David A. Wallsh ______
EDUCATION
The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University Medford, MA PhD in International Relations May 2018 Field Exams: International Security Studies, Middle East Studies Dissertation: Switching Sides: Foreign Policy Realignment in Syria and Egypt MA in Law and Diplomacy May 2011
Hebrew University of Jerusalem Jerusalem MA in Islamic and Middle East Studies August 2009 Honors: 4.0 GPA, summa cum laude
University of Florida Gainesville, FL BA in Political Science May 2005 Study Abroad in Prague, Ice Hockey Team
PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE
Center for Naval Analyses Arlington, VA Research Analyst, Center for Strategic Studies 2017-present • Conduct analyses of international security issues including regional political-military dynamics, irregular warfare, and international security cooperation, among other topics.
Department of Defense, Office of the Secretary of Defense for Policy (Middle East) Washington, DC Expert Advisor on Counter-ISIL Strategy / Jordan Policy Director 2014-2016 Expert Advisor on Israeli-Palestinian Security 2013-2014 • Advised the Secretary of Defense and Office of the Secretary of Defense for Policy (OSD Policy) leadership on matters relating to the Middle East security environment, including preparation for engagements with foreign counterparts and staffing U.S. leadership travel to the Middle East; • Managed multiple transnational initiatives involving regional security cooperation and security assistance; • Advised DoD leadership on communication strategies regarding official statements and speeches, Congressional testimonies, and press inquires; • Advised the Senior Advisor to the Secretary of Defense for Middle East Security on Israeli-Palestinian security matters in support of 2013-2014 Israeli-Palestinian negotiations.
Al-Nakhlah Online Journal on Southwest Asia and Islamic Civilization Medford, MA Co-Editor-in-Chief 2010-2011 • Managed policy-oriented research related to the Middle East and Islamic world.
Israel-Palestine Center for Research and Information Jerusalem Project Manager, Israeli-Palestinian Business Forum 2008 • Managed project aimed at mitigating conflict through joint bilateral commerce; Co-authored a 90-page business guide to help local businesses manage risk while conducting cross-border trade.
Acknowledgments This dissertation is the product of the support of many individuals and institutions. I would first like to thank my dissertation committee, Professors Robert Pfaltzgraff, Richard Shultz, and Malik Mufti, for their time, guidance, and expertise. In addition to fostering my intellectual development, my advisors provided invaluable flexibility during a three-year period in which I left campus in order to serve in government, and I am indebted to their patience. I would also like to recognize Professors Andrew Hess and Bill Martel for their mentorship during my time at Fletcher, as well as Ph.D. Program Director Jenifer Burcket- Picker for helping me to navigate this program through her sustained support and encouragement. I am equally fortunate to have received the financial support of many generous institutions. Thank you to the Fletcher School and the Fletcher School Ph.D. Program, the Eisenhower Institute at Gettysburg College (Eisenhower-Roberts Fellowship), The Lynde and Harry Bradley Foundation (Bradley Foundation Fellowship), the Fares Center for Mediterranean Studies (Dissertation Fellowship), and both the International Security Studies Program at Fletcher and the Sarah Scaife Memorial Grant in International Security. Lastly, I would be remiss if I did not also thank the librarians at Tufts University’s Tisch Library and the Fletcher School’s Ginn Library for their consistently reliable and friendly assistance and for cancelling not a few overdue book fines over the years. My tour-de-horizon of the Fletcher School would not be complete, however, without mention of the friends and colleagues with whom I shared countless brainstorming sessions, presentation dry runs, and fun times. To Mike Baskin, Matt Herbert, Nick Kenney, David Knoll, Barbara Ramos, and Ivan Rasmussen, thank you for your friendship. During my final year of graduate school I had the great fortune to hole up in a Delaware bungalo and concentrate on my writing. For that opportunity I am deeply grateful to my mother- and father-in-law, Nina and Sol, for granting use of their home for this adventure. My in-laws’ support, generosity, and willingness to engage in foreign policy discussion know few bounds, and I count my lucky stars that my amazing wife happens to come from an amazing family. In addition, I would like to express my appreciation to Ms. Margaret Melson at the local public library for helping me to take full advantage of Delaware’s interlibrary loan system. To my parents, Richard and Harriet Wallsh, simply put, I could not have reached this milestone without your love and inspiration. My parents have have nourished my interest in the world, instilled in me the values of service and seeking to make the world a better place, and encouraged me in my pursuits, and it is to them that I dedicate this dissertation. Finally, it would be impossible to capture the words to fully convey my love and indebtedness to my wife, Tamar, who stood by my side my throughout this process, encouraging, reassuring, and ultimately driving me to the finish line. Tamar more than any other bore the brunt of the sacrifices involved in writing a dissertation, and I am blessed to have her in my life.
Dedicated to my parents, Richard and Harriet Wallsh
Switching Sides: Foreign Policy Realignment in Egypt and Syria, 1970-2000
David Wallsh
Dissertation in support of requirements for Doctor of Philosophy (PhD) in International Relations at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University
Advisor Committee:
Dr. Robert Pfatlzgraff, Shelby Cullom Davis Professor of International Security Studies (Chair) Dr. Richard Shultz, Lee E. Dirks Professor and Director, International Security Studies Program Dr. Malik Mufti, Professor, Tufts University Department of Political Science
Table of Contents
INTRODUCTION 1
PART I: EGYPTIAN AND SYRIAN FOREIGN POLICY DIVERGENCE IN THE 1970S 20
CHAPTER 2: EGYPTIAN FOREIGN POLICY REALIGNMENT (1970-1979) 23
CHAPTER 3: SYRIAN FOREIGN POLICY NON-REALIGNMENT (1970-1979) 48
PART II: SYRIAN NON-REALIGNMENT FROM IRAN 80
CHAPTER 4: SYRIAN FOREIGN POLICY NON-REALIGNMENT (1985-1989) 80
CHAPTER 5: SYRIAN FOREIGN POLICY NON-REALIGNMENT (1991-2000) 105
CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSIONS 126
BIBLIOGRAPHY 134
Chapter 1: Introduction
Why do states realign their foreign policies between competing adversarial blocs? In other words, why do they “switch sides”? Such “Brutus-like betrayals”1 may be rare but, when they occur, are nevertheless some of the most important phenomena in international politics. For example, Egypt’s realignment in the 1970s from Soviet client state to American partner has served as a cornerstone of U.S. Middle East security strategy for approximately forty years. Syria’s durable alignments with Moscow for most of that period and later with Iran, in contrast, stand as a longstanding challenge to the United States and to many of its regional allies. The primary research questions driving this study are: Why did Egypt and Syria adopt such dramatically different foreign policy trajectories following the 1973 Arab-Israeli War? And why, in a region known for its constantly shifting alliances, did Syria’s alignment preferences largely persist throughout Hafiz al-Asad’s thirty-year presidency from 1970 to 2000. Indeed, if the decades after post-colonial independence and leading up to 1973 war witnessed the overlap of Egyptian and Syrian foreign policy interests, the mid-1970s stands out as the period during which these interests dramatically diverge. Underlying this question is a more general theoretical inquiry into why states realign their foreign policies between adversarial poles, a phenomenon that is crucial to understanding international politics beyond any one time or space. As one Chinese scholar recently wrote, “the core of competition between China and the United States will be to see who has more high-quality friends.”2 As such, I examine multiple cases of Egyptian and Syrian realignment decision-making in order to glean theoretical insights regarding this behavior. This introductory chapter proceeds as follows. The first section explains why the divergence of Egyptian and Syrian foreign policy in the 1970s is so perplexing in light of both the historical record and international relations theory. I then define and discuss key concepts of this study before providing an overview of the relevant theoretical literature. The subsequent research design section is comprised of many parts. I open with a discussion of my theoretical argument and propose three hypotheses for testing. Following that, I provide a detailed explanation of my case selection before concluding with a discussion of my research methodology.
The Puzzle
Both the historical and theoretical literature suggests that the divergence of Egyptian and Syrian foreign policies in the 1970s is a puzzle that merits explanation. For one reason, the two countries share a history of common foreign policy interests. Both adhered to a doctrine
1 Timothy Crawford, “Preventing Enemy Coalitions,” International Security 35, no. 4 (Spring 2011): 165. 2 Xuetong Yan, “How China Can Defeat America,” The New York Times, November 20, 2011.
1 of Arab neutrality after independence3 and, in fact, united as one country in the form of the United Arab Republic from 1958-1961.4 Soon after, Egypt and Syria both lost large swaths of strategic territory to Israel in the June 1967 Arab-Israeli War and, after joining forces to regain the Sinai Peninsula and Golan Heights, respectively, made modest gains in the 1973 Arab-Israeli War before ultimately losing more territory to Israel. For most of the 1960s and early 1970s, both Cairo and Damascus leaned toward Moscow as their superpower patron. Domestically, too, Egypt and Syria shared a number of similarities. Both were authoritarian, presidential political systems led by Arab nationalist revolutionary movements. In 1970, each country was led by a military man who assumed power in the fall of that year. While Cairo and Damascus were not without their differences, both Anwar Sadat and Hafiz al-Asad rose to power amid modest levels of support but not insignificant domestic vulnerabilities against which they would need to balance. The importance of explaining the “non-event” of Syrian non-realignment is all the more apparent in light of the trend toward realignment in the region after the 1973 war. Since 1973, Egypt and the Palestinian Liberation Organization have abandoned hostility toward the West. Jordan, for its part, has long enjoyed a pro-Western foreign policy. Why does Syria stand apart? Posed another way, the alliance theory literature places considerable emphasis on the role of internal and external threats as drivers of balancing alliances. Yet at different points in the mid to late 20th century Hafiz al-Asad, Anwar Sadat, Jordan’s King Hussein, and Yasir Arafat each faced external threats from Israel and others in the region, as well as internal threats to leadership over their respective constituencies. Why did Hafiz al- Asad’s balancing act differ so markedly from those of his counterparts? It is worth highlighting that, since the 1980s, Iran’s Western and regional adversaries have committed significant resources toward the aim of driving a wedge between Damascus and Tehran. American proponents of affecting Syria’s strategic realignment include such leading foreign policy luminaries as the former Secretary of State James Baker, former National Security Advisors Brent Scowcroft and Zbigniew Brzezinski, Council on Foreign Relations President Richard Haass, and Brookings Institution Executive Vice President and former U.S. Ambassador to Israel Martin S. Indyk, not to mention senior leaders in Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Israel, among many others.5 In a 2009 Foreign Affairs essay, for example, Richard Haas and Martin Indyk write,
Syria is the principal conduit for Iran’s influence in Lebanon and the Palestinian territories. Israeli- Syrian negotiations threaten to sever these ties. Drawing Syria away from Iran would also deprive Tehran and its Hamas and Hezbollah proxies of a critical ally. Such a strategic realignment would weaken Iran’s influence in the region, reduce external support for both Hamas and Hezbollah, and improve the prospects for stability in Lebanon.6
3 Rami Ginat, Syria and the Doctrine of Arab Neutralism: From Independence to Dependence (Eastborne: Sussex Academic Press, 2005); Hrair Dekmejian, Egypt under Nasir: A Study in Political Dynamics (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1971). 4 For one account of the formation of this union, see Malcolm Kerr, The Arab Cold War, 1958-1964: A Study of Ideology in Politics (London: Oxford University Press, 1965). 5 Tony Badran, “Syriana,” Tablet, June 22, 2010. 6 Richard Haass and Martin Indyk, “Beyond Iraq: A New U.S. Strategy for the Middle East,” Foreign Affairs 88, no. 1 (January/February 2009): 41-58.
2 The policy aim has been so widespread for so long that one Washington think tank analyst wrote in 2010, “In the annals of ‘big policy ideas,’ perhaps none has had as much staying power in the face of a dismal track record than the seemingly perpetual conviction that integrating Syria into the pro-American order in the Middle East is a real, achievable possibility.”7 This dissertation ascribes no normative value to the success or failure of international efforts to drive a wedge between Syria and either of its allies in Moscow and Tehran. Nevertheless, with so much policy weight behind these goals for such a long period their persistent failure to materialize is striking.
Concepts and Definitions
Alliances and Alignment
Before defining the phenomenon of realignment, I distinguish between the two distinct concepts of alliance and alignment. An alliance is one type of alignment.8 Alliances involve a commitment between two or more entities for security cooperation against some third party. This definition does not require a formal agreement, such as a pact or treaty. Observers of Middle East politics note that cooperation between states in the region often results from some form of informal arrangement rather than any signed treaty. The concept of an alignment refers to a broader type of relationship. Whereas an alliance concerns security cooperation, an alignment refers to areas of international cooperation that might include but are not limited to issues of security. This dissertation accepts Curtis Ryan’s definition of alignment as “an informal relationship between two or more states, involving expectations of political and economic support that may include, but is not restricted to, security affairs.”9
Realignment
There is no widely accepted definition of realignment in the alliance literature, and scholars use the term in a variety of contexts. For many, it refers simply to any change in foreign policy regardless of magnitude or direction. This could range from adopting positions of neutrality, taking on new partners, trading one ally for another, or undertaking a massive restructuring of grand strategy from, say, isolationism to multilateralism.10 Some who do attempt to scope the concept of realignment look at the phenomenon exclusively through the lens of changes in a bilateral relationship. Take for example
7 Tony Badran, “Syriana,” Tablet, June 22, 2010. 8 Glenn Snyder, “Alliance Theory: A Neorealist First Cut,” Journal of International Affairs 44, no. 1 (1990): 105. 9 Curtis R. Ryan, Inter-Arab Alliances: Regime Security and Jordanian Foreign Policy (Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 2009): 5. 10 For some examples of different perspectives, see Kalevi Jaako Holsti, Why Nations Realign: Foreign Policy Restructuring in the Postwar World (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1982); Dankwart A. Rustow, “Realignments in the Middle East,” Foreign Affairs 63, no. 3 (1984).
3 examinations of the U.S.-Iranian relationship before and after Iran’s 1979 Islamic Revolution. Iran undoubtedly adopted a wholly new set of foreign policy preferences with respect to the United States after the Islamic Revolution, a development that has not unreasonably been described as a realignment in Iranian foreign policy.11 However, Iran’s “realignment” from a policy of partnership to one of hostility toward the United States is conceptually distinct from the outcome I examine in this study, which looks at realignment as a function of a given state’s relationships with both preexisting and prospective new allies. Iran notably did not realign from the United States and align itself with Washington’s chief Cold War adversary; rather, Moscow supported Iraq in the Iran-Iraq War, and Ayatollah Khomeini publicly declared Islam to be incompatible with communism.12 Timothy Crawford, in his treatment of “wedge strategies” that states employ to break up enemy coalitions, provides a useful taxonomy of foreign policy break-ups that helps to distinguish the outcome under investigation in this dissertation from similar but still distinct phenomena. Crawford identifies at least three alignment change outcomes relevant to this study: realignment, dealignment, and disalignment. He describes these outcomes as follows:
• Realignment: The outcome in which a state shifts allegiance from an adversarial to a friendly alliance.
• Dealignment: The outcome in which a state abandons an ally and adopts a neutral position between that ally and a given adversary.
• Disalignment: The outcome in which a state reduces its cooperation with an ally without fully defecting from it.13
I use the term realignment in the same manner as Crawford. My dissertation seeks to explain the phenomenon of realignment between adversarial poles. That is, the instance in which a state I call the potential switcher defects from a preexisting alliance bloc, which I term adversarial pole 1 (AP1), in order to join an alliance with a countervailing grouping identified as adversarial pole 2 (AP2). Realignment is the practice of switching sides.
Realignment as a Distinct Concept
It is also important to emphasize the differences between the concepts of realignment and alliance formation. The alliance formation literature typically does not differentiate between states that form an alliance from a neutral position and those that abandon a preexisting ally in order to join forces with a new partner. The distinction is critical. I argue that realignment between adversarial poles involves at least three variables that are not present in alliance formation from a position of neutrality. The first variable relates to reputation
11 See Ely Ratner, “Reaping What You Sow: Democratic Transitions and Foreign Policy Realignment,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 53, no. 3 (2009): 390–418. 12 Ervand Abrahamian, History of Modern Iran, (New York: Columbia University Press, 2008): 179. 13 Crawford, “Preventing Enemy Coalitions,” 165.
4 costs.14 A state that abandons its allies – let alone by defecting to “the other side” – risks a reputation for unreliability. Douglas Gibler states “a leader’s behavior during opportunities to honor an alliance commitment creates reputations for that leader regarding his or her likelihood of honoring future alliance commitments.”15 It follows then that a state viewed as unreliable will have fewer alternative alliance options and thus relatively little bargaining position vis-à-vis its new partner. A second variable specific to realignment is the potential for punitive costs. A state that defects from a preexisting ally is likely to incur retaliation. Third, realignment between adversarial poles implies a more dramatic change in the relative balance of power than a situation in which a previously neutral state forms a new alliance. If State A and State B are members of opposing alliance blocs and each claims four allies, State B’s poaching of an ally from State A’s grouping would give it a five to three ally-advantage, whereas State B’s acquisition of a new ally from among a previously unaffiliated group of states would give it an advantage of five to four allies.16
Revisionist and Status Quo States
A discussion of the concepts of revisionist and status quo states illuminates how a state’s geopolitical preferences toward revising or preserving the distribution of power in a given system influence its alliance decision-making. Jason M. K. Lyall ascribes three attributes to revisionist states: first, a preference for radically changing the shared standards regarding membership in the international community; second, disagreement with shared standards regarding the acceptable use of force; and third, a clear desire to recast the prevailing balance of power (defined by relative military capabilities) or prestige hierarchy.17 In the chapters that follow I argue that Syria during most of its rule by Hafiz al-Asad behaved as a revisionist state. Given that Syria’s geopolitical interests were generally regional rather than global, I accept Lyall’s definition but focus primarily on the third criteria, demonstrating in the chapters that follow that, at least throughout the 1970s and 1980s, Damascus sought to overturn the pro-Western dominated regional balance of power. In turn, I refer to status quo states generally as those seeking to preserve the prevailing distribution of power in a given system.
Literature Review
Alliance Theory’s Emphasis on Alliance Formation
14 For more on the concept of alliance reputation, see Gregory D. Miller, “Hypotheses on Reputation: Alliance Choices and the Shadow of the Past,” Security Studies 12, no. 3 (2003): 40–78; Douglas M. Gibler, “The Costs of Reneging: Reputation and Alliance Formation,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 52, no. 3 (2008), 426–54. 15 Douglas M. Gibler, “The Costs of Reneging,” 426–54. 16 For a similar discussion see Tim Crawford, “Wedge Strategy, Balancing, and the Deviant Case of Spain, 1940–41,” Security Studies 17, no. 1 (March 2008): 1–38. 17 Jason M. K. Lyall, “Paths of Ruin: Why Revisionist States Arise and Die in World Politics,” Unpublished dissertation, Cornell University (2005),18.
5 A theory of realignment would help to explain the Syrian and Egyptian cases previously mentioned, as it would similar questions about contemporary alliances. Which way will Qatar turn in the Saudi-Iranian competition for dominance in the Middle East? What should the United States make of Turkey’s burgeoning relationships with Russia and Iran, or Philippines President Rodrigo Duterte’s warming ties with China? Despite the importance of these questions to international relations, the phenomenon of realignment as a cumulative process of defection and formation is surprisingly understudied. Alliance theory tends to be sorted into studies on alliance formation, management, and dissolution, respectively. Of the three, alliance formation garners the most attention. By now, most reviews of the alliance formation literature begin with a discussion of the balance of threat theoretical framework first put forth by Stephen Walt in The Origins of Alliances. Writing in the Neorealist tradition, Walt homes in on systemic-level explanations for alliance formation, arguing that states most often form alliances as a means of balancing against external security threats, which Walt argues can be measured as a function of a threatening actor’s geographic proximity, aggregate power, offensive capability, and aggressive intentions.18 Walt’s contribution to the study of alliance making is critical both for its theoretical refinement of the then prevailing balance of power perspective and for widening the empirical base of alliance research in the Middle East. By focusing on systemic level factors, however, Walt downplays important intervening variables such as domestic politics, ideology, and political economy, which have subsequently been shown to influence alliance formation behavior.19 Steven David’s theory of omnibalancing rectifies this imbalance by pointing out that “Third World” states are in fact more likely to form international alliances to balance against domestic rather than external threats. David’s driving logic is that Third World states tend to be led by ruling regimes with tenuous domestic legitimacy, and thus view security from a regime rather than “national” perspective.20 While Walt was correct to cite balancing as a key cause of alliance formation, David offers the nuance that regimes with a vulnerable grip on power will seek external power support to balance against domestic rather than external challengers. There is undeniable truth to the systemic and domestic level approaches represented by Walt and David, respectively, though they are both vulnerable to criticisms of being uni- causal and overly rational and are ultimately rooted in Cold War era analysis. Neither, moreover, sufficiently explains the divergence of Egyptian and Syrian foreign policy preferences after the 1973 Arab-Israeli War. For Walt, Egyptian realignment was a result of “bandwagon[ing] with the United States to gain peace and economic aid.”21 There is little emphasis on balancing against internal threats as David describes it, and the argument that Egypt was drawn to U.S. power begs the question: Why Syria did not share the same
18 Stephen M. Walt, The Origins of Alliances (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987), 21. 19 See Michael N. Barnett and Jack S. Levy, “Domestic Sources of Alliances and Alignments: The Case of Egypt, 1962-1973,” International Organization 45, no. 3 (1991): 369–95; Steven R. David, Choosing Sides: Alignment and Realignment in the Third World (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1991); Laurie Brand, Jordan’s Inter-Arab Relations: The Political Economy of Alliance Making (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994); Ryan, Inter-Arab Alliances. 20 Steven R. David, Choosing Sides: Alignment and Realignment in the Third World (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1991). 21 Walt, The Origins of Alliances, 145.
6 motivation? However, David’s emphasis on internal rather than external threats as a source of Third World alliance formation is muddied by his assessment that Moscow fomented and exacerbated the domestic threat to Egyptian President Anwar Sadat.22 As I will show in my treatment of the same period in chapters 2 and 3 of this dissertation, Moscow differed in its relationships with Cairo and Damascus in that it did not pose a threat to the Asad regime. Moreover, I will also show that Asad faced many internal threats of his own. Clearly, factors other than threat play a causal role in foreign policy realignment.23 In response, a subset of alliance formation theory emerged to challenge an alleged bias toward defensive causes of alliance making. Randall K. Schweller’s bandwagoning for profit thesis, for instance, argues that states may form alliances with dominant powers in order to opportunistically secure offensive gains. For Schweller, balance of threat theory reflects a blanket assumption that states are status quo powers seeking to maximize security within a given system, when in reality some states are revisionist powers seeking to redraw the geopolitical map in their favor.24 Separately, Marc Lynch’s social constructivist analysis of inter-Arab politics departs from those of his “rational” counterparts by focusing on the role of public dialogue and debate in shaping foreign policy interests during a period of political liberalization in Jordan.25 These theories, among others, are helpful in terms of both broadening and sharpening our understanding of why states choose allies, and fortunately for this study they do so increasingly upon the basis of Middle Eastern case studies. On the latter point, I note that many of the authors mentioned above build and test their theories using cases primarily or exclusively involving Jordan.26 One can only speculate as to the reasons. As a relatively weak state often caught between Syrian, Iraqi, Saudi, and Israeli intrigues, Jordan has a fascinating and empirically rich history of shifting alliances and bold foreign policy making. It is also possible that Amman’s relatively pro-American and pro-Western foreign policy orientation makes Jordan more accessible to Western academics for field and archival research. Whatever the reason, a large amount of alliance theory is derived from Jordanian foreign policy behavior and that may well exacerbate alleged biases toward defensively motivated alliance formation. More work is needed on regional powers such as Iran, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Syria (pre-Arab spring) in order to better assess the defensive and offensive motives driving alliance behavior.
Alliance Defection
22 David, Choosing Sides, 68–76. 23 Many authors have sought to reconcile these shortcomings. See Gregory Gause, “Balancing What? Threat Perception and Alliance Choice in the Gulf,” Security Studies 13, No. 2 (2003/4); Malik Mufti, Sovereign Creations: Pan-Arabism and Political Order in Syria and Iraq (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1996); and Ryan, Inter Arab Alliances. 24 Randall K. Schweller, “Bandwagoning for Profit: Bringing the Revisionist State Back In,” International Security 19, no. 1 (Summer 1994): 72–107. 25 Marc Lynch, State Interests and Public Spheres: The International Politics of Jordan’s Identity (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999). 26 Among the authors previously discussed, these include Brand, Jordan’s Inter-Arab Relations; Lynch, State Interests and Public Spheres; Ryan, Inter-Arab Alliances.
7 Alliance defection behavior receives comparatively less scholarly attention than alliance formation and alliance management. The relative dearth of theory testing against a wide empirical base largely leaves us to deduce the causes of defection from the literature on alliance formation. Stephen Walt, for example, deduces that alliances might dissolve as a result of changing perceptions of threat (i.e. a given threat recedes, one party to a balancing alliance grows stronger and threatens its partner, and/or one party to a balancing alliance acquires sufficient strength to meet a threat on its own), perceptions of ally credibility, ideological disputes between states, and/or non-systemic factors such as domestic politics in a given state, including changes in demographics, elite competition, and regime change.27 These are reasonable propositions, but they leave us with many potential explanations. What is more, when applied to the cases in this study they fall short. In asking why alliances collapse, for example, Walt states that Egyptian realignment in the 1970s “arose from [Sadat’s] belief that the Soviet Union could not provide the…support he needed to regain the Sinai and to sustain Egypt’s faltering economy.”28 Yet neither could the Soviet Union muster the support Syria needed to regain the Golan Heights from Israel and shield Damascus from its economic challenges, and Asad nevertheless remained aligned with Moscow after the 1973 Arab-Israeli War. This suggests a difference between Egypt and Syria’s interests in their respective alliances with Moscow. Conversely, in the same article Walt argues that alliances are more likely to endure “when there is a large asymmetry of power within them, when the allies share similar political values, and when the relationship is highly institutionalized.”29 Syria and Iran in the 1980s, however, shared relative power symmetry and adhered to dissimilar ideological programs, secular pan-Arabism and revolutionary Islam, respectively. (The extent to which their alliance was institutionalized is unclear.) These features indicate that the decades-long durability of the Syrian-Iranian alliance merits further explanation. One welcome exception to the limited alliance defection literature is Avi Kober’s 2002 book, Coalition Defection: The Dissolution of Arab anti-Israeli Coalitions in War and Peace.30 Kober proposes a theoretical framework in the Realist tradition for a general theory of defection upon the basis of cases of Arab Anti-Israeli coalitions. Kober’s theoretical and empirical inquiry is significant, though my dissertation departs on a number of points. First, Kober studies broad, ad hoc coalitions. I study alliances. Second, Kober tests defection from some amorphous entity termed “the framework of inter-Arab coordination.”31 I am interested in states. Kober says himself that diffuse (i.e. multipolar) political systems are more conducive to defection than systems with concentrated power centers. It is therefore less obvious why a state will defect from an agreement with a single or small number of partners with centralized power centers rather than some loose and frequently changing collection of state and non-state actors grouped by a transnational ideology that has already been showing to have negative effects if any on alliance
27 Stephen M. Walt, “Why Alliances Endure or Collapse,” Survival 39, no. 1 (1997): 170. 28 Ibid., 160. 29 Ibid., 170. 30 Avi Kober, Coalition Defection: The Dissolution of Arab Anti-Israeli Coalitions in War and Peace (Westport: Praeger, 2002); James D. Morrow, “Alliances and Asymmetry: An Alternative to the Capability Aggregation Model of Alliances,” American Journal of Political Science 35 (November 1991): 904–33 31 Kober, Coalition Defection, xi.
8 cohesion.32 Third, Kober studies alliance defection whereas my dependent variable looks at the comprehensive process of realignment. It matters, I argue, whether a state defects to a position of neutrality or realigns with an adversary of its former ally. Just as realignment involves costs and benefits distinct from alliance formation, so is it distinct from alliance defection; the flip side of the potential punitive costs associated with defection, for example, is a potential “realignment bonus” that can accompany transitioning to a new partner.33
Research Design
This research includes both historical and theoretical analyses of Egyptian and Syrian alliance decision-making. The theoretical framework is drawn from neoclassical realism, which looks at the influence of balance of power politics in the international system through the filter of intervening domestic variables such as state structure and leadership perception.34 The neoclassical realist approach is the most appropriate for this study given the perpetual balancing act among Middle Eastern states between threats and opportunities at the domestic, regional, and global levels, as well as the importance of leadership perceptions in alliance calculations. In terms of methodology, in the sections below I deduce a series of hypotheses regarding realignment from this theoretical framework and upon the basis of theories of alliance formation and defection. In my discussion of each hypothesis I list the respective empirical implications that I expect will either confirm or nullify my arguments. I then test my hypotheses against the four cases of Syrian and Egyptian alliance decision-making outlined later in this chapter.
Bridging International Relations and Middle East Studies
Gregory Gause outlines two alternative approaches to the study of the Middle East. On the one hand, scholars of international relations treat the Middle East as one constituent part of the broader international system. The Middle East is treated just like any other subsystem in that it is a source of empirical data useful for explaining phenomena that occur at the systemic level. On the other hand, Middle East regional specialists, the majority of whom are historians, tend to limit their scope of inquiry to variables at the sub-system level. Each approach has its drawbacks. According to Gause, the former sometimes lacks the empirical nuance and access to raw data drawn from primary source material – though this certainly need not be the case – while the latter risks detachment from broader debates in international relations, imprecision regarding what is truly exceptional to the Middle East, and ad-hoc analyses. For Avi Kober, a narrowing gap between these two approaches in recent years has greatly benefited the study of the region through both the addition of theoretical concepts and frameworks to aid regional analyses, as well as the widening of the empirical base upon
32 Walt, The Origins of Alliances; Eberhard Kienle, Ba’th vs. Ba’th: The Conflict between Syria and Iraq, 1968-1989 (London: I. B. Tauris, 1990). 33 Ratner, “Reaping What You Sow.” 34 Steven E. Lobell, Norrin M. Ripsman, and Jeffrey Taliaferro, Neoclassical Realism, The State, and Foreign Policy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009).
9 which to test theoretical hypotheses. My dissertation seeks a middle ground between the traditional analytic points of departure for international relations scholars and Middle East specialists, respectively. Prior to my analysis of the Egyptian and Syrian cases, I propose a theoretical framework for assessing the causes of realignment between adversarial poles. Following that, I assess the alliance calculations in both countries upon the basis of primary and secondary source material in order to add new data to the empirical base and to obtain potentially generalizable insights into the phenomenon of realignment.35
Proposed Theory of Realignment
In this dissertation I propose a new theory of realignment by deducing three hypotheses, mostly from the prevailing alliance literature but also borrowing from other subfields of international relations theory. I theorize that my dependent variable, realignment, is a function of three independent variables, including: (1) the perception of regime security; (2) confidence in the availability of alternative allies; and (3) the opportunity cost of defection to a state’s revisionist ambitions. I expect realignment to take place when states perceive that they are insecure, possess confidence in the availability of a viable alternative ally, and when the opportunity cost to revisionist ambitions is low. The following section outlines my hypotheses and explains how I test their validity.
Perception of Security
Hypothesis 1: The perception of regime insecurity by state leadership is a necessary but insufficient condition for realignment.
I contend that the perception of insecurity is a necessary but insufficient condition for realignment. States that feel secure will not realign their foreign policies between adversarial poles, regardless of other variables, whereas states that perceive themselves to be insecure will consider realignment. My reasoning stems from the basic assumptions of political Realism and the logic of prospect theory, as I explain below. Alliances often impose on their members a tradeoff between increased security and decreased autonomy.36 Between these two assets, states value security more than they value autonomy; freedom of action is useless without the assurance that your regime or state will survive another day.37 So why would a state consider reshuffling its alliances? The tradeoff between security and autonomy implies that a state might realign in order to “trade up” for a new alliance that offers either greater security or at least a more favorable security to autonomy ratio. I argue, however, that a state that perceives itself to be sufficiently secure
35 Gregory Gause, “Systemic Approaches to Middle East International Relations,” International Studies Review 1, no. 1 (Spring 1999): 11–32; Kober, Coalition Defection, xii. 36 Stephen M. Walt, “Why Alliances Endure or Collapse,” 158; James D. Morrow, “Alliances and Asymmetry”; Thomas Christensen and Jack Snyder, “Christensen, Thomas and Jack Snyder, Chain Gangs and Passed Bucks; Predicting Alliance Patterns in Multipolarity,” International Organization 44, no. 2 (Spring 1990): 137–68. 37 It is the basic assumption of political Realism that all states share a fundamental interest in survival. See Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (New York: Random House, 1979).
10 will not realign regardless of the opportunity to gain either greater security or greater autonomy. My reasoning stems from the logic of prospect theory. Prospect theory suggests that decision makers are risk-averse when it comes to obtaining gains but risk-tolerant with respect to losses.38 Stated plainly, decision makers are more likely to take risks in order to prevent a potentially big loss while they are less likely to take risks when it comes to securing potentially large gains. This translates to international alliance making as follows. States that perceive their security to be sufficient will not bear the risk of the unknown inherent in realignment. Security is money in the bank. According to prospect theory, a state’s leaders will not risk jeopardizing its most prized possession for even the high probability of a more favorable basket of security and autonomy. In contrast, states that feel insufficiently secure will be more willing to risk realignment, even if it means a potentially worse outcome, because doing so is their only option to counter burgeoning threats.
Measurement and Empirical Implications
If a state engaged in an alliance judges its security to be insufficient, then it perceives that its preexisting ally is either unable or unwilling to provide sufficient security support. Allies may be unable or unwilling to provide required support due to a lack of a material capability, fear of entrapment in an unwanted conflict, or a desire to conserve resources, among many other reasons. Under such conditions, a potential switcher has an incentive to seek support elsewhere. If this hypothesis is correct, I expect to find potential switcher states exploring their alliance options after mitigations of preexisting ally support in the form of denied requests for assistance, unilateral decreases in assistance, and public and/or private disputes between allies. Evidence of exploring alternative alliance options might take the form of communications with adversarial states or a softening of rhetoric against enemies.
Availability of Alternative Ally
Hypothesis 2: An insecure regime’s confidence that another state (adversarial pole 2, or AP2) is willing and able to sufficiently support its foreign and/or domestic policy priorities increases the likelihood of realignment.
Naturally, a potential switcher state can only realign between competing alliance blocs if an AP2 is willing to accept a new ally and provide it with the support that the potential switcher state requires as the price for its partnership. In turn, a potential switcher state must have confidence in a prospective new ally’s support before it abandons its preexisting ally. This dissertation explores the conditions under which these dynamics occur. I examine conditions in which an alternative ally makes itself available, including by looking at two scenarios: (1) when an AP2 employs wedge strategies to separate a potential switcher state away from its preexisting AP1 alliance and (2) when a potential switcher proactively seeks
38 Jack S. Levy, “Prospect Theory and International Relations: Theoretical Applications and Analytical Problems,” Political Psychology 13, no. 2 (June 1992).
11 an AP2 to replace its preexisting AP1 alliance. I also explore the conditions in which a potential switcher state perceives an AP2 to be a viable new ally by focusing on the potential switcher state’s assessments of AP2 interest and capability to meet its priorities.
Measurement and Empirical Implications
If this hypothesis is correct, I expect to find evidence of realignment decisions following a potential switcher state’s leadership expressing confidence in the credibility of an alternative offer of support; similarly, non-realignment decisions would follow potential switcher state frustrations at a prospective new ally’s lack of willingness or ability to support its interests. There are a number of ways to gauge these perceptions. The first involves analysis of public statements made by leaders or members of their inner circles in speeches, interviews, and memoirs, as well as private testimony found in government archival documents. Second, historical experience helps construct an individual leader’s perception of her environment. Do two particular states share a history of shared or conflicting interests, or a history of broken agreements vis-à-vis a potential new ally? Third, governments can signal their intentions through unilaterally implemented policies. It is possible, for example, that Hafiz al-Asad believed Israel was not serious about relinquishing the Golan Heights after Israel chose to annex that territory in 1981 while never annexing the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Fourth, I conduct an exhaustive review of expert analysis of Syrian and Egyptian decision- making in the secondary source literature.
Opportunity Cost to a State’s Revisionist Ambition
Hypothesis 3: When the opportunity cost of defection to a state’s revisionist ambitions is high (i.e. realignment will hinder a potential switcher state’s options to pursue its revisionist aims), then states are less likely to realign. As that opportunity cost decreases, an insecure state with an available alternative ally is more likely to realign.
Randall Schweller’s bandwagoning for profit thesis highlights the alliance literature’s tendency to view states as status quo actors – that is, as satisfied with the existing distribution of power in the regional or international system at a given time. In fact, Schweller argues, history frequently witnesses revisionist states seeking to change the balance of power in their favor, and for these revisionist states, alliances can be motivated not by the desire to avoid losses but rather by the opportunity to secure gains.39 It follows that if states occasionally form alliances in the pursuit of opportunistic interests, then they also maintain alliances that offer the potential to achieve such goals now or in the future and avoid realignments that could preclude desired gains. In a Middle Eastern context where realignment often implies drawing closer to the United States, and where and anti-Western rhetoric plays well to local populations, realignment toward the West could well cost states room to maneuver in the regional theater.
39 Schweller, “Bandwagoning for Profit: Bringing the Revisionist State Back In.”
12 Jordanian foreign policy during the 1990-1991 Gulf War provides a case in point. Following Saddam Hussein’s invasion of Kuwait, Amman resisted U.S. requests to abandon its close relationship with Baghdad and join the U.S.-led coalition seeking to push the Iraqi military out of Kuwait. Instead, Jordan’s King Hussein publicly condemned the U.S.-led military operation and those Arab states participating in it (among them Egypt and Syria). To be sure, Jordan resisted Western pressures partly out of domestic concerns related to Jordan’s large, pro-Iraqi Palestinian population, but according to Malik Mufti, it also did so because of a dynastic ambitions to restore the Hashemite monarchy to Iraq, however remote the probability of success.40 Mufti argues that on multiple occasions in the 1980s and 1990s Jordan acted “in an assertive, even expansionist, manner that belied its relative weakness.”41 Regarding my proposed theoretical model, it is notable that Jordan in this example is a relatively weak state with an available ally in the form of the United States but that Amman’s assessment of potential geopolitical gain, however slight, prevented realignment.
Measurement and Empirical Implications
If this hypothesis is correct, I expect to find evidence of states who perceive themselves to be insecure, possess confidence in the availability of alternative allies, but nevertheless do not realign for fear of jeopardizing opportunistic ambitions. Conversely, I expect that states that do realign will do so in a way that does not preclude their revisionist ambitions. States have a number of tells that indicate revisionist aspirations. Public rhetoric is a good starting point. Sometimes a leader will explicitly say what he or she desires. A more subtle approach involves attempting to identify with and endear oneself to either certain communities or movements within a given society, including by emphasizing historic connections, ethnic bonds, ideological affinity, or common enemies. Textual analysis of public statements, speeches, and broadcasts yield relevant data in this regard. Still other empirical implications that offer insight into a state’s expansionist desires include the allocation of state financial, military, and human resources, which indicates a regime’s priorities, the historical precedence of trying to acquire a specific objective in the past, and the nature of relationships formed with foreign organizations.
At the end of each case study chapter I summarize my findings with respect to each of the above hypotheses in a chart, such as Figure 1 below. These charts enable the reader to more easily follow my analysis and, given the intrinsically imprecise nature of measuring leadership perceptions and confidences, the data that informs my conclusions. In the final conclusion chapter of this dissertation I combine the key conclusions from each chapter (the bottom row of the chart at Figure 1) in order to compare cases. These charts are organized as follows. From left to right, the columns include my analysis of each of the three independent variables discussed above, respectively, with the dependent variable listed in the fourth column. The second row from the top includes the various factors or conditions that I assess in determining my overall measurement for each independent variable (for example, threat perception is a measured as function of external
40 Malik Mufti, “A King’s Art: Dynastic Ambition and State Interest in Hussein’s Jordan,” Diplomacy and Statecraft 13, no. 3 (September 2002): 1–22. 41 Ibid., 20.
13 threats, internal threats, AP1 sufficiency in helping to mitigate threats, and the extent to which the AP1 ally might pose a threat); the row below that includes my measurement for each respective condition; and the bottom row lists my overall measurement. For example, the chart below – which appears again in my third case study – indicates my assessment that Syria during a juncture of potential realignment from 1985-1989 (identified as the unit of study in the bottom left cell): (1) perceived a medium, or moderate, degree of insecurity; (2) perceived the AP2 in this case to be extremely willing but minimally capable of supporting its priorities; and, (3) perceived that realignment would entail a high opportunity cost to its revisionist ambitions. These three factors, as I outline in chapter 4, led to Syria’s non- realignment decision during this period.
Figure 1: Sample chart at the end of each case study chapter to summarize findings
` IV1 IV2 IV3 DV
Percep(on of Insecurity Confidence in Alterna(ve Ally (AP2) Opportunity Cost of Defec(on to Outcome Availability Revisionist Ambi(on
Condi(ons
AP2 Threat
Security If PS, AP2 Preference Preference Preference Geopoli(cal Exclusive (ME) Assessment PS PS Geopoli(cal Internal Threat AP1 Sufficiency External Threat If PS, Unmet PS AP1 Geopoli(cal AP2 Geopoli(cal AP2 Capability to AP1 Threat to PS Interests Threat to PS vs. AP2 Ini(ated Interest Acceptable If Wedge, AP2 Seeks Reinforcing (MR) or PS to Balance against Support PS Priori(es Alliance Suitability to Preference: Mutually
w/ Iran: MR Low - AP Case 3: Med Low High N/A N/A Yes Low Rev. Rev. SQ Syria Med 2 w/ Arab bloc: ME 1985-1989
(AP1 = Iran PS =Syria AP2 = pro- Nega>ve Western Arab High Willingness/Low Med High (-) states) Capability
14 Case Selection
My comparison of Syrian and Egyptian realignment decision-making includes four case studies, one positive case of Egyptian realignment and three negative cases of Syrian non- realignment. In the first two case studies I compare Egypt and Syria’s respective calculations regarding whether to realign between Moscow and Washington following the 1973 Arab- Israeli War. As I outlined earlier in this chapter, Egypt and Syria shared similar foreign policy alignments prior to 1973 and also experienced similar outcomes during the war before ultimately choosing dramatically different post-war foreign policy trajectories. Comparison of these two case studies helps explain why Egypt chose realignment while Syria did not. The next two cases include two additional instances in which Syria might have been expected to realign its foreign policy away from Iran and, as I will show, during which time Damascus in fact demonstratively explored the possibility of doing so, but ultimately chose to stay the course. Specifically, chapters 4 and 5 examine the durability of the Syrian- Iranian relationship during periods of intense bilateral confrontation in Lebanon in the mid to late 1980s and U.S.-Syrian diplomacy during the Middle East peace processes of the 1990s, respectively. It is worth noting that studying non-realignment, a non-event, is a challenging endeavor. How do you identify something that did not happen? I do so in this study by identifying what I call junctures of potential realignment, or windows of time in which either the nature of events and/or the existing frameworks of alliance theory suggest the possibility of realignment. Specifically, I argue that a juncture of potential realignment takes place when two conditions are present: (1) a significant historical process or event creates a basis for the emergence of alternative alignment decision-making; and, (2) a formal and/or informal initiative that attracts consideration or participation of one or more parties.42 This is the basis upon which I select the cases of non-realignment described above, and each relevant chapter includes a section devoted to demonstrating this. Taken together, these four cases cover instances of positive and negative realignment and realignment considerations in the Cold War and post-Cold War periods, at regional and global levels, respectively. Three cases of Syrian non-realignment are important both in order to answer my research questions regarding Syrian foreign policy and also because they allow for the deviation of my dependent variable, which serves my theoretical aims of providing a modest foundation for a general theory of realignment. Similarly, the case of Egypt in the 1970s can be described as critical. This is not a reference merely to its “intrinsic interest” or “historical importance,” but also to the comprehensive nature of Egypt’s turn toward the United States. Just as the comparativist cannot purport to explain revolutions without accounting for the French Revolution, neither can the international relations scholar theorize about realignment without explaining Cairo’s behavior in the 1970s.43
42 For additional background on the theoretical development of my concept of a juncture of potential realignment, see Elie Podeh, Chances for Peace: Missed Opportunities in the Arab-Israeli Conflict (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2015). 43Jack S. Levy, “Case Studies: Types, Designs, and Logics of Inference,” Conflict Management and Peace Science 25, no. 1 (March 2008), 7.
15
Methodology
This study employs a variety of qualitative research methodologies in order to test my proposed theory of realignment and assess my historical questions. Regarding the former, this dissertation represents an in-depth plausibility probe of my deduced theory through structured, focused comparisons and the process tracing of the four case studies identified above. These cases include both cross-case comparisons of Syrian and Egyptian alliance decision-making in the 1970s and longitudinal within-case analyses of Syrian alliance decision-making from 1970 to 2000. In the following section, I discuss the appropriateness of a plausibility probe to my research and explain the merits of combining cross- and within- case studies. I then outline the importance of process tracing methods and other qualitative techniques to this dissertation; I conclude with a brief discussion of my source material.
Plausibility Probes
Plausibility probes involve the preliminary study of yet untested hypotheses and theories in order to determine whether more testing is warranted. Daniel Drezner likens them to a swimmer dipping his toe in the water before diving in: “Swimmers want to know if the water is temperate enough to go deeper. Researchers want to know if the empirical climate is friendly enough for more extensive forays.”44 I have deduced my theory of realignment upon the basis of combining the theories from international relations (alliance theory) and social psychology (prospect theory), and by doing so within the framework of Neoclassical Realism. Before placing my hypotheses under the scrutiny of a large-N examination, this approach determines whether my theory holds enough water to merit more extensive research. The probability probe concept is often criticized for being used too loosely, or worse yet as a “cop-out.”45 This is unfortunate because it can serve a valuable role in theory development. Indeed, I designed my study in a theoretically deliberate manner by testing my hypotheses methodically and against extensive empirical research supported by primary and secondary source analysis. The plausibility probe approach is particularly appropriate in this case because of the deductive and untested nature of my theory. A close reading of six different kinds of research objectives collectively identified by Arend Lijphart, Harry Eckstein, and Alexander George and Andrew Bennett leads me to the conclusion that it is the research objective most relevant to my study.46
Cross- and Within-Case Comparison
44 Daniel Drezner, The Sanctions Paradox: Economic Statecraft and International Relations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 59. 45 Levy, “Case Studies,” 7. 46 George L. Alexander and Andrew Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2005), 75.
