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The John Marshall Journal of Information Technology & Privacy Law Volume 16 Issue 3 Journal of Computer & Information Law Article 1 - Spring 1998 Winter 1997 Cryptography and Liberty: An International Survey of Encryption Policy, 16 J. Marshall J. Computer & Info. L. 475 (1998) Wayne Madsen David L. Sobel Marc Rotenberg David Banisar Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.uic.edu/jitpl Part of the Computer Law Commons, International Humanitarian Law Commons, Internet Law Commons, Privacy Law Commons, and the Science and Technology Law Commons Recommended Citation Wayne Madsen, David L. Sobel, Marc Rotenberg & David Banisar, Cryptography and Liberty: An International Survey of Encryption Policy, 16 J. Marshall J. Computer & Info. L. 475 (1998) https://repository.law.uic.edu/jitpl/vol16/iss3/1 This Symposium is brought to you for free and open access by UIC Law Open Access Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in The John Marshall Journal of Information Technology & Privacy Law by an authorized administrator of UIC Law Open Access Repository. For more information, please contact [email protected]. ARTICLES CRYPTOGRAPHY AND LIBERTY: AN INTERNATIONAL SURVEY OF ENCRYPTION POLICY by WAYNE MADSEN, DAVID L. SOBEL, MARC ROTENBERG, & DAVID BANisAR OF THE ELECTRONIC PRIVACY INFORMATION CENTERt I. THE IMPORTANCE OF CRYPTOGRAPHY ............ 477 II. ENCRYPTION AND HUMAN RIGHTS ................ 478 III. THE GLOBAL INTERNET LIBERTY CAMPAIGN AND ENCRYPTION ......................................... 479 IV. PURPOSE OF THE SURVEY .......................... 480 V. SURVEY RESPONSES ................................ 481 VI. SUMMARY OF RESULTS ............................. 482 A. SURVEY RESULTS ..................................... 483 1. Anguilla: Green ................................. 483 2. Antigua and Barbuda: Green ................... 484 3. Argentina: Yellow ............................... 484 4. Armenia: Yellow ................................ 484 5. Australia: Green / Yellow ........................ 484 6. Austria: Yellow ................................. 486 7. Bahrain: Unknown ............................. 488 8. Belarus: Red ................................... 488 9. Belgium: Green ................................. 488 10. Belize: Green ................................... 489 11. Brazil: Green ................................... 489 12. Bulgaria: Green/Yellow ......................... 489 t Wayne Madsen was the principal researcher and writer of this Article. Assistance was provided by David L. Sobel, Marc Rotenberg, and David Banisar. This Article was produced on behalf of the Global Internet Liberty Campaign, a coalition of forty-one human rights, civil liberties, and computer user groups around the world. More information on The Electronic Privacy Information Center ("EPIC") is available at http://www.epic.org/. A grant from the Open Society Institute funded the research. 476 JOURNAL OF COMPUTER & INFORMATION LAW [Vol. XVI 13. Cambodia: Unknown ........................... 489 14. Campione d'Italia: Green ....................... 489 15. Canada: Green/Yellow .......................... 490 16. China: Red ..................................... 490 17. Croatia: Green .................................. 491 18. Cyprus: Green/Yellow .......................... 491 19. Czech Republic: Green/Yellow .................. 491 20. Denmark: Green ................................ 492 21. Estonia: Green .................................. 493 22. European Union: Green/Yellow ................. 493 23. Falkland Islands: Green ........................ 494 24. Finland: Green ................................. 495 25. France: Red/Yellow ............................. 496 26. Federal Republic of Germany: Green ............ 