The American Vision of Baltic Security Architecture: Understanding the Northern Europe Initiative

By Edward Rhodes

n intellectual terms, America’s and pursued quietly in the years since, and far too easily, the NEI represents a Northern Europe Initiative (NEI) the NEI reflects a fundamentally altered paradigm shift. represents one of the most extraordinary conception of the nature of international It is of course possible to discuss the and most exciting conceptual departures security and of how this security is to various programs that compose Ameri- in U.S. international security policy un- be created. In important regards, the ca’s NEI in traditional terms. To do so, dertaken during the Clinton years. The NEI’s architectural blueprint is not sim- however, is to profoundly misunderstand NEI must be viewed not simply as a crea- ply post-Cold War but post-national in the NEI. The basic vision of the NEI; its tive, pragmatic package of policies aimed design. It assumes not only that the glo- conception of what security is and how at encouraging continued and expanded bal distribution of power has shifted in it is created is profoundly different from stability in the Baltic basin but as a re- the last decade but that the goals and the vision that shaped twentieth century markable, though largely overlooked, means of security policy have changed. approaches to building security. Thus, in revolution in American thinking. To use a phrase that slips off the tongues addition to representing a practical effort Launched in 1997 with little fanfare of political scientists far too frequently to deal with the unique circumstances

91 found in northern Europe today, Ameri- of northern Europe are secure from mili- of civil society, energy, the environment, ca’s Baltic policies promise to serve as a tary aggression, but ensuring that indi- and public health.1 critical test of an alternative model for viduals in the region have the security Second, in the American perspective, building global security in the twenty-first necessary to pursue a meaningful, produc- security is not zero-sum. To the contrary, century. tive life. reflecting this broader understanding of Obviously, many of the threats to se- security, security is understood as a col- Three Underlying Assumptions curity, when security is defined in this lective good. To succeed, security poli- of the NEI’s Vision sweeping fashion, are domestic in source cies will have to increase security for all, and scope and can be resolved by indi- not the security for some at the expense To understand the NEI’s vision of vidual sovereign states or by domestic non- of others. The NEI argues that the secu- northern European security architecture, governmental institutions. In today’s in- rity problems facing the peoples of North- it is necessary to begin by identifying creasingly tightly interconnected world, ern Europe are ones that can be solved three key assumptions on which the NEI however, an increasing number of these only by thorough cooperation; they can is based. threats escape the capacity of individual not be solved competitively. First, the NEI starts with a broad con- states or societies to manage. For exam- As troubled as American policymakers ception of what security means. Security ple, problems such as capital movement, are by certain developments in Russia and is taken to mean not simply safety from pollution, and crime, which typically used by certain Russian actions - most obvi- external aggression, but at least some mini- to be local or national in scope, are now ously, Russian military policies in mally acceptable level of protection from frequently regional or global ones. As Chechnya - Russia is seen as a necessary the range of threats that endanger human problems become regional or global in partner, not as an adversary, in the pur- welfare for example, from economic dep- scope, they demand regional or global suit of security. “The U.S. goal”, the State rivation, shortages of energy, infectious institutions to manage them. Examining Department insists, “is to demonstrate that disease, environmental toxins and hazards, Baltic realities, the NEI has specifically integration and cooperation in the NEI crime, corrupt political institutions, and identified six A-priority areas in which region benefit Russia as well as its Baltic the forceful imposition of an alien cul- regional and cross-border cooperation is neighbors.... By strengthening the coop- ture. In other words, the NEI takes as its particularly useful; economic develop- erative links between Russia and its goal not simply ensuring that the nations ment, law enforcement, the construction neighbors, NEI increases security for all

92 and helps build the foundation for greater a more active public-private partnership tutions are seen as also playing an impor- economic prosperity in the region.”2 in the conduct of diplomacy, in which tant role in the provision of northern Third, American thinking starts with the U.S. Government works closely with European security: the Organization for the recognition that while individual sov- the business and NGO community to Security and Cooperation in Europe, the ereign states will be important participants achieve shared goals.”3 Partnership for Peace, the Council of in the effort to provide the peoples of The NEI also expands the focus of at- Baltic Sea States, the Nordic Council, the the Baltic region with this broadly-de- tention up from the state to a variety of U.S.-Baltic Partnership Commission, the fined security, sovereign states will not intergovernmental organizations that, like Barents Euro-Arctic Council, and the be and can not be the only important non-governmental actors, are seen as play- Arctic Council. More narrowly defined actors in this effort. Rather than focus- ing a critical role in northern Europe’s institutions for cooperation between the ing exclusively on the role of sovereign security architecture. Far from simply three Baltic states for example, the Baltic states, in designing regional security ar- being superstructure in the interaction Defence College, the Baltic Battalion, the chitecture the NEI expands attention up, between sovereign states, these intergov- Baltic Squadron, and the Baltic Air down, and out from the state. ernmental actors are viewed as playing an Defense Network are also regarded as serv- The NEI expands attention outward important, independent, non-sovereign ing a critical function, and are targeted from the state by recognizing that non- role in regional governance. Although the for U.S. political and financial support. governmental actors play a critical role in European Union and NATO are the most Finally and perhaps most provoca- the provision of security, broadly con- obvious among these actors and have cer- tively, the NEI also recognizes the impor- ceived. Non-governmental actors are not tainly dominated the foreign policy agen- tance of sub-state actors and institutions. at the margin: they are as integral to the das of the Baltic states, from the perspec- The NEI thus expands attention down- process of building security as are states. tive of the NEI they are only two of a ward from the level of the nation-state to The NEI Seeks to energize government wide range of problem-solving intergov- provincial and local governments, seeing agencies, the private sector, and the com- ernmental institutions able to facilitate these sub-state actors as full and directly munity of non-governmental organiza- discussion of common concerns and to engaged partners in the security-building tions (NGOs) to build “a culture of co- exert pressure on member-states to con- process. They are regarded not merely as operation.” “... The Northern Europe tribute to common efforts. Other, less the instruments of the central governments Initiative is a conscious effort to develop widely watched, intergovernmental insti- of the various sovereign states, but as in-