16 This study integrates both cross- and within-case analyses in order to increase opportunity for comparison. Regarding the cross-case comparison of Egypt and Syria in the 1970s, a perfectly controlled comparison, as envisioned by John Stuart Mill’s method of difference, is unattainable. As Mill himself is said to have conceded, “...the multiplicity and complexity of causes of social phenomena make it difficult to apply the logic of elimination relied up on by the methods of agreement and difference, thereby making it difficult to isolate the possible cause of a phenomenon.”47 The cross-case comparison method is nevertheless useful because the divergent paths of Egyptian and Syrian foreign policy beginning during the 1973 Arab-Israeli War reveal a striking deviation of my dependent variable (realignment) following a period of many similar foreign policy inputs. Still, limits remain. As George and Bennett explain, “cross-case comparisons...necessarily simplify or omit the contexts of the case studies.”48 I therefore also carry out an in-depth examination of Syrian history over a longer period of time – three decades, and the entirety of the rule of Hafiz al- Asad – in order to account for consistency and context of my cases. Jack Levy explains that dividing a study into longitudinal cases composed of multiple sub-cases provides “additional inferential leverage” over imperfectly comparable cases.49 Thus I divide my examination of Syrian non-realignment into three separate cases. This approach offers many advantages. For one, it helps control for such factors as political culture, political structure, and historical experience.50 Moreover, it provides the ability to assess not only discrete events but also the time before and after those events, which may also bear on their analysis.51 Cross- and within-case study methods alone may demonstrate correlation and covariation but not necessarily causality.52 I therefore employ process tracing methods, also known as “causal process observations,” in order to lay bare the causal relationships I put forward. According to George and Bennett, “Process-tracing offers an alternative way for making causal inferences when it is not possible to do so through the method of controlled comparison.”53 For these reasons, I include process tracing in my mixed method study. Process tracing is especially pertinent to a study in the Neoclassical Realist tradition, which emphasizes the role of domestic state structure and leadership perception as intervening variables. Jack Levy, once again, explains that this method “has a comparative advantage in... the analysis of leaders’ perceptions, judgments, preferences, internal decision-making environment, and choices”54 This is helpful in light of my hypotheses regarding the perception of security, confidence in alternative allied support, and what is ultimately a leadership’s judgment of opportunity cost. Process tracing is furthermore useful for investigating the observable implications of independent and dependent variables, a method of testing a theory proposed by Gary King,
47 Ibid., 154. 48 Ibid., 176. 49 Levy, “Case Studies,” 10. 50 Ibid., 10. 51 Alexander and Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences, 166. 52 Levy, “Case Studies,” 11. 53 Alexander and Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences, 214. 54 Levy, “Case Studies,” 11.
17 Robert Keohane and Sidney Verba.55 I have already explicitly outlined these variables and listed the observable implications I expect to find if the corresponding hypotheses are correct. Finally, the close examination of events inherent in process tracing mitigates the risk of omitted variable bias, a potential pitfall when testing a new theory.
Data Collection
I utilize both primary and secondary source material to gather qualitative empirical data. Primary source data comes from a number of places, beginning with the oral and written testimony of relevant leaders and members of their respective inner circles. These sources include public speeches, government statements, public interviews, and personal memoirs. I approach public rhetoric with a degree of caution, but just as we cannot take a politician’s words at face value, neither can we dismiss them completely. I further assess leadership perceptions upon the basis of archival material. I make extensive use of publicly available documents at U.S. presidential libraries as well as those published by the State Department’s Foreign Relations of the United States, among other archives. In addition to primary sources, secondary source analysis is crucial to this dissertation. I frequently examine the expert testimony of scholars, journalists, and other observers to inform my analysis. Historians and other experts have written extensively about some of the specific events that I study. They have conducted primary source research themselves in multiple languages and in many countries, and I take full advantage of the rich body of empirical evidence and analytic judgments they publish. For example, the relative dearth of Syrian government documents and leadership memoirs presents a significant but not insurmountable challenge to assessing Syrian government decision- making. One way that I deal with this challenge is by comparing relevant primary sources material available elsewhere with key secondary sources. For example, I work closely with the writings of Hafiz al-Asad’s semi-official biographer Patrick Seale, a British journalist to whom Asad granted unprecedented access to senior government leaders and official archives. It is not unlikely that the Syrian government gave Seale this access with an eye toward advancing its own agenda, and I assess Seale’s observations and analyses accordingly, comparing them to U.S. officials’ accounts regarding certain meetings, for example. But Seale nevertheless came into closer contact with Syrian policy leaders and official documents than any other Western journalist and is therefore essential to establishing as close to a complete picture as possible regarding Syria’s modern history. All told, my use of a wide range of primary and secondary source material aids me in identifying the most accurate information available in the inherently messy process of assessing leaders’ perceptions and calculations.
Dissertation Structure
55 Gary King, Robert O. Keohane, and Sidney Verba, Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific Inference in Qualitative Research; Alexander and Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), 170–79.
18 The rest of this dissertation is organized as follows. In Part I, I conduct my cross-case comparison of Egyptian and Syrian alliance decision-making during and after the 1973 Arab-Israeli War. Chapter 2 assesses Egypt’s decision to realign its foreign policy from the Soviet Union toward the United States during this period, and chapter 3 explains Syria’s decision to remain aligned with Moscow. Part II includes two additional case studies on Syrian non-realignment, this time away from Iran. In chapter 4, I examine the Syrian- Iranian relationship’s survival in the face of significant strains in the mid to late 1980s, including an intensive bilateral dispute over the future of Lebanon and simultaneous efforts by pro-Western Arab states to drive a wedge between Damascus and Tehran. Similarly, chapter 5 looks at the durability of the Syrian-Iranian relationship during the 1991-2000 Syrian-Israeli peace process, which also caused tension in the Syrian-Iranian relationship and involved sustained efforts to wean Syria away from the Islamic Republic. Chapter 6 includes a summary of my findings and conclusions explaining why Egypt and Syria adopted different foreign policy orientations after the 1973 Arab-Israeli War, why the Syrian-Iranian relationship proved so durable during the 1980s and 1990s, and what lessons can be drawn by analyzing these case studies collectively regarding the broader behavior of foreign policy realignment.
19 Part I: Egyptian and Syrian Foreign Policy Divergence in the 1970s
“…Asad planned to regain territory, Sadat hoped merely to unblock a process of diplomacy.”56
- Patrick Seale, 1988
The autumn of 1970 witnessed two pivotal leadership changes in the Middle East. In September, Egyptian President and Arab nationalism champion Gamal Abd an-Nasser passed away and was succeeded by his former aid Anwar Sadat, who was widely presumed to be politically weak and unlikely to remain long in office. Two months later, Syrian Defense Minister Hafiz al-Asad successfully ousted his Ba’ath Party rival Salah Jadid in a de facto coup d’état. Almost as soon as Presidents Sadat and Asad came to power they began planning a war against Israel to avenge their shared defeat in the 1967 Arab-Israeli War. Their political objectives in war, however, could not have been further apart, and therein lies much of the explanation for the dramatic decade of diplomacy that followed. Indeed, if the mid-20th century witnessed a notable overlap in Egyptian and Syrian foreign policy preferences, the 1970s stands out as the decade in which those policies dramatically diverged. That this happened after what was then the most successful and well- coordinated Arab military effort against Israel is all the more intriguing.
Though the full history of the 1973 Arab-Israeli War is beyond the scope of this study, a brief overview helps set the stage for the two chapters that follow. At approximately 1405 hours on October 6, 1973, the date corresponding with the Jewish Day of Atonement, Yom Kippur, and the tenth day of the Islamic fast of Ramadan, Egyptian and Syrian forces successfully launched a coordinated surprise attack against Israel. The British journalist and Asad’s semi-official biographer, Patrick Seale, describes the heady opening hours:
At precisely the same minute as the barrage began on the Golan, some 4,000 Egyptian guns and 250 aircraft pounded Israeli forces in Sinai. Under cover of this fire, hundreds of rubber dinghies ferried waves of infantry and their personal missiles across the Canal. The thirty-five forts of the Bar-Lev Line were attacked and in most cases overrun; a forward perimeter was quickly established to deal with Israeli armored counter-attacks, while high-velocity water jets blasted some eighty passages through the 60-foot-high sand barrier piled up along the eastern flank. Heavy-duty bridges were then thrown across the Canal to carry tanks and mechanized infantry through the gaps and into Sinai....57
By the next day over 100,000 Egyptian troops and 1,000 Egyptian tanks established five bridgeheads on the east bank of the Suez. Egyptian Chief of Staff Lieutenant General (LTG) Saad el-Shazly writes that by 0800 hours on October 7, “the battle of the crossing had been won.”58 Syria enjoyed similar early successes in the Golan Heights, pushing approximately 35,000 troops and 800 tanks across enemy lines in the first day. “Victory, Asad felt, was
56 Patrick Seale, Asad of Syria: The Struggle for the Middle East (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988), 197 57 Ibid., 202–3. 58 Saad Shazly, The Crossing of the Suez (San Francisco: American Mideast Research, 1980), 222–32.
20 within his grasp,” writes Seale.59 Regardless of the final military outcome, these early operational victories proved a strategic victory for the Arabs. As Sadat puts it, they “restored the self-confidence of our armed forces, our people, and our Arab nation…and exploded forever the myth of an invincible Israel.”60 Nevertheless, as the war continued the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) eventually repelled its adversaries and even captured new Egyptian and Syrian territories beyond the 1967 ceasefire lines.
Despite their strategic victory, Egyptian and Syrian leaders drew from the war the same conclusions: that they could not militarily defeat Israel and that only American influence over Israel offered any real hope of forcing Israeli concessions.61 In this shared assessment lay the origins of my contention that the years following the 1973 Arab-Israeli war constitute a juncture of potential realignment in which Egypt did and Syria could reasonably have been expected to realign their foreign policies away from the Soviet Union and toward the United States of America. As discussed in my introduction, I argue that a juncture of potential realignment occurs when two conditions are present: (1) a significant historical process or event creates a basis for the emergence of alternative alignment decision-making; and, (2) a formal and/or informal initiative attracts the consideration or participation of one or more parties.62 The post-war period in question clearly meets these criteria. First, the 1973 Arab-Israeli War dramatically altered the strategic calculus in the region by leading to the conclusions mentioned above and by restoring Arab national honor and thereby enabling this leadership to countenance negotiations with Israel. As Sadat proclaimed from the United Nations General Assembly podium in October 1975, “We in Egypt and in the Arab world…tell you frankly and realistically that present day circumstances in our region provide a unique opportunity for peace which has never presented itself since the beginning of this Middle East conflict. Therefore, it is your duty, even your primary responsibility, not to miss this opportunity.”63 Meanwhile, both Egypt and Syria responded positively to Washington’s offer to lend its good offices to post-war negotiations with Israel. American post-war diplomacy, initially the purview of President Nixon’s Secretary of State and National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger, thus led to multiple bilateral agreements between Israel and its Arab wartime combatants over the next six years. Kissinger’s diplomatic approach can be best described by the term “step-by-step diplomacy”; Kissinger eschewed the notion of striving for a final, comprehensive Arab- Israeli peace agreement that resolved all issues between the parties in one fell swoop and instead preferred to break up negotiations into smaller, more manageable components. In his words:
If the debris of conflict provided one peril, the temptation to aim immediately for a permanent, comprehensive settlement was another. Indeed, I have been criticized for not seizing this
59 Seale, Asad of Syria, 202–5. 60 Anwar Sadat, In Search of Identity: An Autobiography (New York: Harper & Row, 1977), 249. 61 Kober, Coalition Defection, 89 62 For additional background on the theoretical development of my concept of a juncture of potential realignment see Podeh, Chances for Peace. 63 Sadat, Anwar, “Speech by Egyptian President Anwar Sadat to the United Nations General Assembly, New York, October 29, 1975, [Excerpts],” Journal of Palestine Studies 5, no. 1/2 (Autumn/Winter 1975/1976), 276.
21 ‘opportunity’ for such a solution. But it was a mirage. We knew that Israel adamantly rejected a return to the 1967 borders, including relinquishment of the Old City of Jerusalem. No Arab state, even the most moderate, would ask for less in the context of a comprehensive peace. Israel, covering from the stunning shock of the Arab attack, was as if paralyzed…As for the Arabs, in a comprehensive approach all concerned parties would have to agree, and radical elements in the Arab world would have a veto. Egypt would lose control over its own decisions. And the Soviet Union would inject itself as the lawyer of the Arab side, putting forth a maximum program that years of experience had taught us was unfulfillable. Our allies, both Europe and Japan, would support the Arab position, leaving us completely isolated. It was contemplation of these alternative risks – of bogging down in niggling detail and of consuming our energies in the pursuit of comprehensive goals more yearned for than attainable – that induced us to decide instead on a ‘step-by-step’ approach. A more ambitious effort, if it failed, would make us the target for everybody’s frustrations – the Israelis would blame us for our exactions, the Arabs for our reticence, the allies for their impotence; the Soviets would exploit the resulting turbulence for their hegemonic aims. The statesman must weigh the rewards of success against the penalties of failure. And he is permitted only one guess.64
In due course, U.S. step-by-step diplomacy led to a number of bilateral agreements. First, Kissinger brokered separate disengagement of forces agreements between Israel and Egypt (January 1974) and Israel and Syria (June 1974), achieving partial Israeli military withdrawals on the Sinai and Golan fronts, respectively. While the Syrian-Israeli disengagement of forces agreement would be the last formal agreement between those nations, the Egyptian-Israeli track continued to achieve results, including: a second Egyptian-Israeli disengagement of forces agreement in the Sinai Peninsula in September 1975; President Sadat’s historic visit to Jerusalem in November 1977; the Camp David Peace Accords in 1978; and, finally, the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty in 1979. Though this dissertation is more concerned with alliance decision-making than regional peace agreements, it is important to note here that Egypt’s march toward peace with Israel ran parallel to its rapprochement with the United States such that by the end of the decade Egypt realigned its foreign policy between adversarial superpowers while Syria remained firmly nestled in the Soviet camp. The following chapters explain why Egyptian and Syrian foreign policies diverged so dramatically. The core of my argument is that each country’s alliance decision-making resulted from its respective attitude toward the regional balance of power. Specifically, I demonstrate that Sadat prioritized the return of the Sinai Peninsula at any cost, including the cost of conceding Israeli dominance in the region, and therefore found no contradiction between this regional priority and global realignment with the United States. Asad, in contrast, sought nothing less than the redistribution of regional power in Syria’s favor and at the expense of her regional adversaries, and in this pursuit, he concluded that only the Soviet Union shared his strategic interests.
64 Kissinger, Years of Upheaval (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1982), 615.
22 Chapter 2: Egyptian Foreign Policy Realignment (1970-1979)
Introduction
The October 1973 Arab-Israeli War created a juncture of potential realignment for its principle Arab combatants, Egypt and Syria, both then Soviet allies in the rigid bipolarity of the Cold War. Only Egypt executed the turn. Steven David’s omnibalancing theory explains Egypt’s realignment from Moscow to Washington as a dual balancing act against the combination of an external Israeli military threat and domestic political threats to President Anwar Sadat’s leadership.65 Stephen Walt adds to this analysis an element of defensive bandwagoning, given both the military and economic superiority of the U.S.- Israeli alliance over the Soviet-Arab bloc and America’s comparative advantage over Moscow in terms of its ability to influence Israel.66 These explanations are accurate if incomplete; they cannot account for the fact that the Syrian regime during this time period confronted the same Israeli external threat, faced its own domestic challenges, and operated against the same dominant U.S.-Israeli alliance that so impressed Egypt, but did not realign. What, then, are these theories missing? In this chapter I argue that, in addition to threat-based motivations, Egypt’s foreign policy realignment in the 1970s is a function of two other variables: (1) Cairo’s confidence the availability of a substitute ally, in this case the United States; and (2) President Sadat’s deprioritization of the revisionist ambitions of his predecessor. The chapter is structured as follows. First, I review the combination of external and internal threats to the Egyptian government in the early 1970s and explain how the inability of Cairo’s preexisting allies to mitigate those threats incentivized Sadat to seek a security relationship with the United States. In the second section I trace the process by which President Sadat convinced the United States, initially cold to his overtures, to welcome Egyptian partnership. Finally, the third section outlines how Egypt’s realignment was made possible only by President Sadat’s preference for securing Cairo’s relative power position in the prevailing regional order rather than seeking to increasing Cairo’s relative power vis-à-vis Israel and the Arab world, respectively. Indeed, as both the United States and Israel sought to lock in their own respective gains and advantages after the 1967 Arab-Israeli War, Egypt’s newfound willingness to accept the status quo balance of power paved the way for Cairo’s realignment toward the other status quo powers of the time.
Background
President Anwar Sadat’s decision to realign Egyptian foreign policy away from the Soviet Union (USSR) and toward the United States during the 1970s constitutes perhaps the most significant defection between adversarial poles in the post-World War II era. Cairo’s decision-making was a function of its domestic and regional interests, to be sure, but the successful implementation of Sadat’s strategy required American tutelage. As Sadat told
65 David, Choosing Sides. 66 Walt, The Origins of Alliances, 145; Kober, Coalition Defection, 104.
23 then-U.S. National Security Advisor and Secretary of State Henry Kissinger during their first meeting in November 1973, “Never forget, Dr. Kissinger. I am making this agreement with the United States, not with Israel.”67 Sadat inherited his predecessor’s pro-Soviet foreign policy upon coming to power in 1970, and he initially sought to maintain it.68 In May 1971, he signed a twenty-year Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation with Moscow, formally affirming Egypt’s place in the Soviet camp. In early 1973, he secured from the USSR the largest arms deal ever negotiated in the Middle East. Though moments of ambiguity69 and tension70 undoubtedly colored the Soviet-Egyptian relationship, Israel and the United States, for their part, nevertheless viewed it in black and white terms. Israeli Prime Minister Golda Meir described the Friendship Treaty as a “new dimension in the process of Soviet entrenchment in the Middle East.”71 Washington considered Cairo to be the primary conduit of anti-American and anti-Western propaganda in the Middle East. Kissinger explains in his memoirs that his policy in the Arab World at this time was “to strengthen… the governments associated with the West as against the clients of the Soviet Union. I therefore opposed, as a matter of principle, any concessions to Egypt so long as Nasser (or Sadat for that matter) relied on anti-Western rhetoric buttressed by the presence of Soviet combat troops.”72 That Cairo relied so heavily on Soviet support for nearly two decades makes Egypt’s turn toward the United States so remarkable. After the 1973 War, as Sadat’s participation in U.S.-led diplomacy led to various “interim” agreements with Israel, Egypt and the United States drew increasingly closer together. In 1974, Cairo publicly announced both the full restoration of diplomatic relations with the United States (while the Soviet Foreign Minister was visiting Egypt!) and an end to the Egyptian military’s exclusive reliance on Soviet arms. In 1976, Sadat annulled the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation with Moscow and concluded a five-year, $5 billion deal for U.S. military aid, marking Washington as Cairo’s new principle security backer.73 While it is true that the United States and Egypt enjoyed constructive relations at various points in the Nasser era, the reversal of alliances under Sadat was so stark that Seale later observed, “Sadat’s ideological somersault was so complete that it seemed a sort of ‘anti-Suez,’ setting in reverse everything Nasser had stood for.”74 The rest of this chapter is devoted to explaining the causes of this historic development by examining Egypt’s threat environment, alternative alliance options, and geopolitical preferences.
Perceptions of External and Internal Insecurity
67 Kissinger, Years of Upheaval, 643. 68 David, Choosing Sides, 56–60. 69 Kissinger, Years of Upheaval, 201, 209. 70 David, Choosing Sides, 63–67. 71 Ibid., 67. 72 Kissinger, Years of Upheaval, 201–02. 73 David, Choosing Sides, 91–96. 74 Seale, Asad of Syria, 261.
24 The mounting external and internal threats President Sadat faced in the 1970s were necessary but insufficient conditions for his foreign policy realignment from Moscow to Washington. In this section I demonstrate that the combination of these threats and Egypt’s Soviet and Arab allies’ inability or unwillingness to mitigate them – and, in fact, their tendency to exacerbate them – pushed Sadat toward the United States, the only superpower he perceived as capable of curbing the threats to his regime.
External Threats
The case for Sadat’s perception of an external Israeli threat is clear. The Israeli military successfully routed the Egyptian military in multiple wars since Israel’s founding: the 1948- 1949 Arab-Israeli War; the 1956 Suez Crisis, notably a war of choice for Israel; and, the June 1967 Arab-Israeli War. The latter two conflicts especially eliminated any doubt about the ease with which Israel could violate Egyptian sovereign territory at will. Of course, Israel occupied the entire Sinai Peninsula by the time Sadat came to power. (Compounding the battered state of the Egyptian military was Egypt’s costly intervention in the 1962-1970 Yemeni Civil War, a lengthy affair frequently described as “Egypt’s Vietnam.”75) The 1968-1970 Egyptian-Israeli War of Attrition deepened Egypt’s sense of insecurity. Lieutenant General Saad el-Shazly, Chief of Staff of the Egyptian Armed Forces (EAF) from 1971-1973, writes in his memoirs that that conflict cost Egypt significant blood and treasure, largely as a result of Israel’s continued air superiority. “Our air defenses collapsed and the enemy began to hit even civilian targets with impunity – industrial centers, factories, even a children’s school.”76 The 1973 Arab-Israeli War did little to mitigate the external Israeli threat. Despite Egypt and Syria’s initial early successes, the military balance sheet at the end of the fighting undoubtedly favored Israel, who ended the war with more territory on both fronts. Sadat could not escape the conclusion that Soviet-supported Arab power was no match for the U.S.-Israeli alliance.77 The United States, he was fond to say, “holds 99 percent of the cards” in the region.78 In this context, one episode in particular stands out as likely validating Sadat’s view about U.S. power and leverage over Israel. After a failed ceasefire attempt on October 22, the Israeli military surrounded and positioned itself to destroy of Egypt’s 20,000-man Third Army, a blow that would have devastated the Egyptian military. Henry Kissinger personally took on the cause of saving the Third Army in order to demonstrate the value of U.S. friendship.79 He reportedly sent a promise to Sadat that he would stop Israel, while simultaneously pressing Israeli Ambassador to the United States Simcha Dinitz.80 “You will not be permitted to capture that army,” Kissinger told Dinitz, adding later, “You will be
75 Tharoor, “How Yemen Was Once Egypt’s Vietnam,” Washington Post, March 28, 2015. 76 Shazly, The Crossing of the Suez, 11–13. 77 David, Choosing Sides, 84–86; Sadat, “Speech by Egyptian President Anwar Sadat to the United Nations General Assembly,” 261, 263. 78 Anwar Sadat, “Interview with Egyptian President Anwar Sadat in Al- Usbu’ Al-’Arabi, July 4, 1977. [Excerpts],” Journal of Palestine Studies 7, no. 1 (Autumn 1977): 197. 79 Kissinger, Years of Upheaval, 488, 530–36. 80 Ibid., 576.
25 forced if it reaches that point.”81 The crisis eventually abated, and the United States earned valuable capital in Cairo for securing through diplomacy what the Soviets could not with any of its foreign policy tools.
Internal Threats
Internal threats to Sadat’s leadership similarly played a role in the Egyptian president’s decision to realign toward Washington, as Steven David’s omnibalancing analysis well explains. The Egyptian military was Sadat’s primary institutional support base, and its continued support required progress toward regaining Sinai. The Soviets were doubly unhelpful in this regard. First, they would not support an Egyptian military offensive. Moscow made plain its assessment that Egypt was not ready for war and repeatedly refused requests for select offensive weapons, likely fearing a Middle East conflict that would both jeopardize détente with the United States and lead to yet another defeat of a Soviet client at the hand an American ally. Second, the thousands of Soviet technicians and advisors in Egypt angered their hosts through systemic policies and personal behavior invariably described as condescending, arrogant, and insensitive to Egyptian sovereignty.82 The combination of these two factors harmed EAF morale to the point that junior officers joined student protests in 1972 and reports surfaced that Chief of Staff LTG Sadeq warned President Sadat that the military would intervene unless he expelled the Soviet advisors and “reconsider the foundation of Soviet-Egyptian relations.”83 Tensions brewed at all levels of civilian society. While the military bristled at the relationship with the Soviet Union, Egypt’s economy suffered from a national budget increasingly diverted from economic development for military purposes. Egypt’s military spending as a percentage of Gross National Product, for example, increased from 9.5% in the mid-1960s to 15% by 1971. As a result, infrastructure deteriorated, unemployment increased, public services shrank, and prices spiked. Egypt’s losses in the June 1967 War, including lost revenues from the Suez Canal, Sinai oil, and Sinai tourism, further damaged an already weak economy. When the student protests broke out in January 1972, professional associations of engineers, lawyers, and journalists threw in their support. Egypt’s peasant fellahin class also protested poor economic conditions, conservative Egyptians voiced resentment at their country’s closeness with the “atheistic” Soviet Union, and a cross-section of society grew angry at large-scale Jewish emigration from the Soviet Union to Israel. In the early 1970s, disenchantment with the political and economic status quo was widespread and intensifying.84
Insufficiency of Preexisting Alliances
81 Ibid., 604, 607. 82 David, Choosing Sides, 68–76. 83 Ibid., 71. 84 Ibid., 71–73.
26 It is difficult to overstate the shortcomings of Soviet and Arab support for Egypt at the beginning of Sadat’s presidency. In addition to Moscow’s unwillingness to prepare the Egyptian military for war, Soviet economic assistance, though not insignificant, was too little and poorly targeted. Worse still, accepting Soviet aid precluded Egypt from meaningful assistance from Western Europe or U.S. aligned Saudi Arabia. As such, Egypt’s political relationship with the Soviet Union served as an economic as well as a military liability.85 President Sadat himself held no special love for the Russians. Echoing the popular resentment at alleged Russian crudeness, Sadat complains in his memoirs that the Soviets acted as if “they had Egypt in their pocket” and subsequently that he “wanted to put the Soviet Union in its place.”86 At one extreme, one of Sadat’s closest confidant’s writes that the Egyptian president suspected that the Soviets considered him an unreliable, anti- Communist client and actively plotted against him.87 (Sadat’s memoirs are rife with accusations of his Egyptian political rivals as “Soviet agents.”88 The Soviet press, for its part, declared his memoirs as “based on lies, slander, and falsification” and “a blow at Soviet-Egyptian friendship”.89) In his most charitable view, Sadat characterizes the Soviet approach as tying his hands behind his back through weapons requests ignored and promises broken. “I don’t mind, my friends, if you keep me one step behind Israel,” he claims to have plead to his Soviet interlocutors, “but I find it a bit too much to be twenty steps behind her.”90 Even one of the Soviet Union’s strongest supporters in Egypt at the time acknowledged Moscow’s ability to provide support was limited by capacity and geopolitics. Lieutenant General Shazly, perhaps the most bullish of Egypt’s leaders on the Soviets, writes, “Of the superpowers, only the Soviet Union had the will [to arm Egypt to combat Israel]…the Soviet Union was, and in my view is, the best available ally for an Egypt bent on liberating its lost territory.”91 Nevertheless, Shazly complains that the Soviets considered Egypt a tool in the superpower rivalry and controlled the release of weapons in order to avoid a confrontation with the United States.92 He further concedes that the Soviet military lagged behind that of the United States by a decade. Moscow simply did not have the capacity to provide Egypt with an advantage over Israel.93 The final straw for Sadat came in a May 1972 U.S.-USSR Joint Communiqué, which reaffirmed the superpowers’ support for “a peaceful settlement” in the Middle East.94
85 Ibid., 71–75. 86 Sadat, In Search of Identity, 231. 87 Mohamed Heikal, The Sphinx and the Commissar: The Rise and Fall of Soviet Influence in the Middle East (New York: Harper & Row, 1978), 270. 88 Sadat, In Search of Identity, 216–18. 89 Quoted in Heikal, The Sphinx and the Commissar, 272. 90 Sadat complains about the Soviet Union in memoirs he wrote while still in office in 1978, after his 1977 visit to Jerusalem and before signing the 1979 peace treaty with Israel. The Egyptian president had every incentive to justify his realignment by convincing his readers that the USSR was a poor ally. See Sadat, In Search of Identity, 221, 226. 91 Shazly, The Crossing of the Suez, 100–01. 92 Ibid. 93 Ibid., The Crossing of the Suez, 273. 94 “Joint Communiqué, Moscow, 1972.”
27 Moscow, in other words, publicly announced that it did not support an Egyptian military option, which meant the perpetuation of the status quo stalemate that threatened Sadat’s rule. The Egyptian president was livid and, soon after, famously ordered the expulsion of the more than fifteen thousand Soviet military experts residing in Egypt. (While the expulsion of Soviet advisors was intended to be a punishment, Sadat also sought to remove this obstacle to his military plans.) 95 Though far from a neutral bystander, Henry Kissinger articulates a convincing analysis of the impact of Moscow’s insufficient support: militarily, it was strong enough to keep tensions with Israel high, but not enough to tip the balance of power in the Arabs’ favor; diplomatically, Moscow lacked a formal relationship with Jerusalem and hence offered no hope of brokering a political agreement. “It acted as the Arabs’ lawyer,” he takes no little joy in writing, “but it could not advance their case.”96 The result, Kissinger explains, was Sadat’s assessment that Moscow could not help him achieve his political goals through either military or diplomatic means. Finally, Sadat’s dissatisfaction with Arab support merits brief mention. Sadat resented that the oil-rich Gulf states did not sufficiently compensate Egypt and the other Arab states on Israel’s borders that bore the brunt of the human and financial costs of the Arab-Israeli conflict. When Lieutenant General Shazly informally circulated the idea of an Arab defense fund among his Arab League counterparts before the war, he recounts, the concept was so widely dismissed that he decided it would be counterproductive to raise it formally.97 After the war, an Egyptian request for approximately $10 billion was met with a $2 billion response. Politically, too, Sadat feared that rejectionist Arab states like Syria, Iraq, or Libya would hinder any pragmatic attempt to advance a political process with Israel.98 Taken together, Sadat’s frustration at what he considered either insufficient or counterproductive military, economic, and political support from both his Soviet and Arab allies reinforced his sense of insecurity and led him to seek help elsewhere.
Summary and Analysis
Israel’s record of victory over Egypt and its control of the Sinai Peninsula confirm the threat to Egypt at the time. Sadat’s domestic political and economic concerns were perhaps more daunting. Neither the Soviet Union nor Egypt’s Arab counterparts proved capable and willing of digging Sadat out of these holes, and in many ways Moscow’s perpetuation of the so-called “no war-no peace”99 stalemate over Sinai exacerbated rather than ameliorated internal threats to his power. Sadat’s threat perception thus guided him toward the United States. As Patrick Seale summarizes, the “knocks Egypt had suffered from Syria’s secession [from the United Arab Republic in 1961], from the Yemen War and the 1967 disaster, and from its economic
95 Sadat, In Search of Identity, 230–31. 96 Kissinger, Years of Upheaval, 200. 97 Shazly, The Crossing of the Suez, 108–09. 98 Kober, Coalition Defection, 104. 99 Ismail Fahmy, Negotiating for Peace in the Middle East (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1983), 6.
28 exhaustion, had helped prepare the ground for its retreat from Arab commitments, for its switch of alliances from Moscow to Washington….”100 This assessment was validated when Kissinger took action to save Egypt’s Third Army and, as I review in the next section, throughout the post-war diplomacy. Meanwhile, Sadat understood that Washington was the key to unlocking increased funding streams that could stabilize Egypt’s economy. While omnibalancing and defensive bandwagoning theories therefore help explain Egypt’s realignment they fail to answer important questions. Why, for instance, did Egyptian realignment not take place before the 1973 war when Sadat’s threat perception and his interest in a security relationship with the United States were just as high as they were after the war? They also do not account for the fact that President Asad in Syria faced the same external threat, experienced similar defeats at the hands of the U.S.-Israeli alliance, and, albeit less dire than in Egypt, confronted no shortage of internal challenges, but nevertheless remained a close Soviet ally. As the next section explores, insecurity alone was not enough to bring Egypt to the American camp. American willingness to support Egypt was also a necessary ingredient, and while conventional wisdom may suggest that superpowers want as many allies as possible, this period of history reveals that readiness for new partners is not always ripe.
Alternative Ally Availability
It may seem intuitive that realignment requires willingness on the part of an adversarial pole 2 (AP2) to partner with a potential switcher; less obvious is the fact that would-be patrons are not always eager to take on new allies. In the following section I argue that the availability of a viable alternative ally is a necessary component of the realignment equation. In the case of Egypt, President Sadat’s combined campaign of limited war against Israel and a full-scale charm offensive on Washington during the 1973 Arab-Israeli War convinced the United States to reevaluate its relationship with Cairo. To make this case I begin by demonstrating that even in the competitive bipolarity of the Cold War the United States before October 1973 generally proved uninterested in poaching the client of its superpower rival. I then trace how Egyptian conduct during and after the war convinced the United States of both the consequences of ignoring Cairo’s interests and President Sadat’s seriousness about realignment between superpowers and regional peace. The result in Washington was an almost immediate transformation of U.S. foreign policy from apathy regarding Egyptian interests to active engagement. In Israel, however, the stunningly successful joint Arab attack revived existential fears among the population. America’s newfound courting of Egypt thus necessitated convincing Israel to acknowledge that its long-term strategic interests lay in returning conquered territory to the country that just attacked it. What followed was a years-long, U.S.-led diplomatic process in which the United States nudged Israel and Egypt toward common ground through a series of interim agreements and in so doing brought about Egypt’s defection from both Moscow and Damascus.
100 Seale, Asad of Syria, 261.
29
The United States Rebuffs Egyptian Overtures Prior to October 1973
President Sadat’s repeated signaling to the United States between 1971 and 1973 regarding his interests in separating from the USSR and developing a political process with Israel marks that period as a juncture of potential realignment. Former National Security Council staff Middle East advisor William Quandt laments this period in his memoirs as a “lost opportunity” to achieve political progress before the war.101 As discussed in the previous section, Sadat’s interests stemmed from his interrelated desires to solidify his domestic support base, regain the Sinai Peninsula, and neutralize the external Israeli threat. Washington would ultimately parry Sadat’s pre-war gestures, however, leading him to conclude that only a limited war against Israel would spur U.S. engagement in an Arab- Israeli peace process President Sadat’s public and private diplomacy between 1971-1973 speaks to his early willingness to moderate Egypt’s foreign policy and make difficult concessions. Within his first few months in office, Sadat agreed to a three-month extension in the War of Attrition ceasefire with Israel. Egypt also accepted a UN-sponsored peace plan during the “Jarring talks” in early 1971, agreeing in principle that in exchange for Israel’s withdrawal from the Sinai Peninsula Egypt would provide “practical security arrangements,” freedom of navigation in the Suez Canal and Straits of Tiran, and a peace agreement that involved an end to belligerency and recognition of Israeli borders, a not insignificant gesture in the post- 1967 climate of the Arab League’s “Three No’s”: “no peace with Israel, no recognition of Israel, no negotiations with it….”102 Israel declined.103 Subsequently, in February 1971 Sadat publicly proposed an “interim step”-based approach in which Egypt would take steps to reopen the Suez Canal in exchange for a partial Israeli withdrawal. This too was a noteworthy sign that Egypt might be willing to entertain a process short of the traditionally take-it-or-leave-it demand for Israeli withdrawal from all territories captured in 1967. When Egypt and Israel could not agree on details, Sadat pressed Nixon for active U.S. mediation. He was likely disappointed then on February 25 when Nixon submitted a public report to Congress that called on the parties to the conflict to determine the parameters of a peace settlement. The United States would not force Israel to make concessions.104 Undeterred, Sadat continued to press his case. After he signed the Friendship Treaty with Moscow on May 27, Sadat immediately informed Washington that his interests in closer ties with Washington and peace with Israel remained unchanged. In June he submitted to the senior U.S. diplomat in Egypt a formal Egyptian proposal for interim agreement, but he did not receive a formal response.105 From Sadat’s point of view, by the middle of 1971 his unprecedented and risky concessions had not moved the United States any closer toward Cairo.
101 Kissinger, Years of Upheaval; William Quandt, Decade of Decisions: American Policy Toward the Arab- Israeli Conflict 1967-1976 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977), 129, 160–64. 102 “League of Arab States, Khartoum Resolution, 1 September 1967.” 103 Quandt, Decade of Decisions, 128–36. 104 Ibid., 136–48. 105 Ibid.
30 The year 1972 brought little change. By then, the White House had effectively promoted Henry Kissinger over Secretary of State Rogers as the policy lead on the Middle East. One key difference between Kissinger and Rogers was the former’s belief that pressuring Israel would make it less flexible diplomatically. Kissinger agreed with Israel that it should not be seen as conceding to military pressure from Soviet allies, and he communicated to Sadat that the United States would not pressure Israel until the Soviets were gone.106 That, combined with Sadat’s own internal pressure, likely contributed to Sadat’s July 1972 decision to expel Soviet the military from Egypt. Expelling the Russians, however, did not deliver the Americans. Kissinger did inform Sadat that the United States would initiate a new Middle East peace effort after the 1972 U.S. elections, but when Egyptian National Security Advisor Hafiz Ismail visited the United States in February 1973 Kissinger revised his assessment that a peace process would have to wait until after Israeli elections that October. A few weeks after that the United States announced a new arms package for Israel.107 Cairo’s already minimal confidence in U.S. intentions plummeted. Several factors explain, as Quandt puts it, America’s “uncharacteristically quiet and passive”108 diplomacy during this period. First, the United States prioritized other foreign policy issues, particularly in Asia. Kissinger writes in his memoirs, “Nixon considered us too fully engaged in Indochina to throw full White House support behind [Arab-Israeli peace] proposals he considered unrealistic.”109 (Although not fully known at the time, the Nixon Administration would soon also be distracted by the Watergate scandal.) Second, Nixon’s advisors convey that the president had little appetite for controversial diplomacy involving pressure on Israel during his reelection campaign.110 Third, Israeli elections were planned for that October and Kissinger assessed that “experience had taught us that no Israeli government could make the difficult decisions inherent in the peace process while its future hung in the balance.”111 Fourth, Kissinger acknowledges that his preferred Middle East strategy was a “prolonged stalemate” that sidelined the Soviets and moderated the Arabs. He argued that the U.S. interest required a public display of the inability of Soviet and Arab intransigence to succeed. This would be the only way to show the world that the road to peace ran through Washington.112 Kissinger adds that Israel, for its part, had little interest in large territorial concessions to its traditional foes, calculating that its perceived military superiority and control of the Sinai Peninsula endowed it with the luxury of holding out for its own maximalist concessions. As Golda Meir reportedly told President Nixon a few months before the 1973 War, “We’ve never had it so good.”113
106 Ibid., 144–51. 107 Ibid., 152–55. 108 Ibid., 129. 109 Kissinger, Years of Upheaval, 200–01. 110 Kissinger, Years of Upheaval, 204; Quandt, Decade of Decisions, 162. 111 Kissinger, Years of Upheaval, 196. 112 Ibid., 196, 202. 113 Ibid., 619.
31 The 1973 War Changes U.S. Calculus Regarding Partnership with Egypt
If the Nixon Administration’s explicit policy toward the Arab world between 1971-1973 was what Kissinger termed “complete frustration,”114 the October 1973 Arab-Israeli War convinced Washington the time had come to position itself as an available partner to Egypt, including by warming to the idea of using its influence vis-à-vis Israel on behalf of Egyptian interests. As National Security Advisor and Secretary of State Henry Kissinger told White House Chief of Staff Al Haig on October 6, the day hostilities began, “There is no longer an excuse for a delay. After we get the fighting stopped we should use this as a vehicle to get the diplomacy started.”115 Henry Kissinger resolved to turn the war into a peace process by convincing Arab states that their goals could only be achieved through U.S.-led diplomacy. His wartime strategy was twofold: first, demonstrate the futility of Arab militarism and Soviet “radicalism” by preventing the defeat of the U.S. ally, and second, maintain contact with the warring parties as much as possible during the war in order to shape events and preserve the possibility of a post-war peace process.116 This would include forcing a ceasefire at the appropriate moment; Israel, Nixon instructed, “should not get away with just having [their expected victory] hang over for another four years and have us at odds with the Arab world.”117 If managed well, the United States believed it could initiate post-war diplomacy with credit in the bank with both parties, with Israel for having steadfastly stood by its defense and with the Arabs for having stopped Israel’s anticipated advance. The objective of U.S. policy, in other words, changed from deliberately frustrating Arab demands to showing the Arab world that Washington – and only Washington – could achieve its interests. Why the U.S. policy change? Kissinger explains that the primary geopolitical concern was the fear that regional conflict could draw in the superpowers. This fear proved far from theoretical when on October 24 the Soviet Union threatened to militarily intervene to save the Egyptian Third Army from potential Israeli annihilation.118 A second concern involved the U.S. interest in supporting friendly “moderate” Arab governments vis-à-vis anti-Western “radical” ones. Conflagration of Arab-Israeli fighting reliably roused popular anger against Israel and put so-called moderate Arab states in the risky position of deciding between Western-friendly policies and the demands of their people. A prime example was the Arab oil embargo, which underscored the threat of the unresolved Arab-Israeli conflict to U.S. interests.119 Still other factors convinced U.S. leadership that the post-war diplomatic investment would best begin with Egypt. The Sinai Peninsula, for one, was strategically and religiously less important to Israel than were the other Arab territories that it during the June 1967 War, the Golan Heights, the West Bank, and East Jerusalem. Producing Israeli concessions would therefore be much easier on the Egyptian front. Kissinger also adds that Cairo’s
114 Quandt, Decade of Decisions, 129. 115 Kissinger, Years of Upheaval, 468. 116 Ibid., 468, 467, 503. 117 Ibid., 468. 118 Ibid., 587–91. 119 Ibid.
32 constructive communications with Washington throughout the war reinforced his perception that Sadat’s aims against Israel were as limited as his ambitions with respect to the United States were grand.120 Indeed, Kissinger’s public recounting in his memoirs of Cairo’s wartime communications with the United States supports the argument that President Sadat succeeded in convincing the United States to consider a closer relationship with Egypt and to prioritize the Arab-Israeli conflict. Regarding the former, Kissinger’s memoirs reveal his interpretation that Egyptian messaging was part of a larger strategy to realign with Washington. Cairo messaged Washington nearly every day of the conflict, for example, and as early as the second day of the war Egyptian National Security Advisor Hafiz Ismail sent a message to Kissinger that referenced Sadat’s limited objectives, stating Egypt did not intend to “deepen the engagements or widen the confrontation.”121 Kissinger admits to his readers, “Until this message, I had not taken Sadat seriously…. Now I was beginning to understand…. Sadat wanted to be rid of the Soviets to remove an encumbrance both to the war he was planning and to his projected move toward the United States.122 He repeats this assessment elsewhere, stating, “Egyptian messages indicated an intention to break free of Soviet tutelage; we were determined to explore the prospect.”123 American responses to Cairo, as Kissinger retells them, further demonstrate that U.S. policy would now support an active role in a peace process. Kissinger’s October 8 reply to Ismail’s first message reads:
…[T]he United States will do everything possible to assist the contending parties to bring the fighting to a halt. The United States, and I personally, will also actively participate in assisting the parties to reach a just resolution of the problems which have for so long plagued the Middle East.124
On October 14, he wrote:
The United States wishes to emphasize again that it recognizes the unacceptability to the Egyptian side of the conditions which existed prior to the outbreak of recent hostilities. The U.S. side will make a major effort as soon as hostilities are terminated to assist in bringing a just and lasting peace to the Middle East….125
And on October 16, sensing Sadat might be tempted to insist on what he perceived to be the unrealistic and counterproductive demand of conditioning a ceasefire on Israel’s withdrawal from all of Sinai, Kissinger emphasizes that America’s diplomatic offices would be contingent on the separation of a ceasefire from peace negotiations:
The objective of the U.S. side continues to be to terminate the present fighting in circumstances that will facilitate progress toward a final settlement. Egyptian forces have already accomplished much.
120 Ibid., 615. 121 Ibid., 481–82. 122 Ibid., 482. 123 Ibid., 528. 124 Ibid., 488. 125 Ibid., 522–23.
33 The humiliation…after 1967 has been erased…. The necessity of a political settlement is becoming much clearer to all parties. …What the U.S. side can promise and will fulfill is to make every effort to assist in achieving a final, just settlement once a cease-fire is reached. …If diplomacy is to be given a full opportunity, a cease-fire must precede it.…Egypt will find the guarantee for the seriousness of this effort in the formal promise of the U.S. side to engage itself fully as well as in the objective situation.126
American action during and after the war reinforced Kissinger’s words. Saving the Egyptian Third Army was one concrete achievement. At the political level, Kissinger’s successful separation of the ceasefire from what would become the post-war diplomacy insulated Sadat in the latter from what were anticipated to be unrealistically maximalist demands from the Soviet Union and Syria, who necessarily would be involved in the former.127 This would preserve Sadat’s negotiation space in post-war diplomacy if, as I explore in the next section, the Israelis would play ball. For its part, however, the United States was all in. The visible increase in the allocation of U.S. time and energy to Arab-Israeli peace stands in stark contrast to its pre- war ambivalence. Kissinger himself invested a great deal of his personal time and prestige. His post-war “shuttle diplomacy” between Cairo, Jerusalem, and Damascus in pursuit of the disengagement of forces agreements on both fronts made him the public face of two highly publicized diplomatic initiatives. Their success and his reputation as a statesman were intertwined. William Quandt elaborates, “from October 1973 to May 1974, no issue ranked higher….Secretary Kissinger must have devoted between one-half and two-thirds of his time and energies to the Middle East.”128 Economically, the United States provided Egypt with significant amounts of aid. As Steven David documents, by the end of 1976, American wheat supplied approximately one- third of Egyptian urban consumption. By 1985, the United States had provided almost $11 billion, a significantly higher figure than the Soviets had ever provided. In terms of military support, after the peace treaty the United States made Cairo the second largest recipient of U.S. security assistance.129 External and internal threats may have pushed Sadat to seek a new superpower relationships, but as David concludes, “Sadat’s decision to realign from the USSR was made possible by the willingness and capability of the United States to take Moscow’s place by providing the external assistance necessary to keep Sadat in power.”130
The United States Moves Israel
Notwithstanding President Sadat’s comment that he was making an agreement “with the United States, not with Israel,” Israel’s eventual willingness to deal with Egypt was an essential factor in Cairo’s perception of the United States as an available alternative ally.
126 Ibid., 530–31. 127 Ibid., 547–51. 128 William Quandt, “Kissinger and the Arab-Israeli Disengagement Negotiations,” Journal of International Affairs 9, no. 1 (1975), 38. 129 David, Choosing Sides, 95. 130 Ibid., 94.
