Interview with Joaquim Chipande

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Aluka is a not-for-profit initiative dedicated to creating and preserving a digital archive of materials about and from the developing world. For more information about Aluka, please see http://www.aluka.org Interview with Joaquim Chipande

Author/Creator Chipande, Joaquim (interviewee); de Carvalho, Sol (inteviewer) Date 2003 Resource type Interviews Language English Subject Coverage (spatial) Mozambique, Tanzania, United Republic of Coverage (temporal) 1954-1975 Source Samora Machel Documentation Center Rights By kind permission of Alberto Joaquim Chipande and the Samora Machel Documentation Centre (SARDC). Description This interview tells the life story of Alberto Joaquim Chipande, one of the early leaders of FRELIMO's liberation struggle, the commander of the first attack in the war for independence, and a close colleague of President Samora Machel. Aspects covered in the interview include Chipande's background growing up in a peasant family in Cabo Delgado province, his flight to Tanzania, guerrilla training in Algeria, and developments within FRELIMO in the late 1960s.

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http://www.aluka.org Interview with Joaquim Chipande

Translated by Eleusio Dos Prazeres Viegas Filipe,

Doctoral Candidate in Portuguese and Spanish, University of Minnesota

Reviewed by Jim Johnson, Interdisciplinary Center for the Study of Global Change, U of MM

Can you say your name and tell about your family background?

Can I start talking? Very well, my name is Alberto Joaquim Chipande. My father’s name is Joaquim António Chipande and my mother’s name is Felícia Paulo Mateus. I come from a peasant family. My brothers and I were educated in the same way as any other African family. I’m the fifth child in my family. We were seven children from the same parents. My father had three wives and my mother was his second wife. I have other brothers from the other two wives of my father. We were raised as a big family.

Can you talk about your childhood and youth?

In my family, my brothers and I depended on our mothers. However, my father took me to be under his direct responsibility. He sent me to school in the Catholic Mission of Muecate?. I started studying there in the 1950s and I finished grade four in 1956. I graduated from grade 4, and I couldn’t do anything else because I was very young. This is what the priests said. They said that I was a child, and I was 16 years old, and I couldn’t be a teacher. [They also said that] if I wanted to continue studying I could become a seminarian. I told them that I didn’t want to become a seminarian because I didn’t have any inclination for that. So, I was inactive for an entire year and in the second year, the priests called me and they invited me to teach and I started teaching in 1957. So, I was a teacher from 1957 to 1963.

Talking about the history of the time, I have to say that I was one of those young people of the 1950s. I was one those people who suffered the experiences of colonialism in the skin, flesh, and bones. I physically and psychologically experienced the violence of 500 years of colonialism. Why do I say this? I couldn’t live with brothers. I didn’t have a harmonious family because all of us had to be involved in forced labor. Some of them migrated to Tanzania. Therefore, I didn’t live in a very good family environment with my brothers because they had fled the forced labor. So, I was the victim of the colonial past of 500 years.

Explain to us what the experience of growing cotton was.

We were involved in growing cotton in the plantation of João Vieira in Mocimboa da Praia. He had sisal, cashew nut, and coconut plantations. Since many people who lived on the coast were not used to doing this kind of job, the workers were recruited from Mueda. So, my brothers were always targeted for recruitment and I was never recruited. I recall one day when I was with my brother and he was taken to go to work as forced laborer. He went to work as a coerced laborer in the plantation, but he didn’t stay there a week. When he returned, he fled to Tanzania. He took with him my other brothers, so I didn’t live with them anymore. It was only when I fled to Tanzania that I met him again. These are the events that stimulated me and instilled in me a nationalist spirit with a desire for fighting for the liberation against oppression, colonialism, and other atrocities. These events filled me with hatred

Did you have information about your family in Tanzania?

I grew up hearing about TANU and this was since 1954. One of my brothers fled to Tanzania in 1954 and I was 17 years old at the time. When he came back he told me that he was a member and he was involved with TANU in Tanzania. He lived in Linde and my uncles also lived there. Part of my family lived there too, and as you know I grew up near the border with Tanzania. I would follow the political events unfolding in Tanzania, the formation and development of TANU. When Mozambicans who lived in Tanzania formed MANU, I approached them.

Was this in 1961 or 1962?

My first contacts with TANU were in 1957. It was in 1957 when I had my first contacts with TANU and I was recruited by the elderly people of the region. I started teaching in Mueda in 1957. When I was admitted as a teacher in the mission school the seniors asked me to work with them. I asked them, “what kind of work?” and they replied “We want to work seriously.” I think you’ve heard about Lázaro Kavandame and he had “Sociedade Agrícola e Monetária dos Africanos de Moçambique” [Agrarian and Monetary Association of Africans]. This enterprise was involved in cotton production. There was a system of cotton production directed by the company Sagar. There was an association of Mozambicans which was created by Lázaro Kavandame during the colonial period. This association was more focused on politics than anything else. They talked about politics and they mobilized people through this association. So, in 1957, I was invited to work with them. I asked them “what kind of work am I going to do?” and they replied to me saying “the work is difficult, but since you’re a teacher we need your help…” Then, they explained to me what kind of work by saying, “this is the Associação Algodoeira dos Africanos de Moçambique [Cotton Association of the Africans of Mozambique], but within this organization we’re doing politics.” Beginning that day, I was given assignments to carry out. I started receiving clandestine organizations coming from Tanzania including TANU and MANU that came to work in Mozambique. So, I would clandestinely receive such organizations. I started doing this kind of job in 1957 through 1958 and 1959. I did this job until the time when Lázaro Kavandame was arrested. He was expelled from the area of the Makondes and he was sent to Montepuez where he could not establish contacts with Makonde people. We worked in 1958 and 1959 and in 1960 we had the Mueda Massacre. I was an activist at the time. I would clandestinely receive the delegations that came to establish contacts with the Portuguese. I did this job with my other young fellow friends. One of them was the late Simão Tobias Ndondo and Raimundo Pachinuapa. They were my bosses. I was still a young man and they were senior to me. The late Ndondo and late Colonel João Mandala helped me to get accommodated. So, I would receive the delegations such as MANU…

Was it MANU or MAA, Mozambique African Association?

The African Association was not here. In Mozambique, we didn’t have MANU because we couldn’t form that kind of associations. It was a clandestine organization. In Mozambique, we had Associação Algodoeira dos Africanos de Moçambique and this association was created by Lázaro Kavandame. He created this association as a cover up for political activities inside the organization. He maintained direct contacts and relations with the colonial administration, but with the association appearing as if it was merely a pacific organization. There were political activities inside the association, one of which was to organize the natives and to bring unity among them. So, this association was the focal point of contacts with politicians before the creation of MANU. Initially the association had contacts only with TANU before the formation of MANU in the 1950’s. The organization already existed when I was invited to join it in Tanzania. It seems that TANU was founded in 1950s. I was still studying in 1954, 1955, and in 1956 I was recruited by senior people. I started working with them in 1957 in the cotton association as a cover up for political activities inside the association. Even when the first nationalists who were in Tanzania would come to Mozambique, we would receive them at the border or in Luala next to the border with Tanzania or in the Rovuma. We would receive them and bring them to the interior of Mozambique. I worked with them and we would accompany them in their trip back to Tanzania. After MANU was founded, we were officially informed of the foundation of this movement in Tanganyika. We worked during this period until the Mueda Massacre took place. How did this massacre take place? The nationalists who were in Tanzania were not organized. There were many small organizations in Tanganyika, but we were organized and structured in Mozambique. But, these organizations in Tanganyika didn’t have clear ideas. One important aspect of these organizations was their commitment to the ideas of liberation in Africa and they were influenced by other similar organizations in the continent.

These organizations had embraced the nationalist spirit of the time and were influenced by political organizations such as TANU, and countries like Uganda and Ghana. These winds of African liberation were also of the world as well. Some of the nationalists [MANU] also felt the same thing about African liberation and some of them were directly involved with TANU as activists. However, they didn’t know how to act in Mozambique. Through their direct contacts and relations with [Rashid] Kawawa and Cambona, who was a Mozambican, and also Nyerere, they were advised to get organized. They were advised as Mozambicans not to simply work inside TANU because Mozambique was still under colonial rule. Kawawa, Cambona, Nyerere and other members of TANU gave them advice. From that point, Mozambicans started to form their own movement and they formed MANU. In the beginning, MANU, which stands for Mozambican African National Union, had a regional bias in the Makonde area. When MANU members started their activities they first had to establish contacts with elements of the cotton association, which was headed by Lázaro Kavandame, and his association served as a focal point. We started receiving the first group of people coming from Mozambique. We couldn’t do anything inside Mozambique. In 1958, we received the first group of people coming from Tanzania; the first envoy was a young man. I don’t remember his name. He told us that he was sent as an envoy from Tanzania to talk about [MANU]. Following the young man, Makaba also came alone to meet us. He came to carry out underground missions. Later on, Faustino Magumbe came for the first time to introduce himself and it was when the Portuguese colonial authorities told him, “listen, we can’t do anything here. Go back.” The authorities did not harm him. He was received by the Portuguese authorities and they sent him back to Tanzania and he was accompanied by a sipaio [African police working for the Portuguese colonial government].

Did he talk with the colonial administration?

He went to the colonial administration and he talked with the authorities. It wasn’t a very big issue, but the colonial authorities were surprised by what he had done and they said, “This guy is crazy. He is out of his mind.” That’s why they gave orders to the sipaios to see him leave the country, “accompany him to the Rovuma River to see him cross the border.” Faustino returned to Tanzania and he was accompanied to the Rovuma River to make sure he crossed the border.

You said that you were involved in political activities. What kind of political activities were you involved in? Did these political activities consist in talking with people or raise the level of consciousness? What kind of political work was it? Another question is related to your family: when your brothers fled, did the colonial authorities go to talk with your family inquiring about your brothers?

We couldn’t do much or do any political work because of PIDE. There were also agents involved in psycho-social campaigns and they were more dangerous because they also went to the bush to register people. They would go to the most remote areas to register people and they would ask questions such as “what do you have here?” and they would take note that the person had a house, a machamba (garden) and its location. Sometimes, they would go where the gardens were even if they were far away into the bush. What was the idea behind registering people and property? They expected that one day there would be a guerilla war. Guerillas live in the bush. This is the reason why they were registering people and property. They wanted to know what people had and they would surprise people while working in the gardens. Our work was to call people’s attention to this and tell them to be careful. We would advise people not to trust anyone from the colonial regime and warn them to be careful with their friends and brothers because PIDE was very dangerous. It was difficult to know who was a PIDE agent and anyone could be a PIDE agent including your brother or friend. We couldn’t comment on the kind of work we were involved in and we didn’t talk about it with our families. We couldn’t talk about it with anyone. PIDE agents could be our brothers, wives, female friends. PIDE had psycho-social agents spread out everywhere and this made our missions more difficult.

The clandestine cells had characteristics similar to the party cells with three people who would know each other including the boss. The cell had three people including the boss who knew everybody, but they didn’t know other people. That’s about it; that’s what the cell was about with only three people. This was the way in which we organized ourselves, and we talked about the fact that the Portuguese were foreigners and that one day they would leave the country. We pointed to the events in Tanzania, Kenya, Ghana, Egypt, and other places. We would ask the question “did you hear what happened in Tanzania? Kenya? Ghana? Egypt? and other places? We had no idea of how the process would unfold in Mozambique. We imagined that the Americans or Russians would come to liberate us. We had many ideas but no one was very sure about what would happen. We expected to be free like Tanzania. However, we didn’t have a political party in Mozambique which could lead the country to independence. Our hopes rested on the association. I recall that we used to pray in Makonde before starting any meeting. We would say, “let’s pray to God and Virgin Mary so that they can liberate our people and our country.” It was like that, and we did that before starting. This was our prayer before starting a meeting. But, we didn’t know what to do [to achieve independence]. When the nationalist movement [MANU] emerged and developed in Tanzania, we started receiving envoys who didn’t have very clear ideas. They were not very organized in Tanzania. People would leave unprepared from Tanzania and they would come straight to Mozambique to talk about [politics]. Some would come from Dar es Salaam and they would come to Mozambique without prior consultation with other people in Tanzania. We would question [their methods]. We in Mozambique were more mature and more informed about the situation in the country and they were not. We would ask them some questions, “what are you doing over there? We are waiting for you here.” So, when the envoys would come we would receive them and we would also help them to hide. We would take care of them and they would return to Tanzania. As I told you the first person to come was Macaba. There was also another envoy who came here whose name I’ve forgotten. When Faustino Magumbe came for the first time he was sent back. After him came Tiago Mula who was very scared because he was a catechist for a long time. However, he was also a different and grownup man and he succeeded in shaking the Portuguese who became very agitated. He was the first person to be taken by the Portuguese and he was sent to Mocimboa da Praia and then to Porto Amélia. He never came back. From Porto Amélia, he was taken to Lourenço Marques. He never came back again. Following this event, a group of seven people headed by Simone Tchutcha came here. The group also included a woman. They went to talk with the colonial authorities in the administration and the Portuguese authorities didn’t allow them to leave for Tanzania and they were also deported. Macaba was here during the time when these events took place but he was not arrested. The Portuguese authorities cleaned up everything. What did I do? After all these events, we asked “what are we supposed to do now?” It was around this time that Faustino Armando arrived. He arrived in 1960 and he and his group went to introduce themselves at the colonial administration. They were told “you come back within 3 or 4 days and inform everyone”. They went to announce this to everyone to come and everybody came to Mueda. There were a lot of people and I was also present. Mueda was very full of people who had gone there to listen to what the colonial authorities had to say. However, we knew what the feelings of people were and we also knew what [Faustino Armando] was going to say. He first was going to demand that the Portuguese improve the living conditions of Mozambicans and the end of forced labor. He also wanted the Portuguese authorities to open new better roads, provide better wages and prices. A chicken cost 2$50 escudos and a person would work in the forced labor for six months and he/she would receive 60$00 escudos. After working for six months and earning 60$00 escudos, a person would spend that money [buying goods which were expensive]. They discussed these issues and the Portuguese colonial authorities said “no, you guys are crazy… come here within 3 days.” They returned with their relatives and on June 16, 1960 we went to Mueda. The place was full of people and I had never seen a lot of people before in Mueda. There were a lot of people in Mueda. Thousands of people were present there. We went there early in the morning and the Portuguese authorities in Mueda informed the governor in Porto Amélia. The governor also came to Mueda but he first sent military forces to Mueda. When we arrived the troops had already arrived there. The governor had also arrived. Quibitiri was also present. He was invited by the governor and a couple of other people to go inside. Quibitiri was an interpreter. The governor said that Quibitiri had spoke very well [outside the offices] and that he didn’t speak very well inside. The governor asked who wanted to speak. We didn’t know what was going on inside there and they didn’t tell us what they had talked about. “He [Quibitiri] spoke badly and the question: who wanted to talk?” It was an impressive day because everyone didn’t want anything else except the independence of the country just like in Tanzania. You could see people with tattoos in their front and back with the slogan independence and some other people wore lion skins with the same slogans. So, the authorities asked who wanted to talk and they only wanted three people. Instead of three people, they came up with more than ten people who wanted to talk and as they were walking to meet the colonial authorities they barred others who wanted to walk inside the colonial administration.

Were there only men? Were women also present?

There were also women who volunteered to talk with the colonial authorities. So, when those people who wanted to talk approached the colonial administration, the Portuguese arrested and handcuffed five of them. They were not asked any questions and they were told to line up on the veranda in front of the colonial administration. So, people started wondering what was going on, “What’s going on? What’s going on?” We were standing in front of the colonial administration at a distance and we didn’t know what was going on. Suddenly, the governor comes out and walks down from the office and gives orders to the police who were inside their jeeps and trucks to take the handcuffed people except Quibitiri. The governor gave orders to arrest those people who had volunteered. Everyone became very agitated and all of us moved forward to face the governor. I was one of those who were less than three meters from the governor. I was in front of the governor when the skirmish started. The governor and other colonial authorities were unable to put an end to the skirmish and they gave orders to shoot in the air. No one stopped advancing to face the governor and new orders were given to shoot in the air and no one stopped until orders were given to shoot to kill. When orders to kill were given, the troops that were hiding in the back of Mueda were also informed and they approached the administration and surrounded it and they started to shoot to kill. I was in the middle of many people and I couldn’t move easily and I started to push people who were blocking my way. I fell down a couple of times and I saw people who had fallen. I didn’t go far; I only moved ten meters close to a tomb of a major who died in the battle of Cumbane in 1917. His body remains were deposited in that tomb. So, I went to hide in the tomb while the Portuguese troops were shooting at people. When I turned I noticed that everybody was gone and I remained there. Everyone had disappeared and the [Portuguese police and troops] were no longer on site. They thought I was also dead. When everything was over, I went to search for my bicycle. I went very far to find it. I had gone to the [meeting] on my bicycle. We backed off. “What next?”; “what to do?” From that moment, we started working more freely and everyone was talking about freedom. [The prisoners] were taken to Porto Amélia and from there they were sent to Lourenço Marques. [The Portuguese authorities] banned the association. They said “we don’t want this association anymore. If you want to form an association you ought to form small groups of five people. We don’t want big groups.” So, we formed an association called Cinco [five] because we were only five people. Lázaro was not present during this time because he had been banished from the area and he was sent to Montepuez. Because of the situation [in Mueda] he was called to come back to calm down the situation. When he arrived he asked, “What are we going to do next?” and he was told that “You’re back and you should start organizing people.” We started organizing in groups of 25 people and there were many 25-people groups. We didn’t organize groups with more than 25 people. We started organizing people to make sure that the massacre of Mueda was known everywhere. Information about the Mueda massacre became widespread around the world. In Africa and the rest of the world, there was talk about the massacre. We were compelled to act seriously and MANU started to organize itself differently in Tanzania, not as a tribal and regional association. Tanzania played an important role during this period. Contacts were established with Mondlane who was in the United States of America. [There was a network of diplomatic communication] which involved Nyerere and other leaders and they came up with the idea of a conference in Dar es Salaam. The conference was scheduled for July and we were informed. However, we were already members of MANU and had membership cards of this organization.

Were there any discussions designed to form a solely Makonde [political organization]?

There were and why not? There were some discussions about that but we didn’t participate because we were in Mozambique. The discussions involved only people who were in Tanzania and there were some problems involving them. There were some people who maintained their positions and refused to be part of MANU. They maintained their independence as Makonde. They gave us a lot of work and you can’t imagine the amount of work they gave us. It was not easy even after the formation of FRELIMO; they maintained their positions. They not only maintained their independence as Makonde but they also became members of other movements such as FELIPAMO which had support from Ghana because of the political connections of Nino Guambe. [Some former] members of FRELIMO joined other movements. Some of the members of the Makonde African National Unity joined other movements and some joined FRELIMO. This is how the events unfolded. Other people joined other movements and political parties that emerged in opposition to FRELIMO. The general purpose and vision was to liberate Mozambique and was beyond that agrarian association. The goal was to fight for Mozambique and we had seen what had happened in Mueda where people had been massacred. Members of MANU were sent abroad to establish contacts. It was in the context of the conference of Mozambicans which took place in June 1962 in Dar es Salaam. In this conference, Mozambicans from different walks of life and from different areas of the country were present. Some of them had created their movement in Northern Rhodesia, UDENAMO and some had created UNAMI [in Malawi]. MANU was also present in the conference. These political movements were brought together in Dar es Salaam in June 1962 and we were also prepared in Mozambique. We were informed in advance because envoys were sent to tell us “Listen, tell the Mozambicans that we are going to have a conference and we will discuss how to liberate Mozambique. To liberate not only the Makonde, but all of Mozambique. We will liberate the entire country.” Our association got ready and we sent delegates to the conference.

You mean in the group of 25 people?

Yes, sure. In the group of 25 people.

What was the group like? How many people were there to represent you? Did you have two people representing each group?

No. no. There were only two people representing each group… each group was represented by two people. Of every group of twenty five people, they sent two delegates. We were ready and we organized and financed [the dislocation of these people] and everything else. We were connected through these groups of twenty five. We had groups of twenty five people. We also had connections with the Portuguese government which supported us. We had everything. How could we do this without the knowledge of the colonial government? So, we went to talk with the colonial authorities informing them that “Look, we were invited to Tanganyika. There is a meeting in Tanganyika and we as Mozambicans are invited to participate….” What to do? Refuse or go? We were hesitant to make a decision. The administrator said, “Come here later, I’ll give you an answer.” The administrator called us one of those days and said, “Go to Tanganyika to participate…” and we asked “Can we go?” and he repeated, “Yes, you can go” He gave us some money (laughs). [The administrator] asked “how many people are going there?” and we replied, “Two people” and he asked “who are they?” João Namimba and the senior Pascoal Ngumbi are going to represent Cabo Delgado [in Tanganyika]. João Namimba passed away in Mabelane [Central Prison of Mavalane] and he was a political prisoner. He was detained and died at Mabelane [Mavalene]. He was one of the two who went to Tanganyika to represent Cabo Delgado. The other delegate was Pascoal Ngumbi. We prepared these two men to represent Cabo Delgado. These two men went to represent the group of twenty five and Cabo Delgado. They went to represent all of the 25 groups that existed by then.

