ emphasis is thus best understood within the broader religious culture within which it can be situated. That Meiri is capable of developing an alternative to this religious worldview may in part be due to the fact that he is operating in a Christian milieu that places less of an emphasis on revelation as the sole foundation of the religious life. 33 . One notes that Meiri never appeals to the notion of reason in his construction of “religion.” In this, he is different from Mendelssohn, who in many other respects might be presented as a continuation of Meiri’s position. See Gideon Freudenthal, No Religion without Idolatry: Mendelssohn’s Jewish Enlightenment, Notre Dame University Press, Indiana, 2012, p. 10. 34 . Jan Assman, Of God and Gods: Egypt, Israel and the Rise of Monotheism, University of Wisconsin Press, Madison, 2008, p. 128, suggests that a biblical understanding of idolatry goes beyond the distinction between true god and other gods, or true belief and idolatry. Idolatry includes evils such as injustice, lawlessness, oppression, violence, murder, and fornication. But it is also characterized by lack of insight, a failure to recognize the truth. If we join fundamental religious insight (rather than full recognition of truth) to upholding moral norms, we arrive, in fact, at a Meiri position, suggesting Meiri’s fidelity to a biblical view of idolatry. 3 5 . Bet Habechira Bava Kama 113b. 36 . This passage is the focus of Bleich’s discussion in David Bleich, Divine Unity in Maimonides, the Tosafists and Meiri, Neoplatonism and Jewish Thought, ed. Len Goodman, SUNY Press, Albany, NY, 1992, pp. 237–253. Bleich appreciates the passage correctly for what it is. However, he reads it in the narrow context of Meiri’s views on Christianity, rather than in the broader framework of Meiri’s theory of religion. Unable to accept Meiri’s words at face value, Bleich engages in the poor- est of Orthodox apologies, trying to read Meiri’s reference to Christianity (in his own reading) as to something other than the Christianity prevalent in Meiri’s own time. His attempt has been correctly characterized by Berger, Jews, Gentiles and the Egalitarian Ethos, p. 95, as desperate. 3 7 . J e r . 4 4 , 1 8 . יכולתו in my translation, and have rendered ל I have ignored the .לאחדותו ויכולתו : H e b . 8 3 as power, even though it could equally be translated as capacity, that is, capacity to achieve whatever He wants. 3 9 . Bet Habechira Gittin 62a. 40 . In this, Meiri is much closer to Nachmanides, who also considered idolatry to possess spiritual reality. See Moshe Halbertal, By Way of Truth: Nahmanides and the Creation of Tradition, Shalom Hartman Institute, Jerusalem, 2006, pp. 265–276 [Hebrew]. The issue is not truth versus falsehood or illusion, but the different spiritual or energetic realities associated with true religion on the one hand and with idolatry on the other. 234 NOTES TO PAGES 117–119

It is precisely here that moral and spiritual living makes such a difference. It serves as testimony to the quality of spiritual life associated with a religion. It is likely that Meiri would also acknowledge that moral living provides the foundation for access- ing the reality of God, rather than alternative realities associated with idolatry. 41 . See Katz’s formulation: Meiri’s positive evaluation of Christianity stems in the main from his esteem for the maintenance of legal institutions and moral standards in society. Jacob Katz, Exclusiveness and Tolerance , p. 121. 42 . Pointing to components of Christian faith as providing a common basis with Judaism, and therefore as pointing to the same God, is a move that has been undertaken by many rabbinic authorities. See Katz, Exclusiveness and Tolerance, pp. 165–167 and see our discussion on “same God” in the following chapter. What makes Meiri unique is not simply the list of minimal theological requirements he stipulates, but how these function within a broader conceptual framework of “religion,” which is what ultimately affords Christianity its recognition. 4 3 . Bet Habechira Sanhedrin 90a. 4 4 . B a v l i Shabbat 156a. 4 5 . Bet Habechira Avot 4,19. 4 6 . Y e h u d a H e r z e l H e n k i n ’ s a t t e m p t , Shut Benei Banim 3,35, p. 122, to uphold the criterion of image worship even according to Meiri is completely forced and unsubstantiated. 4 7 . Bet Habechira Shabbat 156a. Halbertal, Ones Possessed of Religion, p. 16, n. 38, notes how original Meiri’s interpretation is even in relation to Meiri’s philosophical predecessors. 48 . See further Bet Habechira Shabbat 156a; Berachot 5a. 49 . The present summary statement is an alternative to Halbertal’s more metaphysical reading of Meiri’s overall understanding. Halbertal’s Meiri still places an emphasis upon the correctness of religious understanding by identifying Avoda Zara with fetishism and true religion with a transcendental sense of God. See Halbertal, Ones Possessed of Religion, p. 23. Without denying this element in Meiri’s thought, I am suggesting that Meiri’s major contribution is his entire construction of religion in terms of its transformative power, hence the phenomenological, rather than cogni- tive, distinction between Avoda Zara and true religion. 50 . See Halbertal and Margalit, Idolatry, Chapters 4 and 5 . 51 . One of the challenges in applying Meiri’s thought to contemporary times is that Meiri provides a theoretical framework for recognizing other religions, but at the same time seems to have no room for accomodating secular humanism. David Berger struggles laudably with this issue. See Jews, Gentiles and the Modern Egalitarian Ethos, p. 98. Another possible challenge concerns the free adaptation of motives and practices from various religions, Hinduism included, in the supermarket of religious ideas and practices, from which many contemporary practitioners draw freely and at will. One may query whether such practices provide the norms of being bound by religion, which Meiri posits as the basis for his system. Classical religions assume some kind of systemic adherence to the religion as a whole, and hence a moral train- ing and discipline of the personality. Contemporary selective application of elements of classical religions may lack the very spiritual and moral discipline that was foun- dational to Meiri’s view of the transformative power of legitimate religion. 52 . The philosophical basis for Meiri’s approach was already suggested by Katz and received detailed attention in Halbertal’s study. 53 . Just how hard it is, even for open-minded Orthodox mentality to accept such a position can be seen in David Berger’s struggles with Meiri. See Berger, Jews, Gentiles and the Egalitarian Ethos, p. 94. Upholding the value and the reality of Avoda Zara NOTES TO PAGES 119–121 235

has become constitutive of Jewish identity, and Avoda Zara is consequently a value that cannot be compromised. Indeed, for Meiri Avoda Zara is not a means of identity construction, as can be seen by how readily he applies talmudic texts on Israel to members of other religions. 5 4 . S e e Bet Habechira Avoda Zara 6b and Halbertal, Ones Possessed of Religion, p. 24 5 5 . Bet Habechira Avoda Zara 15b. 56 . See Bavli Avoda Zara 16a. 57 . Meiri’s text presents further difficulties in that it distinguishes a common ruling in such matters with the less common ruling in the extremeties. 58 . See, however, Brill’s suggestion regarding Meiri’s knowledge of literary works coming from India. See Alan Brill, Judaism and World Religions: Encountering Christianity, Islam and Eastern Traditions, Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 2012, pp. 206–207. 59 . The passage thus remains enigmatic. To make sense of it, one would have to identify a distant Jewish community residing in the shadow of another religion that is nei- ther Christianity nor Islam, unless we had cause to believe that Meiri would declare remote forms of either of these religions as idolatrous. Michael Avraham’s suggestion that Meiri did consider Christianity, after all, as idolatrous, does not withstand the scrutiny of the texts and can therefore not aid in making such an argument. See Michael Avraham, Is There Enlightened Avoda Zarah? On the Attitude to Non-Jews and on Changes in Halacha, A kdamot 19, 2007, pp. 65–86 [Hebrew]. 60 . Abraham Ibn Ezra, in his short commentary to Ex. 23,20 writes: “The laws of the Torah are not given except to straighten the crooked, for those people who live in a place where there are no oxen, there is no need for the laws about an ox who gores . . . and if in the land of India, there is no need for a law about theft and murder and oppression and false witness.” For Ibn Ezra, the morality of Indians is exemplary, making legislation superfluous. This statement is particularly interesting considering that in Ibn Ezra’s view, Hindus do not believe in revelation. See Richard Mark’s forthcoming The Jewish Interest in Hinduism. 61 . There is some circularity here. The seven noachide commandments include the prohibition on idolatry, Avoda Zara, but following Meiri, we would be using the moral criterion to suggest that Hinduism is not Avoda Zara. 62 . See Frederique Marglin, Hierodouleia, Encyclopaedia of Religion , ed. Mircea Eliade, Macmillan, New York, 1987, vol. 6, pp. 309–313, drawing heavily on her 1984 work, Wives of the God-King: The Rituals of the Devadasis of Puri, Oxford University Press, Delhi. Concerning the class of women known as devadasis, temple dancers and cour- tesans, see some of the recent research that provides a counterpoint to previously prevailing views of these women. See Priyadarshani Vijaysri, Recasting the Devadasi: Patterns of Sacred Prostitution in Colonial South India, Kanishka Publishers, New Delhi, 2004, and more recently Davesh Soneji, Unfinished Gestures: Devadā s ī s, Memory, and Modernity in South India , University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 2012. 63 . Saadiah Gaon speaks of Indian temple prostitution. See his commentary to Ex. 32, 1–6. 64 . David Berger, Jews, Gentiles and the Egalitarian Ethos, p. 108, note 54. 65 . As suggestive as this formulation may be, the fundamental question under discussion is the margin of permissible error. 66 . Bhagavad Gita, Chapter 4 , line 7. 67 . See Raymond Williams, An Introduction to Swaminarayan Hinduism , Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2001, Chapter 1 . 68 . See Balwant Dhillon, Sikh Perspectives of Friendship, Friendship across Religions , ed. Alon Goshen-Gottstein, Lexington Books, Lanham, MD, 2015, pp. 135–144. 236 NOTES TO PAGES 122–131