93 dependent and critical contributors to the nity within which state and national other.”5 In other words, identity did not resolution of regional security challenges. boundaries mean relatively little, a com- matter or at least matter very much. What The net impact of this refocusing of munity within which security is provided the NEI looks toward is a post-national attention up, down, and out from the by a host of interlocking international system of politics in the Baltic region, in states is to highlight the fundamentally and transnational institutions.4 The which national identity and national ri- changed picture that has emerged of what Hanseatic reference is conceptually quite valries do not preclude cooperation for security is and how it is created. Security provocative because this return to the past mutual benefit. is not seen as simply an absence of vio- for a model of the twenty-first century In the second place, the Hanseatic era lence, nor is it assumed that it can be cre- security suggests nothing less than a revo- pre-dates the emergence of modern, sov- ated simply by states’ recognition of each lution in international political life. This ereign states. In the Hanseatic system in- other’s sovereignty and by their ability reference being so provocative, it is use- teractions between communities were regu- to keep order within their boundaries; ful to underscore two critical ways in lated by a range of governmental, inter- rather security is seen as a human condi- which the medieval Hanseatic security governmental, and non-governmental au- tion, and it is assumed that it is produced architecture differed from modern, twen- thorities including, inter alia, guilds, the by the interaction and mutual effort of tieth century security architecture. church, religious military orders, the states, NGOs, intergovernmental organi- In the first place, the Hanseatic era was empire, and civic rulers. In contrast to zations, and sub-state actors. These play- pre-national: politics between communi- the modern, Westphalian system in which ers are seen as engaged in complex and ties was conducted with relatively little authority (and responsibility for provid- constantly evolving functional partner- attention to national identity. As U.S. ing security) has been geographically de- ships designed to meet the emerging chal- Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott fined and hierarchically concentrated in lenges to human well being. explained in a lecture to an Estonian au- the state, in the Hanseatic system author- dience, the Hanseatic League was a con- ity was embedded in a complex web of The Hanseatic Analogy cert of city-states precursors of nation- institutions. states that felt secure enough in their iden- It is not that nations, states, and sover- Explicitly recalling the Hanseatic tra- tities and in their neighborhood to make eignty will wither or disappear in the dition of the region, the NEI’s objective a virtue of their diversity and derive ben- American vision; it is that they will cease is to create a northern European commu- efit from their interactions with one an- to be of central importance. Observing

94 that most of the problems facing the re- cases non-governmental organizations and blurry, and depend on the specific secu- gion transcend the borders of particular non-governmental modes of problem solv- rity issue being addressed, the notion is nations and particular sovereign states, the ing may be more effective than state, inter- to be inclusive, not exclusive in building American perspective envisions the devel- governmental, or transgovernmental ones. institutions. Common problems require opment of a dense network of border- A map of problem-solving institutions common endeavors, not a division into spanning political, economic, and social will not be neat: it will not look like a them and us categories. institutions serving legislative, judicial, tidy political map from the 18th, 19th, or Specifically, the NEI is described as and executive functions that is, provid- 20th centuries, with each piece of terri- pursuing three, integrative objectives: to ing governance and regulation, author- tory colored a particular color indicat- - Integrate the Baltic states into a re- ity to resolve disputes, and the capability ing the sovereign authority in that terri- gional network of cooperative programs to mobilize resources for the common tory, with solid black lines separating with their neighbors and support their good. them. It will look more like a medieval efforts to prepare for membership in key The new security architecture, in the map, with overlapping loyalties, duties, European and Euro-Atlantic institutions; American perspective, will have to be both and responsibilities. Different aspects of - Integrate northwest Russia into the functional and complex. Institutions will human security will be ensured by differ- same cooperative regional network to need to be developed to meet specific se- ent, and in some cases multiple, institu- promote democratic, market-oriented curity needs economic integration, pol- tions. Indeed, as in Hanseatic times, maps development in Russia as well as to en- lution remediation, crime prevention, showing political boundaries may be mis- hance Russia’s relations with its northern cultural protection, and so on. No single leading when it comes to understanding European neighbors; and institution will have the right member- how problems are actually solved. - Strengthen U.S. relations with and ship and the right structure to solve all This security architecture and its net- regional ties among the Nordic states, of these problems, so multiple institutions work of institutions explicitly will reach Poland, Germany, and the European Un- will be needed. And since no single prob- into Russia, in some cases engaging the ion.6 lem dominates the others, no single insti- central government, in other cases engag- What the U.S. hopes will emerge is a tution will have primacy: there will be no ing regional governments or local com- Kantian community of Civil states com- hierarchy of institutions. Nor will all of munities. While the boundaries of the mitted to collective security again, using the institutions be governmental: in some northern European region are vague and a broad definition of security and bound

95 together by innumerable ties in a rela- of them, top decision-makers’ time and only linked Russia’s northwest to western tionship of perpetual peace. attention are overstretched already in ad- economies and created a shared prosper- dressing the problems of other regions. ity based on the exchange of raw and fin- The NEI’s Practical Attractions True, the programs lumped together un- ished goods, but changed mental geogra- der the umbrella of the Baltic-American phy. Historically, Pskov, Novgorad, and This emphasis on the idealistic and Partnership have included financial and Smolensk all had ties to the Hansa and visionary qualities of the NEI should not political commitments, but these are ex- through it were exposed to western Eu- obscure two very practical features that traordinarily modest.7 While at the mar- ropean values and ways of thinking; these also make it attractive to American gin, it is conceivable that resources for Hanseatic outposts provided a window policymakers and that make it appealing the region could and will be increased, through which the larger Russian nation even to those policymakers who might but it is unlikely that dramatically greater could be reached. be troubled by its revolutionary, post- resources can be found. Thus, from the The NEI thus aims at blurring the national, non-state-centric conception. American perspective the NEI has the border between Western Europe and Rus- In the first place, the NEI successfully desirable quality of being politically, eco- sia, not at shifting, strengthening, or avoids commitment of significant U.S. nomically, and militarily affordable. reifying that border. “Our hope,” Strobe government resources. The U.S. national In the second place, the NEI is seen as Talbott has explained, “Is that Russia will security agenda is, and for the foreseeable an important element in U.S. policy to- come over time to view this region [the future will continue to be, dominated by ward Russia. The NEI is attractive to U.S. Baltic] not as a fortified frontier but as a concerns about East Asia and the Korean decision-makers not only as a modestly- gateway; not as a buffer against invaders peninsula, the Persian Gulf, the Middle priced strategy for advancing Baltic secu- who no longer exist, but as a trading route East, the Balkans, and, to a lesser degree, rity but as a means of contributing to and a common ground for commerce and Latin America. Given the absence of high the liberalization and democratization of economic development in a word, that profile dangers or critical American in- Russia, a means of trying to bring Russia Russia will come to view the Baltics terests, northern Europe ranks, and will home to the west. The NEI’s Hanseatic Hanseatically.”8 rank, low on the U.S. agenda, despite analogy explicitly recalls the fact that the Such a Hanseatic view would have two strong cultural and emotional ties to the Hansa’s influence extended eastward into consequences, both positive. First and most region. Critical U.S. resources not least Russia. The Hanseatic community not immediately, Russian acceptance of a