34 America’s comparative advantage over the Soviet Union was its ability to move Israel through diplomacy. Had Israel been unwilling to withdraw from the Sinai Peninsula, Sadat would have had thin gruel to justify realignment toward the United States. Fully appreciating this dynamic, approximately three months after the war Washington negotiated the first Sinai disengagement of forces agreement (Sinai One), leading to Israel’s first ever military withdrawal from territory held for a meaningful length of time and removing the threat to Egypt’s Third Army for good.131 Almost two years later, in September 1975, the United States helped broker the second Sinai disengagement agreement (Sinai Two), this time restoring Egyptian sovereignty to the Giddi and Mitla passes. Of course, subsequent diplomacy under the Ford and Carter Administrations involved the painstaking labors that culminated in the 1978 Camp David Accords and the 1979 Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty, which led to the full return of the Sinai Peninsula to Egypt. Sadat’s exchange of Soviet arms for U.S. diplomacy had paid off. In late November 1973, however, these milestones did not seem inevitable. A combination of strategic, psychological, and political factors conspired to harden Israeli positions toward Egypt in the weeks and months after the war. The Israeli strategic calculus had to consider that although the Israeli military ended the war in an operationally advantageous position – Israel occupied more Egyptian territory than it had before the war and had the Egypt’s Third Army surrounded – the IDF lost its aura of invincibility. Would withdrawal now earn Israel a reputation for buckling under pressure and encourage future belligerence? Psychologically, the Israeli government felt little incentive to cede territory to an Egyptian government that had just executed a debilitating surprise attack.132 An agreement to withdraw would presumably involve an exchange of tangible territory for the abstract and easily revocable promise of peace, a huge emotional leap of faith in a country with whom Israel had fought three wars in the preceding three decades. Politically, Israeli elections had been rescheduled for December 1973 and Golda Meir’s Labor Party government, already fending charges of military unpreparedness, could not afford to be seen as soft. Interestingly, these short-term pressures stood at odds with what was actually a long- standing foreign policy preference. Avi Kober writes that, throughout its history, Israel, surrounded and outnumbered by enemies real and perceived, deliberately sought to approach diplomacy with adversarial states in the Arab world through compartmentalized, bilateral talks over multilateral negotiations. “Although it may be an exaggeration to use the term ‘divide and rule’…” he writes, “it was at least a policy of ‘divide and survive.’”133 In the parlance of the classic game theory stag hunt scenario, the stag escapes only if one of its hunters is tempted to defect from his team and satisfy his hunger with a hare. In fact, Moshe Dayan, a former IDF Chief of Staff and Israel’s Minister of Defense from June 1967 to June 1974, claims to have advocated since 1967 a strategy of negotiating an agreement with Egypt in order to isolate Syria. In August 1972, for example, Dayan declared that Israel was open to “peace by stages” with Egypt, and not long after reiterated Israel’s readiness for a “complete peace treaty, for interim, partial or any kind.”134
131 Kissinger, Years of Upheaval, 639. 132 Ibid., 615. 133 Kober, Coalition Defection, 51. 134 Ma’oz, Syria and Israel: From War to Peace-Making (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995), 125.
35 Similarly, in 1974, Yitzhak Rabin candidly stated in his first speech as Prime Minister that he envisioned:
A full and comprehensive peace between Egypt and Israel…under which Egypt would renounce the existence of the state of war with Israel. In contrast, there is no room for another interim settlement with Syria. If we are to achieve further progress with Egypt, it will be necessary to examine whether Syria is ready to sign a peace treaty with Israel. [But]…even with peace treaties, we would not withdraw to the lines of 4 June 1967, which are not defensible and encourage aggression against us. We shall endeavor to achieve peace with Jordan based on the existence of two independence states….135
Like the United States, Israel concluded that the Egyptian, not Syrian, track was the logical starting point for post-war diplomacy. As referenced earlier, from a security perspective the Sinai Peninsula was relatively easy territory to relinquish. Its vast, flat desert and long distance from Israeli population centers would afford Israel plenty of strategic depth. The Golan Heights and West Bank, in contrast, offer its holders strategic high ground and a short distance to Israeli population centers. Religiously, moreover, the Jewish tradition does not consider the land of the Sinai Peninsula as part of the historic Land of Israel (Eretz Yisrael), as it does the West Bank, making it easier for Israel’s political leadership to sell a withdrawal to its public.136 As such, over time, U.S. diplomacy succeeded in moving Israel toward common ground with Egypt. When Golda Meir visited Washington at the end October 1973, Nixon and Kissinger made their case that Egypt’s “turn toward moderation” had created the conditions in which Israel’s interests now dictated a nuanced foreign policy over a simple defense policy. In negotiations over allowing humanitarian supplies to reach the Egypt’s trapped Third Army, for example, President Nixon expounded:
The problem you have to consider is whether the policy you have followed – being prepared with Phantoms and the Skyhawks – can succeed, lacking a settlement. The question is whether a policy of only being prepared for war…is sufficient. This last war proves the overwhelming conclusion that a policy of digging in, telling us to give you the arms and you will do the fighting, can’t be the end. Your policy has to be to move as you are moving toward talks.137
When Prime Minister Meir proved apprehensive, Kissinger explained that the United States could only soften Arab demands if Washington can deliver what the Soviets could not. “If we produced no progress at all, the Arabs would have little incentive to deal with us; it would become impossible to split Egypt from the Soviets; there would be no moderate alternative to Arab radicalism.”138 When cool analysis failed, the occasional stick proved helpful. I reviewed already the U.S. warning about Israel’s potential unwarranted destruction of Egypt’s Third Army. After the fighting, when Prime Minister Meir hesitated about attending the Geneva Conference, President Nixon warned that he could not justify continued support for Israel if
135 Ibid., 140. 136 Seale, Asad of Syria, 368. 137 Kissinger, Years of Upheaval, 622–23. 138 Ibid., 622.
36 no Israeli representative attended.139 And during the Sinai Two negotiations, President Ford and Kissinger pressed Prime Minister Rabin on the location of the Israeli withdrawal lines to a point where, Quandt describes, “Israeli leaders apparently decided that it would be…undesirable to resist the United States indefinitely.”140 Paradoxically, Israel’s leadership came to depend on U.S. pressure in order to justify policies that might be too emotionally difficult or politically risky otherwise.”141 The U.S. approach to Israel during the war and throughout the post-war diplomacy of the 1970s, to be sure, was surely more carrot than stick. Kissinger was explicit in his instructions to senior U.S. officials that “our influence in the Middle East depended on Israel being perceived as a close ally difficult to move.”142 The record reveals, however, that when conditions required, the United States used a wide range of its instruments of power in order to present the U.S.-Israeli alliance as viable alternative to Cairo’s preexisting partners.
Summary and Analysis
The above section demonstrates that the 1973 War changed Washington’s calculus of the U.S. interest vis-à-vis Egypt, which eventually brought about Israeli negotiations over the Sinai Peninsula. President Sadat’s pre-war security interests led him to desire foreign policy realignment away from Moscow toward Washington; war, he concluded, was required to yield him partners. The change in U.S. policy affected by the war highlights the necessity of substitute ally availability as a causal variable in foreign policy realignment. Indeed, that Egypt’s eager and constructive courting of Washington served as a constant feature of the pre-war, wartime, and post-war periods highlights the fact that Cairo’s desire for realignment alone was not a sufficient force to produce the desired outcome. Kissinger, both an academic and a statesman, reminds us not to take this critical theoretical variable for granted:
In a society used to relatively simple answers and in a body politic racked by Watergate…the public ambiguities of our policy increasingly tempted domestic opposition. Conservatives resented the very fact of a Soviet-American dialogue. Liberals suspected its pragmatism. Both shared the classically American nostalgia for policy based on concepts more “elevated” than the national interest. I was preparing a journey to the Middle East that would test not only our diplomacy but also our ability to manage the conflict pressures at home. Could America, emerging in a decisive role in the struggle for peace in the Middle East, unfreeze and reshape the lethal alignments of a quarter century?143
To accomplish this, President Sadat had to convince his desired allies of the dangers posed by spurning his overtures and ignoring his interests. Then he made them an offer they could not refuse. The result, as we know, was that America could in fact “unfreeze and reshape” alignments. However, U.S. mediation could not have succeeded without Egyptian (and
139 Quandt, Decade of Decisions, 222. 140 Ibid., 272. 141 Kissinger, Years of Upheaval, 624. 142 Ibid., 624. 143 Ibid., 613.
37 Israeli) cooperation. For though the Egyptian military was defeated and its Third Army on the brink of annihilation, Egypt’s political leadership could have accepted destruction and rebuilt their military through Soviet aid, as Nasser did in the 1956 Suez Crisis and as the Syrians would do now.144 Accordingly, there must have been some difference between Sadat and Asad’s respective calculations of their political and national interests that empowered the former to accept the separate peace agreements and foreign policy realignment that the latter refused.
Foregone Revisionist Ambitions
In contrast to Gamal Abd an-Nasser, who positioned Egypt (and himself) as the natural leader of the world’s Arab, Muslim, and African worlds, Anwar Sadat chose to secure more limited national interests, namely regaining the Sinai Peninsula and strengthening his domestic economy, knowing that the price involved ceding regional primacy to Israel and abandoning Egypt’s pride of place in the Arab world. The following section demonstrates that Sadat’s realignment toward the United States was the logical conclusion of a foreign policy that substituted limited goals obtainable within the prevailing regional order over the revisionist ambitions of the Nasser era. I argue that Sadat’s limited political goals are evidenced through his limited military operations in the 1973 war, his consistent deception of and defection from his more ambitious wartime allies, his demonstrated post-war preference for negotiating with Israel bilaterally instead of as part of a joint Arab or combined Arab and Soviet position, and his conscious decision to accept punishment from his Arab, Muslim, and Non-Alignment Movement counterparts for his diplomacy. The practical collective effect of these actions was to voluntarily limit his territorial and political leverage vis-à-vis Israel and to publicly deviate from popular Arab opinion, actions incompatible with designs for greater power beyond Egypt’s borders. Analyses of each of these categories of empirical implications demonstrate that Sadat sidelined his preexisting allies precisely because he assessed that their revisionist ambitions would preclude his ability to attain the bare minimum he needed to survive – interests that, in his view, only Washington could secure.
Defection in War
President Sadat’s relatively limited military goals reflect the limits of his political interests. The latter, to be sure, were far from trivial. According to Kissinger, Sadat stated in their first meeting after the war that his goals included shattering the myth of Israeli security through domination, restoring Egypt’s self-respect and national honor, regaining “my” territory, and making peace.145 History cannot read too much into one rendition of one meeting; however, Sadat’s omission of an explicit post-war demand that Israel withdraw from all of the territories captured in 1967, in his first opportunity to record his post-war
144 Sadat, In Search of Identity, 145. 145 Kissinger, Years of Upheaval, 637–38.
38 interests with the most powerful diplomat in the country that he had been diligently courting for the very purpose of achieving his post-war aims, is glaring.146 So, what of his military goals? Sadat’s cessation of offensive military operations early in the conflict and while the Egyptian-Syrian alliance was gaining momentum suggests that, from the first shot, he planned to content himself with the symbolic victory of successfully crossing the Suez Canal. Specifically, after winning the battle of the crossing on October 7 and repelling an Israeli counterattack on October 8, the Egyptian army dug in. With Israel on its heels on two fronts, President Sadat initiated a planned “operational pause” and, rather than make a run for the Sinai Peninsula’s strategic Giddi and Mitla passes 40-50 kilometers inland, he established defensive positions some ten kilometers east of the canal. Asad’s biographer records that for a week the Syrians pleaded with the Egyptians to advance in order to press the Arabs’ advantage and thin Israel’s defenses.147 Russian leaders are said to have wondered aloud, “What is the limit of their limited objectives?” and, “I don’t see why your troops are not advancing.”148 The answer, Seale explains, was that “Sadat’s aim was to give the immobile peace process a jolt, not to embark upon large-scale reconquest.”149 Inasmuch as war is politics by other means, the disparity in Egyptian and Syrian military aims presages the gap between their respective post-war political goals. Sadat’s relatively limited political ambitions are further evidenced by his various wartime deceptions of and defections from Syria. Deviations from coordinated positions in at least three key areas throughout the wartime period reinforce the arguments that politically too Sadat was not preoccupied with maximizing his leverage vis-à-vis his adversary and that Cairo saw the heavier appetites of Egypt’s traditional allies as a liability. First, Sadat’s approach to the war indicates that he recognized his Syrian counterpart’s larger ambitions. According to the memoirs of EAF Chief Of Staff Lieutenant General Shazly, Sadat, in fact, directed Egyptian military leadership to develop two war plans, one real and one fake. The real plan, The High Minarets, envisaged limited military operations “within the [EAF’s] own capabilities.”150 The fake plan, Granite Two, which Shazly writes was the only plan shared with Damascus, outlined a more ambitious offensive toward the Giddi and Mitla passes. The purpose of Granite Two was to entice the Syrians into a wartime alliance through the false promise of a far-reaching campaign to recapture territories lost in 1967.151 As Patrick Seale acknowledges, “Sadat knew that Asad would not fight alongside him unless the joint aim was the liberation of both Sinai and Golan.”152 Sadat needed a Syrian offensive in order to provide his forces with the most favorable
146 Sadat’s account of the same meeting does not contradict Kissinger’s in this regard. Separately, Kissinger’s recounts that in his February 1973 talk with Egyptian National Security Advisor Ismail the latter spoke passionately about the Palestinian issue but made no mention of Syria. See Sadat, In Search of Identity, 267– 70, 339. 147 The Egyptians did initiate a failed offensive toward the Passes on October 14, but Sadat’s motivation for ordering that offensive appear to have been political. “The outcome was predictable,” Chief of Staff Shazly wrote later, “Even now, six years later, I have no idea why that attack was mounted.” See Shazly, The Crossing of the Suez, 248–50. 148 Seale, Asad of Syria, 207. 149 Ibid., 208. 150 Shazly, The Crossing of the Suez, 35–39. 151 Seale, Asad of Syria, 197–99; Shazly, The Crossing of the Suez, 35–39. 152 Seale, Asad of Syria, 198.
39 conditions for crossing the Suez, but once he reached those objectives he would not allow the Syrians to obstruct his political interests. Second, Egypt’s communications with states other than the Soviet Union and Syria during the war bolsters the arguments that Sadat considered the grand ambitions of his wartime allies a threat to his relatively limited political goals. Egypt’s wartime correspondence with Washington is detailed above; however, one communication that bears repeating is Sadat’s message to Kissinger on October 7, the day after the start of the war, in which he assured the United States that Egypt did “not intend to deepen the engagements or widen the confrontation.”153 This assurance directly contradicts what Sadat had promised Asad in Granite Two. Similarly, while Sadat, Asad, and the Soviet Union collaborated on pressuring Jordan’s King Hussein to open a third front against Israel, the Egyptian President reportedly also sent private messages to King Hussein without Syria’s knowledge urging Amman to stay out of the war.154 Thus President Sadat’s unilateral wartime messaging had the effect of minimizing the pressure on his enemy while in combat, indicating that Cairo had no intention to change regional borders through force or approach post-war diplomacy with either maximum military pressure or political strength in numbers. Still a third critical point of departure between Cairo and Damascus during the war was President Sadat’s unilateral acceptance of a ceasefire on October 22. That episode began on October 16 when Sadat issued an “open letter to President Nixon” in a public speech that included a proposal for a ceasefire and follow-up United Nations peace conference. Syria was not informed beforehand. In the ensuing days, as the IDF steadily surrounded Egypt’s Third Army, Sadat sent Asad a desperate message suggesting he was ready to stop fighting. Asad pleaded for “continuing and intensifying” the fight but received no response.155 The UN Security Council finally adopted Resolution 338 just after midnight on October 22 calling for a ceasefire later that day. (The text called for a ceasefire in place and the implementation of Resolution 242, but notably omitted the words “withdrawal” and “Palestine.”) Egypt and Israel accepted the ceasefire immediately; Asad, perturbed that Sadat had abandoned him on the battlefield, held out for another day and a half and even then accepted it only with an unsolicited caveat clarifying his interpretation that Resolution 338 called for Israel’s withdrawal from all of the territories occupied in 1967 and the safeguarding of Palestinian rights.156
Post-War Bilateralism
Following the war, Sadat continued to shield his priorities from Syrian and Soviet maximalism by favoring bilateral negotiations with Israel over participation in joint superpower-mediated talks as part of a joint Arab bloc. As far as Asad was concerned, even Sadat’s decision to entertain disengagement talks involved a continuation of the wartime pattern of defection: “How can you disengage your forces from Israel’s when Israel is still
153 Ibid., 208. 154 Kober, Coalition Defection, 72. 155 Seale, Asad of Syria, 219–24. 156 Seale, Asad of Syria, 219–24.
40 facing Syria in combat?” He challenged, “Did we go to war to arrive at this? Do you have the right to act alone?”157 Asad reportedly claimed that in subsequent conversations Sadat promised not to attend the post-war conference that the superpowers were planning in Geneva unless the disengagement lines were agreed in advance. And at the November 1973 Algiers Summit Egypt and Syria both agreed to resolutions permitting negotiation with Israel pending the reestablishment of Palestinian rights. In the event, Sadat agreed to attend without predetermined lines, with no explicit reference to the Palestinians in the conference invitation, and conceded not to raise the Palestinian issue.158 Asad declined his invitation. Asad’s absence from the Geneva Conference served Sadat’s interest quite well. Now he could enter bilateral negotiations with Israel without concern of Syrian meddling.159 As before the war, Sadat would not subject his vital interests to the traditionally maximalist Arab demands for Israeli concessions that Sadat perceived were unrealistic in the best of circumstances, let alone upon the basis of the post-war disposition of forces on the ground.160 This was the assessment of Geneva Conference architect Henry Kissinger: “Sadat was convinced that unless Egypt proceeded alone President Hafez al-Asad would always find some pretext for delay or put forward impossible demands.”161 Seale similarly concludes that Sadat agreed to the subgroups because he was “eager to escape from any Syrian or Soviet control.”162 Thus the Geneva Conference concluded with no outcome, and in subsequent bilateral talks Egypt and Israel signed the first Disengagement of Forces Agreement, also known as Sinai One, on January 18, 1974. For Kissinger, Sinai One would “mark Egypt’s passage from reliance on the Soviet Union to partnership (in Sadat’s phrase) with the United States.”163 Sadat himself spoke to these motivations in a September 1975 speech to Egypt’s Parliament, in which he justified his diplomacy with the United States and Israel upon the basis of the failure of earlier Arab rejectionism and maximalism:
…The most outstanding feature of Arab conduct [before 1973] was its negative attitude, trying to outdo one another with words; it was rejection coupled with submission to the real state of affairs... The Arabs were defeated in 1948, they rejected the Partition Plan and fell into quiescence; merely getting their rejection down on record was all that they were capable of. Israel later broke the armistice agreement and took much more than was allotted to it by the Partition Plan; once again the Arabs registered their rejection and quiescence, and so it always went. …Ever since I became president, my actions have been governed by a number of considerations in the light of the experiences and lessons of the past: …The second is to break out of the vicious circle of trying to outdo each other and working ourselves into inextricable positions which restrict our options and isolate us from the world, particularly in view of the fact that this is not done from a position of strength but by people who cannot deliver one tenth of what they promise. We should be straightforward and frank with Arab public opinion and not feed
157 Ibid., 227–28. 158 Ibid., 229–30. 159 Kissinger, Years of Upheaval, 769–70. 160 Kober, Coalition Defection, 104; Sadat, In Search of Identity, 293; Seale, Asad of Syri, 227. 161 Kissinger, Years of Upheaval, 815. 162 Seale, Asad of Syria, 230. 163 Kissinger, Years of Upheaval, 825.
41 of the enemy’s strength and his points of weakness, as we must be realistic in our understanding of relations between nations insofar as they bear on the situation. Our Palestinian brothers have toured the world just as we have and they know as we do that despite differences in the positions of various nations of the world, every one of them, without exception, draws the line short of any encroachment on the existence of Israel as a state. The two major powers are no different in this respect from the rest of the world.164
The history of the second Egyptian-Israeli interim agreement signed in September 1975, Sinai Two, followed a similar course. According to Seale, Asad warned his wartime ally that a second partial agreement involving Sinai would harm his chances to regain the Golan Heights. Sadat reassured him that Egypt would agree to nothing less than Syria’s demands, but once again concluded a partial agreement on terms far short of a comprehensive peace agreement.165 Moscow boycotted the Sinai Two signing ceremony in protest that the U.S.-sponsored agreement that had “frozen” the regional balance of power in Israel’s favor and later attacked Sadat for abandoning the Arab liberation struggle. These developments must have reinforced Sadat’s conviction that Soviet involvement would only limit his room for maneuver by introducing maximalist positions that would have forced him to back off his own more limited demands for fear of appearing “less Arab” than Moscow.166 The year 1977 witnessed still more Egyptian maneuvers to avoid the constraints inevitably inherent in calls for a comprehensive settlement, this time from the United States, too. President Jimmy Carter took office in 1977 and early in his administration called for a comprehensive peace agreement to be negotiated by the end of his first year in office.167 Carter reportedly got along well with President Asad and sympathized with the Syrian President’s preference for the resumption of the Geneva Conference, this time with Palestinian involvement. Asad may have had cause for hope that October, when a draft joint U.S.-USSR communiqué called for a resumption of the Geneva process in order to reach “a fundamental solution to all aspects of the Middle East problem in its entirety” and “the resolution of the Palestinian question, including ensuring the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people.”168 However, Egypt had no interest in subjecting itself to a joint Arab delegation at a U.S.-USSR-sponsored conference. On this point Egyptian and Israeli interests dovetailed. Patrick Seale writes, “Sadat shared the Israelis’ dislike of negotiating in an open forum at Geneva under the eye of suspicious, even hostile, parties such as the Soviet Union and Syria. Again like Israel, he was unimpressed with Carter’s vision of a settlement to satisfy everyone, so at odds with Kissinger’s scheme of a tripartite partnership of the United States, Israel and Egypt....”169
164 Sadat, “Speech by Egyptian President Anwar Sadat to the Central Committee of the People’s Assembly, Cairo, September 4, 1975. [Excerpts].,” Journal of Palestine Studies 5, no. 1/2 (Autumn/Winter 1975/1976): 270. 165 Seale, Asad of Syria, 255–59. 166 Heikal, Mohamed, The Sphinx and the Commissar, 271; Seale, Asad of Syria, 258; Kissinger, Years of Upheaval, 843. 167 Seale, Asad of Syria, 291. 168 Ibid., 300–01. 169 Ibid., 303.
42 Therefore, Egypt and Israel sought to bypass the Geneva Conference framework in 1977, just as they had done in 1973-1974, except this time they would be sidestepping the United States as well. In September 1977, Egyptian Deputy Premier Hasan Tuhami and Israeli Foreign Minister Moshe Dayan met alone in Morocco to discuss a bilateral Egyptian- Israeli peace treaty.170 Two months later Sadat made his historic visit to Jerusalem.
Knowingly into the Abyss
President Sadat, former aid to President Nasser, was no stranger to the requirements of popular pan-Arab leadership. He knew that his visit to Jerusalem and the subsequent bilateral Egyptian-Israeli peace initiative would lead to Egypt’s isolation in the Arab world. Recognizing Israel before the establishment of a Palestinian state was not a move of a populist Arab leader seeking regional prominence. Moreover, removing the Egyptian military threat to Israel in the Sinai Peninsula would effectively guarantee, or “freeze” as the Soviets complained, Israel’s regional primacy. Sadat, in other words, made the conscious decision to realign with the United States and regain his lost territory at the cost of Egypt’s regional ambitions vis-à-vis both the Arab world and Israel. After Egypt concluded peace with Israel, nearly every Arab state formally broke diplomatic ties with Cairo. Both the Arab League and the Islamic Conference Organization (ICO) expelled Egypt. Led by Fidel Castro, the Non-Aligned Movement officially condemned Egypt at its September 1979 conference in Havana.171 Syria, for its part, “saw in Egyptian-Israeli peace a continuation of Egyptian treachery, which had begun with the Egyptian defection from military collusion during the October War, continued with the interim agreements of the mid-1970s, and culminated in the separate peace.…”172 Kober adds, Syria’s response took two forms: first, attempting to build a coalition of rejectionist partners such as Libya, Algeria, the People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen, Iraq, and the PLO; and second, “the revisionist, hyper-nationalist notion of Greater Syria… a Syria-led Arab power... [to] consolidate Syria’s position as an alternative to Egypt in a leadership role.”173 Little of this could have come as a surprise to President Sadat. In addition to his instincts and experience, he was warned in multiple Arab summits; by Asad, who privately pleaded,174 threatened,175 and publicly criticized176 Sadat at nearly every major milestone in the latter’s march to Jerusalem; and, by his own advisors, not least among them Foreign
170 Kober, Coalition Defection, 106. 171 Boutros-Ghali, Egypt’s Road to Jerusalem (New York: Random House, 1997), 268. 172 Kober, Coalition Defection, 111–12. 173 Ibid., 112. 174 Seale, Asad of Syria, 219–25. 175 Seale, Asad of Syria, 237–38. Asad reportedly appealed to Sadat: “I will not be able to justify your move to Arab opinion, and this will certainly cause a loss of confidence.” 176 Ibid., 261.
43 Ministers Ismail Fahmy,177 who resigned in protest before Sadat’s visit to Jerusalem, and Boutros Boutros-Ghali.178 Sadat was unmoved that his initiative would cost him Arab leadership, and probably preferred it that way. According to Boutros-Ghali, Sadat felt that Arab support would require Arab involvement in his decision-making and that is precisely what he hoped to avoid.179 As reported by Boutros-Ghali, President Sadat explained his strategic outlook in September 1979 while the two sat overlooking the east bank of the Suez Canal:
I do not wish to underestimate the magnitude of the problems and worries that Egyptian diplomacy is facing. But all these problems and the worries pale in comparison with this land we have regained. They are not worth one square meter of this land, which we have regained without spilling the blood of my children. Boutros, I don’t want to belittle the efforts you are making, but I assure you that a square meter of this Egyptian land is far more important than your diplomatic difficulties. I am not afraid of condemnations. I am not afraid of countries’ severing diplomatic relations with us. And I am not afraid of the provocation and trivia of the Arab countries.180
It is worth noting that Boutros-Ghali, who only seconds before had been reiterating his fears regarding Egypt’s diplomatic isolation, and who throughout his memoirs places himself in the Egyptian camp that believed Sadat should give greater weight to Arab world opinion, records his response as follows: “Actually, when the meeting was over, I was fully convinced by Sadat’s argument: there was no comparison between the two elements of the equation; the political isolation would end after a while, but the regained land would remain forever ours.”181
Summary and Analysis
From planning to execution, President Sadat’s conduct of the 1973 Arab-Israeli War highlights the congruence between his military and political interests. President Asad was prepared to live in a Hobbesian state of war with Israel until his demands were met; Sadat, in contrast, would settle for a political resolution to the stalemate in Sinai. Egyptian decision-making throughout the decade leaves no doubt that President Sadat was determined to shield his diplomacy from Soviet and Syrian fetters. In fact, Soviet and Syrian leadership demonstrated throughout the decade that they would accept nothing less than far-reaching Israeli concessions that Egypt, Israel, and the United States, at least during Henry Kissinger’s period, deemed unrealistic. Therefore, the fact that Sadat defected from arrangements with his preexisting allies is less important here than the fact that he defected because he assessed anticipated Syrian and Soviet maximalism would hem him. This behavior demonstrates how foregone revisionist ambition was a central cause of Egyptian foreign policy realignment.
177 Fahmy, Negotiating for Peace in the Middle East, 256–58. 178 Boutros-Ghali, Egypt's Road to Jerusalem, 281. 179 Ibid., 155. 180 Ibid., 282. 181 Ibid., 281–82.
44 In contrast, President Sadat perceived that only the United States and, through Washington’s influence, Israel, could enable him to achieve his goals. The United States and Israel at the time favored preservation of the prevailing regional balance of power, if only by virtue of their established edge. Their price then, determined upon the basis of repeated victory in war and Sadat’s relatively minimal leverage at the bargaining table, was Egypt’s acceptance of their status quo primacy. Such acceptance would of course run counter to aspirations for pan-Arab leadership. As Kober assesses, “Sadat was convinced that territorial gains – in other words, repossession of the Sinai – necessitated a new approach toward Israel and exacted a heavy price in terms of Egypt’s status in the Arab world.”182 For an Israeli concession on the political status quo in Sinai, Egypt conceded the balance of power status quo to Israel. Accordingly, once Egypt relinquished its designs for regional leadership, a key impediment to tripartite cooperation fell away and a convergence of interests between the United States, Egypt, and Israel surfaced.
Conclusion
Egypt’s realignment from Soviet to American partnership in the 1970s stands as one of the most impactful developments of twentieth-century Middle East history. From a policy perspective, the move served as a cornerstone of U.S. strategy in the region for decades. Regarding international relations theory, it represents a hallmark case of foreign policy realignment; what the French revolution is to the study of revolutions, Egypt’s shift from Moscow to Washington is to the study of realignment. The conclusions from this chapter are summarized in Figure 1 below. The underlying cause of the subject at hand was regime insecurity. Egypt’s President Sadat faced an interlocking set of external and internal threats stemming from Israel’s occupation of the Sinai Peninsula, a failing economy, the Soviet Union’s refusal and/or inability to help in either regard, and public discontent about all of the above. Soviet support was insufficient to help Sadat meet his threats, and Moscow exacerbated many of the problems faced by Sadat. The combination of these factors, regime insecurity, insufficient support from adversarial pole 1, and AP1’s role as a source of threat, led in this instance to the potential switcher state’s initiating a realignment process through the courting of a prospective new ally in the United States. Egypt viewed the United States positively for two reasons. First, Washington held influence that the Soviets did not. Specifically, as Kissinger repeatedly expounded, the United States was uniquely capable of producing through diplomacy what neither the Soviets nor the Arabs could achieve militarily or politically. The problem for Sadat was that from 1971 to October 1973 Washington rebuffed his attempts to enlist U.S. support. The stark contrast between U.S. availability to support Egypt’s interests before and after the 1973 Arab-Israeli War provides helpful insights into at least two of the conditions under which an AP2 may make itself available. As indicated in the column labeled “IV2” in Figure 1 below, U.S. receptiveness came about only after Egypt demonstrated through limited war both that unmet Egyptian interests would threaten vital U.S. interests—among
182 Kober, Coalition Defection, 104.
45 others, avoiding a war between nuclear-armed superpowers–-and that Egypt’s political goals could be made compatible with U.S. policy. Finally, if Egyptian insecurity begat Cairo’s interest in realignment and the 1973 war made the United States an available ally, President Sadat’s shelving of the revisionist ambitions of his predecessor and his scheming to insulate his limited diplomatic objectives from Soviet and Syrian ambitions removed the final obstacle to a security relationship with the United States. If Cairo had been committed to upending Israel’s power advantage, Sadat’s endeavors would have inevitably brushed up against U.S. and Israeli interests in preserving their respective and collective advantages in the status quo balance of power. Sadat could not live with the status quo political situation in Sinai; he would, however, accept Israel’s de facto regional primacy, seeing no realistic alternative in the foreseeable future anyway, in order to resolve Egypt’s most pressing problems. Whether this is the natural disposition of Egypt,183 a modern nation-state with a relatively distinct history of national identity and autonomy in a region otherwise divided by 20th century borders, or President Sadat, heir to a millennia-old civilization, simply understood that Egypt’s naturally endowed strength would one day outweigh the necessities imposed by temporal weakness is unclear and, mercifully, a fascinating debate for a different study.
Figure 1: Summary of Egyptian realignment analysis during the 1970-1979 juncture of potential realignment
183 Henry Kissinger writes in his memoirs, “Deep down, Egypt had no Palestinian vocation; it had to overcome nationalist impulses to dedicate itself to that cause. Indeed, it is a tribute to the power of Arab ideology that Egypt sacrificed so much for so long for an enterprise emotionally so distant.” See Kissinger, Years of Upheaval, 935.
46 ` IV1 IV2 IV3 DV
Egypt 1970s: Case 1
Percep(on of Insecurity Confidence in Alterna(ve Ally Opportunity Cost of Defec(on Outcome (AP2) Availability to Revisionist Ambi(on
Condi(ons
AP2 Threat Security Preference Preference Preference Geopoli(cal Exclusive (ME) PS Geopoli(cal Internal Threat AP1 Sufficiency External Threat If PS, Unmet PS
AP1 Geopoli(cal AP2 Geopoli(cal AP2 Capability to AP1 Threat to PS Interests Threat to PS vs. AP2 Ini(ated Reinforcing (MR) or If Wedge, AP2 Seeks Support PS Priori(es Alliance Suitability to Preference: Mutually PS to Balance against If PS, AP2 Assessment
PS Interest Acceptable Before-1973 War PS Low Med N/A High w/ USSR: ME
High High Low High SQ Rev. SQ Case 1: Egypt AHer 1973 War w/USA: MR PS/ High High N/A High 1970-1979 AP2
(AP1 = USSR PS = Egypt AP2 = USA) High Willingness/High Posi 47 Chapter 3: Syrian Foreign Policy Non-Realignment (1970-1979) “The heart of [Syrian President Hafiz al-Asad’s] argument was that a genuine settlement went beyond the return of territory to a revision of the entire relationship between Israel and the Arabs.” 184 – Patrick Seale, 1988 Introduction The juncture of potential realignment created by the 1973 Arab-Israeli War presented itself to Syria just as it had to Egypt. As discussed in the previous chapter, the war ushered into the region a new political climate that prompted Damascus’s reevaluation of its standing alliance with the Soviet Union. Early Arab military successes on both fronts restored Arab national honor while destroying the perception of Israeli invincibility. At the same time, Israel’s eventual military victory laid plain the military primacy of the U.S.-Israeli alliance. The unavoidable conclusion was that only U.S.-led diplomacy, not Soviet militarism, could produce Israeli concessions. Meanwhile, President Asad’s cautious receptiveness to U.S. initiatives after the war suggests that the idea of a new relationship with the United States had become attractive to some degree.185 Why, then, did the 1970s come and go with Syria firmly in the Soviet camp? Surprisingly few studies attempt to answer this question. Many offer detailed explanations of Egypt’s dramatic realignment during this period, but the negative case of Syrian non- realignment is often glossed over or dismissed entirely, depriving those studies of the analytic power derived from comparing two nearly most-similar and deeply interrelated cases.186 This chapter seeks fill this historical and theoretical gap. Specifically, I argue in this chapter that Syria maintained its foreign policy alignment with the Soviet Union in the 1970s because realignment with the United States would have precluded President Asad’s strategic interest in revising the regional balance of power in Syria’s favor. I support this argument in three sections. First, I demonstrate that President Asad in his first decade in office did not perceive the challenges to his country and regime, real and serious though they were, to be existential threats. This relative sense of security afforded him the flexibility to pursue his foreign policy ambitions free from the constant preoccupation with staying in power. In the second section, I show that Asad concluded the United States did not constitute a viable alternative to Syria’s preexisting alliance with the Soviet Union because Washington would not support his demand for a comprehensive settlement to the Arab-Israeli conflict involving Israel’s withdrawal from all territories captured in the 1967 Arab-Israeli War and the restoration of Palestinian rights. Finally, in the third section, I explain the inherently revisionist implications of that demand, outline Asad’s firm commitment to it throughout the period, and trace his willingness to work with 184 Seale, Asad of Syria, 347–48. 185 Podeh, Chances for Peace, 11, 132. 186 For example, see Podeh, Chances for Peace, 135; Kober, Coalition Defection, 107–14; David, Choosing Sides: Alignment and Realignment in the Third World. 48 either superpower in pursuit of this highest priority strategic interest to his eventual decision to forego realignment with the United States and consolidate Syria’s alliance with the Soviet Union. Background Like his Egyptian counterpart, President Asad of Syria inherited a pro-Soviet foreign policy that he quickly moved to secure upon coming to power. Syria in 1970 also had no formal diplomatic relationship with the United States. Asad made his first official visit to Moscow three months into office and returned at least five times between then and the 1973 war, securing hundreds of millions of dollars in arms in the process.187 From the outset, Asad understood that the success of the Syrian-Soviet relationship rested on each party’s ability to support the other’s revisionist ambitions. The Soviets represented the only viable military and diplomatic ally capable of supporting Syrian interests on the world stage. Asad, in turn, well understood that Soviet support came at a cost, which for cash-strapped Syria meant that, as Seale puts it, “…arms in sufficient volume and of the right quality could be acquired only within the context of Soviet regional interests… a stable presence and listening post in the heart of the Middle East, access to friendly air and naval facilities, a lever on the peace process, and above all the curtailment of American influence.”188 Indeed, there is no record of any Syrian attempts to resume let alone improve relations with the United States before (or during) the 1973 war. Notably, however, Asad refused repeated Soviet requests to sign a friendship treaty throughout the decade. The 1973 war ushered a new period of optimism in U.S.-Syrian relations. Syrians looked at the United States as the superpower that might finally force Israel to return occupied Arab lands. After Henry Kissinger brokered the Syrian-Israeli disengagement agreement in June 1974, producing the first-ever Israeli withdrawal from captured Syrian territory, President Nixon became the first U.S. president to visit Syria, and the two countries formally resumed diplomatic relations. In 1977, President Carter hailed the Syrian President as the “leader of one of the great countries in the Middle East” and a close friend.189 Yet by the end of the decade, Damascus and Washington were back on unfriendly terms. President Asad resented U.S. policy in the Middle East, which he felt sought to preserve Syria’s subordinate position with respect to Israel, while in Washington the U.S. Department of State included Syria on its 1979 inaugural list of state sponsors of terror.190 In 1980, Asad finally signed the formal treaty of friendship with Moscow that he had resisted for so long. 187 Ma’oz, Syria and Israel, 122. 188 Seale, Asad of Syria, 187. 189 “Meeting With President Hafiz Al-Asad of Syria, Remarks of the President and President Asad Prior to Their Meeting.” 190 “State Sponsors of Terrorism,” U.S. Department of State 49 Perceptions of External and Internal Insecurity Syrian President Hafiz al-Asad faced serious external and internal challenges upon rising to power in 1970. He shared with Egypt the same powerful Israeli neighbor capable of defeating his army and violating his sovereignty at will. Also like in Egypt, his domestic opponents would ultimately pose the greatest challenge to his authority. Yet Asad’s threat environment in the 1970s differed from that of his Egyptian counterpart in two distinct ways. First, Asad did not perceive an existential threat that required him to fight or negotiate for his survival. Second, Syria’s preexisting Soviet alliance did not exacerbate the domestic threats he did face. (If anything, whereas Sadat saw the Soviets as undermining his grip on power internally, Asad was prone to view the United States as aggravating his external Israeli threat.) As a result, Asad enjoyed a relatively high degree of flexibility to pursue his international ambitions and to maneuver between both superpowers in that process. This section is divided as follows. First, I provide a brief overview of Asad’s external and internal threat environments, respectively. I then trace the evolution of the Syrian regime’s ability to tightly manage threats in the first half of the decade to the late- decade wave of opposition that ultimately constituted the greatest challenge to Asad’s presidency. Finally, I review the balance sheet regarding the Soviet Union’s ability to meet sufficiently Syrian security requirements throughout the decade. External Threats Syrian leaders had ample reason to perceive a high level of external threat in the 1970s. Like Egypt, Syria bordered an Israeli neighbor that had defeated the Syrians in the 1948- 1949 Arab-Israeli War; the 1967 Arab-Israeli War, in which Israel captured the Golan Heights; and again in the 1973 Arab-Israeli War, which ended with the IDF some twenty miles from Damascus. The failure of Syria and Egypt’s 1973 campaign in spite of its initially successful surprise attack and robust Soviet support was not lost on Damascus. Asad himself conceded years later, “The Arabs are the weaker side [in the Arab-Israeli conflict] in terms of armament, [foreign] assistance and economy.…”191 Separately, President Asad also inherited a contentious relationship with his powerful Iraqi neighbor to the east. Perhaps Iraqi-Syrian tensions were inevitable; Egypt’s abandonment of its traditional Arab leadership role created an inter-Arab power vacuum in which the two Ba’ath party-led regimes were primed to compete.192 Syria and Iraq fought over a water dispute in 1975, for example, and in 1976 Iraq deployed military forces along the Syrian border in response to Syria’s military intervention in Lebanon.193 Compounding 191 Kober, Coalition Defection, 128. 192 See Kienle, Ba’th vs. Ba’th. 193 Mufti, Sovereign Creations, 205–6. 50 the overt military threat was Iraq’s ability to recruit sympathizers and agitators among Syria’s domestic opposition.194 Internal Threats President Asad rose to power in a Syrian state that had not been particularly kind to its previous leaders. As of 1970, Syrians had lived through six coups since gaining independence in 1946.195 Asad, moreover, was a member of Sunni Muslim majority Syria’s historically despised, heterodox Alawite minority community. It could not have helped that Syria’s new Alawite president served as Defense Minister when Syria lost the Golan Heights to Israel in 1967. A number of Asad’s actions while consolidating power between 1970 and 1973 reflect his keen sense of fragility. After his coup, for example, he initially assumed only the title of Prime Minister and installed a Sunni figurehead as president. He publicly embraced the presidency only three months later. Asad also faced early public demonstrations. In January 1973, for example, Asad sparked nationwide outrage including calls for jihad against his regime when a new Syrian constitution was published that overlooked a tradition of explicitly requiring the Syrian president be Muslim. Asad amended the constitution and firmly put down the protests. Later that year he also arranged for the popular Lebanese Shi’a cleric Musa as-Sadr to publicly affirm that Alawites are Shi’a Muslims.196 Two other attempted coups in 1972 and 1973 and the assassinations of political opponents abroad further evidences Asad’s perception of threat.197 Outsiders, too, viewed Asad’s early actions as betraying a sense of insecurity. Kissinger observes that even after the 1973 war, when Asad enjoyed newfound popular support, the Syrian president approached negotiations more cautiously than his Egyptian counterpart. Kissinger recounts negotiations where he and Asad would whittle one another down in the privacy of one-on-one sessions only for Asad to then call in his advisors and repeat the conversation in order to implicate them in the pre-arranged conclusion. In Kissinger’s words, “The Egyptian President was sure of his authority; he did not need to build a consensus for individual acts…. [Asad] had to build a consensus daily, maybe even hourly. Even had he been so disposed, he could not dare the great gestures of Sadat.”198 From Manageable to Mounting Threats Sadat may have appeared more self-assured to Kissinger, but there is little doubt that Asad found his early challenges relatively more manageable than did his Egyptian counterpart. Externally, for example, Asad confronted the Israeli military with a stubborn patience that starkly contrasts President Sadat’s urgency to end the siege of the Egyptian Third Army in 194 Ibid., 205–6. 195 “Syria Profile - Timeline.” 196 Seale, Asad of Syria, 172–73. 197 Mufti, Sovereign Creations, 235. See also Seale, Asad of Syria, 183–84. 198 Kissinger, Years of Upheaval, 780–81, 936, 1083. 51 Sinai. Asad did not rush to either a ceasefire or a disengagement of forces agreement with Israel. To the contrary, he engaged Israel in a war of attrition that spring, apparently assessing that the IDF did not have the appetite to take on a second advance inside Syrian territory.199 William Quandt, a senior U.S. official who has written extensively about his involvement in the Arab-Israeli diplomacy of the 1970s, affirms this analysis, “President Asad was under less pressure than Sadat to reach some form of military disengagement agreement. While uncomfortable, the existing lines were tenable....”200 In sum, the record shows that Asad perceived the Israeli military threat in the immediate aftermath of the 1973 war to be more manageable than did his Egyptian counterpart. With respect to internal threats, Malik Mufti points out that Syria in the 1970s experienced a significant strengthening of state power in terms of the government’s autonomy, efficacy, and legitimacy.201 One reason was Asad’s ability to appoint Alawite loyalists to key posts in his regime. (Sadat, in contrast, enjoyed no such sectarian loyalty in the security forces; rather, many argue that Sadat was allowed to succeed Nasser precisely because he lacked a power base and could therefore be more easily manipulated or pushed aside. 202) A second factor stemmed from the fact that Asad’s predecessor was deeply unpopular. Whereas Sadat succeeded perhaps the most popular Arab leader in modern history, Asad enjoyed early public support due to social, economic, and foreign policies that were relatively successful compared to those of the rigidly ideological Salah Jadid era. Still, the latter half of the 1970s confronted the Syrian regime with a steady rise in domestic and international challenges. These derived largely from three broad factors: a poor economy; Asad’s June 1976 military intervention in the Lebanese civil war; and religious- and sectarian-based opposition to Syria’s Alawite-led regime. First, despite the early successes of Asad’s development and institution-building programs, problems in education, healthcare, employment, and domestic production persisted and compounded. The Syrian Prime Minister himself publicly acknowledged in 1977 widespread problems in terms of corruption, public service and market inefficiencies, inflation and shortages on goods, “brain drain,” and illiteracy. These grievances mobilized opposition across Syrian society, including among Islamic groups, urban middle classes, and intellectuals and artists. One international report observed in 1980 that “for the first time… it is the president himself who is being condemned.…”203 Second, Syria’s June 1976 military intervention in the Lebanese civil war in support the Lebanese Christian establishment against Lebanese Sunni Muslims and the (predominantly Sunni) Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) was deeply unpopular in Sunni-majority Syria and beyond. The controversial move was partly defensive in origin; Asad intervened both to prevent an unchecked PLO base in Lebanon from provoking Israeli reprisals into Arab lands and to preclude the consolidation of a then budding Israeli- Maronite Christian alliance in Beirut.204 Scholars also ascribe offensive intentions to the 199 Ma’oz, Asad: The Sphinx of Damascus, 94; Seale, Asad of Syria, 211. 200 Quandt, “Kissinger and the Arab-Israeli Disengagement Negotiations,” 39. 201 Mufti, Sovereign Creations, 238; Raymond Hinnebusch, Syria: Revolution From Above (London: Routledge, 2001), 69. 202 David, Choosing Sides, 57. 203 Ma’oz, Asad: The Sphinx of Damascus, 75–82, 150–59. 204 Hinnebusch, Syria, 155–56. 