No, this conference was the first to unite everybody and it was followed by the congress. … When did these events take place? What did we discuss? We said that “Look, the Portuguese gave us money and what are we going to do?” We did fundraising for our delegates. So, we decided not to use the money that the Portuguese gave us, not even a cent of that money. The decision about the money was to “go and give that money to the boss in Dar es Salaam.” We did fundraising of money and gave the money to [the delegates to take to Tanganyika] and we also said that “The money is also to be used to cover other expenses. The money is here and we didn’t use a single cent of this money. Take this money and give it in Dar es Salaam….” So, we gave them the money and they went to Tanganyika to participate in the conference in June. It was the first conference where Mozambicans from all walks of life were present. There were three movements based abroad present, in this case MANU, headed by Mateus Mola who was the president, UDENAMO, headed by Adelino Guambe, and UNAMI, headed by Baltazar Changombe. Mondlane was also present but he didn’t have a political movement. But he [Mondlane] was more in favor of Adelino Guambe…

You mean Adelino Guambe from UDENAMO?

Yes, because he had contacts with UDENAMO. But he [Mondlane] was independent. During the conference and in the congress, Mozambicans were unanimous in stating that without unity we could not achieve any success. We had to unite ourselves.

How many people did you have in the agricultural association?

-Uuuuuuhhhh! There were thousands of people. There were thousands of people.

What was the organization like? Did you have membership cards?

Yes, we had membership cards. Each member had a card

What was the regional scope of the association?

[The association covered] Mueda, Mocímboa da Praia, Nandade, Muidumbe, Mucumula, north of Mucumula, and all the northern region…

Were the leaders young teachers?

No, no. The first teacher was Lázaro Kavandame and later on teachers were also integrated into the association.

Were there connections between the association and the rest of the population?

Yes. There were connections between the association and the rest of the population. It was not easy in the beginning because they didn’t want [to be connected]. They didn’t want it.

Have you ever met and talked with Nhangumba?

You mean Faustino?

Yes, I mean Faustino. Yes.

Did he talk about independence or not during that time?

Eh… the idea of independence was not clear at the time. Even for them it was not clear. In the first place, they were not clear about independence. They didn’t clearly know what independence really meant, but they had a nationalist feeling. They still didn’t have the vision of Mozambique. They didn’t know. It was not easy to have an idea of Mozambique. You have to bear in mind the fact that in Mueda the Portuguese didn’t allow people to leave one district for another without a permit card. People were not allowed to move freely. To travel to Mocímboa da Praia, Mudumbe [Muidumbe] and other places, a person had to have a permit card. And there were more restrictions if a person wanted to go to another province. For instance, a person who wanted to go to Nampula had to have a permit card. Very few people knew how to get to Nampula. It was even more difficult to go to Europe and other places. This was an impeding factor. It was an impeding factor, the fact that people didn’t have an idea of what Mozambique was like.

What was the significance of meeting people from different parts of the country?

The contacts that Mozambicans maintained in Tanzania [were important]. There were people coming from Gaza, south, center, and the north of the country. It was a moment of self discovery and awareness of the diversity and dimensions of the country. It was a moment of self discovery where people realized that suffering was the same and widespread in the entire country. It was the realization that oppression and colonialism were the same all over the country. So, people gained a national consciousness, a national dimension.

Were MANU’s activities more oriented to welcoming the delegations or were they also doing more specific activities? For instance, exchanging ideas?

People who had joined MANU were galvanized by [nationalist sentiments], but they didn’t have a clear idea of what was to be done to free Mozambique from Portuguese colonialism.

So, was there a strong connection between the association and MANU? There was a strong connection. They [MANU] could not come and operate easily in Mozambique without the support of the association.

Was Mola a well known figure?

You mean Mateus Mola? He was not a well known person. He was only known in Tanzania. He never crossed the border to come here. He is the son of an emigrant. His parents were from Palma who had left Mozambique for Tanzania. He studied in Tanzania and he didn’t know this country [Mozambique] very well. But you in Mozambique, did you know him very well?

You mean Mateus Mola? I only met him when I ran away from Mozambique to Tanzania.

When did you leave the country for Tanzania?

I left the country in 1963. It was only when I arrived in Tanzania that I met Mateus Mola for the first time. But, when I met him, he was no longer a FRELIMO member. He was no longer a FRELIMO member. As I was saying, the conference of Dar es Salaam resulted in the unification of the three movements. There was unity among Mozambicans from all walks of life and from different parts of the country. Mondlane was also present and he was the unifying factor. National unity was the main topic and it was born there. Tanzanians gave so much support, especially coming from Kawawa and Oscar Cambone and Nyerere. Nyerere would say, “If Mozambicans have no unity they won’t be able to fight and free their country. If Mozambicans are divided, they won’t succeed…” So, Mozambicans listened to Nyerere’s advice and ultimately FRELIMO (the Mozambique Liberation Front) was formed, a movement that united three movements, in this case, MANU, UDENAMO, and UNAMI. An important question that emerged with the unification of these three movements was the future of the leaders of these movements. How to solve this problem? Everyone said that “we need to vote” and we voted. Therefore, democratic elections through the process of voting are nothing new for FRELIMO. It started in the first and founding conference of FRELIMO. So, we voted and Mondlane was elected as the president of the new Mozambique Liberation Front. The conference took place between the 22nd and 25th of June, 1962 and Mondlane was elected president. What about the other leaders such as Mateus Mola, Adelino Guambe? Mateus Mola was elected as deputy president and Adelino Guambe was just like another leader in one of the departments of the movement. Other leaders were placed in other departments and this is how the movement was created. However, the objective of the movement was not clearly defined yet. It was necessary to organize a congress to define the objectives of the movement. So, over three months the congress was organized, in this case, June, July and August. September was defined as the month of the congress which would take place in Dar es Salaam where we would define the goals and political line of the movement. A commission was formed during the founding conference of FRELIMO to organize the congress. Many problems emerged during the three months of preparations and organization for the congress. It’s always like that when something new emerges. There is always opposition. Adelino Guambe didn’t want to be part of the movement and he deserted. He went to create his political party. Shortly thereafter Mateus Mola also deserted and he didn’t even attend the congress. Baltazar Changombe was the only former leader who stayed in Dar es Salaam. Even when FRELIMO was formed following the unification of the three movements, Baltazar Changombe didn’t join FRELIMO. He had said by then that, “I give you my men and everything else but I will remain outside the movement. My men will join the family, but I will stay outside the movement….” He stayed outside and it was only later when Mondlane came and he saw him, Changombe said, “Ah, yes. Now we have a well educated man; I will work alongside Mondlane….” Changombe didn’t want to be part of any political party or movement and he remained like that. By then, FRELIMO had new members. It didn’t only include former Mozambican immigrants who had long established themselves in Tanzania, Northern and Southern Rhodesia, and Malawi, and who didn’t have a political vision. It now included newly-arrived Mozambicans coming from the country to join the nationalist movement. These new members still had fresh memories of the Portuguese regime [atrocities]. They had direct and daily experience of the Portuguese regime. They had experienced forced labor and different forms of discrimination. They had felt discrimination in their bodies. When these groups of Mozambicans arrived in Tanzania it created an opportunity to talk about the colonial experience in the entire country. During meetings people realized that Portuguese colonialism was the same in every part of Mozambique and they had common experiences under colonialism. This realization encouraged national unity in terms of political ideals. People realized that colonialism was the same in Mozambique and affected not only blacks but there were also whites and mulattoes who were being oppressed by the regime. There were whites and mulattoes who were regarded as second- class citizens and who also experienced Portuguese atrocities and oppression. We started to understand the nature of colonial domination and through [these meetings] FRELIMO went beyond the [parochial politics of other nationalist movements].

Were these the kind of discussions that you had?

Yes, sure.

How did these discussions take place? Were such discussions similar to debates or to conversations?

I will get back to your question. The first discussions around these topics were very difficult. The first debate was very difficult. I recall when I was in Mueda and some nurses from here [Southern Mozambique] would call me to talk with them. I would ask them, “Where are you from?” and someone would reply saying, “I’m from Lourenço Marques…” and I would ask, “How is Lourenço Marques?” and they would talk [about Lourenço Marques]. [I would tell them], “You are assimilado” and they would deny it, saying “I’m not assimilado” and [I would say] “Why do you want to run away from that fact?” and [someone] would reply saying, “Young man, I’m assimilado. There’s nothing special about it. It’s a way of getting certain things….” When I was working as a teacher I helped nurses to escape to Tanzania. I would show people from the south the way to get out of the country to Tanzania. For example, Jacinto Iakudi and Calazanso, who was a nurse in Niaca. I also helped a nurse who worked in Balama and another nurse who worked in Mueda. I helped them to hide and escape to Tanzania.

When was this?

This was after the Mueda massacre.

Was this before the conference? This was before the conference…

After the massacre the Portuguese started to investigate all informed and trained Africans…

No. They [the Portuguese colonial authorities] didn’t start right away. They were very cautious. After the massacre they had to assure silencing of the incident and make sure that the public concerns about the massacre faded away. The massacre was very shocking. They came up with a new policy.

Did the population run away?

The population disappeared [from the areas surrounding Mueda]. They [the Portuguese authorities] went there and sent a heavily equipped military force. Given the fact that Mueda didn’t have water, the Portuguese troops were involved in fetching water for the population. The troops would do many things for the population such as taking sick people [to hospitals]. They would do many other things to make people forget about the [massacre]. As a president of one of the groups, in this case, the teaching group, I traveled with the [colonial] administrator to get rice seeds from a big machamba [field]. We had a big machamba of rice. So, I biked to the rice field to get rice seeds. The [colonial] administrator saw me and he said, “How are things, teacher?” and I replied, “I came to get seeds,” and he asked me, “Are the [seeds] ready to be carried away?” I replied saying, “Yes,” and he asked again, “Where is it?” and I replied, “They are in the office,” and he said, “Let’s go”. He approached the [office] with his jeep and we [loaded] the seeds in the car. He used to drive around with his armed sipaio. Then, the [administrator] said “You, teacher, and I will travel together. Just the two of us…” and I inquired, “What did you say?” and he replied saying, “We two will travel together…” and I wondered, “What is going on today?”. We loaded the sacks of seeds and bicycle in the trunk. I wanted to go in the back of the car [trunk] and he said, “Don’t go there, come here inside.” I got inside the car and he was behind the wheel driving. He drove while we talked. He asked, “How is everything, teacher? Is everything alright? How do you feel?” and I replied “I’m feeling very well.” Then, he asked me, “What do you know about Nyerere in Tanzania? They [Mozambican nationalists] talk about coming here to take over power in this country…” I said, “Mr. Administrator, there is nothing in Tanzania [to fear]. They are Tanzanians and they are not going to do anything, and we are Portuguese.” And the [administrator] said, “We are Portuguese and [the Tanzanian interference can cause] war.” I agreed, saying, “Yes, we are Portuguese”. [The administrator] said, “He [Nyerere] is Tanzanian. He could also be an Englishman or a British subject. Here, we are Portuguese. What does Nyerere want to do here? Why doesn’t he take care of his own business…” I agreed with his statement, “You’re right. That’s right.” We talked for some time and he said, “Let’s go.” We drove for awhile and he stopped halfway down the road. Then the administrator said, “Listen teacher, I want you to ask those crazy people who have been wandering around to come here…” [I said that] “The first thing I am going to do is to denounce them before the authorities and troops… I’m going to denounce everyone so that they can be arrested…” He said, “That’s it. You guys who think and have some vision should explain to them that what they are doing is wrong and bad…” I told him, “Very well…” We traveled and when we arrived at the machamba [field], we unloaded the rice seeds… (Laughs)… He [the administrator] said, “Let’s return…” and I told him, “I’m not going to return. I’m going to stay here…” I thought later about that conversation… (Laughs) … I remained in the machamba [field]. I [told the administrator], “I am going to sleep in the machamba because tomorrow I have to explain to these men how to plant rice seeds…” and [he insisted], “Let’s go; I’m going to take you…” and I said, “No, no, no…” I stayed there and he went back alone. Just imagine this kind of conversation. He hated me. On the day that I ran away, the administrator was in his car but he didn’t find me because I had left from the backdoor. He had come to arrest me. I can imagine that he would have said everything that he said on the day when we met (laughs)…

When he came to arrest you, did you know that he was going to do that? Was there any indication that he was going to arrest?

Yes. He had a list of people with information about each person he was going to arrest. I’m going to talk about this in detail later. However, let me talk about the conference now. After the conference, we decided to prepare the first congress. Pay attention to this; some people who had been part of the conference didn’t attend the congress. Many people started deserting, and desertion is a normal phenomenon. Two months after the conference, there were a good number of people who had deserted. Why did they desert if the election of the President, Mondlane, was democratic? and Mondlane was democratically elected. Didn’t the deserters want democracy? What did they want? Did they want dictatorship in the movement? This is the question we still raise up to the present. [Democracy] is an old practice within FRELIMO. We see the actions of the [current] opposition as normal. This is how people express their freedom. Erroneously some people tend to think that there is no freedom inside the FRELIMO Party. FRELIMO was a democratic movement back then and we never prosecuted people. People such as Arlindo Guambe and Mateus Mola would come here and we never tracked them down or hurt them. However, today, within these [new] movements [political parties] when someone leaves the movement [party] s/he is tracked down or persecuted. Why? They forget that all of them are FRELIMO deserters and they were never persecuted or tracked down. All of them are FRELIMO deserters but they are not persecuted. However, in their movements [political parties] as soon as one deserts he/she is in big trouble. He/she is humiliated and they [the party] fight to take away the rights of the deserter as a citizen or his/her citizenship which is in fact conferred by the constitution. They [the party] strive to undermine the deserters’ rights of citizenship. (Laughs) I see these incidents… So, we went to the congress …

I’m sorry, were the debate and discussion about the loss of power?

Wait a moment. How to conduct the liberation struggle? The definition of who is a Mozambican was an important one. Who was going to fight? Who was going to work in the political front? We had a test where we had to write down who was a Mozambican, who was fighting on our side and who we were fighting against. This was the question: who is fighting on our side and who was fighting against us? This was the first assignment. [Before] going to attend the congress in Dar es Salaam, our group in the interior of Mozambique started to organize for the congress. We had to organize ourselves to participate in the congress and not for a conference. We had to work as an organization. After the congress which unified FRELIMO was over, our delegates such as João Namimba received assignments. João Namimba received the assignment to do a reconnaissance mission along the entire border between Mozambique and Tanzania, from the Indian Ocean in Cabo Delgado to Lake Niassa. He had to know the entire border and its geography. He was given this assignment by FRELIMO. So, our delegate [João Namimba] didn’t return with us to Mozambique. However, his colleague returned. João Namimba stayed longer; he was there during the months of June and July and he only returned in August because he was doing a reconnaissance mission along the entire border between Mozambique and Tanzania which included Cabo Delgado and Niassa. When he returned he said, “Listen, FRELIMO is born. We have an organization and a president.” [We replied by saying] “We already know that but it was important to hear that from you. What are we going to do next?” I said, “Go and report this in Mueda and explain it to them too.” He [João Namimba] asked, “Explain what?” and [we] said “Go and explain what happened. Tell them that Mondlane was elected and he is a Mozambican who was in the United States of America. You should explain that to them and don’t hide any information, otherwise we are going to have troubles.” So, he went to the administration with his friend. When he arrived there he was asked, “How were things in Dar es Salaam?” He replied saying, “Mozambicans from different walks of life and from different parts of the country gathered in Dar es Salaam and there were disagreements. There is nothing there and some of them don’t want this newly-founded organization called FRELIMO.” [The colonial official said], “Are you sure?” and [João Namimba] replied, “Yes…” and the [colonial official] said, “And now?”. [João Namimba] replied saying, “Very well, Mondlane was elected, but he said he is not going to start working now. He went back to the United States of America.” He [the colonial administrator] asked him, “So, is he not coming back?” and [João Namimba] replied, “No, he was told that we have to meet again in September… we are going to meet in September and he said he will come for that meeting.” [The colonial administrator] asked, “Is he coming back?” – [João Namimba] replied, “Yes”- [The colonial administrator asked] “Why is he coming back? What does he have to do?” – [João Namimba replied] “There is going to be a congress.” [The colonial administrator asked] “Are you sure?” [João Namimba replied] “Yes, however the three movements have united…” – [The colonial administrator asked] “And what was your role?”- [João Namimba replied] “I am from Cabo Delgado and I came here to inform people and find out what they think about this. I have to find out if they agree or not.” [The colonial administrator asked] “Do you agree?” and [João Namimba replied] “We don’t have any substantial information…” Then, the colonial administrator said, “Very well, go and get some work done…” So, the man [João Namimba] came back to us and gave us a report and we started to prepare the congress. Once again, we went to see him [the colonial administrator] in the administration. When arrived in the office, he [João Namimba] said “The congress is fast approaching. September has arrived…” and he [the colonial administrator asked] “Very well, who is going there?” and the answer was “The same group.” However, the Portuguese were much smarter because they prepared a different group of people and they sent them there. Their group included men and women and they were the first to arrive in Dar es Salaam where they went to work with the local Portuguese councilor. They went there before us and they were welcomed by the councilor. He explained everything to them. There was another Portuguese councilor in Zanzibar at the time. Both councilors started to work very hard with the group sent from Mozambique. When the time approached, the group was given money and we were also given money [by the colonial administration in Mueda]. The main objective of the congress was to recruit young people to join the armed struggle and mobilize the population for the war. With national unity in mind, young people were recruited and prepared [for the armed struggle]. Young people were also needed to mobilize the population in all provinces of the country and they were sent there to carry out this mission. Young people were recruited and sent to Tanzania. The group which was sent to Tanzania returned and gave a report about [the goals of the congress]. However, our delegate João Namimba received another mission. He was told “Don’t you go [to Mozambique]. Go and check the routes again that we will use because when the war starts it will be next to the border with Tanzania. We want to know where we are going to infiltrate the guerrillas…” So he accepted this mission and he was absent for a long time. The group of people that was sent by the Portuguese to Tanzania returned shortly after the congress was over. Within three days they were in Mueda. The Portuguese counselor accompanied them to the border between Mozambique and Tanzania and the following day they were in Mueda. They presented a detailed report about the FRELIMO structure and its internal organization and [the movement] was organized in Cabo Delgado. They also provided a list of leaders … (laughs)… they provided all the information. Eventually, we went to meet the administrator and he asked, “Why is João Namimba not coming back?” and we replied, “His mother who is sick is on the border…” and the administrator pretended to believe it, “Oh, yes…” But, he [the administrator] knew everything; he had all the information. At the end of November, João Namimba arrived and upon his arrival he was called, “João Namimba, what happened? How was the congress?” He [João Namimba] explained how the congress was. [The administrator] wanted to know about the internal preparation for the armed struggle which also included the information of when the war would start and from where the guerrillas would be infiltrated into the country. He also wanted to know about who the guerrillas were because he had a list of people he had received before. João Namimba didn’t have any list of people or any program. He just went to talk with the [colonial administrator]. He was told, “Very well, go back and think. Come back in a week to answer some questions.” When he came to meet us we asked him, “What did they tell you?” and he replied, “I was told to return there in a week to answer some questions.” And we said, “What are [we] going to do next?”

Didn’t you suspect that the other group might have been PIDE agents?

We suspected that. However, when João Namimba went to meet the [colonial administrator] he was asked “Come on; tell us what the organizational structure of FRELIMO is in Cabo Delgado. Your movement has decided to create an organizational structure with leaders and everything else. Where is the war going to start?” [João Namimba] replied, “That is not true…” [The colonial administrator asked] “Are you serious?” and [João Namimba] replied saying, “Very well, Mr. Administrator, I went there but I was not part of the group that dealt with the documents. I was part of a different section. If there was something like what you’ve just described it was in the group or section which elaborated the documents… It’s very possible that there was something like what you’ve talked about.” [The colonial administrator said] “Is what you say true?” The administrator went inside his office and brought with him the entire documents and said, “Here is FRELIMO’s organizational structure in Cabo Delgado. Your role is this. Lázaro Kavandame is the boss, and you’re secretary general. Isn’t this true?” João Namimba replied, “I heard about that and I know that they wrote that… I heard about that… it was talked about this, but they haven’t taken any steps to implement it…” He was told to “go away…” He was told to go home. After two days, they [the Portuguese] came to arrest everyone including our leaders and they were sent to a prison in Mueda. All of them were arrested on the same day. The senior leaders were arrested and we the junior ones remained. Lázaro Kavandame was not arrested in the first wave of arrests. However, after a week Lázaro was also arrested. How did Lázaro Kavandame escape the first arrest? The police and the psycho-social agents went to his house and when they arrived they took his motorbike and put it in the trunk of the jeep. After driving for a short while, the car bumped a few times and Lázaro’s motorbike was about to fall out. Then, he said, “You are going to destroy my motorbike. Put down the motorbike and I’m going to ride ahead of you. You come behind me.” They replied to him saying, “Don’t worry, we are going to drive slowly.” Lázaro replied saying, “I don’t want that anymore.” They argued about this for sometime and they removed his motorbike from the trunk and they gave it to him. He rode his motorbike and went ahead of the police jeep. When Lázaro reached an area with narrow paths, he accelerated his motorbike and he eventually went deep into the bush and ran away. He went missing for two days and we thought that he had been killed because when he was fleeing, the police and psycho-social agents started to shoot at him. He reappeared on the third day and we accompanied him to Tanzania. As I was saying, Lázaro Kavandame ran away and when he reappeared we accompanied him to Tanzania. The rest of us remained. However, all the leaders had been arrested. We accompanied Lázaro Kavandame to cross the border and the rest of us stayed. Those who were not arrested like me went into hiding during January and February. Early morning of February 13 was set as a date to arrest us the teachers. Early in the morning of that day, the colonial administrator came to my house around 6:00 am. He came driving his Land Rover with sipaios to arrest me, Pachinuapa and other people. We left home around 5:00 am and we ran away. I left home without telling my wife. I left from the back door without shoes and never returned home. I fled to Tanzania and I arrived in that country on February 16. Given the fact that I walked barefoot, when I arrived I had lots of thorns in my feet. We had walked a long distance in the rain.