96 Hanseatic space would facilitate mutually famously put it: kto/kogo. The Soviet Un- Petersburg, and conceivably other parts beneficial Russo-Baltic cooperation and ion seemed unable to feel totally secure of the Russian northwest as well. The NEI enhanced northern European security, unless everyone else felt totally insecure. vision imagines incorporating these bor- defined both in traditional military terms Its pursuit of bezopasnost, or absence of der areas of Russia into a variety of eco- and in the new, broader conception. Sec- danger, posed a clear and present danger nomic, political, social, and cultural ties ond, though, a Hanseatic highway would to others, especially small countries on its that will inevitably reduce the power and facilitate not only the flow of goods but periphery. The issue on all our minds is influence of Moscow, further weakening the flow of ideas. For Americans seeking whether post-Soviet Russia, as it goes the authority and legitimacy of a badly to encourage a changed Russian under- about redefining its political system strained Russian state. standing of the world beyond and seek- through elections, will redefine its con- Indeed the NEI’s desire to replace clear, ing to promote liberal, democratic values cept of state security as well.10 Ultimately sovereign, black-and-white boundaries in Russia, such highways are critical. What then, the security of northern Europe with grey areas of overlapping institutions the American Hanseatic architecture is requires a change in how Russian leaders may at times also be troubling to Russia’s designed to facilitate, Talbott has noted, view the world and define security. In place Baltic neighbors. Even while the NEI seeks is that a democratic Russia, at peace with of the Realpolitik lenses for viewing secu- to anchor the Baltic peoples in a Hanseatic itself and its neighbors, integrate itself rity which both Russian history and the that is, in an Euro-centric, westward-ori- into an undivided Europe. That is not Marxist legacy have imposed, the NEI ented identity, it also assumes and insists only desirable, it is possible.9 The NEI seeks to use the Hanseatic connection to that the Baltic States will serve as a bridge assumes that there are no objective bars provide liberal ones. eastward to Russia. With perhaps a touch to this. In the American view there are It is worth recognizing, however, that of diplomatic exaggeration reflecting both no structural issues or unresolvable con- while the NEI offers an appealing vision wishful thinking and gentle pressure, in flicts that would prevent the peaceful in- from Washington’s perspective it is a vi- 2000 Talbott praised Estonia for reach- tegration of Russia into Europe. The only sion that may be quite troubling to deci- ing out to the East; you’re redefining your obstacle to this integration, in the NEI’s sion-makers in Moscow, regardless of their relationships there not on the basis of a analysis, is the Russian mindset: Histori- views about liberalism and democracy. It cruel divisive past but on the basis of a cally, Russia has tended to define security is a vision that suggests increasing au- cooperative future.11 For nations only re- in zero-sum terms win/lose, or, as Lenin tonomy for Kaliningrad and for St. cently freed from Soviet rule, concerned

97 with preserving distinct national identi- to encourage more cautious, step-by-step tion to quite different problems. Thus, ties, and painfully aware of the power and forward movement, avoiding early deep- while American positions on NATO en- size of their eastern neighbor, this vision ening of those institutional ties that are largement, EU enlargement, and ESDI will of blurred borders may be troubling, easiest to create. Ties that exclude Russia have a critical impact on how the NEI is particularly if it implies relatively uncon- lest this sharpen and darken the border implemented, these positions are likely to trolled movement of people and capital. between east and west that the NEI would be adopted without much, or possibly prefer to blur. any, regard to that impact. The NEI in Practice Second, exactly how the NEI vision will Third, what the NEI will look like in be operationalized is difficult to predict practice is difficult to predict because the Though the vision of the NEI is clear, because of uncertainty about other insti- NEI like NATO enlargement, EU enlarge- what the NEI will mean in practice is sub- tutional developments in Europe. In the ment, and ESDI has escaped serious po- stantially more difficult to predict. It is final analysis, both U.S. Baltic security litical debate. The discussions that have difficult to predict for at least three rea- policies and the emerging northern Eu- taken place have been conducted by policy sons. ropean security architecture will be criti- analysts individuals without political re- First, it is difficult to predict because cally shaped by three related but none- sponsibility and, as often as not, without much will depend on events in Russia. theless quite distinct and separable insti- political instincts. At times these discus- This dependence is not a linear one. tutional developments; NATO enlarge- sions have been analytically elegant and Plainly, liberal reforms in Russia permit ment, European Union (EU) enlargement, theoretically sophisticated. But unfortu- faster development and expansion of the and the European Security and Defense nately they provide no information about institutions envisioned by the NEI. Ironi- Identity (ESDI). While it is possible to the choices America’s political decision- cally, however, Russian regression may also treat the NEI and these other three insti- makers will actually make when political result in faster progress for NEI, though tutional developments as a single package, decisions are called for (It is useful to re- on a geographically narrower basis, as the American decision-makers are unlikely to call that American policy analysts were United States and its European partners do so. From the American perspective overwhelmingly opposed to moving press to solidify progress in anticipation each of these four issues has it’s own dis- ahead with the first round of NATO en- of greater challenges. It is uncertainty tinct logic and political imperative. Ameri- largement and are overwhelmingly op- about developments in Russia that is likely can policies on each are seen as the solu- posed to national missile defense. Look-

98 ing at debates among policy analysts for cant economic, ethnic, ideological, or sin- quite clear and consistent. There will be clues about how America will act thus is gle-issue interest group in American soci- little domestic political pressure either to not a good strategy). ety is particularly concerned about the fudge or to change official policy. Nei- The bottom line is that because none outcome of any of these four matters. ther political party (nor, for that matter, of these four issues, Baltic security archi- Thus, unlike on issues like the World any ambitious politician) is likely to make tecture, NATO enlargement, EU enlarge- Trade Organization, the Middle East, re- any of these issues a campaign issue. And ment, or ESDI has been politically salient lations with repressive regimes like China, election results are not likely to shift in America, it is difficult to guess what or ozone depletion and funding for fam- America’s stated policy. conclusions the American political elite ily planning, the government can proceed On the other hand, the actual and attentive public will actually reach safe in the knowledge that it will receive operationalization and implementation of when events confront them with a need little public scrutiny. Only one of these the stated policy is likely to be quite un- to act. There is no serious disagreement four issues - NATO enlargement - has any predictable, ambiguous, and full of unex- within the elite or attentive public over chance at all of ever becoming part of a pected twists and changes. Since these is- American objectives or stated policies. serious political debate in the United States; sues are not at the top of political agen- American objectives and policies are, and and if the first round of NATO enlarge- das and the NEI and decisions regarding will be, quite clear. But how those poli- ment is any indication, even this issue is Baltic security architecture are likely to cies will be implemented is unclear, and unlikely to impinge in any significant way fall even lower on these agendas than the they may be implemented in ways that on public or Congressional consciousness twin enlargements and ESDI what the are quite counterintuitive. or to force the administration to exam- United States actually does on a day-to- It is no accident that serious political ine, explain, or defend its foreign policy. day or year-to-year basis will depend on debate regarding Baltic security, NATO The fact that northern European secu- chance and circumstances. More specifi- and EU enlargement, and ESDI has not rity institutions, NATO and EU enlarge- cally, it will depend on the context within taken place, and observers should not ex- ment, and ESDI are not salient political which policy questions arise and how pect that such debate will ever take place. issues in America has two diametrically these issues are packaged with, or linked However important the underlying issues opposed consequences. to, other more politically salient issues. are by any objective measure, they are not On the one hand, it means the stated U.S. actions and reactions on all four is- politically salient in America. No signifi- policy of the United States is likely to be sues are also likely to depend very much

