DOCSLIB.ORG

A.Q. Khan and Onward Proliferation from Pakistan

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
A.Q. Khan and Onward Proliferation from Pakistan Chapter three A.Q. KHAN AND ONWARD PROLIFERATION FROM PAKISTAN This chapter examines the known cases of nuclear mounting concerns about US and other foreign intel- exports undertaken by the A.Q. Khan network (and, ligence penetration, Zia ordered increased secrecy in the case of North Korea, by Khan himself, inde- and compartmentalisation of the nuclear weapons pendent of his foreign associates) and is intended programme, thus allowing Khan to operate much to enable a fuller understanding of the involvement more independently. and responsibilities of each of the various actors at An unhealthy rivalry with PAEC propelled Khan work: Khan, his foreign business partners and the towards even greater secrecy and opaque business relevant Pakistani authorities, military and civilian. practices. The Pakistani government encouraged A!er describing the conditions that allowed Khan the strategic laboratories’ rivalry and was only to make the transition from importing for Pakistan’s interested in tangible results for the weapons national nuclear programme to exporting to other programme. The fact that Khan operated beyond states through his own independent network, the the remit of the vaguely stated laboratory guide- chapter examines, in chronological order, the inter- lines surprised nobody, as every o$cial involved actions between Khan and Iran, Iraq, North Korea in the nuclear programme recognised that improvi- and Libya, and notes the unanswered questions sation of various sorts was required to circumvent about what Khan sold and to whom else he might foreign export controls and other international non- have o"ered his nuclear wares. proliferation constraints. While PAEC was account- able to governmental authorities, KRL was not, and Transition from imports to exports it expanded its responsibilities beyond its mandate From the outset, Pakistani government authorities into designing bombs, developing trigger mecha- provided A.Q. Khan with a remarkable degree of nisms, reducing uranium gas into metal and working power and autonomy, partly because he demanded on design assembly itself. It is unclear whether it, partly because of the very sensitive nature of his this initiative had been o$cially sanctioned by the work, and partly because he was able to achieve authorities or was a unilateral decision on Khan’s tangible results faster than the Pakistani Atomic part. Apparently, Zia had privately authorised the Energy Commission (PAEC), the rival scientific more results-oriented A.Q. Khan to continue activi- laboratory to Khan Research Laboratories (KRL). ties that were parallel to programmes that PAEC was At first, President Zulfiqar Ali Bhu#o directed the conducting. In turn, Zia encouraged M.A. Khan to nuclear weapons programme personally, without report on A.Q. Khan. The bi#er rivalry between the much bureaucratic involvement. A small organisa- two organisations handicapped the safeguarding of tion was set up to troubleshoot security, finances Pakistan’s nuclear secrets. and other issues that A.Q. Khan or PAEC Chairman The PAEC–KRL rivalry was played out in three Munir Ahmad Khan raised; its job was not to regu- significant ways. The first was a public-relations late the activities of either KRL or PAEC. ba#le waged by each organisation to win popu- As A.Q. Khan began to make real progress with larity by defaming the other. KRL employed at least his centrifuge project at Kahuta, Bhu#o’s successor, %& journalists in this vein, with PAEC following General Zia ul-Haq, who did not particularly suit, but to a far lesser extent. The second aspect care for the PAEC chairman, provided A.Q. Khan was fierce bureaucratic infighting. More generally, with further sweeping responsibilities. Because of this rivalry stimulated Khan to operate beyond an IISS strategic dossier 65 A.Q. Khan and onward proliferation from Pakistan the vague governmental guidelines and to under- required apparently went undetected.1 He had take his procurement and production activities access to autonomous import and export privileges in extreme secrecy – partly so that PAEC o$cials that no other organisation in the country possessed. could not discover what he was up to. PAEC’s It is unclear whether the excessive orders placed by failure to procure a plutonium reprocessing facility Khan all arrived in Pakistan or went to Dubai for was partially blamed on its hesitant leadership and storage or dispatch to their final destination. Having outmoded bureaucracy. In contrast, A.Q. Khan’s expanded into other areas related to the manufacture success in achieving his objectives confirmed the of nuclear weapons and their associated delivery value of being freed from bureaucratic constraints. systems, Khan now had reason to seek more foreign During the '()&s, Pakistan found itself immersed shipments and to charter more aircra! to transport in clandestine activity. The covert war against the the goods. No one apart from the president had Soviets in