How many days?

We walked for two days and we ate at night so that we could not be seen. We hid many times and crossed the river to get into Tanzania. Once we arrived in Tanzania, we were arrested by the Tanzanians (laughs)…After arresting us they said, “Ah, you are PIDE agents…” We told them, “No, we don’t work for PIDE…” and they asked us, “What did you come here for?” and we said, “We are FRELIMO militants.” They said, “You came here on a reconnaissance mission to investigate FRELIMO. There are many PIDE agents here and more people with education including teachers are being sent here. You were also sent here…” We denied the accusations. They took us to a police station for further interrogations. Finally, we said, “We came here because our leader, Lázaro Kavandame, is also here…” They said, “It is precisely because of this issue that we have more PIDE agents here. We have PIDE agents also looking for him. We have PIDE agents who have been sent to look for Lázaro Kavandame and you are part of the same group…” We denied by saying, “We worked with him…” and they refused to listen to us. Then, they took us to the local administration and there was a FRELIMO headquarters in the area. FRELIMO militants saw us and they said, “No, no, these are our leaders…” It was after this that we were released. On the following day, they organized transport for us and we were taken to Linde where Lázaro Kavandame was. This was on February 16.

So, the first place was in Nhanguala, and then?

Hum… the first place was the administrative post of Mahuta, where we were arrested. Then, we were taken by the police to Nhanguala where we were interrogated. Then, we were handed over to FRELIMO militants who told the Tanzanian police forces that they knew us and that we were their bosses. Then, FRELIMO militants organized a trip for us to get to Linde where Lázaro Kavandame was. He was 300 km from where we were. When we arrived in Linde we were subjected to further interrogations. We went through further interrogations by the Linde provincial government. We told them that, “We came here because we are FRELIMO militants.” We found there were many young people who had been recruited to join FRELIMO and most of them were our former students. We had sent many of these students to Tanzania. We had recruited many of these students and sent them to Tanzania. So, we met them there. Life was very difficult there. Every day we would eat beans and nothing else. We would eat beans and maize meal. We stayed there during March and February. Lázaro Kavandame didn’t stay there because he would travel constantly along the border between Mozambique and Tanzania. Then, an American arrived and he became the head of the department of defense. After his arrival he found out that there were some teachers who had fled from Mozambique. We went to meet him and he interviewed us. He told us “All teachers are going to Dar es Salaam very soon.” We agreed with him and days after the interview he returned to Dar es Salaam. On March 22, we left in a small boat and after traveling for two days we arrived at FRELIMO headquarters in Dar es Salaam. Mondlane was not there but we met other FRELIMO militants. After arriving in Dar es Salaam, we asked, “Is this FRELIMO’s office?” and some members replied saying, “Yes, it is.” We stayed there and we asked ourselves, “What are we going to do next?” They told us to “Wait for Mondlane because he is coming from the United States of America. He has the program.” We met Marcelino dos Santos and Chissano. The latter was Mondlane’s secretary. I met him there. Marcelino dos Santos was the first to welcome me. Urias Simango was also there and he was the deputy-president of FRELIMO. At the time of the conference Urias Simango was not the deputy-president. He became the deputy-president when Mateus Mula deserted. It was in the congress that Simango was elected deputy-president. These men welcomed us. We arrived on 22 March and during the same month they started organizing our documentation. We asked, “What comes next in our lives here?” and we were told, “You are going to stay in the camp for training.” They sent us to the refugee center.

Ok. Let’s continue

Hum… when we arrived in Dar es Salaam, Mondlane was still in the United States of America. We didn’t meet him at our arrival, but we met other leaders whom I have already mentioned. They told us to wait. They sent us to the refugee camp-- to the center for refugees

Who were the leaders of the center for refugees?

There were some Tanzanians. Tanzanians were the leaders and they were also present there. This was done through the government of Tanzania. We stayed in the camp during March and April. President Mondlane returned in April or May, I don’t remember the exact date. Mondlane came back for good from the United States of America to stay in Dar es Salaam. We went to welcome him. It was during this time when we were in Dar es Salaam that I started to notice and understand certain things. One of the first things I experienced while in Dar es Salaam was the desertion of two Portuguese soldiers, better said, white Mozambicans, from the Portuguese colonial army. These soldiers were Jacinto Veloso and João Ferreira who flew their plane and landed in Dar es Salaam. After landing they were arrested and this incident called the attention of people from the press. “Portuguese soldiers landed who fled from Mozambique by plane and they had a mission.” So, we started discussing among ourselves and the subject was “Portuguese here? Fleeing from Mozambique?” The answer was “Yes,” and other questions, “Why did they flee the country?” “How did they flee the country?” So, this incident caused endless discussions particularly of how to define our enemy. And these discussions involved us black Mozambicans.

Can you talk about the experiences of living in the refugee centers?

In the refugee camp there were people from every part of Mozambique. There were people from Tete, Gaza, Inhambane and every area of Mozambique. When we the teachers arrived in Linde those who were our subordinates didn’t want to see us there. They would ask, “Why are they fleeing from the country? What is the reason they are coming to join FRELIMO? FRELIMO is not for teachers. It’s for the poor. Teachers don’t suffer at all…” These were people who had been recruited by us saying this. We recruited and encouraged them to [join the liberation movement in Tanzania] and we told them that the movement wanted young people to receive training. When we showed up there they said “These people didn’t run away and they should have stayed there [in Mozambique]. They lived very well. They were teachers and had an income… Why did they run away? They should have stayed there.” We asked, “Listen, are you serious about what you’re saying?” and they replied, “Yes.” However, when Milan [an African- American] arrived he took us the teachers first with him and this created a lot of problems. Some gossiped saying that “PIDE agents who were eating with the Portuguese have been taken away and we who suffered there [in Mozambique] were left behind.” (Laughs) When these gossipers were confronted they would reply saying, “See what FRELIMO leaders are doing? They are taking these teachers who had ties with the Portuguese; some of these teachers had good relations with them and they leave us behind. We are genuinely poor with nothing. They take these teachers instead of taking us to go to study and train. With whom are these teachers going to fight? Are these teachers going to fight? They ate at the same table with the Portuguese…” We replied to them saying, “Listen, we as teachers also suffered…” The man who I was talking with didn’t know that I worked as a teacher in Mueda. The man didn’t have fourth grade, but I had fourth grade and I was receiving 50 escudos. And there was a female teacher who didn’t have fourth grade but she was earning 750 escudos and I was earning only 50 escudos. For them [for the complainers and gossipers] this kind of discrimination was nothing. (Laughs). I used to earn 50 escudos and my salary was raised to 150 escudos and my fellow female teacher had an increase to 750 escudos. By the time that I was about to leave the country my salary was raised to 750 escudos and this was my last salary. However, the salary of my fellow female teacher was increased even more. [Despite this kind of discrimination in Mozambique,] our presence as teachers in Linde was being questioned. Some of the questions included: “Why did they run away? They used to live very well.” After our arrival in Dar es Salaam white Mozambicans also joined us and this also created new problems. Some people were complaining about the presence of white Mozambicans; “Ah, now we have whites in our midst.” This caused some agitation inside FRELIMO and the government of Tanzania acted very well in part because they had ministers who were of British descent [white], Indian and Arab descent. [Because of the tense relations within FRELIMO due to the presence of whites,] Jacinto Veloso and João Ferreira were sent to Algeria. The Algerian government was receptive to the presence of white Mozambicans in its territory and FRELIMO decided to send Jacinto Veloso and João Ferreira to Algeria where they went to stay.

About the same time- if I am not mistaken this was at the end of May or early June- we received a phone call at FRELIMO offices in Dar es Salaam and the caller was asking for someone: “We need someone here”, “To do what?” we asked and the caller said, “Some people from Mozambique have just arrived …” I left, opened the door and went out and I saw two people sitting outside with suitcases. I opened the door and I saw one person and he told me, “Take these people to your camp.” “Are you sure?”, I asked. The people who we are talking about were Samora Machel and Matias Mboa. “My children go with him to the camp of Ilala…” I was instructed to do so. I told Samora and Matias, “Let’s go…” I helped them to carry their suitcases and other things and we rode in a small truck. On our way to the camp we started talking. “Are you from Mozambique?” I asked, and they replied, “Yes.” “Which part of Mozambique are you from?” I asked and they replied, “Lourenço Marques…” Samora replied, “I come from Lourenço Marques” and what about you “you also come from Lourenço Marques.” They asked us, “What about you? Where are you from?” and I replied, “I am from the north of the countryand Iam from Mueda.” “What did you used to do in Mueda?” I was asked and I replied “I was a teacher. What about you?” I asked and he replied, “I was a nurse.” I took them to the camp and I helped them to settle down. On the following day, I had to explain to Samora and his travel companions what life was like in the area. I told them that there were two groups of refugees one of which received support from the United Nations. I’m sorry can you explain again the arrival of Samora Machel?

Yes, sure…

Please Sir, can you repeat your narrative about the arrival of Samora Machel?

Yes, the story about the arrival of Samora. When he arrived we started talking and he said he was a nurse…

I’m sorry…

To repeat? Ah, very well. I was saying that if I am not mistaken he arrived in late May or early June.

May or June?

Hum… very well. I was called on the phone in the office. We were called to go there and when I arrived I saw two people sitting with their suitcases. They told me that I had been called to take those two people to the Camp of Ilala. “Is that so?” I asked and they replied, “Yes.” “Very well. Let’s go” I said. As we were going to the camp we started talking, “Are you from Mozambique?” I asked and they replied, “Yes”. “Which part of Mozambique do you come from?” and Samora replied, “I come from Lourenço Marques,” and they asked him: “what about him?” And he replied, “He also comes from Lourenço Marques,” and he [Samora Machel] asked us: “What about you?” and the question was directed to me, Raimundo, and someone else. We replied saying: “We come from the north, Cabo Delgado, we come from Cabo Delgado province on the border with Tanzania.” We got into the car and we arrived in Ilala. We arranged accommodation for them and we started to explain them how we lived. We explained our everyday life to them. We told them that we were divided into two groups; one group received direct assistance from FRELIMO and another group was supported by the United Nations. So, if they wanted they could receive direct assistance from FRELIMO or from the United Nations. What did the United Nations provide to one of the groups? They provided 21 shillings on a weekly basis to buy food and for other expenses. They received 21 shillings every week. What did FRELIMO give to the other group? Anyone could choose; they provided a sack of maize flour, a sack of maize, a bottle of olive oil, onions, sugar for tea, tea leaves, and also 3 shillings. This was done every week. 3 shillings were destined to buy anything else that was needed. “Oh yes, is this the system in place here?”; “Oh, you go there to receive your 21 shillings and you do everything you want in a week. You go there every week.” Samora asked: “What did you guys choose?” and I replied: “We chose to receive food; that’s all we want. We only want to eat and that’s enough. Why did we come here? What are we going to do with money here?” … we all agreed by saying: “Very well.” He said “Very well” and we also said the same thing. Just like us, he put his name on a list to receive food. We were given food and we would eat rotten beans, maize flour. We had a cooking schedule; one person would cook one day and another person on a different day. We didn’t have a cook; we would cook for ourselves. We would clean the bathrooms; we would do everything ourselves. We would fetch water by ourselves… We cannot tell you what it was like to live in abandoned houses; to sleep on the ground because we didn’t have beds. We went to buy sleeping mats ourselves; [those who didn’t have mats] would sleep on the cement floor. One would sleep on the cement floor with a blanket. We stayed there and we started our life…

What did you do there?

At daybreak, early in the morning, we would go to the office. Upon our arrival, some people would give us work to do and some would go out to do mobilization work among Mozambicans who lived in Tanzania. We would go with them to do this work. There was a group of young Mozambican students who were attending school. The American Institute was inaugurated for Mozambican students to go there to learn English and Portuguese. Some of the young Mozambican students went to attend school there, but the experience didn’t work because the time was too short. Many students enrolled to attend classes, but some didn’t go. Why? Because there was a process of sending the young people abroad. Some of them would come and they would stay for two weeks and they went sent abroad. Where were they sent to? They were sent abroad to Cairo, Egypt, Israel, Cuba, and other places. We didn’t know about this except for the FRELIMO leadership. We didn’t know where these young people were sent. It was a transit camp. Those who stayed a month would have stayed for a long time. If someone stayed for two months, he/she stayed for a long time. [The young students] were supposed to stay only for weeks. However, we [his group] stayed there waiting for Mondlane’s return. When Mondlane came back he called for a meeting in Dar es Salaam. He called for this meeting in the second week shortly after Samora had arrived. He called for this meeting and we were present. It was very full with young people of every province.

One more question: from the first day until when Mondlane came back, were you living together with Samora? Is this true?

Yes, yes.

What was your first impression of this man who was coming from Lourenço Marques?

About this man coming from Lourenço Marques… eh… I would say the following: Samora was a nationalist, a determined and dynamic person. He was everything. He was not only what I said. He was also a nurse who knew how to make use of his training and profession. He would offer his services to everybody. When he arrived, we didn’t have a nurse. Whenever someone said that he/she was sick, Samora would get worried… We would get diarrheas and other diseases. Soon, he would get worried about people’s illnesses… As a nurse, his profession, he would get worried. Besides all this, as I just described, when we arrived in Linde and when our former students asked us why we fled… Samora also went through the same experience there… “a nurse ran away?” , “Yes” “Why did the nurse run away?” “ assimilados.” He [Samora] experienced the same life we had and he knew how to deal with everybody very well from the youngest to the oldest person. He would also make sure to explain things to people so that they could understand. So, this was the kind of man I knew, Samora. And it was not only that; he was a good advice-giver for his friends. He was straightforward and if anything was wrong he would say clearly “no, this is wrong…” He didn’t care who the person was; it didn’t matter to him if he knew or didn’t know the person. He was always straightforward. When he joined our group, we welcomed him, and he would sleep on the floor with us in the same bedroom. This is how I came to know Samora during all this time and we were always together. He was always with us and our group. That’s how things were.

Were the first interventions [political] ?

You mean those people we had sent to Tanzania from Mozambique? You mean before the conference? Some of them had been sent to Israel for training. Some people were sent to Israel, Cairo, and many other places for training. People were sent to many different places for training. Some of the nurses we sent… there were some Mozambicans who ran away…

What about the meeting…?

Hum… Samora called for a meeting in the conference room…

You mean Mondlane…

Oh yes, Mondlane. He called for a meeting in the conference room. There was a house called Anatogo for conferences in the center of Dar es Salaam. What was the name of that camp? It was in the camp [football pitch] of [Nazimona]. So, Mondlane called for a meeting with everybody in that camp; it was full of young people coming from Mozambique. In a short period of time, we met people from all over the country: Zambézia, Cabo Delgado, Niassa, Gaza. We, people from different parts of the country, were present there. Mondlane started the meeting by saying: “Listen, I came here to meet you, but I don’t have much to tell you. You ran away from Mozambique and you came here because FRELIMO is calling you. You responded to FRELIMO’s call to recruit young people to the various tasks of liberating Mozambique. I know that there are some of you who are educated; some of you who have training and expertise. The task number one that we have today is to fight against the [colonial] regime and train young people who are going to fight in Mozambique. Thus, I want to know two things: first, I want to remove very young people; young people should not go to war.” He looked around [and said]: “Young people go there.” All the young people left. He saw a young man and he said: “You’re a young man, go there.” [The young man replied]: “Ah no, I want to go to war.” [Mondlane replied]: “No, no, you go there” [And he insisted]: “You go and join that group.” Some of us saw adults who left the whole group to join the group of young people. [Mondlane would ask]: “But, are you a young man? You’re not a young man. Why don’t you stay here?” Then, he would remove the person from the group he didn’t belong to and put him in a different group. That was it. Then, he asked our group of people who were not young: “In this group, who wants to go for military training? Those who want to go for military and political training to fight in Mozambique come here to this side.” So, we stood up, including Samora. All of us in our group stood up and we went to the other side. Then, Mondlane asked: “Samora, you’re a nurse. Why are you joining the group that is going to fight?” and he [Samora] replied: “No, they also need nurses over there [in the war front]… it is the war front where we need more nurses.” He [Mondlane] said: “Ah, don’t you want to go to study?” [Samora] replied: “No.” [Mondlane] asked: “Who are those people who want to go to study?” Those who wanted to go to study went to the other side. So, we were separated inside there into a group of students who wanted to go to study and a group of those who wanted to go for military training. It was a big group but with these two divisions.

You Sr. always talk about our group, our group, our group. Do you mean that Pachinuapa was with you? Do you mean that there was a group which was always with you? Who was part of such a group?

Oh, when I’m talking about the time when we were at the border, I’m referring to the group of teachers. Hum… it was the group of teachers, and there were two groups of teachers. It was a very big group of teachers that was there. When we arrived here there was another group of teachers that was here in Dar es Salaam. This group of teachers in Dar es Salaam was the one that was not going to study but for military training. They were waiting for military training. Yes, they were waiting to receive assignments and instructions from FRELIMO to go for military training. There were others who went there to do what they had chosen. So, there were two groups that went to study. This was in June. It was on June 12. We started to prepare our passports, vaccines, and everything and on June 12 we, including Samora, left for Algeria. Now, as I said, Samora was a nurse, a civilian, a nationalist and a patriot. I saw in him a very firm and determined man who had very good relations with everybody. He would work in the kitchen, sweep the floor. He worked with us. We had a schedule to sweep and clean the house because we didn’t have a person to sweep the house and the yard. He would do everything in the home with us. We had a schedule for doing this. He was a good adviser to everybody.

How did you enjoy yourselves? Did you have fun?

We had fun, we enjoyed ourselves. Sometimes, we went to watch football. We enjoyed ourselves. Sometimes, we went to the cinema to watch movies. These were the kinds of entertainment that we had. We didn’t have anything, for example, money to do other things. We didn’t have much choice.

What about girls?

Well, I can’t talk much about it because we didn’t have girls where we stayed. We were limited in that regard. Why were we limited? Because to have fun with girls you need to have money. It’s necessary to have money, you need money for that. We didn’t have enough money and that was a limitation. Perhaps, the group that received money…. Sometimes, we also had language limitation and everything. We stayed for a short period of time and we didn’t know how to speak the local language, Swahili. We didn’t know how to speak the language. Did Mondlane have a private or separate meeting with Samora besides the meeting that separated the groups?

He had a meeting… he had a meeting… he had a meeting with all of us. I also met with him. We had meetings; he had meetings with some groups.

Was the meeting designed to find out what people wanted?

Yes, it was a meeting to find out what people wanted. Yes, yes. He [Mondlane] had different [meetings with different groups of people].

Did these meetings take place [in his residence] or at the headquarters?

He had meetings at the headquarters. He had meetings at the headquarters. He also had meetings in his house; Mondlane organized meetings in his house; I went to his house several times.

Where was Mondlane’s house located?

Eh… Zungun; there was an area called Zungun. Yes, it was where he had his house and he sometimes invited people. We went there several times, I knew his house.

Did Mondlane ever show to people that he had a special relationship with Samora or a special admiration for him during that time?

Yes, he showed it. He [Mondlane] showed great admiration for [Samora], he showed great admiration for him. When we left for Algeria, a subject which I haven’t touched on, he [Mondlane] entrusted the entire group to Samora. He [Samora] was the chief of the group of 72 people who went to Algeria. He was the boss of the group. He entrusted the group to Samora and he [Mondlane] talked with him in private before leaving. He explained to him all the responsibilities and wanted him to be in charge. Yes, he talked with him, that’s it, we are now in a state of [war]. Mondlane decides, “You get ready to go to Algeria for military training. The rest of the people will go to other countries. I’ll have to negotiate, or they would go to China or Ghana or somewhere else. Everything will depend on the scholarship that I will receive.” That’s it. We were divided into different groups; there was this group of people going to [study] and the group of people who would undergo military training. Our group left Dar es Salaam through Nairobi on June 12. We left Dar es Salaam by bus and we traveled through Ganda, Corogui?, and Nairobi. In Nairobi, we boarded an African Airways plane to Algeria.

Did you travel as normal passengers?

We traveled as normal passengers. We went by 3 buses, yes, 3 buses took us from Dar es Salaam until we reached [Nairobi].

Did you go through Arusha? Yes, we went through Arusha. We passed through Arusha and Limoche, we slept in Limoche and at dawn we left. We left Arusha around 1 o’clock and by 8 o’clock we were in Nairobi, yes, and around 1:00 pm the plane took off and we arrived in Algeria at dawn. We arrived at dawn.

Did you go via Egypt?

No, it was a direct flight. It was a direct flight. It was chartered plane and it went straight to Algeria.