69 . A theory of progress need not rely on Meiri’s position. It can be incorporated also into other views of religions. Eliyahu Henkin applies a notion of progress within the Shituf view, suggesting that Christian society is progressively less idolatrous. Therefore, even contemporary image worship may not really be idolatrous. See Ketz Hayamin, Hadarom 10, 1959, p. 8 . 70 . The range of presentations of Tantra is confusing, as is the attempt to attain a clear focus on how representative Tantra—and what we mean by the term—are of the religion of India throughout the ages. A fairly tame presentation is Agehananda Bharati, The Tantric Tradition, Doubleday, New York, 1965. Far more challenging is a presentation such as David Gordon White, Kiss of the Yogini: “Tantric Sex” in Its South Asian Contexts, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 2003. The challenge is not only in accommodating the sexual practices of Tantra, but in the broader claim of the author that Tantra is the truly pervasive religion of South India, rather than the more refined elite forms of Hinduism that have served most of our discussion. Serious exploration of this claim is beyond my competence, but may matter little, once we acknowledge changing constellations and constructions of Hinduism, and the prominence of certain constructions in today’s Hinduism. Meiri’s views on the evolution of religions are particularly relevant in this context. 71 . Tantra is of interest to the Jewish-Hindu encounter inasmuch as some tantric ideas provide important analogies to kabbalistic thinking. See the discussion of Charles Mopsik in Chapter 6 of The Jewish Encounter with Hinduism. The present discussion, however, is concerned with the implications of tantric morality, rather than with tantric mysticism or metaphysics. 72 . One may reflect upon whether the practitioners of such methods might in fact be practicing a form of religion that, according to Meiri, would land them beyond the pale of legitimate religion. Such reflection takes us beyond blanket pronouncements concerning an entire religion and into more particular appreciation of movements and even individuals. For a view that rejects such detailed evaluation, see Steinsaltz above. For a view of Hinduism that breaks down the global approach to the religion, see Part V of the present work . 73 . Halbertal, Ones Possessed of Religion, p. 24, claims that for Meiri, the concept “possessed of religion” is linked to belief in creatio ex nihilo, providence and recompense. I am unable to muster proof for this statement in Meiri’s writings on other religions and regrettably I do not find this claim (highlighted in the essay) substantiated in Halbertal’s discussion either. 7 4 . U n l e s s t h a t p a s s a g e ( Bet Habechira Sanhedrin 90a) refers to minimal requirements made within Judaism, as opposed to requirements of other faiths. 75 . One could, of course, offer a reading of the Bhagavad Gita, where the one omnipotent God offers a teaching, but even that does not provide us with a revelatory basis for morality. Dharma is presupposed rather than revealed as part of the teaching.

1 1 D o J e ws and Hindus Worship the Same God?

1 . One collection of essays is Do Jews, Christians and Muslims Worship the Same God (no editor), Abingdon Press, Nashville, TN, 2012. A second collection of essays, edited by Miroslav Volf, is Do We Worship the Same God? Jews, Christians, and Muslims in Dialogue , Eerdmans, Grand Rapids, MI, 2012. While conscious articulation of this question is recent, one notes that this strategy provides a foundation for A. J. Heschel’s seminal essay, No Religion Is an Island. See No Religion Is an Island: Abraham NOTES TO PAGES 132–134 237

Joshua Heschel and Interreligious Dialogue, ed. H. Kasimow and B. Sherwin, Orbis, Maryknoll, NY, 1991, especially pp. 9, 15. 2 . The development may already take place within the Hebrew Bible. Recognition of the same God could be a way of making sense of such texts as Malachi 1,11. This seems to be a development that is distinct, even if related, to texts that are taken to suggest the rise in monotheistic thought, such as Deutero Isaiah. 3 . Strictly speaking, if there is only one God, there are no other gods to worship. From that perspective, the “same God” question is meaningless. At best, one either does or does not worship “God.” From a monotheistic perspective, it is therefore easier to speak of Avoda Zara than to refer to other gods. 4 . For a critique of this statement, see David Berger, Dabru Emet: Some Reservations about a Jewish Statement on Christians and Christianity, Persecution, Polemic and Dialogue: Essays in Jewish Christian Relations, ed. David Berger, Academic Studies Press, Boston, MA, 2010, pp. 392–398, and Jon Levenson, How Not to Conduct Jewish-Christian Dialogue, Commentary 112,5, 2001, pp. 31–37. 5 . A possibility raised by Steinsaltz. See also Korn, Rethinking Christianity: Rabbinic Positions and Possibilities , Jewish Theology and World Religions , ed. A. Goshen- Gottstein and E. Korn, The Littmann Library, Oxford, 2012, pp. 203–204. The consideration is also raised in a halachic discussion by Rabbi Isaac Herzog, Minority Rights According to the Halacha, p. 175, note 10. 6 . This may be alluded to in his commentary on Mishna Avoda Zara. See chapter 6, note 14. 7 . Christianity and Hinduism may not be in the same camp with reference to this argument. One could argue that the understanding of the triune God is indeed essentially different than the Jewish view of the one God. To affirm the same God would require adopting specific arguments by means of which the identity of the same God is estab- lished, despite this theological difference. Such arguments are discussed later with regard to the Shituf position. By contrast, Hinduism does recognize a simple Godhead beyond all manifestations. Thus, it is not open to the same theoretical objection. 8 . See Maimonides’ Responsa, ed. J. Blau, Jerusalem, 1960, vol. 1, responsum 149, pp. 284–285. On this responsum see H. Kreisel, Maimonides on Christianity and Islam, Jewish Civilization: Essays and Studies, ed. Ronald Brauner, Reconstructionist Rabbinical College, Philadelphia, PA, 1985 and D. Novak, Maimonides’ Treatment of Christianity and Its Normative Implications, Jewish Theology and World Religions, ed. A. Goshen-Gottstein and E. Korn, The Littmann Library, Oxford, 2012, pp. 217–233. 9 . Revelation plays an important role in pointing to God in other contexts. Non-Jews are expected to observe the seven noachide commandments, as a minimal moral and religious obligation. The noachide commandments do not, in and of themselves, speak of faith in God. However, Maimonides, Laws of Kings 8,11, stipulates that observance of the noachide commandments must be performed based on faith in their revealed character, rather than by force of reason. Various authors have pointed out that faith in revelation actually implies faith in the revealer. See Michael Zevi Nehorai, Righteous Gentiles Have a Share in the World to Come, Tarbiz 61, 1991–2, pp. 465– 488 [Hebrew]. Note the fascinating application of this principle in the ruling of Rabbi Moshe Feinstein, who considers prayer as part of the religious life of a non-Jew who observes the seven noachide commandments. While prayer is not one of those commandments, it is an expression of faith, which underlies the fulfillment of the seven commandments. Faith in revelation thus points to the revealer, establishing a relationship with Him, leading to a life of prayer. See Igrot Moshe, Orach Chayim 2, 25. 10 . David Novak has gone as far as to claim that this ruling reverses the earlier rulings concerning the status of Christianity as Avoda Zara, and therefore distinguishes 238 NOTES TO PAGES 135–139

between early and late Maimonides on Christianity. I find Novak’s conclusion far- reaching and not supported by the evidence. While his argument does not work for the halachic status of Christianity as Avoda Zara, it is effective for a discussion of the “same God” question. 11 . For purposes of constructing a hypothetical “same God” argument for Maimonides, this would have to be limited to Advaita Vedanta. Maimonides’ strictness in terms of imagining God with form would seem to preclude the application of this strategy to other schools of Vedanta, those of Ramanuja and Madhva, that envision the highest God (Vishnu) as possessing form. 12 . Nachmanides’ thought structure is here applied to Hinduism. In terms of what beings are called elohim and therefore considered divine there would probably be no point of commonality between Nachmanides and followers of Hinduism. 13 . Herein lies the difference with Maimonides, who may also be able to recognize some aspects of the Hindu ideal of God, while rejecting others. 14 . This statement appears in several sources with minor variations. See Tosafot Bechorot 2b s.v. Shema; Tosafot Sanhedrin 63b s.v. Asur; Rabenu Yerucham, Toledot Adam Vechava 17,5. See further Rosh, Sanhedrin, Chapter 7, 3 and Meiri to Sanhedrin 63,2. 1 5 . S e e T o s a f o t Bechorot and Meiri to Sanhedrin . 16 . The second variant may or may not suggest a slightly different theological nuance. The argument from intention is a second argument following the claim that they do not actually use an idolatrous name. The difference may not amount to much and the argument from intention may stand on its own. Alternatively, it may be considered weaker, and only sufficient to neutralize the implicit reference to Jesus, as part of an understanding of God. It would not be sufficient to override express reference to his name. The first reading makes better theological sense. It would be hard to argue why intention is effective only so far, but no more. Both variants can, in any event, support such a reading. 17 . This view assumes some core notion of divinity that is common, with an overlay of theological views that Judaism does not recognize. Such a structure can be readily applied to an Advaita Vedanta view of the absolute in relation to the various manifestations of divinity, making Shituf one option for validating an Advaita view. It would be harder to justify the view of the schools of Ramanuja and Madhva that affirm the absolute as having form and personality, using this strategy. To do so, one would have to affirm there is something that is significantly recognizable as “God” within the Divine, understood as Vishnu, despite the name, form and personality attributed to Vishnu, which does not immediately show commonality with a Jewish view of God. Such a position can be constructed, but it requires theological will. 18 . It is worth noting that Ibn Ezra applies a “same God” strategy to Indians, while claiming they do not believe in creation. For such a possibility, see note 27. Ibn Ezra assumes they recognize only the name elohim , which provides a commonality, without knowing the great name. This is a completely different way of constructing a “same God” argument. While theoretically interesting and while serving as a precedent in principle for the application of a “same God” argument, one would have a hard time transposing Ibn Ezra’s India to the Hinduism we know. See Richard Marks’s chapter on Ibn Ezra in his forthcoming The Jewish Interest in Hinduism: A History of Ideas from Judah Halevi to Jacob Sapir . 1 9 . T o s a f o t Avoda Zara 2b, s.v. Asur. 20 . See Bavli Chulin 13b, and see the application of this ruling to Christians by Rabbenu Gershom, Responsum 21, quoted in Katz, Exclusiveness and Tolerance , Oxford University Press, New York, London, 1961, p. 33. I have come across a fascinating NOTES TO PAGES 139–142 239