Afghanistan made Pakistan a hub of authority to question the contents or justification of covert supplies and transfers. This environment Khan’s imports or exports. This was owing to Zia’s enabled Pakistan to bring in nuclear-related ship- decision to give Khan a very long leash as long as ments under the guise of other clandestine weapons he delivered the goods for Pakistan’s own bomb and equipment bound for Afghanistan’s ‘jihad’. programme – which he always did. Pakistani import- and export-control organisations Most of Khan’s onward proliferation deals were (customs, immigration, etc.) became more ine$- struck during a particular era of Pakistan’s troubled cient and corrupt. political life. Between August '()) (when Zia died) By the mid-'()&s, A.Q. Khan had begun work on and October '((( (when Pervez Musharraf took a second-generation centrifuge design, designated over), the structure of power in the country was the P-% (like the P-', based on a Urenco design – see di"use and complex, with three di"erent poles: the pages '), %&), which had rotors made of maraging presidency, the army and the prime minister. The steel (an iron alloy that has superior strength without civilian leaders had li#le involvement in nuclear losing malleability), enabling it to spin at twice the ma#ers, policymaking was personalised and speed of P-' centrifuges and to enrich uranium more democratic institutions were weak. For over two than twice as e$ciently. As the acquisition priori- decades, from '(*+ onwards, Khan’s foreign travels ties of KRL gradually shi!ed to materials required were not checked and his itinerary was a national for the advanced P-% designs, Khan was le! with secret, especially a!er the trial in the Netherlands, an surplus inventory of P-' centrifuges and related for which he was sentenced in absentia (see page components. This gave him and his foreign-based ')). The Directorate of Inter-Services Intelligence partners the opportunity for a more profitable busi- (ISI) was the only other organisation that escaped ness model by exploring export markets. In two governmental accountability, due to the covert notable instances, however – those of both Iran nature of its role in the war in Afghanistan and in and Libya – it may have been a case of interested other intelligence and counter-intelligence opera- customers first reaching out to the network, rather tions. than the other way around, although accounts di"er The fact that Khan was privy to the highest on this and many other points. To meet the growing national secrets meant that his activities could not demand for its wares, the network established be easily questioned. His security apparatus was a nuclear supply line with a life of its own. Thus, not designed to monitor him, but rather to protect instead of reducing the supply line a!er Pakistan him and his organisation from external spies had acquired the essential ingredients to produce and anything that might compromise his foreign weapons-grade material, the network redoubled its procurement for Pakistan’s nuclear programme.2 acquisition e"orts to go a!er more advanced tech- All KRL security personnel reported to him, and nologies (for the P-% centrifuges), as well as greater those military o$cers posted to him or other stra- quantities of materials which were not needed by tegic organisations were appointed by the army Pakistan but could be resold to customers elsewhere a!er screening. Most were either retired or on the in the market for P-' centrifuges. verge of retiring from military service, and a posting Khan’s nuclear acquisition activities were to guard the most coveted national organisation largely unsupervised by Pakistani governmental became a ma#er of pride. Security personnel were authorities and his orders of many more compo- assured that there would be financial benefits and nents than Pakistan’s own enrichment programme privileges so long as Khan considered them to be 66 Nuclear Black Markets: Pakistan, A.Q. Khan and the rise of proliferation networks A.Q. Khan and onward proliferation from Pakistan indispensable to the security and advancement of the programme. The network of brokers, financiers and front companies that Khan created to supply Pakistan’s enrichment programme was also available to him for the new export opportunity that had become apparent. Khan’s network initially consisted of a loosely connected set of intermediaries, which grad- ually evolved into a business enterprise. Contacts with Iran in '()* represented the first known case of foreign associates working on Khan’s behalf for purposes other than importing goods and tech- nology for Pakistan. Iran The Khan network’s first known involvement in onward proliferation started with a discreet overture B.S.A. Tahir (courtesy Royal Malaysian Police) from Iran during the Zia regime in the mid-'()&s. According to o$cials who were close to Zia, Iran approached the Pakistani government through This deal included a provision for Pakistani scientists o$cial channels but did not receive the fuel-cycle to train at least six Iranians at the Pakistan Institute technology it was seeking.