498 27. Gibraltar:Green ................................ 499 28. Greece: Green/Yellow ........................... 499 29. Hong Kong: Yellow ............................. 500 30. Hungary: Green/Yellow ......................... 500 31. Iceland: Green .................................. 500 32. India: Yellow/Red .............................. 500 33. Indonesia: Yellow ............................... 501 34. Iran: Unknown ................................. 501 35. Ireland: Green/Yellow .......................... 501 36. Israel: Red ..................................... 502 37. Italy: Green/Yellow ............................. 502 38. Japan: Yellow .................................. 503 39. Korea, Republic of.- Yellow ...................... 504 40. Kuwait: Unknown .............................. 504 41. Latvia: Green ................................... 504 42. Liechtenstein: Green ............................ 505 43. Lithuania: Green ............................... 505 44. Luxembourg: Green/Yellow ..................... 505 45. M alaysia: Yellow ............................... 506 46. M exico: Green .................................. 506 47. Mount Athos, Republic of. Green ................ 506 48. Nauru: Green ................................... 507 49. Netherlands: Green/Yellow ..................... 507 50. NetherlandsAntilles: Green / Yellow ............. 508 51. New Zealand: Green / Yellow .................... 508 52. Nicaragua: Unknown ........................... 508 53. Norfolk Island: Green ........................... 509 54. Norway: Green ................................. 509 55. Pakistan:Red .................................. 509 56. PapuaNew Guinea: Green ...................... 509 1998] CRYPTOGRAPHY AND LIBERTY 477 57. Philippines: Green .............................. 510 58. Poland: Green/Yellow .......................... 510 59. Portugal: Green/Yellow ......................... 510 60. Romania: Green/Yellow ........................ 511 61. R ussia: Red .................................... 511 62. Saudi Arabia: Green ............................ 512 63. Singapore: Red ................................. 512 64. Slovakia: Green/Yellow ......................... 512 65. Slovenia: Green ................................. 513 66. South Africa: Yellow ............................ 513 67. Spain: Yellow .................................. 513 68. Swaziland: Green ............................... 515 69. Sweden: Green .................................. 515 70. Switzerland: Green ............................. 516 71. Taiwan: Yellow ................................. 518 72. Tibet: Green .................................... 518 73. Turkey: Yellow ................................. 519 74. Ukraine: Yellow ................................ 519 75. United Kingdom: Green/Yellow ................. 519 76. United States: Yellow/Red ...................... 521 B. THE ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT: ("OECD") GUIDELINES ON CRYPTOGRAPHY POLICY ................................ 522 C. COUNCIL OF EUROPE ................................ 524 VII. CONCLUSION OF THE SURVEY ..................... 525 I. THE IMPORTANCE OF CRYPTOGRAPHY Emerging computer and communications technologies are radically altering the ways in which individuals communicate and exchange infor- mation. Along with the speed, efficiency, and cost-saving benefits of the "digital revolution" come new challenges to the security and privacy of communications and information traversing the global communications infrastructure. In response to these challenges, the security mechanisms of tradi- tional paper-based communications media-envelopes and locked filing cabinets-are being replaced by cryptographic security techniques. Through the use of cryptography, communication and information stored and transmitted by computers can be protected against interception to a very high degree. Until recently, there was little non-governmental de- mand for encryption capabilities. Modern encryption technology was traditionally deployed most widely to protect the confidentiality of mili- tary and diplomatic communications. 