52 intervention, at least partly explaining it as part of a broader realpolitik strategy to increase Syria’s relative weight vis-à-vis Israel and its Arab rivals.205 Still others view it as part of an irredentist design to assert control over territories traditionally known collectively as Syria, including modern day Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, Israel, and the Palestinian territories.206 Whatever the reason, Asad’s war against Lebanese Muslims and Palestinians cost him dearly abroad and at home. Protests from around the region came quickly. As mentioned above, Saddam Hussein ordered Iraqi military units to the Syrian border. Lebanese and PLO leaders declared war against Asad. The Arab oil states cut back on economic assistance, and the Soviet Union, none too pleased that its Syrian client was targeting its Lebanese clients, withheld significant military support.207 The most potent objections to Asad’s Lebanon policy and the third great challenge to Asad’s rule in the latter half of the decade came from within Syria. Asad’s military action against Lebanese Muslims and the PLO hit a raw nerve among many Syrians, who viewed it as what Raymond A. Hinnebusch describes as an assault on “the touchstone of Arabism.”208 The secular Arab nationalist Ba’ath Party’s co-founder Salah al-Din al-Bitar criticized the intervention from his exile in France, attributing Asad’s poor decision to his being “lonely, cut off from the people, stifling all democracy.”209 (Bitar would be assassinated in Paris in July 1980.) The intervention also emboldened Syria’s militant Islamic opposition, who long seethed at Asad’s secular, Alawite minority-led regime and took advantage of widespread opposition to the intervention to initiate campaign of violence that quickly took on a highly sectarian dimension. Between 1976 and 1979, a wave of terror against government and civilian Alawite targets took dozens of lives, among them: the commander of the Hama garrison (October 1976), the rector of Damascus University (February 1977), the missile corps commander (June 1977), an Aleppo University professor (November 1977), a leader of Syria’s professional dental society (March 1978), the Ministry of the Interior director of police affairs (August 1978), and Asad’s personal doctor (August 1979).210 The drip of violence turned into a deluge when in June 1979 an Aleppo Artillery School officer ambushed and slaughtered dozens of his own Alawite cadets. Events spiraled out of control after that, leading to the regime’s June 1980 massacre of hundreds of Muslim Brother inmates in their jail cells and, later, its infamous 1982 shelling of the Islamist stronghold city of Hama in which some 20,000 to 30,000 Syrians were killed.211 The details of these events lay beyond the temporal scope of this chapter, but they nonetheless underline the seriousness of the mounting threat to Asad in the late 1970s. That said, as I show later in this chapter, the worst of this violence took place after Asad had given up on the prospect of a closer relationship with the United States. 205 Ma’oz, Asad: The Sphinx of Damascus, 114. 206 See detailed discussion of Greater Syria later in this chapter. 207 Seale, Asad of Syria, 286–87, 320. 208 Hinnebusch, Syria, 155. 209 Seale, Asad of Syria, 285–86. 210 Ibid., 316–17. 211 Ma’oz, Asad: The Sphinx of Damascus, 154-163. 53 Soviet Sufficiency On balance, Asad found the Soviet Union to be a sufficiently supportive security partner. He understood the Soviets could not deliver on Israel: the Soviet Union had reliably supported Syria during the 1973 war, but there was no question that Moscow could neither enable its Arab allies to defeat Israel militarily nor produce Israeli concessions diplomatically. Still, the Soviet Union was the only country willing to arm the Syrian military to confront Israel, and Moscow did not stir the sort of frustrations in Syria that took place in Egypt. Regarding this latter point, Soviet policies did not pose distinct problems for the Asad regime. While Syria’s close partnership with the “atheistic” Soviet Union rankled Asad’s Islamist opposition – Islamist militants had targeted and murdered a number of Soviet officials during the anti-regime terror campaign at the end of the decade – that campaign was hardly a direct result of the Syrian-Soviet relationship.212 The guerilla movement against the regime and its affiliates, be they Alawite civilians or Soviet officials, stemmed from deep-seated ethno-sectarian grievances, notably heightened by Syria’s 1976 intervention into Lebanon, which the Soviets opposed. In any event, the pro-Israeli United States would hardly have been more acceptable to Asad’s Islamist dissenters. Similarly, Syria’s civilian and military leadership did not leave a record of frustration with Soviet perpetuation of a “no-war, no-peace” stalemate on the Golan. Whereas Sadat found his stalemate in the Sinai Peninsula unsustainable, Asad conveyed to the Americans after the 1973 war that he preferred the stalemate over a suboptimal peace agreement.213 Moreover, the presence of Soviet personnel in Syria did not foment the same level of public and official resentment as did the Soviet presence in Egypt. This difference may owe to the relatively small number of Soviets stationed in Syria; according to Michael Eisenstadt and Kenneth Pollack, at its peak the Soviet presence in Syria numbered around 3,000 advisors as compared to the nearly 20,000 advisors in Egypt at height of the 1969-1970 Egyptian-Israeli War of Attrition.214 Summary and Analysis President Asad’s threat perception was real and justified for much of the 1970s. It is hardly conceivable that any newly installed leader of Syria in 1970, then plagued by successive coups and wartime losses to Israel, no less an Alawite, could have felt otherwise. Yet it is equally clear that Asad’s troubles in the first half of the decade paled in comparison to those of Sadat. Asad’s relative popularity compared to that of his predecessor, his firm grip on 212 Ibid., 324. 213 Kissinger, Years of Upheaval, 1045; Quandt, “Kissinger and the Arab-Israeli Disengagement Negotiations,” 39. 214 Michael Eisenstadt and Kenneth Pollack, “Armies of Snow and Armies of Sand: The Impact of Soviet Military Doctrine on Arab Militaries,” The Middle East Journal 55, no. 4 (Autumn 2001), 552–54; Ma’oz, Asad: The Sphinx of Damascus, 86. 54 state institutions, and the absence of a costly war of attrition with Israel between 1967 and 1973 afforded him a measure of flexibility with his public and elite that his Egyptian counterpart did not enjoy. Asad would not face a truly existential threat until Syria’s Islamic opposition mobilized waves of violence around the country at the tail end of the decade. By then, however, Egypt’s defection was complete and Asad was more likely to view Moscow as an indispensible counterbalance to the U.S.-sponsored diplomacy he despised. A second key difference between Asad’s security environment in the mid to late 1970s and that of Sadat at his tensest moments is a lack of evidence that Syria’s relationship with Soviet Union compounded Asad’s external or internal challenges. Israel’s occupation of the Golan Heights did not agitate Asad’s power base as it had Sadat’s. Neither did the behavior of Soviet military personnel in Syria provoke widespread resentment. After the disagreement over Lebanon came to the fore – a decision Asad took with full knowledge of Moscow’s position – Damascus and Moscow eventually resolved their differences in order to preserve the strategic relationship. If anything, in Asad’s view it was the United States that exacerbated the threats to Syria by supporting a bilateral peace process between Egypt and Israel that pacified Israel’s southern flank and left Syria vulnerable to its mortal enemy. In other words, President Asad judged Moscow a sufficient, if imperfect, superpower ally. In October 1980, Syria finally signed the friendship treaty with the Soviet Union that Asad had avoided for a decade.215 This outcome, however, should not be treated as historically inevitable. While biographers and analysts of Hafiz al-Asad interpret certain elements of Syrian history differently, they largely agree that the Syrian president was willing to work with either superpower if it would further his strategic interests.216 Indeed, the roughly year and a half following the 1973 war and the first year of U.S. President Jimmy Carter’s administration offered momentary periods of optimism that a new U.S.- Syrian relationship might emerge. The next section examines those junctures of potential realignment and explores why they proved so fleeting. Alternative Ally Availability The post-1973 war period brought about new levels of optimism in the U.S.-Syrian relationship. President Asad was tempted by the prospect that the U.S.-sponsored post-war diplomacy might enable him to force Israeli concessions through the negotiation of a comprehensive settlement to the Arab-Israeli conflict, first under the auspices of Henry Kissinger during the Nixon and Ford administrations, respectively, and later during the Carter administration. Asad, however, ultimately concluded that the United States lacked either the will or capacity to support his political terms. The sections below outline the Syrian president’s gradual disillusionment with the United States due to Washington’s prioritization of Egyptian-Israeli bilateralism at the expense of a multilaterally-negotiated comprehensive settlement, beginning with second 215 Seale, Asad of Syria, 311; Ma’oz, Asad: The Sphinx of Damascus, 147–48. 216 Leverett, Inheriting Syria: Bashar’s Trial By Fire (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2005), 52–56; Ma’oz, Asad: The Sphinx of Damascus, 135–48; Hinnebusch, Syria, 151–55; Seale, Asad of Syria. 55 Egyptian-Israeli disengagement agreement in September 1975 (Sinai Two) and finally in the run up to Anwar Sadat’s 1977 visit to Jerusalem. Asad’s Early Optimism Regarding the United States The year and a half after the 1973 war ushered in a period of unprecedented optimism in the U.S.-Syrian relationship. The prospect of American diplomatic leverage over Israel promised to yield what Soviet supported militarism could not. Henry Kissinger reminded the Syrians of this during his first visit to Damascus in December 1973, telling President Asad, “We have to do some work with the Israelis and [the] Soviet Union can’t help us there. They have no influence with Israel.…”217 He furthermore linked Washington’s good offices directly to Syria’s interest in a comprehensive agreement, albeit on the condition of a “step-by-step” negotiation process: I tell you candidly that the only way for us to proceed… is not to speak of a final settlement but to go step-by-step. We are not children. No solution is possible without your consent. No one who has dealt with you has the illusion you will give up your principles. But we must take this first step or we will never take the final step…218 The United States took still other measures to convince Damascus of its seriousness. While Kissinger made clear to all stakeholders in the run-up to the post-war Geneva conference that he would sequence Egyptian-Israeli disengagement talks first, he records sending reassurances to Damascus that the same principles applied to Sinai would apply to the Golan. Then of course there was the Syrian-Israeli disengagement agreement in June 1974, which secured Israel’s withdrawal from all territory captured in 1973 and a sliver of land captured in the June 1967 war, an impressive deliverable considering Syria had lost both of those wars and what Kissinger describes as “a Syrian gain over what a strict calculation of the existing balance of forces would have warranted.”219 President Nixon’s June 15 visit must have validated Asad’s optimism. The Syrian leader publicly welcomed Nixon with expressions of hope for a new phase in bilateral U.S.- Syrian relations, and together both leaders publicly announced the resumption of formal diplomatic relations. 220 Kissinger further adds that in private discussions Nixon responded to Asad’s prodding about U.S. policy toward Syria’s demand for the return of the entire Golan Heights by explaining, “If you want to push a man off a cliff you say to him take just one step backward, then another and another. If he knew where he was going, he would take no steps.…”221 He may have intended this metaphor as a defense of his administration’s step-by-step diplomacy, but as Kissinger notes, “Asad, unfamiliar with my chief’s method of operation, would not have been far off the mark if he distilled from the conversation the idea that Nixon… was agreeing to total Israeli withdrawal from the 217 Kissinger, Years of Upheaval, 782. 218 Ibid., 778. 219 Ibid., 1088–89, 765; “Syrian-Israeli Disengagement Agreement (Dated May 31, 1974).” 220 “Remarks of the President and President Hafez Al Asad of Syria at a State Dinner in Damascus (Dated June 15, 1974)”; “Remarks About Resumption of Diplomatic Relations Between the United States and Syria.” 221 Kissinger, Years of Upheaval, 1135. 56 Golan.”222 The U.S.-Syrian relationship continued on its bullish trajectory over the following months. In January 1975, the Ford administration offered financial assistance to Syria.223 In March, Asad granted an interview to Newsweek’s Arnaud de Borchgrave in which he stated explicitly for the first time that Syria was willing to sign a peace treaty with Israel: Q: Israeli leaders say that the next step with Syria should be an over-all peace settlement. Could this idea be profitably explored at a reconvened Geneva conference? A: Of course. If the Israelis return to the 1967 frontier - and the West Bank and Gaza become a Palestinian state - the last obstacle to a final settlement will have been removed. Q: Could this be a peace treaty with Israel? A: Yes, it could. When everything is settled it will have to be formalized with a formal peace treaty. This is not propaganda. We mean it - seriously and explicitly. You look so surprised from the expression on your face. This is not a new logic in Syria's policy; it is our fundamental position, decided by party leaders.224 These marked the Syrian leader’s most forward-leaning public comments yet, though by this stage they may also have reflected his growing apprehension about the second round of U.S.-Egyptian-Israeli negotiations moving forward without him. The Sinai Two Disillusionment American stewardship over the September 1975 Sinai Two agreement led Asad to conclude that his optimism toward Washington had been misplaced. While cautiously cooperative with Henry Kissinger’s step-by-step diplomacy during the first round of disengagement negotiations, Asad soon grew weary that bilateral incrementalism was depriving the Arab states of their collective bargaining leverage vis-à-vis Israel. As far as he was concerned, the United States was managing a process that at best disadvantageously deferred Syrian interests and at worst purposefully undermined them. In many respects, Asad’s disillusionment stemmed from the perception that the United States refused to rein in its partners. Israel, for one, publicized its intention to dig in on the Golan Heights. As early as March 1974 – three months before the Syrian-Israeli disengagement agreement – Israeli Prime Minister Golda Meir publicly declared the Golan Heights an inseparable part of Israel.225 And just days after the agreement her successor, Yitzhak Rabin, stated in his first speech to the Israeli parliament that the issue of peace: …depends on the attitude of Egypt, as the foremost country in the Arab world… the next stage on the road to peace must be between Egypt and Israel…. As for Syria… there is no place for an interim stage…. [T]he question will arise whether Syria is indeed ready to sign a peace treaty with Israel. 222 Kissinger, Years of Upheaval, 1135. 223 Ma’oz, Asad: The Sphinx of Damascus, 100. 224 de Borchgrave, Voices Across the Fence; Asad,” Newsweek Magazine, March 3, 1975, 34. 225 Ma’oz, Asad: The Sphinx of Damascus, 102. 57 And it is essential that the leaders of the neighboring countries realize that Israel is entitled to defensible borders. Israel will not return – even within the context of a peace treaty – to the 4 June 1967 lines. These lines are not defensible borders….226 In other words, Israel was prepared to sign a deal with Damascus, but only after finalizing a deal with Egypt and then only on the understanding that Israel would not relinquish all of the land Syria demanded. Israeli Minister of Foreign Affairs Yigal Allon summarized publicly later that year that, in his view, Syria’s maximalism “removes [Damascus] from the top of the negotiating queue to the bottom.”227 Nor did Asad receive much help from then nascent U.S.-ally Egypt. Sadat, it will be recalled from the previous chapter, had deceived and defected from his Syrian wartime ally at multiple points before and during the 1973 Arab-Israeli War. As the Sinai Two negotiations advanced in the spring and summer of 1975, Asad appealed directly to Sadat to coordinate actions lest Sadat jeopardize Syria’s ability to negotiate concessions in the Golan but received only empty promises of solidarity in response.228 Syria had little recourse in the face of what appeared to be a U.S.-Israeli-Egyptian diktat. Failing to move Sadat personally, Asad tried constraining him publicly by emphasizing Egyptian and Syrian solidarity in the media and issuing a joint call the Soviet Foreign Minister for a resumption to the Geneva conference, this time with PLO participation.229 He took a similar tack in the American press, emphasizing in a March 1975 Washington Post interview that “peace can only be realized through a collective Arab movement. Separate moves which American diplomacy is trying to achieve are leading in the opposite direction…” adding later, “[b]ut [Kissinger] is in deep love with separate moves.”230 Asad made his case to Kissinger directly as well, according to archival records, imploring the U.S. Secretary of State in a March 9 meeting to “leave the separate move where it is now… then move on all fronts.”231 Kissinger explained in response: I want to tell you, in front of your colleagues, that I consider it an obligation to help make progress on the Syrian front. And so does President Ford. But I also feel it must be done in a way that can succeed and not just be a theoretical exercise.... [O]ur preference for step-by-step is not directed at Syria, but…[i]t does no good to publish a Rogers Plan and have to resign six weeks later.... And it does no good to make statements that make everyone feel good but can’t be implemented…. I was in 226 “Statement to the Knesset by Prime Minister Rabin - 3 June 1974.” 227 Israeli Deputy Premier and Foreign Minister Yigal Allon, “Directions of Israel’s Foreign Policy (Text of Public Lecture, Dated December 26, 1974).” 228 Seale, Asad of Syria, 255. 229 Seale, Asad of Syria, 255–56; Ma’oz, Asad: The Sphinx of Damascus, 103. 230 Philip L. Geyelin, “Syria’s Hafez Assad: No 'Deep Love' for Separate Moves,” Washington Post, March 5, 1975. 231 “Memorandum of Conversation (between U.S. Secretary of State and Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Dr. Henry A. Kissinger and President Hafiz Al-Asad of the Syrian Arab Republic, Dated March 9, 1975),” Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library and Museum, March 9, 1975. Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Kissinger Reports on USSR, China, and Middle East, Box 3, March 7–22, 1975, Volume 1, no. 2, 23–29. 58 sympathy with it, but it taught me a lesson – that a comprehensive approach cannot work in America.232 Asad, however, remained unmoved and appeals soon turned to criticisms and threats: Asad denounced “piecemeal” American diplomacy; complained in the Arab press that the United States and Egypt hid negotiation details from him; and, while Henry Kissinger was in the region, announced plans to establish a joint military and political command with the PLO. Once Egypt signed off on Sinai Two, Asad personally criticized Cairo’s move as a “total submission to Israeli demands” and “a breach in Arab solidarity.”233 A brief review of the Sinai Two provisions shed light on Syria’s perception. The published agreement involved Israeli withdrawals in exchange for Egyptian demilitarization agreements, mutual commitments not to use force against one another, and the introduction of approximately two hundred U.S. technicians to monitor early warning systems. Egypt had, in fact, signed away its military option against Israel,234 prompting Syrian representative to the United Nations Mowaffak Allaf to declare that “The latest agreement arranged by the United States between Egypt and Israel… has proved that the main aim of Zionism and colonialism is to freeze the status quo in the region.235 Syria held the United States accountable (in addition to Egypt) for maintaining Israel’s regional advantage. Asad’s apprehension about Sinai Two was about more than just foregone gains or being left out. Sinai Two augured security concerns for Syria. As mentioned earlier, the removal of the Egyptian military threat against Israel gave the IDF flexibility to focus on its northern border and minimized the costs to Israel of adventurism along its other borders. Quandt shares this assessment when he argues that Israel’s 1982 war in Lebanon was one of choice, concluding, “[Israel] would probably not have launched such an operation if it had still been obliged to keep a good part of its army on the Egyptian front.”236 It must also be mentioned, however, that the United States offered to continue working toward a second agreement on the Golan Heights after Sinai Two. Kissinger delivered this offer directly to Asad on September 3, 1975, before the signing of Sinai Two, and as well as to the Arab representatives to the United Nations later that month, adding he would “refine his thinking on how the legitimate interests of the Palestinian people could be met.”237 A few weeks later a senior State Department official stated publicly before a congressional committee that, “the legitimate interests of the Palestinian Arabs must be taken into account in the negotiating of an Arab-Israeli peace.”238 According to Quandt, 232 Ibid. In 1969 Secretary of State William Rogers publicly presented a framework for a “package deal” between Israel and Egypt and Israel and Jordan, respectively, which came to be known as the Rogers Plan. It was swiftly rejected by the Israel, Egypt, and the Soviet Union. See also Quandt, Decade of Decisions, 89–92. 233 Seale, Asad of Syria, 255–61; Ma’oz, Asad: The Sphinx of Damascus, 103. 234 Quandt, Decade of Decisions, 274; “Interim Agreement between Israel and Egypt (Sinai Two),” United Nations, September 4, 1975. 235 Kathleen Teltsch, “Syria Denounces Sinai Agreement: U.N. Delegate Says It Cause Arab Discord,” The New York Times. September 11, 1975. 236 Quandt, “Camp David and Peacemaking in the Middle East,” Political Science Quarterly 101, no. 3 (1986), 361. 237 Quandt, Decade of Decisions, 276; Seale, Asad of Syria, 260. 238 Quandt, Decade of Decisions, 278. 59 Kissinger’s approval of these remarks was meant as a signal of U.S. intentions. Asad, however, was by this time suspicious in such gestures. The diplomatic events of 1975 thus epitomized the dynamic that would play out for the rest of the decade: Egypt and Israel would continue to share mutual interests that they believed Syrian involvement would compromise, and the United States would continue to prioritize the relatively achievable Egyptian-Israeli bilateral agreements at the expense of what Washington considered to be Syria’s unfeasible demand for multilateral negotiations over a comprehensive settlement to the Arab-Israeli conflict.239 Whether Washington was sincere in its promises to pursue subsequent, similar agreements on the Syrian front is a matter of fierce debate. There are those who, like Asad, felt Kissinger had all along deceived the Syrians as a tactical ploy to buy time for Egyptian-Israeli bilateralism and, as Mowaffak Allaf complained, consolidate the U.S.-Israeli advantage in the region.240 On the other hand, Quandt writes that “[Kissinger] genuinely wanted to draw Syria toward a moderate settlement with Israel. The objective situation, however, thwarted his efforts.”241 Whatever Kissinger’s true intentions, Asad’s actions and stated views before and after Sinai Two support the argument that this agreement constituted the turning point in his assessment that Washington might help him secure a comprehensive arrangement. The Carter Administration: A Fleeting Last Hope If Sinai Two killed Asad’s hopes about the prospect of American partnership in the wake of the 1973 war, U.S. President Jimmy Carter’s unfulfilled goal to broker a comprehensive peace agreement put the final nail in the coffin. President Carter took office in January 1977 and wasted little time declaring his intention to complete a comprehensive peace agreement within his first year in office. He also signaled less deference to Israel than the previous administration: during his first few months in office, he sent his Secretary of State Cyrus Vance to the region to discuss reconvening the Geneva Conference and, in March 1977, delivered a speech in Clinton, Massachusetts, in which he called for the creation of a Palestinian “homeland.”242 President Carter also invited Middle East leaders to the United States for early consultations. Israeli, Jordanian, Egyptian, and Saudi leaders subsequently travelled to Washington; Asad, however, declined his invitation and requested instead that the American president meet him in Geneva, neutral turf and a symbolic reminder of the multilateral forum available for comprehensive agreement negotiations. That Carter agreed, to the dismay of Israel and Arab states alike, rekindled a spark of hope in Damascus.243 This first and only meeting between Carter and Asad took place in May 1977 in Geneva. It went well for both sides: the Syrian leader impressed President Carter with his intelligence and humor, while Asad found Carter to be sincere and even-handed in his 239 Ibid., 270–71. 240 Seale, Asad of Syria, 255. 241 Quandt, Decade of Decisions, 276. 242 Jimmy Carter, “Clinton, Massachusetts Remarks and a Question and Answer Session at the Clinton Town Meeting,” The American Presidency Project, March 16, 1977. 243 Seale, Asad of Syria, 292-293. 60 approach to a comprehensive settlement.244 Carter’s opening public remarks were as grandiloquent in praise as they were forward leaning in substance, hailing “the great President of Syria… leader of one of the great countries in the Middle East,” with whom he had apparently established a “close friendship” in their first engagement. Carter went on declare that “There must be fairness… a resolution of the Palestine problem and a homeland for the Palestinians….” This statement likely struck a chord with Asad, who replied, “I would like to express myself right now--although the meeting between President Carter and myself is still at its first flush… and take the risk in saying it, that we are greatly optimistic.”245 Asad’s optimism, however, soon yielded to the reality that Carter either could not or would not sway Egypt and Israel. This is first evident in Carter’s failed bid to reconvene the Geneva Conference. Israel’s new hardline Likud-party Prime Minister Menachem Begin rejected a bevy of shared American and Syrian preferences regarding Geneva, including the participation of either Palestinians or a united Arab delegation and also that Israel explicitly recognize that UN Security Council Resolution 242, which vaguely calls for Israel’s withdrawal “from territories occupied” in 1967, includes to the Golan Heights, West Bank, and Gaza Strip.246 President Sadat also opposed the Syrian desire for a united Arab delegation lest Syrian maximalism constrain him.247 These disagreements came to the fore when the United States and Soviet Union issued an October 1, 1977, joint communiqué calling for a comprehensive settlement “within the framework of the Geneva Peace Conference,” including with Palestinian participation and the “resolution of the Palestinian question.”248 Israel fought the communiqué vigorously, and Carter ultimately back down and amended the text in a way that excluded Syria and protected Israeli-Egyptian bilateral talks, avoiding a public confrontation with Israel but discrediting his administration in the eyes of Asad.249 Before moving on it must be noted that Asad missed numerous opportunities to curry favor with Washington during this critical juncture. Asad turned down the United States President’s invitation to visit Washington when all other Middle East leaders accepted. At another point, when Secretary of State Vance consulted Syrian Foreign Minister Khaddam regarding the latter’s views on the original text of the October 1977 joint communiqué, which explicitly supported Syria’s desire to reconvene the Geneva Conference, Khaddam responded, “When the Americans and Soviets agree about something, we Arabs tend to be 244 William Quandt, Camp David: Peacemaking and Politics (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1986), 56; Vance, Hard Choices: Critical Years in America’s Foreign Policy (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1983), 176–77. 245 “Meeting With President Hafiz Al-Asad of Syria, Remarks of the President and President Asad Prior to Their Meeting.” 246 Ma’oz, Syria and Israel, 121. 247 Ibid., 151–52. 248 “Joint Communiqué, Moscow, 1972.” 249 Vance, Hard Choices, 192–94; Brzezinski, Power and Principle: Memoirs of the National Security Adviser 1977-1981 (New York: Farrar, Straus, Giroux, 1983), 107–10; “Israel-U.S. Working Paper on The Geneva Conference,” Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, October 5, 1977. Israel’s Foreign Relations Vol 4-5: 1977- 1979, Document 54. 61 suspicious.”250 Perhaps he was joking, but Syria’s failure to exploit every opportunity to influence the superpower that it rightly assessed to be the only avenue for extracting concessions from Israel cannot be wholly separated from the U.S. decision to prioritize step- by-step Egyptian-Israeli diplomacy. What followed is the familiar history of Sadat’s peace initiative, including his November 1977 visit to Jerusalem, the 1978 Camp David Accords, and the 1979 Egyptian- Israeli peace treaty. It bears repeating here that both Egyptian President Sadat and Israeli Prime Minister Begin preferred bilateral negotiations over multilateralism to the extent that, when faced with the prospect that the United States might force the latter on them, they circumvented Washington altogether in the form of bilateral meetings in Morocco to chart their way forward.251 They presented Carter with a fait accompli, which he little choice but to accept. Asad, who was inclined to give Carter more benefit of the doubt than Kissinger in terms of his sincere desire to reach a comprehensive settlement, was left with no choice but to conclude that the United States was no partner. He had now lost all confidence in a viable relationship with Washington, as Seale summarizes: Asad had suffered many disappointments at the hand of the United States, but Carter’s betrayal, as he saw it, was particularly painful because he had expected so much from the new Administration. Although he continued to keep open a channel to Washington, by 1979 his alienation from the United States was almost total as he felt his vital interests had no only been disregarded but deliberately undercut. He never visited the United States nor rid himself of a deep distrust of US intentions towards him.252 Summary and Analysis For President Asad, the prospect of American partnership in the 1970s, real as it was in the heady days of Kissinger’s 1974 Syrian shuttle, took a turn for the worst after the September 1975 Sinai Two agreement and passed completely when President Jimmy Carter proved unable to fulfill his promises of a comprehensive settlement. Egypt and Israel were committed to their path toward a separate bilateral peace agreement and, as viewed from Damascus, America was either unwilling or unable to redirect them. Could Carter, whom Asad viewed as more sympathetic to his position, have pushed his less powerful partners harder? Hypothetically, one might argue that Washington could have ratcheted up enough pressure to force Israel to go to Geneva under the desired U.S. and Syrian terms. Such a course, however, would likely have required untold domestic political capital (In May 1975, seventy-six U.S. senators signed a letter to President Ford requesting that this administration be “responsive to Israel’s economic and military needs),253 for uncertain gains, while in the process jeopardizing Egypt’s foreign policy realignment toward Washington. At the same time, Egypt and Israel presented Washington with an opportunity to secure an historic if still incomplete diplomatic achievement. 250 Seale, Asad of Syria, 297–301. 251 Kober, Coalition Defection, 106. 252 Seale, Asad of Syria, 309. 253 Quandt, Decade of Decisions, 270. 62 Meanwhile, it is unclear whether such pressure would have worked. The Israelis, as I demonstrate above, made no secret as to their unwillingness to withdraw from all territories captured in 1967. Former Ambassador to Syria in the late 1970s Talcott Seelye contends, “Israel was determined to cut Syria out and do a deal with Egypt alone. Even had Syria moved faster and been more flexible, it is doubtful whether it would have got any satisfaction.”254 This counter-factual assessment, however, remains hypothetical, for in addition to passing up Kissinger’s offers of additional U.S. diplomacy and missing opportunities with the Carter administration, President Asad never deviated from his core demands throughout the 1970s. Why did Asad hold so firmly to his so-called maximalist terms for Israel’s withdrawal from all territories captured in 1967 and the full restoration of Palestinian rights? If the conventional wisdom in international relations is that leaders seek to maximize their self-interest, why not abandon the Palestinians and explore an arrangement with Israel over only the Golan Heights? After all, Sadat had set a precedent for a bilateral agreement to regain lost territory under the guise that Palestinian interests would be addressed later. And Hinnebusch’s assessment that Syrian resentment of Jordanian and PLO bilateral agreements with Israel in the 1990s, respectively, “generated a growing readiness to accept that Syria also had to put its own interests first,”255 begs the question: why did Asad supposedly subordinate his country’s interests for the first two decades of his rule? In the next section, I argue that the answer to these questions lies in Asad’s desire to rewrite the post-1967 distribution of power in the Levant. Revisionist Ambitions In the previous section I demonstrate that Syrian President Hafiz al-Asad concluded that the United States was not prepared to support his priority of reaching a comprehensive settlement with Israel. In this section I contend that this policy goal derived from the inherently revisionist objective to increase Syria’s relative power position vis-à-vis both Israel and its inter-Arab rivals. This revisionism involved a mix of defensive, offensive, and ideological motivations, but regardless of its origins Asad never wavered from his steadfast commitment to its realization. In the paragraphs below, I argue that Asad chose to remain a Soviet ally rather than realign with the United States in the 1970s precisely because doing so would have precluded his revisionist ambition. This section is organized as follows. First, I explain why Syria’s call for a comprehensive settlement between Israel and its Arab neighbors would necessarily entail a revisionist outcome. I then take a step back to discuss Asad’s political and ideological upbringing and how the radical nationalist movements of his youth likely influenced his political outlook as a leader. Finally, in the third subsection, I trace Asad’s consistent prioritization of his political goals throughout the decade, including his flexible adaptation of his foreign policies and international partners in its service, to his final assessment that only the Soviet Union shared his ambition to upend the prevailing regional order. 254 Seale, Asad of Syria, 302. 255 Hinnebusch, Syria, 141. 63 The Revisionist Implications of a Comprehensive Settlement Asad’s vision of a comprehensive political agreement involved Israel’s withdrawal from all of the territories captured in 1967, including the Sinai Peninsula, Golan Heights, and the West Bank and Gaza Strip, and the recognition of Palestinian self-determination. He was reportedly obsessed with this outcome since the day he rose to power, for if achieved it would amount to a reversal of Israel’s power advantage since at least the 1967 war.256 The logic of this assessment is straightforward given the military advantage conferred by control over the territories in question, especially the Golan Heights and West Bank. The Golan Heights provides a strategic high point overlooking southern Syria, southern Lebanon, northwestern Jordan, and northern Israel, including the Sea of Galilee’s important water reserves and population centers. The West Bank similarly provides strategic elevation along the Judean Hills and proximity to the majority of Israel’s population centers, including Israel’s main international airport. The Sinai Peninsula, in contrast, is much simpler. It is relatively distant from most Israeli population centers and holds less religious significance than the West Bank. Israeli and Syrian leaders both understood these strategic implications. As Prime Minister Rabin told President Ford, The Arabs stress total Israeli withdrawal to the pre-June 1967 lines, which we consider practically indefensible. In the past when they moved their troops, we either had to wait for the attack or preempt.… The real fact that they can move near to our borders means that we would have to mobilize and they then can destroy our economy by requiring total mobilization…. [A]s we see it, a return to the 1967 borders and the establishment of a Palestinian state means that Israel cannot survive.257 On the one hand, Asad viewed this argument as a cover for Israel’s expansionist aims: “[T]here has been nothing that can be described truly as a secure border, especially in the era of modern weapons.... When Israel talks of secure borders, we understand that they want more territory.”258 On the other hand, he acknowledges Syria’s geostrategic disadvantage when asking Carter, “[W]hy should secure borders be 50 kilometers from Damascus, but 350 kilometers from Tel Aviv?”259 From a political-military perspective, control over the territories in question would provide the Arab states, assuming successful coordination, a powerful defensive deterrent against Israel as well as a stronger coercive capability. 256 Seale, Asad of Syria, 305, 311. 257 “Memorandum of Conversation (between President Ford and Prime Minister of Israel Yitzhak Rabin, Dated June 11, 1975),” United States Department of State Office of the Historian, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XXVI, Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1974–1976, June 11, 1975. Document 183. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v26/d183. 258 “Memorandum of Conversation (between President Jimmy Carter of the United States and President Hafiz Al-Asad of Syria, Dated May 9, 1977),” Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume VIII, Arab-Israeli Dispute, January 1977–August 1978, May 9, 1977. Document 32. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1977-80v08/d32. 259 Ibid. 64 Hafiz al-Asad’s Public Persona, Political Philosophy, and Ideological Conviction This chapter does not argue that Asad’s ideological convictions dictated his foreign policy behavior. Indeed, scholars have rightly pointed out that Asad, like so many leaders, frequently expropriated popular ideologies to legitimize his rule at home and his actions abroad.260 It is both impossible and unnecessary to determine exactly where deeply held beliefs end and convenient rationalizations begin. Rather, my purpose in the paragraphs that follow is to demonstrate that President Asad was influenced by, ascribed to, and promulgated a political philosophy that was consistent with and certainly contributed to his ambition to revise the regional balance of power in his favor. Biographers and analysts of Hafiz al-Asad describe a man who idolized both the twelfth- century Kurdish-Muslim conqueror Salah al-Din (Saladin) and the twentieth-century Egyptian President Gamal Abd an-Nasser. As Moshe Ma’oz offers, both figures “symbolized to generations of nationalist Arabs the quest for Muslim or Arab unity and the elimination of the ‘Crusader’ or Zionist state in Palestine.”261 Saladin owes his place in history to his 1187 conquest of the Crusaders in Jerusalem. Asad honored that accomplishment in many ways, including by depicting Saladin on Syrian currency and renaming a Crusader-era castle from its original name of Zion Castle to Saladin Castle.262 Henry Kissinger describes meetings at the Presidential Palace in Damascus in which President Asad invariably sat under a painting of Saladin’s famous 1187 victory at the battle of Hittin, located just west of the Golan Heights in modern day Israel, en route to Jerusalem: “The symbolism was plain enough. Asad frequently pointed out that Israel, sooner or later, would suffer the same fate.”263 Years later President Carter added, “as Asad stood in front of the brilliant scene and discussed the history of the Crusaders… he seemed to speak like a modern Saladin, feeling that it was his dual obligation to rid the region of all foreign presence while preserving Damascus as the only focal point for Arab unity today.”264 Asad also styled himself after Egyptian President Nasser, the mid-twentieth-century champion of Arabism who earned region-wide popularity by standing up to Israel and the West. Asad’s November 1970 coup symbolically (and perhaps intentionally) took place just two months after Nasser’s death. Asad praised Nasser in his speeches, publicly displayed Nasser’s image alongside his own, and arranged for the Syrian parliament and media to depict him as the successor to Nasser’s legacy. In December 1970, just three months after Nasser’s death, Asad spoke to a crowd that reportedly responded with chants of “Nasser, Nasser, Nasser… Asad, Asad, Asad.”265 Ma’oz concludes that “tactics aside, it is likely that Asad is ideologically committed to the ideas of Arab unity and of the struggle against Israel. 260 Mufti, Sovereign Creations, 240; Ma’oz, Asad: The Sphinx of Damascus, 43. 261 Ma’oz, Asad: The Sphinx of Damascus, 43. 262 Ibid., 43–44. 263 Kissinger, Years of Upheaval, 779. 264 Carter, The Blood of Abraham: Insights into the Middle East (Fayetteville: The University of Arkansas Press, 2007), 78. 265 Ma’oz, Asad: Sphinx of Damascus, 43–44, 83. 65 His commitment as well as his identification with the figures of Saladin and Nasser are probably rooted in his upbringing, experience, and Weltanschauung.”266 Hafiz al Asad was born in French Mandate Syria on October 6, 1930. He was born to an Alawite peasant family in a small mountain village nestled among the Crusader-castle ruins of Saladin’s conquests.267 He grew up at a time when radical political movements were becoming increasingly popular in response to the failure of Syria’s traditional nationalist elites, most of whom were established, wealthy, urban Sunni families, to drive out the French. In this environment, Asad was drawn to the Ba’ath Party platform of socialism and non-sectarian Arab unity, which appealed to many non-Sunni minorities looking toward social equality and mobility. He organized Ba’ath Party student “cells” during his high school days and remained active in the party throughout his student, military, and political career.268 “Those years formed my political thinking…” he later recounted, “[m]y political life started then and has not been interrupted since.”269 Paramount in Ba’ath Party teachings is the notion of Arab unity, a theme that echoes throughout the Syrian president’s public rhetoric: “[it is] not merely an emotional feeling, but is an eternal historical truth…. It is the source of strength for the Arabs…. It is also a struggle of the entire Arab people to achieve equality with other peoples of the world…. There is a strong feeling among Arabs, a spiritual feeling, that we are all a single nation of people…”270 “The solidarity of the Arab nation is something extremely important – all of us are aware of this fact. And we shall continue to do all we can to maintain and strengthen this solidarity.…”271 Inherent in the commitment to Arab unity at this time was the struggle against Zionism and Israel. Asad would have been seventeen years old when Israel declared independence and the 1948-1949 Arab-Israeli War began. (According to Asad, his request to enlist in the Syrian military was denied, presumably on account of his youth.272) The struggle with Zionism would henceforth be a constant feature of his life and, much like it was for Nasser, one deeply intertwined in the Arab quest for unity: I also want those of our brothers who are in the occupied territory to know that we are with them in all circumstances, whatever the difficulties and hardships, because we are one people, we have the same values, the same language, the same history, the same interests and aspirations and because, finally, we have the same will.273 266 Ibid., 43. 267 Ibid., 43. 268 Bernard Reich, Political Leaders of the Contemporary Middle East and North Africa, (New York: Greenwood Press, 1990), 52–53. 269 Seale, Asad of Syria, 26. 270 Ma’oz, Asad: The Sphinx of Damascus, 109. 271 al-Assad, “Speech by Syrian President Hafiz Al-Assad, on the Anniversary of the March 8, 1963 Revolution, Damascus, March 8, 1975.” 272 Seale, Asad of Syria, 35. 273 al-Assad, “Speech by Syrian President Hafiz Al-Assad, on the Anniversary of the March 8, 1963 Revolution, Damascus, March 8, 1975.” 66 If Asad shared these sentiments with countless other Ba’athists and Arab nationalists, he distinguished himself through his relative pragmatism. Asad’s political and military efforts throughout the 1970s were aimed recovering the territories that Israel captured in 1967 and fulfilling Palestinian rights.274 According to Asad’s own words, however, his druthers was an Arab political entity that replaces Israel altogether. The question was merely one of tactics. When asked by a Western interviewer in 1974 whether he would accept Israel’s existence alongside a Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza, Asad replied: This is a very complex question…. I will admit that there is a mood in the Arab world to make some sort of settlement with Israel to allow Israel to exist within certain frontiers. There is a great struggle taking place between the heart and the mind. In our hearts we say, ‘No Israel – not on any terms.’ In our minds we say, ‘We must turn to other things so let us give Israel a chance to withdraw to its original frontiers, let us give it a chance to prove that it will no longer try to expand’…. If Israel withdraws to its original borders, we will not wage a war against it. We will accept the United Nations resolutions… we will work [then] behind the scenes to overthrow the Zionist system in Israel and bring about a just return of Arab presence there so as to make this land an integral part of the Arab world…. The ultimate goal of all Arabs is an all-Arab world here.... We do not know exactly how it will come about. But we know it will come about….275 Similarly, the 1975 12th Ba’ath Party National Congress endorsed a policy of interim steps designed to facilitate this strategic long-term vision. Below is an excerpt of language in that policy: • The whole Arab national potential should be concentrated against the imperialistic, colonialistic [sic], Zionistic presence. The struggle against it is the major issue of the national liberation struggle. • The Arab-Zionist conflict is a fatal historical struggle, a struggle for life or death, to be or not to be. It is a long struggle and although there are relative periods of tranquility and armistice, this struggle must end with the eternal elimination of Zionism and with the liberation of all occupied Arab territories, including the entire Arab Palestinian land. • In order to implement this strategy, we have to formulate our interim tactical positions in the light of realistic considerations and in view of the Arab and international circumstances. The October war enabled the Arab nation, for the first time, to design interim goals without giving up the strategic aim of the full liberation of the Arab Palestinian land. • The first interim goal is to obtain the full withdrawal of Israel from the territories occupied in 1967…. Then to assist the struggle of the Palestinian people and support its legitimate right to establish a national rule in the liberated territories. This as a step towards gradually uprooting the Zionist enemy from the land through an armed struggle, and returning Arab sovereignty to the full Palestinian land, on the ruins of the Zionist enemy.276 274 Hinnebusch, Syria, 151. 275 Ma’oz, Asad: The Sphinx of Damascus, 105. 276 Ma’oz, Syria and Israel, 143–44. 67 In other words, Asad’s goal to reclaim the Arab world’s lost territories was envisioned as just one revisionist step on the road toward of an even grander revisionist outcome of completely redrawing the region.277 Lastly, in addition to Arab unity and the confrontation with Israel, Asad spoke of unifying the lands of “Greater Syria.” The term “Greater Syria” refers to the territories that make up contemporary Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, Israel, and the Palestinian territories. According to Daniel Pipes, these lands, more or less, have been “universally recognized for more than two thousand years as a cohesive region.”278 After centuries of Ottoman rule, European powers divided the region during and after World War One into the modern borders of today. As a result, Hinnebusch explains, “an enduring and profound irredentism [issued] from the frustrations of Syria’s national aspirations by the Western imposition of the Middle East state system. A truncated Syrian state was separated from its Arab environment, subjected to French rule and detached from the rest of [Greater Syria] by the creation of separate ‘mandates’ in Palestine, Lebanon and Jordan.”279 The notion of Greater Syria as a political unit was popularized in the 1930s by the Syrian Social Nationalist Party (SSNP). The pan-Syrianism of the SSNP competed with the pan-Arabism of the Ba’ath party in the halls Latakia’s high schools in the 1940s, where Hafiz al-Asad most certainly became familiar with its ideas.280 In the 1970s, Asad resurrected the notion of Greater Syria to provide an ideological foundation for a foreign policy that, especially after Sinai Two, focused on spreading his influence in the Levant. He told President Carter, for example: Up to a certain point, there were no separate states of Syria, Lebanon, Jordan. They were all one…. The British took Palestine and Jordan…. And the French took Syria and Lebanon… present-day Syria was subdivided into five sections, but, at the first chance we had to regroup, we did so. We see that in the long run to subdivide countries does not serve the people or the countries themselves. This haphazard subdivision was the prelude to the creation of Palestine… to problems that we recently saw in Lebanon.281 He went on to remind the famously devout U.S. president, “Jesus Christ himself was a Syrian—before partition!”282 Scholars have offered a variety of explanations for Asad’s revival of the Greater Syria concept. Pipes views it primarily as a tool for Asad’s domestic legitimacy, while 277 Tabitha Petran, Syria: A Modern History (London: Ernest Benn Limited, 1972), 254. 278 Pipes, Greater Syria: The History of an Ambition (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990), 16–17. 279 Hinnebusch, Syria, 139. 280 Pipes, Greater Syria, 186–87. 281 “Memorandum of Conversation (between President Jimmy Carter of the United States and President Hafiz Al-Asad of Syria, Dated May 9, 1977),” Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume VIII, Arab-Israeli Dispute, January 1977–August 1978, May 9, 1977. Document 32. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1977-80v08/d32. 282 “Memorandum of Conversation (between President Jimmy Carter of the United States and President Hafiz Al-Asad of Syria, Dated May 9, 1977),” Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume VIII, Arab-Israeli Dispute, January 1977–August 1978, May 9, 1977. Document 32. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1977-80v08/d32. 68 others see it as a justification for either an irredentist or realpolitik foreign policy.283 Regardless of whether it served as a source or justification of Asad’s foreign policy (and most likely it was both), it is clear from his use of it in the 1970s that Syria sought to expand its relative power and influence vis-à-vis both Israel and its fellow Arabs in the region. Implementing A Vision Throughout the 1970s President Asad consistently prioritized his strategic objective of forcing an Israeli withdrawal from the territories it captured in 1967, wavering only in his approach to achieving his goal. For Asad, this was a strategic objective in search of an implementation policy and international patron. As I outline below, he initially sought to force Israeli withdrawals through collective Arab power. This was the logic behind the 1973 war and, after that failed, his attempts to salvage a united Arab negotiation position. After Sinai Two laid bare Egypt’s defection from this front, Asad shifted his strategy to the build- up of a Syrian-led Levantine order from which to confront Israel and fill the new leadership vacuum in the Arab world. In both stages, Asad refrained from compromising on his strategic objective and cooperated with whichever superpower would support his interests. Below I provide an overview of Asad’s approaches to securing his strategic objectives in the 1970s through collective Arab power and the establishment of a Syrian-led Levantine order, respectively. In the course of this overview I trace how the Syrian president’s consistent pursuit of his revisionist ambition led him to cooperate with both the Soviet Union and the United States as conditions dictated, and subsequently to his eventual decision to consolidate Syria’s alliance with the Soviet Union. Take One: Leveraging Collective Arab Power Hafiz al-Asad viewed organizing collective Arab power as key to the confrontation against Israel even before becoming president. His predecessor, Salah Jadid, under whom Asad served as defense minister, had preferred to battle Israel through Syrian-controlled Palestinian guerillas; other Arab states were deemed too politically and ideologically compromised to participate. The more pragmatic Asad understood, however, that simultaneously dismissing Arab alliances and provoking Israeli retaliation bode ill for Syrian national security, stating at a Ba’ath Party meeting in 1969, “I have repeatedly stressed the importance of Arab military coordination… regardless of the differences and the contradictions in their political positions… [lest] Israel would be able to strike in each of the Arab fronts separately one after the other.”284 Accordingly, upon coming to power Asad prioritized rebuilding Syria’s relationships in the Arab world. His first foreign policy decision, taken on his first full day in power, was to join the Federation of Arab Republics (FAR) with Egypt and Libya. (The FAR was one of many short-lived Arab unity schemes in the mid to late twentieth century and would soon 283 Ma’oz, Asad: The Sphinx of Damascus, 109–22; Ma’oz, Syria and Israel, 154; Mufti, Sovereign Creations, 240; Hinnebusch, Syria, 139–41. 