articulation of the principle that contemporary idol worship is a continuation of paren- tal customs in a Hindu tractate against the worship of idols. See Dialogue Between a Theist and an Idolator, an 1820 Tract Probably by Ram Mohun Roy , ed. Stephen Hay, Firma K. L. Mukhopadhyay, Calcutta, 1963. On p. 85 the following argument is made: “If you say whether it is agreeable to reason and the Shaster (scriptures) or not, we must do what our forefathers did.” The argument goes on to invalidate this kind of justification for worship of idols. 21 . This is at least how E. E.Urbach reads Meiri. See chapter 10, note 15. My own reading of Meiri makes it clear that Meiri involves much more than simply making explicit and systematic what is already implied by the Tosafot. Still, it is possible that the seeds sowed by the Tosafists bore fruit already in the work of Meiri. 22 . For a history of these views and their context, see Jacob Katz, Exclusiveness and Tolerance . 23 . Eugene Korn has suggested that advances in the theological view of Christianity are related to historical circumstances changing for the better. See his Rethinking Christianity. 24 . One rarely thinks of the halachic process and the pronouncements made concerning other religions as intuitive. In fact, intuition may be one of the most significant, if not the most significant, faculty employed in making such pronouncements. Intuition precedes logically working out the arguments for why another religion’s god is recognized as an other god. We can see intuition at work to this very day in halachic discussions of Christianity. An analysis of Rabbi Yosef’s responsum is highly suggestive (see chapter 14, note 4, this volume). His personal struggles as well as his application of the notion of desecration of the divine name ultimately rely on his personal intuitions. It is intuition that leads him to proclaim Christianity as Avoda Zara, despite the massive weight of the sources he brings that could have led to an alternative conclusion. Recognizing the centrality of intuition points the way to moving beyond present-day positions, either by recognizing alternative intuitional points of departure or by appealing to reason, beyond intuition. Education would play a central role in such a process. It seems to me very significant that the Tosafists’ position concerning the permissibility of Shituf is complemented by another statement of theirs, which recognizes Christians as nonidolaters, on what may be described as purely intuitional grounds. See note 19. The significance of intuition in approaching another religion is extremely fertile ground for future reflection, to which I can only hint here, better yet: that I can only intuit at present. 25 . Be’er Hagola on Shulchan Aruch, Choshen Mishpat, 425, letter Shin. 26 . See also the previous discussion of the “same God” question with regard to Maimonides. 27 . Whether or not Hindus can be said to believe in a creator God, in a sense that Jews would recognize, is a matter both of philosophical difference between various schools and interpretive generosity, in one’s view of Hindu religious and philosophical systems. (A fact not considered by Flusser, who comfortably equates the Upanishad’s creator with Abraham’s faith. See Flusser, Abraham and the Upanishads, Between Jerusalem and Benares, ed. Hananya Goodman, SUNY Press, Albany, NY, 1994, pp. 33–40). For some schools (Mimamsa, possibly Vedanta), one cannot speak mean- ingfully of a creator God. Brahman is creator only by implication as there is nothing outside the absolute reality. Creation is, thus, not the essential function of God, but only a secondary definition. Shrivatsa Goswami emphasizes this perspective to me in personal communications, citing among others the work of T. R. V. Murti. At the same time, contemporary vedantins certainly do refer to God, the absolute, as 240 NOTES TO PAGES 142–150

creator. And it is worth noting that when de Nobilis engages Saivite theology, he reads it comfortably as referring to the creator God he knows. Reference to God as creator is therefore not simply a product of colonial exposure to other religions. See Anand Amaladass and Francis X. Clooney, Preaching Wisdom to the Wise : Three Treatises by Roberto de Nobili, Institute of Jesuit Sources, St. Louis, MO, 2000, pp. 45ff. 28 . It is also suggestive of an important methodological consideration in the approach and study of other religions and how these inform the halachic process. Book learning and the study of ideas will yield a very different process and understanding than the encounter with the faithful, their practices, and spirituality. Just as the Tosafot’s instinctive recognition of the Christians among them was based on some firsthand knowledge, even if not upon meaningful study of Christianity, so too one must have some firsthand exposure as the basis for appreciating another religion. 29 . This strategy for affirming the same God, as well as that of Meiri to be discussed presently, would not be limited to an advaitic position and can be applied to most, if not all, schools of Hinduism. 30 . The continuing scholarly debate concerning fundamental similarity or difference of mystical and religious experience in different religions is obviously relevant to this consideration.

12 From Hindu God to Hindu gods: Confronting the Particularity of Hindu Deities

1 . S e e C h a p t e r 1 1 o f The Jewish Encounter with Hinduism. For present purposes I gloss over the question of how appropriate the use of “monotheism” is to describe Hinduism, in the self-understanding of Hindu religious leaders. Sperber’s use of “monotheism,” in The Halakhic Status of Hinduism , to describe Hinduism has met with some opposition by Swami Dayananda, who more than any other figure has influenced Sperber’s own work. As Hindu respondents to Sperber note, the joint Hindu-Jewish statements never refer to both religions as monotheisms. 2 . Jan Assman, Of God and gods: Egypt, Israel and the Rise of Monotheism, University of Wisconsin Press, Madison, 2008. 3 . I b i d . , p . 1 0 7 . 4 . This gives pause for thought. The third formulation is actually part of the Muslim creed, while the second captures the core statement of Jewish faith, the shema . If the second is not as strong as the third, what are the implications of this fact for the potential of constructing a Jewish view of other religions that is not based on the total rejection that Assman associates with the third? 5 . Consider, however, the fascinating possibilities opened up by the discussion of Yehuda Gellman, Names and Divine Names: Kripke and Gikatillia, Sefer Higayon: Studies in Rabbinic Logic, ed. M. Koppel and E. Merzbach, Zomet Institute, Alon Shevut, 1995, pp. 51–60, especially p. 60. 6 . Ausonius, Epigrammata no. 48, brought in Assman, Of God and gods, pp. 55–56. See further the text in Mozart’s cantata K. 619, discussed in Jan Assman, Moses the Egyptian: The Memory of Egypt in Western Monotheism, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1997, p. 136. 7 . Of God and gods, p. 56, where various other sources from Late Antiquity are brought. 8 . I have not found such a taxonomy of gods and goddesses in the literature. It clearly reflects the concerns of a Jewish perspective and the possibilities it affords us for NOTES TO PAGES 151–155 241

addressing the Hindu understanding of divinity and of the many Hindu gods and goddesses. 9 . See most recently on biblical monotheism as the antithesis to nature worship in Assman, On God and gods , pp. 72–74. 1 0 . D e t a i l e d r e f e r e n c e s a r e p r o v i d e d b y B r i l l , Judaism and World Religions: Encountering Christianity, Islam and Eastern Traditions, Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 2012, p. 204 and notes, p. 276. 11 . Nachmanides’ thought structure is the only one that has meaningful room for relating to gods and angels through the mechanism of translatability, discussed below, which allows us to recognize gods across religious cultures, in view of their association with natural and cosmic forces. 12 . Some scholars have considered this to be the dividing line between Judaism and early Christianity. While there is a common conceptual background, according to which other beings are acknowledged alongside God, offering worship to one of these, in this case to Jesus Christ, constitutes the real dividing line between acceptable faith, in Jewish terms, and heresy or the beginning of a new religion. See Larry Hurtado, One God, One Lord: Early Christian Devotion and Ancient Jewish Monotheism , SCM, London, 1988. Contrast this with Daniel Boyarin, Border Lines: The Partition of Judaeo-Christianity, University of Pennsylvania Press, Philadelphia, 2004, pp. 119, 295. In his abstract to Beyond Judaisms: Metatron and the Divine Polymorphy of Ancient Judaism, Journal for the Study of Judaism 41, 2010, pp. 323–365, Boyarin shifts from belief in a second divine person to perhaps a cult, to a cult of the second person. The article itself does not explore this distinction in any way. 1 3 . S p e r b e r , i n C h a p t e r 6 o f The Halakhic Status of Hinduism draws the analogy from the many instances of prayerful approach to angels in the history of Judaism to legitimating or recognizing parallel approaches to forces of nature in Hinduism. Sperber is also aware of the distinction between devas and other ways of expressing an understanding of God. In fact, this contribution of his is one of the most important contributions to the Jewish-Hindu summits. See Chapter 11 of The Jewish Encounter with Hinduism . In considering prayers to Hindu gods along the lines of the precedent of prayers to angels we confront a twofold challenge. From the Jewish side, it is worth considering the fact that Jewish angelology has all but disappeared. Other than ves- tiges in prayer books, belief in angels plays next to no role in contemporary faith and cosmology. This obviously makes reflection on the approach of other religions to a class of beings that was once prominent in Jewish experience less immediate. From the Hindu side, as Martha Doherty notes in a comment on Sperber’s manuscript, the case of Hinduism is not really one of intercessory prayer, inasmuch as one does not turn to various beings to intercede with higher beings, but rather turns to them as expressions and manifestations of the higher being. 14 . Ezekiel 29,3. 15 . For the association of monarchy and the gods in an Indian context, see the summary of Christopher Fuller, The Camphor Flame: Popular Hinduism and Society in India, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 2004, p. 38ff. 1 6 . A s s m a n , On God and gods , p. 75. 17 . I ignore in the present context the broader observation, already made above, that rabbinic culture is fairly insular and therefore lack of engagement with contemporary philosophy may not mean as much as what I here ascribe to it. 18 . See Sacha Stern, Jewish Identity in Early Rabbinic Writings, chapter 4 , note 5. 19 . I shall not reenter the discussion of the moral and educational challenges associated with ascription of divinity to contemporary teachers. The points made above remain 242 NOTES TO PAGES 156–158

