• Abstract and Figures
• Public Full-text

71-27,633 NAIMI, Mohammed Omar, 1927- DECISION-MAKING IN THE DISRAELI GOVERNMENT IN REGARD TO ARMED INTERVENTION IN AFGHANISTAN: AN ANALYTICAL APPROACH. The University of Oklahoma, Ph.D., 1971 Political Science, international law and relations University Microfilms, A XEROX Company, Ann Arbor, Michigan THE UNIVERSITY OF OKLAHOMA GRADUATE COLLEGE DECISION-MAKING IN THE DISRAELI GOVERNMENT IN REGARD TO ARMED INTERVENTION IN AFGHANISTAN: AN ANALYTICAL APPROACH A DISSERTATION Su b m i t t e d t o t h e g r a d u a t e f a c u l t y in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY BY M. OMAR NAIMI Norman, Oklahoma 1971 DECISION-MAKING IN THE DISRAELI GOVERNMENT IN REGARD TO ARMED INTERVENTION IN AFGHANISTAN; AN ANALYTICAL APPROACH APPROVED BY </7- 1/ V DISSERTATION COMMITTEE \ TABLE OF CONTENTS ACKNOWLEDGMENTS...................................... iv LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS.................................. vii Chapter I. INTRODUCTION ................................ 1 II. THE HISTORICAL SETTING ...................... 12 III. ORGANIZATIONAL S E T T I N G ...................... 35 IV. THE ACTORS .................................. 61 V. THE DECISION .................................. 108 VI. DETERMINAÎÏTS OF DECISION; COmUNICATION AND INFORMATION..................................... 168 VII. DETERMINANTS OF DECISION: MOTIVATION ......... 199 VIII. DETERMINANTS OF DECISION: CAPABILITY ......... 245 IX. ANALYSIS OF THE SITUATION ..................... 26 8 X. CONCLUSION .................................... 305 GLOSSARY ............................................... 331 BIBLIOGRAPHY ........................................ 333 111 ACKNOWLEDGMENT S The writer wishes to acknowledge that without the help and encouragement of others, this work would not have been completed. The writer is especially indebted to Dr. Rufus G. Hall, Jr., Professor of Political Science at the University of Oklahoma, who served both as his advisor and chairman of his committee. Dr. Hall's guidance, assistance, and encouragement greatly helped the writer to pursue his studies to completion. Special thanks are due Dr. Hall for the many hours he spent in reviewing this work in its intermediate and final stages. His suggestions and corrections were invaluable, and largely responsible for the improved content of this study. However, the writer assumes responsibility for any errors and defects that may still remain in the work. Dr. Hall's courtesy, patience, wisdom, and scholarly attitude have been a great source of inspiration to the writer. Grateful acknowledgment is also due to Dr. Oliver E. Benson, Professor of Political Science and Director of the Bureau of Government Research at the University of Oklahoma, who took time from his busy schedule to serve on the Dissertation Committee. His assistance and suggestions iv / V in the early stages of this work greatly helped to simplify and clarify the method and approach being used. His advice helped the writer to avoid certain pitfalls, and at the same time, led to a more cohesive study. The writer's appreciation is also extended to Dr. Percy W. Buchanan, Professor of History at the University of Oklahoma. The writer's association with Dr. Buchanan throughout the years of his graduate study at the University of Oklahoma has been most rewarding. Dr. Buchanan has always been very helpful and encouraging, and his knowledge of Asian history has served to give the writer new insights. Dr. Buchanan's suggestions concerning this work have been most helpful. A word of thanks is also due to Dr. Paul Tharp, Professor of Political Science at the University of Oklahoma, for his time and patience in reading the dis­ sertation and his comments and suggestions, which aided the writer in revising and clarifying certain points. Another note of thanks is extended to Dr. Stanley Vardys, Professor of Political Science at the University of Oklahoma, who graciously consented to serve on the Dissertation Committee. His time and effort spent on this committee are highly appreciated. The writer also wishes to thank Mr. William Mettinet, Professor of Geography at Eastern New Mexico University, for his assistance in preparing the map of ) VI Afghanistan and the surrounding areas for this study. This is a great help in locating the many places, not commonly known, which are mentioned in and important to the study. The writer also wishes to extend his sincere thanks and appreciation to his wife Pat for the invaluable help and assistance she furnished during the many tedious and long hours when this work was taking shape. The many hours she spent at the typewriter and the help she furnished in correcting and proof-reading greatly facilitated the completion of this work. Without her encouragement and prodding, this work was to remain undone, and perhaps even sterile. LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS Figure Page 1. Map of Afghanistan............................ viii 2. Contribution of the Determinants of Decision to the Actor's View of the Situation .......... 