Nuclear Deal with Iran

Surrender in Vienna Why We Need A BETTER Nuclear Deal With Iran A special briefing from the Editors of The Tower Ephraim Asculai • Ben Cohen • James Kirchick • Peter Kohanloo • Allan Myer Emanuele Ottolenghi • Michael Pregent • Oubai Shahbandar Surrender in Vienna: Why We Need A Better Nuclear Deal With Iran A special briefing by The Tower. ©2015 The Israel Project. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in any retrieval system of any nature, or transmitted in any form or by any means electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise with out prior permission in writing from the publisher. ISBN: 978-1-943842-05-6 The Tower is a digital publication covering Israel, the Middle East, and the U.S.-Israel relationship, published by The Israel Project (TIP), a nonpartisan 501(c)3 educational organization based in Washington D.C. that works to provide facts about Israel and the Middle East to the media, policymakers and the public. Tel: (202) 857-6644 Email: [email protected] TheIsraelProject.org CEO & President: Joshua S. Block Editorial Team: Ben Cohen, David Hazony, Aiden Pink Design and Production: Avoca Designs Surrender in Vienna: Why We Need A Better Nuclear Deal With Iran A Special Briefing by The Tower [4] Surrender in Vienna: Why We Need A Better Nuclear Deal With Iran. Table of Contents 7 - 8 Preface: Could There Be A Better Nuclear Deal With Iran? Ben Cohen 9 - 11 Introduction: The False Assumptions of the Obama Administration Allan Myer 12 - 14 Iran’s Drive for Regional Hegemony Michael Pregent 15 - 17 Iran and its Terror Proxies: A Clear and Present Danger James Kirchick 18 - 22 Gold Rush: The Dismantling of the Sanctions Regime Against Iran Emanuele Ottolenghi 23 - 26 Verification, Not Trust? Assessing the Weaknesses of the Inspections Regime Ephraim Asculai 27 - 29 Syria: The Most Immediate Victim Oubai Shahbandar 30 - 31 Iran: The Human Rights Nighmare Continues Peter Kohanloo 32 - 33 Contributors 34 Additional Resources Surrender in Vienna: Why We Need A Better Nuclear Deal With Iran. [5] [6] Surrender in Vienna: Why We Need A Better Nuclear Deal With Iran. PREFACE COULD THERE BE A BETTER NUCLEAR DEAL WITH IRAN? Ben Cohen n January 2010, a few weeks before France pointed out in a recent briefing, “Iran has the tools Iassumed the chairmanship of the UN Security to immediately avoid any violation, either by down Council, I interviewed Gerard Araud—today blending or halting Low-Enriched Uranium (LEU) France’s Ambassador to the United States, but at production... Based on Iran’s long history of violations the time its envoy to the UN—about Iran’s nuclear of its safeguards violations and non-cooperation program. “The Iranian nuclear program has no with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), civilian explanation whatsoever,” he told me. “You any overage over the cap should be treated as Iran don’t start a civilian nuclear program by enrich- testing the limits of the agreement.”3 ing uranium. It’s like buying the gas before the car.”1 As the contributions to this collection make clear, With hindsight, Araud’s fears seem remarkably pre- Iran is ideally placed to violate the JCPOA—not just scient. Under the terms of the Joint Comprehensive in terms of uranium enrichment, but on other critical Plan of Action (JCPOA) agreed with Iran in Vienna on aspects of its nuclear program as well. As Emanuele July 14, 2015,2 Iran will be able to continue enriching Ottolenghi points out in his chapter on the disman- uranium within certain limits—a major concession tling of the sanctions regime against Iran, the most that completely reverses the negotiating position of important tool for exerting pressure over the Iranian the major western powers over the last decade, which regime until now, has been effectively dispensed was to demand an end to its enrichment program. As with. the Institute for Science and International Security Surrender in Vienna: Why We Need A Better Nuclear Deal With Iran. [7] Why We Need A Better Nuclear Deal With Iran Nor can we overstate the negative regional impact conclusion match up to the world as it is, or is the of the JCPOA on the general security situation in conclusion based on series of profoundly false as- the Middle East. As both Michael Pregent’s chapter sumptions?” Regrettably, and despite President on Iran’s regional ambitions and James Kirchick’s Obama’s insistence that the agreement with Iran is chapter on Iranian backing for terrorism make clear, grounded on empirical verification rather than plain the United States and its allies have effectively legiti- trust, the assumptions of the current administra- mized the foreign policy goals of one of the world’s tion concerning Iran and its future behavior have, as most dangerous and aggressive regimes—goals that Myer asserts, created an outcome whereby research extend not only to its active