99 on the particular agendas and world-views America and the particular sequence of Tallinn: ”the American desire is that Esto- of the particular officials and bureaus as- crises in the Balkans as by any long term nia, Latvia, and Lithuania become Secure, signed to implement policy. Personalities plan for building a European security stable, prosperous democracies integrated may play a major role not in determin- architecture. into all the structures of the Euro-Atlan- ing policy, but in determining what tic community.... [It] remains a bedrock American policy means in practice. The NEI and NATO Enlargement principle of American foreign policy that For example, the United States unam- no country should be disadvantaged for biguously supports EU enlargement. But With regard to the question of NATO reasons of history or geography. The Bal- what this unambiguous support will mean enlargement, the unpredictable nature of tic states in particular should not be pun- in real life is anyone’s guess. Whether U.S. American behavior is even more evident. ished for having prevailed over occupa- official support for EU enlargement trans- However firm and clear in principle, the tion and dictatorship, nor should you lates into meaningful pressure on EU- American position on NATO enlargement be forgotten or neglected now that you member states to move forward with en- is extraordinarily uncertain and ambigu- have made such progress in establishing largement or, by contrast, turns into tacit ous in practice. prosperity and openness in your support for a go-slow approach may have It must be emphasized that the com- neighborhood”.13 more to do with beef and bananas, or mitment in principle to further NATO Indeed, these commitments are en- with who happens to become U.S. Trade enlargement is crystal clear. As Strobe shrined in international agreements. The Representative, than with the U.S. vision Talbott put it in Brussels in December Baltic-American Charter officially commits for central Europe and the Baltic region. 1999, it has always been the U.S. position the United States to nothing less: As part Similarly, whether the U.S. policy on that NATO enlargement is not a one-time of a common vision of a Europe whole ESDI equates to meaningful positive sup- event, but an on-going process. Our new- and free, the Partners declare that their port for a separable European military est members must not be the last. Our shared goal is the full integration of Latvia, capability or to behind-the-scenes pressure leaders committed to review enlargement Estonia, and Lithuania into European and on Britain and Germany to proceed again at our next summit, no later than transatlantic political, economic, security skeptically is likely to be determined as 2002.12 This unambiguous commitment and defense institutions. Europe will not much by French rhetoric, the domestic explicitly includes the Baltic States. As be fully secure unless Latvia, Estonia, and politics of National Missile Defense in Talbott reaffirmed to an audience in Lithuania each are secure.... The Partners

100 believe that the enlargement of NATO will states can become members - that is, it image of Baltic security envisions bring- enhance the security of the United States, seeks not only to ensure that the Baltic ing Russia in as a partner in the region’s Canada, and all the countries in Europe, states will be ready for membership but problem-solving and security-building, including those states not immediately to alter European political realities so that even while Russia remains excluded from invited to membership or not currently their admission enhances their security, some of the key institutions, such as interested in membership. The United the security of the region, and the secu- NATO and the EU. An isolated and an- States of America welcomes the aspirations rity of the Alliance as a whole. That the gry Russia undermines the region’s secu- and supports the efforts of Latvia, Esto- Baltic States will eventually join NATO rity, preventing the widening and deep- nia, and Lithuania to join NATO. It af- assuming they continue to desire to join ening of the network of institutions and firms its view that NATO’s partners can is essentially certain, given U.S. commit- ties necessary to deal with the real and become members as each aspirant proves ments and given support in principle pressing problems of environmental se- itself able and willing to assume the respon- from other NATO members. What is dif- curity, economic security, cultural secu- sibilities and obligations, and as NATO ficult to predict, however, is when Ameri- rity, and so on. Even if Russian isolation determines that the inclusion of these na- cans conclude that the necessary condi- and anger are entirely self-generated, even tions would serve European stability and tions have been met. American policy if they are entirely unjustified, and even the strategic interests of the Alliance.14 presently proceeds on the assumption that if they are in both the short- and long- As this language suggests, however, the NATO membership for the Baltic states run self-destructive, they nonetheless re- American perspective is that two criteria is neither in the Alliance’s interest nor in duce the ability of the nations of the re- need to be met before candidates are ac- the interest of the Baltic states if it dis- gion, and of Europe and the trans-Atlan- cepted into NATO: new members will be rupts relations with Russia or if it results tic community as a whole, to meet shared admitted only when they are ready and in a substantial hardening of Realpolitik challenges. Ideally, creating the conditions when we judge it to be in the overall in- thinking in Russian decision-making cir- for Baltic membership thus means shift- terests of the Alliance.15 It is this second cles. ing Russia from its zero-sum view of se- criteria that will make American policy, As the Baltic Charter and repeated U.S. curity and educating Russians that Baltic in practice, so unpredictable. statements make clear, no non-NATO membership in NATO is, as Talbott puts The American vision looks to create country has a veto over Alliance deci- it: “Good for everyone - I stress everyone the conditions under which the Baltic sions.16 Nonetheless, the NEI’s Hanseatic - since it is the best way to ensure that

101 this region as a whole never again becomes less. In other words, it is the process of security, and to the particular vision of a zone of insecurity and instability.”17 enlargement, not the end state, that is northern European security embodied in Again, however, what this will mean uncertain and that may be influenced by the NEI, in the broader context of Ameri- in practice is hard to predict, and will Russia. ca’s historically problematic engagement certainly depend on developments in with the world and to be aware how Russia, on American perceptions of de- The NEI in American changes in Americans’ self-conception are velopments in Russia, and on the sequence Grand Strategy likely to impact these. and salience of particular political events. With only an acceptable degree of over- Realpolitik is deeply ingrained in Russian How exactly the NEI fits into overall simplification, it is possible to argue that thinking, and Americans are not known American grand strategy, and whether this American society and leaders have histori- for their patience. Thus, either a more is a comfortable or uncomfortable fit, will cally moved uneasily between two com- forthcoming Russia or a clearly less-forth- depend on certain fundamental political peting visions of the world.18 The first is coming Russia might result in American choices facing the American nation in the Realist vision. This account of inter- support in NATO councils for early ad- coming years. While policies and institu- national life starts from the observation mission of the Baltic States. tions have considerable inertia and, as a that politics between sovereign states takes To interpret the American position as consequence, we are unlikely to see dra- place in an anarchic setting that is, it takes giving Russia some sort of back-door veto matic, immediate changes in either of place in the absence of any higher, super- over NATO enlargement is thus absolutely these even if a major shift in underlying sovereign power with the capacity to im- incorrect. American policy is aimed at conceptions of American identity and pose authoritative judgments on compet- bringing the Baltic States into NATO. At interests were to occur, the direction in ing states. As a result, interstate politics is least at present, though, the United States which U.S. policies and trans-Atlantic in- one of self-help. While states can frequently appears inclined to be patient and to en- stitutions evolve will clearly be strongly resolve their differences through bargain- gage in constructive dialogue with Russia influenced by how the American people ing or negotiation, military power remains to alleviate concerns that NATO enlarge- come to understand themselves and the the ultimate arbiter of interstate disagree- ment threatens Russia or its interests, even world around them. It is therefore both ments, and war the final court of appeal. while recognizing and firmly enunciating useful and necessary to consider Ameri- Thus, in the Realist view, military con- that these concerns are objectively ground- can commitment to northern European flict is an unfortunate but nonetheless