284 Ma’oz, Asad: The Sphinx of Damascus, 38–39. 69 dissolve.) He also restored diplomatic relations with Morocco and Tunisia and significantly improved Syria’s ties with Saudi Arabia, among other Arab states.285 The 1973 Arab-Israeli War marked the high point of Asad’s early efforts to mobilize Arab power for his revisionist designs. The Syrian leader’s willingness to place his military under the supreme command of the Egyptian Minister of War speaks to his commitment to the success of collective effort.286 Yet Asad differed from his Egyptian counterparts in that Syria aimed to retake all of the Golan Heights as a launch point for securing additional concessions from Israel, whereas President Sadat employed limited military action to achieve more limited political goals. Seale explains that Asad held this position because he “genuinely believed the Arabs could snatch back and hold some if not all their lost land. By changing the balance of power, another round would allow them to deal with Israel from something like equality.”287 After the war, and after the realization that the Arab-Soviet alliance was not going to push Israel back through military force, Asad chose to engage with Israel’s superpower ally in Washington. This was not Asad’s only foreign policy response option. After the 1967 Arab-Israeli War, for example, his more doctrinaire predecessor joined other Arab states in cutting ties with the United States and declaring the well-known “Three No’s” regarding Israel: no to peace, no to recognition, and no negotiations. The pragmatic Asad, however, was committed to a strategic outcome and saw U.S.-led post-war diplomacy as his best opportunity to achieve his goals. After all, he had said in 1971 that “political activities could perhaps facilitate the military campaign… sometimes political maneuvers are important for the war effort in order, for example, to gain time or to acquire the sympathy of international public opinion.”288 Asad thus changed his foreign policy from Soviet- supported militarism to participation in U.S.-led diplomacy. This new approach involved unprecedented gestures of Syrian cooperation with the United States along with a corresponding willingness to defer or dismiss Soviet interests. Foremost, Asad excluded the Soviet Union from his post-war disengagement talks with the United States. This act included a number of diplomatic slights directed at his Soviet interlocutors. For example, Asad forced Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko to reschedule a February 1974 visit around Henry Kissinger’s itinerary.289 Similarly, in Newsweek interviews in 1974 and 1975, Asad increasingly held out the carrot of peace with Israel while simultaneously deemphasizing the Soviet role in those negotiations.290 Critically, however, Asad’s strategic objective remained consistent throughout this period of change in Syria’s relations with both world superpowers. From the outset of the disengagement negotiations, Asad’s emphasized to Henry Kissinger, “I see [disengagement] as a step toward full Israeli withdrawal and that this had been made clear to Secretary Kissinger from the start...” and “It is not possible for any Arab leader to make peace without 285 Petran, Syria, 252. 286 Ma’oz, Syria and Israel, 31, 123. 287 Seale, Asad of Syria, 185. 288 Ma’oz, Syria and Israel, 120. 289 Kissinger, Years of Upheaval, 944–45, 956. 290 Kissinger, Years of Upheaval, 1133; Ma’oz, Asad: The Sphinx of Damascus, 99–100. 70 solving the Palestinian problem.”291 The Syrian-Israeli disengagement agreement included the stipulation: “This agreement is not a peace agreement. It is a step toward a just and durable peace on the basis of Security Council Resolution 338 dated October 22, 1973.”292 (As I mentioned in the previous chapter, it should be recalled that Asad only agreed to UN Resolution 338 with the unsolicited disclaimer that he interpreted it to call for Israel’s withdrawal from all territories captured in 1967 and the safeguarding of Palestinian rights.) Asad reiterated these demands in his opening remarks to President Nixon in June 1974,293 and doggedly adhered to them throughout 1975, even as Egypt gradually inched its way out of the Arab fold.294 Why did Asad not follow Egypt’s lead and pursue a second round of mutual withdrawals on the Golan? Quandt indicates that one reason was his reluctance to pay the price of inter-Arab leadership.295 Asad’s star was on the rise in the first half of the 1970s: Syria’s bold fighting in 1973; his decision to start a war of attrition in early 1974; and the small gain on the Golan through disengagement earned him a reputation in the Arab world for defiance against Zionism and internationally as a key regional player to be acknowledged. No less, to compromise on his pan-Arab agenda at this point would have created an opening for his Ba’athist rivals in Iraq to assert Baghdad’s claim to inter-Arab leadership; to follow Sadat’s course offered uncertain gains and placed Syria as second fiddle to Egypt. A second cost involved aggregate Arab and Syrian leverage vis-à-vis Israel. If Israel cut a deal with both Egypt and Syria, who would pressure Israel for future concessions, in the West Bank or elsewhere? Time, Asad felt, was on Syria’s side. As he explained to Kissinger in March 1975, “[i]n the long run we believe America will have to give up their support for Israel…. The Arabs see the long run is favorable for their interests.296 These costs, plus his security concerns associated with Sinai Two, thus drove Asad back into Russian arms. In October 1975, the Syrian president returned to the Soviet Union, 291 “Memorandum of Conversation (between Secretary of State Kissinger and Syrian President Hafiz Al-Asad, Dated March 1, 1974),” United States Department of State Office of the Historian, Foreign Relations of the United States, March 1, 1974. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XXVI, Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1974–1976, Document 29. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v26/d29. 292 “Syrian-Israeli Disengagement Agreement (Dated May 31, 1974).” United States Department of State Office of the Historian, Foreign Relations of the United States, May 31, 1974. Document 88. 293 “Memorandum of Conversation (between Secretary of State Kissinger and Syrian President Hafiz Al-Asad, Dated March 1, 1974),” United States Department of State Office of the Historian, Foreign Relations of the United States, March 1, 1974. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XXVI, Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1974–1976, Document 29. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v26/d29; Kissinger, Years of Upheaval, 1133-1135; Seale, Asad of Syria, 248. 294 “Memorandum of Conversation (between U.S. Secretary of State and Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Dr. Henry A. Kissinger and President Hafiz Al-Asad of the Syrian Arab Republic, Dated March 9, 1975).” Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library and Museum, March 9, 1975. Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Kissinger Reports on USSR, China, and Middle East, Box 3, March 7–22, 1975, Volume 1, no. 2.; Seale, Asad of Syria, 260; Philip L. Geyelin, “Syria’s Hafez Assad.” 295 Quandt, Decade of Decisions, 276–78. 296 “Memorandum of Conversation (between U.S. Secretary of State and Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Dr. Henry A. Kissinger and President Hafiz Al-Asad of the Syrian Arab Republic, Dated March 9, 1975).” Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library and Museum, March 9, 1975. Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Kissinger Reports on USSR, China, and Middle East, Box 3, March 7–22, 1975, Volume 1, no. 2. 71 which shared his frustration at being shut out of the regional diplomacy and obtained new promises for Soviet support.297 In the region, meanwhile, Damascus began to take matters into its own hands. Take Two: From Pan-Arab Soldier to Wali of Greater Syria Egypt’s bilateral peace diplomacy with Israel prompted Asad to position his own country as the organizing force of the Arab struggle against Israel. He operationalized this strategy by attempting to position Damascus as the center of a political-military network with the key Arab actors of the Greater Syria, Jordan, the PLO, and Lebanon. Below I provide a brief overview of Asad’s Greater Syria strategy and how he used it to enhance his relative position vis-à-vis both Israel and his Arab neighbors. I further demonstrate that Asad once again the mid to late 1970s remained faithful to his core strategic objective to redistribute regional power in his favor and continued to flexibly adapt his international partnerships accordingly. In June 1975, Asad became the first Syrian leader to visit Jordan in nearly two decades. In theory the Jordanian military could provide a defensive buffer for Syria’s southern flank, or further Damascus’s offensive aims by opening up a separate front with Israel at a time of its choosing. Jordan’s King Hussein, for his part, stood to gain from potential Syrian political, economic, and security support, though he had to balance these benefits against his suspicion of Syrian designs over his country. Asad thus approached Jordan cautiously, emphasizing in the spirit of Greater Syrian solidarity that Syria and Jordan constituted “one entity and one country,” though falling short of declaring them ‘one state.’298 The two countries agreed to a series of political, military, and economic cooperation agreements and enjoyed a relatively constructive relationship throughout the following two years.299 It was not until late 1977 and early 1978 that Asad overplayed his hand by proposing a Syrian-Jordanian-Lebanese federation under his leadership, raising flags in Amman that, on top of other strains in their bilateral relationship, eventually led to a thawing of Syrian-Jordanian relations.300 It was only natural given his objectives that Asad sought to control the various Palestinian factions in the area. The Palestinian nationalist cause was central to the Arab struggle against Israel and deeply important to the Syrian president, but its leaders could pose practical problems should their uncoordinated maneuvers provoke Israeli reprisals at inconvenient times. Here too Asad leveraged the language of Greater Syria to co-opt his target: …[O]ur struggle in Syria has always been linked to the Palestinian cause…. We are prepared to establish a single Palestinian-Syrian political command… and a single military command to lead the Syrian-Palestinian armed forces…. [W]e are one people, we have the same values, the same 297 Ma’oz, Asad: The Sphinx of Damascus, 135; Seale, Asad of Syria, 265. 298 Mufti, Sovereign Creations, 239; Ma’oz, Asad: The Sphinx of Damascus, 117. 299 Ma’oz, Asad: The Sphinx of Damascus, 115–19. 300 Ibid. 72 language, the same history, the same interests and aspirations and because, finally, we have the same will.301 Mirroring his alternately supportive and cautionary rhetoric, Asad also implemented a series of practical carrot and stick measures designed to control Palestinian groups. One of his first moves as president was to purge guerilla leaders inside Syria who were deemed resistant to his authority, while continuing to provide basing privileges for those in his good graces.302 When Asad needed new friends after Sinai Two, he offered Arafat the olive branch of a unified command, notwithstanding the fact that he had previously ordered the PLO Chairman’s arrest in 1966 and, a decade later, ordered his military to fight the PLO in Lebanon.303 It was Lebanon, however, where Asad exerted his most ambitious efforts to influence regional affairs. When the Lebanese civil war broke out in early 1975, pitting the Lebanese National Movement (LNM), a collection of leftist Sunni Muslim and Druze militias, and the PLO against the conservative Maronite Christian forces that traditionally ruled the Lebanese state, Asad feared both a Maronite-Israeli alliance and an LNM victory in which the PLO might provoke Israeli reprisals. In June 1976, the Syrian military intervened on behalf of the Maronites.304 Asad publicly framed this move within the familiar language of Arab unity and Greater Syria, declaring in July 1976 for example, “Throughout history, Syria and Lebanon have been one country, one nation…. This in turn created… genuine common interests and a real common security….”305 Syria’s intervention cannot be wholly separated from Asad’s genuine commitment to Arab unity, to be sure, but at the end of the day he acted on tangible balance of power calculations, for defensive and offensive reasons. The Syrian intervention in Lebanon was at least partly an act of external balancing306 and perhaps a textbook example of offensive realism: Asad sought to establish dominance over Lebanon before, he feared, Israel might beat him to the punch.307 At the same time, control over Lebanon offered the strategic asset of enabling Syria to coordinate offensive actions against Israel from another country’s border. As Lebanese Druze leader Kamal Junblatt explains, “For President Asad, as I see it, Lebanon was a diplomatic wager of the first importance, a trump card, an asset to be traded off in negotiations with the US, the USSR and Europe, with a view to securing a satisfactory settlement of the problem of Syria’s frontiers and of the territories occupied by Israel.”308 Lebanon was an asset for Asad in his dealings with both Israel and great powers of the world. In addition to serving as a key component of Asad’s Greater Syria strategy, Syria’s experience in Lebanon also highlights Asad’s willingness to work with whichever 301 al-Assad, “Speech by Syrian President Hafiz Al-Assad, on the Anniversary of the March 8, 1963 Revolution, Damascus, March 8, 1975.” 302 Petran, Syria, 253. 303 Ma’oz, Asad: The Sphinx of Damascus, 119–22; Mufti, Sovereign Creations, 239. 304 Ibid., 127-130. 305 al-Assad, “Inaugural Speech by President Assad of Syria on the Lebanese Situation made to the Local Councils, Damascus, July 20, 1976.” 306 Mufti, Sovereign Creations, 241. 307 John Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (W. W. Norton & Company, 2014). 308 Ma’oz, Asad: The Sphinx of Damascus, 142. 73 international partner supported his revisionist ambition. In this case, Syrian support for Lebanon’s traditionally privileged Maronites dovetailed with Washington’s interests in preserving Lebanon’s pro-Western status quo and Asad thus secured tacit U.S. acquiescence for his venture. 309 The corollary of U.S.-Syrian cooperation in Lebanon was Asad’s willingness to defy the Soviet Union. The Soviets disapproved of the Syrian intervention because it pitted Moscow’s Syrian proxy against its Lebanese ones. This was embarrassing and undermined Soviet efforts to chip away at U.S. prominence in that country. Asad, however, ignored and defied multiple Soviet appeals not to intervene. Moscow publicly rebuked him for his “knife in their back” and later delayed critical arms deliveries. It was only after Sadat’s travels to Jerusalem in 1977 – and after Damascus adopted a more neutral position in the Lebanese civil war – that Asad approached the Soviets with hat in hand in order to patch up the Syrian-Soviet relationship.310 The preceding paragraphs show that, beginning in 1975, as Egypt gradually closed in on a second separate disengagement agreement with Israel, Syria attempted to extend its influence in Jordan and Lebanon and among the Palestinians in order to position Damascus as the central node in the Arab struggle against Israel. Asad’s Greater Syria strategy was thus an expansionist endeavor designed to increase Syrian power vis-à-vis Israel as well as within the Arab world, particularly with respect to Iraq. By the mid 1970s, both Damascus and Baghdad had consolidated their domestic power bases and adopted increasingly aggressive foreign policies for regional influence. Iraq, for its part, recognized the opportunity to challenge Asad’s rising regional popularity by criticizing his participation in the post-1973 war diplomatic process as a betrayal of the Arab cause.311 Asad’s consistent insistence on a comprehensive political agreement with Israel thus served his revisionist ambitions on two fronts: success would make him the undisputed leader of the Arab world, while failure would still leave Syria the only confrontation state willing and capable to stand up to Israel, without conceding leadership of the Arab nationalist movement to his Iraqi rivals. Summary and Analysis President Asad in the 1970s was determined to increase Syria’s relative power in the Middle East. As Seale observes, Asad in this period was “obsessed with the geopolitical equation.”312 His primary foils were Israel and Iraq; his interim objectives, forcing the Jewish state to withdraw from all territories occupied in the 1967 Arab-Israeli War and the establishment of a Palestinian polity. For the first half of the decade Asad pursued this objective by attempting to marshal collective Arab power, first through Soviet-backed war 309 “Memorandum of Conversation (between Secretary Kissinger and U.S. Ambassadors, Dated August 7, 1976).” Foreign Relations of The United States, 1969–1976, Volume XXVI, Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1974–1976, August 7, 1976. Document 292. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v26/d292.; Ma’oz, Syria and Israel, 149. 310 Ma’oz, Asad: The Sphinx of Damascus, 136; Seale, Asad of Syria, 311. 311 Ma’oz, Syria and Israel, 153. 312 Seale, Asad of Syria, 305, 311. 74 and later through U.S.-led diplomacy. After Sinai Two brought about Egypt’s defection from the Arab fold, Asad embarked on the implementation of his Greater Syria strategy by seeking to expand Syrian influence over the political and military activities of key Arab players in the Levant. This too was aimed at Israel, but it no less reflected Asad’s determination to revise Syrian power vis-à-vis among his Arab rivals and counterparts. Asad was remarkably consistent in his strategic objectives from the time he came to power until President Sadat’s peace initiative, in war and peace, in public and in private. At no point did he abandon the Palestinian cause and focus solely on reclaiming the Golan Heights, despite President Sadat’s precedent.313 Hinnebusch writes in 2001, “Syria could long ago have reached a Sadat-like settlement with Israel over the Golan instead of mortgaging its welfare and future to a struggle rooted chiefly in Arabism, not narrowly defined Syrian raison d’etat.”314 The previous sections outline numerous explanations for the Syrian president’s supposed subordination of “Syria-first” interests. There was an undeniable defensive motivation behind Asad’s commitment to Arabism. Even as Syria’s Minister of Defense in the late 1960s he warned that allowing Israel to deal bilaterally with its Arab foes would place them at the mercy of Zionism’s unchecked expansionist ambitions.315 He likely felt that Israeli military operations in southern Lebanon in 1978 (Operation Litani) and again in 1982 (Operation Grapes of Wrath) vindicated this assessment. Along this line of thinking, the Syrian leader’s own expansionism into Lebanon was perceived in Damascus at least partly as a necessary defensive measure to protect both Syria and the Arab lands of Greater Syria from further Israeli occupation. Only Greater Syria could stem the tide of Greater Israel.316 I have also outlined explanations that point to offensive or opportunistic aims. Regarding Israel, Asad publicly portrayed the recovery of territory lost in 1967 as an interim step on the path toward liberating all of the land Palestine. Premature concessions that might prejudice his long-term aims were not worth his time. Further, Asad’s defiant leadership of the struggle against Zionism promised to jettison the Syrian president to unrivaled regional prominence. Sadat had removed Egypt from this struggle, and Saddam Hussein enjoyed no border with Israel from which to stake his claim. Asad was the leader who declined to attend the 1974 Geneva conference, summoned a United States president to Europe in 1977, and made clear to all that he would accept nothing less than Israel’s full withdrawal and Palestinian liberation. Both these defensive and offensive interests demanded a revision of the regional distribution of power, and Asad’s deviation from his demand for a comprehensive settlement would have precluded that outcome. A separate Syrian peace with Israel involving only the Golan Heights, for example, would presumably entail mutual security commitments, demilitarization provisions, and plausibly a closer relationship with the United States at the expense of Soviet military support. Such a hypothetical arrangement would effectively place Syrian sovereignty at the whim of the security guarantees of others while diminishing 313 “Memorandum of Conversation (Bw President Jimmy Carter of the United States and President Hafiz Al- Asad of Syria, Dated May 9, 1977).” Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume VIII, Arab- Israeli Dispute, January 1977–August 1978, May 9, 1977. Document 32. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1977-80v08/d32.; Hinnebusch, Syria, 152. 314 Hinnebusch, Syria, 141. 315 Seale, Asad of Syria, 374, 380, 418. 316 Seale, Asad of Syria, 374, 380, 418. 75 Syria’s ability to deter or pressure Israel in the future. As for Asad’s inter-Arab ambitions, a bilateral Syrian-Israeli agreement represented a sure-fire recipe for the regional ascendance of longtime ideological and geopolitical rival Iraqi president Saddam Hussein. There are still other explanations for Asad’s consistent hard line. Asad himself often explained his positions in terms of pride and justice. “The Arabs seek only justice,” he told Kissinger, “…does not he who seeks to recover usurped land have right on his side?”317 Asad was moreover confident that time was on the side of his just cause; if the Arabs could not achieve their goals under present conditions, better to hold their cards until justice would prevail. Separately, Hinnebusch points to an irredentist Syrian national identity rooted in the “imagined communit[y of] Greater Syria,” while yet a third category of explanations includes the Alawite minority leader’s domestic security considerations.318 Yet what each of these explanations has in common is the requirement of a change to the regional balance of power. Justice, in Asad’s eyes, required the Arabs and Israelis to interact at least as equals. Greater Syrian irredentism required by definition the expansion of Syrian power in the Levant. Even Asad’s internal political power by some accounts benefited from an Arab nationalist foreign policy that channeled the energies of Syria’s majority-Sunni population while propping the legitimacy of its minority Alawite-led regime. For all these reasons, Asad determined that both Syria and his own future would best be served by strengthening his country through the alliance with the Soviet Union until such time that he could make another run at evening the balance with Israel. Conclusion Syrian President Hafiz al-Asad’s drive for regional prominence all but demanded a consolidation of the Syrian-Soviet alliance at the end of the 1970s. At the beginning of the decade, however, this was not yet inevitable. The combination of post-war diplomacy as well as the confluence of U.S. and Syrian interests in both Lebanon in 1976 and during the Carter administration in 1977 collectively created a juncture of potential realignment that could have resulted in Syria’s realignment of its foreign policy from East to West. Nevertheless, a number of developments led President Asad to conclude that Moscow was better able to guarantee Syrian interests. The analysis that leads to my conclusions is summarized below and depicted in Figure 1 at the end of this section. First, though Asad faced serious internal and external threats to his security upon coming to power in 1970, he did not face the same existential challenges as his Egyptian counterpart. He faced serious threats, to be sure, but he did not have to fight for his survival the same extent as Sadat. Reasons for this include: the new Syrian leader’s relative popularity compared to that of his predecessor, Asad’s ability to depend on Alawite 317 “Memorandum of Conversation (between Secretary of State Kissinger and Syrian President Hafiz Al-Asad, Dated March 1, 1974).” United States Department of State Office of the Historian, Foreign Relations of the United States, March 1, 1974. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XXVI, Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1974–1976, Document 29. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v26/d29.; See also “Memorandum of Conversation (Bw President Jimmy Carter of the United States and President Hafiz Al- Asad of Syria, Dated May 9, 1977).” Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume VIII, Arab- Israeli Dispute, January 1977–August 1978, May 9, 1977. Document 32. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1977-80v08/d32. 318 Hinnebusch, Syria, 135; Pipes, Greater Syria, 150–54. 76 loyalists, and the fact that his relationship with the Soviet Union did not empower the internal and external threats against him. Asad did not need the United States for his security and thus enjoyed the flexibility to pursue his non-core security interests with both superpowers. (These differences are recorded in column “IV1” in Figure 1.) Threat perception alone, however, does not fully explain Asad’s foreign policy calculations during the period at hand. Second, President Asad concluded after American support of both Sinai Two and President Sadat’s trip to Jerusalem that the United States either would not or could not support his political demand for a comprehensive settlement with Israel. The United States and Syria demonstrated a mutual willingness to cooperate where their interests aligned, most notably during the Israeli-Syrian disengagement negotiations in 1974, but the issue of a comprehensive solution was unattainable. Indeed, Syria’s lukewarm embrace of diplomatic engagement with the United States is a subtle but important theme of the 1970s. Sadat engaged with the United State both before and throughout the 1973 Arab-Israeli War; Asad did not. The Syrian leader declined to attend the post-war Geneva conference in December 1973 and, while making concessions in order to achieve the June 1974 Syrian-Israeli disengagement agreement, afterwards conveyed a disinterest in continuing along the path of Kissinger’s step-by-step diplomacy. Similarly, during the Carter administration Asad was the only Middle Eastern leader to turn down an early 1977 presidential invitation to Washington, Syrian Foreign Minister Khaddam, perhaps inadvertently, signaled opposition to the October 1, 1977 joint U.S.- USSR communiqué that in fact aligned with Syrian policy, and Damascus then obstructed Carter’s efforts to reconvene the Geneva conference. Regarding the latter, Secretary of State Vance later conveyed that “[Asad] missed the chance to participate in a broad conference in which everything could have been discussed including the return of the Golan Heights…. Asad shot himself in the foot.”319 Once again, it is possible that a different Syrian policy may not have affected the outcome, but it is certainly the case that Asad spared not a few efforts to convince the United States, a global superpower and the only force that even he recognized could potentially produce concessions from Israel and that the results of such an effort would be worth the monumental political capital required to achieve it. Was Asad prepared to strike a deal in the first place? Was the Syrian leader simply leveraging the political process for geopolitical gain, issuing demands that he knew his adversaries would not entertain? I submit that the available evidence leaves open the possibility that Asad would have signed a comprehensive arrangement if Israel was willing to do the same. This is a hypothetical proposition, to be sure, but a number of developments during the period at hand lead me to conclude that Syria’s insistence on a comprehensive agreement, though ambitious, was not entirely out of the realm of possibility. First, at the beginning of the post-war diplomatic process Nixon and Kissinger intimated at the possibility of extensive Israeli withdrawals; recall Kissinger’s remarks regarding Asad’s first meeting with Nixon that, “Asad… would not have been far off the mark if he distilled from the conversation the idea that Nixon… was agreeing to total Israeli withdrawal from the Golan.”320 Second, Quandt cites numerous senior U.S. foreign policy intellectuals who in the early days of the Ford administration publicly supported a 319 Seale, Asad of Syria, 302. 320 Kissinger, Years of Upheaval, 1135. 77 comprehensive agreement.321 In other words, Asad had reason to believe the United States might support such an approach, and indeed the U.S. foreign policy community seriously considered it. Whether Asad would have been willing to agree to an offer, if presented, remains unknown, but, as I show in the third section of this chapter, hastening the return of the Arab territories captured in 1967 and the establishment of a Palestinian entity would have endowed the Syrian president with the transnational clout and tangible geopolitical gains that he clearly desired. Still a third critical theme of this period was Egypt and Israel’s shared preference for bilateralism. Sadat, as I discussed in the previous chapter, anticipated that Syrian (and Soviet) maximalism in multilateral forums would undermine his determination to exchange land for peace at almost any cost. Israel, for its part, explicitly preferred to deal with the Arab states bilaterally for the very reason Asad insisted on a united Arab front: to maximize its power in negotiations. And when Egypt and Israel began to fear that the United States might deviate from its exclusive support for bilateral diplomacy, they circumvented the United States by meeting in Morocco in order to advance the peace process to such a point that Washington would have no choice but to follow their lead.322 This is why in Figure 1 I record Egyptian and Syrian perception of alternative ally capability to meet potential switcher state priorities differently (high and moderate, respectively); superpowers cannot always control their dependent allies. Despite these headwinds, Asad held firm to his demand for a comprehensive settlement. He would accept nothing less than an outcome in which Israel and the Arabs emerged as equals. And therein lies the rub: Asad’s demands fundamentally required a transfer of power from Israel to Syria, for the prevailing status quo power in the region to willingly facilitate a real or perceived decrement to its advantage over its mortal enemy. While in theory the United States could have achieved its own relative gain vis-à-vis its Soviet adversary by poaching Syria in addition to Egypt, Washington was both unconvinced that Damascus was serious about switching sides and cautious that Syrian maximalism would impede Egypt’s realignment. Asad therefore chose to remain with the Soviet Union, the only outside power that shared his interest in upending the region’s geopolitical status quo. Figure 1: Summary of Syrian non-realignment analysis during the 1970-1979 juncture of potential realignment 321 Quandt, Camp David, 269–70. 322 Kober, Coalition Defection, 106. 78 ` IV1 IV2 IV3 DV Syria1970s: Case 2 Percep(on of Insecurity Confidence in Alterna(ve Ally Opportunity Cost of Defec(on Outcome (AP2) Availability to Revisionist Ambi(on Condi(ons AP2 Threat Security Preference Preference Preference Geopoli(cal Exclusive (ME) PS Geopoli(cal Internal Threat AP1 Sufficiency External Threat If PS, Unmet PS AP1 Geopoli(cal AP2 Geopoli(cal AP2 Capability to AP1 Threat to PS Interests Threat to PS vs. AP2 Ini(ated Reinforcing (MR) or If Wedge, AP2 Seeks Support PS Priori(es Alliance Suitability to Preference: Mutually PS to Balance against If PS, AP2 Assessment PS Interest Acceptable Before-1973 War N/A N/A N/A N/A Med w/ USSR: Med Low MR Case 2: Syria to to High Low Rev. Rev. SQ High Med AIer 1973 War PS/ w/ USA: 1970-1979 Low Low No Med ME AP2 (AP1 = USSR PS =Syria AP2 = USA) Low Willingness/Med Med to High Capability High Nega>ve (a]er 1973 War) (-) 79 Part II: Syrian Non-Realignment from Iran Chapter 4: Syrian Foreign Policy Non-Realignment (1985-1989) “If the Syrian-Iranian alliance was rooted in shared (Israeli and Iraqi) enemies and the shared threat of Western hegemony in the region, it soon also proved its utility to Syria and Iran in their efforts to maneuver in and affect the regional balance of power.”323 - Anoushiravan Ehteshami and Raymond A. Hinnebusch, 1997 Introduction This chapter explains the durability of the Syrian-Iranian alliance in the mid to late 1980s. During that period, a rise in bilateral Syrian-Iranian tensions accompanied by a credible and sustained attempt by anti-Iranian Arab states to recruit Syrian President Hafiz al-Asad to their side combined to form a juncture of potential realignment. It might not have been that remarkable if the young Syrian-Iranian alliance, formed in a region known for constantly shifting, short-term alignments, succumbed to such pressures. But the alliance persisted, and by the end of the decade, Syria and Iran boasted a politically durable, battletested, and institutionalized alliance. This chapter explains why Asad did not realign away from Tehran despite both the bilateral disagreements and the foreign courtship of Damascus. Foremost, I argue that the Iranian activities that so rankled Asad, particularly in Lebanon, did not pose an existential threat to the Syrian president’s grip on power. This assessment does not prove my proposed theory of realignment, but it is consistent with my first hypothesis that secure states will avoid the inherent risks associated with the uncertainty of realignment between adversarial poles. I furthermore show that Damascus may well have considered the anti-Iranian Arab bloc that tried to drive a wedge between Syria and Iran, most notably led by Saudi Arabia, as a potentially viable partner. However, I conclude that Iran’s eventual willingness to defer to Syrian interests in Lebanon and the assessment that Iran was best positioned to enable both Syria’s security and opportunistic interests further reinforced Syrian non-realignment during this period. This chapter is organized as follows. First, I begin with an introductory section that reviews Syria’s geopolitical position at the turn of the 1980s, analyzes the Syrian and Iranian motivations in forming and consolidating their alliance and, lastly, argues that the period between 1985 and 1988 constitutes a juncture of potential realignment in the Syrian-Iranian alliance. The subsequent analysis follows the same pattern as the previous two chapters, looking successively at the Syrian regime’s security environment, president Asad’s perception of the availability of alternative allies, and the relationship between Asad’s revisionist ambitions and alliance decision-making during the period in question. At points I 323 Ehteshami and Hinnebusch, Syria and Iran: Middle Powers in a Penetrated Regional System (London: Routledge, 1997), 101. 80 also discuss dynamics of the Syrian-Soviet relationship; I argue, however, the there was no juncture of realignment present within the temporal scope of this chapter. Syria in International Context As outlined in the previous two chapters, Syria in 1979 confronted both increasing regional isolation and a worsening internal uprising. The 1979 Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty crystalized Egypt’s defection from the Arab struggle against Israel and enabled the IDF to focus on its northern borders. The Syrian-Iraqi rivalry remained as vitriolic as ever,324 while Iraq, Saudi Arabia, and Jordan began drawing closer toward one another due to ideological and geopolitical concerns over Iran’s 1979 Islamic Revolution.325 Syria’s status among the superpowers was only slightly better. Asad resented the Carter administration after Washington’s support for Egyptian-Israeli bilateralism, and from his perspective the United States added insult to injury in December 1979 when it included Syria on its inaugural list of state sponsors of terror.326 The Soviet Union remained supportive and willing to patron Asad’s new strategy of achieving “strategic parity” with Israel, but even in Moscow Asad’s regional isolation diminished his value. Damascus, in other words, needed friends. For these reasons it is unsurprising that on February 12, 1979, Syria became the first Arab state to recognize the Islamic Republic of Iran. In fact, Asad had supported Ayatollah Khomayni’s movement even prior to the February 1979 Islamic revolution, offering the Ayatollah asylum in 1978.327 Events in the region would soon conspire to drive this unlikely partnership between secular, Arab nationalist Syria and the Persian, Islamic revolutionary regime in Iran into a full-fledged military alliance. The Origins of the Syrian-Iranian Alliance The Syrian-Iranian alliance owes to two shared motivations: first, a mutual desire to balance against threats; and second, each regime’s desire to increase its relative power position in the Middle East. This assessment runs counter to those who explain the alliance exclusively as a defensive relationship. Iraq, to be sure, presented exactly the type of threat that Walt argues will provoke balancing alliances. Iraq bordered both countries, boasted one of the region’s most powerful militaries, and signaled hostile intentions toward both Damascus and Tehran.328 For Asad, Iraq’s ruling Ba’ath party also presented an ideological challenge to the Syrian president’s claim to pan-Arab leadership. As Walt outlines in his discussion of the relationship between ideology and alliance formation, “ideologies such as pan-Arabism ultimately can be more 324 Seale, Asad of Syria, 354; “Syria’s Chief Says U.S. Sends Arms to Insurgents,” The New York Times, March 8, 1982. 325 Walt, The Origins of Alliances, 136–38. 326 “State Sponsors of Terrorism,” U.S. Department of State 327 Seale, Asad of Syria, 352–53. 328 Walt, The Origins of Alliances, 229–30, 291. 81 divisive than unifying....”329 He goes on to explain that “[t]he reason is simple: as an ideology explicitly aimed at all Arab states, its success posed a potential threat to all regimes save the ultimate victor….”330 Persian Iran, in contrast, held no cards in the contest for pan- Arab leadership and instead aspired to lead a completely different movement in revolutionary Islam, sparing Tehran and Damascus from a zero-sum struggle for leadership over the same ideological movement. Asad’s quest for pan-Arab leadership was therefore made smoother by his alliance with non-Arab Iran. Israel of course also figured prominently in the equation. Israel presented Syria with both threats and opportunities, and Iran was well positioned to help on both accounts. Israel fit all the same threat criteria as did Iraq, and, as isolated as Syria was at the time, an alliance with Iran promised to bolster Asad’s deterrent and defensive capabilities.331 Iran’s ties to Lebanon’s Shi’a militias would help Syria defend against Israeli offensives, while, as I discussed in the previous chapter, also offering potential opportunities inasmuch as Asad could coopt them to advance Syrian interests.332 The Israeli threat to Iranian security in 1979 is less clear. Israel was geographically distant and enjoyed a history of friendly relations with pre-revolutionary Iran. Rather, Syria’s value to post-revolutionary Iran with respect to Israel stemmed from a profit-seeking motive, the Islamic Republic’s desire to export its brand of Islamic revolution for both ideological and geopolitical gains. Agha and Khalidi write, “The revolution opened the door for a fundamentally new Iranian profile in the area…. [T]he possibility of forging a new regional order with Iran at its hub no longer seemed fanciful.”333 Lebanon, with its large Shi’a population and chronic instability, was a logical first target for Tehran’s revolutionary adventurism, and Syria’s proximity and historic ties to that country made it an attractive partner. Syria’s Arab character could moreover help Tehran emphasize the Islamic nature over the Persian origin of its revolutionary movement, while joining the fight against Israel would bolster Iran’s revolutionary credentials and regional popularity.334 Scholars cite still other factors behind the Syrian-Iranian partnership. Ehteshami and Hinnebusch note that Asad’s close ties with the Shi’a in both Iran and Lebanon endowed his heterodox Alawite regime with much needed religious legitimacy during the Sunni Islamist insurgency against him. By the same token, aligning with Iran may have dissuaded Tehran from supporting that insurgency.335 Seale contends that the relationship is rooted in the Syrian president’s own minority heritage and his “fellow feeling” for the rural, dispossessed Shi’a of Lebanon.336 These explanations may be true, but they are at best secondary. Asad, after all, demonstrated a clear willingness to prioritize his geopolitical interests over “fellow feeling” during his rule, such as when he turned his guns on Palestinian militants in Lebanon or when the Syrian military killed bothersome Hezbollah militants in the late 1980s.337 329 Ibid., 207. 330 Ibid., 212. 331 Ehteshami and Hinnebusch, Syria and Iran, 59. 332 Goodarzi, Syria and Iran, 88. 333 Agha and Khalidi, Syria and Iran: Rivalry and Cooperation (London: Pinter Publishers, 1995), 10. 334 Goodarzi, Syria and Iran, 8-10. 335 Ehteshami and Hinnebusch, Syria and Iran, 97. 336 Seale, Asad of Syria, 351. 337 Ma’oz, Asad: The Sphinx of Damascus, 130; Goodarzi, Syria and Iran, 202. 82 In sum, alliance formation theory’s emphasis on balancing against external threat is an accurate if incomplete explanation for the Syrian-Iranian alliance. Where the alliance literature falls short is in its lack of a concept or theory that captures the motivations of two middle-weight regional states, neither of whom can be said to be bandwagoning with the other, to both balance against threat and advance their respective revisionist ambitions. These ambitions were most often complimentary, whether shared or independent of one another. Indeed, Syria and Iran shared immediate threats, a mutual desire to replace the Western-dominated regional status quo with their own hegemony, and a corresponding commitment to universalist ideologies that did not necessitate competition with the other for leadership of a single movement.338 Underlying these similarities, however, were geopolitical ambitions unique to each state that, as we will see in the next section, were not immune from direct conflict. Consolidating the Alliance: the Iran-Iraq war and Israel’s 1982 Invasion of Lebanon Two dramatic events in the early 1980s hastened the consolidation of the Syrian-Iranian alliance. The first was Saddam Hussein’s September 1980 invasion of Iran, an attack that put the fledgling Islamic Republic on its heels and positioned Syria to provide its ally with critical support during a time of need. The second event took place in June 1982 when Israel invaded Lebanon in order to dislodge the PLO from its northern border. This attack presented a direct challenge to Syrian power in Lebanon and potentially to Syrian sovereignty as well, thus positioning Iran to bring its assets to bear on behalf of Syria.339 Syrian support to Iran during the early stages of the Iran-Iraq war took many forms. Asad responded to military requests, for example, reportedly by providing arms and allowing Iranian warplanes to take off from Syrian territory, among other areas.340 On the economic front, Asad’s decision in April 1982 to close the Syrian-Iraqi oil pipeline stretching from northern Iraq to the eastern Mediterranean cut off one of Baghdad’s most valuable sources of funds.341 Diplomatic and political assistance came in the form of supportive public statements and Syrian efforts to minimize Arab pressure on Iran and facilitate Soviet support for the Islamic Republic.342 Multiple scholars note that Syria and Iran formalized their alliance in early 1982. That March, a delegation of nearly 50 Syrians led by Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Abdul Halim al-Khaddam travelled to Iran and signed a range of bilateral agreements.343 I have identified no evidence that Damascus and Tehran ever signed a 338 For a detailed analysis on why states with similar ideologies do not tend to make good partners, explicitly including states that espouse pan-Arabism, see Walt, The Origins of Alliances, 206–17. 339 Goodarzi, Syria and Iran, 3. 340 Yair Hirschfeld, “The Odd Couple: Ba’athist Syria and Khomeini’s Iran,” In Syria Under Assad: Domestic Constraints and Regional Risks, ed. Moshe Ma’oz and Avner Yaniv (London: Croom Helm Ltd), 107.; Agha and Khalidi, Syria and Iran, 10–11; Goodarzi, Syria and Iran, 33–38. 341 Hirschfeld, “The Odd Couple,” 107–8. 342 Agha and Khalidi, Syria and Iran, 10–11; Goodarzi, Syria and Iran, 33–38. 343 Goodarzi, Syria and Iran, 55. 83 formal mutual defense pact, but nevertheless Iran seized the opportunity only months later to come to Syria’s defense in Lebanon.344 Israel’s 1982 invasion of Lebanon set the stage for Iran to reciprocate Syrian support. As Agha and Khalidi describe it, Israel’s invasion was meant primarily to push the PLO out of the Lebanon, but “its grander objective was to humble Syria militarily and dislodge Lebanon from Syria’s sphere of interest and control.”345 The Israeli military’s early success put it on the path to achieving those goals. From June to August 1982 the Israeli military advanced northward and eventually reached Beirut. The Syrian military suffered humiliating and costly setbacks at the hands of the IDF, while neither Damascus’s Soviet nor Arab allies mustered much help. Israeli momentum also spread into to the Lebanese political arena in the form of a short-lived Lebanese alignment toward Israel: in May 1983, Lebanese president Amin Jumayil penned an agreement with Israel under U.S. mediation that included a formal end the state of war between both countries.346 Moshe Ma’oz describes Syria’s outlook at the time: This juncture indeed constituted the worst setback in Asad’s political life as both his domestic and his regional policies painfully collapsed, while Israel posed a serious threat to Syria’s security. On the one hand, the Golan had been formally annexed [in 1981] and the Israeli army was deployed some thirty miles south of Damascus; and on the other, Lebanon practically became Israel’s satellite, while Israeli troops were stationed some twenty-five miles west of Damascus.347 Against this backdrop, Iranian leaders travelled to Syria one day after the Israeli invasion.348 Whereas Asad had previously prevented the deployment of large numbers of Iranian security forces into Lebanon, reports indicate that now he allowed Iranian personnel to establish a presence in Lebanon’s Beqaa Valley.349 Asad, however, reportedly resisted Iranian offers to deploy up to 50,000 troops into Lebanon as well as Tehran’s pressures to initiate an all-out assault against the IDF.350 He may have needed Iranian help, but he would not let it come at the expense of Syria’s privileged position in Lebanon. Syria and Iran thus set about organizing their respective proxies against Israel and its Western backers. On November 11, 1982, a Shi’a suicide bomber killed at least 67 Israeli troops in an attack on an IDF headquarter facility in Tyre.351 That following spring, Syria and Iran unleashed their proxies on Western targets, orchestrating the suicide bombing at the U.S. Embassy in Beirut on April 18, 1983, that killed at least 63 people. In October 1983 they attacked U.S. and French military barracks in Lebanon, killing 241 and 58 U.S. and French military personnel, respectively.352 On November 4, 1984, the IDF was again 344 Agha and Khalidi, Syria and Iran, 13; Goodarzi, Syria and Iran, 54–57. 345 Agha and Khalidi, Syria and Iran, 14. 346 Ma’oz, Syria and Israel, 175–77. 347 Ibid., 177. 348 Goodarzi, Syria and Iran, 63. 349 Goodarzi, Syria and Iran, 64; Agha and Khalidi, Syria and Iran, 15; Hirschfeld, “The Odd Couple,” 111. 350 Goodarzi, Syria and Iran, 64, 71. 351 Seale, Asad of Syria, 396. 352 Ma’oz, Syria and Israel, 178. 84 attacked in Tyre. Only months later, Amin Jumayil – whose brother, Bashir, was presumably assassinated by the Syrians for his pro-Israeli policies – voided the May 1983 Israeli-Lebanese agreement.353 In due time, the Syrian-Iranian strategy of war by proxy forced their enemies to retreat. In the first six months of 1984 both the United States and France withdrew their forces from Lebanon. The Israelis began their retreat from Beirut in September 1984, and by early 1985 the IDF had withdrawn to a self-declared “Security Zone” in southern Lebanon. (The IDF would remain there until 2000, at which point fifteen years of relentless targeting by Hezbollah would finally force them out of Lebanon completely.)354 Asad experienced first-hand that Iran and its followers among the Lebanese Shi’a made invaluable partners in his mission to wrest Lebanon from U.S. and Israeli influence. Yet as I mentioned above, not all Iranian and Syrian interests in Lebanon were perfectly aligned. While enlisting Tehran’s support in Lebanon, Asad was equally on guard lest Shi’a revolutionary fervor jeopardize of his quest to impose pax-Syriana. Juncture of Potential Realignment: Tensions and Wedges The two criteria for establishing a juncture of potential realignment as set out in the introduction to this study are both present in the Syrian-Iranian relationship between 1985 and 1988. First, conflicting Syrian and Iranian interests over a number of bilateral and geopolitical differences, most poignantly represented by deadly clashes between the Syrian military and Iranian-backed Hezbollah in Lebanon, as I will describe below, caused Damascus to reconsider Syria’s pro-Iranian alignment. Second, Syria entertained numerous attempts by regional powers to capitalize on these divisions and drive a wedge between Damascus and Iran. That these forces might compel Asad to realign Syrian foreign policy away from Iran was the subject of considerable speculation during this juncture of potential realignment.355 The Syrian government held many grievances against Iranian foreign policy in the mid to late 1980s. First, the Iranian military’s occupation of Arab territory and attacks against Arab states during the Iran-Iraq war undermined Asad’s Arab nationalist bona fides. In February 1986, the Iranian military captured the strategic Faw peninsula in southern Iraq, forcing Damascus to publicly qualify its support for Iran and even threaten abandoning its ally in the event Tehran refused to withdraw at the appropriate time.356 In January 1987, the Iranians advanced on the major Iraqi city of Basra, and throughout the winter of 1986 and 1987 they 353 Ibid., 178. 354 Augustus Richard Norton, Hezbollah: A Short History (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007), 79– 80. 355 For examples see Avner Yaniv, “Are Syria and Israel on the Verge of Peace?” Washington Post, March 15, 2987; Robert Fisk, “Oiling a New Arab Line-up / Focus on Syria’s Role in the Middle East Changing,” The Times (London), June 24, 1986; Goodarzi, Syria and Iran, 134; Jonathan C. Randal, “Ties with Iran Paralyze Syrians in Lebanon; Assad Seen Under Pressure to Halt Shiite Wars in Beirut before Arab Summit June 7,” Washington Post, May 25, 1988; Antony Walker, “Syria, Iran Face a Clash in Beirut,” Sydney Morning Herald, March 14, 1987; Badran, “Syriana.” 356 Goodarzi, Syria and Iran, 171. 85 carried out attacks against Arab oil tankers in the Persian Gulf, destroying at least 20, mostly Kuwaiti-flagged vessels. Not only did these actions put Syrian leaders in a difficult position vis-à-vis their fellow Arabs, Damascus also feared that Iranian aggression would encourage the Arab Gulf states to reintegrate Egypt into the Arab fold and to invite a larger U.S. presence in the region.357 A second Syrian frustration involved Tehran’s halting of oil shipments during a period of severe economic crisis in Syria. By late 1985 Syria owed Iran more than $1 billion in oil debt.358 Whether because Syria could not pay its debts or in order to influence Syrian behavior in Lebanon, Iran ceased its oil shipments and on May 15, 1986, declined to renew an expiring oil agreement.359 Iran’s attempt to hold oil over the head of its ally was a major sticking point with Syria and provided the oil-producing Arab Gulf states an opening to replace Iranian support. The third and greatest area of divergence came in Lebanon, where Iranian zeal to spread the Islamic revolution and stage a relatively unrestrained war against Israel butted heads with the secular Asad regime’s determination to pacify this multiethnic state, keep a lid on Sunni extremism, regulate the confrontation with Israel, and present itself to the West as the security guarantor of the Levant.360 Lebanon became the site of nothing less than a pitched battle between Iranian revisionist ambition and Syrian defensive and offensive geopolitical goals. The Israeli military’s retreat into in southern Lebanon in 1985 put Lebanon’s future up for grabs. The ensuing race to fill the void largely manifested itself in proxy wars. In September 1985, for example, fighting broke out in the northern Lebanese city of Tripoli between the then dominant Sunni Islamist group, at-Tawheed, and the pro-Syrian militias who challenged its authority. Tawheed threatened Syrian interests in a number of ways. It represented a brand of Sunni fundamentalism similar to that which had recently rebelled against Asad’s rule in Syria, in fact playing host to many Syrian Muslim Brothers who fled Hama in 1982, and it resisted Syrian attempts to impose its authority on Tripoli. Iran supported Tawheed, however, because it viewed Sunni fundamentalism in Lebanon as a vehicle for uniting all revolutionary Islamic forces against the Lebanese status quo and downplaying the Persian and Shi’a element of the Islamic revolution.361 When Tawheed refused to accept Syrian ceasefire terms, Asad resolved to impose his will by force, organizing pro-Syrian Lebanese militias to advance under cover of Syrian artillery in order to break the group’s hold on Tripoli. This assault eventually caused Iran to force its proxy to accept a negotiated solution favorable to Syria, though not without straining relations with Tehran. Iranian media publicly criticized Syrian heavy handedness and treachery in this episode.362 357 Ibid., 198. 