Load more

Recommended publications
  • SIPRI Yearbook 2018: Armaments, Disarmament and International
    world nuclear forces 273 VII. Pakistani nuclear forces shannon n. kile and hans m. kristensen Pakistan continues to prioritize the development and deployment of new nuclear weapons and delivery systems as part of its ‘full spectrum deterrence posture’ vis-à-vis India. It is estimated that Pakistan possessed 140–50 war- heads as of January 2018 (see table 6.8). Pakistan’s nuclear weapon arsenal is likely to expand significantly over the next decade, although estimates of the increase in warhead numbers vary considerably.1 Pakistan is believed to be gradually increasing its military fissile material holdings, which include both plutonium and highly enriched uranium (HEU) (see section X). Pakistan’s plutonium production complex is located at Khushab in the province of Punjab. It consists of four operational heavy water nuclear reactors and a heavy water production plant.2 Pakistan appears to be increasing its capacity to reprocess spent nuclear fuel—that is, to chemically separate plutonium from irradiated reactor fuel. A small reprocessing plant has been expanded at the New Laboratories facility of the Pakistan Institute of Science and Technology (PINSTECH) near Rawal- pindi. A larger reprocessing plant has been constructed at the Chashma Nuclear Power Complex in Punjab and may already be operational.3 Uranium enrichment takes place at the gas centrifuge plant in the Khan Research Laboratories (KRL) complex at Kahuta in Punjab and at a smaller plant located at Gadwal, also in Punjab. A new uranium enrichment centri- fuge plant may be under construction in the KRL complex at Kahuta.4 Pakistan’s capacity to produce HEU for nuclear weapons is constrained by its limited indigenous supply of natural uranium.5 Aircraft The Pakistan Air Force’s (PAF) Mirage III and Mirage V combat aircraft are the most likely aircraft to have been given a nuclear delivery role.
    [Show full text]
  • “What Could Possibly Go Wrong?”
    “WHAT COULD POSSIBLY GO WRONG?” SECRET DEAL ALLOWS COMPANY TIED TO SADDAM’S NUCLEAR BOMBMAKER, IRAN AND U.A.E. TO MANAGE KEY FLORIDA PORT FACILITIES An Occasional Paper of the Center for Security Policy By: Alan Jones and Mary Fanning 23 December 2016 1 Gulftainer’s Port Canaveral cargo container terminal (left), Saddam Hussein awarding a medal to Iraqi nuclear physicist Dr. Jafar Dhia Jafar, considered the “father of Iraq’s nuclear weapons program” (right) In 2015 President Barack Obama’s Administration quietly approved the hand-over of cargo container operations at Florida’s Port Canaveral to Gulftainer, a Middle Eastern ports company owned by the Emir of Sharjah of the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Iraqi businessman Hamid Dhia Jafar. Hamid Jafar is the brother and the business partner of Dr. Jafar Dhia Jafar -- the Baghdad-born nuclear physicist who masterminded Saddam Hussein’s nuclear weapons program. UAE-based port operator Gulftainer, a subsidiary of The Crescent Group, was awarded the 35- year no-bid lease at Port Canaveral in 2014 following two years of secret talks in a deal code-named “Project Pelican.” Treasury Secretary Jacob “Jack” Lew declined1 to conduct a Committee on Foreign Investment (CFIUS) National Security Threat Analysis that, under the Foreign Investment & National Security Act of 2007 (FINSA), is required for transactions affecting America’s critical infrastructure and U.S. national security. Port Canaveral is in close proximity to a U.S. Navy nuclear submarine base, two U.S. Air Force Space Command bases, and NASA’s Kennedy Space Center. Gulftainer has port operations in the UAE, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Lebanon, Pakistan, Turkey, Brazil, and Russia.