valid. However, they do not address the issue in terms of Avoda Zara, the present focus of the discussion, but in terms of broader educational concerns. Many of these concerns apply to potential abuse of power also in relation to Jewish teachers and authority figures, even if no ascription of divinity is made to them. 20 . See, however, the possibility that such worship may also be condoned, based on our analysis of the Rashba, discussed in chapter 7 . 21 . Recall the Tosafot who identify Christian worship as the same as ours, due to intention, while recognizing that Jesus is worshipped as well. See Tosafot Bechorot 2b s.v. Shema. 22 . See my The Image as Body of God in Rabbinic Literature, Harvard Theological Review 87,2, 1994, pp. 171–195. 2 3 . Y a i r L o r b e r b a u m , The Image of God: Halacha and Aggada , Schoken, Jerusalem and Tel Aviv, 2004 [Hebrew]. 24 . Of the vast literature on the subject, see Veli-Matti Karkainen, One with God: Salvation as Deification and Justification , Unitas Books, Collegeville, 2004, and Stephen Finlan and Vladimir Kharlamov (eds.), Theosis: Deification in Christian Theology vol. 1, James Clarke, Cambridge, 2010, and Vladimir Kharlamov (ed.), Theosis: Deification in Chrisitan Theology vol. 2, James Clarke, Cambridge, 2012. 25 . Crispen Fletcher Louis, Humanity and the Idols of the Gods in Pseudo Philo’s Biblical Antiquities, Idolatry: False Worship in the Bible, Early Judaism and Christianity , ed. Stepen Barton, T & T Clark, London 2007, pp. 58–72, presents us with an interesting ancient argument that contrasts the worship of idols with God’s true image in humanity. If God’s real presence is within humanity, this allows us to distinguish between different expressions of what is typically considered under the one umbrella of Avoda Zara. 26 . The earliest instance is the originary image of God, Adam. See Bereshit Rabba 8,10. 2 7 . M a r k S . S m i t h , God in Translation: Deities in Cross-Cultural Discourse in the Biblical World, Mohr Siebeck, Tubingen, 2008. 28 . One common denominator, however, is noteworthy. As Smith notes, in the second chapter of his book, translatability is a function of international relations and their requirements. The same may be said of the “same God” discussion, even if the political circumstances that it serves are radically different from those that are manifest in ancient practices of translating divinities. As Smith further suggests, p. 328ff., the contemporary situation in many ways resembles that of the ancient world, especially the Greco-Roman period, where permeability of identity and mobility require theological reflection on relations between gods or religions. Smith’s Epilogue seeks to spell out the continuing relevance of the problem of translatability to contemporary reality, though he seems to be unaware of the “same God” discussion. 29 . I say this with particular reference to the Abingdon Press collection; see chapter 11, note 1. One of the surprising facts about it is how issues one would have considered simple at face value have become complex and how one cannot take for granted the affirmation of the same God even across Abrahamic faiths. 30 . See Jan Assman, Of God and gods, p. 54. See also Moses the Egyptian, p. 45ff. The difference may be captured by contrasting two slogans, representing each of the strategies. For the “Same God” strategy—one God, many names; for translatability—many gods, many names. 31 . Accordingly, Assman puts forth the thesis that the “mosaic distinction” is that there is no translatability between Israel’s God and other gods, thereby setting them apart. Smith nuances the historical issue of translatability, suggesting some biblical precedents, but he is in agreement that ultimately biblical religion moved toward a position NOTES TO PAGES 159–164 243

of untranslatability, in the relations between Israel’s God and the gods of its neighbors. In what follows I shall continue to refer to translatability, albeit in an altered sense. Translatability into ideas and aspects of the Divine will replace reference to translatability of the name and identity of a particular god from one pantheon to another. 32 . M. N. Srinivas, Religion and Society among the Coorgs of South India , Asia Publishing House, New York, 1952. 33 . In the final part of the present work, I argue for moving away from a global view of Hinduism, toward a more nuanced and complex view. The discussion of great and local traditions points in this direction as well. 34 . It is conventional to present a Trinity of Hindu gods—Brahma, Siva, and Vishnu, corresponding to three aspects of creation, preservation, and destruction. This presentation is actually far less common internally than it is in outward-looking presentations of the religion. The god Brahma is, in fact, almost universally absent from Hindu temples and worship. 35 . The humanity of Rama and Krishna, however, seems more theoretical, even mythi- cal, rather than historical, given the immense span of time since they are said to have lived. In this they are different from great teachers, whose memory is much closer. For Hindus, however, this seems to matter very little. 36 . See Saxena Neela Bhattacharya, Shekhina on the “Plane of Immanence”: An Intimation of the Indic Great Mother in the Hebraic Wholly Other, Journal of Indo- Judaic Studies 12, 2012, pp. 27–44. 37 . Indeed, from such a perspective, imagination and idolatry are related. Both serve purposes related to controlling masses, based upon a false understanding of reality. See Halbertal and Margalit, Idolatry , Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1992, p. 127ff. 3 8 . D i a n a L . E c k , Dar ś an: Seeing the Divine Image in India, Anima Books, Chambersburg, PA, 1981, p. 28. 39 . This is the conceptual thread that informs Elliot Wolfson’s Through a Speculum That Shines: Vision and Imagination in Medieval Jewish Mysticism, Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ, 1994. 40 . Translation by Israel Zangwill, brought by Arthur Green, K eter: The Crown of God in Early Jewish Mysticism , Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ, 1997, p. 108. 4 1 . S e e W o l f s o n , Speculum , p. 217. 4 2 . I b i d . , p . 2 1 4 f f . 43 . It is useful to reference broader theories of the imagination, as these have found expression in the history of philosophy. Daniel Reiser, To Fly Like Angels: Imagery or Waking Dream Techniques in Hassidic Mysticism in the First Half of the Twentieth Century, PhD, Hebrew University of Jerusalem, 2011, pp. 301ff. [Hebrew], suggests three models for understanding the human imagination. The first is the mirror model, dating back to Plato. According to this model, the imagination is charged with copying and representing the original. A second model is the light-bulb model, according to which the imagination is active and productive in and of itself, and not only by force of its representational power. This is the romantic model. A third model, a postmodern one, is the multiplication of mirrors, so that each reflects the other, ultimately leading to a collapse between reality and imagination. Recognizing these different models is helpful in appreciating some of the texts brought in the present discussion. One recognizes that it is only within a very specific understanding of the imagination that one can even think of critiquing other religions as erroneous, due to the workings of the human imagination. 244 NOTES TO PAGES 164–167

4 4 . S e e W o l f s o n , Speculum, pp. 108–119. 45 . Wolfson works through contemporary scholarly research in an attempt to provide an alternative to naive positivism or reductionism of these images. I find it interesting that this issue is only raised in contemporary scholarship and is not part of traditional reflection on these early texts and on the phenomenology of religious experience as such. This fact is best accounted for by the little attention given overall to the issue of religious imagination, suggesting how much constructive work lies ahead. 4 6 . S e e D a n i e l R e i s e r , To Fly Like Angels. See also Zvi Leshem, Between Messianism and Prophecy: Hasidism According to the Piaseczner Rebber, PhD, Bar Ilan University, 2007 [Hebrew]. 47 . See Hilchot Teshuva 3,7. 48 . From Kalonymus Kalman Schapira, Experiencing the Divine: A Practical Jewish Guide, unpublished translation by Yaakov Shulman, 2002, pp. 25–26. A less precise translation of the same text is available in Andrea Cohen-Kiener, Conscious Community: A Guide to Inner Work, Jason Aaronson, Northvale, NJ, 1996, pp. 23–24. Thanks are due to Zvi Leshem for sharing translations and sources relevant to the work of Rabbi Schapira with me. 49 . How far-reaching Rabbi Schapira’s understanding of the role of imagination in the spiritual life is will depend on how to understand the final phrase: when we pray, etc. If it reflects the state following the purification of the imagination, then it describes a form of imagination that would be distinguished from that described earlier in the section. We would thus speak of higher and lower or more or less correct expressions of the imagination. The sentence could also be read as a return to the general instruc- tion of the passage, rather than as a description of the function of the imagination following its purification. 50 . In the original, “which,” referring to the proof text from Isa.44,13, omitted here for sake of simplification. 5 1 . Likutey Moharan II, 8, end subsection 12. Translation taken from Zvi Mark, M ysticism and Madness: The Religious Thought of Rabbi Nachman of Bratslav, Continuum, London, 2009, p. 178. 52 . On the imaginative power in R. Nachman’s teaching see Zvi Mark, Mysticism and Madness, especially Chapters 1 and 5 . Mark’s discussion provides references for some of what follows. Mark’s project in Mysticism and Madness is to explore how ordi- nary consciousness and its rational constraints are transcended in the teachings of R. Nachman. See further Yaara Levitas Bibas, Imagination in the Thought of R. Nahman of Brahslav , Phd, Bar Ilan University, 2008. 5 3 . I n Likutey Moharan II, 5,9, R. Nachman distinguishes between a dream given by means of an angel and a demon. Dreaming with the aid of an angel is obviously not strictly true to reality, in the sense of everyday life. Yet it is true in some other sense, and this sense is related by R. Nachman, again, to the purification of the imaginative faculty. The imagination conveys to us a different aspect or quality of truth. 54 . R. Aharon of Strashelye, Sha ’arei Avoda , Introduction, p. 9a. 55 . See, however, later in this work part 4, Chapter 35, where R. Aharon is explicit with reference to the souls of Israel, and possibly Israel only. The present argument may therefore extend R. Aharon’s way of thinking beyond his own intention, an extension that can, nevertheless, be justified by his own metaphysical system. The following sources that consider the imagination as an expression of the image of God would lend further support to such an argument. 56 . Alluding to Hosea 12,11—by the prophets I was imaged. 5 7 . O r e s t i m a t e . NOTES TO PAGES 167–174 245

5 8 . R . S i m c h a B u n e m o f P r z y s u c h a , Kol Simcha to Gen. 1,26, translated by Wolfson, Speculum, p. 73. Wolfson omits the last phrase in his translation and concludes the translatiom by translating: “after our likeness ( ki-demutenu), “ by the power of imagination.” What R. Simcha Bunem seems to be saying here, rather, is that the power of the imagination provides the bridge and link between man and God, allowing man to imagine God, because of an existential common ground. Wolfson also points to R. Nachman of Breslav’s Li kutey Moharan II, 5,9. 59 . It may be argued that this reading only assumes a commonality in human potential across all of humanity, but this does not guarantee correct application of the imaginative power, nor does it make all imaginations appropriate. Given that all imaginations are ultimately wrong, this objection may not mean much, certainly if supported by R. Aharon’s view of God’s presence in the imagination. Nevertheless, recognizing the same God would seem a precondition for extending theories of the religious imagination from an internal context to other religions. 60 . Overall, this is the strategy for appreciating other religions cultivated by the Dalai Lama. This non-theist is capable of appreciating what faith in God could bring believers, by reference to the fruits of faith in their lives. It seems to me this is an important approach that can be integrated into a Jewish view of other religions, by means of a Meiri understanding of religions. See His Holiness the Dalai Lama, Toward a True Kinship of Faiths: How the World’s Religions Can Come Together , Doubleday, New York, 2010, and see my review at http://www.elijah-interfaith.org/ index.php?id=1011 . . שובב My translation of . 61 6 2 . Chazon Ish, Yore Deah , I, 19. 63 . Nor is it permitted. For Chazon Ish it still constitutes recognition of another god, which is forbidden, though on a lower level. Thus, the Chazon Ish would offer us a way of reducing the severity of recognizing many gods or forces of nature as expressions of the Divine, without legitimating such a perspective, even for non-Jews. 64 . Chazon Ish’s distinction between real and imaginary beings is not dependent on his reading of Tosafot as forbidding Shituf. Consequently, the distinction between real and imaginary beings can be incorporated within a view that permits Shituf, or within a view that otherwise accommodates and validates other religions. 65 . That Hindu gods are considered part of the created order would not make them crea- tures for purposes of the present discussion. Creature, for Hazon Ish, is seen in the concrete physical world, and not imagined in the celestial world. 66 . Though not in the philosophical tradition to which Meiri himself subscribes. 67 . See, however Rabbi A. I.Kook, Shemona Kevazim 8,44.