358 Ibid., 160. 359 Ibid., 180. 360 Ibid., 133-134, 259. 361 Goodarzi, Syria and Iran, 153–54; Ehteshami and Hinnebusch, Syria and Iran, 131–32. 362 Goodarzi, Syria and Iran, 154. 86 Perhaps the longest running proxy war between Damascus and Tehran in Lebanon took place over three rounds of fighting from 1985 to 1987 between the pro-Syrian Shi’a group Amal on one side and Iranian-supported Palestinian guerillas and Hezbollah on the other side. The “war of the camps” began in May 1985 with an Amal assault against the PLO in Beirut’s Palestinian refugee camps. The move aimed to preempt the return of the uncontrolled Palestinian militarism that previously provoked Israeli reprisals and devastated southern Lebanon.363 Iran, however, feared that the optics of Shi’a Amal’s attack on Palestinian refugees would taint Tehran’s revolutionary image among Lebanon’s Shi’a community and the overall Shi’a reputation within Lebanon.364 The war of the camps led to some of the worst conflict between Damascus and Tehran. In May 1985, for example, the Grand Ayatollah Montazeri alluded to Syria when he denounced those who manipulated Lebanon’s Shi’a for their own geopolitical interests. After Iranian officials descended on the region to negotiate a solution, Asad reportedly cautioned them that Syrian interests would take priority in Lebanon. Amal later reinforced that message when it detained a delegation of Iranian diplomats in Lebanon, prompting Tehran to indirectly denounce the Syrians as “traitors to Islam,” no small slight to the Alawite regime.365 The second round of fighting between Amal and Palestinian militants took place in summer 1986, and the third round later that year due. Syria was hard pressed to defend its proxy’s killing of so many innocent Palestinians, and by the end of the year Amal was on its heels.366 In order to rescue its client, Syria in February 1987 deployed some 7,000 troops to Beirut, thus ending the fighting and asserting its primacy. Matters quickly came to a head when on February 24 Syrian troops murdered in cold blood 23 captured Hezbollah fighters in Beirut’s Basta neighborhood.367 The Basta massacre infuriated Tehran. Iranian Foreign Minister Ali Akbar Velayati publicly declared while seeking clarification in Damascus that Tehran calls the shots in Lebanon. The Interior Minister castigated Damascus for aiming to destroy the Islamic resistance and issued a thinly veiled threat to unleash Hezbollah against the Syrian military if more troops entered Beirut.368 Other leaders, however, tempered their criticism by blaming rogue elements of the Syrian military rather than Asad’s regime, no doubt restrained by the Iranian military’s setbacks in the January 1987 offensive to take Basra in Iraq. Asad, for his part, showed no remorse. Syrian troops in Beirut subsequently replaced posters of Ayatollah Khomayni with those of Asad and forcibly shaved the beards of Shi’a fundamentalists.369 The issue of hostage taking in Lebanon provided yet another source of tension. Christian Marschall notes that Western visitors began disappearing in Lebanon only after the Iranians arrived on the scene in 1982. Syria may well have supported some of these kidnappings in 363 Agha and Khalidi, Syria and Iran, 21. 364 Goodarzi, Syria and Iran, 147–50; Agha and Khalidi, Syria and Iran, 21–25. 365 Goodarzi, Syria and Iran, 148–52. 366 Ibid., 192–94. 367 Ibid., 199-202. 368 Goodarzi, Syria and Iran, 198–203; Ehteshami and Hinnebusch, Syria and Iran, 133. 369 Goodarzi, Syria and Iran, 202; Yaniv, “Are Syria and Israel on the Verge of Peace?” 87 the early half of the decade, but as Asad’s international reputation declined in the mid-1980s due to accusations of supporting terrorism the Syrian president resolved to rehabilitate his standing in the West.370 In June 1987, Syrian troops reacted to a Hezbollah kidnapping of an American-British journalist by surrounding Shi’a enclaves of Beirut, seizing Hezbollah equipment, and restricting Iranian movements in Lebanon. After Hezbollah kidnapped U.S. Marine Corps Lieutenant Colonel William R. Higgins in early 1988, Hezbollah and Amal engaged in some of their fiercest fighting, with hundreds killed as Amal sought to curb Hezbollah’s rapidly increasing power. (Hezbollah eventually murdered Colonel Higgins.)371 Syrian Vice President Abdul Halim al-Khaddam notably cautioned in the summer of 1988: We greatly value our alliance with Iran, but our regional allies must respect our position… [O]ur role [in Lebanon] is above all other considerations. In their operations, our allies should pay attention to our interests and to those of our [Lebanese] friends. The movements of some [Lebanese] have become a threat to the Syrian role.372 The crisis abated only after the January 1989 “Damascus Agreement,” in which Syria conceded not to disarm Hezbollah and to allow the group to remain in southern Lebanon, so long as it exercised restraint.373 At the same time as Syria and Iran butted heads in Lebanon, over the Faw Peninsula, and regarding oil, the pro-Western Arab states that supported Iraq in the Iran-Iraq War sought to exploit these disagreements and drive a wedge through their alliance. Saudi Arabia and Jordan in particular implemented a range of strategies, including efforts to mediate a Syrian-Iraqi rapprochement, provision of Gulf aid and, when carrots failed, threats and punishments.374 These wedge strategies are detailed and analyzed in the substitute ally availability section below – the point here is that they occurred and Asad entertained them. The confluence of escalating tensions with his preexisting ally and a credible effort by an adversarial pole to alter Syria’s foreign policy alignment presents an unquestionable juncture of potential realignment. Yet throughout these years of turmoil and courtship Asad never wavered from his strategic alliance with Tehran. In the following analysis I explain why, despite the apparent threats from Iran and availability of alternative allies, Asad chose not to realign Syria’s foreign policy between adversarial poles. Perceptions of External and Internal Security President Asad’s greatest security challenges in the 1980s came from three key sources: Iraq, Israel, and Syria’s own Sunni Islamist domestic opposition. Iran was uniquely 370 Christian Marschall, “Syria-Iran: A Strategic Alliance, 1979-1991,” Orient 33, no. 2 (1992), 442–43. 371 Ehteshami and Hinnebusch, Syria and Iran, 132–34. 372 Goodarzi, Syria and Iran, 274. 373 Ehteshami and Hinnebusch, Syria and Iran, 132–34. 374 Goodarzi, Syria and Iran, 160-66, 180-83, 211, 224-238.. 88 positioned to help on all three fronts, and in fact successfully helped mitigate threats from each of these sources. While, as I detailed above, Iran challenged Syrian interests during this period, I argue below that Tehran never posed an unmanageable threat to the survival of the Asad regime. Furthermore, especially after Israel’s 1985 withdrawal to its self-declared southern Lebanon Security Zone, Asad enjoyed a relatively high degree of regime security such that he did not need to consider any major overhauls of international alliance network in order to survive. In the following paragraphs, I review each of Syria’s key security threats in the mid to late 1980s and the ways in which Iranian support helped Asad prevent them from becoming existential threats. Iraq As previously discussed, Iraqi President Saddam Hussein presented both military and ideological threats to Asad. He boasted a powerful military, oil wealth, and a claim to pan- Arab leadership through Iraq’s Ba’ath Party apparatus.375 Iraq’s distance from Israel, moreover, afforded Saddam Hussein a relative degree of luxury in calling for hardline positions against the Jewish State without much concern for the consequences. Yet for most of the 1980s Baghdad’s commitments in the Iran-Iraq War diverted and consumed resources that might otherwise be aimed at Syria. The war forced Iraq to keep the lion’s share of the Iraqi military busy and bleeding far from Syria’s borders. While an Iraqi victory could have spelled disaster for Syria given Asad’s support for Iran, the general back and forth nature of the eight-year conflict and Iranian successes in 1986 and 1987 in particular precluded any serious Iraqi challenges toward Syria during this period. Even though Baghdad eventually did emerge empowered after the conflict, Asad could have no more natural ally against a resurgent Iraq than the Islamic Republic. Iran shared Asad’s fear of Saddam Hussein and held an optimal geographic position to threaten Iraq. Iranian reliance on Asad for access to Lebanon, moreover, gave it a reason to cooperate with Damascus. The Iraqi threat to Asad in the mid to late 1980s therefore did not rise to unmanageable or existential levels, and if it had then Iran was better positioned than any other state in the region to help Syria balance against it. As such, there was no need for difficult decisions in Damascus regarding Syrian alignment choices. Israel While Israel hardly posed an ideological competitor to Asad, its proven military, geographic proximity, the contentious history with Syria, and the raging contest for primacy in the Levant all pointed in the direction of more Syrian-Israeli conflict. In December 1981, Israeli Prime Minister Begin annexed the Golan Heights. In June 1982, Begin ordered the IDF invasion of Lebanon. The IDF’s 1982 invasion of Lebanon posed a direct challenge to Syria’s regional interests and national security. As if to remove any doubt, during the opening days of the 375 Ehteshami and Hinnebusch, Syria and Iran, 92. 89 war the IDF Chief of Staff publicly ordered his troops to “destroy the Syrian army in Lebanon.”376 The IDF subsequently tried to capture the critical Beirut-Damascus highway, which would have cut off Syrian forces in Lebanon from their supply sources in Syria and enabled the IDF to directly threaten Damascus from the west, before they were repelled.377 Here too Iran and Hezbollah were instrumental in pushing the Israelis out of Beirut and into the southern Security Zone (where Hezbollah continued to pin them down and sap their forces until 2000.)378 The same IDF Chief of Staff who ordered the destruction of the Syrian military in Lebanon later changed his tune when he stated in 1983, “We have no intention of going to war against Syria… for any… reason.”379 In the meantime the Iran- Iraq War kept the Iraqis out of Asad’s way enough that he could focus on Israel. Asad’s Domestic Opposition No discussion of the Asad regime’s threat environment during the 1980s is complete without mention of Syria’s domestic Sunni Islamist opposition. Recall that this movement’s campaign of guerilla violence from roughly 1978 to 1982, put down only by Asad’s brutal February 1982 massacre of tens of thousands of Syrians in Hama, posed the greatest challenge to his rule. There are two important points to note here about this threat. First, the Iranians played a helpful role to the Asad regime during this crisis. Tehran criticized rather than supported the revolutionary Islamic movement challenging Asad, providing the Syrian government with critical religious legitimacy.380 As such, Asad’s alliance with Iran contains an element of omnibalancing, as close ties with the revolutionary Islamic Republic helped him to balance against a serious internal threat. The second point is that Asad’s decisive defeat of the rebellion against him effectively shut down the strongest domestic movement against his regime. Ma’oz writes in 1988, “The terrible crushing of the Hama revolt not only broke the military backbone of the Muslim Brothers but also served as a vivid warning to them, as well as to other opposition groups, against further acts of disobedience… the mujahidun ceased for the time being to be a threat to Asad.”381 As a result, the Asad regime was firmly in control over Syria by the mid-1980s. AP1 Sufficiency: The Balance Sheet Iran in the 1980s helped Syria to significantly neutralize external threats from both Iraq and Israel. Tehran also buried any urges it may have had to support the Sunni Islamist rebellion 376 Ma’oz, Syria and Israel, 174–75. 377 Ibid., 173–74. 378 Augustus Richard Norton, Hezbollah: A Short History (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007), 79– 80. 379 Seale, Asad of Syria, 400. 380 Hirschfeld, “The Odd Couple: Ba’athist Syria and Khomeini’s Iran,” 116; Agha and Khalidi, Syria and Iran, 13. 381 Ma’oz, Asad: The Sphinx of Damascus, 162–63. 90 in Syria, which in any event had subsided by the onset of the juncture of potential realignment in 1985. Iran did not pose an unmanageable liability to Syria regarding any of these threats. Of course, Iranian offensives in Iraq challenged Asad’s claim to pan-Arab leadership, and many of its activities in Lebanon obstructed his interest to dominate that country and present himself to the West as an essential partner for regional stability. Iranian decisions to withhold oil shipments set Asad back at a time of sharp economic decline. Yet none of these actions escalated to the point of an existential threat to Damascus; in fact, as I detail toward the end of this chapter, Iran’s commitment to bilateral dialogue and its eventual willingness defer to Syrian interests in Lebanon mitigated their impact. A brief word about the state of the Syrian-Soviet alliance will also provide context regarding Syria’s security environment at this time. Moscow’s record toward Syria in the 1980s is a mixed bag. On the one hand, Syria’s decision to remain a Soviet ally in the 1970s provided Moscow with a silver lining following Egypt’s realignment to the United States. On the other hand, as Galia Golan points out, “The very reasons that prompted Asad to agree to the [1980 friendship treaty] were those which may have given the Soviets second thoughts.”382 Indeed, Asad in the early 1980s was isolated in the Middle East and consumed by a grave rebellion at home, not exactly a position from which to advance Soviet interests. Moreover, Syria’s president often acted “annoyingly independent.”383 Former Soviet Foreign Minister Yevgeny Primakov adds, speaking of Syria’s Lebanon policy in the early 1980s, “If the USSR had no strong ally within Lebanon, neither could it depend on Syria. Though the Syrian regime was the Soviet Union’s closest partner in the Middle East… its activities were sometimes inimical to Soviet interests or desires.”384 Nevertheless, Moscow in the early to mid-1980s was indispensable to Asad’s goal of achieving strategic parity with Israel. According to Seale, Soviet military assistance by the middle of the decade enabled the Syrian military to increase dramatically in size and capability.385 Ma’oz assesses that “by 1985-6 Syria had probably reached military parity with Israel in quantitative terms,” though the qualitative gap remained significant, especially regarding air power.386 At the same time, however, Golan writes in 1990 that “it remained uncertain, possibly to the Syrians themselves, just how far the Soviet commitment would go, in the case of armed conflict with Israel….”387 Seale concedes that the Syrian-Soviet relationship before Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev died in late 1982 was “far from being a strategic alliance.” 388 During the early days of Israel’s 1982 invasion, for example, the 382 Golan, Soviet Policies in the Middle East from World War Two to Gorbachev (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 154. 383 Ibid., 154. 384 Primakov, Russia and the Arabs: Behind the Scenes in the Middle East from the Cold War to the Present (New York: Basic Books, 2009), 199. 385 Seale, Asad of Syria, 398–99. 386 Ma’oz, Syria and Israel, 185–86, 189; Khalidi and Agha, “Military Force: The Uses and Abuses of Military Parity,” In The Middle East in Global Perspective, ed. Judith Kipper and Harold Saunders (Boulder: Westview Press Inc, 1991), 191–93. 387 Golan, Soviet Policies in the Middle East from World War Two to Gorbachev, 156. 388 Seale, Asad of Syria, 397. 91 Syrians chaffed at the shortcomings of their Soviet-provided equipment and Moscow’s unwillingness to support them in combat.389 After a brief resurgence in Soviet support under Brezhnev’s successor, Yuri Andropov (1982-1985), Andropov’s successor, Mikhael Gorbachev, made clear to Asad that he had no stomach for another Syrian-Israeli war. In April 1987, Gorbachev reportedly told Asad that the Soviet Union would no longer support Syria’s policy of strategic parity with Israel and subsequently decreased Soviet military assistance.390 The Soviets may have calculated that Asad’s regional troubles meant they could maintain their alliance with Damascus at a lower cost, for as the next section indicates, an alternative superpower alliance was far from the offing. Alternative Ally Availability In order to understand Syria’s allegiance to Iran in the mid to late 1980s we must also examine Damascus’s potential alternatives. The prime candidate for a substitute alliance, and the adversarial bloc that opposed Iran in the Iran-Iraq war, was the pro-Western bloc of mainstream Arab states led by Saudi Arabia and including states like Jordan and Kuwait. In the following section I detail the wedge strategies that these states employed in attempting to draw Syria into their camp, Asad’s responses to and participation in these initiatives, and the reasons for their ineffectiveness. But first, a brief diversion on Asad’s perception of the United States during this period. Syrian Realignment toward the United States? The previous section’s discussion about the poor state of Syrian-Soviet relations in the eras of Brezhnev and Gorbachev, respectively, begs the question of whether a Syrian realignment with the United States was possible. In the following paragraphs I demonstrate that Asad did not perceive the United States as a viable partner in the 1980s. The Soviet Union’s declining support for Syria in the mid to late 1980s does not constitute a juncture of potential realignment because there was no Syrian effort to realign toward the United States nor any indication of a U.S. initiative designed to “flip” Syria. As recounted earlier, the Syrian government was disenchanted with Washington in 1979 for its role in Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty and the decision to list Syria as a state sponsor of terror. The fact that Syria reached out so warmly to Iran the same year as the newfound Islamic Republic held 52 U.S. citizens hostage hardly helped its case in Washington. The election of Ronald Reagan in 1980 did not promise improvement in U.S.-Syrian relations. Ehteshami and Hinnebusch explain that the Reagan administration prioritized Israel as a “strategic asset” at the expense of both Syria and Iran.391 Israel initiated a number of antagonistic moves toward Syria in the Reagan era that Washington, if not outright supportive, tacitly accepted, including Israel’s 1981 annexation of the Golan 389 Ma’oz, Syria and Israel, 176. 390 Ibid., 189–90. 391 Ehteshami and Hinnebusch, Syria and Iran, 103. 92 Heights and its 1982 invasion of Lebanon.392 Making matters worse, on September 1, 1982, Reagan delivered a speech highlighting his administration’s foreign policy priorities in the Middle East. The “Reagan Plan” was relatively forward leaning concerning the Palestinians – he spoke of Israeli settlement freezes and Palestinian self-rule – but neglected to address Syria or the Golan Heights.393 In May 1983, the United States helped broker the short-lived Lebanon-Israel peace treaty that threatened Asad’s grip over Lebanon.394 “By this time,” Seale underscores, “Asad’s resentment of the United States was curdling into something like hatred.”395 Accordingly, any viable alternative to Iranian support in the mid to late 1980s would have to come from within the region. Egypt was not an option given its estrangement from Syria after its peace treaty with Israel, Turkey maintained a pro-Israeli foreign policy, and Iraq proved more committed to its rivalry with Damascus than to rapprochement. This equation effectively left Saudi Arabia, the leader of the pro-Western, Sunni-majority, status- quo oriented states that feared an Iranian victory in the Iran-Iraq war would invite an unacceptable geopolitical and ideological threat. Damascus was the key to lining up an all- Arab opposition front to the Iranian threat, and so Saudi – and to a lesser extent Jordanian – leaders embarked on a years-long campaign of sticks and carrots designed to wean Syria away from Tehran. Wedge Episode 1: Syrian-Jordanian Reconciliation (August 1985 – May 1986) The first in a series of policies that I characterize as Arab attempts to drive a wedge between Syria and Iran occurred in the form of a Saudi bid to mediate Syria’s then frosty relationships with Jordan and Iraq, respectively. The initiative began at the August 1985 Arab Summit in Casablanca, where participants consented to the formation of Saudi and Tunisian-led “reconciliation committees.” Perhaps tellingly, Syria boycotted the actual summit and soon afterwards hosted the foreign ministers of Libya and Iran in Damascus. But the futility of Arab mediation initiatives may not have been inevitable at the time, for as Jubin Goodarzi notes, “this was one of the last trouble free meetings Syrian and Iranian officials were to have until 1988.”396 Asad had many reasons to engage in Saudi-led mediation efforts in 1985, at least with respect to Jordan. Relations between Damascus and Amman had deteriorated after Jordan supported the Camp David process. Syrian moves to mend fences, however, would ease Asad’s growing isolation at a time when both Syrian-Soviet relations were cooling and Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Jordan, and increasingly Egypt were closing ranks against the Syrian- Iranian alliance. Accepting the Saudi initiative also promised much needed material benefits and added leverage vis-à-vis Tehran. Drawing closer to Jordan would also give Damascus 392 Seale, Asad of Syria, 381, 384–85. 393 Reagan, “Address to the Nation on United States Policy for Peace in the Middle East.” 394 Goodarzi, Syria and Iran, 89. 395 Seale, Asad of Syria, 395. 396 Goodarzi, Syria and Iran, 143. 93 greater opportunity to dissuade Amman from pursuing a potential peace process with Israel.397 Asad consented to a series of Saudi-initiated meetings between the Syrian and Jordanian leaders beginning in autumn 1985. Prime ministers met in Saudi Arabia in September and October and exchanged visits to one another’s countries in November and December. On December 30, Jordan’s King Hussein travelled to Damascus for the first time since 1978, and both leaders agreed to restore diplomatic relations and established a framework for a potential Jordanian-mediated Syrian-Iraqi reconciliation process.398 The Saudi role in fostering a Syrian-Jordanian rapprochement involved more than Riyadh’s good offices. According to Sonoko Sunayama, the Saudis provided Syria with some $600 million for participating in the process, while the Kuwaitis also resumed provisions of aid. After the Syrian prime minister travelled to Saudi Arabia in November to update the royal family on the progress of reconciliation, Saudi financial institutions announced more than $50 million in loans for Syria. Both Saudi Arabia and Kuwait sent Gulf crude oil to Syria through Jordan when Iranian oil shipments came to a stop.399 Indeed, it must not be overlooked that Saudi Arabia’s attempt to pull Syria further into the anti-Iranian camp in 1985-1986 coincides with a sudden downturn in Syrian-Iranian relations. In addition to oil disputes, Syria and Iran butted heads in 1985 and 1986 in Lebanon over the war of the camps, Tawheed in Tripoli, and the fate of Western hostages. In the Gulf, meanwhile, the Iranian military occupied the southern Iraqi Faw Peninsula in February 1986, delivering a crippling blow to Asad’s rival in Baghdad but at the same time undermining Asad’s claims that his non-Arab ally harbored no annexationist designs on Arab lands. In May 1986, the Daily Telegraph reported that Syrian leaders threatened to end their cooperation with Iran, and voices in Tehran similarly called for a break with Damascus.400 It was in this context that Asad continued to improve relations with Amman in the spring and early summer of 1986. On May 5, the Syrian president travelled to Amman for his first visit in nearly a decade. So successful was Saudi rehabilitation of the Syrian- Jordanian relations, in fact, that Amman subsequently took an active role in efforts to mediate between Damascus and Baghdad. Wedge Episode 2: Iraqi-Syrian Reconciliation? (May 1986 – July 1987) The conflation of Syrian-Iranian disagreements and the thaw in Syrian-Jordanian diplomatic relations by May 1986 encouraged the pro-Iraqi Arab states to pursue a similar Syrian-Iraqi track. Following Asad’s May 5 visit to Amman, King Hussein returned to Damascus on May 24 in the hope of kick-starting a Syrian-Iraqi reconciliation process. The king then travelled to Baghdad days later and set into motion a series of engagements between various 397 Sunayama, Syria and Saudi Arabia: Collaboration and Conflicts in the Oil Era (London: Tauris Academic Studies, 2007), 190; Goodarzi, Syria and Iran, 161. 398 Sunayama, Syria and Saudi Arabia, 198; Goodarzi, Syria and Iran, 159–68. 399 Sunayama, Syria and Saudi Arabia, 189; Goodarzi, Syria and Iran, 166. 400 Goodarzi, Syria and Iran, 174–75, 179. 94 combinations of Syrian, Jordanian, Iraqi officials. An announcement soon followed that a meeting between the Syrian and Iraqi foreign ministers would take place on June 13.401 Iranian leaders appear to have taken the prospect of a Syrian-Iraqi rapprochement seriously. In a stick and carrot counter-wedge combination, Tehran reportedly reciprocated the move by both hosting the head of Asad’s reviled Syrian Muslim Brotherhood and resuming oil deliveries to Syria. The strategy worked; the June 13 meeting was cancelled at the last minute.402 This setback, however, did not stop Riyadh from continuing to court Damascus. Despite the cancelled June meeting, Saudi Arabia reportedly still offered Damascus hundreds of millions of dollars in aid that summer. And when the Saudi Crown Prince failed to revive the talks after highly publicized interventions in Damascus and Baghdad that October, Riyadh was careful not to blame Asad for the setback.403 If Saudi generosity at this time did not produce a substantive change in Syrian foreign policy, it at least bought Syria’s continued participation in mainstream Arab efforts to isolate Iran. In January 1987 Asad agreed to attend the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) summit in Kuwait. There he met with Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak, his first meeting with an Egyptian leader since the 1979 Egyptian peace treaty, and agreed to a resolution critical of Iran, both significant concessions to the mainstream Arab states.404 For his troubles, Sunayama contends, Asad received upwards of $500 million and tacit Saudi support for his February 1987 military surge in Lebanon, the same surge in that led to the Basta massacre of 23 Hezbollah members.405 Also, during (and after) the January OIC summit, Asad met with King Hussein of Jordan to further discuss Syrian-Iraqi reconciliation. Even the Soviets pressed the issue with Damascus, fearing as they did that the continuation of the Iran-Iraq War would lead to an increased U.S. military presence in the Persian Gulf, among other reasons. When during an April 1987 visit to Moscow Gorbachev offered to postpone Syrian debt repayments, sign a series of economic development agreements, and provide sophisticated new weapons systems, Asad saw little reason not to accede to the Soviet request that he meet with his Iraqi rival, according to Sunayama.406 And so it came to pass that on April 26, 1987, Asad flew directly from Moscow to Jordan for two days of meetings with Saddam Hussein, including at least one in the presence of Jordanian and Saudi royalty.407 The Asad-Hussein meetings may have been the high point of the Arab mainstream’s hope to mediate a Syrian-Iraqi rapprochement. The Syrian and Iraqi leaders agreed on a variety of de-escalation measures and to continue their dialogue in the future.408 Asad, once again, cashed in Saudi largess for his participating in the process. Saddam Hussein, however, did not share his fellow Ba’ath leader’s interest in a pretense of resolving their 401 Ibid., 179–85. 402 Goodarzi, Syria and Iran, 182–83; Sunayama, Syria and Saudi Arabia, 196. 403 Sunayama, Syria and Saudi Arabia, 197. 404 John Kifner, “Moslem Parley Ends Without Resolving Disputes,” The New York Times, January 30, 1987; “Organisation of Islamic Cooperation Resolution 10/5-P(IS) On the Iran-Iraq Conflict.” 405 Sunayama, Syria and Saudi Arabia, 198–99; Goodarzi, Syria and Iran, 197, 207. 406 Goodarzi, Syria and Iran, 208–10. 407 Sunayama, Syria and Saudi Arabia, 200. 408 Ibid. 95 rivalry: on July 28, the Iraqi military shot down a Syrian warplane flying over Iraqi territory.409 The era of the Arab carrots aimed at driving a wedge between Syria and Iran was coming to an end. Wedge Episode 3: Threats and Punishment (August 1987 – November 1987) At least two events drained the Saudis of their patience with Asad in the summer of 1987. First, on Friday, July 31, violence erupted between Saudi security forces and Iranian pilgrims-cum-demonstrators performing the annual hajj pilgrimage in Mecca. Each side blamed the other for starting the violence; regardless, the clashes resulted in more than 400 deaths, including 275 Iranians and 85 Saudi civilians and security personnel, and at least 649 wounded, according to Saudi statements. Riyadh grew even more irate when in response Iranian protestors stormed and vandalized the Saudi and Kuwaiti embassies in Tehran.410 A second factor hardening the Saudi position toward Iran involved increased Iranian attacks on Arab oil tankers in the Persian Gulf beginning in late 1986. Kuwait responded to the Iranian strikes by requesting that the United States (and Soviet Union) reflag Kuwaiti tankers sailing in the Persian Gulf. Sunayama explains that the ensuing robust U.S. commitment “renewed confidence and assertiveness” on the part of the Gulf Arabs.411 Together, escalating Iranian aggression and increased U.S. support sapped Saudi Arabia of its prior patience for Asad’s dithering. Saudi Arabia’s newfound assertiveness added pressure to the menu of prior Arab approaches to weaning Syria away from Iran through offers of mediation, diplomatic support in Lebanon, and cash. Arab calls on Syria to revoke its ties with Iran picked up, and Arab summits were convened in August (Tunis) and November (Amman) in order to consolidate a unified Arab position against Iran.412 One reporter on the scene in Tunis described a tense atmosphere in which “the most conservative of the Arab states felt emboldened to make pronouncements of a quite surprising ferocity against Iran.”413 It was also reported that some states floated the idea of reviving a 1950 Arab mutual defense pact.414 The purpose, it seems, was to publicly corner the pro-Iranian Arab states led by Syria into anti-Iranian positions, an outcome the Arab mainstream would eventually achieve in name but not in practice. So much did Arab pressure pick up that in September 1987 Libya relented and realigned to the pro-Iraqi camp.415 Syria remained unmoved, however, leading Saudi Arabia and Kuwait to up the ante. On November 3, one week before the November 8-11 Arab Summit in Amman, it was reported that Kuwait threatened to discontinue its foreign 409 Ibid. 410 John Kifner, “400 Die as Iranian Marchers Battle Saudi Police in Mecca; Embassies Smashed in Teheran,” The New York Times, August 2, 1987. 411 Sunayama, Syria and Saudi Arabia, 203. 412 Ibid., 202. 413 Andrew Gowers, “Arab Nations Consider Ending Links With Iran,” Financial Times, August 25, 1987. 414 Simon Ingram, “Arab Hint at Total Boycott of Tehran,” The Guardian, August 24, 1987. 415 Goodarzi, Syria and Iran, 228; Fisk, “Libya Switches to Iraqi Side in Gulf Conflict.” 96 aid to Damascus.416 A few days later a Saudi official told a reporter that his country’s leadership would “‘not talk about aid or money at all,’ unless the Syrians stop defending Iran....”417 The timing of this threat was especially poignant given the pending expiration of Arab financial commitments to Syria as agreed in the 1978 Baghdad Summit. Riyadh further forced Syria’s hand on various political issues, particularly on the reintegration of Egypt into the Arab fold.418 The result of the Amman Summit was, once again, Syria’s nominal agreement to positions hostile to Iran while ensuring the de facto flexibility to maintain the strategic alliance. Asad, for example, agreed to a final statement that “condemned Iran for its occupation of a part of Iraqi territory” and highlighted “Iranian threats, provocations and acts of aggression.”419 The final statement also affirmed “solidarity with Iraq,” “support for Kuwait in all the measures it had adopted to protect its territory and its territorial waters” – measures that included inviting the U.S. military presence in the Gulf – and “complete solidarity with the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.”420 The wording suggests a near complete Syrian realignment between Iran and its Arab adversarial pole. Yet upon further inspection the final statement outlined little in the way of concrete actions to be taken against Tehran. And immediately after the summit, as we see in the following section, Syrian leaders wasted little time in traveling to Tehran in order to reassure their partner that Damascus remained firmly committed to the alliance. Summary and Analysis In the 1970s, Egypt actively courted a U.S. alternative to its preexisting Soviet ally. So too did Syria, albeit to a less enthusiastic extent, explore the potential benefits of cooperation with the United States. In both of these cases the potential switcher state courted a potential alternative (adversarial pole 2) to its preexisting patron (AP1). In contrast, the juncture of potential realignment between Syria and Iran in the 1980s entailed an AP2’s active and unsolicited effort to compel a potential switcher state to switch sides. Did Asad perceive Riyadh to be a credible alternative to Iran? Saudi Arabia certainly spent years lavishing attention and generous funding on Syria in order to procure supportive policies. In the previous section I identify at least three distinct “wedge strategies,” including: (1) mediation between Syria and its then rivals Jordan and Iraq; (2) sustained financial aid; and, (3) threats to discontinue that assistance. Syria indeed responded to these gestures: it embraced the reconciliation process with Jordan, participated in a similar process with the Iraqis, met with Hosni Mubarak at the OIC Summit in Kuwait, and supported anti-Iranian resolutions in both Kuwait and at the 1987 Amman Summit. Yet the most Arab wedge strategies could buy was mere Syrian participation in these initiatives and a few non-binding public statements of support. Asad, it seems, 416Youssef Ibrahim, “Qaddafi Will Boycott Arab Summit,” The New York Times, November 8, 1987 417Youssef Ibrahim, “Arab Summit Talks Opening Today,” The New York Times, November 3, 1987 418 Sunayama, Syria and Saudi Arabia, 204–5. 419 “Final Declaration Issued by the Extraordinary Arab Summit Conference Held at Amman, Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, from 17 to 20 Rabi’ I A.H. 1408, Corresponding to 8 to 11 November A.D. 1987.” 420 Ibid. 97 correctly calculated that he could reap the benefits of constructive relations with the mainstream Arab states while retaining his strategic alliance with Iran. In fact, even in the period of renewed Arab Gulf state assertiveness Riyadh did not deliver an “us or them” ultimatum to Damascus. Saudi policy reflected a view from Riyadh that the benefits of an imperfect Saudi-Syrian relationship exceeded the expected value of pushing a harder line on Damascus. Why did the Saudis come to this conclusion? Did they underestimate their influence? To answer these questions, we turn to the next section, which outlines the geopolitical constraints and opportunities in the Middle East that favored the continuation of the Syrian-Iranian alliance. Revisionist Ambitions In this section I demonstrate that Damascus and Tehran remained committed to maintaining their strategic alliance despite both the stresses of Syrian-Iranian competition and the wooing from alternative suitors. I do this first by outlining the mechanisms by which they ensured the continuation of their relationship, and then by analyzing the critical role of each country’s respective revisionist ambition in explaining this outcome. Practice of Durability: Reassurance, Consultation, and Compromise Even as the Syrians entertained entreaties by their Arab Gulf suitors, they rarely failed to reaffirm their commitment to Iran. As Sunayama observes, “Between September 1985 and early 1986, almost every single positive response to Saudi-led mediation efforts was followed by a gesture to calm Tehran’s anxiety and exasperation.”421 When news emerged in October 1985 of a potential Syrian-Iraqi rapprochement, for example, Damascus complimented its responsiveness to the Saudi-sponsored initiative with a letter from Asad to Iranian Prime Minister Mir Hussein Musavi that reportedly reiterated Syrian support for Tehran as well as a second message of reassurance between foreign ministers.422 This practice continued throughout the juncture of potential realignment. In early summer of 1986, before the aborted June 13 meeting between the Syrian and Iraqi prime ministers, President Asad issued a public statement in defense of the Syrian-Iranian relationship and hosted an Iranian delegation led by Tehran’s deputy foreign minister, during which Syrian leaders reaffirmed the strategic alliance.423 Further, as I reference above, only days after Asad succumbed to Arab pressure at the November 1987 Amman summit and consented to myriad pro-Iraqi positions in the Summit’s final statement, Syrian Foreign Minister Farouk ash-Shara stated publicly that Syrian-Iranian relations remained “unchanged” and that efforts to drive a wedge between Damascus and Tehran would not 421 Sunayama, Syria and Saudi Arabia, 190. 422 Goodarzi, Syria and Iran, 162. 423 Ibid., 182–84. 98 succeed.424 Shara also publicly stated, “Syria remains firmly on the side of the Iranians, and will never depart from its solidarity with the Islamic Republic.”425 In addition to consistent Syrian reassurance, the durability of the Syrian-Iranian alliance owes also to a mutual willingness to engage in regular dialogue and policy coordination during periods of disagreement. These consultations often involved one party’s concession to the other, though each party also demonstrated the occasional willingness to impose its interests unilaterally. In either instance – whether a negotiated concession or an acceptance of the other’s diktat – both countries proved willing to compromise in the other’s area of primary interest.426 For Syria this meant deference to Iranian interests in the Gulf, and for Iran it meant – eventually – accepting Syrian primacy in Lebanon. Syria and Iran’s willingness to resolve their differences through regular consultation and compromise is evident in the following examples. The first involves the late 1985 conflict with Tawheed in Tripoli, when Asad spurned Iranian offers to mediate the conflict until his proxies had sufficiently battered the Sunni Islamist group militarily. Iran had hoped to advance its goal of exporting Islamic revolution in the Arab world by aligning with Sunni fundamentalist movements like Tawheed, but Asad’s resolve not to allow a Sunni Islamist threat to fester in Tripoli presented Tehran with a choice between pressing its revolutionary agenda or accepting Syria’s terms in Tripoli. Tehran chose the latter, and, after a phone call between Asad and Ayatollah Khomayni Iranian diplomats, dragged Tawheed’s leader to Damascus to negotiate his surrender.427 Second, Iranian-Syrian consultations proved critical to quelling the violence in each of the three rounds of the war of the camps. These were not always easy encounters. During the first round of fighting (May-June 1985), Iranian diplomats reportedly told Asad that Iranian interests would take priority in Lebanon and, in light of the Palestinians’ momentum against Amal, forced upon Syria a relatively unfavorable ceasefire that advantaged the Palestinians.428 Again during the second round of conflict (May-August 1986) Syria and Iran set out to negotiate an end to the fighting between their respective proxies. This time, however, Syria held the advantage after it accepted the requests of multiple Lebanese factions that the Syrian military intervene to enforce a fragile ceasefire.429 Just like in Tripoli, Tehran chose to concede to Syrian primacy rather than escalate bilateral tensions. “Under pressure from Iran,” summarizes Goodarzi, “Hezbollah grudgingly accepted the Syrian-sponsored security plan in Beirut. Tehran clearly did not want to antagonize its main Arab ally, even if it meant partially curbing Hezbollah’s freedom of action.”430 Third, many Iranian leaders publicly castigated Damascus for the Basta massacre, after which more than 10,000 Lebanese Shi’a attended the next day’s funeral and chanted 424 Antony Walker, “Heroes and Villains of the Amman Summit; Arab League,” Sydney Morning Herald, November 14, 1987. 425 Goodarzi, Syria and Iran, 245. 426 Ibid., 135. 427 Ibid., 153–56. 428 Ibid., 149–52. 429 Ibid., 177–78. 430 Ibid., 177–78. 99 anti-Syrian slogans. But the faction in Tehran urging restraint ultimately swayed Iran’s response. They placed responsibility for the massacre not on Damascus but rather on rogue elements in the Syrian military and urged Hezbollah not to take revenge. On March 8, Asad met with Iran’s Interior Minister Ali Akbar Mohtashami-Pur in Damascus and counseled him that Syrian interests take priority in Lebanon. The Syrian president did, however, concede not to disarm Hezbollah,431 a not insignificant concession that enabled Mohtashami-Pur to return with the face-saving message that Syria and Iran continue to see eye to eye on the struggle against Israel.432 Reasons for Durability The lack of publicly available Syrian government documents regarding Asad regime decision-making makes it difficult to trace a causal link between Syria’s revisionist ambitions and its preference for maintaining the alliance with Iran. What is observable, however, is that Asad’s clear preference to remain allied to Iran is consistent with his ambition to strengthen Syria’s regional position vis-à-vis key competitors. The Asad regime’s foremost ambition in the 1980s involved the quest to control Lebanon. As I outlined in the previous chapter, this drive involved both legitimate security interests and opportunistic, revisionist ambitions. In this endeavor, Iran offered many advantages over Saudi Arabia and the mainstream Arab camp. For one, Iran’s star was on the rise in 1980s Lebanon. Iran’s relationships with the Lebanese Shi’a, Sunni fundamentalist groups like Tawheed, and different stripes of Palestinian militants provided Tehran with considerable influence over many strata of Lebanon’s fragmented, multi- sectarian society. Syria undoubtedly viewed this influence with concern, but also recognized that harnessing it would carve the most efficient path toward controlling the broad range of Lebanon’s militias and parties. After all, Iranian cooperation was vital to resolving the 1985 Tripoli crisis, ending the war of the camps, and eventually to forcing Israel’s complete withdrawal from Lebanon in 2000.433 In turn, a hypothetical Syrian realignment away from Iran could well have jeopardized Asad’s control over Lebanon. Saddam Hussein, for example, wasted little time after his success during the Iran-Iraq war in 1988 in extending his influence into Lebanon. Marschall offers, “[T]he increasing military and financial assistance of Saddam Husayn for [anti-Syrian Lebanese General Michel Aoun] kept the alliance between Syria and Iran intact shortly after the Iran-Iraq war.”434 One could counter that hypothetical Syrian realignment away from Iran in favor of the pro-Iraqi Arab camp, or Iraq itself, would give Baghdad less cause to antagonize Syria, but scholars point out that the history of the intense Syrian-Iraqi rivalry and Asad’s support for Iran during so many years of war make it likely that Asad reasonably perceived that Saddam Hussein would seek his pound of flesh and resume his 431 Goodarzi, Syria and Iran, 192–94, 198–206; Ihsan Hijazi, “Syrian Assurance to Iran Reported,” The New York Times, March 11, 1987 432 Goodarzi, Syria and Iran, 206. 433 Goodarzi, Syria and Iran, 277; Norton, Hezbollah, 79–80. 434 Marschall, “Syria-Iran: A Strategic Alliance, 1979-1991,” 441. 100 own campaign for pan-Arab dominance at the expense of Asad regardless.435 At least in partnership with Iran, Asad remained the most powerful Arab nationalist external actor while also maintaining influence in Tehran to coordinate pressure against Iraq. On Israel, too, Iran offered unique defensive and offensive advantages. Iran’s ability to pin down the Iraqi military far away from Syria afforded Syria the flexibility to focus on Israel. Iranian influence over Hezbollah increased Israel’s cost of action in southern Lebanon and diversified Syria’s ability to threaten Israel, an essential component to both attaining strategic parity and initiating offensive actions at a time of Syria’s choosing.436 More broadly, Iran more than any of the so-called moderate Arab states offered to preserve Asad’s quest for pan-Arab leadership. For Syria to have aligned with any of the Arab world’s heavy hitters, whether Saudi Arabia, Iraq, and/or Egypt, would have rendered Damascus, at best, one among many, and likely a junior partner considering Egypt’s population size and historic leadership role, Iraq’s military prowess, and Saudi Arabia’s wealth. Syria’s comparative advantage in the Arab world, its status as the only remaining confrontation state against Israel, was strengthened by revolutionary Iran and would likely be diluted in alliance with the mainstream Arab camp due to their relative moderation and the Gulf States’ new status as confrontation states against Iran. Better to exchange the short- term image problems associated with support for Iranian operations against Iraq for control over Lebanon and reclaim a unique status as the only Arab confrontation state after the war. Furthermore, had Asad alienated himself from Tehran he would have foregone his leverage over his inter-Arab competitors as a mediator between Iran and the Arab world. Iraq’s successes against Iran beginning in the January 1987 Iranian attempt to take Basra counter-intuitively increased Asad’s leverage vis-à-vis both Iran and Saudi Arabia. Iran’s losses in the war left Tehran isolated and weakened, thus increasing Syria’s leverage over its ally.437 Iraq’s victory, in turn, whetted Baghdad’s appetite for regional adventurism, which raised warning flags in Arab capitals and thus increased Syria’s value as a check on Saddam Hussein (and Egypt, which after almost fully rejuvenating its place in the Arab world after nearly a decade of post-Camp David exile posed a potential challenge to other Arab states). In December 1988, Asad made his first visit to Riyadh in nearly six years, and the following year Saudi Arabia and Syria worked closely together to broker the October 1989 Taif Accords, the agreement that ended the Lebanese civil war and all but formalized Saudi Arabia’s approval of Syria’s hegemony over Lebanon. As in the case of steady Saudi funding for Syria during the Iran-Iraq war, Asad seems to have correctly calculated that he could retain Saudi Arabia’s support for his ambition to dominate Lebanon while at the same time maintaining his alliance with Iran.438 Summary and Analysis This section details both the ways in which Syria and Iran preserved their strategic alliance during the juncture of potential realignment in the mid to late 1980s and Asad’s reasons for 435 Agha and Khalidi, Syria and Iran, 26. 436 Goodarzi, Syria and Iran, 183. 437 Agha and Khalidi, Syria and Iran, 26. 438 Sunayama, Syria and Saudi Arabia, 208, 211–13. 101 doing so. I detail how Syria and Iran worked through their many significant differences through Syrian reassurances and a mutual commitment to bilateral dialogue. Embedded in Asad’s commitment to regular consultation with Tehran, moreover, was the implicit offer to Iran of a de facto “right of first refusal.” Asad consistently gave Tehran the opportunity to satisfy Syrian interests, whether in terms of resuming oil shipments or choosing to accept Syria’s domination of Tripoli, Beirut, and other areas of Lebanon. Often, Ayatollah Khomayni availed himself of the opportunity. Thus, Khomayni’s acceptance of Syrian primacy over his revolutionary goals in Lebanon and, in turn, Syrian acceptance of Iranian interests in the Gulf region despite the implications for Asad’s pan-Arab bona fides, conspired to ensure the continuation of the alliance. Finally, I analyzed the ways in which a hypothetical Syrian-Iranian break in the late 1980s would have harmed Asad’s revisionist ambitions. This analysis does not argue that the profit-seeking motive behind Asad’s foreign policy is irrational, nor that it fully explains the persistence of the Syrian-Iranian alliance. Rather, I argue that Syria’s desire to revise the regional balance of power in its favor, for both offensive and defensive reasons, is an essential complement to the balance of threat explanation regarding the durability of this alliance and Asad’s decision not to realign away from Iran during the juncture of potential realignment in the mid to late 1980s. Indeed, even if we control for threat-based motivations by assuming Asad perceived Saudi Arabia or the mainstream Arab bloc more generally as capable of defending the Syrian regime against Israel, Iraq, and domestic enemies alike, Asad’s forfeiture of Iranian support would still have dealt a major blow to his quest both to control Lebanon and to position himself as the leader of transnational Arabism. Conclusion The conclusions from this chapter are portrayed in Figure 1 below. Foremost, the Syrian government did not face an existential threat from either its external or internal foes during the juncture of potential realignment in the mid to late 1980s and, as a result, did not need to reshuffle its alliances in order to survive. In fact, Iranian support in the early 1980s against Israel, against the Iraqis, and against Syria’s Islamist opponents at home played a significant role in mitigating the Asad regime’s most troublesome threats. This finding does not prove my proposed theory of realignment, but it is consistent with that theory’s first hypothesis, which posits that secure states will seek to avoid the costs and uncertainty associated with realignment between adversarial poles. I also show that Asad embraced Saudi, Kuwait, and Jordanian efforts to entice Damascus to align with the pro-Iraqi Arab states. The Syrian leader had little reason to doubt their interest in a closer partnership given both the generous resources they dedicated to their wedge campaign and Syria’s obvious importance to helping them balance against their Iranian threat. I furthermore identify at least three distinct wedge strategies employed by these states. These include mediation between a potential switcher state and its rivals, the provision of generous financial aid, and, when honey failed to catch the fly, threats to withdraw that aid. Neither these carrot nor stick wedge strategies succeeded in their ultimate aim, but Asad’s participation in relevant initiatives suggests that he perceived Riyadh’s offers of support as credible. However, as I demonstrate above, Asad still had reason to doubt whether the pro-Iraq Arabs could fulfill either his security needs or regional 102 ambitions as well as Iran could fulfill these interests. Ironically, it is perhaps because these offers of support were so credible that Asad understood that Saudi support would continue even if he did not abandon Tehran. In the final section of this chapter I argue that Iran’s willingness to defer to Syrian interests in Lebanon and Tehran’s unique ability to further Syria’s revisionist ambitions in the Middle East are necessary but insufficient explanations regarding the durability of the Syrian-Iranian alliance in the 1980s. The relative dearth of credible primary sources regarding Syrian government decision-making plus Asad’s relatively secure domestic position makes it difficult to isolate the relationship between Asad’s revisionist ambitions and his views toward the Syrian-Iranian alliance. What we do know, however, is that Asad aspired to revise the regional balance of power, Iran shared similar objectives that, after 1988, were no longer in competition with those of Damascus and, finally, that Syria’s alternative alliance options, the pro-Western Arab states that generally favored the status quo balance of power, were less capable of advancing this agenda. In a March 1987 Washington Post Sunday edition, Israeli scholar Avner Yaniv authored an op-ed titled “Are Syria and Israel on the Verge of Peace?”439 In it he argues that the Syrian- Iranian partnership is a “tactical alliance” formed exclusively as “a counterweight to Syria’s traditional rival – Iraq.” He reasoned that because Asad’s “alliances shift with events and external pressures,” the Syrian-Iranian partnership was tenuous and Iran’s momentum against Iraq and in Lebanon might force Asad to balance against a radical Shi’a threat on both his eastern and western borders. To be fair, Yaniv does not know at the time that Iran would lose the Iran-Iraq war and that Tehran would bend to Syria’s will in Lebanon. But by viewing the Syrian-Iranian relationship only through the lens of a balance against threat rationale and without attention to a geopolitical profit-seeking motive, Yaniv’s analysis fails to appreciate Syria and Iran’s unique disposition toward enabling one another to pursue their revisionist ambition. As I have demonstrated in this chapter, Damascus viewed its partnership with Iran – when properly harnessed – as its best prospect for dominating Lebanon and pursuing the mantle of pan-Arab leadership. Yaniv states at the outset of his piece that Syria and Iran both “use their superpower patrons to advance their regional interests.” In fact, they use each other. 