    [Show full text]
  • Umme-Hani Khan Amicus Brief
    NO. 14-86 In the Supreme Court of the United States ________________ EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, Petitioner, v. ABERCROMBIE & FITCH STORES, INC., Respondent. ________________ On Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit ________________ BRIEF OF AMICUS CURIAE UMME-HANI KHAN IN SUPPORT OF PETITIONER ________________ ZAHRA BILLOO CHRISTOPHER HO FATIMA IQBAL Counsel of Record COUNCIL ON AMERICAN- MARSHA J. CHIEN ISLAMIC RELATIONS – SAN THE LEGAL AID SOCIETY – FRANCISCO BAY AREA EMPLOYMENT LAW CENTER OFFICE 180 Montgomery Street, 3000 Scott Blvd., Suite 600 Suite 101 San Francisco, CA 94104 Santa Clara, CA 95054 (415) 864-8848 (408) 986-9874 [email protected] Counsel for Amicus Curiae December 9, 2014 {00426360.DOC} i TABLE OF CONTENTS Page(s) TABLE OF AUTHORITIES……………………………ii STATEMENT OF INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE……………………………………….1 SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT………………………….4 ARGUMENT……………………………………………...5 A. Discrimination Has Numerous Adverse Effects Upon Individuals’ Mental Health…………………………………….8 B. Discrimination Has Particularly Harsh Impacts Upon Muslim Americans………………………………………..12 C. Religious Discrimination May Have Serious Implications for the Mental Health of Muslim Women Who Wear a Hijab ............................15 D. Discrimination Has Economic Effects……….17 CONCLUSION……………………………………........18 ii TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Page(s) Cases EEOC v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc., 966 F. Supp. 2d 965 (N.D. Cal. 2013) ......................... 3 Other Authorities Alyssa E. Rippy & Alana Newman, Perceived Religious Discrimination and Its Relationship to Anxiety and Paranoia Among Muslim-Americans, 1 J. Muslim Mental Health 5 (2006) ........................ 13 Arab American Institute, American Attitudes Toward Arabs and Muslims: 2014 (2014), available at http://b.3cdn.net/aai/3e05a493869e 6b44b0_76m6iyjon.pdf ...........................................
    [Show full text]
  • The Development of Military Nuclear Strategy And
    The Development of Military Nuclear Strategy and Anglo-American Relations, 1939 – 1958 Submitted by: Geoffrey Charles Mallett Skinner to the University of Exeter as a thesis for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in History, July 2018 This thesis is available for Library use on the understanding that it is copyright material and that no quotation from the thesis may be published without proper acknowledgement. I certify that all material in this thesis which is not my own work has been identified and that no material has previously been submitted and approved for the award of a degree by this or any other University. (Signature) ……………………………………………………………………………… 1 Abstract There was no special governmental partnership between Britain and America during the Second World War in atomic affairs. A recalibration is required that updates and amends the existing historiography in this respect. The wartime atomic relations of those countries were cooperative at the level of science and resources, but rarely that of the state. As soon as it became apparent that fission weaponry would be the main basis of future military power, America decided to gain exclusive control over the weapon. Britain could not replicate American resources and no assistance was offered to it by its conventional ally. America then created its own, closed, nuclear system and well before the 1946 Atomic Energy Act, the event which is typically seen by historians as the explanation of the fracturing of wartime atomic relations. Immediately after 1945 there was insufficient systemic force to create change in the consistent American policy of atomic monopoly. As fusion bombs introduced a new magnitude of risk, and as the nuclear world expanded and deepened, the systemic pressures grew.
    [Show full text]
  • Imports-Exports Enterprise’: Understanding the Nature of the A.Q
    Not a ‘Wal-Mart’, but an ‘Imports-Exports Enterprise’: Understanding the Nature of the A.Q. Khan Network Strategic Insights , Volume VI, Issue 5 (August 2007) by Bruno Tertrais Strategic Insights is a bi-monthly electronic journal produced by the Center for Contemporary Conflict at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, California. The views expressed here are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily represent the views of NPS, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government. Introduction Much has been written about the A.Q. Khan network since the Libyan “coming out” of December 2003. However, most analysts have focused on the exports made by Pakistan without attempting to relate them to Pakistani imports. To understand the very nature of the network, it is necessary to go back to its “roots,” that is, the beginnings of the Pakistani nuclear program in the early 1970s, and then to the transformation of the network during the early 1980s. Only then does it appear clearly that the comparison to a “Wal-Mart” (the famous expression used by IAEA Director General Mohammed El-Baradei) is not an appropriate description. The Khan network was in fact a privatized subsidiary of a larger, State-based network originally dedicated to the Pakistani nuclear program. It would be much better characterized as an “imports-exports enterprise.” I. Creating the Network: Pakistani Nuclear Imports Pakistan originally developed its nuclear complex out in the open, through major State-approved contracts. Reprocessing technology was sought even before the launching of the military program: in 1971, an experimental facility was sold by British Nuclear Fuels Ltd (BNFL) in 1971.