13 Revisiting the Worship of Images: Glimpses of a Future Dialogue

1 . Adin Steinsaltz, Peace without Conciliation: The Irrelevance of “Toleration” in Judaism , Common Knowledge 11,1, 2005, Duke University Press, p. 47. 2 . There is a lesser category of images, typically images that are mass produced, which does not follow these principles. These serve mainly as memorials and devotional objects, but are not understood as proper vehicles for divinity, unless the broad philosophical principle of divine omnipresence is applied. 3 . Needless to say, the mocking attitude will highlight the impossibility of achieving these goals through the various elaborate rituals. Our task is not to assess the effectiveness of the method nor the possibility of achieving its stated goal, but only to understand 246 NOTES TO PAGES 174–178

the religious attitude and worldview of practitioners who approach God through the use of images. A serious comparison of attitudes to ritual will also have to consider energetic approaches to the observance of mitzvot, such as we find in the Kabbalah, as we seek to establish a baseline for comparison between the religions. With reference to Christianity, the proper analogy is the eucharist, rather than the use of images in prayer. Here too, whether an understandings of the workings of ritual seems reason- able to the outside observer or not should be kept distinct from the ruling whether a religion is viewed as Avoda Zara. See, however, Rabbi Isaac Herzog, Minority Rights According to the Halacha, Tehumin 2, 1981, p. 175, note 10, on the eucharist. 4 . Major images in great temples seem exempt from this process. There are alternative rituals that are performed on these images that rely on the same worldview and apply it to “perpetual” statues. 5 . See Sapir, quoted by Alan Brill, Judaism and World Religions: Encountering Christianity, Islam and Eastern Traditions, Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 2012, p. 211. 6 . See Jon Levenson, Sinai and Zion: An Entry into the Jewish Bible, Winston Press, Minneapolis, MN, 1985, pp. 137ff. 7 . See Gary Anderson, Towards a Theology of the Tabernacle and Its Furniture, Text, Thought and Practice in Qumran and Early Christianity, ed. Ruth Clements and Daniel Schwartz, Brill, Leiden, 2009, pp. 161–194. 8 . It is fascinating to read Exodus 32 and following in light of this insight, especially keeping in mind the rabbinic view that the sin of the golden calf preceded the instruc- tion and construction of the Tabernacle. The Tabernacle is accordingly a response to the sin of the golden calf. 9 . Ben Sommer, The Bodies of God and the World of Ancient Israel, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2009. 10 . See chapter 5 . 11 . One of the passages analyzed by Sommer is Genesis 18, which offers a very good example of this theology. 1 2 . S e e Y o c h a n a n M u f f s , The Personhood of God, Jewish Lights, Woodstock, 2005, pp. 12ff. 13 . The present study does not explore the implications of astrology to a religious worldview and to the present discussion. This is fertile ground for further study and reflection. 14 . See Jan Assman, Of God and gods: Egypt, Israel and the Rise of Monotheism, University of Wisconsin Press, Madison, 2008, p. 75. 15 . In terms of biblical theology itself the problem may not exist. God is a person, rather than the abstract being of Brahman . His particular individual personality is therefore the unique focus of Israel’s faith and as such clearly distinguishable from any other personality. Once we move from personalities to theological models, it becomes harder to state our differences. 1 6 . Tradition 42,1, 2009, pp. 15–28. 17 . Hefter, p. 23, quoting Heinrich Zimmer, M yths and Symbols in Indian Art and Civilization , ed. Joseph Campbell, Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ, 1946, p. 130. 18 . Ibid., pp. 25–26. Underlying Zimmer’s and Hefter’s discussion is a certain understanding of images. It is useful to relate this understanding to the fourfold division of attitudes to icons and images, developed by Bruno Latour. See Bruno Latour, What Is Iconoclash? Or Is There a World beyond the Image Wars, Iconoclash: Beyond the Image Wars in Science, Religion and Art, ed. Bruno Latour and Peter Weibel, MIT NOTES TO PAGES 180–186 247

Press, Cambridge, 2000, pp. 14–37. On p. 14 Latour defines four classes of iconoclasts: A—those who are against all images; B—those who may destroy images, but are not against them as such, only their “freeze framing,” their absolutizing or fetishizing; C—those who are only against images of others; D—those who break images only by accident, unintentionally. This is a helpful breakdown of possibilities. Most Jewish theorists would belong to group A, or to group C (if we are willing to accept verbal images as our own legitimate images, while condemning the images of others). Hefter’s identification with option B is largely unique within a traditional Jewish framework. 19 . It is interesting to consider, in this context, a discussion by Rabbi Kook on Maimonides’ laws of idolatry, presented in chapter 9, note 28, in his Orot Harambam. Rav Kook discusses the difference between Abraham, who smashed the idols of his father and his society, and the other great men, who, according to the rabbinic view, maintained a kind of chain of tradition of proper knowledge of God, even if they did so as a minority, or even in hiding. The Rabad on Laws of Avoda Zara 1,3 asks where these figures were prior to Abraham’s coming along. Rav Kook seeks to offer a theoretical accounting for why they did not smash idols as Abraham did. His answer is similar to the vedantic answer. Patience and the hope that people will eventually regain the lost faith informed their attitude, while Abraham represents the impossibility of leaving people in darkness and the need to take active steps to guide and save people. 20 . Such an understanding could emerge from the oft-quoted verse 9,26. 21 . Within the vast literature on the subject see the debate between the two authors cited in the present chapter. If Jan Assman, in both M oses the Egyptian and Of God and gods, affirms the potential relationship, Mark Smith seeks to put the charge of monotheism and violence to rest, once and for all. See Smith, God in Translation: Deities in Cross-Cultural Discourse in the Biblical World, Mohr Siebeck, Tubingen, 2008, p. 28. 22. See Rabbi A. I. Kook, Orot, pp. 130–131.

14 Beyond a Global Approach to Hinduism

1 . Contrast Laws of Avoda Zara 9,4 and Laws of Forbidden Foods 11,7. 2 . The earliest near-contemporary discussion in this vein is Rabbi Herzog’s Minority Rights According to the Halacha. Rabbi Henkin’s responsa in Shut Benei Banim 3,35–36 also acknowledge some differences between different Christian sects. In terms of practice, however, his ruling ignores the distinctions he himself sets up, opt- ing for a blanket view of Christianity as Avoda Zara. For more recent discussions, see the short comment of Michael Broyde, Entering a Sanctuary for Hatzalat Yisrael: An Exchange, Hakira 8, 2009, pp. 53–68, specifically p. 58. Broyde’s comment indicates awareness of the need to distinguish between the different sects and proposes this as a long-standing distinction. (Most of Broyde’s argument relies not on the status of Christianity but on permitting exceptions in situations of public need by public representatives, thereby accounting for exceptional behavior of leaders such as Rabbi Sacks). Also Rabbi Riskin’s recent lenient ruling on entering churches appeals to this distinction. See http://jewishisrael.ning.com/page/rabbi-riskin-on-jews-entering . There seems to be a trend among contemporary rabbis to argue for nuances and distinctions among Christian groups, in ways that are significantly different than the precedent of tradition up to contemporary times. This could, in and of itself, be a positive development. Unfortunately, little is done beyond the proclamation in principle, with only occasional differences being drawn. Moreover, the age-old specter of images and the visual plays a disproportionate part in such discussions, working 248 NOTES TO PAGES 186–187

against Catholicism (Braude) and Orthodox Christianity (Henkin). Consequently, the distinction often opens the door to a view of Christianity that privileges worship over theology. For further contemporary discussion, see J. D. Bleich, Entering a Non- Jewish House of Worship, Tradition 44,2, 2011, pp. 73–101. 3 . S p e r b e r ’ s The Halakhic Status of Hinduism is an important exception to this statement. While authored as a kind of halachic responsum and while applying, especially toward the end, a variety of halachic reasonings, the bulk of the work consists of quotations from Hindu authors and experts, suggesting how important a correct and nuanced view of another religion is to its halachic consideration. With reference to entering houses of worship, Sperber’s opening remarks place participation or observation of rituals as one of the realities that has to be addressed. Supposedly his tractate and its absolution of Hinduism from the charge of Avoda Zara would therefore have consequences on issues of entry into temples and observation (and participation?) in rituals. One notes, however, that this question is raised in the opening description of the situation that the book seeks to address, but is not made explicit in its conclusions. The matter was also brought up in a question, following a public lecture delivered by Sperber at the David Cardozo Academy, Jerusalem, March 23, 2011. Sperber was asked what the halachic consequences of his understanding might be. The question was posed in terms of permissibility to enter, or even pray, within a Hindu temple, if one considers that Hinduism is not Avoda Zara. On this question, as a test case, see the following note. In this context, Sperber avoided drawing an out-and-out conclusion from his position. He preferred a more pedagogic approach, according to which he would require the prospective visitor to learn more about Hinduism, till he or she had formulated their own position as to whether or not Hinduism was Avoda Zara. The practical consequences would then flow as a decision based on personal convic- tion. Note that a more nuanced view of Hinduism has led Sperber to basically absolve Hinduism of the charge of Avoda Zara, rather than take a more complex view of Hinduism as Avoda Zara. 4 . Let me illustrate this again with reference to the question of entering a church. Methodologically, entry into another religion’s religious space is often the limit case for testing a halachic authority’s views on another religion. The basis for the prohibition to enter a church is that one is forbidden, by mishnaic law, to enter a house of Avoda Zara (see Mishna Avoda Zara 1,3). If Christianity is considered Avoda Zara, one cannot enter a church. This is the plain logic of Maimonides in his commentary to this Mishna. But what of the more nuanced understanding of Christianity that recognizes it as a permissible form of worship for non-Jews? If in fact it is not considered Avoda Zara , why should one refrain from entering a church? An extreme, if disputed, expression of how far one would legitimate Christianity is the permission to partici- pate financially in the construction of a church. See David Ellenson, Jewish Covenant and Christian trinitarianism: An Analysis of a Responsum on Jewish-Christian Relations in the Modern World, Jewish Civilization, 3, 1985, pp. 85–100. It is hard to imagine forbidding entry into the church that one was allowed to help construct. It may therefore be reasoned that entry into a church and abstention from entry should fully correspond to the views one takes on whether worship through Shituf is permissible for non-Jews. This logical and coherent reasoning can be seen in several responsa of Rabbi Ovadia Yosef. See Y abi’a Omer , Yore De’ah, Part 2, 11; Part 7, Yore De’ah 12. However, we find halachists avoiding such clear conclusions and holding on to views of one school while affirming the practices of another. Thus, Rabbi Herzog, who is a strong proponent of the view that Shituf is permitted for non-Jews, and who bases his view of the required religious and political tolerance in the about-to-be-formed state NOTES TO PAGES 187–190 249