102 inevitable fact of international life. How- The second and competing vision of ists are unnecessarily pessimistic, Liberals ever pacific a particular nation may be, the world in American thought is the argue, and their pessimism is a self-fulfill- and however willing it may be to try to Liberal one. In this vision, conflict is not ing prophecy, preventing the creation of resolve disputes through peaceful means, inevitable. Yes, the international system the institutions - ranging from a free trade in the end the international system is in- is anarchic, but this, in the Liberal view, regime and international courts of arbi- herently conflictual and participation in does not necessarily imply disorder and tration to a more powerful UN and a international politics will involve even violence. It is, the Liberals argue, possible better-financed IMF - that would facili- pacific states in violent conflict. to imagine a well-ordered international tate a mutually beneficial international In this vision of the world, a state’s society composed of peaceful republics order. policies must proceed, as George W. Bush’s that have created the international insti- At the same time that America has foreign policy advisor, Condoleezza Rice, tutions necessary to resolve conflicts of moved back and forth between Realist and recently explained, from the firm ground interest on the basis of the rule of law Liberal visions of the world, it has also of the national interest, not from the in- rather than through an appeal to raw moved back and forth between two com- terests of an illusory international commu- power. Just as in well-regulated families peting visions of how America should nity.19 States must look out for their par- and domestic societies order is based on engage that world. The two visions of ticular nation’s interests because no one communication, consent, and accepted America’s role are usually termed interna- else will. If this pursuit of one’s own self- rules of behavior, not on raw violence tionalist and isolationist, but these terms, interest also happens to bring benefits to and open intimidation, in well-regulated especially the latter, are quite misleading. others - as Americans believe the U.S. international societies order can be based The latter vision, the isolationist one, does pursuit of a liberal international political on negotiation and law rather than brute not imagine a hermit America that eschews and economic order does - so much the power. While the absence of a super-sov- contact with the external world. To the better, but making sacrifices for the good ereign authority, with the ability to adju- contrary, like the internationalist vision, of others is a dangerous business. Again dicate disputes definitively and punish the isolationist vision assumes that in Rice’s words, to be sure, there is noth- transgressors, makes international order America will be integrated into the world ing wrong with doing something that more difficult to achieve, Liberals con- economy and that Americans will travel, benefits all humanity, but that is, in a tend that the international realm, like the trade, and invest in the outside world. sense, a second-order effect.20 domestic one, can be one of peace. Real- Nonetheless, in a key aspect the isolation-

103 ists and internationalists part, and this is future. To achieve their full nature, the others will walk down the same liberal, on the desirability of politico-military American state and American nation must democratic path that America has chosen, involvement and commitments in the participate in the full range of global this is their decision. So long as other world - what George Washington in his politics and be active players on the world nations do not seek to impose their rule Farewell Address termed “Entangling alli- stage. However different America may be or their values on America, the American ances.” At heart is the question: Does the from other nations internally, internation- state should not use military force against use of force or the commitment to use alists believe the United States has to en- them or involve itself in their political force, except in self-defense, threaten the gage externally just as other states do - affairs. In some sense the isolationist vi- basic nature of a democratic republic? using the same means (e.g., war, alliance, sion might be better described as a “re- For internationalists, the answer is no. intimidation, and intervention), though publican vision, with a small r”. It is the Like any great nation, America must com- perhaps with different goals. vision of an independent republic with- pete on the world stage (in fact, has a duty The isolationist vision, by contrast, out external claims. to compete on that stage) either to make answers the question in the negative and sure that stage remains safe (that is, em- has an inwardly focused construction of Four Visions of American bodies an acceptable balance of power) identity. The essence of America is its Foreign Policy or to make sure that stage incorporates domestic society, and the principal goal the values and rules the nation believes of the American people and of the Ameri- Obviously, if one combines the two necessary or desirable (that is, has the in- can state needs to be the perfection of possible worldviews with the two possi- stitutions necessary for a peaceful order). that society. While Americans wish oth- ble views of America, one ends up with Indeed, at its root, the internationalist ers well, and will exchange ideas, goods, four possible visions of American foreign vision defines American identity in terms and investments with them, the isolation- policy; Realist isolationist, Realist inter- of the nation’s external relations. Who ists argue that Americans must not con- nationalist, Liberal internationalist, and Americans are, and the pride they can take fuse other peoples’ political struggles with Liberal isolationist. Looking across Ameri- in that identity, depends on America’s their own. Their fights are theirs to wage. can history, it is possible to find periods place in the world and the role that Ameri- While isolationists are delighted if America in which each of these was dominant, and cans play in improving and transform- serves as a beacon on the hill - a role model in today’s political discourse it is possi- ing that world or in shaping that world’s for other societies - and while they hope ble to see at least three of these compet-