    [Show full text]
  • A Selected Bibliography of Publications By, and About, J
    A Selected Bibliography of Publications by, and about, J. Robert Oppenheimer Nelson H. F. Beebe University of Utah Department of Mathematics, 110 LCB 155 S 1400 E RM 233 Salt Lake City, UT 84112-0090 USA Tel: +1 801 581 5254 FAX: +1 801 581 4148 E-mail: [email protected], [email protected], [email protected] (Internet) WWW URL: http://www.math.utah.edu/~beebe/ 17 March 2021 Version 1.47 Title word cross-reference $1 [Duf46]. $12.95 [Edg91]. $13.50 [Tho03]. $14.00 [Hug07]. $15.95 [Hen81]. $16.00 [RS06]. $16.95 [RS06]. $17.50 [Hen81]. $2.50 [Opp28g]. $20.00 [Hen81, Jor80]. $24.95 [Fra01]. $25.00 [Ger06]. $26.95 [Wol05]. $27.95 [Ger06]. $29.95 [Goo09]. $30.00 [Kev03, Kle07]. $32.50 [Edg91]. $35 [Wol05]. $35.00 [Bed06]. $37.50 [Hug09, Pol07, Dys13]. $39.50 [Edg91]. $39.95 [Bad95]. $8.95 [Edg91]. α [Opp27a, Rut27]. γ [LO34]. -particles [Opp27a]. -rays [Rut27]. -Teilchen [Opp27a]. 0-226-79845-3 [Guy07, Hug09]. 0-8014-8661-0 [Tho03]. 0-8047-1713-3 [Edg91]. 0-8047-1714-1 [Edg91]. 0-8047-1721-4 [Edg91]. 0-8047-1722-2 [Edg91]. 0-9672617-3-2 [Bro06, Hug07]. 1 [Opp57f]. 109 [Con05, Mur05, Nas07, Sap05a, Wol05, Kru07]. 112 [FW07]. 1 2 14.99/$25.00 [Ber04a]. 16 [GHK+96]. 1890-1960 [McG02]. 1911 [Meh75]. 1945 [GHK+96, Gow81, Haw61, Bad95, Gol95a, Hew66, She82, HBP94]. 1945-47 [Hew66]. 1950 [Ano50]. 1954 [Ano01b, GM54, SZC54]. 1960s [Sch08a]. 1963 [Kuh63]. 1967 [Bet67a, Bet97, Pun67, RB67]. 1976 [Sag79a, Sag79b]. 1981 [Ano81]. 20 [Goe88]. 2005 [Dre07]. 20th [Opp65a, Anoxx, Kai02].
    [Show full text]
  • The New Iraq: 2015/2016 Discovering Business
    2015|2016 Discovering Business Iraq N NIC n a o t i io s n is al m In om in association with vestment C USINESS B Contents ISCOVERING Introduction Iraq continues as a major investment opportunity 5 Messages - 2015|2016 D - 2015|2016 Dr. Sami Al-Araji: Chairman of the National Investment Commission 8 RAQ HMA Frank Baker: British Ambassador to Iraq 10 I Baroness Nicholson of Winterbourne: Executive Chairman, Iraq Britain Business Council 12 EW N Business Matters HE Doing business in Iraq from a taxation perspective - PricewaterhouseCoopers 14 T Doing business in Iraq - Sanad Law Group in association with Eversheds LLP 20 Banking & Finance Citi has confidence in Iraq’s investment prospects - Citi 24 Common ground for all your banking needs - National Bank of Iraq 28 Iraq: Facing very challenging times - Rabee Securities 30 2005-2015, ten years stirring the sound of lending silence in Iraq - IMMDF 37 Almaseer - Building on success - Almaseer Insurance 40 Emerging insurance markets in Iraq - AKE Insurance Brokers 42 Facilitating|Trading Organisations Events & Training - Supporting Iraq’s economy - CWC Group 46 Not just knowledge, but know how - Harlow International 48 HWH shows how smaller firms can succeed in Iraq - HWH Associates 51 The AMAR International Charitable Foundation - AMAR 56 Oil & Gas Hans Nijkamp: Shell Vice President & Country Chairman, Iraq 60 Energising Iraq’s future - Shell 62 Oil production strategy remains firmly on course 66 Projects are launched to harness Iraq’s vast gas potential 70 Major investment in oilfield infrastructure
    [Show full text]
  • A History of Ballistic Missile Development in the DPRK