of Israel on these grounds, nevertheless affirms that even if Christians are permitted to build churches, Jews may not enter them. This position tries to affirm what are essentially two opposing perspectives. It seems to me that underlying this attempt is the difficulty in moving from a theoretical position to bringing about changes in practical halachic terms. The halacha tends to traditionalism. Certainly the specter of Avoda Zara is such that halachists would have no reason to seek change to prevailing attitudes, unless it was realized that those attitudes are in some way harmful, spiritually if not politically. When we add identitarian considerations, we come out with a halachic system that is willing to consider in theory that there exists more than one form of Christianity, but that draws almost no practical consequences from such theoretical affirmations, or that draws some conclusions, stopping short of others. It is worth noting that even though Rabbi Sacks will attend public functions in a church, he avoided being present in church for the funeral mass of a personal friend and Archbishop of Canterbury, Cardinal Basil Hume. Sacks avoided the mass as a moment of worship, preferring instead to be present, and to be acknowledged as such, in a side room. The inconsistencies inherent in the decisors and in practice can only be accounted for in light of a patchwork of conflicting perspectives that are brought to bear upon what should ideally be decided on a more principled level. 5 . I noted above that the most “tolerant” view of Hinduism, expressed by Rabbi Steinsaltz, is similarly not a halachic discussion but a theoretical reflection on the ideals of tolerance in Judaism. Of course, one cannot fully divorce these processes. Theoretical recognition of Hinduism’s status could, and should, be brought into a discussion of the practical consequences of relating to it. See once again Sperber’s comments in How Not to Make Halachic Rulings, http://www.jewishideas.org/articles/how-not- make-halakhic-rulings. 6 . For a powerful, as well as entertaining, illustration of this theological question, see the dialogue narrated in the Mechilta DeRabbi Ishmael Bahodesh 6, on Ex. 20,5. 7 . Our discussion of Maimonides’ Laws of Avoda Zara pointed to the gap, wherein his halachic definition as well as his history of devolution into Avoda Zara fail to address the possibility of worship of the one true God, through the use of images. Does this assume that the criterion has no independent value other than helping establish the identity of the god that is worshipped? Much would depend on whether non-Jews and Jews are obligated by the same criteria when it comes to defining Avoda Zara, a question that underlies the Shituf controversy. For Jews there exists an independent commandment to not worship through images. See Exodus 20,5 and Maimonides’ count of negative commandments, where this appears as the second negative commandment. See also the list of commandments at the introduction to the Laws of Avoda Zara, where a distinct prohibition on image making is brought. Whether or not the same prohibition applies equally to non-Jews would determine whether the worship of images constitutes in and of itself Avoda Zara, or whether in relation to non-Jews it functions only as means of pointing to another god. 8 . The problem may be situated philosophically at an even more fundamental level, in relation to the notion of the potential divinization of man. This seems to have been the great stumbling block for Shmuel Hugo Bergmann, in his almost lifelong dialogue with Hindu thought, as represented primarily through the thought of Sri Aurobindo. See Miriam Dean-Otting, Hugo Bergman, Leo Baeck and Martin Buber: Jewish Perspectives on Hinduism and Buddhism, Journal of Indo-Judaic Studies , 1,2, 1999, pp. 7–26. 9 . Our discussion of spirituality and wisdom in The Jewish Encounter with Hinduism , Chapters 7 and 9 , indicated how central the quest for God and wisdom are in Indian religious life. 250 NOTES TO PAGES 190–196

10 . It is recognized that there is room for fruitful conversation around questions of the spiritual life and how it should be lived in this world. Jewish and Hindu voices may differ. Nevertheless, whatever differences in philosophical vision may be identified are not relevant to the implications of living in a spiritually oriented culture for purposes of thinking of that culture in terms of Avoda Zara. 11 . Following the 2010 Haiti earthquake, Rabbi Dov Berkovitz published an essay in the Israeli weekly M akor Rishon (29.1.2010, titled cheshbono shel olam), in which he attempted his own theodicy of the event. In it he appealed to the religious culture of voodoo, which many of the people of Haiti practice, and which he saw as an instance of Avoda Zara. In attempting to distinguish the religious culture of Haiti from that of India, Berkovitz appealed to the Hindu religious culture as one driven by the quest for spirituality, and thus radically different from that of the people of Haiti. The argument assumes that the broader backdrop of the spiritual life provides the context in light of which similar practices may be valued differently as far as their status as Avoda Zara is concerned. 12 . See, in particular, the quotes above from Bet Habechira Avoda Zara 6b and 26a. 13 . I could equally well use the term “relational” here instead. However, by using “bonding” I seek to capture the sense that something real transpires through worship, and that the relational nexus brings about a real exchange of being, an energetic exchange, and that this exchange is crucial to the spiritual life and consequently to the definition of a religion as Avoda Zara. 1 4 . S e e H a l b e r t a l , By Way of Truth: Nahmanides and the Creation of Tradition, Shalom Hartman Institute, Jerusalem, 2006, Chapter 7 [Hebrew]. 15 . Religious orthodoxy may be quick to dismiss the spiritual value of anything outside the Jewish fold and to attribute to it harmful negative influences. I recall the case of a Jerusalem figure, Rabbi Moshe Bentov, who specialized in reading mezuzot, the ritual parchments placed upon doors and entryways. He used these as mantic devices, through which he would tell those who came to him what needed to be set right in their lives and homes. One of his frequent recommendations was the removal of foreign books, that is, books belonging to other religions. I have heard several testimonies of people who had books on Hinduism in their homes. Rabbi Bentov counseled to burn those books, due to their harmful energetic influence. He knew of these books through his psychic or mantic powers, rather than by being told about them by his clients. 16 . In theory, the very same practice may be Avoda Zara in the life of one practitioner, and not Avoda Zara, given the overall picture of the spiritual life, in the life of another. 17 . See Deut. 18,9 ff. 18 . The notion of purposes of religion and the recognition of multiple purposes within religious systems are central to the theology of religions of Mark Heim. See Mark Heim, The Depth of the Riches: A Trinitarian Theology of Religious Ends , Eerdmans, Grand Rapids, MI, 2001. 19 . See Zipi Koifman, Foreign God and Avoda Zara in Hassidic Thought, A kdamot 19, 2007, pp. 87–104 [Hebrew]. I have seen in the streets of Jerusalem posters of ultra- Orthodox groups that condemn processes of local political involvement in terms of Avoda Zara and have photos of such posters in my possession. 20 . I have noted this frequently with regard to rabbinic critiques of magical or mystical practices. I imagine Avoda Zara is used in these contexts without intending the full consequences of the term as it applies say to Christianity. For one example, see http://www. moreshet.co.il/web/shut/print.asp?id=120996&kod=&modul=15&codeClient=58 . 21 . See Rabbi Isaac Herzog, Minority Rights According to the Halacha, pp. 178–179. NOTES TO PAGES 196–203 251

2 2 . I b i d . , p . 1 7 5 . 23 . Compare this to the alternative calculus applied by Chief Rabbi Sacks, above note 4. 24 . See Chapter 11 of The Jewish Encounter with Hinduism . 25 . The Torah forbids making alliances with idolaters and this injunction carries over into halacha. This is one of the driving considerations of Rabbi Sperber’s The Halakhic Status of Hinduism. 26 . At the David Cardozo Academy. 27 . See Chapter 9 of The Jewish Encounter with Hinduism . 28. Ibid., Chapter 2. 29 . For example, conformity on all criteria, except for the worship of images, would not get in the way of recognition for spiritual purposes, as it would be recognized that this is an expression of a religious language, particular to Hindus, a language that Jews don’t speak. Jews would take internal distance from the worship of images, but might be able to bracket such internal reservation, while remaining open to the overall spiritual testimony of a given Hinduism. Similarly, worship of a guru , even though it may go against the grain of Jewish sensibilities, may be accommodated as part of the religious path of Hinduism, without necessarily impeding possibilities for spiritual sharing and learning. Ability to tolerate deviation from a single (or minimal number of) criterion also informs internal Jewish conversations on proper faith. See Rabad contra Maimonides, Laws of Repentance 3,7. 30 . Note the reference to the figure of Rabbi Bentov, see above, note 15. 31 . On Tantra, see chapter 10 , note 70. 32 . We recall the lessons drawn by Flug from the sheitel crisis. It is no more than an opportunity to study forgotten or uncommon laws. See chapter 3 , note 11.