1 With the advent of the computer 1. Encryption is a mathematical process involving the use of formulas (or algorithms). 478 JOURNAL OF COMPUTER & INFORMATION LAW [Vol. XVI revolution, and recent innovations in the science of encryption, a new market for cryptographic products has developed. Electronic communi- cations are now widely used in the civilian sector and have become an integral component of the global economy. Computers store and ex- change an ever-increasing amount of highly personal information, in- cluding medical and financial data. In this electronic environment, the need for privacy-enhancing technologies is apparent. Communications applications such as electronic mail and electronic fund transfers require secure means of encryption and authentication-features that can only be provided if cryptographic know-how is widely available and unencum- bered by government regulation. Governmental regulation of cryptographic security techniques en- dangers personal privacy. Encryption ensures the confidentiality of per- sonal records, such as medical information, personal financial data, and electronic mail. In a networked environment, such information is in- creasingly at risk of theft or misuse. In the "Resolution in Support of the Freedom to Use Cryptography," members of the Global Internet Liberty Campaign ("GILC") noted that "the use of cryptography implicates human rights and matters of personal liberty that affect individuals around the world" and that "the privacy of communication is explicitly protected by Article 12 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Article 17 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 2 and
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  • Development of Surveillance Technology and Risk of Abuse of Economic Information

    Development of Surveillance Technology and Risk of Abuse of Economic Information

    ∋(9(/230(172)6859(,//∃1&( 7(&+12/2∗<∃1∋5,6.2)∃%86( 2)(&2120,&,1)250∃7,21 9ΡΟ 7ΚΗςΗΡΙΚΗΥΛΘΦΡΠΠΞΘΛΦΛΡΘς ,ΘΗΟΟΛϑΗΘΦΗ&20,17ΡΙΞΡΠ∆ΗΓΣΥΡΦΗςςΛΘϑΙΡΥΛΘΗΟΟΛϑΗΘΦΗΣΞΥΣΡςΗς ΡΙΛΘΗΥΦΗΣΗΓΕΥΡΓΕΘΓΠΞΟΛΟΘϑΞϑΗΟΗςΗΓΡΥΦΡΠΠΡΘΦΥΥΛΗΥ ς∴ςΗΠςΘΓΛςΣΣΟΛΦΕΛΟΛ∴Ρ&20,17ΥϑΗΛΘϑΘΓςΗΟΗΦΛΡΘ ΛΘΦΟΞΓΛΘϑςΣΗΗΦΚΥΗΦΡϑΘΛΛΡΘ :ΡΥΝΛΘϑΓΡΦΞΠΗΘΙΡΥΚΗ672∃3ΘΗΟ /Ξ[ΗΠΕΡΞΥϑ2ΦΡΕΗΥ 3(9ΡΟ &ΟΡϑΞΛΘϑΓ 7ΛΟΗ 3∆Υ7ΚΗςΗΡΙΚΗΥΛΘΦΡΠΠΞΘΛΦΛΡΘς ,ΘΗΟΟΛϑΗΘΦΗ&20,17ΡΙΞΡΠ∆ΗΓΣΥΡΦΗςςΛΘϑΙΡΥ ΛΘΗΟΟΛϑΗΘΦΗΣΞΥΣΡςΗςΡΙΛΘΗΥΦΗΣΗΓΕΥΡΓΕΘΓΞΟΛ ΟΘϑΞϑΗΟΗςΗΓΡΥΦΡΠΠΡΘΦΥΥΛΗΥς∴ςΗΠςΘΓΛς ΣΣΟΛΦΕΛΟΛ∴Ρ&20,17ΥϑΗΛΘϑΘΓςΗΟΗΦΛΡΘ ΛΘΦΟΞΓΛΘϑςΣΗΗΦΚΥΗΦΡϑΘΛΛΡΘ :ΡΥΝΣΟΘ5ΗΙ (3,9%672∃ 3ΞΕΟΛςΚΗΥ (ΞΥΡΣΗΘ3ΥΟΛΠΗΘ ∋ΛΥΗΦΡΥΗ∗ΗΘΗΥΟΙΡΥ5ΗςΗΥΦΚ ∋ΛΥΗΦΡΥΗ∃ 7ΚΗ672∃3ΥΡϑΥ∆ΠΠΗ ∃ΞΚΡΥ ∋ΞΘΦΘ&ΠΣΕΗΟΟ,379/ΩΓ(ΓΛΘΕΞΥϑΚ (ΓΛΡΥ 0Υ∋ΛΦΝ+2/∋6:257+ +ΗΓΡΙ672∃8ΘΛ ∋Η 2ΦΡΕΗΥ 3(ΘΞΠΕΗΥ 3(9ΡΟ 7ΚΛςΓΡΦΞΠΗΘΛςΖΡΥΝΛΘϑ∋ΡΦΞΠΗΘΙΡΥΚΗ672∃3ΘΗΟ,ΛςΘΡΘΡΙΙΛΦΛΟΣΞΕΟΛΦΛΡΘΡΙ672∃ 7ΚΛςΓΡΦΞΠΗΘΓΡΗςΘΡΘΗΦΗςςΥΛΟ∴ΥΗΣΥΗςΗΘΚΗΨΛΗΖςΡΙΚΗ(ΞΥΡΣΗΘ3ΥΟΛΠΗΘ I nterception Capabilities 2000 Report to the Director General for Research of the European Parliament (Scientific and Technical Options Assessment programme office) on the development of surveillance technology and risk of abuse of economic information. This study considers the state of the art in Communications intelligence (Comint) of automated processing for intelligence purposes of intercepted broadband multi-language leased or common carrier systems, and its applicability to Comint targeting and selection, including speech recognition. I nterception Capabilities 2000 Cont ent s SUMMARY .............................................................................................................................................................................................