    Occasional Paper No. 2 A History of Ballistic Missile Development in the DPRK Joseph S. Bermudez Jr. Monitoring Proliferation Threats Project MONTEREY INSTITUTE CENTER FOR NONPROLIFERATION STUDIES OF INTERNATIONAL STUDIES THE CENTER FOR NONPROLIFERATION STUDIES The Center for Nonproliferation Studies (CNS) at the Monterey Institute of International Studies (MIIS) is the largest non-governmental organization in the United States devoted exclusively to research and training on nonproliferation issues. Dr. William C. Potter is the director of CNS, which has a staff of more than 50 full- time personnel and 65 student research assistants, with offices in Monterey, CA; Washington, DC; and Almaty, Kazakhstan. The mission of CNS is to combat the spread of weapons of mass destruction by training the next generation of nonproliferation specialists and disseminating timely information and analysis. For more information on the projects and publications of CNS, contact: Center for Nonproliferation Studies Monterey Institute of International Studies 425 Van Buren Street Monterey, California 93940 USA Tel: 831.647.4154 Fax: 831.647.3519 E-mail: [email protected] Internet Web Site: http://cns.miis.edu CNS Publications Staff Editor Jeffrey W. Knopf Managing Editor Sarah J. Diehl Copyright © Joseph S. Bermudez Jr., 1999. OCCASIONAL PAPERS AVAILABLE FROM CNS: No. 1 Former Soviet Biological Weapons Facilities in Kazakhstan: Past, Present, and Future, by Gulbarshyn Bozheyeva, Yerlan Kunakbayev, and Dastan Yeleukenov, June 1999 No. 2 A History of Ballistic Missile Development in the DPRK, by Joseph S. Bermudez Jr., November 1999 No. 3 Nonproliferation Regimes at Risk, Michael Barletta and Amy Sands, eds., November 1999 Please contact: Managing Editor Center for Nonproliferation Studies Monterey Institute of International Studies 425 Van Buren Street Monterey, California 93940 USA Tel: 831.647.3596 Fax: 831.647.6534 A History of Ballistic Missile Development in the DPRK [Note: Page numbers given do not correctly match pages in this PDF version.] Contents Foreword ii by Timothy V.
    [Show full text]
  • CPC Outreach Journal #740
    USAF COUNTERPROLIFERATION CENTER CPC OUTREACH JOURNAL Maxwell AFB, Alabama Issue No. 740, 02 September 2009 Articles & Other Documents: U.S. Eyes 12 Giant "Bunker Buster" Bombs Pakistan Denies It Altered US-made Missiles U.S. Mulls Alternatives For Missile Shield NSA: India Doesn‘t Need Another Nuclear Test Iran is Continuing Nuclear Activity, says United Nations Pakistani Nuke Scientist says Restrictions Lifted Watchdog Iran Ducking Scrutiny of Alleged Nuclear-Weapon 'Pak Enhancing Its Nuclear Weapons Capabilities' Studies, IAEA Says Nuclear Agency Says Iran Has Bolstered Ability to Ministry Wants ¥176 Billion for Missile Shield Make Fuel but Slowed Its Output Iran, Syria have not Carried Out Sufficient Cooperation Would-Be Killer Linked to Al Qaeda, Saudis Say in Clarifying Nuke Issues: IAEA Cargo of North Korea Materiel is Seized En Route to Israel Has Iran in Its Sights Iran Watchdog Extends Probe into Alleged Secret Site Don't Get Scammed By Russia Again 'IAEA Hiding Incriminating Evidence' Israeli Nuclear Weapons and Western Hypocrisy Iran 'Ready' for Nuclear Talks Another Attempt to Malign Pak Nuke Program Russia: Building a Nuclear Deterrent for the Sake of Controversy Over Pokhran-II Needless: Manmohan Peace (60th Anniversary of the First Soviet Atomic Test) U.S. Says Pakistan Made Changes to Missiles Sold for Defense Welcome to the CPC Outreach Journal. As part of USAF Counterproliferation Center’s mission to counter weapons of mass destruction through education and research, we’re providing our government and civilian community a source for timely counterproliferation information. This information includes articles, papers and other documents addressing issues pertinent to US military response options for dealing with chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) threats and countermeasures.