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Index

Abraham (biblical figure), 27, 50–1, 59, Maimonides and, 42 239n27, 247n19 Meiri and, 45–6, 189, 193, 196–7 Adret, Rabbi Solomon ben Abraham, 68 Nachmanides and, 42–3, 59–80, 190–2 Advaita Vedanta, 14, 22, 210n23, 238n11, objectivity and, 192–3 238n17 other religions and, 29–31, 34 see also Vedanta otherness and, 28–9 American Academy of Religion, 14 prophets and, 34–5 angels religion as, 183–7 astrology and, 220n40 religious phenomenology and, 190 Avoda Zara and, 43, 47–50, 52, 61–8, 128 Shituf and, 44–5 dreams and, 244n53 see also idolatry; Shituf Gentiles and, 76, 222n56 Avraham, Michael, 235n59 Hinduism and, 151–3, 158–9, 241n13 Israel and, 66–8, 70 Berger, David, 121, 223n63, 233n36, Nachmanides and, 43, 61–2, 97, 152, 234n51, 234n53 169, 221n44, 241n11 Berkovitz, Rabbi Dov, 250n11 prayer and, 47, 152–3, 241n13 Bhagavad Gita, 121, 180, 236n75 role of, 68 bhakti movements, 169 Shituf and, 97 Bharati, Agehananda, 236n70 see also elohim Bhatt, Neelima Shukla, 209n21 Assman, Jan, 148–50, 154, 158, 160, Bible 233n34, 240n4, 242n31, 247n21 angels and, 61 astral bodies, 48, 53, 63, 65–6, 70, 74, 113, Avoda Zara and, 3, 25, 27–8, 41, 51, 53, 115, 140, 156, 191 60–2, 102, 143 astrology, 43, 64–6, 69–72, 118, 156–7, 175, Christianity and, 81 177 Deuteronomy, 52, 62, 64–5, 67, 69, 71, 95 Atmapriyananda, Swami, 14 Exodus, 70, 140–1, 205, 214n11, 219n16, Aurobindo, 249n8 219n30, 246n8, 249n7 Avoda Zara God/gods and, 61, 67, 70–1, 108, 110–12, attitudes toward, 36–9 128–9, 162–3, 176–7, 188 definition of, 188–9 Hinduism and, 131, 137–8, 141, 143 delegitimation and, 33–5 idolatry and, 35–7, 116–17, 199 determining, 194–6, 200 imagination and, 162 diplomacy and, 197–200 Judaism and, 30, 34–5, 41 evolution of term, 27–8 Leviticus, 61, 112, 218n14 factors to consider, 200–1 monarchy and, 153 gurus and, 189–90 monotheism and, 147–8 identity and, 29 Bleich, David, 233n36 levels of, 62–6 Blidstein, Gerald, 114 260 INDEX

Boyarin, Daniel, 224n1, 241n12 dharma, 121, 236n75 Brahman, 22, 72, 83–4, 89, 95, 123–4, 136–7, diaspora, 38 152, 159–60, 168, 177, 239n27, 246n15 Donner, Rabbi, 18, 21 see also Hindu deities dreams, 160, 244n53 Brill, Alan, 207n1, 210n25, 235n58 dynamism, Hindu imagery and, 178, 206 Brodman, Rabbi David, 221n48 Broyde, Michael, 247n2, 249n4 Eck, Diana, 162 Buddhism, 74, 84, 88–91, 208n9, 227n26, Elijah Interfaith Institute, 11, 13–15 249n8 Elman, Yaakov, 231n10 Bunem, Rabbi Simcha, 167 elohim, 61, 63, 65, 67–8, 70, 76, 136, 219n30, 223n61, 238n12, 238n18 Carman, John, 210n23 Elyashiv, Rabbi Yosef Shalom, 18–19, caste system, 120, 181 207n2, 208n7 Chaitanya, 14 embodiment Chandra Swami, 148–50, 202 astral bodies and, 65 Chazon Ish, 170, 229n18–19, 245n63–5 Divine, 129–30, 175–7 see also Karelitz, Rabbi Abraham Isaiah Hinduism and, 176 Chidananda, Swami, 153, 221n48 idolatry and, 175 Chief Rabbinate, 197, 211n28 Emden, Rabbi Yakov, 95–7 Christianity Esther (biblical figure), 102 Avoda Zara and, 25–6, 29–30, 38, 44, exclusivism, 180, 222n55 55–7, 196 Exodus, Book of, 70, 140–1, 205, 214n11, God and, 30, 95–8, 101, 104, 157–8 219n16, 219n30, 246n8, 249n7 idolatry and, 37, 153–5, 202 Ezekiel (biblical figure), 153–4, 229n21 Judaism and, 38, 107–8, 153–6, 176 Maimonides and, 42, 55–7 Feinstein, Rabbi Moshe, 213n2, 216n11, Meiri and, 45, 108–10, 113, 116–17, 119, 237n9 124, 126–7, 156, 189 Fleming, Benjamin, 208n4 Nachmanides and, 43, 80 Flug, Joshua, 208n11, 210n22, 251n32 Rabbi Herzog and, 196 Flusser, David, 239n27 “same God” and, 131–5, 138–43, 145, fortune telling, 193 168, 194 Fuller, Christopher, 241n15 Shituf and, 44, 81–3, 86–91, 95–8, 152, 169, 186 Ganesha, 159–61, 169 Trinity, 56, 84, 86, 89, 116, 142, 158, 176, see also Hindu deities 224n3 Gaudiya Vaishnavism, 161 see also Jesus Genesis, Book of, 61, 167 colonialism, 122, 240n27 Glicksberg, Rabbi Shlomo, 225n7 covenant, Judaism and, 27–9, 43, 59–60, God 66–7, 70, 99–101, 103–5, 110, 188 Abraham and, 51 see also Israel approaches to, 84–6 astral bodies and, 63–5 Dabru Emet, 133, 225n8 Avoda Zara and, 21–2, 28–30, 42–4, Dayananda, Swami, 240n1 49–51, 63, 68–9, 110–11 delegitimation, 6, 25, 33–5, 38–9, 128, 211n1 Bible and, 61, 67, 70–1, 108, 110–12, Deuteronomy, Book of, 52, 62, 64–5, 67, 128–9, 162–3, 176–7, 188 69, 71, 95 Christianity and, 30, 81–4, 95–8, 101, devadasis, 235n62 104, 117, 157–8 devas, 151–2, 241n13 false prophecy and, 49–50 Devi, 159 form and, 77–8 INDEX 261

Hinduism and, 9–10, 14, 38–9, 72–7, 84, gods/goddesses, 158–60 147–53, 156–8 Hanuman, 159 identity and, 21, 29 holy persons/saints, 153–8 idolatry and, 48–50, 173–80 Judaism and, 162–6 Israel and, 27–8, 43, 66–71, 76, 86, 97, Krishna, 73, 89, 105, 148–9, 155, 159, 99, 137, 139, 167 161, 169, 171, 243n35 Kabbalah and, 47 meditation and, 148 Maimonides and, 54–6, 78–9, 164–5 Meiri and, 170–1 Meiri and, 108–10, 114–16 monotheism and, 148–9 morality and, 110–12, 121–2 natural forces and, 151–3 Nachmanides and, 59–63, 76–8, 188 overview, 147–8 prayer and, 165, 233n48 prayers to, 148–50 prophecy and, 162–3, 165–6 religious imagination and, 162–70 Rabbi Steinsaltz on, 86–9 “same God” and, 150–1, 160 religion and, 113–14 translation and, 16 religious imagination and, 129, 164–8 Vishnu, 77, 159–61, 238n11, 238n17, Shituf and, 45, 83, 93–106 243n34? spirituality and, 9 see also Hinduism ubiquity of, 77 Hinduism worship and, 51, 74–5, 112–16 angels and, 151–3, 158–9, 241n13 see also “same God” concept; Trinity Bible and, 131, 137–8, 141, 143 Greenberg, Moshe, 213n4, 229n21 embodiment and, 176 Greenstein, Edward, 231n13 Israel and, 13, 26, 38, 83, 120, 155 gurus, 45, 72, 101, 103, 121, 189–90, 201, Meiri, Rabbi Menachem and, 120–6 251n29 prayer and, 77–8, 148–50, 221n48 prophecy and, 176 halacha, 19, 30, 87, 90, 93, 186–7, 190, 192, “same God” concept and, 135–6 194, 220n42, 249n4, 250n19 Shituf and, 88–91, 97, 101–2 Halbertal, Moshe, 109, 211n4, 217n2, Torah and, 112–14, 118–20 231n8, 233n30, 234n49, 236n73 see also Hindu deities Halevy, Rabbi Aharon, 166, 208n13 Hanuman, 159 Ibn Ezra, Abraham, 209n13, 235n60 Hassidic Judaism, 18–19, 79, 164, 166–7, idolatry 171, 178, 205, 208n9, 221n48 Bible and, 35–7, 116–17, 199 Hefter, Rabbi Herzel, 130, 178–9, 206, Christianity and, 37, 153–5, 202 246n18 drowning/immersion, 174–5 Heim, Mark, 250n18 embodiment and, 175 Herford, R. Travers, 224n1 Israel and, 51 Herzog, Rabbi Isaac, 83–4, 142, 151, 169, Maimonides on, 48–50 196, 227n3, 231n14, 247n2, 248n4 Meiri on, 111–12, 116–17 Heschel, A. J., 236n1 prophecy and, 34–7, 48–9, 60, 117 Hindu deities Torah and, 112, 178, 251n25 abstraction and, 160–2 see also Avoda Zara Brahman, 22, 72, 83–4, 89, 95, 123–4, intermediaries, 42, 52–4, 76–8, 95, 98, 104, 136–7, 152, 159–60, 168, 177, 239n27, 188, 213n4, 222n54, 223n59, 228n8 246n15 see also angels categories of, 151 Isaac (biblical figure), 85 Chazon Ish and, 169–70 ishta devata, 169 Devi, 159 Islam, 29–30, 41, 45, 83, 86, 88–9, 108–9, Ganesha, 159–61, 169 119, 121–2, 126, 152, 186, 195 262 INDEX