104 ing for predominance. Which vision America’s independence. Americans, in who opposed Woodrow Wilson and his comes to dominate American thinking has this view, are a unique (indeed in some League, tooth and claw. In America to- had, and will have, enormous consequence accounts, chosen) people guided by a firm day, this is the intellectual grounding of for the broad shape of America’s engage- and unchanging set of values, forever political spokesmen on the far right of ment with the world. threatened by the darkness that lies out- the spectrum, individuals such as Ross The power of each of these visions to side. In the Realist isolationist perspec- Perot and Pat Buchanan. seize the American imagination, however, tive, the world is an evil and dangerous Realist isolationism gave way, in the depends on how Americans define them- place, in which imperial or expansionist late 1880s and early 1890s, to Realist in- selves - that is, on the identity Americans powers will inevitably war with each other ternationalism. Industrialization, immi- construct for themselves. Thus, at the as they seek to conquer weaker states; the gration, urbanization, and the present time much hinges on the stories best course of action for a liberal, demo- reincorporation of the Southern states Americans devise, and come to believe, cratic republic such as America is to avoid back into the Union created enormous about what makes them a single nation getting dragged into these quarrels and social and domestic political challenges for despite the increasingly multi-cultural to guard against the maurauding basic America. The effectiveness of any solution composition of American society, despite feature of world politics. The prescrip- to these problems hinged on creating the widening social and economic polari- tion is to create a “Fortress America” - to some sort of unifying national identity zation created by movement to an infor- raise the barriers high against the various that included old Americans, the new ur- mation-based post-industrial economy, evils, contaminations, and dangers posed ban immigrant proletariat, and Southern- despite the growing gap between sectors by the corrupt world outside the nation’s ers. The Progressive solution was to re- of society subscribing to traditional reli- borders, to eschew alliances, and to re- build American identity around a stronger giously-based value systems and those sub- serve the use of military force for self- central government and to turn the re- scribing to liberal ones, and despite wide- defense. public’s attention outward. Using the iron spread de facto racial segregation. Since the 1890s, Realist isolationism has of traditional America, the trace metals The Realist isolationist vision domi- never dominated American thinking, but of the new immigrants, and the heat and nated American thinking in the early re- it remains a powerful undercurrent. In oxygen of the state, the melting pot would public and shaped U.S. foreign and the 1920s, it was the vision of the hand- yield a new, beautiful steel, strong enough defense policies for the first century of ful of Irreconcilables in the U.S. Senate, to stand up to foreign nations in the clash

105 of blades on the world stage. The Ameri- and American policy did not aim at cre- can-led free world from the hostile, en- can nation, in this conception, was ating a lasting peace. Rather, in this Real- slaved world beyond. This was the vision strengthened by the addition of the best ist internationalist vision, American mili- of American foreign affairs that justified of other national groups - the strongest, tary power was needed to protect Ameri- Realpolitik policies to contain the Soviet the most determined, the most intelligent ca’s global interests from the imperial Union, to intervene in politico-military - but these individuals then had to sur- claims of other great powers and to main- struggles across the third world, and to render themselves and become or be made tain a global balance of power. Though pursue tripolar balancing with China. into Americans. In this Progressive view, sometimes couched in terms of America’s Although the end of the Cold War led to membership in the national community special mission or American another eclipse of this Realist internation- was defined by loyalty and service to the exceptionalism, in practical terms Realist alist vision, this vision remains a power- national state. What justified such loyalty internationalism embraced a policy of fully attractive one today. Advisors sur- and service - that is, what made the state Realpolitik. The creation of an American rounding George W. Bush, for example, the worthy object of veneration - was the sphere of influence and the balancing of explicitly describe American foreign American state’s greatness and, by impli- the European great powers replaced For- policy in Realist internationalist terms.21 cation, the nation’s greatness, evidenced tress America as the central principle of What displaced the Realist internation- by its role in world politics and by its foreign policy. alist vision in 1913 and again in the 1990s, ability to defeat other states in the great This Realist internationalist vision went and also dominated American thinking global struggles between nations. into eclipse in 1913 with the Wilson presi- for a short period in the early 1940s, was Thus beginning with the Harrison dency. It returned, however, in 1946 with a Liberal internationalist one. This is the administration in 1889, the United States Truman, and was the vision that shaped vision of American foreign policy popu- pursued a foreign policy that was prem- American behavior during the Cold War. larized by Woodrow Wilson, resurrected ised on the assumption that while the For nearly half a century following World by Franklin Roosevelt, and flirted with world was a hostile and inevitably violent War II, Americans and their leaders saw by Bill Clinton. The Liberal perspective, place in which great powers competed for global politics as inevitably conflicting and unlike the Realist one, does not assume primacy, American domestic order re- believed that America had to step in, build that difference implies conflict. Rather, it quired that the American state join in this a balance of power, construct deterrent assumes that so long as liberal, democratic great social Darwinist competition. No capabilities that would hold hostile forces institutions exist, different cultures can lasting international order was possible, in check, and generally preserve an Ameri- live peacefully, side by side, within

106 America and in the world as a whole. In- institutions. The second is that if inter- tegic interests are not engaged have made deed, the task of building these liberal, national institutions and democracy are this a hard vision to sustain. Nonethe- democratic institutions itself serves as a in place, reason and rule of law will be less, much of the American elite contin- source of common identity. The Liberal secure: that is, it assumes that ues to subscribe to it today, and polls internationalist vision thus links Ameri- shortsightedness or passions or ethnic suggest that it continues to shape the views can national identity to moral purpose: identities will not be a problem. of much of the general public; certainly at its heart, it is a crusading vision, defin- The implications of this vision for this vision found its way into Al Gore’s ing American identity in terms of a com- American policy are interesting. Though campaign rhetoric. Where Realist isolation- mitment to a noble, transformative goal, the goal is the creation of a millennial, ism looks to build a Fortress America in abroad as well as at home. peaceful world order, based on democ- a hostile world and Realist international- This Liberal internationalist vision racy and law, Liberal internationalists tend ism seeks to create an American sphere of holds out the prospect of a meaningful to accept the use of force as necessary to influence and satisfactory balance of peace. It argues that if two conditions are achieve this. Hence we have Wilson’s in- power, Liberal internationalism aims to met, a stable global order based on law terventions in Mexico and Latin America impose, crusader-style, a democratic, lib- and not on power, is possible. First, there and his interest in transforming World eral peace on a backward world. must be a spread liberal democracy: lib- War I into a struggle to make the world The fourth vision, Liberal isolation- eral, democratic states will by their na- safe for democracy, and we have Bill ism, dominated American thinking dur- ture tend to be peace-loving and to pre- Clinton’s Liberal internationalist advisors ing the 1920s and early 1930s, defining fer trade and negotiation to conquest and pressing him to intervene in Africa, the the policies of successive Republican ad- war. Second, the necessary international Caribbean, and the Balkans. It is not en- ministrations. It starts from an image of institutions must be built to facilitate the tirely unfair to suggest that the Liberal America that denies American orderly and peaceful resolution of such internationalist notion is that democracy exceptionalism or, rather, asserts every disputes as do arise. The liberal interna- and the international institutions neces- nation’s exceptionalism: every nation can tionalist vision then makes two assump- sary for harmonious cooperation can be and must strive to create and to maintain tions. The first is that American power created at the point of a gun. its own political institutions that allow it can and must be used to achieve these The costs of Liberal internationalism calmly and rationally to advance the pub- changes to spread liberal democracy and being the need to intervene politically and lic interest in the face of ever-changing to construct and empower international militarily in areas in which American stra- social, technological, and economic chal-