In separating people who wanted to go to study because they wanted to do so, and people who wanted to fight: in the case of teachers and nurses, were there some who wanted to go to study and some who wanted to go fight?

Yes, yes. There were volunteers; they were not forced. I recall that Samora’s colleagues such as Massango who is now in East Germany, East Germany? Yes, in Germany. He is in Germany. He was a nurse just like Samora and they came together [from Lourenço Marques]; there is also another man called Lisboa who went to the United States of America and I don’t know where he is now. He never came back. He never came back. From the group of people who fled [from Lourenço Marques] with Samora only two people remained and these included Samora and Matias Mboa. We don’t know the whereabouts of the rest of the people; they just disappeared.

Did Matias Mboa get military training?

Yes, yes. He got military training in Algeria. We went together and he was with Samora. They came together [from Lourenço Marques] and they left together for Botswana in a plane chartered by the ANC that was carrying ANC militants going to Dar es Salaam. So, they offered some places for FRELIMO militants and they took advantage of the opportunity and Samora boarded the plane and arrived in Dar es Salaam. He was one of the first to flee Mozambique, but he was the last to arrive in Tanzania. We arrived before, yes, yes.

How were you received in Algeria?

Yes, now talking about Algeria. Let’s talk about Algeria. We know Samora as patriot and nationalist, and a very simple man. We know him as a simple man, as a nurse, and a peasant. He was also the son of a peasant. He knew how to behave as a peasant and son of a peasant. He was everything. As a trained and educated man, he also knew how to behave as such. He lived up to his training. This Samora I am talking about when he arrived in Algeria became the leader of our group of 75 people. Our group was the second; there was a first group before us, and our group was the second. We started organizing ourselves into groups in Algeria: there was the first platoon, the second platoon, and the third platoon. Samora and I, and some other people belonged to the same platoon and section. He was the leader of the platoon after dividing up all the groups. He was the leader of Mozambicans, but divided into platoons and sections. He [Samora] and I were in the same platoon and section. We were together. When we arrived in Algeria, we went to the military headquarters and were told that we would start wearing military uniforms because we were no longer civilians. It was the first time that we started wearing military uniforms. We arrived at dawn and not in the afternoon. After arriving and on the same day we were told “Take off your civilian clothes,” and we put on military uniforms with boots and everything. We also put on hats.

Did you have any military training in Tanzania?

No, never. When we arrived at the gates of the military headquarters in Algeria, we were told to line up. When we arrived we asked, “What is going on?” There were officers waiting for us in the military headquarters in the Algerian capital. We were taken straight to receive uniforms and boots. Each one received boots. We were also given caserns [barracks] to stay in, and we wondered, “Is this a military headquarters.” We met a group of some Mozambicans, some of whom had finished their training, and they were waiting to go for another type of training, for example, in telecommunications. Two of them who were in the first group had remained to serve as leaders in our group, namely Feliciano Mundane and the deceased Milagre Mabote. Feliciano Mundane died in the first combat in Niassa. So, these two remained to support our group and the rest had returned and didn’t maintain any contact with us. We crossed each other at the airport in Algeria; they were on one side and we were on the other side, but we were not allowed have any contacts.

Do you still remember some people from the first group?

Yes, yes, yes… I remember many of them…

Are they here?

Yes

It is Feliciano Mundane, and who else was in Algeria?

Some came from the provinces. There are many in the provinces, but of the leaders, among the leaders is Mundane who was in the group, yes. Mundane remained as our leader. We were introduced to him. We, the group, went with Mondlane and he left us at the airport and he continued with his trip. We didn’t see him in Algeria, and we were taken to the headquarters. When we arrived we were taken to the barracks. We were divided into sections, platoons, and infantries. Each infantry was subdivided into sections and platoons. As I said, Samora and I were in the same infantry, same platoon and same section. However, I was the leader of the section. We had three groups. I was the leader of the group, and we had three leaders of groups… and he was the leader of the section, so we stayed there together. It was in Algeria where the problem started; what was our job? Every day in the morning we had to wake up and run, do gymnastics, and do everything else. We stayed next to the headquarters in transit. We had a schedule to work in the headquarters, cook, sweep, and do other tasks. We did this while waiting to go to the training camp, so we would choose one person to work one day in the kitchen, peel potatoes, garlic, onions, and do other things, and another person would be doing something else, that was the group of Mozambicans. It was during these occasions that the conversation started among us, some people started the conversation with, “So, we came here. Why don’t we go for training now, these monhés [derogatory term used to refer to people believed to be of Indian origin].” (Laughs) “They brought us here to cook for them,” and Samora asked, “Eh, what is the matter? What kind of language are you using now?” “These monhés

Derogatory term used to refer to people believed to be of Indian origin.

?”… [Samora asked] “Who is a monhé?” [Samora’s interlocutor said] “These guys are monhés; did they call us to come here to cook for them? Did we come here to cook? We came here to train and then go back to fight, to liberate the country. Now, they want us to cook. What is the matter? To peel garlic, potatoes; why don’t they give these orders to other people?” [Samora] said: “Listen here.” It was the beginning of the problem, “This monhé,” so we became divided right there. There was a group of people who were not in favor of that kind of work, to peel potatoes, and do other chores. We were divided. There was a group of people who didn’t appreciate doing that kind of work, peeling potatoes, and doing other household chores. We were divided on this issue. There was a group of people that said “No, no, no, this is not [the kind of work we want to do]” and others said, “Ah, now we understand; it is the group of assimilados; there, we have nurses; there we have teachers, they’re over there, can you see that? Mondlane did the wrong thing.” (Laughs) “Why did he send these people here?” As I said, we were staying in the military headquarters; so, when we started running we had to think about Samora’s idea. He, the leader of the group, proposed the idea that “Listen, we have to create a leadership group, we have to structure the group in a way that appreciates different questions and takes into consideration the diversity of the group that we have.” So, he was able to choose some comrades as his advisors and people with vision.

Can you mention the names of some of those people? Yes, sure. The group included Samora, Raimundo Pachinuapa, Bonifácio Gorveta, Mundane, Nihia, and me. The group also included Simão Tobias who was the deputy, Simão Tobias. So, this was the group that he [Samora] asked to look at different questions about everything. The group had to look at every issue. The first thing he did was to create a team, organize and structure teamwork with his colleagues.

Did they hold meetings frequently?

Yes, sure. Sometimes, when there was something to discuss, he would invite the group. The group also included Matias Mboa.

Did the group also include people who were angry? Was there any person representing this group? There were many of them. There were many of them. There were many agitators and they had to be included too. We knew who they were. There were many of them, there was a great number. Why? Because many of them had not lived in Mozambique. These were people who had lived in Tanzania for a long time. They didn’t have any idea about Mozambique. They had extremely little knowledge about Mozambique. So, talking about politics and colonialism and other issues in Mozambique with these people was like talking about very vague issues. Some of them didn’t speak Portuguese. Some of them had lived in Malawi for a long time and came from there. It was the Malawian front. Some Mozambicans came from Zambia where they lived for a long time. Their reference point was only Zambia. They didn’t know anything about Mozambique. Some [Mozambicans] came from Southern Rhodesia or Northern Rhodesia. You can see the kind of people we had to deal with. He [Samora] was able to explain the reality in Mozambique to these people. He knew how to make these people understand the situation in different places of Mozambique; explained how it was in Mozambique in Tete, Zambézia, Niassa, and hold these people together, including people who were already living in Mozambique. So, he would hold these few people together in order to create a cohesive leadership with the same line of thinking and direction. So, this was the merit of Samora as a guerilla, he knew how to structure; he was not only a leader, he was able to organize that group and the commandants that we had. The first group that underwent military training in Algeria - once they arrived in Dar es Salaam - they deserted because most of them were emigrants. They deserted. That group was formed precisely because of that [being emigrants]. So, Samora soon realized while in Algeria the need to create that kind of organization; he also thought that we went to Algeria not only as soldiers or guerillas but that we needed to have a political thought [ideology]. Sinanga, Maduna- we called him Maduna- was in Cairo. He was present at the founding of FRELIMO and he was expelled because of problems that also involved people like Simango and other people. Maduna was expelled and he went to Cairo. Mondlane told him [Maduna] to join us [in Algeria] and when he showed up some people rejected him. Some people asked, “Who is this man that didn’t come with us from Dar es Salaam? Where did he come from? He is a PIDE agent.” Other people [including myself] said “He is not a PIDE agent. He is a Mozambican .” Some people suspected him and didn’t want him very close. They insisted saying, “This man was not introduced to us by Mondlane.” So, what did we do? Maduna had a clear political vision. So, he started to plan a political program for us and not just a military vision. He wanted us to have a political vision and he started to introduce the program. He had read many works by Mao Zedong and other people. So, we started to introduce politics into our training programs. Oh, this caused us some problems, it caused us some problems. Some people said, “Mondlane did the wrong thing.” When asked, “What?” [some insisted] saying: “He sent assimilados here including teachers and they are now organizing a coup against Mondlane. They’re going to organize a coup once Mondlane is back.” “Oh, yes?” “Yes.” We had to mobilize ourselves to say that that was not our policy. Why? We said that we needed to identify who was the enemy in Mozambique, [we thought about] the time when we would get our training and return to Mozambique, who will we be fighting against? Who was our enemy? Who is our friend? Who is fighting on our side? Against whom? This should be our starting point and every guerrilla should be included. [Some guerrillas] replied saying, “We didn’t come here for politics; who said this [political discussion]? Mondlane didn’t talk about this [with us].” So, we started to form small groups [around this issue].

As was always the case, the argument for these discussions was that Mondlane was far away.

Hum. (Laughs) Yes, it seemed that we were all against Mondlane. [Some people would say] “Those people are fighting against Mondlane,” [and others would comment] “Mondlane didn’t tell us about [political discussions].” So, what was the problem? Many people started to say “When I return to Mozambique after my training, the first thing I will do is to kill that cantineiro [shopkeeper], I’ll kill him.” [Other people asked] “Ah, you’ll kill the shopkeeper, what for? What will you gain from killing him?” [and other people said] “Ah, that shopkeeper, when I used to go to sell my peanuts he would pay me very little [money]…” [Others asked] “Now, are you going to kill him because he paid you little? Do you need to kill him because of that?” [Others would say] “That man there, when I return the first thing I’ll do [is to punish him], when I become a soldier, he’ll see what I do to him.” These conversations took place in Algeria before we went to the training camp.

But, did you have the answers for questions, for example, who the enemy was?

Hum, we had answers [for those questions], we had answers. I was going to give you the answer. We organized political meetings and some didn’t attend, they would say, “We’re not going to those classes; they are not political classes, they are tricksters’ classes and [they’re planning] how to get rid of Mondlane.” They didn’t go and they remained [marginal to the political process]. They were organized by some, some were very clear [about their goals]. They were not weak, but they didn’t have political convictions. So the few were mobilized and they sparked [big discussions].

Did these discussions involve the entire group or did they take place when we were going to have food?

The whole group, the discussions involved the entire group of more than 70 people. When we were all together as a group, the discussions were ignited . Hum, they did that, sometimes they caused some indiscipline, but see, Samora was always ahead as a military leader with political vision and ability to organize. From there we went to the military training center, we went to the center for marine training…

How long did you stay in Algiers?

You mean in the capital? We stayed a week, a week was enough to ignite everything. [It was enough time] to know who we are, and to know each other, [enough time] to know who we are, to talk with each other, and know each other’s problems. We knew [each other] in the group, [although we knew each before] we got to know each other better, that was it. From there we went to Marnial on the border with Morocco for training. We started with the same kind of group distribution and over there we met Angolans who were militants of MPLA, South Africans and people from many other countries. We started our training and we didn’t give up on politics. Samora was always [insistent on this issue].

Were the South Africans you met from the ANC?

Yes, they were members of the ANC. We had a group of people among us. They were with us; there were about eight people from the ANC in our group and we also met other people such as Angolans from MPLA. Samora was not only what I’ve just described to you; he was also a very tough man. He encouraged everybody in different areas such as strategy, tactics, and other things, he did everything as a soldier.

Was it a guerrilla training?

It was not only guerrilla, it was not only guerrilla, it was crazy, it was kind of crazy; it was crazy. Just to see that we didn’t rest in Algeria. We would wake up early in the morning and we would start by washing ourselves for 15 minutes. It was always 15 minutes. To take breakfast was 15 minutes. We would take food with us to go for training. We would take everything such as ammunitions, grenades, and everything. Our bodies would feel heavy, we would carry everything including food to go there, we would take food with us and sometimes we would take a whole watermelon and put it into a sack. Sometimes one would take a whole watermelon to eat there [in the training center], but ended up not eating it, and the person would bring it back again. A person would come back with a whole watermelon to eat in the headquarters. We would take everything with us including tinned food, walk with food but not be able to eat it. Sometimes, we would fill flasks [water bottles] with water and not have the opportunity to drink it. Sometimes running water was not available or it was available only for 15 minutes and the rest of the day there was no water. Running water was available in the morning, during midday when we were returning [from the training center], and late afternoon and early evening. And they wanted us always to be clean when there was no running water. What did we do? We were given water containers to fill with water so that we could have water to drink. We would drink a little bit of water and we would also buy small towels which we used to clean ourselves with water. We would put the small towels in water and clean ourselves. We were expected to be very clean and well-dressed. (Laughs)

Did you have theoretical lessons?

We had theoretical and practical lessons. These classes didn’t take place in a classroom. The [instructors] would walk while giving lessons and they would arrive at a place and stop there and give a class. They would run, climb a mountain while running and stop at the top of the mountain. They would give a class and they would walk down the mountain while running. This was everyday and 24 hours a day. Sometimes, they would wake us in the night to sweep the floor. What could we get on the floor at night when it is very dark? Were these instructors the ones that Samora honored later?

Yes, sure, the Algerians who came here [Mozambique].

Was there anybody else?

No, they were all Algerians.

How did you communicate or talk with Algerians?

We had a translator, his name was Mundana. He was a translator from French to Portuguese. They [the instructors] would give the lessons and they would demand that we take notes on everything. Everything. So, it was very tough training. He [the instructor] would open fire while walking, the instructor would come behind with his men and we would be walking ahead of them. They would open fire not with fake bullets but with real bullets, they were real bullets, the bullets would come and hit here and he [the instructor] would say “if you die, it is not my fault and the same is true if the soldier kills you. I’m here to train you.” Just like that; it was very tough training. It was for crazy people and they, the crazy people, were the ones missing there. That was it. And Samora was there disciplining everybody and making sure that we were on time for training and other things during the day and evening. We would make long marches on foot, about 50 kilometers. We would march for 50 kilometers going and coming back. If someone fell on the way, only his gun would be removed and nothing else. Your gun would be taken away from you and you would stay alone with your luggage and everything else except your gun. No one would look at you and everyone else would continue walking. They would say, “remove his gun,” and they would take the gun and walk away. They would say, “If he wants to be captured by the enemy, he can stay alone.” However, the food that we were carrying, we would not eat on our way until we reached the headquarters. This was our experience and how we responded to it. We stayed in Marnia until Algeria and Morocco became involved in a war [the 1963 Sand War]. Our platoon, our group of Mozambicans was the only one, the oldest group, we were on sentry duty until the eve of the war between these two countries. Everybody would go to his bedroom and we stayed there on sentry-go. On the day that we left the headquarters late in the evening, at 11:00 pm the headquarters [quartel] was bombarded exactly where we were heading to line up.

How long did you stay in that camp?

We stayed for three months in Marnia. We stayed between three and four months in Marnia, yes, sure, in the first center.

During this time, did you have enough time for those conversations and discussions in groups?

You mean [conversations and discussions] in groups? Yes, there were. We had Saturday and Sunday to wash clothes, everybody had to do this, then we would find time on Saturdays and Sundays to talk about politics. We were evacuated because of the war and on the day when we left, the military quarters were being attacked. One of our instructors died right there. When we arrived in Tiaret, in the Sahara, we were informed about it. “This happened after you had left, the military quarters were bombarded by the Moroccans.” So, we stayed in Tiaret and that’s where we finished our instruction.

23:16: 11. How long did you stay there? Three more months?

Yes, sure. We stayed longer, we stayed one year. We stayed in Marnia six months. We stayed six months in Marnia and then we went to Tiaret. We stayed longer there and then we went to Orak, yes, to Orak

Did you have a special kind of training in Orak? Was it training for specific expertise?

There it was training for more expertise…Marnia, Tiaret, Ansehat, yes, Ansefral… Marnia, Tiaret, Ansefral and Orak. Yes three cities. So, we stayed there for a year, that was it, in Tiaret . We received a third group when we were in Tiaret, it was the third group of Mozambicans coming to Algeria, a very big group that joined us. The supervisor of the group was Samora. The group came from Dar es Salaam and were told that the supervisor of all the groups there [Algeria] was Samora, The group came from Dar es Salaam and they were told that the supervisor of the group was Samora and he could supervise all other groups. Once again, he took responsibility and worked with a new group from scratch. Therefore, Samora was a commander and he had to take the responsibility of the task.

I’m sorry, didn’t Magaia travel with you?

No, Magaia was in China with another group. Yes, he, Magaia was in China, others were in Algeria, others in Cuba, others were in the Soviet Union. Chissano was in the Soviet Union. We were distributed to many different places. Chissano was in the Soviet Union, Magaia was in China, Samora was in Algeria, who was in Cuba? The group of Cairo? Lopes Tembe was part of the Cairo group. Who was in Israel? Sumbane, the old man Sumbane.

What about Magaia?

He was part of the group that went to Soviet Union. Yes, yes, he was part of the group that went to the Soviet Union. That’s how we were distributed, in various groups, that was it. We received the third group, that’s all. After welcoming the third group, we received instructions that we all had to return, but we could not return. All the conditions had been created to start the war, but we could not return. Our group had to return, but there were problems in Tanzania, there was a failed coup d’etat, and we could not return at that particular time. So, we had to stay, yes, so this situation affected us. After we had finished our training, we had to stay for another three months in Algeria. Yes, we had to stay for another three months, imagine what it was like to manage a group of people that was not doing anything, a group such as ours. There were people asking, “Why don’t we return? Why can’t we return? We want to go to fight.” It was in these circumstances that the controversy you just asked about started: so, what about the problem with women? Some of group members would ask, “So, what’s up? Are we going to stay here today? There is nothing to do here? Just stay like this?” How do you control people? But, since the Algerians would give us money, some of them [group members] would leave and go out, that’s it, they would give us some freedom to move around, so they [the group members] would go out to have fun. On this issue, the Algerians didn’t complicate [things for] us; they would give orders to people to leave their quarters during the weekends. People would go to the cities and return [later]. But, when people would go out, they had to go together as a group and well dressed. Because if someone committed a mistake over there [in the city], he would be brought back by the troops stationed in the barracks. They [the troops] had control of everyone; they would control the time coming in and going out. Even in Tiaret, Marnia, Ansefral, when we went out, we were controlled outside; anything, if you dressed poorly or put your hat on the wrong way, you would be sent back to the quarters. They would straighten you up. We would be very clean and well dressed up. If you dressed poorly and were found outside, you would be sent back to the barracks. So, we finished our training, and our group was well trained and we returned to Dar es Salaam. If I’m not mistaken this was in March we arrived in Dar es Salaam. Egypt sent planes to take us from [Algeria to Dar es Salaam]. We traveled first through Libya. We landed in Benghazi and from this city we went to Cairo. From Cairo we went to the south of Sudan and from there we went to Dar es Salaam. When we arrived in Dar es Salaam, there were very serious problems. Those immigrants [Mozambicans] didn’t want to go to the camp. They said, “No, we want to go to see our wives, our mothers. It has been a long time since we have had contacts with women. We want to have fun.” We told them, “No, let’s go to the camp.” During this time, Mondlane was absent and Comrade Chissano was the one who was present. The Tanzanians were forced to take us to the police and the entire group was taken to [the police] and from there we were taken to the camp, Tanzanian quarters. We went there and it was there where the group was selected. Again, just like Chissano, Machel showed his leadership skills as a commander and he said, “No, we must go to the center that FRELIMO has indicated.” Half of the group stayed, and half of the group advanced to Kongwa in Dodoma. It was a place with nothing, absolutely nothing. When Samora arrived there, the first thing he did [with the group] was to create conditions for the camp, his first task was to create the conditions in the camp, structure the entire camp, establish a structure, and a organizational structure. He himself was the leader and he also created sections and we had to give assignments or tasks for each section. We would do everything. In the morning, a group of people would go for training [and others stayed behind] not to leave the camp abandoned . Then another group would go for training and the other group would do the manual work. The camp didn’t have barracks so Samora had in mind self- reliance. He not only acted as a commander; he was thinking as a political leader. Samora was a leader. It was not only there that he revealed his leadership skills; he had military vision, how to survive in such conditions where there was nothing. There was no water; there were no barracks; we had to build blocks while others were training. We had to reconcile training while at the same time thinking about organizing the center- all that dust- there was nothing there except desert. Dusty conditions were very frequent… Samora would always give the instruction that when it was 3 o’clock, and with the very little water that we had in that place, we had to water because all the dust would go inside. It was a matter of health. It was very hot, very hot.

How many of you were in Kongwa?

In Kongwa? We reached about a hundred; we were more than a hundred; you mean those who started?

I mean those who came from Algeria.