439 Yaniv, “Are Syria and Israel on the Verge of Peace?” 103 Figure 1: Summary of Syrian non-realignment analysis during the 1985-1989 juncture of potential realignment ` IV1 IV2 IV3 DV Percep(on of Insecurity Confidence in Alterna(ve Ally (AP2) Opportunity Cost of Defec(on to Outcome Availability Revisionist Ambi(on Condi(ons AP2 Threat Security If PS, AP2 Preference Preference Preference Geopoli(cal Exclusive (ME) Assessment PS PS Geopoli(cal Internal Threat AP1 Sufficiency External Threat If PS, Unmet PS AP1 Geopoli(cal AP2 Geopoli(cal AP2 Capability to AP1 Threat to PS Interests Threat to PS vs. AP2 Ini(ated Interest Acceptable If Wedge, AP2 Seeks Reinforcing (MR) or PS to Balance against Support PS Priori(es Alliance Suitability to Preference: Mutually w/ Iran: MR Low - AP Case 3: Med Low High N/A N/A Yes Low Rev. Rev. SQ Syria Med 2 w/ Arab bloc: ME 1985-1989 (AP1 = Iran PS =Syria AP2 = pro- Nega>ve Western Arab High Willingness/Low Med High (-) states) Capability 104 Chapter 5: Syrian Foreign Policy Non-Realignment (1991-2000) “Our bilateral relationship is dependent on many things; but…a critical part of that relationship depends on Syria’s position on peace.” - President George H.W. Bush, in a letter to Syrian President Hafiz al-Asad, dated May 31, 1991440 “With the Clinton Administration and four Israeli prime ministers assigning priority to the Syrian track, and with Asad apparently interested in a trilateral deal with the United States and Israel, the failure to reach an agreement is striking.” - Itamar Rabinovich, Israel’s chief Syria negotiator from 1993-1996441 Introduction This chapter explains the durability of the Syrian-Iranian alliance in the 1990s. Throughout that decade the Syrians enjoyed warming relations with the United States, while from 1991 to 2000 Damascus participated in peace negotiations with Israel that, if successful, would likely have led Asad to downgrade his partnership with Tehran. Yet once again observers who foretold of Syria’s coming strategic realignment would be disappointed. In March 2000, the Israeli-Syrian peace process came to an abrupt halt, and in June of that same year Syrian President Hafiz al-Asad passed away, bequeathing unto his successor and son, Bashar al-Asad, a twenty-year-old alliance with Iran. As in the previous two chapters, the examination of this non-event is important to both the historical and methodological components of this study. Regarding the former, this case study completes the empirical record regarding Syrian alliance decision-making during the rule of Hafiz al-Asad. In terms of methodology, the analysis of yet another non-event allows for the deviation of my dependent variable, as well as for increased opportunity for within-case comparisons against the other periods of Syrian history included in this dissertation. This chapter is organized as follows. In the introductory section I argue that the Syrian-Israeli peace process of the 1990s serves as a proxy for Syria’s potential foreign policy realignment and, as such, constitutes a juncture of potential realignment in the Syrian- Iranian relationship. I then provide brief a history of both the Syrian-Israeli peace talks as well as of the Syrian-Iranian relationship during this period. In the subsequent analytic sections I argue that Syria’s decision to stay the course with Iran was a function of two independent variables, Asad’s perception of his security environment and his perception of the availability of alternative allies, respectively. Regarding the former, I argue that the Syrian government’s relative security for most of the 1990s insulated Damascus from 440 George H. W. Bush, All the Best, George Bush: My Life in Letters and Other Writings (New York: Scribner, 2013), 524. 441 Itamar Rabinovich, “Damascus, Jerusalem, and Washington: The Syrian-Israeli Relationship as a U.S. Policy Issue,” (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 2009), 6. 105 pressure to change its foreign policy. Perhaps ironically, it was then the ailing Asad’s preoccupation with regime survival and ensuring his son’s succession to power that led the elder Asad to effectively end the peace process in March 2000. Regarding the latter variable, I demonstrate that Asad’s disinterest in revolutionary foreign policy moves in March 2000 notwithstanding, there were previous moments in the peace process in which the Syrian leader appeared prepared to strike a deal but perceived Israeli inflexibility as an indication that he did not have a serious partner with whom to negotiate. Background The United States and Syria began to repair their frayed relationship in the late 1980s and early 1990s for a number of reasons. First, the decline of the Soviet Union upended Asad’s strategic environment. He could no longer count on a superpower patron to help him reach strategic parity with Israel, and prudence dictated a stronger working relationship with the emerging unipolar power. The United States was uniquely positioned to help Syria break out of its regional isolation following the 1980-1988 Iran-Iraq War and to provide critical aid to a beleaguered Syrian economy.442 Second, the United States and Syria also experienced a convergence of interests in the inter-Arab political arena during this period. In Lebanon, beginning in the late Reagan era both Washington and Damascus shared a desire to restore stability to that war-torn country. Washington supported the 1989 Ta’if Accord that ended that country’s civil war on terms friendly to Damascus.443 On Iraq, both U.S. President George H. W. Bush and Asad sought to contain Iraqi adventurism. The U.S.-led coalition to expel the Iraqi military from Kuwait during the 1990-1991 Gulf War served the shared goal of cutting Saddam Hussein down to size, and Syria’s participation in that coalition endowed it with much needed regional legitimacy. Third, the Bush administration spoke about the Arab-Israeli conflict in what Asad perceived to be more even-handed terms than Reagan. In a May 22, 1989, speech to the American Israeli Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC), for example, Secretary of State James Baker stated, For Israel, now is the time to lay aside once and for all the unrealistic vision of a Greater Israel. Israeli interests in the West Bank and Gaza, security and otherwise, can be accommodated in a settlement based on [United Nations] Resolution 242. Foreswear annexation, stop settlement activity, allow schools to reopen, reach out to the Palestinians as neighbors who deserve political rights.444 Not since President Carter did Asad believe he might have such an honest broker in the White House. 442 Ma’oz, Syria and Israel, 201-02. 443 Alasdair Drysdale and Raymond Hinnebusch, Syria and the Middle East Peace Process (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1991), 196–97. 444 “Jim Baker 1989 AIPAC Speech.” 106 Juncture of Potential Realignment It was the onset of the Syrian-Israeli peace process in 1991, however, that presented the juncture of potential realignment in the Syrian-Iranian alliance. Though this study’s unit of analysis is not peace agreements, in this particular case the Syrian-Israeli peace process serves as a clear proxy for the prospect of Syria’s defection from Tehran. According to my definition, a juncture of potential realignment requires two conditions: first, a historical process or event that creates a basis for alternative alignment decision-making; and, second, a formal or informal initiative that pique’s the interest of a potential switcher state. The fall of the USSR, the Gulf War, and the Ta’if Accord, while historic, do not constitute a juncture of potential realignment because they do not fully meet even the first condition – they do not in and of themselves necessitate a break with Tehran. Instead, the fall of the Soviet Union increased Syrian dependence on Iran. Soviet support may have been on the wane since the mid-1980s, but Asad’s loss of his only superpower ally nevertheless came as a blow. According to Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) Arms Transfers Database, for example, Soviet arms transfers to Syria decreased in value from $1.5 billion in 1985 to $739 million in 1990, and then plummeted to just $24 million, $14 million, and $10 million in 1991, 1992, and 1993 respectively.445 The newly independent Russian Federation was similarly not in a position to provide much in the way of substantial financial aid or political support on par with what the United States could provide Israel – in other words, Asad’s goal of strategic parity with Israel was no longer viable. Iran thus emerged as Syria’s only remaining ally and, given Tehran’s influence with Hezbollah in southern Lebanon, one of Asad’s primary tools for maintaining a credible military threat against Israel. In September 1990, Asad made his first state visit to Iran since the 1979 revolution.446 Iran, for its part also isolated by the end of the 1980-1988 Iran-Iraq War, could not fully fill the void left by Moscow, but it demonstrated its commitment to continuing the alliance with Syria by recognizing Syria’s privileged position in Lebanon. That and the shared threat from a newly emboldened Iraq provided enough reason for Syria and Iran to continue their security cooperation into the 1990s. The Syrian-Israeli peace negotiations that began at the 1991 Madrid Conference, however, historic in their own right given the decades of prior conflict, are distinct from the aforementioned momentous events precisely because their success inherently implied a Syrian break with Iran. All parties involved acknowledged this dynamic. Itamar Rabinovich, Israel’s chief Syria negotiator under Labor Party prime ministers Yitzhak Rabin and Shimon Peres, attests to Israel’s view in this regard when he writes, “Asad would be expected as part of his new relationship with the United States, to distance himself from Iran…”447 As for Syria’s view, according to Rabinovich, 445 Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), Arms Transfers Database, Trade Registers, accessed April 2018. 446 Goodarzi, Syria and Iran, 289. 447 Rabinovich, “Damascus, Jerusalem, and Washington: The Syrian-Israeli Relationship as a U.S. Policy Issue,” 5. 107 Hafiz al-Asad made no secret of the fact that he was not interested in peace with Israel as such. Of course, he was anxious to regain the Golan Heights and expected to obtain the territory as part of the settlement package, but an agreement fitted into a larger scheme – a new relationship with the United States with direct benefits for Syria and an American recognition of Syria’s regional position. Peace with Israel, Asad felt, was a necessary component of a larger package.448 Syrian Defense Minister Mustafa Tlas echoed this analysis when he publicly acknowledged that peace with Israel would require disarming Hezbollah, the Iranian-backed Shi’a militia in Lebanon.449 The Americans and Iranians, as adversarial poles, understood these stakes as well. President George H. W. Bush conveys in his memoirs that he explicitly linked the future of U.S.-Syrian relations to the Syrian-Israeli peace process in a letter he wrote to the Syrian president during the run up to the 1991 Madrid Conference, explaining, “Our bilateral relationship is dependent on many things; but… a critical part of that relationship depends on Syria’s position on peace.”450 The Clinton administration viewed Syria’s strategic realignment as a critical component of its “dual containment” policy directed toward both Iraq and Iran. Martin Indyk, a senior Middle East policy advisor in the Clinton administration and lead negotiator in the Syrian-Israeli peace process, states plainly in his memoir that, “It was a part of our calculation that if we could succeed in negotiating a Syrian-Israeli peace, we could break Damascus’s alliance with Iran.”451 The Clinton team also put forward this argument publicly at the time. In a May 1994 speech to the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, President Bill Clinton’s National Security Advisor, Anthony Lake, delivered a speech in which he identifies Iran as a hostile “reactionary backlash” regime and then goes on to assess that “[a]n Israel-Syria peace would… construct a bastion against backlash states.” Added Lake, Thus, when President Assad took the significant step of announcing in Geneva with President Clinton that Syria had made, in his words, a “strategic choice for peace” with Israel, his nation’s erstwhile extremist allies quickly grew very nervous…. Iranian officials hurriedly visited Damascus but apparently left empty-handed, and when they got home, the Iranian clergy began criticizing the leadership for failing to prevent the emerging isolation of their nation.452 The Iranians indeed grew quite nervous about the prospect of Syrian-Israeli peace for this very reason. In 1995, Iranian Foreign Minister Ali Akbar Velayati reportedly acknowledged, “the more a country gets closer to the usurper regime [Israel], the more it will distance itself from us.”453 In sum, each of the relevant players – Syria, Israel, the United States and Iran – understood that the strength of Syrian-Iranian partnership hung in the balance of the Syrian-Israeli peace process. 448 Ibid., 6. 449 Ehteshami and Hinnebusch, Syria and Iran, 193. 450 George H. W. Bush, All the Best, George Bush, 524. 451 Martin Indyk, Innocent Abroad: An Intimate Account of American Peace Diplomacy in the Middle East (New York,: Simon & Schuster, 2009), 172. 452 Anthony Lake, “Conceptualizing U.S. Strategy in the Middle East” (Washington, DC: Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 1994). 453 Ehteshami and Hinnebusch, Syria and Iran, 193. 108 As for the second juncture of potential realignment criterion, the Syrians demonstrated a clear interest in U.S.-mediated negotiations for almost a decade. When the Bush administration sent out invitations in July 1991 regarding what would become the Madrid Conference later that year, for example, President Asad’s was the first positive response.454 In March 1992 the head of the Syrian negotiation team in Washington stated publicly that Syria was ready to make peace with Israel,455 and in April 1993 Asad granted Patrick Seale an on-the-record interview in which the Syrian president affirmed, “We now assert that our aim is peace…”456 Asad also directed messaging toward his domestic constituency. In August 1993, he told the Syrian military, “We are in the battle for peace and we conduct it with the same ability that we displayed in conducting the military battles.”457 He allowed Syrian television to fully broadcast the signing of peace agreements between Israel and the Palestinians and Jordanians, respectively,458 and in 1995 Syrians could drive past billboards declaring, “We fought with dignity; we will make peace with dignity.”459 The latter half of the decade witnessed further evidence of Asad’s investment in the process. According to Ross, for example, after the assassination of Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin in November 1995, Syrian Foreign Minister Farouk ash-Shara reportedly told his U.S. interlocutors that “something good might come from something bad.”460 Overall, Syrian regime words and action through much of the 1990s, directed at both external and domestic audiences, reveal active engagement in a process that, if successful, would have led to dramatic foreign policy changes. The question, then, is what happened in that process? The Syrian-Israeli Peace Process: From Madrid (1991) to Geneva (2000) Secretary of State James Baker came to office uninterested in Arab-Israeli peace diplomacy. “All evidence suggested that even the most intensive application of diplomacy would be a wasted investment,” Baker writes in his memoir.461 Baker’s early experiences with Israelis and Palestinians reinforced his initial instinct, but the 1990-1991 Gulf War changed the Bush administration’s calculus. Washington had neutralized Iraq, Israel’s greatest threat at the time, and earned a debt of gratitude with the Gulf Arabs, Egyptians, and Syrians in the process. The time had come to secure the peace. 454 Ma’oz, Syria and Israel, 207. 455 Ibid., 216. 456 Seale, “Interview with Syrian President Hafiz Al-Asad,” Journal of Palestine Studies 22, no. 24 (Summer 1993): 112. 457 Ma’oz, Syria and Israel, 236. 458 Ibid., 236, 250. 459 Indyk, Innocent Abroad, 279. 460 Dennis Ross, The Missing Peace: The Inside Story of the Fight for Middle East Peace (New York: Farrar, Straus, Giroux, 2004), 219; Helena Cobban, The Israeli-Syrian Peace Talks: 1991-1996 and Beyond (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1999), 108. 461 James A. Baker, III, The Politics of Diplomacy: Revolution, War & Peace, 1989-1992 (New York: G. P. Putnam’s Sons, 1995), 117. 109 The result was a months-long process aimed at convening the parties to the Arab- Israeli conflict at the negotiation table, culminating in the opening of the Madrid Conference on October 30, 1991. President Bush and Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev nominally co-led the conference, which included Israeli, Syrian, Egyptian, Lebanese, and a joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation. After Madrid, the peace process branched out into separate, U.S.-mediated bilateral tracks; given Asad’s previous insistence on comprehensive negotiations under UN auspices, Syria’s agreement to this formula stands as a remarkable development. The issues at stake in the Syrian-Israeli track were relatively straightforward. According to Rabinovich, Syria demanded Israel’s full withdrawal from the Golan Heights and Israel sought in exchange “full peace,” including the normalization of diplomatic relations, economic trade, and tourism, as well as sufficient guarantees regarding security and water resources. There were of course other related issues, but for most of the decade the primary topic of conversation concerned commitments to and definitions of full withdrawal and full peace.462 In general, Arab-Israeli diplomacy tends to slow down in the period preceding U.S. and/or Israeli elections – American candidates tend not to want to be seen pressuring Israel, and Israeli candidates prefer not to be seen making concessions. For that reason, little progress was made for most of 1992 as U.S. and Israeli voters elected Bill Clinton and Yitzhak Rabin, respectively. In the summer of 1993, Dennis Ross, whom President Clinton had kept on the State Department rolls as his senior Middle East negotiator, returned to the region to restart the process. According to Ross’s memoirs, in an August meeting that included only U.S. Secretary of State Warren Christopher, himself, Yitzhak Rabin, and Itamar Rabinovich, Rabin surprised the U.S. negotiating team with a message for Asad that would come to serve as a focal point for all future negotiations: Rabin asked his American intermediaries to convey to Asad that Israel was prepared to commit – to the United States – to fully withdraw from the Golan Heights provided Syria would meet Israel’s needs regarding the normalization of relations, security, and water and that Syria would not tie these issues to any of the other Arab-Israeli negotiation tracks.463 The “Rabin deposit,” as it came to be known, was duly conveyed to Asad, whose pleased but unreciprocating response satisfied the Americans but deeply disappointed Rabin. As a result, Rabin, who was also concerned that his public could not handle dramatic progress on two fronts simultaneously, decided to table the Syrian-Israeli track in favor of rapidly developing progress with the Palestinians at Oslo.464 The Syrian-Israeli talks thus sputtered along in fits and starts from the announcement of the Oslo Peace Accords in September 1993 to the Rabin’s assassination in November 1995. There were some notable achievements during this period, including meetings between military chiefs of staff and an agreement on an “Aims and Principles Non-Paper,” but, according to Ross, at this stage it was Asad who retreated from previous commitments 462 Rabinovich, “Damascus, Jerusalem, and Washington,” 6–7. 463 Ross, The Missing Peace, 111. 464 Itamar Rabinovich, The Brink of Peace: The Israeli-Syrian Negotiations (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998), 106–8; Ross, The Missing Peace, 111. 110 and precipitated a pause in the talks in July 1995.465 In the interim, Israel concluded yet another separate peace agreement, this time with the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, in October 1994.466 On November 4, 1995, a right-wing Israeli Jew assassinated Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin at a peace rally in Tel Aviv. It was a major blow to the peace process, but from the crisis emerged a rare window of opportunity. “Terrible as it was,” writes Ross, “the assassination had changed the circumstances, creating… a shield behind which [Rabin’s successor] Shimon Peres could pursue the Rabin legacy....”467 Acting Prime Minister Shimon Peres stated on the record within days after Rabin’s assassination that he intended to pursue a peace deal with the Syrians before Israeli elections the following year.468 Israeli, Syrian, and American delegations subsequently convened at the Wye River Plantation in Maryland for an intensive round of negotiations from December 1995 through February 1996. The parties made substantive progress at Wye, but the talks would ultimately fall victim to two familiar obstacles. The first related to Israeli elections, specifically the lingering question of whether and when Acting Prime Minister Shimon Peres would call for early elections. The second was a series of deadly Palestinian terrorist attacks in Israel beginning on February 25 and leading to the deaths of 59 Israelis.469 Israeli negotiators found it difficult to continue peace talks during this wave of violence, and according to former lead negotiator Itamar Rabinovich, they refused to do so once it became clear that the Syrians would not condemn the Palestinian terror attacks.470 The blow to the peace camp would eventually lead to Peres’s loss to Likud Party leader Benjamin Netanyahu in the May 1996 elections. Benjamin Netanyahu’s first tenure as prime minister from 1996-1999 bode ill for the Syrian-Israeli negotiations. Netanyahu did not prioritize the Syrian track, which he effectively stalled for three years.471 In May 1999 Israelis voted to replace Netanyahu with Ehud Barak, the former IDF Chief of Staff and Minister of Foreign Affairs under Peres. Barak had campaigned on a platform of withdrawing the IDF from Lebanon (where it had been since in 1982) and pursuing an agreement with Syria, and thus entered office with a mandate for peace.472 The Syrians and Israelis were never as close to peace as they were in the months following Barak’s election. Talks quietly picked up in Washington in fall 1999, and it was soon agreed that the parties would meet at a retreat in Shepherdstown, West Virginia, in January 2000 to make a final push. By all accounts it was the Israelis at this stage who withheld flexibility. When President Clinton presented both parties for the first time with a draft peace treaty, Ross recounts, the Syrian delegation was reportedly forthcoming and flexible 465 Ross, The Missing Peace, 162–63. 466 Ibid., 164–87. 467 Ibid., 215. 468 Ibid., 215. 469 Ibid., 244. 470 Rabinovich, The Brink of Peace, 228. 471 Cobban, The Israeli-Syrian Peace Talks, 170. 472 Ross, The Missing Peace, 489, 509. 111 but “There was no responsiveness on the Israeli side….”473 In the weeks that followed Washington leaned on Barak to salvage the negotiations by providing Damascus a package of his near-bottom lines. Barak soon approved a proposal to return 99% of the Golan Heights, but by the time Clinton presented this offer to Asad in Geneva in March 2000 it was too late. Secretary Albright records Asad’s immediate reaction upon hearing the proposal: “Then he doesn’t want peace.”474 This time Asad was the one who would not be moved. Asad made clear to Clinton that the 99% solution was not good enough to accept or serve as a basis for more detailed discussions, conveying the impression to American negotiation team, according to the memoirs of many of those involved, that he was done with the peace process.475 It is not entirely clear why Asad passed on the opportunity to regain 99% of the Golan Heights. Foreign Minister Shara would explain to Clinton that, “The problem is not a matter of kilometers. It is one of dignity and honor.” As I explain in more detail later in this chapter, however, it is more likely that Asad’s poor health and corresponding concern to ensure his son’s smooth succession to power played an even greater role in the elder Asad’s decision to effectively end his involvement in the peace process after Shepherdstown. Regardless, the juncture of potential realignment had closed. Peace, remarked Ehud Barak immediately after the Geneva meeting, would now have to wait for a next generation of Israelis and Syrians.476 The Syrian-Iranian Alliance during the Syrian-Israeli Peace Process Iranian leaders disliked Syria’s involvement in the Arab-Israeli peace process. Tehran understood that peace could lead to a diminishment of its influence in the Levant, while Israel’s normalization in the region augured a major setback to Iran’s revolutionary agenda.477 On the opening day of the Madrid Conference, Iranian parliamentarian Ali Akbar Mohtashami stated that all conference participants should be assassinated for treason, while in Lebanon thousands of Hezbollah supporters demonstrated at the site of the bombed U.S. Embassy in Beirut.478 Ehteshami and Hinnebusch argue that Iranian opposition to Syrian involvement in the peace process was “largely rhetorical,” citing Tehran’s economic and geopolitical challenges as limiting its practical options. There certainly was plenty of critical rhetoric. In 1993 a group of Iranian clerics reportedly warned that a Syrian-Israeli peace agreement would cost Tehran its relationship with Hezbollah and ultimately lead to Israeli and American economic domination of the Middle East.479 When the Syrians and Israelis tried 473 Ibid., 561. 474 Madeline Albright, Madam Secretary (New York: Miramax Books, 2003), 481. 475 Madeline Albright, Madam Secretary (New York: Miramax Books, 2003), 481; Indyk, Innocent Abroad, 282; Ross, The Missing Peace, 567. 476 Eyal Zisser, Asad’s Legacy: Syria in Transition (Washington Square: New York University Press, 2001), 125. 477 Ehteshami and Hinnebusch, Syria and Iran, 183. 478 Peter Bakogeorge, “Old Ways, Old Positions Hard to Break After a Day,” Vancouver Sun, October 31, 1991. 479 Ehteshami and Hinnebusch, Syria and Iran, 188–89. 112 in late 1995 and early 1996 to move quickly toward peace after the Rabin assassination, Iranian Vice President Hassan Habibi cancelled a trip to Syria, and the Iranian media levied accusations of Syrian submission to “U.S. and Zionist dictates,” characterizing Syria’s role in the talks as “humiliating and beggarly.”480 Did Iranian opposition extend beyond rhetoric? Rabinovich shares his view that Iran also expressed its displeasure by supporting non-state armed groups willing to play a spoiler role during the peace process when he writes, “Hezbollah received its instructions from Iran, and Iran was clearly interested in fanning tension… to disrupt the peace process and to help bring down the Labor government that was committed to it.”481 This dynamic always seemed to make headlines during optimistic periods in the peace process, such as when Western media reported on Hezbollah leaders visiting Iran for discussions about Syria during the winter 1995-1996 push at Wye River Plantation, or in the reports of increased Iranian support for its regional proxies during the winter 1999-2000 talks at Shepherdstown.482 How did the Syrians, for their part, view Iranian subversion? Iranian spoiler activities served as a source of friction in the Syrian-Iranian relationship during the moments when an agreement seemed possible. According to Rabinovich, the Syrians was furious at Iranian subversion during the Wye River Plantation talks in late 1995 and early 1996,483 and Asad dismissed Iranian requests to withdraw from the peace process.484 The pattern that thus emerges is one in which Iran, buoyed and reassured by the long stretches of dormancy in the peace process for most of the decade generally resigned itself to Syrian involvement in the peace process. During those brief moments of progress, however, Syria chafed at Iranian activities aimed at obstructing its interests. Perceptions of Security President Asad entered the 1990s regionally and globally isolated, bereft of any viable option to achieve his goal of strategic parity with Israel. His subsequent efforts to win new friends quickly succeeded in insulating Syria from its most potent external threats, however, while domestically the Asad regime enjoyed a firm hold on power throughout the decade. As a result, the Syrian government faced no imminent pressure to abandon Iran and undertake risky foreign policy decisions vis-à-vis the West. External Threats The late 1980s ushered in a period of increased geopolitical uncertainty for the Asad regime. Mikhail Gorbachev began reducing Soviet support for Syria in 1986, and the fall of the 480 Hirst, “Syria Upsets Ally by Talking to Israel,” The Guardian, January 1, 1996. 481 Rabinovich, The Brink of Peace: The Israeli-Syrian Negotiations, 229–30. See also Ehteshami and Hinnebusch, 189–90. 482 David Hirst, “Syria Upsets Ally by Talking to Israel”; Lancaster, “U.S.: Iran’s Terrorism Role Grows; Increased Aid Seen As Effort to Derail Mideast Peace Bid.” 483 Rabinovich, The Brink of Peace, 226. 484 Ehteshami and Hinnebusch, Syria and Iran, 192. 113 Soviet Union deprived Asad of his longtime superpower ally. Gone was any credible hope of strategic parity with Israel. Meanwhile, developments around the 1980-1988 Iran-Iraq War chipped away at Asad’s inter-Arab position. The Arab states’ need to mobilize support against Iran led to Egypt’s reintegration into the Arab fold after nearly a decade of expulsion, legitimizing Cairo’s separate peace with Israel in the process. Iraq’s success, moreover, emboldened Saddam Hussein to test his influence in the region by supporting proxy groups in Lebanon and invading Kuwait, among other things. Asad’s newfound global and regional constraints led him to explore alternative alignment arrangements, as the first hypothesis of my proposed theory of realignment would suggest. Iran, to be sure, was not the cause of his troubles, but neither was Tehran capable of containing Iraq or providing Syria with the military support needed to achieve strategic parity with Israel. Asad thus began thawing relations with previous adversaries like the United States, Israel, and Egypt.485 As mentioned in the introduction, Asad began improving relations with the United States during the tail end of the Reagan administration, and bilateral ties would continue to improve under presidents Bush and Clinton. Both Damascus and Washington shared an interest in pacifying Lebanon, and Asad would benefit from the Bush administration’s decision to support the 1989 Ta’if Accord, which had the effect of legitimizing Asad’s long sought goal of dominating Lebanon. In 1990, Syria agreed to join the U.S.-led coalition to push Saddam Hussein out of Kuwait, lending Washington’s effort critical legitimacy in the Arab and Muslim worlds. Meanwhile, throughout the late 1980s and early 1990s, Syrian state-run media and government officials issued increasingly positive statements about the United States.486 Asad also made concessions on his Israel policy in connection to his overtures toward the United States. Prior to 1991, for instance, Asad demanded that a peace process take place in an international conference under UN auspices, that it include comprehensive negotiations between Israel and all of the Arab states collectively, and that Israel make certain commitments as a precondition to talks. By 1991, however, Asad agreed to the Madrid Conference despite that it was effectively led by the United States, that it involved direct, bilateral negotiations between Israel and respective Arab states, and despite Israel’s refusal to agree to Asad’s preconditions.487 Similarly, Syria’s regional isolation and Iraq’s expanding influence after the Iran- Iraq War also led Asad to drop his grudge with Cairo. In late 1987 Asad agreed to Arab League resolutions allowing member states to restore bilateral diplomatic relations with Egypt. Two years later Syria restored its own ties with Cairo.488 In 1990, Asad visited Egypt for the first time since before Egypt signed the 1978 Camp David Accords. As a result of Asad’s flexible foreign policy in the late 1980s and early 1990s, the Syrian president affected a regional security environment that was perhaps more favorable than when he enjoyed Soviet support. By 1991 Asad had secured international legitimacy for his occupation of Lebanon and contributed to the humbling of his Iraqi rival in Kuwait. 485 Ma’oz, Syria and Israel, 201-02. 486 Ibid., 204–7. 487 Ibid., 209. 488 Leverett, Inheriting Syria, 49. 114 As for Israel, Asad recognized the IDF’s superiority, but precisely by maintaining ties with both Washington and Tehran he had constrained Israel’s room for maneuver. Politically, American support for Lebanon’s Ta’if Agreement limited Israel’s military options in that country, while an Israeli assault against Syria at a time when Washington was investing prestige and resources in the Syrian-Israeli peace process was highly unlikely. Militarily, Asad’s relationship with both Iran and Hezbollah provided Syria with added strength with which ratchet up threats against Israeli targets, as needed. In sum, Asad’s success at managing geopolitical uncertainty at the turn of the 1990s enabled him to largely neutralize Syria’s chief external security threats and thereby reduce his need to undertake a risky realignment away from Iran. Internal Threats Hafiz al-Asad, who ruled his country with absolute authority since 1970, enjoyed a firm grip on the instruments of power throughout the 1990s. Yet Asad’s health declined toward the end of the decade, and as I discuss below it is likely that concerns regarding his son’s succession played a significant factor in his decision to turn down Israeli prime minister Ehud Barak’s offer of 99% of the Golan Heights in early 2000, just months before his death in June of that year.489 If Asad witnessed a geopolitical earthquake in his regional environment at the start of the 1990s, internally he enjoyed welcome continuity in his undisputed leadership over Syria. Flynt Leverett writes in 2005 that the elder Asad suffered two serious threats to his leadership during his 30-year rule, the 1976-1982 Islamist uprising and a 1983 challenge from his brother, Rifa’t Asad, while the Syrian president was recuperating from a heart attack.490 (Rifa’t was ultimately rebuffed and exiled to Europe.491) After the latter incident, Asad enjoyed complete control over the Syrian state, as Leverett explains, “Hafiz’s clear suppression of Rifa’t’s challenge effectively closed the question of national leadership for the balance of the elder Asad’s presidency; it also ended any real possibility of another challenge to his authority from within the family.”492 Despite this internal security, after decades of anti-Israeli propaganda and public accusations of treachery toward those Arab states willing to conclude separate peace agreements with the Jewish state, Asad viewed his participation in the peace process as a significant risk. Indyk writes: Asad was never prepared to stand up in front of his people and explain why, for the sake of peace and a better future for their children, it would be necessary to accept anything other than Syria’s maximum requirements. His flexibility was limited by his own insecurities more than by the demands of his people. Peace with Israel threatened Asad’s sources of legitimacy and control. It would give the Sunnis a stick to beat him with, by arguing that their president had strayed from the very pan-Arab, 489 Ross, The Missing Peace, 588. 490 Leverett, Inheriting Syria, 23. 491 Seale, Asad of Syria, 421–40. 492 Leverett, Inheriting Syria, 29. 115 anti-Israeli orthodoxy that he had done so much to promote in the face of other Arab leaders making peace with Israel…. Overall, despite moments when he seemed ready to do the deal, peacemaking was too risky a business for Asad….493 The risk was not entirely in Asad’s head, to be sure. Both Egyptian President Anwar Sadat and Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin had been assassinated for their moves toward peace. After Syria participated in the talks at Shepherdstown, the Syrian Writers Union sharply and publicly criticized foreign minister Shara for alleged concessions in exchange for little in return. Ross explains the significance of this development, “This was bound to have an effect on Asad. Nothing happens by accident in an authoritarian state like Syria…. Asad’s health situation made him less capable of maintaining total control, and he was bound to read the criticism as a warning shot over concessions that Syria was making.”494 In fact, after that embarrassment, Asad began to retreat from previous commitments and the peace process altogether.495 Asad’s declining health and the corresponding concern over managing his son’s succession likely exacerbated his already low tolerance for risk regarding the peace process. Thought it is difficult to establish a definitive causal connection through primary source material—few leaders would openly acknowledge such a calculation, and the paucity of Syrian government documents available to the public makes it difficult to corroborate—this is the assessment of both leaders involved in the negotiations and knowledgeable observers. Both Dennis Ross and Martin Indyk, for example, cite Asad’s succession concerns as a key factor behind his cold response to Ehud Barak’s offer in 2000.496 Leverett, furthermore, offers, “As the 1990s wore on and Hafiz began to groom… Bashar to succeed him, the elder Asad assumed that [his insistence on full withdrawal and comprehensiveness] would be critical to a smooth transition and long-term regime stability.”497 The logic of this argument is straightforward. Leadership succession involves a unique moment of vulnerability for an authoritarian regime, and the absence of any institutionalized process for the transfer of power in Syria might offer ambitious regime insiders a rare window of opportunity to make a run at the presidency. For Asad to have taken a foreign policy decision as revolutionary as peace with Israel, and with it a harder line on traditional partners Hezbollah and Iran, during such a vulnerable period would have made Bashar al-Asad’s early efforts to legitimize his own rule significantly more difficult. Indeed, as one of Bashar al-Asad’s advisors later reported, the younger Asad felt pressure early in his tenure to be seen as continuing his father’s legacy lest members of the regime’s “old guard” move against him.498 Summary and Analysis 493 Indyk, Innocent Abroad, 280–81. 494 Ross, The Missing Peace, 566. 495 Ibid., 584. 496 Ross, The Missing Peace, 588; Indyk, Innocent Abroad, 281-82. 497 Leverett, Inheriting Syria, 46. 498 Ibid., 29. 116 Asad faced geopolitical isolation at the turn of the 1990s, and as a result he went in search of new partners. His primary ally, Iran, was no threat to his regime, but neither was Tehran’s support sufficient to make up for Syria’s geopolitical disadvantages. External insecurity thus incentivized exploring alliance alternatives. However, the geopolitical gains earned by forging closer ties with countries like the United States, Egypt, and even Israel quickly insulated Damascus from any sense of urgency to realign its foreign policy. By the mid- 1990s, Asad did not need Washington for his security; if he was going to make peace with Israel and realign toward the West, he had the luxury of choosing to do so on his own terms. Internal insecurity, on the other hand, did play a role in Asad’s decision to end the Syrian-Israeli peace process in early 2000 – and with it the prospect of realignment toward the West in his lifetime – at least partly in order to secure his son’s transition to power. This argument remains consistent with my proposed theory, which hypothesizes that the perception of insecurity is a necessary but insufficient condition of realignment. Alternative Ally Availability The 1990s witnessed a dramatic change in U.S.-Syrian relations: for the first time since the early days of the Carter administration, Syrian president Hafiz al-Asad expressed his perception of the United States as a viable partner willing to support key Syrian interests. Regarding Israel, too, the Syrian regime’s near-decade-long participation in peace talks indicated an unprecedented openness in Damascus toward a radically new foreign policy orientation. Naturally both Syria and Israel provided one another with plenty of opportunity to doubt the other’s intentions, but the periods of optimism were significant. Ultimately, however, when Asad’s perceptions of Israel’s willingness to meet his needs mattered most, in late 1999 and early 2000, he found Israeli prime minister Ehud Barak wanting. In the following section I demonstrate that Damascus in the 1990s viewed the United States as an available substitute ally, willing to press the Israelis more than ever before, but that doubts about Washington’s ally played a significant role in Syria’s non- realignment at the turn of the century. Perception of American Availability The George H. W. Bush administration laid the foundation for Syria’s new perception of the United States, especially by reintegrating Damascus into the Arab-Israeli peace process. As stated above, Asad’s willingness to concede on certain procedural issues in order to participate in the 1991 Madrid Conference indicates his increasingly optimistic view toward Washington. This perception would continue to evolve during the Clinton administration. In the summer of 1993, Asad told Seale in a public interview that, “[The peace process] is going well with the Clinton administration.… [W]e detect a sense of seriousness in what we have 117 seen so far of the Clinton administration.”499 He expressed similar sentiments in Syrian media too, only months later referring to Clinton as “a full partner and honest broker.”500 Asad’s positive view toward Washington continued to grow after his first meeting with Clinton in January 1994. The Syrian president stated publicly of the meeting, I wish to express my deep satisfaction for what these talks have effected in terms of the United States determination to do all it can in order to bring the peace process to its desired objective, the objective of establishing the just and comprehensive peace in the region…. [Clinton] has attached a special importance as a full partner and honest intermediary to helping the parties reach a comprehensive peace….501 Ross records that Asad expressed a similar enthusiasm in private: At the end of the meeting, Asad came over to me and, holding my arm as he shook my hand to convey greater warmth and appreciation, stated: “You know I liked President Bush. But president Clinton is a real person. He speaks to you with awareness and understanding. He knows our problems better and he is committed to solving them. I haven’t felt this from an American president before.” For someone who had previously met with Presidents Nixon, Carter, and Bush, this was a remarkable statement.502 The United States and Syria continued down the path of rapprochement during the remainder of the 1990s, despite the ups and downs in the Syrian-Israeli talks. Presidents Clinton and Asad met three times, twice in 1994 and again in 2000, while other senior U.S. and Syrian leaders enjoyed increasingly warm working relations. Washington and Damascus still held certain grievances against one another, especially regarding Syrian support for terrorism and corresponding U.S. sanctions, but both states proved willing to compartmentalize those concerns in order to provide room for the peace process to bear fruit.503 Perception of Israeli Availability The Syrian view of Israel’s availability as a peace partner is naturally more complicated than the Syrian view toward the United States. The Syrians and Israelis share a long history of enmity, and Asad had reason to interpret certain Israeli actions in a negative light. Public opinion in Israel at the start of the peace process was largely in favor of keeping the Golan Heights, and Israeli leaders, including Yitzhak Rabin, issued public statements in the early 1990s explicitly rejecting the notion of exchanging the Golan for peace with Damascus. In July 1991, after Syria already accepted its invitation to the Madrid Conference, the government of Israel published a formal plan to increase Jewish settlement in the Golan 499 Seale, “Interview with Syrian President Hafiz Al-Asad,” 115. 500 Ma’oz, Syria and Israel, 241. 501 William J. Clinton, “The President’s News Conference With President Hafiz Al-Asad of Syria in Geneva.” 502 Ross, The Missing Peace, 140. 503 Rabinovich, “Damascus, Jerusalem, and Washington,” 7. 118 Heights.504 Syrian disappointments would continue even after negotiations began; Asad chaffed at Rabin’s prioritization of the Palestinian track after Oslo, and he remained wary of the refusal of successive Israeli leaders throughout the 1990s to commit – to him – to full withdrawal from the Golan Heights.505 Despite these obstacles Asad also had cause for and betrayed moments of confidence in his Israeli rivals. In 1994, Israeli Minister of Foreign Affairs Shimon Peres’s made a public statement alluding to Israel’s willingness to withdraw to the June 1967 borders along the Golan Heights in exchange for full peace.506 For as much as Asad wanted the Israelis to explicitly confirm the Rabin deposit to Damascus directly, the fact that each Israeli prime minister did so to Washington, who in turn communicated Israel’s seriousness to Syria, was enough to keep Asad publicly associated with the peace process.507 The most important test for Syrian perception of Israel’s availability came after Ehud Barak defeated Benjamin Netanyahu in the 1999 Israeli elections. The Syrian-Israeli track had largely stalled under Netanyahu, but Barak had campaigned on withdrawing the IDF from Lebanon and concluding peace with Syria. He thus provided Damascus with its greatest hope in years that a deal might be reached. Barak raised expectations during his campaign and early in his tenure by speaking out strongly in favor of peace. In his first speech to the Israeli Knesset as Prime Minister, Barak stated in July 1999, We have an historic obligation to take advantage of the “window of opportunity” [that] has opened before us in order to bring long-term security and peace to Israel. We know that comprehensive and stable peace can be established only if it rests, simultaneously, on four pillars: Egypt, Jordan, Syria and Lebanon, in some sense as a single bloc, and of course the Palestinians.… To Syrian President Hafez Asad, I say that the new Israeli government is determined, as soon as possible, to advance the negotiations for the achievement of full, bilateral treaty of peace and security, on the basis of Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338.… These two missions – arriving at a permanent settlement with the Palestinians, and achieving peace with Syria and Lebanon – are, in my eyes, equally vital and urgent. One neither outranks the other, nor has priority over it.508 In an unusual twist, Asad’s biographer Patrick Seale also emerged on the scene to conduct parallel interviews with the Syrian and Israeli leaders in June 1999 in which the British journalist seemed to choreograph a pair of confidence-building statements. In reportedly the only foreign policy meeting Barak granted before assuming office, Barak told Seale that he was prepared to make a “peace of the brave” as well as for the “painful decisions it entails.”509 Asad, for his part, publicly described Barak as “a strong and honest man who 504 Ma’oz, Syria and Israel, 211–13. 505 Indyk, Innocent Abroad, 278. 506 Ma’oz, Syria and Israel, 249. 507 Indyk, Innocent Abroad, 278. 508 Ehud Barak, “Address in the Knesset by Prime Minister Elect Ehud Barak upon the Presentation of His Government.” 509 Yigal Carmon and Yotam Feldner, “Israel-Syrian Negotiations, Part 1: From Hope to Impasse” (The Middle East Media and Research Institute, 1999). 119 wants to make peace with Syria and who operates according to a well-planned strategy.”510 As far as Seale was concerned, “Israel and Syria have never been so ready for a settlement.”511 In December 1999, the Syrians dropped their standing preconditions and agreed for the first time to allow negotiations to take place at the political level rather than among technical experts or military leaders. Asad explained this decision to his American interlocutors by noting his unprecedented optimism, “Barak is serious; he wants to reach agreement quickly and so do I.”512 Intensive, political-level talks first took place on December 15 and 16, 1999, in Washington and then in January 2000 in Shepherdstown, West Virginia. The first round of talks went reasonably well. Syrian head of delegation Foreign Minister Shara reportedly stated privately to Clinton and Barak that these meetings “brought us closer to our Israeli neighbors…. There is no reason why we should not succeed.”513 Martin Indyk adds, “An observer of this scene could be forgiven for believing that for one brief moment it looked as if reconciliation in the Middle East was actually possible, even between Syria and Israel.”514 At Shepherdstown, however, the climate deteriorated. The American delegation found Shara and the Syrian delegation surprisingly flexible, but it soon became clear Barak had no intention of making any compromises at this time.515 Barak prevented his working group negotiators from reciprocating Syrian compromises, and he raised new demands regarding the start of Lebanese-Israeli peace negotiations. Clinton, Secretary of State Madeline Albright, and Ross each appealed to Barak for flexibility, but to no avail. As Ross would later describe, from the Syrian point of view, “Shepherdstown was a disaster; Syria had been flexible and exposed concessions and gotten nothing in return.”516 The American mediators at Shepherdstown agree that the reason for Barak’s stubbornness was the Israeli leader’s desire to show his public he could secure Syrian concessions without compromising on Israel’s core needs.517 Barak’s theory was that this tack would enable him to conclude an agreement during a final round of negotiations soon after. Bill Clinton writes in his memoir that, “The Syrians came to Shepherdstown in a positive and flexible frame of mind, eager to make an agreement. By contrast, Barak… decided, apparently on the basis of polling data, that he needed to slow-walk the process for a few days in order to convince the Israeli public that he was being a tough negotiator.”518 (Clinton adds later, “I was, to put it mildly, disappointed.”519) The Israelis, for their part, do not dispute this assessment as much as they argue for its necessity. Itamar Rabinovich, for example – who was no longer Israel’s chief negotiator when Shepherdstown took place – writes of U.S. frustration with perceived Israeli foot-dragging that, “This was a difference of 510 Ibid. 511 Ibid. 512 Ross, The Missing Peace, 537, 546. 513 Indyk, Innocent Abroad, 256. 514 Ibid., 256. 515 Ross, The Missing Peace, 555. 516 Ibid., 563–64. 517 Ross, The Missing Peace, 561–62; Indyk, Innocent Abroad, 258. 518 Ibid. 519 Clinton, My Life (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2004), 886. 120 perspective characteristic of the relationship between a superpower and a small, insecure state.”520 When challenged by Albright at Shepherdstown, Ehud Barak responded, “I’m coming to the toughest decision ever made by an Israeli leader…. It is an existential issue. You don’t seem to understand the risks involved. It’s much more complicated than what Clinton and Asad have at stake.”521 Regardless of the reason, the fact remains that Israel did not come to Shepherdstown to negotiate, which left Asad feeling deceived. “[Asad] felt burned,” explains Ross, “and he would not rush back into a situation whose outcome was now uncertain and potentially costly to him in the succession sweepstakes.”522 The Syrian-Israeli peace talks had all but formally ended. Although Clinton met one last time with Asad in Geneva in March 2000 to convey Barak’s unprecedented, near-final offer of 99% of the Golan Heights, Asad rejected it out of hand, retreating from previous commitments and raising new demands. The Americans quickly concluded that Asad decided to withdraw from the peace process. “What’s the point?” exclaimed Clinton during their meeting, “He’s not even listening.”523 Summary and Analysis In this section I demonstrate that for much of the 1990s the Asad regime viewed the United States as a viable diplomatic partner, considered the U.S.-sponsored Syrian-Israeli peace process worthy of legitimization, and entertained the notion of peace with Israel. At the same time, the Syrian president’s conclusion that the Israeli side was unwilling to conclude an agreement during the critical round of negotiations from December 1999 to January 2000 – a period when the dying Syrian president was growing increasingly preoccupied with ensuring the succession of his son – ultimately led to Asad’s decisions to end the peace process and maintain Syria’s status quo foreign policy. In other words, the Syrians perceived the United States as an available substitute ally, but Washington’s ally’s unavailability proved significant in Syria’s non-realignment during this critical juncture. Revisionist Ambitions There is little evidence that revisionist ambition prevented Asad from concluding a peace agreement with the Israelis and realigning Syrian foreign policy toward the United States in the 1990s. In fact, Asad’s softer position toward negotiations with Israel during this juncture of potential realignment, including his willingness to negotiate bilaterally, suggests his openness to an outcome in which Israel would likely retain its geopolitical advantage. To be sure, some argue that Asad may never have intended to sign a peace agreement with Israel during this period, suggesting that Syria’s participation in the peace 520 Rabinovich, “Damascus, Jerusalem, and Washington,” 7. 