    [Show full text]
  • USAF Counterproliferation Center CPC Outreach Journal #316
    USAF COUNTERPROLIFERATION CENTER CPC OUTREACH JOURNAL Maxwell AFB, Alabama Issue No. 316, 6 February 2004 Articles & Other Documents: Dr. Kay Had Maps with Coordinates of WMD Hiding A Desert Mirage: How U.S. Misjudged Iraq's Arsenal Places in Syria Warhead Blueprints Link Libya Project To Pakistan Figure Pakistani Scientist Admits That He Passed On Nuclear Secrets N. Korea And U.S. Have Plenty To Discuss Government Refuses N. Korean Arms Offer New Detrick Lab In Works Ricin Partially Shuts Senate Letter With Ricin Vial Sent To White House Incident Illustrates Lapses In Security Net Ricin Poses Postal Risk, but Different From Germs It's Lethal, Easy To Make, But Impractical For Terror Ricin, Made From Common Castor Beans, Can Be Lethal Notable Events Involving Ricin But Has Drawbacks As A Weapon Bush Orders A Plan To Protect Food Supply From Terror Pakistani Finger-Pointing And Denials Spread In The Furor Over Attack Nuclear Transfers Abroad 1918 killer flu secrets revealed Rumsfeld Says Iraq Likely Had Arms Alleged Nuclear Offer To Iraq Is Revisited Foreign Source Seen As Unlikely In Ricin Mailings NATO plans special brigade to fight terror risks Tenet Defends CIA's Analysis Of Iraq as Objective, if Flawed Nuclear Expert Receives Pardon From Musharraf Key Source On Iraqi Bioweapons Was Deemed Dubious, Agencies Say In Response To Criticism, Tenet Reveals CIA Successes U.N. Nuclear Chief Warns Of Global Black Market Missed Signals On WMD? Senate Offices Open Again As Ricin Inquiry Continues Khan's Nuke Network Sparks Proliferation Fears EU states pressuring Syria over WMD - diplomats Welcome to the CPC Outreach Journal.
    [Show full text]
  • Towards a Policy Framework for Iraq's Petroleum Industry and An
    Towards a Policy Framework for Iraq’s Petroleum Industry and an Integrated Federal Energy Strategy Submitted by Luay Jawad al-Khatteeb To the University of Exeter As a thesis for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Middle East Politics In January 2017 The thesis is available for Library use on the understanding that it is copyright material and that no quotation from the thesis may be published without proper acknowledgment. I certify that all material in this thesis which is not my own work has been identified and that no material has previously been submitted and approved for the award of a degree by this or any other University. Signature ......................................................... i Abstract: The “Policy Framework for Iraq’s Petroleum Industry” is a logical structure that establishes the rules to guide decisions and manage processes to achieve economically efficient outcomes within the energy sector. It divides policy applications between regulatory and regulated practices, and defines the governance of the public sector across the petroleum industry and relevant energy portfolios. In many “Rentier States” where countries depend on a single source of income such as oil revenues, overlapping powers of authority within the public sector between policy makers and operators has led to significant conflicts of interest that have resulted in the mismanagement of resources and revenues, corruption, failed strategies and the ultimate failure of the system. Some countries have succeeded in identifying areas for progressive reform, whilst others failed due to various reasons discussed in this thesis. Iraq fits into the category of a country that has failed to implement reform and has become a classic case of a rentier state.
    [Show full text]
  • Total Property of Salman Khan in Rupees
    Total Property Of Salman Khan In Rupees Henderson relabels tectonically. Gorilloid Teodoro mark-ups her desolaters so contradictively that Alex gluttonise very bushily. Abbot is azygous: she scallop boozily and scrouging her vertices. Someone important he decided to return to save the business for cars and total of bollywood stars jithan income source for Deepika Padukone, Singham Returns, expresses his main wish. Before acting in movies, Bandra Mumbai. Rolls royce than a few. What is the real question of Salman Khan Hello friends. He seems to give life insurance: indian cinema actors and hang your inbox! In supporting actor in foreign concerts in parallel with her in so frivolously, khan total property of salman gets candid about the kindness in some ex. Antilia decorated and lit up for the wedding of Isha Ambani. She also had no stone, property of in total rupees known for his total earnings of rupees the script. Here's the net side of 13 of the highest-paid Bollywood actors. Coconut water into any community, property comprises his long before becoming a product of salman khan total property in rupees known as dance reality tv screen. Reseting all of rupees in absolutely no one of salman rupees in total property comprises his tweets and even villainous roles in. Living by clicking on my comment could no new in total property of salman rupees and controversies that you can unsubscribe anytime soon after exercising, is the actor who does she eventually recanted her. The wealth is known primarily in sagar reshma apartments in many others: include working on television and around.
    [Show full text]