From Algeria, yes. Other groups joined us; it was not only the group coming from Algeria; [the camp] was given to everybody including those who came from the Soviet Union, Cuba, and other places, it was given to everybody. Now, can you see all these political orientations? It was not only that, it was necessary to have skills, calm, to deal with all these political orientations to be one thing, Mozambicans. Not to be Algerians, not be Chinese, not be Russians, but to have Mozambican thinking. Samora was like that. Samora would say, “Listen, we have almost everything here, everyone should do his best, but don’t forget that we’re Mozambicans, we’re Mozambicans and we have something that is ours.” It was true; everyone had to give something to others to come up with something Mozambican. In China [certain things were possible and could be done], but in the Mozambican conditions, how would you do it, given the real conditions of our country, such as illiteracy, backwardness, and not knowing each other, we still didn’t know each other, this question of tribes, the issue of tribalism?

How did those discussions take place?

It was through talks and talks. We used to have talks and political lessons. We held political lessons for everyone. In the morning, one group would wake up and go to attend political lessons and others would go for training, others not. Some would go to do manual work such as building houses, opening wells.

And did you organize the talks?

We organized them. It was among us. There were instructors. Assignments of instructors were made among us. Such and such a person was designated as an instructor for a specific task.

Did you also talk, sir?

Oh, yes. I had to talk, yes. I talked very little because I didn’t stay long in Kongwa. I was one of those who were called earlier to leave, but I was the boss for military discipline, the sector of discipline, committee of discipline, it was a new sector. It was all that and other stuff. After that, I was soon selected to go to Mozambique. I was selected to leave the camp to go to create conditions in Mozambique. Very well, I left in May, I think it was in June, I left Kongwa in June, it was in June, and I went to stay in the south of Tanzania, north of Mozambique. From Tanzania, I went to Mozambique in August to create conditions to start the war. So, Samora was the leader of the center during all this time. Filipe Samuel Magaia was head over all of us [head of the defense department].

Filipe Magaia had come to Beira?

No, no. He was in China when we opened the camp [military training center of] Kongwa. Yes, he was in China. First, he went to Algeria as part of the first group. When he arrived in Algeria, he started organizing the group there. When we [the second group] arrived, he went to China. He returned when we started the war. During all this time all the work was done by Samora Machel, such as the organization of the struggle in the interior. It was the responsibility of the center of Nachingwea to organize the struggle, to open new warfronts, to send clandestine groups to every part of the country, to every province, including here in the South. All of us have come from these clandestine groups, we all came from these underground groups. It was he [Samora Machel] who selected and sent us [to the country], he would select such and such a person to go there, to Niassa, he was the one who selected us and gave us orders to go to Niassa. Such and such a person should go to Niassa. He didn’t say that right there.

Besides organizational matters, did the center also carry out reconnaissance missions using the information that you gathered from your contacts with the settlers?

Reconnaissance missions? Sure, sure, everything. [We and the center] also organized the masses and the connection with the committees, the committee groups that were here. It was necessary to have contacts with the committee groups that were organized here [Lourenço Marques], so this kind of work was done there.

When Samora was bidding farewell from Tanzania, he said that the construction of the camp of Kongwa was very complicated. How did you succeed in overcoming that problem? Did FRELIMO succeed in obtaining money abroad or did it solve the problems by relying on local expertise and materials to build the dorms?

The problem was the following: when the camp of Kongwa was opened, it was under the supervision of UAO. When the [officials] at the headquarters of BNPLA found out that there was war in Mozambique, the first thing they proposed was to establish a blood [donation] center. The first thing that was said was: “We have our African brothers who are going to fight to liberate their countries. Since we’ve achieved our [independence], since the war is fought with war [sic; blood?] and money, we need to open a blood [donation] center.” This was their first proposal to other heads of state. So it was agreed [at that meeting] to establish a committee, it was the committee of 9. First, there were nine countries and later it was enlarged and in that committee there were contributions. I’m sorry, I’m wrong. The money was to be given to those movements that were involved in fighting in the warfronts and another portion of the money was to safeguard their bases. What were their bases? Angolans [nationalists] were based in Tanzania, in Zambia, Conakry and other places. In the case of Mozambican [nationalists] they were based in Tanzania, Malawi, and Zambia. So these countries had to receive this money in order to solve the problems of their refugees. So these countries would receive this money. Besides this [initiative] there was also the blood [donation] center. The blood center which much later became the food committee was enlarged to include more members. Many more members adhered to this committee much later. Yes, it was under these conditions that they gave more help with food, transportation, and to solve other problems.

But, there was a problem in the beginning having to do with the fact that the committee didn’t provide military support; it only provided civilian support. Why?

Sure, sure. It was only civilian support. But, much later, with the involvement of Tanzania that mobilized more support, many more people agreed to provide additional support and they started supporting us. But in the case of us Mozambicans we had to count on our own means. For instance, the kinds of constructions with bricks that I’m talking about were built depending on our own resources and expertise, and the bricks were not bought. We made the bricks ourselves. When we arrived in Kongwa we opened wells and we did the same thing when we arrived in Nachingwea. We also planted trees such as banana trees, and opened wells. We did a lot of things including opening lakes for fish farming, and raising pigs, chickens and other animals. We created the conditions to make sure that everybody [in the group] could eat chicken. We did fish farms in order to allow everybody in the barracks to eat fish; vegetables for everybody in the barracks. For all these things, we didn’t have to ask the UAO, we didn’t have to ask for help elsewhere when we had such things there. Sometimes we had around 7 to 9 thousand people. What could we do besides training? It was necessary to produce something; we had to do something. We also built a hospital…

Did you end up having seven thousand people?

We had more than nine thousand people. We had more people and the number reached more than nine and even ten thousand people.

Did you have this many people in Kongwa or in Nachingwea?

It was Nachingwea on the border with [Mozambique], sure, the number of people reached ten thousand. So, this was Samora’s thinking. And it was not only this. We also built houses and many other things, that’s it. We produced food to feed the war [we produced food to feed the guerrillas]. We did this by ourselves: sacks of maize, sacks of other products. We produced cashew nuts in Nachingwea to sell to Tanzania. Nowadays, when you go to Nachingwea there is nothing there. Everything has been destroyed and you won’t recognize the place. Wells dried and there is no water, there is nothing. Nobody eats fish, there is nothing, there are no roads, no fish. Just as we left everything disappeared; after our departure, everything disappeared and there is nothing there. It is only bush and snakes, there were snakes. All this was Samora’s thinking. Samora was about the transformation, work, and it was not only this, Samora made sure that each one of these centers, each place was transformed into Mozambique in miniature. Wherever you would go, in Kongwa, Mtwara, the hospital of Mtwara, you could to Tunduro, you could go to Bagamoyo, you would go to all these centers and you would find Mozambicans from every part of the country. He had that vision, Samora was this kind of person. Now, let’s look at Samora as a strategist. Samora was a strategist, and he was not only that. He was a strategist in different phases. We saw the [political and military] trainings and the role he played. On his return [from Algeria], his thinking was oriented towards the [political and military training] center as an integrated [program]. In addition to this was the role he played in the beginning of the liberation struggle in Mozambique. He was the one ahead of everything; he was responsible for selecting the men to conduct reconnaissance missions in Mozambique. Samora was responsible for this, he did this in a masterly way. It was not only that; with mastery and wisdom, he did all this. Just to look at it no one would know that a person had left the Kongwa center. If someone was gone [on a mission], no one would know that such and such a person was away. People would only know that such and such a person was away, but they didn’t know where that person was. People would not know where the person was. People would not know the time that a person had left. They would only notice that the person was gone. And that was it. And no one was preoccupied with knowing where the person went. Nothing. It was a secret; no one would worry about it…

Did people go in small groups or singly?

Sometimes people would go in groups of three people.

Where were people coming from the provinces sent to?

No, these were groups of people coming from every part of the country. It didn’t matter. A person could be from any place. But, in the first phase, people who were sent went to their provinces of origin. They were sent to Cabo Delgado, Nampula, Niassa… As I said previously, Maduna was sent here [Lourenço Marques], but his brother, the brother of Samora, Josefa….

Was he spotted by the administration at the time?

No, no, it was only after the 25th [September]; it was on the eve of the 25th, but all that stage of preparation . If I’m not mistaken we started sending people beginning in May; if I’m not mistaken, it was starting in May, June, July, August, September when the war started. So, this was the role played by Samora.

Did he have other advisors to make the shifts?

Yes, he had.

Can we know who they were?

You can know them. President Chissano was there, members of the FRELIMO committee were there. Mariano Matsinhe was there; the close assistants of Chissano, Simão Tobias, and many others. But, some of them left. However, as others left Samora always remained there… Was he the one who gathered all the information?

He collected all the information, and sent groups [to Mozambique]. He always remained there.

Did he memorize all this information or did he write down notes?

Who?

I mean Samora

Yes, yes. He took notes and he had the information in his head, he took notes.

Now, as a matter of curiosity, I would like to know why you chose Zambézia and Tete. In terms of logistics, weren’t these provinces complicated?

You mean to open a new warfront?

Yes. We know that there were difficulties of access into Niassa and Cabo Delgado. But, Zambézia in that initial stage was not, or did you want to cause more [impact]?

No, no. You have to see that the majority of people who went with us for training in Algeria came from Zambézia. You have to see the interest as political pressure…

Was the commander Basílio in the Zambézia warfront?

Yes, hum…. Zambezianos were the largest group, very big battalions. However, there was another aspect to it. There were many Zambezianos joining FRELIMO but also there were many of them who deserted…

Can you talk about Basílio and the military options between Tete and Zambézia?

He was part of our group, he was part of our group. [There were also people] from Tete. However, Tete was a strategic question and not Zambézia, because of the weight of FRELIMO militants coming from Zambézia, because many of them lived in Malawi. There were many of them.

Did they come from or via Malawi? Is this true?

They came from Malawi. They came via Malawi. Now, Tete was a strategic question because there was no way of targeting the south of the country without going through Tete. To get into the south was via Tete. It was not a matter of choice. Going through Tete was not a choice of a group of people with [political weight]. It was an option decided by everyone. People from everywhere decided that Tete was the way to get into the south. The best [guerillas and commanders] were sent to Tete in order to open a warfront there and if possible to go all the way into Lourenço Marques. It [Tete] was a strategic point…

During all this period, did Samora get into Mozambique?

He did, he came into Mozambique. Where you see Mozambique; you see that group over there in Cabo Delgado; you see that group over there in Niassa.

I’m talking about in 1964

In 1964, he [Samora Machel] went to Niassa, he went to the east of Niassa. He was the one who accompanied the group. He started from Machaque, and he went to leave the group in the interior of Niassa in order to open a warfront…

So, was this in Tanzama? Am I correct?

Tanzama is in the west next to Mussunguela…

That’s in Metangula

It was in the area of Metangula; it was also in the areas of Marrupa, Mahúa. It was Samora who went to these areas. He went to these areas to leave guerillas.

This was in 1965

1965. In 1964, he came to [Mozambique]. He accompanied our group, everything. Sure, sure.

So, the plan was to open a new front on the same day, September 25 th , to conduct a fourth attack; because there was the Metangula attack, there were also attacks in Tete, Zambézia. Were these four the only attacks?

No, no, no. The plan was the following: each province was free according to the conditions and they could attack in any place. For instance, in Cabo Delgado, they attacked several places, there were several attacks on that day, but the attack against Chai [was the most successful]. We attacked Mueda the same day, we attacked Mocimboa da Praia on the same day, yes; we attacked the post of Diaca on 25th September. However, the most successful attack was against Chai, yes.

Because in the attack in Zambézia, [the guerrillas] were encircled and arrested.

Yes, yes, yes.

Can you talk about other attacks? We conducted attacks in Chai, Metangula, and other places. There were attacks everywhere, but the most efficient attack was in Chai. It is a classic attack.

How many guerrillas were involved in that attack?

In Chai, we were not that many. We were about 22 people…

Didn’t you reach 200 people?

We? No. We didn’t reach that number.

And in Cabo Delgado?

You mean Cabo Delgado? Eh, the group coming from Algeria, we reached 20 people. There were 22 people and the same group trained in Algeria was divided into five groups. The group trained in Algeria was joined by other recruits.

You mean about twenty in the entire province of Cabo Delgado?

In the entire province of Cabo Delgado, the guerrilla groups didn’t reach a hundred men to start with. But, very quickly and in a very short time, the group was above a thousand, sure, sure.

Was it the same thing in Niassa?

It was the same thing in Niassa and when we opened this front, many more young people were drawn into the [movement] and we were compelled to open more centers. We had to open new centers.

You, Comrade General, talked many times about the situation in the military encampments, but in the other attacks was it the same thing?

It was the same situation. The same situation.

You mean that you never used heavy equipment?

No, no. never. We received slightly heavy military weapons in the months of September, October, November, December, and January. In December, we started to receive Russian cannons and artillery weapons. Then, we started to receive cannons 60 [mm?] coming from, coming from…. Much later, we started to receive more bazookas. When we started we didn’t have bazookas, we didn’t have any [heavy] weapons.

You came from the interior, and during the period of training and reconnaissance, did you live in close contact with the population? Or did you live in close contact with FRELIMO cells or with the civilian population? How were things arranged? Yes. When we came into Mozambique, we survived thanks to FRELIMO cells. We prepared cells everywhere in order to support the soldiers. During that big congress, when the congress took place, every delegation had the mission of keeping food and finding safe places to hide the soldiers once the war started.

How did the investigation take place to find out the relationship and contacts between the population and FRELIMO columns?

You mean a FRELIMO guerrilla group? Eh, we already had the committees. We had the liberated zones and semi-liberated zones. In the liberated zones, there were only FRELIMO militants. In the semi-liberated zones part of the population was dependent on [FRELIMO].

But in 1964 there were no liberated zones.

We had them. Soon, we had them in Cabo Delgado. As soon as the war started, the Portuguese soldiers were confined. They didn’t go long distances. When they went out it was only to undertake some operations and return to the military quarters and they didn’t have real contact with the population. The same happened in Niassa where we had liberated zones, and we walked during the day and at night. I remember when I went there during the months of August and September; we only walked during the night. We didn’t have [liberated zones by then]. When it was morning, we would hide in the bush and that was it. The same was true in Cabo Delgado. We would hide. We would hide in the bush and avoid going out during the day. Around 6 or 7 pm we would leave the bush. Before these hours, you could not get out of the bush in Niassa and Cabo Delgado. We would remain hiding in the bush. You could not try to get out. You were confined to the bush. But, when the war started we could walk around during the day. Soon after, we could walk 24 hours a day without any problems in Cabo Delgado. But, there were provinces, zones, including Cabo Delgado, where we could not move around during the day. We could only move in the night and that was it.

So, there was the first attack and immediately the [Portuguese] troops stayed in their quarters.

Yes, yes, in their quarters. They didn’t have contacts with the population. We were the ones who moved around freely in those areas.

After the attack, was there a quick response by the colonial troops?

It was a quick response, it was a quick and sudden response.

But, were they [the Portuguese troops] able to find the group?

No, no. It was the population who suffered. They [the Portuguese troops] burned down villages and other belongings because they were saying that, “You know where they are; you’re hiding them; you’re hiding those bandits. Therefore, burn down [the houses and belongings].” So, the population would leave [their villages] and come to live with us in the bush under our protection, and they [the Portuguese troops] would remain isolated. This was the policy, so the soldiers were wondering, “Oh.” The population that lived with them at the [colonial administration] post never left, they remained there under their direct control and administration. The population was confined there. But the population that came to stay in our areas had everything. The population had contacts with the rest of the world and they could go to Tanzania. They could move or travel anywhere they wanted. But the population living close to the colonial administration could only move around when the troops also moved and it was escorted by the Portuguese troops. In contrast, in our areas things were different and people could move easily including assimilados who could move alone.

Did the construction of bases take place during this period?

Soon after; soon after. Our first preoccupation was the construction of military bases and to provide military instruction. This was soon after we started and [occupied some areas]. But, we first started by small detachments, in small groups; and it was much later that we started to have a battalion on a military base and two battalions on big military bases….

How many people were there? 300 people?

More than 300 people on a military base, more than 300 people.

What about the first groups? How many men were in the first groups? 10, 20 people?

In the first groups? Eh, when we started, as I said, my group was a section of only 20 or 22 people.

But, when the attack was over did you, comrade General, go back to Tanzania again?

No, no. I didn’t go there soon after the attack.

Did you stay in Cabo Delgado?

I stayed there. I left in 1965. I stayed there. The attack started in 1964 and it was only in May 1965 that I left for Tanzania.

Did you stay during that time to organize the military structure?

Yes, to organize the whole military structure. I was chief of operations.

How many bases did you create?

We had sectors in Cabo Delgado. We had the first sector, second sector, third sector. The first sector is the road that goes from Mocímboa da Praia to Mueda, and from Mueda going down to […]. The second sector was from Messalo River to the Nugenda [Lugenda] River. That line was for the second sector. The third sector was from the road that starts in Pemba to Montepuez. This was the third sector. The fourth sector started from the [railroad] line to Niassa and the limit was with Nampula. This was the fourth sector.

Did you start with the first and second sectors?

I started with the first, second, and third sectors. Chai was in the second sector.

And the distances were bigger, so, you had to create storages.

Yes, yes. We had to create storages so that we could move forward.

And you already had contacts with the local population.

We had contacts with the population. We had all the support of the population, but it was difficult during that time. Why? In the case of Cabo Delgado, when the colonial troops moved in they exploited the ethnic issue between Makua and Makonde. This situation made things very difficult for us; they would say that this a Makua’s war or this is a Makonde’s war and that Makondes will benefit from this war and not you [Makuas], therefore, don’t allow the Makondes here. Second, they forged [different kinds of] alliances. All of the population was placed under control and they would take the young people to serve as local forces for protection [strategic hamlets], and for us to move in we had to engage in war. It was only under these conditions, it was very difficult for the third sector. The third and fourth sectors were very difficult, and this is the reason why the war in Cabo Delgado didn’t advance very fast. It was very difficult to move into Nampula. But, in terms of the structures of the liberated zones, they were very strong and indestructible. The Portuguese could not do anything there.

In 1966, the Portuguese colonial administrations buried many blacks alleging that they collaborated with FRELIMO, especially in the area of ---- Makuas. Were these people being contacted by [FRELIMO] or did they make these confessions under torture? They also harassed and prosecuted many chiefs including Muslim leaders. Did FRELIMO move into these areas or was this only a rumor?

No. Some had been contacted by FRELIMO and some had strong nationalist sentiments; they had strong nationalist sentiments and they had aspirations resulting from their humiliations. They had been humiliated and they had aspirations. They had strong feelings and when they arrived there, soon after their arrival, they would say without hiding, “one day, they will die.” So, what did they do? All those people had [hatred for Portuguese colonialism], for instance, the old man Begama from Cabo Delgado, the régulo from Cabo Delgado, the régulo Begama was not contacted [by FRELIMO] but came by himself. He was dealing with the Portuguese and because of how he was poorly treated he felt that he couldn’t take anymore and something had to change. He became a rebel, he didn’t feel right to be called a Portuguese when he was a Mozambican. So, the régulo Begama [rebelled] and he was arrested and died there. We don’t know where he died and was buried, régulo Begama. Just as in Montepuez, Balama, some had been contacted [by FRELIMO] and others were not. [Some were drawn into FRELIMO] because of nationalist and patriotic sentiments, and the feeling that “this is my land,” and the convictions they had. Some heard and believed that one day they would be free. Many of them died here in the South in this prison Mavalane. Many of them died in this prison Mavalane and others in Montepuez, Moma, Lama, in the coastal areas of Ibo, Quissanga, Mecufi, and in other places in the country.

In the event that there was an area where you didn’t have a FRELIMO cell, how did you organize yourselves so that the population could welcome you?

There was the following: we had messengers who were people with permanent contacts. In every part of the country we had people with contacts; it didn’t matter if it was from one province to another. Those who lived on the border of each province had communications, a natural communication, and we took advantage of that. We would send someone to work on that particular area. Because the [messenger] to a particular area to work had to have a normal life he had to make friends, and by going to the stores he would establish contacts with shopkeepers, and through all this he would get the necessary information. The messengers would bring all the information that we needed. For instance, when we went to Macomia, we got in touch with a young man who was already there. We also had an old man who traveled in that area. He would go there to sell his goods because he was a shopkeeper. We had to send that shopkeeper to that area and bring young people with him. He went there and brought young people with him. When the young people came we gave them instructions and assignments and we told them to return to their home areas where they had to spread [the word]. From Macomia, the trader brought a young man called Matias and when the young man returned he went to expand [the political activities of FRELIMO] in the entire area of Macomia. It is how we worked. We would find someone influential and we would convince him [to work with us] and he would bring us more people. When the struggle started we would organize ambushes along the roads not to engage in actual fighting but to get more people, we would capture more people [and bring them] to our areas and organization. We would prepare [the captured] people and send them back to their home areas, so we would do that, we would go capture some people, take them with us to our [areas]. We would take [the captured] people to Nachingwea and from there we would send them to the Soviet Union. After two, three, or four years, they would return and would be sent to work [in the interior]. Some of them are still alive. Sure, we would make some ambushes.

When did Kongwa stop being a center and the center was transferred to Nachingwea?

The center of Kongwa stopped being used as a center in 1974. 1974? It was in 1975 that the center of Nachingwea was opened.

