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Lessons of the Gold Standard Era and the Bretton Woods System for the Prospects of an International Monetary System Constitution

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Lessons of the Gold Standard Era and the Bretton Woods System for the Prospects of an International Monetary System Constitution This PDF is a selection from an out-of-print volume from the National Bureau of Economic Research Volume Title: Money in Historical Perspective Volume Author/Editor: Anna J. Schwartz Volume Publisher: University of Chicago Press Volume ISBN: 0-226-74228-8 Volume URL: http://www.nber.org/books/schw87-1 Publication Date: 1987 Chapter Title: Lessons of the Gold Standard Era and the Bretton Woods System for the Prospects of an International Monetary System Constitution Chapter Author: Anna J. Schwartz Chapter URL: http://www.nber.org/chapters/c7512 Chapter pages in book: (p. 391 - 406) 16 Lessons of the Gold Standard Era and the Bretton Woods System for the Prospects of an International Monetary System Constitution The pre-World War I gold standard and the Bretton Woods system are the closest approximations to a constitution for the international mon- etary system that the world has experienced. By a constitution I mean established rules, whether or not a written instrument embodies the rules. No such written instrument embodied the gold standard rules. Individual countries determined at discrete times that their national interest would be served by assuming the obligation to live by the rules imposed by adherence to the gold standard. The international gold standard evolved gradually as an organic development during roughly three decades before World War I without any overall design coordi- nated by a supranational agency. Rules were embodied in a formal constitution for Bretton Woods. Although membership in the Bretton Woods system was voluntary, there were compelling inducements, to be discussed at a later point, for countries to participate in a consciously planned arrangement for the international monetary system that was to last for a quarter of a century. The impersonality of rules without a formal constitution con- trasts with the role of bureaucrats interpreting the rules of a formal constitution. Currently two views have been advanced concerning the way to achieve a constitution for the international monetary system. One view is that stable international arrangements can only develop as individual countries adopt appropriate monetary and fiscal policies that stabilize their own economies. The alternative view is that rules governing in- ternational monetary behavior must first be agreed upon by key coun- tries and that adherence to those rules by the contracting parties and additional countries will in turn produce national monetary stability. The gold standard appears to conform to the first view, the Bretton Woods system to the second view. 391 392 Anna J. Schwartz The pre-World War I gold standard and the Bretton Woods system are only two of many international monetary arrangements that were proposed over the past century and either implemented or not imple- mented. Earlier proposals include: 1) the attempt to institute a form of international bimetallism dur- ing the secular deflation of the last quarter of the nineteenth century; 2) the proposals the British delegation presented to the Genoa Conference that met between April 10 and May 19, 1922, with the participation of thirty-three governments, the United States present unofficially; 3) circumscribed monetary arrangements such as the Latin Mon- etary Union of 1866-78, the Scandinavian Monetary Union of 1873- 1914, the Tripartite Monetary Agreement of September 25, 1936, among six participating countries, and the creation on March 13, 1979, of the European Monetary System-replacing the “snake,” the European joint float. It is instructive to review the past record. What light does it shed on the prospects for implementation of the crop of proposals that are currently advocated to reform international monetary arrangements? These range from variants of a gold standard to consolidating the money supplies of the United States, Japan, and West Germany (McKinnon 1984), to the creation of a common currency for all the industrial de- mocracies with a common monetary policy and a joint Bank of Issue (Cooper 1984), to the issue of a new international monetary unit by private money producers (Hayek 1984). To determine why certain international monetary arrangements were adopted and others not, section 16.1 assesses the costs and benefits of those international monetary proposals that were implemented in the past, and section 16.2 of those that were never implemented. Section 16.3 applies the lessons that emerge from the past to current proposals for international monetary reform. Which, if any, are likely to be adopted? Section 16.4 gives a summary that appraises the two views on how to achieve international monetary reform. 