interventions in Syria and on advanced centrifuges is permitted and, at the Yemen, its takeover of Southern Lebanon through same time, the bans on Iranian weapons imports and Hezbollah and the Gaza Strip through Hamas, and its ballistic missile programs are removed. All in all, this plans for other countries from Bahrain to Azerbaijan. provides “a significant boost to the legitimacy of a Moreover, our ability to police Iran’s nuclear program, regime with a truly despicable human rights record.” as Ephraim Asculai explains in his chapter on the In the coming weeks, the United States Congress will deeply flawed inspections regime, has been critically be faced with a decision of truly historic proportions. compromised by the JCPOA. This briefing aims to provide legislators, opinion- formers and the general public with the arguments The cause of human rights, too, has been dra- and perspectives that will transform the present matically set back, as Peter Kohanloo and Oubai feeble deal into a more robust one—a deal that will Shahbandar point out in their respective chapters guarantee not just our security, but that of future on the domestic situation in Iran and the Iranian generations who may otherwise be condemned to regime’s continuing support for the bloodstained a world where Iran’s desire for a nuclear weapon is dictatorship of Bashar al Assad in neighboring Syria. achieved, and where the states around it launch their own nuclear programs is a desperate bid to prevent In his introduction to this collection, Allan Myer the regime in Tehran from achieving regional asks the pertinent question: “Does the President’s hegemony. 1. The interview with Araud can be viewed here: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2VG8Aq69v2c 2. See http://eeas.europa.eu/statements-eeas/docs/iran_agreement/iran_joint-comprehensive-plan-of-action_en.pdf 3. See http://isis-online.org/uploads/isis-reports/documents/Reconciling_the_300_kg_Cap_with_Iran%E2%80%99s_Monthly_Production_of_LEU_Final.pdf [8] Surrender in Vienna: Why We Need A Better Nuclear Deal With Iran. INTRODUCTION SURRENDER IN VIENNA: THE FALSE ASSUMPTIONS OF THE OBAMA ADMINISTRATION Allan Myer he Iran nuclear deal agreed in Vienna on July 14, The Obama Administration has avoided such a T2015, known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of voyage of discovery, signing a nuclear deal based Action (JCPOA), will be the focus of furious debate on a belief system and a series of assumptions that, for the remainder of President Barack Obama’s term in the President’s own words, provide “a historic in office and beyond. The White House and other chance to pursue a safer and more secure world.” proponents will argue its merits and proclaim it to be Hence, the fundamental question is this: “Does the a “good deal” in the best interests of the United States President’s conclusion match up to the world as it is, and our allies and friends. They will also warn that the or is the conclusion based on series of profoundly only alternative to the Vienna deal is war. Opponents false assumptions?” will claim that if the deal goes into effect as it is cur- rently structured, it will prove to be a catastrophic Assumptions always play a huge part in the way mistake and will make the Middle East and the world decisions are made. Failure to address, understand, at large a far more dangerous place. They will argue and then heed the truth or fallacy of underlying as- that the alternative to this deal is a better deal. sumptions provide the best forecast of whether the outcome will be successful or not. When it comes Perhaps the underlying reason for this glaring to forecasting the outcome of this deal, testing disparity can be found in a phrase that often afflicts the validity of the Administration’s underlying as- strategic thinkers and political decision-makers: We sumptions should be an essential starting point for don’t believe the world we see; we see the world we any rational debate. If the assumptions are valid, believe. As the great liberal philosopher Karl Popper it’s probably a good deal; if invalid, it is probably a argued, the always-difficult search for truth is guided horrific deal. in part by “the gradual discovery of our prejudices.”1 Surrender in Vienna: Why We Need A Better Nuclear Deal With Iran. [9] Surrender in Vienna: The False Assumptions of the Obama Administration Assumption: Iran should be and will be a stabilizing imposed on Iran in November 2011. Two years later, regional power in the Middle East. Really? The day Iran was six months away from a severe balance- after Secretary of State John Kerry announced the of-payments crisis, the value of the Iranian Rial deal in Vienna, President Obama said “this deal… was collapsing, and Iran’s inflation rate soared to 60 makes our country and the world safer and more percent.

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