107 lenges. Because these challenges will be development, Liberal isolationists con- do little to speed or make more likely the different in different nations at any given clude that in the end democracy and sta- emergence of a stable international order. time, every nation will have its own unique ble liberal domestic institutions can not By unnecessarily threatening and provok- institutions, and the paths to stable, lib- be imposed from outside or from above, ing other nations, however, it can make eral order will be as varied as the nations but must grow organically from the cul- progress more difficult. Intervention and themselves. ture of individual nations. Indeed, by war may be necessary in self-defense when For Liberal isolationists, membership destroying the delicate political plants that America is threatened by non-liberal pow- in any community - national or interna- are beginning to grow and the ecosystem ers (most Liberal isolationists supported tional - is defined by submission to the that is emerging around them, politico- U.S. entry into World War I, for exam- rule of that particular community’s law and military crusades to impose a liberal, ple), but they are not useful tools for ad- by a willingness to accept short-term indi- democratic world order are likely to set vancing the millennium. Hence, a key el- vidual sacrifices for the long-term collec- back progress, rather than to advance it. ement in the Liberal isolationist vision is tive good. American identity is thus rooted Further, the Liberal isolationist argument to avoid displays or uses of American not in a particular set of American values, suggests, in the absence of mature, stable military power that would stimulate mili- in a melting pot designed to produce a democracies, international institutions of tarism or excessively nationalistic re- nation stronger than any of its adversar- the sort championed by Wilson and FDR sponses. At the same time, in contrast to ies, or in a covenant to undertake a great are mere superstructure and will be un- the Realist isolationist vision, the Liberal moral crusade, but in a commitment to a able to preserve or impose peace. Only if isolationist vision underscores the impor- rational pursuit of the public interest. nations possess the maturity and the tance of economic and cultural openness, Liberal isolationists share the Liberal democratic domestic institutions that al- seeing the outside world not as a danger- internationalist ideal of global order based low them to comprehend that their best ous and evil place, but as a potential part- on law, not power, and on a community interests are served by submitting them- ner in the construction of peace. In sum, of liberal democracies. They assume, how- selves to the rule of law will international the underlying aim in this vision is to ever, that such an order depends on the institutions be able to resolve conflicts of create a peaceful world order through si- natural evolution of mature, liberal soci- interest. multaneous economic and cultural engage- eties around the world. While economic In this Liberal isolationist vision, ment and politico-military noninterven- and cultural contact can encourage such American politico-military power can thus tion.

108 has revealed just how divided Americans litical mainstream, including much of the Competing Visions and the NEI still are and how difficult a prediction Republican party, is skeptical of the no- about the future will be. tion of a multi-cultural rainbow America Obviously, each of these four compet- Since the end of the Cold War, America and sees the need to return to a common, ing visions has very different implications has flirted with a return to Liberal inter- melting pot construction of identity that for U.S. policies in the Baltic region, as nationalism. It has, however, repeatedly would produce a distinct, singular Ameri- in the world as a whole. Realist isolation- shied away from the apparently open- can culture. For Realist internationalists, ism implies a return to Fortress America; ended price of actually carrying through cultures inevitably clash rather than coex- Realist internationalism calls for an aggres- with this vision. At the same time, this ist harmoniously. Logically, this vision sive pursuit of American national inter- Liberal internationalist vision has faced implies an inevitable clash of cultures, lib- est and containment of or balancing two challenges, one from the center-right eral-western versus others, in the world as against potential adversaries such as Rus- of the American ideological spectrum and a whole. This is a struggle that America can sia, China, rogue states, and radical ide- the other from the far right. not shy away from. Thus, though the com- ologies; Liberal internationalism calls for From the far right of the ideological munist threat has collapsed, this broad sec- active, crusading employment of Ameri- spectrum, Realist isolationist voices con- tion of the elite and mass public contin- can power, military as well as economic tinue to demand that America turn in- ues to view the world through the Realist and political, to protect liberal, democratic ward and wash its hands of a world that internationalist lenses of the Cold War. The governments and to roll back illiberal they describe as corrupt and evil. At the notion of a peaceful world order is re- forces in the world; Liberal isolationism extreme, these voices are at times xeno- garded as a self-delusion: enemies exist calls for the maintenance of economic and phobic and reactionary, looking backward or will arise, and America must combat cultural openness while resisting military to some sort of idealized past when eve- these enemies. While the identity of the involvement. Which of these competing ryone in America was white and Chris- principal enemy is still unclear - perhaps visions emerges triumphant in tomor- tian, or wanted to be. a non-western Russia but, if not, then row’s America will depend on the out- The more serious challenge to the Lib- China, or Arab nationalism, or Islamic come of the soul-searching and identity- eral internationalist vision of foreign fundamentalism - an activist foreign construction efforts now underway in policy comes from Realist international- policy is necessary, designed to protect American society. The election of 2000 ism. A large section of the American po- America and its friends from the dan-

109 gers that will surely emerge, as they al- not be surprising to see a gradual evolu- military guarantees, would grow, while ways have in the past. tion of the NEI. American support for NATO activities, It is hardly surprising that the NEI The direction of such evolution is quite particularly out-of-area military interven- emerged during an American flirtation predictable. If Realist internationalist tions, would decline. with Liberal internationalism. The NEI, thinking emerges triumphant, the NEI is It deserves to be underscored, however, with its emphasis on the non-zero-sum likely gradually to focus more narrowly that these changes would come only at nature of security, on the importance of on military concerns and on state-to-state the margin. Particularly given the low constructing institutions, on the signifi- contacts; unless Russia moves quickly in political salience of the NEI and its low cant role of non-state actors, and on the the direction of liberalism, the NEI is likely costs, regardless of the direction in which need to commit America’s politico-mili- also to become geographically narrower. American foreign policy as a whole moves, tary power to the task of building global In this scenario, NATO enlargement is the natural inertia of policies and institu- order, fits squarely within the Liberal in- likely to proceed more rapidly, limited tions means that American commitment ternationalist vision of American engage- principally only by the perceived ability to the NEI and its vision of northern ment in world affairs. It co-exists less com- of the applicants to contribute meaning- European security architecture are likely fortably with other visions of American fully to NATO’s strength. By contrast, in to endure. engagement. Indeed, if America’s flirtation the less likely case that Realist isolation- with Liberal internationalist ideas does not ism emerges triumphant, American com- Conclusions yield a more permanent commitment, the mitment to the NEI will wane, as Euro- NEI will increasingly stick out as an odd- pean security is defined as a matter of In its underlying premises, the NEI ity or inconsistency in American foreign European, not American concern; support steps outside what could be characterized policy. The NEI is nonetheless likely to for NATO is also likely to decline. Al- as the traditional or modern, national remain in place, both because of inertia though, it is difficult to discern voices framework for conceptualizing security, and because northern Europe (or at least advocating Liberal isolationism in rooted in three-and-a-half centuries of the non-Russian portions of it) lies safely America today, it is easy to see what such experience with the Westphalian sover- inside the “us” side of Realism’s “us”/ a vision would imply for the NEI: were eign-state system of international politics. ”them” divide, if Realist international- Liberal isolationism to emerge as a domi- Implicitly, the NEI is grounded in a post- ism or Realist isolationism comes to nant vision of foreign policy, American Westphalian vision of how international dominate American thinking it would support for the NEI, minus its implicit order can best be constructed, a vision