You mean 1965?

Yes, sure, it was in 1965 when the Nachingwea center was opened, and we had to give up the center of Kongwa. We left this center for South Africans, Namibians, and Angolans. There were people from another country which I don’t remember. We moved out from Kongwa. It was difficult to conduct operations from very far, which was the case of Kongwa which was located in the center of Tanzania. Now, Nachingwea was very close.

Did Samora remain the leader in Nachingwea?

Samora was the leader in Nachingwea and he was the one who opened the center. He also opened Kongwa and when this center was opened he also went to open Nachingwea center. What was the role of the center of Nachingwea? The Nachingwea center was designed to give political and military training to the cadres. Kongwa was mainly [oriented] to military training. However, in [Nachingwea] the emphasis was on political and military training, the goal was to train people militarily and politically. We had political commissars and it was not only that; [in contrast to] Kongwa, in Nachingwea the goal was to train people for a prolonged war, the war was not going to be short. The other objective of [Nachingwea] was to train people to manage the liberated zones-areas that had been liberated. This meant to establish an administration, we thought we needed to create an administration, we had to manage and administer the liberated zones.

Was it in this context that the contradictions emerged?

That was in 1978, I mean 1968. One of the reasons for those contradictions was the lack of training, it was the lack of military and political training. The contradictions of 1968 had to do with the emergence of liberated zones. When the liberated zones emerged the contradictions within FRELIMO also emerged. How to administer? How to manage the liberated zones? These were the reasons behind the contradictions. Why? Because in the vast liberated areas of Cabo Delgado, Lázaro Kavandame wanted to replace the colonialists; he wanted to replace the colonial administration. He didn’t want to introduce a new set of rules. He just wanted to have the settlers replaced by us. Laws, trade, and economy would remain the same and they would run as in the [past].

During this time, Kavandame was not undermining the struggle? Did those problems surface during this time?

The problems started with the emergence of liberated zones, when the idea of replacing the white settlers [with Africans], the question of [human] exploitation was very central. This was the main point of Lázaro Kavandame, that was it.

When did he return to Cabo Delgado? In which year did he go back to Cabo Delgado?

He went there in 1968.

Was this the [year] when he returned to Cabo Delgado?

Yes. That’s when he went back. He arrived in 1968 and he remained there in 1969. It was at the end of 1968 and he stayed there in 1969. In 1970, because of his complicity …. Was the center of operations always in Cabo Delgado?

The center of operations was always in Nachingwea, yes. First, we were in Dar es Salaam and later in Nachingwea. Everything was there, the military headquarters was there.

In the beginning, all the provinces had some degree of freedom of organization. This changed to give way to centralization.

Sure, sure, sure. We used to do the following: we had a central command in Nachingwea that made the plans that were then sent for implementation in the provinces. Taking into account the specific conditions of each province; taking into consideration specific military operations of each province, particularly the military forces and everything else and the reactions against our forces, we launched military operations in Cabo Delgado, Niassa, Manica. For each province, we had a specific plan and they didn’t have to wait to execute a national plan. Each province had its own plan. Instead of implementing a national plan, each province had to implement its own plan based on local conditions. In each province there were regions and sectors. For instance, in the case of Niassa, there were western and eastern regions, and they had to make individual regional plans. In the case of Cabo Delgado where there were sectors, each sector had to make its own plan besides the provincial plan. The commander, however, had the obligation of designing national and provincial plans and plans for the sectors. The leader of the sector had detachments and he would make the plans for his detachments. The detachments had their plans and the detachments had patrols. So, he [the commander] would give the instructions to the patrols, which also had their plans.

When did FRELIMO start having telecommunications?

We started having [tele-] communications after the sixties. We introduced [tele]- communications in Cabo Delgado starting in 1968. But there were communications connecting the big centers. We did all this work in Nachingwea. We would do everything from Nachingwea, such as making [phone] connections and commanding the [military] operations directly from there. The [tele-]communications were established after 1967 after the death of Filipe Samuel Magaia, followed by the appointment of Samora Machel. It was after that when we created the [telecommunications] sector with a chief. Then, we started introducing the [tele-] communications inside FRELIMO. Yes, sure, it was in 1967; we started training people in 1966 and in 1967 we established this sector.

After all this time, and during the liberation struggle, you had regular contacts with Samora Machel. Up until 1968, what was your contact with him?

With regards to our contact with Samora: I was selected in sixty-four by Samora Machel to go the Cabo Delgado front to start the war. He called me, and I was not there in Kongwa. Well, I had left with my group and I didn’t say where I had gone. We left Kongwa and we arrived in Dar es Salaam and Mondlane came to meet us. It was he who told us “Look, you go to Mozambique to start the war.” He recommended that we be very careful, respect the rules, rules of war. [He also said] It is not [just] any war; know who the enemy is; and he didn’t want to hear that civilians had been massacred. Know, therefore, that “your enemy is the colonial machine, that’s all, the colonial structure, the colonial structure. [I] don’t want to hear that civilians were [killed], [our targets] are those who are involved in the colonial machine, colonial structure, military, government, these are the ones, this is the mission that you have.” [We replied saying] “Very well,” and we went. This meeting took place in June, if I’m not mistaken. We left around 20 of June. We left, and we stayed in Mtwara. We didn’t have weapons, we didn’t have anything, we had to wait; there were no weapons; there was nothing and we stayed until August when the weapons arrived, old weapons from Algeria. There were second-hand weapons from Algeria. We were careful not to show our soldiers; otherwise they would have said that those were old weapons and that we were selling them. “What is this?” We were very careful not to show them. My assistant and I were the only ones who had seen these second-hand weapons. So, we carried the weapons and when we arrived at the border we opened them. [They] asked, “Are these the weapons?” [We replied] saying, “Yes, these are the weapons; let’s go.” So, we had to carry them and we got into [Mozambique] in August. We prepared the conditions and on September 25th we started the war with those weapons, and we were always in contact with Samora. In December, he visited [the warfront in Cabo Delgado] for the first time. So, the war had started in September, and October, November, and finally in December he came to visit Cabo Delgado, this was after three months, he came to Cabo Delgado three months after the war had started.

Did he come to visit Mueda?

He came to visit Mueda. He came to visit the area of Mueda, the area of Mudumbe, he had come to see the conditions and how we were doing there. He wanted to see if everything was fine. He saw the conditions and left.

What did you talk about during that time?

We talked a lot; we talked a lot. First, we talked about the achievements and the need to make more advances [on the battlefront]. We didn’t want to be confined and we wanted to open new warfronts. We wanted to expand the war to the areas of Montepuez, Namumba, Lama. My battlefront was Pemba and that’s where I was heading to. I didn’t plan initially to start the war in [Chai]; when I left [Kongwa, Tanzania] my mission was to start the war in Pemba. When I arrived in Macomia, in Chai, I stopped because Father Daniel had been assassinated. After the assassination of Father Daniel, the colonial troops were warned and were on an alert. We couldn’t move on; everything was blocked, the bush, and everything was under search. How to move on? What to do? So, that [incident], the assassination of Father Daniel, affected us negatively. The [assassination] was perpetrated by MANU led by Mateus Mbunde. His name is Lucas Mbunde; he was called Mbunde. He organized a group that killed the Father and they [other MANU elements] thought that we were responsible and they wanted to attack us to get our weapons to start the war. The incident that involved the Father was a mistake. The goal was for FRELIMO to attack, and they knew [MANU members]. The Father was killed about three kilometers from where we were going to pass… Comrade, you were talking about the assassination of the Father, did the plans change during this time or close to September 25 th ?

We didn’t change it during that time. First of all what happened was the following: when we arrived in [Cabo Delgado] these guys from MANU were there to start the war. Mateus Mola [Matthew Mmole] and his men from MANU were there, and they were aided by the government of Ghana.

So, you, General, didn’t know that group was in Cabo Delgado?

We knew; we knew that, we knew everything. We had two things in our hands which were to confront MANU forces and the Portuguese forces. Now, what happened? When we arrived in Cabo Delgado, they knew that we would arrive, they had the information. Two days after the march and from the area I was going to pass through, and the other group too, the men of MANU made an ambush in the area of Chicalanga. There was a shopkeeper in the area, and they went to attack the shop. The poor man was able to escape, the owner of the shop, a white man, escaped, but, the objective was to ambush us. We proceeded and broke out of that blockade and penetrated. We arrived in the area of Ntogue and the Portuguese were aware of our movement and they came to blockade our progression. They searched the bush; they burned the bush because they knew that we only walked during the night. During the day, we hid in the bush, we didn’t leave the bush, and they [the Portuguese troops] spread out in the bush. I had to stop and I stayed for a week; the troops were searching the bush while we were hiding there. What was my mission? I said, “Listen, if they find us here in the bush, each one should open fire using the gun in his hand. However, if we are not discovered, it is not worth causing a war, let’s proceed with the march.” We stayed there for a week. They [the Portuguese troops] backed off and went to Mueda, and we proceeded. On that road that goes from Mueda to Mocimboa da Praia, over at Sagal, there is a bridge, and we would pass about three kilometers from there. I don’t know what happened to these guys of MANU. There was a car coming from Mueda in the direction of Mocimboa da Praia. They approached the road and they opened fire with “canhangulo” and they punctured the tires of that car. Their objective was to attack us, and I don’t know what kind of madness went into their heads. They opened fire on the tires of the car. But, we had moved ahead and we had gone to the area of Budund where we slept. On the following day in the late afternoon, when we left around five, six, five, six, seven o’clock, when we were leaving and going in the direction where the Father was, which was about three kilometers, the Father was killed precisely in the area that we would pass through. They [MANU] were looking for us to attack us because we were heavily loaded with weapons: guns, grenades, ammunitions. They wanted to attack us to get our weapons so that they could start the war with our weapons. But, they failed and they killed the Father and over there the situation changed drastically. There was no way, troops everywhere, reconnaissance planes and other things going on, so I had to change the plan and I ordered the group to disperse. We dispersed and some backed off and some had to bury the weapons. Two people and I, the commander, stayed there watching the materiel. We stayed there for two weeks. When this was over, we returned to unbury the weapons. We proceeded with our march until we reached the area of Mogumbe, now in the direction of Macomia. When I arrived there, I sent someone to get there, but it was completely closed, there was no space in the area of Macomia and the Message River. We penetrated and went there. Well, I had to back off to inform that, “Listen, the conditions are not very good,” otherwise they would take the weapons from us because we had been walking for awhile with the weapons. If we penetrated they would take the weapons from us. Or we had to start the war, take some operative actions and proceed: this was my opinion and I proposed that. The group which was going to Montepuez arrived in the area of (----) and was attacked by the population. PIDE had set up its [machine] in the area. The group was attacked and was forced to pull back. And I remained there on the border [between Mozambique and Tanzania]. So, on the day scheduled to go there, I gave orders to someone to go and find out how and when to start the war. He returned with a notice saying that the war should start on September 25th, and we were at September 15th. I was told on September 15th that we should start the war, and I came back running and said, “Well, I can’t reach Porto Amélia where I was going in the first place, but at least where I can succeed in starting the war is where I will start.” I walked into [Mozambican territory] without knowing the conditions ahead of me, and when I arrived in Chai I didn’t have any information about the area, I had no information about the area. I arrived there and I walked into the post, now what am I going to do? What did I come here for? My colleagues told me, “Let’s attack over there, it’s the house of the chief of the Post,”and I said, “No, no, we are not going to attack, otherwise we will kill civilians; let’s pull back.” On the 25th of September, I was there at midnight. I stayed at the post at midnight, until midnight. I said, “Listen…” [someone asked] “But, how are we going to [start the war]?” I said, “Let’s return,” and we pulled back to the bush. The following day in the morning, I gave orders to someone to go for a reconnaissance mission to get information. I wanted updated information and from there [we could attack]. He brought me detailed information. At 6pm I was close to Chai, and at 7pm I was at the post. At 8pm, we started attacking the post, that was it. From that day on, there was no need to hide, what to do, we started walking with weapons even during daylight, that’s was it. Now, it was a battle, a battle during the day and night. We discarded the idea of walking only during the night and hiding in the day, that’s what we did. We had to reinforce our guerrillas. We had to receive orders from Dar es Salaam to start the war, that’s was it. We started the war and we spread the war to new areas. From that moment, I stayed in the detachment; I was called to organize new bases, detachments, to create new detachments, new training centers because there were many people who wanted to train. Now I was not only the commander of that unit but I was also called to become a commander of operations of the entire [province of] Cabo Delgado. The chief of operations in 1964 and 1965 was Magaia and he came to me to say, “Listen, Comrade Chipande you have to leave,” [and I asked] “Where to?” and he replied, “Go to Nachingwea” and [I asked] “What for?” [and he said] “To get training for the post of general staff of the army” because I didn’t have any training as general staff of the army. So, I was called to receive training as general staff of the army in May.

Were they Chinese instructors?

Sure, they were Chinese instructors. It was training for chief commander of a platoon. It was not training for general staff of the army, but chief commander of a platoon, company. So, I went there. The first military training with Samora took place in Nachingwea when I arrived. It was in the same platoon and we were in the same group when we received political and military training. Samora, and many others including me were present there. When we finished [the first instructions], we attended the course for general staff of the army together. We started from platoon, then company, and when I went back, to be selected once again for training as general staff of battalion.

So, when Samora went to Cabo Delgado in December and met with you, you discussed how to advance the war, etc. Let me ask you a question. You had a friendship, you were together in Algeria, etc, etc. You had a strong friendship. Did you talk about personal issues, for instance, you, comrade general, didn’t see your wife for a long time. Did you talk about these types of issues?

We talked about everything; we talked about personal issues; how my wife and I thought [about different issues], because even when I left Tanzania, my wife remained there and I didn’t have time to go to see her with the children. She was in the refugee camp [in Lamba]. I was not allowed to go to see her. I only passed from there and I went to Mozambique. She only heard that her husband was with those who had come from Mozambique. She heard that “your husband is commanding the war over there.” Do you know when I saw her again for the first time? In 1965 when we went with Mondlane to [- --], and that’s when my wife saw me. Now, when Samora came we had conversations about everything including the administration of areas and how to bring up the rear and how to advance the struggle…

Was it during this time that the population was close to you for the first time and you discussed how to organize the population? Is this true? What did Samora have to say about this?

He said that we could continue the war without bringing up the rear and that we had to have a safe rear. What did this mean? It meant to reconstruct the liberated zones. It was necessary to do so. [In other areas] the administration was under the colonial regime, but in the liberated zones the population had problems: they lacked sugar, salt, there were no medicines and other essential goods. Who could solve those problems? FRELIMO. They wanted hoes; the hoes had been burned. They wanted other things, everything else, and who was going to provide them with those goods? FRELIMO. So, when Samora came, he said, “Look, the first thing to do is to organize the liberated zones to solve the problems of the population, to create and consolidate solid administrative structures that can solve the social problems,” and it was not only that. There would be conflicts, and some would want to inflict harm on others, and who is going to solve those problems? It is necessary to have a group of people and from there we created committees of specialized groups to feed the soldiers because we didn’t produce. Our questions were: Where are you going to live? Where will the food come from? Who is going to help you with the transportation of materials? You are carrying the materials, and how are you doing that? Organize the population in the liberated zones and in the warfronts too.” So, Samora came up with this question. “Medicines come from abroad and who is going to carry them from the border to the first, second, third, and fourth sectors? You go there and mobilize the population to come to carry the materials. They will carry the materials for their own benefit. And they will produce to feed you and themselves, to exchange their goods for basic goods.” This was Samora speaking; we discussed this issue and we also examined the best crops that the population should produce to solve their basic needs and we said, “They cannot exchange maize with anything; maize is only for food; they cannot even exchange with soap, capulanas [wraps]; peanuts can be used for exchanging with other goods because it is not a common good, but maize, manioc, rice cannot be sold because they are food. But peanuts, cashew nuts, ginger, beeswax and other goods could be sold by the population, and if possible to organize the population to sell these goods in Tanzania.” We discussed many things about these issues with Samora. He would come to see the liberated zones; however, he didn’t stay long. He stayed for a short time, almost a week.

Let me ask you a question. For instance, with regards to sugar and salt, were there people who would go to get these goods and return bringing these goods with them and exchange them with the population in the liberated zones? Or did the population take their goods to exchange in Tanzania?

There was not much sugar; there wasn’t much sugar for consumption; the same was true with salt; it was not a practice, we had lack of salt. But, what did they want? capulanas, and sometimes the population wanted soap, powdered soap (Omo). They wanted omo to wash their clothes. It was a serious problem; people had serious problems with skin diseases like scabies and other type of diseases. Soap would kill scabies and remove other diseases, and wash clothes. So, the population would need these kinds of essential goods to solve their daily problems. So, this is what was necessary. Later on, we were able to solve the lack of salt. We organized some groups when we started controlling the coast from the extreme point of Cabo Delgado to the area of Mocimboa da Praia, to the south of Mocímboa Praia. The salt was produced there at the beach. We created a group to do that kind of work.

But, you were saying something very funny. You mean that the choice of Samora to lead FRELIMO was not made directly by Eduardo Mondlane?

No, it was done there [Dar es Salaam], the replacement had taken place there. We came to communicate and replace, there were members of the Central Committee and I was nothing during that time. So, the members of the Central Committee had come, Mondlane himself came, Chissano also came, and comrade Mocumbi came too. They were members of the central committee…

So, you only discussed the organization?

Yes, they discussed, and it was only for implementation, how to implement the decisions taken. So, they came.

[------?] They came, but he didn’t; he was in Dar es Salaam. Those who came are the ones that I mentioned to give us the information, they came only for that. They came to tell us about the organization, and that was it. The General Staff of the Army was getting organized. What was the structure presented by the General Staff of the Army? They said Samora, here you have four of your colleagues. Very well, we started. The idea which was presented was that Samora would become the boss and I would become chief of operations; Cândido Mondlane would be placed in the training center, recruitment of cadres, and Casal Ribeiro would become political commissar and deputy chief of Samora. Ribeiro would become political commissar and deputy-chief; Célio Manaiva, chief of material. Raul Gusmane would become chief of administration; Munhepe would become chief of telecommunications. Everything was done there, and I don’t remember other names.

Were the provincial chiefs part of the [Central Committee]?

No, they depended directly on the chief of DD (Department of Defense). So, a structure was created and we were initiated right there, then they went away. With Samora, we started organizing and creating the General Staff of the Army for the first time. We put it into operation and created structures in the provinces. We had a provincial chief and he had different sections. They didn’t have departments but sections. So, we started to organize all this to face the [challenges]. We had the chief of DD [Department of Defense] in the provinces. But, the chief of the DD (Department of Defense) was the deputy of the provincial secretary who was a politician. He was the second person [in command]. There was the political structure headed by Kavandame and now there was a chief of DD who was Raimundo. So, Raimundo was the deputy of Kavandame, that’s how things were. With the deputy we discussed everything, but when we approached the boss there was nothing to discuss. Nothing. It was a serious problem. It was under these circumstances that the contradictions exacerbated. The soldiers had to take a position, and we knew that the reason behind all these contradictions was the development of the war itself. It was necessary to define the new philosophy and the new policy, and how to advance, but not using the methods defined in the first congress. It was necessary to have a new congress to define new methods. If we have to advance, and how to do so; rebuild the liberated zones; what kind of policy we must develop; everything [was under consideration] including the advance of the struggle. It was in these circumstances that the contradictions emerged with the Chairmen rejecting. The group of elderly [Council of Elders] people still wanted to use the old methods and they didn’t want to change. So, this was a contradiction. What did Samora do? What did Mondlane do? They invested in the young people to continue with [the struggle]. They invested in the young, in the commanders, and those who were in the field. We invested in them and started giving them power in the [military] operations, and in the commandants in the field of [operations]. We invested in them and we started giving them power in the [military] operations and in the contacts with the population. The population started to look at the elderly people [Council of Elders] differently and the elderly people started to leave one by one for Tanzania, including Lázaro Kavandame who didn’t want to go into the interior anymore. I was part of the group that was sent to go with Uria Simango; Uria Simango and I were part of the group sent by the Central Committee to go to study the problems. Urias Simango had to find out the reasons behind the problems and contradictions. What were the causes of the contradictions and problems affecting Cabo Delgado particularly between Chairmen and the military? When Simango went there, what he heard could not be transmitted to Lázaro Kavandame. Lázaro Kavandame abandoned the meeting. We went there and the entire population said, “Listen, Simango, bring Lázaro Kavandame here to answer for [these problems]. What is he doing over there? We are dying here, and there are such and such problems. Why doesn’t he come here? He didn’t want to come, so you should report this to the central committee. All those people are staying in Tanzania or they stay in [Lamba]. Leave the soldiers here because they are solving the problems.” This is how things unfolded. So, we invested in the commandants. They [the elderly people, Chairmen] abandoned and left, and they said, “If you want to have the congress, we are not going to take part in it;” they didn’t go. Those who went to the congress were the soldiers; now, how would they implement the decisions if they had closed the border. They had closed the border not to allow anyone, including military materiel, [to pass]. They didn’t even allow sick people to leave; they closed the border with militias, with militia forces; the soldiers were tolerant; they didn’t go to confront the militias. They didn’t go. The result of all this was the death of Paulo Samuel Kankhomba. Paulo Samuel Kankhomba left for the interior and said, “Don’t you know that the border is closed?” “Who closed it?” “the Chairmen closed the border; the politicians closed the border.” “But, since when?” He said, “Yes, they closed [the border],” and said “Very well, but I am going to have a delegation here.” Do you know who was there? Sevene was there, and he was arrested.