521 Indyk, Innocent Abroad, 264. 522 Ross, The Missing Peace, 567. 523 Indyk, Innocent Abroad, 282. 121 process was merely a ruse designed to secure concessions from the United States and buy time until Syria’s geopolitical environment improved. Indyk writes, [E]ngaging in a peace process with the United States and Israel, while stopping short of concluding an agreement, held out considerable advantages for Asad. He could avoid being treated like Iraq and Iran, which was certainly possible given Syria’s sponsorship of Palestinian and Lebanese terrorism, its efforts to acquire weapons of mass destruction, and its occupation of Lebanon. He would give the United States enough of a stake in the survival of his regime that it would constrain its Israeli ally from taking advantage of Syria’s loss of its superpower patron after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Moreover, active engagement in the peace process… neutralized American pressure and legitimized Syria in the eyes of much of the world.524 Indyk allows, however, that the Syrian leader was ready for an agreement in late 1999 and early 2000 and was only deterred at the last moment by fears of domestic backlash after his humiliation in Shepherdstown.525 Thus the two contentions – that Asad in the 1990s sought to use the peace process to recuperate his geopolitical position and that he was willing to sign a peace agreement under the right terms and conditions – are not necessarily mutually exclusive, and it is therefore difficult to isolate a causal relationship between Syria’s geopolitical ambitions and the failure of the peace process. It is also worth pointing out that a Syrian-Israeli peace agreement in 2000 need not preclude the Asad regime’s traditional revisionist ambitions. A hypothetical agreement would certainly limit Damascus’s ability to threaten Israel by likely involving Syrian recognition of Israel’s right to exist, mutually agreed security arrangements in the Golan Heights, and a likely significant curtailing of Hezbollah in Lebanon. Still, an unresolved Palestinian issue would remain ripe for manipulation, while even the best security arrangements might not neutralize the Golan Heights’s natural strategic advantages. Meanwhile, it is possible that a Syrian-Israeli agreement would not have led to a complete break between Damascus and Tehran. The elder Asad has an accomplished record of playing competing powers off one another, and Iran has a record of conceding to Syrian diktat in the Levant when faced with little alternative; a Syrian-Israeli peace agreement could well have resulted in a diminishment of Syrian-Iranian cooperation without the severing of ties that would preclude future cooperation. Summary and Analysis The section above succinctly captures the argument that there is little evidence connecting revisionist ambition and Asad’s decision not to realign Syrian foreign policy in the 1990s. If, hypothetically, Barak had been more forthcoming at Shepherdstown and the Syrians still balked at an agreement, then we might be able to conclude that Asad never intended to sign an agreement. But there is no definitive proof that Asad was unwilling to sign an agreement while he was still healthy. Senior American mediators involved in the negotiations agree that considerations pertaining to regime security and succession played a decisive role in 524 Ibid., 281. 525 Ibid., 281–82. 122 Asad’s walking away from the process in March 2000, a not wholly irrational calculation for a dying dictator.526 Conclusion The prospect of Syrian foreign policy realignment between adversarial poles never seemed as likely as in the 1990s. The Madrid Peace Conference, the Oslo Accords, and the Jordanian-Israeli peace treaty signaled a potential new trend toward U.S.-sponsored diplomacy in the region. Syria’s President Asad enjoyed unprecedentedly warm relations with U.S. President Clinton, and viewed the potential for a Syrian-Israeli peace agreement – which would entail a significant restructuring of Asad’s relationship with Iran – as uniquely possible under the Israeli Labor Party governments of Yitzhak Rabin, Shimon Peres, and Ehud Barak. The juncture of potential realignment was evident, especially during the negotiations of 1999 and 2000, but appears to have fallen prey to both familiar causes and uniquely circumstantial developments. The conclusions of this chapter are summarized in the following paragraphs and in Figure 1 below. Syria’s non-realignment in the 1990s stems from both security- and substitute ally availability-related factors. While Syria’s geopolitical isolation at the turn of the decade forced Damascus to warm relations with previous adversaries, the Asad regime’s subsequently secure position both internationally and domestically precluded the need for any dramatic foreign policy changes. The Iranians still served as a hedge against Iraq, and Tehran’s prudent decision to restrain its opposition to the Syrian-Israeli peace process meant it would not pose a threat. While Asad may have desired the return of the Golan Heights, his survival did not depend on it. If anything, Asad’s actions convey a perception in Damascus that signing an agreement recognizing Israel as a greater risk to his regime than maintaining the status quo. Nevertheless, Asad expressed a genuine interest in finalizing a peace agreement with Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak. It was only after Shepherdstown when, according to the public accounts of multiple U.S. negotiators at the time, the ailing Syrian president’s concerns regarding an anticipated threat to his son’s succession influenced his decision to effectively end the peace talks.527 Thus, the independent variable of regime security plays a dual role in Syrian foreign policy during this juncture of potential realignment, as indicated in column “IV1” in Figure 1 below: Asad’s perception of security insulates him from pressure to undertake risky foreign policy decisions for most of the decade, while the expectation of future domestic vulnerability disincentivized him from making the same move at the end of the decade. That the perceptions of both security and insecurity, respectively, contributed to Asad’s status quo foreign policy is not contradictory. In my proposed theory I contend that a potential switcher state will only consider realignment between adversarial poles when it perceives itself to be insecure. The decision to stay the course during the period of perceived security is therefore consistent with my hypotheses. The decision to maintain a status quo foreign policy during a period of anticipated insecurity was made easy in this case 526 Ross, The Missing Peace, 588; Indyk, Innocent Abroad, 281-82. 527 Ross, The Missing Peace, 588; Indyk, Innocent Abroad, 281-82. 123 by the fact that Iran was both a familiar ally and not a threat. As such, this case study adds to the empirical evidence, also found in chapter 3 on Syrian non-realignment from the Soviet Union in the 1970s, that suggests one of the key conditions in which the perception of insecurity affects realignment decisions is when a potential switcher state’s preexisting ally (adversarial pole 1) is itself a source of threat. As for the second reason for Syria’s non-realignment during this period, Asad seems to have had unprecedented levels of confidence in the United States during the Clinton administration but, unsurprisingly, lacked a perceived partner in Israel when he was closest to striking a deal. This explanation is as straightforward as it is idiosyncratic. Indyk writes that the reason for the failure of these negotiations “is straightforward: when Asad was ready, Barak was not; and when Barak was ready, it was too late for Asad.”528 This is not to say that Israel was not ready to make a deal at other points during the peace process, or to weight in on wehther one side deserves more blame than the other for the failure to reach an accord. Rather, to assess the question of Syrian non-realignment in the 1990s, notwithstanding the regime security concerns discussed at length above, it is important to consider that, at the moment when Asad appeared most eager to finalize an agreement, he found his Israeli counterparts wanting. And once again the United States, for all its power and efforts, ultimately could not force the hand of its ally. In a world in which unpredictable or isolated events can significantly shape the political conditions that either support or constrain diplomacy – such as the assassination of Yitzhak Rabin or the spate of Palestinian terror attacks that precipitated the end of the Wye River talks in early 1996 – timing matters. 528 Ibid., 277–78. 124 Figure 1: Summary of Syrian non-realignment analysis during the 1991-2000 juncture of potential realignment ` IV1 IV2 IV3 DV Percep(on of Insecurity Confidence in Alterna(ve Ally (AP2) Opportunity Cost of Defec(on to Outcome Availability Revisionist Ambi(on Condi(ons AP2 Threat Security If PS, AP2 Preference Preference Preference Geopoli(cal Exclusive (ME) Assessment PS PS Geopoli(cal Internal Threat AP1 Sufficiency External Threat If PS, Unmet PS AP1 Geopoli(cal AP2 Geopoli(cal AP2 Capability to AP1 Threat to PS Interests Threat to PS vs. AP2 Ini(ated Interest Acceptable If Wedge, AP2 Seeks Reinforcing (MR) or PS to Balance against Support PS Priori(es Alliance Suitability to Preference: Mutually 91-99 Low w/ Iran: MR Low - AP Low High N/A N/A Yes Med N/A Rev SQ Case 4: 2 99-00 Med w/ USA: MR Syria High 1991-2000 1991-1999 (AP1 = Iran Low PS =Syria Nega>ve High Willingness/Med AP2 = USA) Med (-) Capability 1999-2000 High 125 Chapter 6: Conclusions This dissertation examines three questions: (1) Why did Egypt and Syria adapt divergent alliance policies after the 1973 Arab-Israeli War?; (2) Why did Syria remain aligned with Iran throughout the 1980s and 1990s, despite bilateral disputes and concerted wedge attempts by prospective new allies?; and, (3) Collectively, what do the four cases of Egyptian and Syrian alliance decision-making reviewed in this study reveal about the broader phenomenon of foreign policy realignment? Question 1: Egyptian and Syrian Foreign Policy after the 1973 Arab-Israeli War In Part I of this dissertation I argue that the divergence of Egyptian and Syrian foreign policy after the 1973 Arab-Israeli War owes to two key factors. First, I argue that Egyptian President Anwar Sadat perceived a higher degree of threat to his regime than did President Asad. As a result, Cairo sought new international partnerships to address Sadat’s problems. Second, I demonstrate that Sadat and Asad held diverging geopolitical preferences for preserving and revising the regional distribution of power, respectively. This comparison is depicted in Figure 1 below. The Sadat government’s security environment in the early 1970s involved a witch’s brew of interlocking external and internal threats. Sadat and Asad shared a similar external Israeli threat, and the Syrian leader faced no shortage of domestic problems, but as depicted in the column labeled “IV1” in Figure 1 below Sadat ultimately perceived a greater sense of vulnerability than did his Syrian counterpart. Perhaps most notable is the fact that Egypt’s Soviet ally exacerbated Sadat’s internal challenges. Sadat reports in his memoirs that he suspected Moscow of plotting against him, and he and many other Egyptian leaders resented the Soviets for providing insufficient military support against Israel and for their abrasive and demeaning treatment of Egyptians.529 Asad, however, did not suffer these challenges. Thus, where proponents of omnibalancing theory are correct to point out that Sadat aligned with the United States in order to balance against his domestic threats, I demonstrate that the Soviet Union’s role in exacerbating those threats is a critical factor in Egypt and Syria’s differing attitudes toward Moscow during this period. Assessing whether a potential switcher state’s preexisting ally is a source of threat must therefore be a part of the realignment equation. Threat perception alone, however, cannot fully account for Egypt and Syria’s respective positions toward the global superpowers. Insecurity, after all, does not fully explain why Asad grew disenchanted with Henry Kissinger’s “step-by-step” diplomacy or with the Carter administration’s eventual backing for Egyptian-Israeli bilateralism over multilateral negotiations. Further, I outlined in both chapters 3 and 4 that Asad faced grave internal and external threats in the late 1970s and early 1980s as a result of the Islamist uprising against him and Israel’s incursions into Lebanon, respectively, but that these periods witnessed little movement toward realignment, indicating that realignment can result from factors other than a need to balance against threat. 529 Sadat, In Search of Identity, 216–18. 126 This brings us to the role of geopolitical preferences and revisionist ambition. After coming to power in 1970, Sadat resolved that he could only secure Egypt’s vital interests – namely, regaining the Sinai Peninsula and salvaging the Egyptian economy – with the support of the United States. Sadat thus calculated that U.S. support could only be obtained at the price of accepting the continuation of U.S. and Israeli regional primacy; the United States and Israel would be unlikely to agree to a political arrangement that resulted in anything less. This analysis led to two important developments: first, the convergence of Egyptian, U.S. and Israeli interests around maintaining the status quo regional balance of power; and second, Sadat’s conclusion that the larger geopolitical appetites of Damascus and Moscow posed an obstacle to the achievement of his goals. In contrast, Syrian president Hafiz al-Asad aspired to redraw the regional balance of power in Syria’s favor and against his two main rivals, Israel and Iraq. As Patrick Seale explains, Asad refused to be “just another weak state on Israel’s borders, another Jordan perhaps, living on sufferance, projecting no power.…”530 The Syrian president thus set for himself the goal of reaching a comprehensive political agreement with the United States and Israel that would lead to the return of all territories captured by Israel in 1967 and the establishment of an independent Palestinian entity. As I outline in chapter 3, achieving this goal would not only return the Golan Heights to Syria, but it would also restore Arab and/or Syrian primacy to the Levant and position Asad as the undisputed champion of the Arab nationalist movement. Unfortunately for Asad, the Nixon, Ford and Carter administrations ultimately declined to pursue a comprehensive agreement. Henry Kissinger, who as Secretary of State and National Security Advisor spearheaded U.S. post-war diplomacy from 1973 to 1976, eschewed a comprehensive agreement in favor of a “step-by-step” diplomatic approach involving a sequence of separate, bilateral agreements between Israel and its Arab neighbors, and he refused to allow what Washington (and Egypt and Israel) considered to be Syrian and Soviet maximalism to threaten the potential of the promising Egyptian-Israeli track. In 1977 the Carter administration inspired a brief window of hope in Damascus that Washington might finally revise its approach to Arab-Israeli diplomacy, but it too would ultimately succumb to the momentum of Egyptian-Israeli bilateralism. Asad understood the implications of these developments. He correctly anticipated that a separate Egyptian-Israeli agreement would neutralize the Egyptian military threat toward Israel and diminish Arab leverage in future political negotiations; the Arabs would lose rather than gain relative power vis-à-vis Israel. In the inter-Arab arena, the prospect of following Sadat’s example would likely keep Syria second-fiddle to Egypt while exposing Damascus to criticisms of betraying the Arab cause from rivals like Iraq; conversely, insisting on a comprehensive deal after Egypt’s separate peace, indeed considered a betrayal in the Arab world, would both position Asad as the rightful heir to Nasser’s legacy and as the only confrontation state along Israel’s borders willing to fight for the liberation of Arab territory and Palestinian rights, giving him a significant advantage over his Ba’athist rivals in Iraq in the contest for Arab leadership. Accordingly, whereas Sadat successfully orchestrated the 1973 Arab-Israeli War to produce U.S. interest in support his goals, Asad concluded that the United States was either unwilling or unable to produce Israeli concessions in line with his interests (see Figure 1, column “IV2” below) and subsequently 530 Seale, Asad of Syria, 267. 127 decided to deepen his relationship with the Soviet Union, which felt equally wounded by U.S.-led post-war diplomacy and shared Asad’s desire to undo the U.S.-led order in the Middle East. In sum, Egypt realigned away from the Soviet Union while Syria remained closely linked with Moscow after the 1973 Arab-Israeli War for the following reasons. First, Sadat perceived a direr threat to his regime than did Asad, and the Egyptian president viewed his Soviet ally as a principle source of the threat against him. Second, while Sadat accepted Egyptian acquiescence to U.S. and Israeli regional primacy as a precondition to regaining the Sinai Peninsula and consolidating the Egyptian economy, Asad aspired to a complete revision of the relationship between Syria and both Israel and his Arab competitors, respectively, and he forged his policy toward Arab-Israeli diplomacy and his international alliances accordingly. Figure 1: Comparison of Egyptian and Syrian alignment assessments during the 1970-1979 junctures of potential realignment IV1 IV2 IV3 DV Perception of Confidence in Oppty Cost to Realignment Insecurity Substitute Ally Revisionist Outcome Availability Ambition Case 1: Egypt 1970-1979 High Willingness/ Positive High High Capability Low (after 1973 War) (+) Case 2: Syria 1970-1979 Med to High Low Willingness/ Negative Med Capability High (after 1973 War) (-) 128 Question 2: The Durability of the Syrian-Iranian Alliance in the 1980s and 1990s Part 2 of this study examines the survival of the Syrian-Iranian alliance during two junctures of potential realignment. The first juncture took place from roughly 1985 to 1988, when Syria and Iran butted heads over competing interests in Lebanon and, simultaneously, while Saudi Arabia and other pro-Western Arab states attempted to wean Asad away from Iran in order to isolate Tehran during the 1980-1988 Iran-Iraq War. The second juncture occurred during the 1991-2000 Syrian-Israeli peace process, which Iran vocally opposed and which the United States and Israel pursued with an eye toward driving a wedge between Syria and Iran. I summarize my analysis of both these cases in Figure 2 at the end of this section. The Asad regime’s relatively secure strategic environment during both junctures of potential realignment, as indicated in column “IV1” in Figure 2 below, plays a significant role in explaining Syrian non-realignment. I demonstrated that Asad was well insulated against external and internal threats during these periods, allowing him flexibility in his international partnerships. It is true that Iran opposed and indeed confronted Syria over disagreements in Lebanon in the mid to late 1980s and on the Arab-Israeli peace process in the 1990s; however, in neither instance did the Iranians respond in a way that threatened the survival of the Asad regime, and both times Tehran ultimately toned down its protests and deferred to Damascus. Iran, moreover, helped mitigate Asad’s two greatest external threats in the 1980s, Israel and Iraq, by helping to drive the Israeli military out of Beirut in 1985 and by diverting Iraqi military attentions during the 1980-1988 Iran-Iraq War. Tehran’s decisions to soften its opposition to certain Syrian policies also represents a “counter-wedge” strategy of sorts, as in both cases this took place while Iran’s rivals were actively courting Syrian support. In the mid to late 1980s, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Jordan, and Iraq itself sought to wean Damascus from Tehran by mediating Syria’s conflicts in the Arab world, providing generous financial aid and, when carrots failed, threatening punishment. These wedge strategies failed for two main reasons. First, while the Saudis and Kuwaitis were able to offer money, and Jordan its good offices, they collectively lacked the geopolitical weight to meet Syria’s security interests and/or regional ambitions. Iran was much better positioned to defend Syria against Israel and Iraq, and by virtue of being a non- Arab country the Islamic Republic posed little challenge to Asad’s campaign for pan-Arab leadership. Second, Asad may have suspected that Saudi financial and political support would continue regardless of whether he abandoned Tehran. The Saudis had consistently provided Syria with financial support throughout the latter stages of the Iran-Iraq War, despite Asad’s continued cooperation with Iran, and there is no record of Riyadh issuing an unequivocal ultimatum. The Saudis, after all, shared Syria’s interest in pacifying Lebanon and would need Damascus to balance against whomever emerged victorious from the Iran- Iraq War. Simply put, other than funding, which they continued to provide regardless, the pro-Iraqi Arab states lacked the ability to offer the Syrians much that the Iranians could not already better provide. The United States, in contrast, did have exclusive leverage with Syria because it was the only power in a position to convince the Israelis to withdraw from the Golan Heights. (These different assessments of AP2 capability are reflected in column “IV2” in Figure 2 below.) However, Washington’s unique capacity was insufficient to bring about Syria’s realignment. While as I show in chapter 5 there were periods when Israel sought to proceed 129 with the peace process and Syria stalled, in assessing Syrian perceptions it must be noted that when the Syrians finally appeared ready to strike a deal at Shepherdstown in early 2000 both they and the Americans found the Israelis uninterested. The U.S. wedge strategy failed because Washington could not force its ally’s hand. The failed Arab and U.S. wedge strategies in these two cases of Syrian non- realignment underscore the insufficiency of alternative ally availability as a determinant of realignment, and indicates that there must be a push factor to accompany a pulling one. That the significant but ultimately non-regime threatening Syrian-Iranian disputes over both Lebanon and Israel policy were not enough of a forcing function further supports the contention that a perception of high insecurity is a necessary condition for realignment. Such a perception notably occurred only once during the junctures of potential realignment studied in chapters 4 and 5, when the aging and ailing Hafiz al-Asad reportedly grew concerned to ensure a smooth path to succession for his son, Bashar al-Asad, in early to mid-2000.531 In this case, however, as I discuss in chapter 5, the unique nature of this anticipated threat and the fact that Asad’s preexisting allies were not the source of that threat favored maintaining Syria’s pro-Iranian foreign policy. Finally, revisionist and/or status quo geopolitical preferences did not play a decisive role in either of these two cases. I demonstrate in chapter 4 that Asad’s ambition for pan- Arab leadership is consistent with his decision not to realign with the pro-Iraqi Arab states in the late 1980s, but there is little basis to suggest this relationship was distinctly causal. In chapter 5 I argue that there is little evidence that geopolitical preference played a role in Syrian non-realignment toward the United States during the Syrian-Israeli peace process of the 1990s. Both of these findings are consistent with my proposed theory of realignment given the fact that the Asad regime enjoyed a relatively high degree of security throughout both junctures of potential realignment. 531 Ross, The Missing Peace, 588; Indyk, Innocent Abroad, 281-82. 130 Figure 2: Comparison of Syrian non-realignment assessments during the 1985-1989 and 1991- 2000 junctures of potential realignment, respectively IV1 IV2 IV3 DV Perception of Confidence in Oppty Cost to Realignment Insecurity Substitute Ally Revisionist Outcome Availability Ambition Case 3: Syria 1985-1989 High Willingness/ Negative Med Low Capability High (-) Case 4: Syria 91-99: Low 1991-2000 High Willingness/ Med Capability Med Negative (-) 99-00: High Question 3: Toward a Theory of Realignment This dissertation constitutes both a historical and theoretical undertaking. While my primary questions are theoretically conscious but ultimately historical undertakings, my third question examines the theoretical implications of my historical findings. In the course of the preceding chapters I tested a proposed theory of realignment, deduced from the existing theoretical literature, against four case studies of realignment decision-making. These cases involve one positive case of realignment (Egypt after the 1973 Arab-Israeli War) and three negative cases, or non-events (each of the cases involving Syria). The research design was crafted in order to maximize longitudinal and cross-case comparability, and each case study collects, identifies, and tests empirical data in a theoretically conscious framework designed to shed light on the phenomenon of realignment, as fully depicted in Figure 3 below. In my introductory chapter I describe this approach as an extended plausibility probe that will help determine how best to refine my proposed theory and whether it merits additional testing. Because it includes only one case of positive realignment, it would be premature to assert that my theory holds; however, initial testing reveals useful insights. 131 First, my proposed theory explains the critical case of Egyptian realignment by examining the remarkable divergence of Egyptian and Syrian foreign policy preferences after the 1973 Arab-Israeli War. It shows that while discussions of external and internal threat are important to understanding alignment outcomes, these discussions are incomplete without an analysis of a potential switcher state’s confidence in alternative ally availability and the geopolitical preferences of the complete set of actors involved in a given realignment equation. Further, each of my four case studies is consistent with my proposed theory. Notably, the three cases of Syrian non-realignment, while admittedly unable to “prove” my theory, support my first hypothesis that perception of insecurity is a necessary but insufficient condition for realignment by demonstrating a correlation between the lack of a high or existential level of threat to regime security and non-realignment. It is also noteworthy that in two of my case studies the Asad regime experienced a moderate (1970s) and momentarily high level (1999-2000) of insecurity, and realignment did not occur. In both of these cases, however, the AP1 did not constitute a threat to the potential switcher state, an observation that, in conjunction with the conclusion that Sadat perceived the Soviet Union as a threat in the 1970s, suggests one useful refinement to my proposed theory would be to explicitly test future cases for incidents of preexisting allies serving as a source of threat to a potential switcher state. A second set of theoretical takeaways involves findings regarding the conditions under which a potential switcher state perceives an alternative ally to be willing and capable to provide desired support. The realignment process can initiate in one of two ways: either a prospective new ally (AP2) begins a campaign to poach a potential switcher state from a competing alliance bloc or a potential switcher state actively seeks to attract a new partner. Regarding the former, this study includes two instances of AP2 wedge attempts, the Arab states’ wedge attempt in the mid to late 1980s and the U.S. and Israeli wedge attempt in the 1990s. In both cases, the AP2 sought to draw Syria away from Iran in order to mitigate an Iranian threat. In other words, AP2 interest in positioning itself as an available alternative ally arose out of a balance of threat logic. Regarding the latter, the two potential switcher state-initiated cases in this study include Egypt before and after the 1973 Arab-Israeli War and Syria only after the 1973 Arab-Israeli War. In the case of Egypt, the United States did not fully respond to Sadat’s desires for a closer partnership in the early 1970s until after the 1973 war. Kissinger’s memoirs indeed clarify that he did not change his policy of “complete frustration” toward Cairo until only after it became clear both that the unresolved Arab-Israeli conflict might inadvertently spark a superpower conflict and that Egypt’s goals were limited and therefore compatible with U.S. interests. Conversely, in the case of Syria, Kissinger similarly points out that prioritizing Syria’s interest in a comprehensive political agreement might risk other achievable gains. This history indicates that an AP2 may emerge as an available alternative ally in a potential switcher state-initiated juncture of potential realignment when the following two conditions are present: (1) the potential switcher state demonstrates that its unmet interests present a threat to AP2 security; and (2) the potential switcher state simultaneously demonstrates that the fulfillment of its aims is compatible with AP2 interests. These two conditions should be viewed as a single collective condition, for each 132 without the other may be insufficient to produce the perception of alternative ally availability. Finally, this dissertation argues that geopolitical preference is a critical consideration in assessing realignment outcomes. I demonstrated in Part I that the tension between revisionist and status quo preferences was a significant cause of divergent alliance preferences in the cases of Egypt and Syria in the 1970s and, as I write in chapter 4, arguably in the case of Syria’s non-realignment from Iran in the 1980s. Certainly, more positive cases of realignment must be studied in order to determine the generalizable utility of this variable, but its relevance in these three cases points to the importance of further testing. Indeed, in an increasingly multipolar world marked by the rise of Russia and China, revisionist ambitions will undoubtedly be a factor on at least one end of the future realignment equation. Figure 3: Comparison of Egyptian realignment and Syrian non-realignment assessments from 1970 to 2000 IV1 IV2 IV3 DV Perception of Confidence in Oppty Cost to Realignment Insecurity Substitute Ally Revisionist Outcome Availability Ambition High Willingness/ Case 1: Egypt Positive 1970-1979 High High Capability Low (after 1973 War) (+) Case 2: Syria Med to High Low Willingness/ Negative 1970-1979 Med Capability High (after 1973 War) (-) High Willingness/ Case 3: Syria Negative Med High 1985-1989 Low Capability (-) 91-99: Low High Willingness/ Case 4: Syria Med Capability Med Negative 1991-2000 99-00: High (-) 133 Bibliography Abrahamian, Ervand. History of Modern Iran. New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 2008. Agha, Hussein J., and Ahmad S. Khalidi. Syria and Iran: Rivalry and Cooperation. London: Pinter Publishers, 1995. Albright, Madeleine. Madam Secretary. New York, NY: Miramax Books, 2003. Alexander, George L., and Andrew Bennett. Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 2005. Allon, Yigal. “Directions of Israel’s Foreign Policy (Text of Public Lecture, Dated December 26, 1974).” Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, December 26, 1974. Israel’s Foreign Relations Vol 3: 1974-1977, Document 56. Assad, Hafiz al-. “Inaugural Speech by President Assad of Syria on the Lebanese Situationmade to the Local Councils, Damascus, July 20, 1976.” Journal of Palestine Studies 6, no. 1 (Autumn 1976): 177–84. ———. “Speech by Syrian President Hafiz Al-Assad, on the Anniversary of the March 8, 1963 Revolution, Damascus, March 8, 1975.” Journal of Palestine Studies 4, no. 3 (Spring 1975): 187–88. Badran, Tony. “Syriana.” Tablet, June 22, 2010. Baker, III, James A. The Politics of Diplomacy: Revolution, War & Peace, 1989-1992. New York, NY: G. P. Putnam’s Sons, 1995. Bakogeorge, Peter. “Old Ways, Old Positions Hard to Break After a Day.” Vancouver Sun, October 31, 1991. Barak, Ehud. “Address in the Knesset by Prime Minister Elect Ehud Barak upon the Presentation of His Government.” Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, July 7, 1999. MFA, Foreign Policy, Historical Documents, 1999-2001, 1. Barnett, Michael N., and Jack S. Levy. “Domestic Sources of Alliances and Alignments: The Case of Egypt, 1962-1973.” International Organization 45, no. 3 (1991): 369–95. Borchgrave, Arnaud de. "Voices Across the Fence; Asad." Newsweek Magazine, March 3, 1975, 34. 134 Boutros-Ghali, Boutros. Egypt’s Road to Jerusalem. First. New York, NY: Random House, 1997. Brand, Laurie. Jordan’s Inter-Arab Relations: The Political Economy of Alliance Making. New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 1994. Brzezinski, Zbigniew. Power and Principle: Memoirs of the National Security Adviser 1977-1981. New York, NY: Farrar, Straus, Giroux, 1983. Bush, George H. W. All the Best, George Bush: My Life in Letters and Other Writings. New York, NY: Scribner, 2013. Carmon, Yigal, and Yotam Feldner. “Israel-Syrian Negotiations, Part 1: From Hope to Impasse.” Inquiry and Analysis Series. The Middle East Media and Research Institute, August 12, 1999. https://www.memri.org/reports/israel-syrian- negotiations-part-i-hope-impasse#_edn6. Carter, Jimmy. “Clinton, Massachusetts Remarks and a Question and Answer Session at the Clinton Town Meeting.” The American Presidency Project, March 16, 1977. http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=7180. ———. The Blood of Abraham: Insights into the Middle East. Third. Fayetteville, AK: The University of Arkansas Press, 2007. Christensen, Thomas, and Jack Snyder. “Christensen, Thomas and Jack Snyder, Chain Gangs and Passed Bucks; Predicting Alliance Patterns in Multipolarity.” International Organization 44, no. 2 (Spring 1990): 137–68. Clinton, William J. “The President’s News Conference With President Hafiz Al-Asad of Syria in Geneva.” The American Presidency Project, Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, January 16, 1994. http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=50132. ———. My Life. New York, NY: Alfred A. Knopf, 2004. Cobban, Helena. The Israeli-Syrian Peace Talks: 1991-1996 and Beyond. Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1999. Crawford, Timothy. “Preventing Enemy Coalitions.” International Security 35, no. 4 (Spring 2011): 155–89. ———. “Wedge Strategy, Balancing, and the Deviant Case of Spain, 1940–41.” Security Studies 17, no. 1 (March 2008): 1–38. David, Steven R. Choosing Sides: Alignment and Realignment in the Third World. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1991. 135 Dekmejian, Hrair. Egypt under Nasir: A Study in Political Dynamics. Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1971. Drezner, Daniel. The Sanctions Paradox: Economic Statecraft and International Relations. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999. Drysdale, Alasdair, and Raymond Hinnebusch. Syria and the Middle East Peace Process. New York, NY: Council on Foreign Relations, 1991. Ehteshami, Anoushiravan, and Raymond Hinnebusch. Syria and Iran: Middle Powers in a Penetrated Regional System. London: Routledge, 1997. Eisenstadt, Michael, and Kenneth Pollack. “Armies of Snow and Armies of Sand: The Impact of Soviet Military Doctrine on Arab Militaries.” The Middle East Journal 55, no. 4 (Autumn 2001): 549–78. Fahmy, Ismail. Negotiating for Peace in the Middle East. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1983. “Final Declaration Issued by the Extraordinary Arab Summit Conference Held at Amman, Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, from 17 to 20 Rabi’ I A.H. 1408, Corresponding to 8 to 11 November A.D. 1987.” Extraordinary Arab Summit Conference, Amman, November 8-11, 1987, November 11, 1987. United Nations General Assembly Security Council. https://unispal.un.org/DPA/DPR/unispal.nsf/0/87B12A15D54207CF852568B D004CEE83. Fisk, Robert. “Libya Switches to Iraqi Side in Gulf Conflict.” The Times, September 11, 1987, Issue 62871 edition. ———. “Oiling a New Arab Line-up / Focus on Syria’s Role in the Middle East Changing.” The Times (London), June 24, 1986. Gause, Gregory, “Balancing What? Threat Perception and Alliance Choice in the Gulf.” Security Studies 13, no. 2 (Winter 2003/4). ———. “Systemic Approaches to Middle East International Relations.” International Studies Review 1, no. 1 (Spring 1999): 11–32. Geyelin, Philip L. “Syria’s Hafez Assad: No 'Deep Love' for Separate Moves,” Washington Post, March 5, 1975. Gibler, Douglas M. “The Costs of Reneging: Reputation and Alliance Formation.” Journal of Conflict Resolution 52, no. 3 (June 2008): 426–54. Ginat, Rami. Syria and the Doctrine of Arab Neutralism: From Independence to Dependence. Eastborne, United Kingdom: Sussex Academic Press, 2005. 136 Golan, Galia. Soviet Policies in the Middle East from World War Two to Gorbachev. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 1990. Goodarzi, Jubin M. Syria and Iran: Diplomatic Alliance and Power Politics in the Middle East. London: Tauris Academic Studies, 2006. Gowers, Andrew. “Arab Nations Consider Ending Links with Iran.” Financial Times, August 25, 1987. Haass, Richard, and Martin Indyk. “Beyond Iraq: A New U.S. Strategy for the Middle East.” Foreign Affairs 88, no. 1 (January/February 2009): 41–58. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/middle-east/2009-01-01/beyond- iraq. Heikal, Mohamed. The Sphinx and the Commissar: The Rise and Fall of Soviet Influence in the Middle East. New York, NY: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1978. Hijazi, Ihsan. “Syrian Assurance to Iran Reported.” The New York Times, March 11, 1987, Late City Final Edition edition, sec. Section A, Page 10, Column 4. Hinnebusch, Raymond. Syria: Revolution from Above. The Contemporary Middle East Series. London: Routledge, 2001. Hirschfeld, Yair. “The Odd Couple: Ba’athist Syria and Khomeini’s Iran.” In Syria Under Assad: Domestic Constraints and Regional Risks, edited by Moshe Ma’oz and Avner Yaniv, 105–24. London: Croom Helm LtD, n.d. Hirst, David. “Syria Upsets Ally by Talking to Israel.” The Guardian, January 1, 1996. Holsti, Kalevi Jaako, ed. Why Nations Realign: Foreign Policy Restructuring in the Postwar World. London, United Kingdom: George Allen & Unwin, 1982. Ibrahim, Youssef. “Arab Summit Talks Opening Today.” The New York Times, November 8, 1987, sec. Section 1; Part 1, Page 22, Column 1; Foreign Desk. ———. “Qaddafi Will Boycott Arab Summit.” The New York Times, November 3, 1987, sec. Section A; Page 3, Column 1; Foreign Desk. Indyk, Martin. Innocent Abroad: An Intimate Account of American Peace Diplomacy in the Middle East. New York, NY: Simon & Schuster, 2009. Ingram, Simon. “Arab Hint at Total Boycott of Tehran.” The Guardian, August 24, 1987. “Interim Agreement between Israel and Egypt (Sinai Two).” United Nations, September 4, 1975. http://peacemaker.un.org/egyptisrael-interimagreement75. 137 “Israel-U.S. Working Paper on The Geneva Conference.” Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, October 5, 1977. Israel’s Foreign Relations Vol 4-5: 1977-1979, Document 54. “Jim Baker 1989 AIPAC Speech,” 1989. https://www.c- span.org/video/?c4532888/jim-baker-1989-aipac-speech. “Joint Communiqué, Moscow, 1972,” May 29, 1972. http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp- srv/inatl/longterm/summit/archive/com1972-1.htm. Kerr, Malcolm. The Arab Cold War, 1958-1964: A Study of Ideology in Politics. London, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press, 1965. Khalidi, Ahmad S., and Hussein J. Agha. “Military Force: The Uses and Abuses of Military Parity.” In The Middle East in Global Perspective, edited by Judith Kipper and Harold Saunders. Boulder, CO: Westview Press Inc, 1991. Kienle, Eberhard. Ba’th vs. Ba’th: The Conflict between Syria and Iraq, 1968-1989. London: I. B. Tauris, 1990. Kifner, John. “400 Die as Iranian Marchers Battle Saudi Police in Mecca; Embassies Smashed in Teheran.” The New York Times, August 2, 1987. ———. “Moslem Parley Ends Without Resolving Disputes.” The New York Times, January 30, 1987. King, Gary, Robert O. Keohane, and Sidney Verba. Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific Inference in Qualitative Research. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994. Kissinger, Henry. Years of Upheaval. First. Boston, MA: Little, Brown and Company, 1982. Kober, Avi. Coalition Defection: The Dissolution of Arab Anti-Israeli Coalitions in War and Peace. Westport, CT: Praeger, 2002. Lake, Anthony. “Conceptualizing U.S. Strategy in the Middle East.” Conference Report. Washington, DC: Washington Institute for Near East Policy, May 17, 1994. http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/conceptualizing- u.s.-strategy-in-the-middle-east. Lancaster, John. “U.S.: Iran’s Terrorism Role Grows; Increased Aid Seen As Effort to Derail Mideast Peace Bid.” Washington Post, December 4, 1999. “League of Arab States, Khartoum Resolution, 1 September 1967,” September 1, 1967. http://www.cfr.org/world/khartoum- 138 resolution/p14841?breadcrumb=%2Fpublication%2Fpublication_list%3Ftype %3Dessential_document%26page%3D69. “Letter from President Ford to Egyptian President Sadat (Undated).” United States Department of State Office of the Historian, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XXVI, Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1974–1976, undated. Document 233. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969- 76v26/d234. “Letter from President Ford to Israeli Prime Minister Rabin (Undated).” United States Department of State Office of the Historian, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XXVI, Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1974–1976, undated. Document 233. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969- 76v26/d233. Leverett, Flynt. Inheriting Syria: Bashar’s Trial by Fire. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2005. Levy, Jack S. “Case Studies: Types, Designs, and Logics of Inference.” Conflict Management and Peace Science 25, no. 1 (March 2008): 1–18. ———. “Prospect Theory and International Relations: Theoretical Applications and Analytical Problems.” Political Psychology, Special Issue: Prospect Theory and Political Psychology 13, no. 2 (June 1992): 283–310. Lobell, Steven E., Norrin M. Ripsman, and Jeffrey Taliaferro, eds. Neoclassical Realism, The State, and Foreign Policy. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2009. Lyall, Jason M. K. “Paths of Ruin: Why Revisionist States Arise and Die in World Politics.” Dissertation (unpublished), Cornell University, 2005. Ma’oz, Moshe. Asad: The Sphinx of Damascus: A Political Biography. New York, NY: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1988. ———. Syria and Israel: From War to Peace-Making. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995. Marc Lynch. State Interests and Public Spheres: The International Politics of Jordan’s Identity. New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 1999. Marschall, Christin. “Syria-Iran: A Strategic Alliance, 1979-1991.” Orient 33, no. 2 (1992): 433–46. Mearsheimer, John. The Tragedy of Great Power Politics. 1st ed. W. W. Norton & Company, 2014. “Meeting with President Hafiz Al-Asad of Syria, Remarks of the President and President Asad Prior to Their Meeting.” The American Presidency Project, May 9, 1977. 139 Jimmy Carter, XXXIX President of the United States: 1977-1981. http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=7488. “Memorandum of Agreement (between the Governments of Israel and the United States, Dated September 1, 1975).” United States Department of State Office of the Historian, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XXVI, Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1974–1976, September 1, 1975. Document 227. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v26/d227. “Memorandum of Conversation (between President Ford and Prime Minister of Israel Yitzhak Rabin, Dated June 11, 1975).” United States Department of State Office of the Historian, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XXVI, Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1974–1976, June 11, 1975. Document 183. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v26/d183. “Memorandum of Conversation (between President Jimmy Carter of the United States and President Hafiz Al-Asad of Syria, Dated May 9, 1977).” Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume VIII, Arab-Israeli Dispute, January 1977– August 1978, May 9, 1977. Document 32. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1977-80v08/d32. “Memorandum of Conversation (between Secretary Kissinger and U.S. Ambassadors, Dated August 7, 1976).” Foreign Relations of The United States, 1969–1976, Volume XXVI, Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1974–1976, August 7, 1976. Document 292. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v26/d292. “Memorandum of Conversation (between Secretary of State Kissinger and Syrian President Hafiz Al-Asad, Dated March 1, 1974).” United States Department of State Office of the Historian, Foreign Relations of the United States, March 1, 1974. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XXVI, Arab- Israeli Dispute, 1974–1976, Document 29. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v26/d29. “Memorandum of Conversation (between U.S. Secretary of State and Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Dr. Henry A. Kissinger and President Hafiz Al-Asad of the Syrian Arab Republic, Dated March 9, 1975).” Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library and Museum, March 9, 1975. Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Kissinger Reports on USSR, China, and Middle East, Box 3, March 7–22, 1975, Volume 1, no. 2. Miller, Gregory D. “Hypotheses on Reputation: Alliance Choices and the Shadow of the Past.” Security Studies 12, no. 3 (Spring 2003): 40–78. “Minute of Record (Dated September 1, 1975).” United States Department of State Office of the Historian, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XXVI, Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1974–1976, September 1, 1975. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v26/d230. 140 Morrow, James D. “Alliances and Asymmetry: An Alternative to the Capability Aggregation Model of Alliances.” American Journal of Political Science 35 (November 1991): 904–33. Mufti, Malik. “A King’s Art: Dynastic Ambition and State Interest in Hussein’s Jordan.” Diplomacy and Statecraft 13, no. 3 (September 2002): 1–22. ———. Sovereign Creations: Pan-Arabism and Political Order in Syria and Iraq. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1996. Norton, Augustus Richard. Hezbollah: A Short History. Princeton Studies in Muslim Politics. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2007. “Organisation of Islamic Cooperation Resolution 10/5-P(IS) On the Iran-Iraq Conflict.” Organization of Islamic Cooperation, January 26, 1987. Petran, Tabitha. Syria: A Modern History. London: Ernest Benn Limited, 1972. Pipes, Daniel. Greater Syria: The History of an Ambition. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1990. Podeh, Elie. Chances for Peace: Missed Opportunities in the Arab-Israeli Conflict. First. Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 2015. Primakov, Yevgeny. Russia and the Arabs: Behind the Scenes in the Middle East from the Cold War to the Present. New York, NY: Basic Books, 2009. Quandt, William B. “Camp David and Peacemaking in the Middle East.” Political Science Quarterly 101, no. 3 (1986): 357–77. ———. Camp David: Peacemaking and Politics. Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1986. ———. Decade of Decisions: American Policy Toward the Arab-Israeli Conflict 1967- 1976. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1977. ———. “Kissinger and the Arab-Israeli Disengagement Negotiations.” Journal of International Affairs 9, no. 1 (1975): 33–48. Rabinovich, Itamar. “Damascus, Jerusalem, and Washington: The Syrian-Israeli Relationship as a U.S. Policy Issue.” Analysis Paper. Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, March 2009. https://www.brookings.edu/wp- content/uploads/2016/06/03_syria_israel_rabinovich.pdf. ———. The Brink of Peace: The Israeli-Syrian Negotiations. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1998. 141 Randal, Jonathan C. “Ties with Iran Paralyze Syrians in Lebanon; Assad Seen Under Pressure to Halt Shiite Wars in Beirut before Arab Summit June 7.” Washington Post, May 25, 1988. Ratner, Ely. “Reaping What You Sow: Democratic Transitions and Foreign Policy Realignment.” Journal of Conflict Resolution 53, no. 3 (June 2009): 390–418. Reagan, Ronald. “Address to the Nation on United States Policy for Peace in the Middle East,” September 1, 1982. Ronald Reagan’s Major Speeches, 1964-89. Reagan Library Archives. https://reaganlibrary.archives.gov/archives/speeches/1982/90182d.htm. Reich, Bernard, ed. Political Leaders of the Contemporary Middle East and North Africa. New York, NY: Greenwood Press, 1990. “Remarks About Resumption of Diplomatic Relations Between the United States and Syria.” The American Presidency Project, June 16, 1974. http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=4256&st=Syria&st1=. “Remarks of the President and President Hafez Al Asad of Syria at a State Dinner in Damascus (Dated June 15, 1974).” The American Presidency Project, June 15, 1974. Richard Nixon, XXXVII President of the United States: 1969-1974. http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=4255&st=Nixon&st1=Asa d. Ross, Dennis. The Missing Peace: The Inside Story of the Fight for Middle East Peace. New York, NY: Farrar, Straus, Giroux, 2004. Rustow, Dankwart A. “Realignments in the Middle East.” Foreign Affairs 63, no. 3 (1984). Ryan, Curtis R. Inter-Arab Alliances: Regime Security and Jordanian Foreign Policy. Gainesville, FL: University of Florida Press, 2009. Sadat, Anwar. In Search of Identity: An Autobiography. First. New York, NY: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1977. ———. “Interview with Egyptian President Anwar Sadat in Al- Usbu’ Al-’Arabi, July 4, 1977. [Excerpts].” Journal of Palestine Studies 7, no. 1 (Autumn 1977): 197–211. ———. “Speech by Egyptian President Anwar Sadat to the Central Committee of the People’s Assembly, Cairo, September 4, 1975. [Excerpts].” Journal of Palestine Studies 5, no. 1/2 (Autumn/Winter 1976/1975): 255–300. ———. “Speech by Egyptian President Anwar Sadat to the United Nations General Assembly, New York, October 29, 1975, [Excerpts].” Journal of Palestine Studies 5, no. 1/2 (Autumn-Winter 1976 1975): 255–300. 142 Schweller, Randall K. “Bandwagoning for Profit: Bringing the Revisionist State Back In.” International Security 19, no. 1 (Summer 1994): 72–107. Seale, Patrick. Asad of Syria: The Struggle for the Middle East. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1988. ———. “Interview with Syrian President Hafiz Al-Asad.” Journal of Palestine Studies 22, no. 24 (Summer 1993): 111–21. Shazly, Lt. General Saad. The Crossing of the Suez. First. San Francisco, CA: American Mideast Research, 1980. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), Arms Transfers Database, Trade Registers, accessed April 2018. Snyder, Glenn. “Alliance Theory: A Neorealist First Cut.” Journal of International Affairs 44, no. 1 (1990): 103–23. “State Sponsors of Terrorism.” United States Department of State, n.d. https://www.state.gov/j/ct/list/c14151.htm. “Statement to the Knesset by Prime Minister Rabin - 3 June 1974.” Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, June 3, 1974. Israel’s Foreign Relations Vols 1-2: 1947-1974, XIII, The Yom Kippur War and Aftermath, Document 31. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), Arms Transfers Database, Trade Registers. Sunayama, Sonoko. Syria and Saudi Arabia: Collaboration and Conflicts in the Oil Era. London: Tauris Academic Studies, 2007. “Syria Profile - Timeline.” BBC News, December 23, 2016. http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-14703995. “Syrian-Israeli Disengagement Agreement (Dated May 31, 1974).” United States Department of State Office of the Historian, Foreign Relations of the United States, May 31, 1974. Document 88. “Syria’s Chief Says U.S. Sends Arms to Insurgents.” The New York Times. March 8, 1982. http://www.nytimes.com/1982/03/08/world/syria-s-chief-says-us-sends- arms-to-insurgents.html. Teltsch, Kathleen. “Syria Denounces Sinai Agreement: U.N. Delegate Says It Cause Arab Discord.” The New York Times. September 11, 1975. Tharoor, Ishan. “How Yemen Was Once Egypt’s Vietnam.” The Washington Post, March 28, 2015, sec. WorldViews. 143 https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2015/03/28/how- yemen-was-once-egypts-vietnam/?utm_term=.bd2f7f3e307a. Vance, Cyrus. Hard Choices: Critical Years in America’s Foreign Policy. New York, NY: Simon and Schuster, 1983. Walker, Antony. “Heroes and Villains of the Amman Summit; Arab League.” Sydney Morning Herald, November 14, 1987. ———. “Syria, Iran Face a Clash in Beirut.” Sydney Morning Herald, March 14, 1987. Walt, Stephen M. The Origins of Alliances. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1987. ———. “Why Alliances Endure or Collapse.” Survival 39, no. 1 (Spring 1997): 156–79. Waltz, Kenneth N. Theory of International Politics. New York, NY: Random House, 1979. Yan, Xuetong. “How China Can Defeat America.” The New York Times, November 20, 2011. http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/21/opinion/how-china-can-defeat- america.html. Yaniv, Avner. “Are Syria and Israel on the Verge of Peace?” Washington Post, March 15, 1987. Zisser, Eyal. Asad’s Legacy: Syria in Transition. Washington Square, NY: New York University Press, 2001. 144