110 that differs from the traditional, modern have two consequences: in the first place, communication, and alienation from tra- one in two key regards. First, where tra- it would improve Baltic security by facilitat- ditional sources of social and political ditional thinking about international se- ing regional cooperation and the resolu- authority all challenge both the cohesion curity has focused on the security of sover- tion of shared problems; in the second of American society and the cultural bases eign states, this post-Westphalian approach place, it would facilitate the transformative for this cohesion. Elites are now strug- is concerned with the security of individu- flow of liberal, democratic ideas into Russia. gling, as during the Progressive era, to cre- als. Second, where traditional Westphalian While the NEI explicitly anticipates the ate new cultural foundations for a cohe- models of international security have fo- enlargement of NATO to include the Baltic sive American society. Public debates over cused narrowly on security from physical vio- States, it hopes to accomplish this enlarge- values, lifestyles, and multi-culturalism re- lence, this new vision focuses on security to ment without hardening Russian flect elements in this struggle. Thus, the pursue a meaningful, productive life. The NEI Realpolitik views and without deepening outcome of today’s efforts to redefine envisions security, defined in this broader the divide between east and west within American identity will powerfully shape manner, as a collective good and reasons the region. What this will mean in prac- how Americans view their world and how that its provision will depend on a com- tice remains uncertain. American leaders define the goals of Ameri- plex network of institutions including sover- The fit between the NEI and the gen- can foreign policy. This said, at least in its eign states, non-governmental organiza- eral thrust of American foreign policy also general form and at least for the foresee- tions, international agencies, and local gov- remains uncertain, largely because the lat- able future, the NEI seems likely to en- ernments. ter itself is uncertain. As in the past, how dure regardless of larger shifts in Ameri- The image that the NEI’s authors have the American public and policymakers can foreign policy: the NEI’s low politi- is the Hanseatic one, in which national come to view the world and America’s cal salience and low cost offer it a sub- identities are relatively unimportant and role in it is likely to depend on how, in stantial degree of immunity from change. international interactions are regulated by the face of problems that divide Ameri- More interestingly, the success or fail- a number of overlapping and interlock- can society and threaten to tear it apart, ure of the NEI may provide important ing institutions, not simply by sovereign Americans come to define their own iden- lessons to policymakers as they wrestle with states. In this model, borders blur. In par- tity. America’s movement to a post-indus- the meaning of globalization and with the ticular, the NEI hopes to encourage the trial economy, the resulting growing di- problem of providing meaningful human blurring of the border between northwest Russia vide between a highly educated class and security in the new era. In its backward and the rest of northern Europe. This would a less well educated one, new patterns of glance to the Hanseatic League, the NEI

111 explicitly looks for an alternative model States of America, Washington, D.C., Janu- op. cit., p. 4. of order and governance. Whether or not ary 16, 1997.@ (http://www.nato.int/pfp/lv/ 14 Charter of Partnership Among the Re- this model proves to be a good one may charter.html; downloaded 7/24/00.) For a public of Latvia, the Republic of Estonia, the clearer sense both of the American commit- Republic of Lithuania, and the United States well have significant consequences for the ment to northern Europe and of the limits of of America, Washington, D.C., January 16, construction of international order in the the U.S. resources available for the region, see 1997, op. cit., p. 3. coming century. also, for example, H.R. 4249: Cross-Border 15 Deputy Secretary Strobe Talbott, Address Cooperation and Environmental Safety in at the North Atlantic Council, Brussels, Bel- 1Overview of the Northern Europe Initia- Northern Europe Act of 2000; Fact Sheet re- gium, December 15, 1999 (The State of the tive: Fact Sheet released by the Bureau of Eu- leased by the Bureau of European Affairs, U.S. Alliance: An American Perspective), op. cit., ropean Affairs, U.S. Department of State, Department of State, Washington, DC, May p.5. Washington, DC, May 1, 2000, p. 1. (http:// 26, 2000" and U.S.-Baltic Partnership Com- 16 Charter of Partnership Among the Repub- www.state.gov/www/regions/eur/nei/ mission Communiqué, June 7, 2000. (http:/ lic of Latvia, the Republic of Estonia, the Re- fs_000501_nei.html; downloaded 7/24/00) /www.usislib.ee/partnership/html; public of Lithuania, and the United States of 2 Ibid., p. 4. downloaded 7/24/00). America, Washington, D.C., January 16, 3 Ibid., pp. 1, 3. 8 As Delivered: Robert C. Frasure Memorial 1997, op. cit., p. 4. 4 In particular, see Strobe Talbott on the Lecture by Strobe Talbott, Deputy Secretary 17 As Delivered: Robert C. Frasure Memorial subject: As Delivered: Robert C. Frasure Me- of State of the US, 24 January 2000, Tallinn, Lecture by Strobe Talbott, Deputy Secretary morial Lecture by Strobe Talbott, Deputy Sec- op. cit., p. 2. of State of the US, 24 January 2000, Tallinn, retary of State of the US, 24 January 2000, 9 Ibid., p. 2. op. cit., p. 4. Tallinn, pp. 1-2. (http://www.vm.ee/eng/ 10 Ibid., p. 3. 18 For a more detailed discussion see, for pressrelease/speeches/2000 Talbott_asdeli- 11 Ibid., p. 2. example, Edward Rhodes, Constructing Peace vered.html; downloaded 4/19/00.) 12 Deputy Secretary Strobe Talbott, Address and War: An Analysis of the Power of Ideas to 5 Ibid., p. 2. at the North Atlantic Council, Brussels, Bel- Shape American Military Power, Millennium 6Overview of the Northern Europe Initia- gium, December 15, 1999 (The State of the Journal of International Studies (Spring 1995). tive: Fact Sheet released by the Bureau of Eu- Alliance: An American Perspective), p. 5. 19 Condoleezza Rice, Promoting the Na- ropean Affairs, U.S. Department of State, op. (www.state.gov/www/policy_remarks/1999/ tional Interest, Foreign Affairs (January/Feb- cit., p. 1. 991215_talbott_nac.html; downloaded 11/ ruary 2000), p. 62. 7 For the text of the Baltic-American Part- 19/00) 20 Ibid., p. 47. nership, see Charter of Partnership Among 13 As Delivered: Robert C. Frasure Memorial 21 See, for example, Rice, op. cit., and Robert the Republic of Latvia, the Republic of Esto- Lecture by Strobe Talbott, Deputy Secretary B. Zoellick, AA Republican Foreign Policy, nia, the Republic of Lithuania, and the United of State of the US, 24 January 2000, Tallinn, Foreign Affairs (January/February 2000).

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