Was he a student?

Yes, he was a student. Yes, [Paulo Samuel Kankhomba] was with Sevene. Sevene had advanced with a group, and Kankhomba was coming behind. The militias went after him; they chased him. Imagine that there were foreigners who came from [abroad] because they were impressed with the war situation. So, they came and met Kankhomba and [they were asked], “Where are you going?”; [they replied], “Young man, I’m going to Mozambique,” and [he] would ask, “To do what? Don’t you know that the border is closed and none can go in and none can leave?” and [asked], “What about the sick? Can material get in?” “Nothing can get in.” Kankhomba said, “I’m going to get in” and [he was told], “You won’t” and they started to stab him and he died there…

I’m sorry, sir. Yes, yes…

I was given orders by Samora to interview the assassin.

Ah, the guy …

He was there and Samuel Kankhomba moved forward and said, “No, I’m going to [go in]” and it was then the [assassin] came behind Samuel Kankhomba and stabbed him?

Sure, it was from the back, it was from the back. His bodyguard [was also stabbed] and everything else happened there. Sevene was already in the river, he was a little bit ahead. He found out about the [incident] when he was already in Mozambique. Those who came behind told him, “The commandant is dead, the political commissar and deputy political commissar [are dead].”

I’m sorry. What was the logic behind the closure of the border? What was the purpose of closing the border? Was it to end with FRELIMO or was there another reason?

No, it was out of despair, they were desperate, they had received orders to kill any leader. Sure, sure, they were desperate, there was nothing. The government of Tanzania didn’t want to listen to them and didn’t want to see them. Even some of those who supported them had lost power. Yes, it was out of despair, it was out of despair and they committed those crimes. I also escaped. I was with Kankhomba, and we arrived in the morning. When we arrived I said, “Kankhomba, stay here. I am going to Mtwara to buy materials [goods] because I received a request to get bureaucratic materials [office materials].” I wanted such and such items. So, I left and went to Mtwara to buy the materials. I bought the materials and when it was 3:00 pm, I was returning from Mtwara and I came across the car of Lázaro Kavandame with the Chairmen. The car was loaded and I asked them to stop and they refused. They were going at high speed and I insisted that they stop. I insisted that they stop, and gave them a signal to stop, and nothing. So, I said to myself, “Let’s go back and chase them,” and in the middle of the road I stopped, “Let them go.” “What is going on?” I started [the car] and went around and when I arrived there I was told, “Kankhomba is dead, he was killed.” And I was about to leave with Kankhomba, two of us to meet with Sevene and come to Cabo Delgado. I escaped by having left to go to buy materials. Now, Kankhomba didn’t go with Sevene because I had told him [Kankhomba] to wait so that we could go together. He had said, “I am going to go ahead, and when the boss arrives tell him that I am in my way to Rovuma because I have uniforms to distribute there.” He had uniforms for the militias and I don’t know which new group. He had said, “I have uniforms, and I am going to distribute it, I’m going to do this job and when he arrives he will find me.” So, he went ahead. So, that’s how things happened. Otherwise, I would be dead too. We belonged to the same group. This is how things unfolded, and when I arrived there, “Kankhomba?”, someone pushed me to one side and I asked “me, Kankhomba?” when I got out of the car I was asked about Kankhomba. “Commandant and commissar Kankhomba?” someone came and held me and I asked, “What is going on?” I was told, “Kankhomba is dead.” “What happened?” “He was assassinated.” I had to leave quickly for Nachingwea to inform Samora. He fell when I told him. I had never seen him crying and screaming. He cried.

Were you close friends?

We were all friends, all of us.

Do you remember what Samora said?

Samora? He only asked me, first, when I said, “Chief” he said, “What did you come to do here? Did someone die?” Epa, once he saw me, and because he knew that I was going to Mozambique and that I was going to cross into Mozambique that night and come back on the same day, [he asked me] “What did you come to do here? Did someone die?” Epa, I told him, “Yes, someone died” and [he asked] “Who died?” [and I replied], “Kankhomba”, “They have already executed the plan, it was already done, the plan has just started” because we had information that they had put people everywhere in Dar es Salaam, in Tanda, on the border and everywhere. They had placed people everywhere with cold-steel weapons to assassinate FRELIMO leaders including the commandant. Someone who had participated in the meeting left and came to say, “Listen, I came here to give you this information: today there was a meeting where they discussed such and such things [the assassination of FRELIMO leaders] and people would be going everywhere [to carry out this mission].” Sure, it was just like that…

This relationship with the Department of Defense was also associated with the Gordian Knot Operation? Is this true?

Thanks to the organization of the Department of Defense, and thanks to the second congress. Thanks to the FRELIMO second congress where Mondlane trusted new people. Sure, there he had a new vision. He had done his work and he had finished it. He died in peace. Why? When he went to Cabo Delgado in February of 1969; no, it was not that trip; this one was in Tete and that one [1969] was a different one. There are not pictures here. We crossed the Rovuma and when we reached the Mozambican side of the border, he [Mondlane] took some sand and started to eat it. He swallowed the sand; he crushed the sand and ate it. We looked at him and asked, “What is going on Comrade Mr. President?” and [he] said, “You can’t know how I am thrilled with satisfaction. I ran away from the south of the country, and now I’m entering my homeland, free; it is free [liberated areas] it is free here in the north; this land of ours.” He started to eat, we stopped there, swallowed and ate the sand, that sand, “You can’t imagine’ [Mondlane said]. He drank his water, we left and we returned. This was the trip that Lázaro Kavandame didn’t want [Mondlane] to take part in it. This was the trip that he didn’t want.

When was this? Was this in 1968?

1969, I mean 1968, yes, sure.

But at the end of the Second Congress, when the congress was over, and besides the contradiction with the Chairmen, there was a new discussion that had to with Urias Simango. In particular, after a certain moment there was a discussion about the road to be followed and Mondlane was the one who decides.

The solution.

But, was it peaceful?

No, it was not peaceful. The problem had to do with rejection. He [Simango] was rejected in the second congress and he couldn’t do more, he didn’t have any space, he didn’t have space. All of them, including Simango, all of them had been rejected; it was a decision of the congress to be implemented. There was no way and it was necessary to implement such decisions in a specific time period in the interval between that congress and the other, there was no space for [them, Kavandame, Simango, Gwenjere], all of them didn’t have space, all the intentions that they had were frustrated. That’s how things unfolded and there was no room for them, there was no way, they could not commit crimes and [the government of] Tanzania could not withstand them anymore and it took all of them and created the Center of Tabora [and Dabalo] where they were confined. Well, we started to reorganize, and when the Gordian Knot Operation came we didn’t have any problems. We were in good standing and comfortable, and that’s why we withstood that offensive.

Were you aware that the offensive had started?

Well, when you are at war you always have to suspect. We expected that something would happen.

Movement of troops.

Besides the movement of troops; the situation itself would tell, because when you are at war, and when the situation is not what you are used to, you always have to suspect, and we suspected that something was about to happen. What would it be? First, because whether the Portuguese wanted it or not, they were informed about the second congress. The fact that Lázaro Kavandame ran away and went straight to [inform the Portuguese].

About the Portuguese knowledge about the congress:

Yes, it was not suspicious because the information was real. If we operated and we had our people in their midst, how would they not have people [in our midst]? It’s tabanca; it was like that; we had people in their midst and they also had people in our midst. It’s normal. Therefore, they had [information] and we also had [information]. If we had, they also had. You only had to accept that fact, and that’s how it was. That’s why we organized the congress; we organized everything in Cabo Delgado and the Portuguese concentrated their [military power] there, including airplanes and other [military equipment] and forces of intervention. But we went to Niassa instead and there in a short time they [the Portuguese] found out. We prepared many places in Niassa; it was not only in one place. This is what I wanted to add; first, in Cabo Delgado we organized constructions to accommodate several delegations including foreigners and many others, there was a lot of movement going on there. The Portuguese moved everything, but we left the place and we went to Niassa. And in Niassa there were several places, that’s how things happened. This information was to add to the previous one.

[My question has to do with] the leaking of information. Was the preparation of the congress restricted to a small group or not?

Yes, yes, yes. So, the infiltration of [those who leaked] the information was a little [bit easier].

No, listen here, it was not only that. When I am talking about infiltration even us, we were not a secret. If within FRELIMO the deputy-president Urias Simango was implicated in problems, what do you expect? He was not [reliable] and that’s why there was not cohesion. Even after the death of Mondlane, he continued. He didn’t abandon, and he was frequently exposed and Lázaro and Simango were frequently confronted. Simango, what do you want now?

But, are you saying that Simango provided information to [the Portuguese]?

It was not Simango; it is not what I’m saying. For sure, it was known that the deputy- president of FRELIMO was involved in these kinds of things; there was the money that he used when he ran away; where did the money came from? It was from PIDE. Now, the names are written in the books and it is also written that “We gave this amount of money when he ran away.” Now, if the deputy-president was implicated in these kinds of issues, you can imagine [other people]. War is very complicated; it’s very complicated. It is very complicated and it is even so when it is conducted by the liberation movement like FRELIMO with that weight. In terms of the national, regional, and international arena; it was not a simple thing; it was the same situation that FRELIMO is in nowadays. That’s true.

You, sr., were talking about the Gordian Knot Operation.

Yes, sure, Gordian Knot Operation.

So, you suspected that something was going on, but during that particular time the contradictions were more or less resolved, and therefore you were ….

Ya, ya, yes.

What was the role of Samora during that time?

Oh, oh, oh, oh. When the Gordian Knot Operation started, the first thing that Samora said was, “Stop this; give orders to stop this; I don’t want to listen to anything; I don’t want to see fire over here and such [nonsense] to fill the borders, what is this?” and he outlined a strategy to disperse all the troops, all the troops, no concentration of troops because at the time we moved and acted in big groups to attack and other things. He said, “I don’t want to hear about concentration.”

I’m sorry to interrupt just for me to understand much better; during that time, how many guerrillas would make up the force for a big attack?

We? Sometimes, we would take two battalions; a battalion had more than a thousand men and [sometimes] more than two thousand men. We would have [such numbers when necessary]. Now, Samora said, “I don’t want to see people dying, disperse the forces, all the forces, disperse them and act as guerrillas, invite the enemy to our areas to annihilate them, invite the enemies to kill them. Once the enemy is in, encircle them and don’t let them leave.” allow the enemy to come into our areas, but don’t allow them to leave, and kill them. That’s how we conducted the war. Every commandant in Cabo Delgado [conducted the war in this way], and sometimes a commandant was with a section, and sometimes the soldiers would command a well equipped and armed population. This is what he did; the commandant alone and others. [Samora] said, “We cannot compete with aircrafts and helicopters” because the parachutes during the night would bombard and target our areas with canoes and mortars all night. During the day there were fighter jets, helicopters, and they would move from one side to another. In a very short period of time, they were moved to another place, and other unknown locations. The entire movement during the night, you would try to do [something else] but you would be under bombardment by canoes and bulldozers would open the roads. Where you thought they would not reach, in a very short period of time they were there. They would open roads. So, it was necessary to act in small groups, it was worth doing that.

But, did he call all the commandants and discuss [this] with them in a single meeting? Did he discuss the operations right there or.…

Yes, yes, yes, there was. Fortunately he [Samora] was there. We were in the General Staff of the Amy meeting where the commandants of Tete, Cabo Delgado, and Niassa were present. We had to close the course where there was more concentration of (---). It was in Cabo Delgado where we sent soldiers, we redirected all major commandants to Cabo Delgado.

How many men came into Mozambique during that time?

On our side? We had a lot of people. We had guerrillas going to Tete, Manica to open new warfronts. We had to send them there.

What was the figure? Were they 5,000 men?

The number of men that we sent there reached this figure and even went beyond this number, yes. During this time, the good thing was that we were well equipped and the OAU had taken a new attitude of supporting us in everything. We had (fardamento [camouflage?]), weapons, ammunitions, and not only that. The Soviet Union had also offered tinned food, and I don’t know what happened. China also provided us with vegetables (couve) in packets. It only provided (couve) in packets. Just add hot water and it was ready to eat. (Laughs)

In the case of Guinea Bissau with PAIGC, there were many bullets, ammunitions that were delivered in cans of food and this was before the committee of [African] liberation had openly [started to support the movement]. Did this also happen to you, and did the Tanzanians hide [ammunitions] in cans for you? No, we did it in Malawi [because of the restrictions imposed by Kamuzu Banda on the liberation movements]; we would put sacks of fish on top of weapons [we would put weapons inside the fish] and we would tell the vendors to go to sell the fish and they would come from Tanzania via Malawi into Tete. They didn’t allow us to pass with weapons. This was the system we adopted. We had bought trucks to put some people in as Malawian vendors, but they were Mozambicans. That’s what we did.

There was a meeting of Samora in Malawi to try to solve this problem.

Yes, yes. There was. Chissano was very much involved in it. Yes, Chissano, the men of Cubanda [Kamuzu Banda]; the security of Cubanda [Kamuzu Banda], all of them, and Samora was also present.

But they didn’t succeed!

Nothing was achieved.

A question about the absence of Kamuzu Banda in the meetings.

Not Cubanda [Kamuzu Banda]; not Cubanda [Kamuzu Banda], nothing, nothing. The one present was a security man called Chicuenga. His security man was called Chicuenga. He was the key security man of Cubanda [Kamuzu Banda]. The contacts were at that level with some ministers.

Did they give you some space of maneuver?

Who?

The men of Cubanda [Kamuzu Banda]

Who was Cubanda? No, that old man was not there. It is because I attended the meeting. I attended the last meeting.

Was the last meeting in 1986?

It was in 1986. No, it was the meeting to decide the meeting which followed the death of Samora. It was in that meeting; it was Banda who said, “No, it is not with me.” Nyerere, Mugabe, Kaúnda were present. Samora was sitting somewhere like here, Banda was seating like here. I had never seen heads of state getting angry, everybody there was very emotional. Everybody was emotional. It is true, and at the end, Banda said, “Listen, the problem is not mine. Go and meet with Mobuto.” “Epa”, “go and meet Mobuto.” “Are you serious?” “Yes.” So they asked who was going to organize the meeting with Mobuto. So, it was said Kaúnda should organize the meeting. Samora and others said the same thing. When Samora was returning, he didn’t make it home. Do you see?

You, General, did you have contact with the couple, Josina Machel and Samora? How?

I mean some form of contact even at a personal level with the two.

I went to their weeding. I was the godfather of the weeding.

Can you tell us if Samora talked with you, and asked for your advice?

About what?

About the wedding. What was it like? Or did he only invite you just to be the godfather?

No, no, I attended. (Laughs) So, we had a leader [Samora Machel], and the boss could not be just like that, alone; it was necessary for him to organize his life. How is it? For us to be safe it was important for us to find someone for him. That was it. That was it. We had to support [him], and help him organize his life. When she [Josina] expressed her desire [of marrying him] and when she said “that’s the man [I want].” We couldn’t do that for him, he had to make the decision himself and say, “Listen, that’s her [whom I want to marry]. ” So, when he pointed her out, all of us went to [initiate the whole wedding process]. That was it. [laughs]

And how did she react?

Who?

Josina

It was positive (laughs). We were concerned that he needed to have someone [a female companion]; as a leader then, to have a leader [not married was a problem]. No, no, no. Even the old people talked about it and they used to say, “Boss, so, what is the matter?” and he [Samora] would say “Listen, I [can’t get married], if I get married, if I meet someone, that woman would impede me from going around solving people’s problems,” and [the old people] would say, “Eh, eh, eh, listen; you better find someone [a woman].”

But, he had previous relationships with other people [women], and did he think that a wedding would be an impediment to advance the armed struggle?

No, no, it was [an idea] in his head; he had that [idea], therefore, we had to fight to convince him that if got married he would not forget the problems of the struggle. It was something [an idea] that he had in his mind. We told him, “On the contrary, you are still going to have more time to think about the people and about the struggle. It is good.” It was [something that] he had in his mind, and he would say, “Listen, I am committed to the struggle, to the revolution, to the liberation of the people” and we would say, “No, you should also commit yourself to finding a female companion, someone who will help you.” We advised him. We also want to have a father and a mother. Yes, we would talk with him, “We want to have a mother.” Did you end up talking with Josina about the weeding?

I also talked with Josina.

Do you want to tell us a little bit about it?

Ah, I didn’t talk much with Josina because she had already [made her decision]. It was only a matter of ensuring her that she had made a very good decision and encourage her to proceed with the [wedding] arrangements.

I have an impression that she was a very courageous woman.

Who?

Josina

Josina? Sure, sure, sure.

Did she end up going to visit the [orphanages] and other places?

Listen, I worked with her, Josina, and on the day that she fell sick that would eventually cause her death, she went to Niassa to organize the orphanages. She went there, and she returned from Niassa. She traveled to Nachingwea, Tunduru, and Nachingwea and when she arrived I noticed that she was not feeling very well, “Listen Josina, how are you?” [and she replied], “No, I have to go to Cabo Delgado because I heard that children in the orphanages [were facing problems]; I have to go there,” and I said, “But, why don’t you go first to Dar es Salaam?” [and she said], “No, later.” She left and went to Cabo Delgado to solve the problems of the orphanage. When she returned and arrived in Nachingwea, [I told her], “You’ve returned; now we can go.” [She] said, “No, now I have to go to Tunduru because there is a problem with children over there.” I said, “is that so?” [she] said, “Yes” “I give you two days. “You go there today, and after tomorrow you come here and from here we go to Dar es Salaam.” Having said this she went and came back. We left on a Friday by car to Linde. We slept there so that we could proceed the following day in the morning to board the plane to Dar es Salaam. We arrived there in the early afternoon and we slept in the Beach Hotel. We slept there and that was it. The following day in the morning, we, she and I, boarded the plane, and the drivers and their companions returned to Nachingwea; we went to Dar es Salaam. We arrived there and we met Samora, and Samora was getting ready to travel, on an official trip to the Soviet Union. That was it; we arrived there and helped prepare the trip and everything else. That was it. I stayed there for three days, and on the fourth day I returned. First we accompanied Samora to the airport and he traveled to the Soviet Union, and when he departed, on the following day, I went to Nachingwea. When I arrived in Nachingwea I stayed one day, and the following day Josina died. In the morning, I received a phone call saying Josina died, [and I said], “Epa, she died?”, “Yes.” [I asked] “When was she hospitalized?” [I was told], “It was at dawn,” and I don’t know, there was nothing else, that was it. [ ------?]

Yes, yes, we discussed.

What did you discuss?

We discussed a lot of how to take care of Samito, we discussed not only about taking care of Samito, but also Samora’s life. Because he was very affected [by the death of Josina], and we had to sit down and talk about how to support Samora in order for him to continue leading us, so that he wouldn’t have problems that could affect him. All of us surrounded [Samora]. It was only much later that he came to tell me, and this was when I faced the unfortunate death of my mother, he came to me and said, “Chipande, I’m very sorry. I don’t know if I could do the same thing for you that you did to me. I was surrounded by people who comforted me and you did everything for me because we were in the struggle, but not now, we are independent and each one is alone taking care of his life. [He also said] I don’t know if you are going to withstand this situation, but Machel’s family is willing [to help], but I can’t say the same about all of us within FRELIMO.” That’s what he told me. When Samora came to talk with me, I looked at him, and he said, “I’m very sorry about this situation, it is a difficult situation to loose a woman. The love she gave you,” this is to say that the first thing that Samora told me was that, “Listen, put that child away.” Samito was a child, “I don’t want to see him around me otherwise I’m not going to [be as committed in the struggle as I am now], and such and such things.” [We asked him], “to put him far away, but where?” [He replied], “I don’t know, I don’t know what to do because when I see him I see Josina and see other things, and now how am I going to [be involved in the struggle]?” That was the first idea that came to his mind. I went to sit with him and I said, “Samora, it is wrong what you’re saying, a child like this, take him away and send him away, where to? Abroad? It can’t be that way; if you give the child to the Tanzanians that child will not be Mozambican, and we don’t want that. We want that child to be Mozambican. That child, even when Josina was alive was surrounded by all your colleagues who gave him affection and love. Now, why do you want to reject the affection and love from other people; why do you want to reject this affection to FRELIMO, to Mozambicans, and your colleagues? Why? First, I’m ready, and my wife is alive, and I’m going to take that child and give him to her, the child will stay with her. This is the first thing to assure you. Second, I’m not worried because all of us will take care of that child. If we send the child to Cuba, tomorrow he will give us a lot of trouble, [because] the child would have become a Cuban. If we send him to East Germany, the child will become German. This will happen wherever we send him. To China, he will become Chinese. We want that child to be Mozambican, grow up with us and know all of our Mozambican cultural values. The child stays. This idea of sending the child elsewhere, doesn’t work.” He listened to what I said, and he didn’t react at that moment. Later, he called me and said, “I went to think about what you said, and I’m not going to do it [send the child away].” That’s what we discussed because Samora wanted a different fate for his child. Now, when Samora [Samito?] grew up and when he finished grade nine, he wanted to take his child to London and I called him [Samora], and I told him to sit down, “Listen, sit here, where do you want to take this child? Do you want to destroy the child? Send him to London for education, but I want to tell you that child should not come back as a Englishman, this child is Mozambican, don’t destroy the child.” “Ah…”, and I said, “Listen to this, this was the commitment that we assumed with Samora.” “Does Graça know this?” and I said yes she does, [he asked me] “Do your colleagues know this?” and I said “they know…”, “Does the president know about this?” I said “he knows,” and he was traveling to the airport said, “Listen, I’m not going to leave if the situation is this, I’m not going to take the young man; I have to talk with President Chissano; I have to talk again with Graça,” and postponed the trip. This is what I wanted to say.