16.1 Why Were Certain International Monetary Proposals Implemented? In the century before World War I the international monetary system was simply the aggregation of monetary preferences of individual coun- tries. Most countries chose a bimetallic monetary system before they shifted to the gold standard during the final decades of the nineteenth century, although in some cases fiat money episodes punctuated their adherence to a commodity standard. Commodity standards imposed rules requiring each government to define its monetary unit as a spec- 393 Lessons of the Gold Standard Era ified weight of gold or silver, or of gold and silver, leaving banks free to produce money convertible into central bank money or government money issues that were in turn convertible into the standard metal or metals. The chief benefit for countries that adopted the gold standard at the close of the nineteenth century was access to capital markets, centered in London, Paris, or Berlin. That benefit was invaluable for developing countries, which was the stage of economic maturity of most countries at the time. The chief cost, as viewed at the time, was the need to acquire a gold reserve. Except for Germany, which obtained it as the war indemnity from France in 1870-71, countries borrowed at home and abroad to get the funds with which to buy gold. The standing as a debtor the country achieved by embracing the gold standard far outweighed the interest cost of such borrowing. With that choice made, governments did not have to coordinate policies they adopted explicitly, in pursuit of their national economic interest. Coordination was achieved by the maintenance of converti- bility, which fixed exchange rates between national monetary units within narrow limits, with no external agency guiding the result. Na- tional price levels moved in close harmony. It was no myth of the gold standard world, as some latter-day critics describe it, that people, goods, capital, and money moved with reasonable freedom across national boundaries. International monetary arrangements reflected the inde- pendent choices of countries linked by market forces. That world came to an end in World War I. I now turn to the cost- benefit reasons that account for the adoption of the Bretton Woods international monetary system. The international monetary system that was designed at the Bretton Woods Conference in 1944 reflected professional views on the defects of the arrangements that had prevailed in the 1930s. The aim was to avoid in the postwar world protectionist trade policies, exchange con- trols, and competitive currency depreciation that had infected the pre- World War I1 period. The goals of the system created by the delegates to the conference accordingly were the removal of controls on trade and payments under a system of fixed exchange rates, with adjustment of parities limited to “fundamental disequilibrium” in the balance of payments. The lending facilities of the International Monetary Fund were to be available to supplement IMF members’ gold and foreign exchange reserves in order to provide liquidity to overcome temporary balance of payments deficits. The system was designed to operate with the United States as the reserve currency country. Other countries would peg their currencies to the dollar. Stable economic policy in the United States would assure stable economic policy worldwide. 394 Anna J. Schwartz The Bretton Woods system initially conferred many benefits and imposed few costs on IMF members. The attitude of the United States was paternalistic. Wartime destruction and disruption had left countries in Europe and Asia with limited productive capacity and swelled the immediate postwar demand for U.S. exports. To promote economic recovery in the rest of the world, the United States encouraged an outflow of dollars by official U.S. aid, military spending, and private investment. The United States did not protest discriminatory tariff and quota restrictions that Western European countries applied. As Europe and Japan recovered, the U.S. balance of payments turned negative. The United States resorted to capital controls and restrictions on do- mestic gold convertibility but still regarded the deficit in its balance of payments as a contribution to international liquidity. The overvaluation of the dollar and the decline in the competitiveness of U.S. exports came to be regarded as an intolerable cost only at a later stage in the evolution of the Bretton Woods system. For the nonreserve currency countries, the benefits were the obverse of the costs from the perspective of the United States. A weakening of the U.S. balance of payments was acceptable to other countries as long as they desired surpluses in their balance of payments in order to add to their dollar reserves. Once assets denominated in dollars grew in excess of the demand for them by the rest of the world, nonreserve- currency countries insisted on action by the United States to right its balance of payments. They held that accelerating inflation in the United States from the mid-1960s on undermined price stability in their econ- omies. The system collapsed amid growing doubts that the United States would be able to maintain external gold convertibility. Although nonreserve-currency countries were unwilling as a group to adopt the inflationary policies the United States was pursuing, the dispersion of inflation rates among them enforced more frequent changes of exchange rates.
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