270 VI 1 fTÔ Khiva URKISTAN Bokhara 40 Samarkand SINKIANG (C HINA) Merv* Method •Wokharf' B aikh • Mazar-I-Sharif BAOAI Herat JAMMU and PERSIA KABUL Jalalabad All Masjid KASHMIR Dakka'jtWomrud ^ «Reshmor • Srinagar • • • KHYBER y \ PASS I Katot» Kandahar . SEIS 3a ,P UIVJ A Simla Ludianoh Quetto '^eOLAN PASS •S\bi Kalot BALUCHISTAN (INDIA) AFGHANISTAN (PAKISTAN) RAJ PUTANA 25 loo 20> 4 RABIAN SEA CHAPTER I INTRODUCTION In the decade of the 1870s Britain was faced with the problem of what policy to pursue towards her neighbor, Afghanistan, on British India's Northwest frontier. The problem arose as a result of Russian expansion in Central Asia, and was further aggravated by Russia's war with Turkey which for a time threatened to precipitate war between England and Russia. The question of what type of policy to have towards a neutral country in danger of going under the domination of an opposing power faced Britain in her relations with Afghanistan at this period. However, this question is still a very pertinent one today. In fact it is such situations that pose a threat to world peace, rather than the possibility of a direct confrontation between the major powers. There are enough similarities between the position in which Britain found herself in relation to Afghanistan, and the situation in which the United States now finds herself in relation to small neutral countries threatened by political and/or military 1 2 aggression, that it is hoped some of the points brought out by this study may be of some use in analyzing the current situation. The decision of the British Government to enter upon a war with Afghanistan had far-reaching effects, for it not only contributed to financial difficulties in India, but it led to such a protestation on moral grounds that the support of the Conservative Government was greatly undermined. Gladstone made much of what was termed, by supposedly impartial reporters in the Annual Register, "a very wanton and a very wicked war."^ The defeat of the Conservative Government in the general election of 1880 was due in no small degree to the disastrous results of the Afghan policy. Objectives The purpose of this study is to discover just how the decision to declare war upon Afghanistan in November of 1878 was arrived at by the British Government. In doing this, the study hopes to answer such questions as: who was responsible for the formulation of British policy towards Afghanistan? What motivated that policy? Was sufficient information available for making a sound ^Annual Register, 1878 (London: Longmans and Co., 1879), CXX, 194. 3 decision? Where was the decision made, and who was responsible for it? In addition, it is hoped that certain hypotheses may be drawn concerning the decision-making process in general which may be of some value when applied to the study of other foreign policy decisions. Establishing the validity of such hypotheses will depend on many more research projects of this type being undertaken which utilize the decision-making approach, but perhaps the present study may make some contribution in the direction of helping establish certain data regarding the nature of decisions and decision-making. Approach The approach being used in this study is basically the decision-making approach as set forth by Richard C. Snyder, H. W. Bruck, and Burton Sapin, in their book, p Foreign Policy Decision-Making. Glenn D. Paige's The O Korean Decision, has also been used as a further guideline, This approach has been modified somewhat, and combined with certain aspects of the historical approach, such as ^Richard C. Snyder, H. W. Bruck, and Burton Sapin, Foreign Policy Decision-Making (New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1952). ^Glenn D. Paige, The Korean Decision (New York: The Free Press, 1968). 4 providing historical background of the decision in order to better suit the case at hand. The mere fact that the decision was made almost ninety-three years ago necessi­ tates providing some information pertaining to the back­ ground and environment in which the decision took place, in order to make it comprehensible. The Snyder-Bruck-Sapin approach is essentially an ordering device. In developing their approach these three gentlemen believe that an understanding of all States is to be founded on an understanding of any one State through the use of a scheme which will permit the analytical con­ struction of properties of action which are shared in common by all specific States. They reject the assumption that two different analytical schemes are required simply because two States behave differently. They approach State action from an Actor-Situation point of view, the Actors being those whose action is the action of the State, otherwise called decision-makers. The scheme is intended to provide certain advantages.. The frame of reference is designed to be more inclusive. The system provides for a limited number of categories for the phenomena of international relations, as well as for the identification of key variables which may explain State behavior. The focal point is shifted to the decision-maker, thus avoiding some of the problems of the objective- subjective dilemma.

Load more

  356

Copy Link