There is another complicated moment for Samora which was the death of Mondlane. Can you talk briefly about how Samora reacted?

Yes. Listen here, I told you about the death of Josina and she worked with me; Mondlane also worked with me like Josina did. Mondlane came to Nachingwea to work with me; Samora was absent, he was in Cabo Delgado, he was with Pachinuapa, he was with Guebuza. Like many others he said, “Chipande, I’m going to Cabo Delgado because of the situation; I’m not feeling well here for such and such reasons; I must go there. In order to see the struggle’s advances because my problem is to see the advance of the struggle to reach Nampula. That’s why I want to go to Macomia and if possible to Chai.” I said, “Go there.” I organized the forces and everything, and he [Samora] went, and I stayed. Mondlane came to Nachingwea to work with me because at the time I had to send materials [including weapons] to Tete in order to open the Manica warfront. Manica and everything, and Zambia had held our materials and didn’t want to return them. We asked them to return it but nothing happened. So, he [Mondlane] was preparing and organizing a meeting of the nine, the frontline; those nine in Dar es Salaam; so, I said “listen, if Zambia doesn’t want to return our materials, I’m going to talk over there at the committee; I’m going to express this preoccupation to see if Zambia can return the materials to us. I’m going to talk about this in the committee, I’m going to express this preoccupation to see if Zambia can return the materials to us because we need them. Why does a member of this committee hold our materials?” Then, when Mondlane found out about this he came to Nachingwea to meet with me, and Samora was away, he had left. He [Mondlane] asked me, “What is the matter?” I said, “Boss, I don’t know if I or you, comrade president, should go there.” He said, “No, I’m going there.” He came to Nachingwea, we met and discussed with him. Samora was absent and I was Samora’s deputy at the time. Then, we arranged for me to go to Dar es Salaam to take care of the situation because the meeting of the committee of the nine was being prepared. We left the same way Josina and I did; we slept in Linde and the driver who accompanied us was Raúl Gusmane. He left us there, and in the following day we boarded the plane and we arrived in Dar es Salaam on Saturday. On Sunday, we went to the beach. He [Mondlane], said, “No, let’s go to the beach and I’ll come to pick you up.” He came to pick me up and we went to the beach. It was he and his children, a woman [who lived in his house], and I. His wife, Janet, was abroad. We stayed there [at the beach], we ate there. Around 4 o’clock in the afternoon we left the beach. We had gone to the beach early in the morning around 8 o’clock. We ate there. We returned and he accompanied me, and he left me where I was staying. We arranged for me to board the plane back to Nachingwea on Monday morning around 9 o’clock. We also planned that I should meet him in his office at 8 o’clock so that he could pass to me some materials to dispatch so that I could proceed with my trip. [I said] “Very well.” I left early in the morning at 7 o’clock and I arrived a few minutes before 8 o’clock, and when I arrived there he had already arrived well before. I saw his car leaving when I was leaving [arriving], it was coming from this direction; I saw the car of the president leaving; the president leaves, and I thought someone was in his car or himself, then I went inside and I asked, “comrade president?” [My interlocutor asked], “Didn’t you meet him? He was there, he left but he will return very soon.” [I asked] “Is he coming back soon?” [The other person said], “Yes.” So I went to Rebelo’s office, to his office, and I started to organize some things; I went to the other office to prepare myself and do other things; so, the time passes and I had to be at the airport at 9 o’clock. He doesn’t come back and then it was 10, then 11 o’clock, and midday. I said, “Well, I’m going home; I’m going to Changombe where I’m staying.” So I left and I went there. I didn’t meet anyone there. No one came. I went there, I helped myself to some food. Then, I sat down there reading the newspaper and around 1pm or 2pm Oliver Tambo comes. He came in and said, “Excuse me,” and walked in. He looked at me and said, “My condolences”, and I [said] “Ha,” [he repeated] “My condolences.” He noticed that I didn’t understand anything and I saw him walking back and leave and he didn’t say anything. He didn’t say anything else and left. After 30 minutes, I saw Chissano coming handcuffed surrounded by police. I [exclaimed] “Epá, what is going on?” Chissano didn’t look at me; he only looked at me [in passing], then, they went to the bedrooms. They checked everything, beds, everything and I don’t know what else, everything. There was a small weapon that we had captured from régulo [----] from Cabo Delgado; it was a small captured weapon that they had offered Samora. It was a very tiny gun, and we had given it to him. They searched until they found that gun, a pistol. Then, they left. Chissano only looked at me, and he didn’t say anything, epá. He left. I tried to call all FRELIMO houses and the telephone line was cut. As soon as I arrived I tried to call to Samora’s house, Mondlane’s house, to Mondlane’s office and other places, everywhere, all telephone [lines were cut]. I sat down and after an hour, I saw Chissano walking in. Ah, I had not turned on the radio. I turned on Tanzania radio broadcasting when it was 4 pm. The Tanzanian radio was announcing, “Eduardo Chivambo Mondlane died.” Epa, they repeated, [I exclaimed], “What? He died?” [The radio] announced a bomb exploded. [I exclaimed] “A bomb?” This was announced on the radio; I heard this news only on the radio; during all this time I’m alone, and no one knew. I was by myself there. It was 4pm. It was after the news; it was 15 minutes after the news, Chissano came back again with the police without the handcuffs. He came in and called me. He approached me and asked, “Do you have the news?” I said, “I’ve just heard about it and it was announced on the Tanzanian radio,” and he said, “That’s the truth, comrade Mondlane died.” [I said], “What happened? Let’s go,” [and] he said, “No, don’t leave. You stay right here. If you leave you won’t come back, you’ll be taken to jail; everybody is being arrested over there; they’ve been detained. FRELIMO members are under police custody at the police station; you stay here, and don’t leave.” So, they [the police] had released him and had removed his handcuffs so that he could walk around with them. So, I stayed there. Around 7pm, Chissano comes back again, but this time alone. He took me and we went to where everybody was in detention, in police custody. That’s how the death of Mondlane happened. I worked with him. How did Samora react to this?

Samora was in the interior of Mozambique. The comrades turned on the radio and got the news about the death of Mondlane. Comrades Guebuza, Raimundo, and the commandants Cândido Mondlane and others met and said “Listen, don’t inform Samora about this right away,” because he was armed with a pistol; so, they decided to disarm him first. They went there and they waited until he removed his pistol. He put it down. Then they approached him and in a subtle way removed his pistol. Then some of them disappeared with the pistol and some entertained him and everything else. It was after all that when they informed him. He fell right there because Samora couldn’t withstand that, even when it was a [regular] soldier [who died] in battle [inform him about his death]. Hi, it’s very emotional, very human. You have to be well prepared to give that kind of news. To die a natural death, but to die in combat; [to report] that [a soldier] died in combat,yes. It takes some time to recover, yes sure. So, that how things happened. They disarmed him and informed him. He fell there. That’s how it happened. Some people had to be next to him, and watch him until he recovered. He himself said, “No, let’s go, we have to go back, we have to shorten the trip.” So, they had to shorten the trip and return. They took three days of march, first, second, and third day marching, until they reached the Rovuma and crossed the border without stopping. They walked day and night. And they arrived there. Then, we went to get them by car and took them to Dar es Salaam.

What I wanted to understand is that Samora had a decisive role in his struggle against Simango. Is this true?

No, the question was not about Simango and Samora. It was the process itself; it was the process itself. Simango was confronted on several occasions about his attitudes and about his ways, just like the question of Chairmen in Cabo Delgado, because he was also accused. Lázaro Kavandame had accused him during a meeting that everybody attended. We were in Mtwara and the meeting was attended by Tanzanians, members of government and TANU. Everybody was there including the police. He [Simango] was under criticism and people said things like, “This is the one who organized us; it’s him, Simango. Speak, you told us that we should do this and that; why don’t you speak now? Defend us now; can you see, FRELIMO is pushing us into the corner now. Now, what’s happening with you?” It was just like that. Simango was unable to defend himself. Therefore, it was not a matter of Samora or something like that. It was the process, and Simango was facing the process of struggle, of the revolution, just like the others; the outcome was not a matter of who is who [within FRELIMO]. I called Simango, the two of us alone, [in fact] he invited me and I don’t know why, [and he said], “Ah, I want to talk with you to find out about the war situation in the interior. What is the situation?” I said, “It is good.” He invited me. There was a university in Dar es Salaam, and we went there, sat down, and he asked me what the situation was. I explained to him that the situation was such and such and when we finished I asked, “Boss, we hear this and this about you; what is going on? You have been agitating the Chairmen and it even comes out in the newspaper. In the Kenyan newspaper and other places. What is the problem? What is going on?” He didn’t answer my questions, [then he said], “Very well, the meeting is over, we’re going to have a meeting another day, and we’re going to talk.” Simango never talked about this subject.

When Mondlane died, let’s say, there was a situation of agitation inside FRELIMO, but afterward a candidate was elected as the president, and again Urias Simango was elected to be part of the [leadership as interim president and member of the triumvirate] when all of you, guerrillas, knew what kind of person he was. But despite that [you put him in the leadership].

Listen, when Mondlane died, on the following day, the deputy-president [Urias Simango] was there and we had to call for a meeting of members of the central committee who were residents [in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania], and who were present there so that at least [the appointment] would not happen without a meeting. We arrived there, and Simango asked, “What kind of meeting is this?” We said, “This is a meeting of FRELIMO central committee members who are present here to examine the situation.” [He] said, “No, it is not what I want to know. What are we going to call this meeting?” [We asked] “This meeting?” “Yes, how are we going to name this meeting? How are we going to name this meeting? Is it an executive committee? Is it another meeting or something else?” [The answer was], “We are gathered here, members of the central committee. It is not a meeting of the central committee, but a meeting of the members of the central committee.” “Very well, and what are you going to call me?” he asked. [We asked], “You? What are we going to call you? You’re deputy president because no one has seen a meeting of the central committee; Mondlane died yesterday and we were here yesterday but everyone was detained; today and now, we are here because of that to find out what is the next step to take. This is the situation, and now what do you want to call it? We are gathered here, and say what?” [Simango replied saying], “Now, but what do you call me; I just want to know what you’re going to call me.” This was Simango [speaking]. We said, “Listen here, Simango, we’re not going to discuss those issues.” Do you know who got very rough with him? Armando Panguene, Marcelino dos Santos, Comrade [Jorge] Ribeiro and I. We said, “But Simango, what do you want? We are going to sit here.” Aurélio Manave [also became very rough with Simango]. “We are going to call you Simango, and that’s it. You’re deputy president, and other comrades will be coming and that is when [we can decide who will be the president].” [Simango said] But now, what are other people out there going to call me, ask me?” [We] said, “There is nothing [to worry about] because we don’t know what happened and we still don’t have any information.”. So, this was Simango’s problem. He was a highly ambitious man which he couldn’t hide. At least to hide, but he couldn’t. So, he did things openly. Sometimes, he would do things as if he were joking, but he was not. This is what I saw in him because I lived and talked with him.

The members [of the central committee] already knew what kind of man he was even though he remained in the FRELIMO leadership. Or was it a matter of transition. Or he knew that….

We already knew. We didn’t want to enlarge the fronts [enlarge the conflicts]. We knew and said, “This is the moment of cohesion; we must preserve the unity.” If we dropped each other there, others would come to get them, and it would be very damaging for us. We would keep [the group together] without sending anyone away. Perhaps others wanted us to send some people away so that they could come to [recruit] them. We said, “No, [you, Simango] stay,” and that’s why we created that [the transitional triumvirate] and we told him about it. That was it.

And Samora maintained a good relationship with him [Simango] because I think Samora was not the kind of person to be involved [in such conflicts]?

But, no, he had [to get involved], he had to get involved. It was not an option for him. He had to take a position and we also had to impose on Samora [to press Samora to take a firm position]. So, otherwise […] it was necessary to impose on Samora otherwise he [Simango] would do everything he wanted as if [the movement] belonged to him. No, no.

Some people believed and argued that with the death of the president the deputy- president automatically takes charge of all the powers.

They discussed that; they proposed that but we rejected that proposal. The statutes [of FRELIMO] had some gaps for some people and others, and that’s what we said. So, it was worth noting that there were gaps for both sides [everyone]. There were also some inconsistencies on other issues. We argued, therefore, that what we needed to look at was the ideal situation for us to keep fighting.

During the meeting ------?

Oh, they insisted. There were some groups that insisted. It was not an easy meeting and we took too much time in Nachingwea. We held the [meeting] behind closed doors so that when we left the room white smoke could come out and not dark smoke. To confuse people outside? No, no, it was not necessary; this happened and we said yes, yes… some posed the question, “Listen here, we have this issue; let’s say that this happened.” Now, if we don’t leave; sure, there were inconsistencies in the statutes for both sides; on our side and on their side. But, what we had to see there was the ideal situation for continuing with the struggle; sure, [the ideal situation was] to continue with the struggle, [we] had to maintain the momentum [of the struggle]. We had to look at how far we had gone with the struggle and how far we could still push the struggle ahead instead of holding back ourselves and trying to satisfy the [interests of ambitious people].

Given the fact that Samora was a very emotional person and very explosive, how was he able to keep or maintain his discipline to deal with someone who [was acting against the interests of the struggle]?

No, but the first principle of a man like him is discipline; Samora was very disciplined; sure, he was very disciplined and not liberal. That was his advantage: discipline and everything, and he was a man of principles too. These things gave him [an advantage]… because he was first disciplined, a man of principles. Then, when he took over the presidency [of FRELIMO], he stayed for a little while in Tanzania and he started to make many trips. He goes to Soviet Union and then to Asian countries, then to Italy, and did you, comrade Chipande, accompany him on one of those trips?

I didn’t accompany him, but I was aware. I was aware because we planned everything, Samora’s trips. First, we told Samora that we had support for the struggle that we were waging in [Mozambique]. The support came first from Tanzania and [it was important] to travel to all the provinces of Tanzania to say thank you…

But, during the liberation struggle

Yes, when the liberation struggle was over?

No, in 1971 he made a big trip.

Exactly

He made another trip to China, and during that time he made a trip inside Tanzania.

Ah, before or after the transition? Before? Ah, exactly, I understood. It was also part of our FRELIMO strategy.

What was the goal of the trip? To get more support from the international community?

That’s where I am going. It was part of Tanzania [the strategy that was designed in Tanzania]. We were fighting and following the struggle on the battlefield, and we realized later, we were caught by surprise by the progress of the armed struggle in Mozambique. We would tell ourselves, ten years from now, ten years more [we will achieve victory]. But that was not the case; there were no more than ten years, and why? We started to prepare to train ourselves as leaders, as guerrilla political leaders, as diplomats, and everything else. The level that our struggle had reached had gone beyond a regular war to become a classic war. We used rockets on the warfront, and we used land-to-air missiles on the battlefront, we used those Soviet rockets called cachucha with forty rocket launchers. But we used those with one rocket launcher but the power was the same. We had those [rocket launchers].

Are they are called cachucha? Is that so?

Yes, yes.

Or Mussolini

(Laughs) We had those one barreled rocket fire launchers. They [the Soviets] used forty barreled rocket fire launchers, and we also had them here. But during the war, we used one barreled rocket fire launchers and we transported them. About five or six people would carry those one barreled rocket fire launchers in Tete and Cabo Delgado. We expected that the war would take more than five and ten years, and we had to prepare ourselves. We had the party school in Nachingwea; we had the school of diplomacy there too. We would teach everything; we taught everything including foreign diplomacy, world [relations] and politics as we needed them. The Chinese played an important role in providing training for us. I did not understand [the lessons], and it was only when I arrived in Mozambique. Épa, someone would arrive and the Chinese would prepare a banquet with everything; why? Because a commandant had arrived from the warfront; they would organize everything for the [guest] and they would say, “We heard that a guest has arrived.” “Who is the guest?” “Didn’t a commandant from Niassa arrive?” “Yes. He did.” “We are inviting him to our house.” The guest would arrive at the host home and the first thing was to show the guest a film. After the film, they would take us to a room for a banquet. Then [I] was told “You have to introduce the commandant. [I] would find out how the guests were doing and everything else and the commandant also had to talk and explain what he was doing in the interior. The Chinese would provide the drinks and food. Sometimes, they would prepare the meals [and receptions] at the Chinese embassy in Dar es Salaam. They would invite FRELIMO members to attend these [receptions] and [dinners] once every month. It was training, isn’t it so? Therefore, when we arrived here [Maputo, then Lourenço Marques] some people would say “Those [receptions were part of] diplomacy,” they would understand that it was part of diplomacy. At a meeting that everyone attended the Chinese who had sent a large delegation called us to attention saying, “We heard that you’re damaging bridges, why? We don’t want to hear that. You’re destroying bridges instead of protecting them. Are you going to have the capacity to rebuild after independence? Some of you will be 30 and others 50 years old and you won’t have that capacity. Your economy will be fragile.” And it is true because we destroyed that bridge that goes from Pemba, Macomia and Chai, and it is still there. When I see it, I say “The Chinese told us.” (laughs) We are the ones who destroyed it and I say, “The Chinese told us about this.” Do you see, up to the present, after independence, the [damaged] bridge is still there. They [the constructors] installed a metallic [platform] but this year it had problems. It is there and we destroyed it. The Chinese were angry with us and they sent a very important delegation to call our attention to the destructions: “You have to be careful; it is your country; you can’t be the ones who destroy it. Your goal is to protect it. What has to be destroyed is the enemy.” Very well, very well. They taught us and we said ya. We had started the Lusaka agreements. Guebuza [was absent]. Do you know where we had to recall him from? From the Soviet Union where he was receiving training. Guebuza and many others of [the current] state apparatus. Tazama is one of them and many others commandants like Panguene. All of them were in the Soviet Union being trained as diplomats and everything else in order to fill the state apparatus one day. That was our situation. You also have to know president Samora as statesman and not only as guerrilla commandant. Wherever he went, he was welcomed with military honors. Everyplace that he went and passed he was welcomed with military honors. We discussed everything including some agreements; we didn’t do anything [in terms of agreements after independence]; everything was done during that time. Everything was done during the time of the armed struggle. Things were done during the time of war [of liberation] before we came here [to Maputo], before we became independent. We had agreements; FRELIMO had agreements, and we only came to ratify [these agreements] here [Maputo]. But everything had been done before. We were confident about our victory and it was also Samora’s vision. This is what I can say and as I was saying when [the war] was over, we said, “Go abroad to [thank for the support], go to Tanzania and Zambia to bid farewell.” He [Samora] also went to Zambia.

So, you were saying that FRELIMO was surprised that the war was over sooner than what you had anticipated.

Yes, sure. It is true. We expected more years. Very well, we had to bring back the commandants; they didn’t attend the courses, some didn’t finish. It was a group of officers.

[Factors that led to the end of the war?]

No, on the side of [the enemy], they could not withstand [the war]. The Portuguese economy and its allies could not withstand and support the war effort. It was something else. It [the end of the war] was not only on our side, it was also on the other side.

Comrade General, how did you feel about Samora, and how do you feel today about your friend?

Listen, I have very good memories. Because I can say that Samora treated us as brothers. He treated us like brothers, and as I said about his wedding, I was present. Let me say that whenever I went to Tanzania coming from [the warfronts in the north], I slept with him in the same bedroom. I slept with Samora in the same bedroom. He stayed there at the time that I was in the interior, and when I arrived there Samora’s bedroom was also mine and we would talk. There in Algeria where we trained, you would find Samora, Raimundo, Elias [sic. Urias?], Bonifácio Groveta and I always together.

During that time, did he like to talk about boxing?

Sure, sure, sure. He liked boxing and all those things. We trained there. Our group was very disciplined for everything including cooking. On the day scheduled for us to cook and when we, including Samora, went to the kitchen, everybody was assured that they would eat good food. “Who are in the kitchen?” “It is such and such a group [Samora, Chipande’s group].” No one wanted to be left out and everybody would come. In Kongwa was the same thing when it was our day. “Who is in the kitchen today?”, “That is Samora’s group,” “Ah.” Everybody would come to the kitchen and we would do marvelous things in the kitchen. But, when it was other people, no one would go there [to the kitchen]. So, we had [these shared experiences]; we slept together and Samora and I did everything together. However, I would like to add this, when we slept together we would talk until daybreak. “Eh, Chipande can you stop talking,” and sometimes he was the one to ask me to be quiet, sometimes he [would ask] “Eh, are you sleeping?” (laughs) We would have endless conversations. When we walked in the liberated areas, he would stop and say, “Chipande, when Mozambique is independent we have to come to build here. We have to open a machamba [field for crops], and [produce goods] like rice. Do you see here,” and I would say, “But, comrade what is that [will that be possible]?” “No, we have to do it,” and [he would say] that in Niassa and sometimes in Cabo Delgado.

END OF INTERVIEW.