Israel Madhavacharya, 14 astrology and, 118 magic, 126, 168, 193, 232n19, 250n20 Avoda Zara and, 59–71, 82–3, 110, 188, 196 Maimonides biblical, 51, 59–61, 154 Avoda Zara and, 42–5, 107, 187–8, 195 covenant and, 110 Christianity and, 82, 186 God and, 27–8, 43, 66–71, 76, 86, 97, 99, God and, 78–9, 164–5 137, 139, 167 on identity, 50–2 Hinduism and, 13, 26, 38, 83, 120, 155 on idolatry, 48–5 idolatry and, 51 Laws of Avoda Zara, 47–53 law and, 85 Meiri and, 114, 116 monotheism and, 154, 176 Nachmanides, 59–60, 62–4, 70, 72, 76, 78 Nation of, 196–7 on prophecy, 49–50 nature and, 151 on religious imagery, 52–3 neighbors, 154, 176 “same God” and, 133–6, 145 other religions and, 86, 90, 97, 118–20, 154 Shituf and, 82–3, 85–7, 95–6 revelation and, 114 Mark, Zvi, 244n52 “same God” and, 137, 139–41 Marks, Richard, 209n13, 219n24, 235n60, Shituf and, 97, 99–101, 105 238n18 see also covenant, Judaism and Meiri, Rabbi Menachem, 45–6, 87 Avoda Zara and, 108, 110–14, 118–20 Jesus, 45, 56, 82, 94, 98, 101–2, 105, 138, Christianity and, 108–9 142, 154–7, 169 on God, 114–16 see also Christianity on Godlessness, 112 Hinduism and, 120–6 Kabbalah, 30, 47, 56, 126, 137, 152, 161 on idolatry, 111–12, 116–17 Karelitz, Rabbi Abraham Isaiah, 170 Maimonides and, 114, 116 see also Chazon Ish morality and, 109–10 Katz, Jacob, 224n2, 231n6 on religion, 112–14, 117–18 Katz, Nathan, 227n33, 234n41, 234n52 on theology, 115–17 Kaufmann, Yehezkel, 213n4, 214n9 miracles, 67, 127, 140–1 Kavana, 192 monotheism, 51, 56, 84–6, 88–91, 94–5, 109, Koifman, Zipi, 250n19 116, 147–9, 154, 158, 160, 176–8, 180 Kook, Rabbi Abraham Isaac, 79, 230n28, mysticism, 55, 128, 136, 141, 151–2, 162–4, 247n19 201, 236n71, 240n30 Korn, Eugene, 213n1, 217n16, 226n21, 239n23 Nachman of Breslav, 165–6 Krajewski, Stanislaw, 215n13, 231n10 Nachmanides Krishna, 73, 89, 105, 148–9, 155, 159, 161, applying teachings to modern Judaism, 169, 171, 243n35 72–80 see also Hindu deities Avoda Zara and, 42–4, 59–60, 191 kumari, 210n25, 229n24 on “bonding” of religious life, 191 on God, 76–8, 188 Lasker, Daniel, 226n21 Hinduism and, 70–80 Latour, Bruno, 246n18 idolatry and, 60–1 Leiner, Rabbi Mordechai Yosef, 205–6 intermediaries and, 76–7, 152, 169 Leshem, Zvi, 244n48 Israel and, 67–8 Levine, Amy Jill, 214n11 on jealousy, 60–2 Leviticus, Book of, 61, 112, 218n14 levels of Avoda Zara, 62–6 Lorberbaum, Yair, 157 Maimonides and, 59–60, 62–4, 70, 72, Lubavitch movement, 18–19, 79, 229n22 76, 78 INDEX 263

Meiri and, 191 Ramakrishna Order, 15 Rashba and, 68–70 Ramanuja, 14, 22–3, 210n23, 238n11, “same God” and, 136–7 238n13 Shituf and, 95–8, 101, 107, 128, 138 Rashba, 68–70, 80, 97, 136, 136, 218n15, ten commandments and, 66–7 220n40–1, 221n46, 223n62, 242n20 worship and, 152, 156–7 Rashi, 61, 79 Nanak, Guru, 73, 121 Reiser, Daniel, 243n43 Novak, David, 227n33, 229n23, 231n11, revelation, 36, 52, 114, 124, 127, 134, 237n10 141–2, 178, 233n32, 235n60, 236n75, 237n9 Ochs, Peter, 11 see also prophets/prophecy Orthodox Judaism, 1, 5, 17–19, 33, 38, 178 Rivkes, Rabbi Moshe, 140–1 Osho see Rajneesh Saadiah Gaon, 235n63, 249n4 otherness, 12, 21, 25, 27–30, 33, 54–5, 57, Sacks, Rabbi Jonathan, 247n2 128–9, 143, 150, 160–2, 173, 175, 186, sacrifice, 47–50, 65, 125 188, 197, 202–3 saints, 77, 93, 101–4, 125, 142, 144, 169, 189, 222n57, 225n11, 229n17 paganism, 109, 119, 153–4, 196 “same God” concept Pettit, Peter, 215n11 Avoda Zara and, 133–5 prayer Christianity and, 139–42 angels and, 47, 152–3, 241n13 creation and, 138–41 Avoda Zara and, 217n11, 225n7, 248n3 Hinduism and, 135–6 Christianity and, 246n3 Maimonides and, 133–6, 145 God and, 165, 233n48 Meiri and, 143–5 Hinduism and, 77–8, 148–50, 221n48 Nachmanides and, 136–7 non-Jews and, 237n9 Rabbi Herzog and, 142 religious imagination and, 244n49 Shituf and, 138, 141–2 “same God” and, 140 Sperber and, 142–3 prophets/prophecy Steinsaltz and, 142 Avoda Zara and, 51–2, 55, 69, 176, 194 theology and, 137–40 divinity and, 48 Tosafot and, 138–9 Ezekiel and, 153 view of other religions and, 132–3 false prophecy, 49–50 Schafer, Peter, 224n1 God and, 162–3, 165–6 Schapiro, Rabbi Kalonymous Kalman, 165, Hinduism and, 176 244n48–9 idolatry and, 34–7, 48–9, 60, 117 Schwartz, Dov, 221n45, 222n54 Maimonides and, 55 Separate Intelligences, 63–4, 156, 223n62 Meiri and, 117 Shankar, Sri Sri Ravi, 14, 122, 174 Nachmanides and, 60 Shankara, 22, 135 Rebbe and, 19 Shapiro, Marc, 212n11 religion and, 48–9, 155 sheitel crisis see also revelation attitudes and, 33, 36, 38 Purim, 102 Avoda Zara and, 17–24, 33, 42, 56 controversy over, 18–21 Rabad, 164–5, 230n28, 247n19 explained, 17 Rabbenu Tam, 82 otherness and, 197 Rajneesh, 102, 200–1 ritual and, 21–2 Rama, 148, 155, 159, 169, 243n35 Torah and, 18 see also Hindu deities tradition and, 18 264 INDEX

Shirdi Sai Baba, 73 Stern, Sacha, 211n5, 224n1, 239n21 Shituf Sugunendra Theerta Swami, 174–5, angels and, 97 229n26 Avoda Zara and, 44–5 Swaminarayan, 121 Christianity and, 44, 81–3, 86–91, 95–9, 152, 169, 186 Talmud, 84, 99, 109–10, 116, 118–19, complex nature of, 93–4 212n10, 224n1 divinity and, 102–3 Tantra, 122, 201, 236n70–1 explained, 83 Tikkun, 122 halachic thought and, 94–5 Tillich, Paul, 178 halakhah and, 85 Tirupati, 17–20, 22–3, 29, 197 Herzog on, 83–4 tolerance, 44, 70, 82, 84, 86, 90–1, Hinduism and, 88–91, 97, 101–2 107–8, 116, 130, 135, 171, 173, identity and, 99–101 180–1 Israel and, 97, 99–101, 105 Torah Jews vs. Gentiles and, 99–101, 104–6 Avoda Zara and, 52, 63–4, 66, 69, Judaism and, 83–7 118–19, 193 Maimonides and, 82–3, 85–7, 95–6 commandments, 86, 235n60 practice of, 99–100 creation and, 139 religion and, 87–91 fixity and, 206 “same God” concept and, 138, 141–2 Herzog and, 83 Steinsaltz on, 84–91 Hinduism and, 112–14, 118–20 Torah and, 45, 83, 86 idolatry and, 112, 178, 251n25 Sikhism, 121 Maimonides and, 134 Siva, 89, 149, 159–61, 169, 171 Meiri and, 112–14, 118, 232n25 see also Hindu deities Nachmanides and, 42, 59–60, 63–4, 66 Sivananda, Swami, 13, 77, 221n48 prophecy and, 49 Smith, Mark, 158, 242n28, 242n31, religion and, 118, 232n25 247n21 ritual and, 21 Soloveitchik, Haym, 230n3 “same God” and, 134, 139–40 Sommer, Ben, 176–7 sheitel and, 18 Soneji, Davesh, 235n62 Shituf and, 45, 83, 86 Sperber, Daniel, 142, 198, 207n1, 208n8, Tosafot, 82, 93–5, 97, 138–42, 170, 239n21, 209n19, 210n22, 210n28, 216n6, 240n28, 242n21, 245n64 240n1, 241n13, 248n3, 249n5 Trinity, 56, 84, 86, 89, 116, 142, 158, 176, stasis, idolatry and, 130 224n3 Steinsaltz, Rabbi Adin see also Christianity Avoda Zara and, 89–91, 223n64, 227n33 unity, Divine and, 6, 22, 73, 76, 89, 94, on changing relationship between Jews 96, 116–17, 123–4, 147–8, 163–4, and non-Jews, 84–6 199 on God, 86–7 Upanishads, 23, 136–7, 239n27 Indian religions and, 88–9, 226n26, Urbach, E. E., 232n15 227n29 on Jewish law, 85, 87 van der Toorn, K., 209n18 Meiri and, 107, 230n2 Vedanta, 14, 23, 74–5, 89–90, 123, 126, on religion, 87–8, 226n20 153, 159, 179–80 Shituf and, 84–91, 142, 229n25 Venkateshwara temple, 17 on tolerance, 86, 173, 228n7, 249n5 Vijayananda, Swami, 202, 228n15 INDEX 265

Vishishtadvaita, 22 Yoga Sivananda, 100 Volf, Miroslav, 236n1 Yogaswaroopananda, Swami, 14, 23, 179 White, David Gordon, 236n70 Yosef, Rabbi Ovadiah, 216n11, 239n24, wigs, 1, 5, 10, 17–20, 24, 29, 33, 199 248n4 see also sheitel crisis Wolfson, Elliot, 164, 244n45, 245n58 Zalman, Rabbi Shneur, 79 Wolpe, Rabbi Shalom Dov, 19 Zimmer, Heinrich, 178, 246n18