Chapter three A.Q. KHAN AND ONWARD PROLIFERATION FROM PAKISTAN This chapter examines the known cases of nuclear mounting concerns about US and other foreign intel- exports undertaken by the A.Q. Khan network (and, ligence penetration, Zia ordered increased secrecy in the case of North Korea, by Khan himself, inde- and compartmentalisation of the nuclear weapons pendent of his foreign associates) and is intended programme, thus allowing Khan to operate much to enable a fuller understanding of the involvement more independently. and responsibilities of each of the various actors at An unhealthy rivalry with PAEC propelled Khan work: Khan, his foreign business partners and the towards even greater secrecy and opaque business relevant Pakistani authorities, military and civilian. practices. The Pakistani government encouraged A!er describing the conditions that allowed Khan the strategic laboratories’ rivalry and was only to make the transition from importing for Pakistan’s interested in tangible results for the weapons national nuclear programme to exporting to other programme. The fact that Khan operated beyond states through his own independent network, the the remit of the vaguely stated laboratory guide- chapter examines, in chronological order, the inter- lines surprised nobody, as every o$cial involved actions between Khan and Iran, Iraq, North Korea in the nuclear programme recognised that improvi- and Libya, and notes the unanswered questions sation of various sorts was required to circumvent about what Khan sold and to whom else he might foreign export controls and other international non- have o"ered his nuclear wares. proliferation constraints. While PAEC was account- able to governmental authorities, KRL was not, and Transition from imports to exports it expanded its responsibilities beyond its mandate From the outset, Pakistani government authorities into designing bombs, developing trigger mecha- provided A.Q. Khan with a remarkable degree of nisms, reducing uranium gas into metal and working power and autonomy, partly because he demanded on design assembly itself. It is unclear whether it, partly because of the very sensitive nature of his this initiative had been o$cially sanctioned by the work, and partly because he was able to achieve authorities or was a unilateral decision on Khan’s tangible results faster than the Pakistani Atomic part. Apparently, Zia had privately authorised the Energy Commission (PAEC), the rival scientific more results-oriented A.Q. Khan to continue activi- laboratory to Khan Research Laboratories (KRL). ties that were parallel to programmes that PAEC was At first, President Zulfiqar Ali Bhu#o directed the conducting. In turn, Zia encouraged M.A. Khan to nuclear weapons programme personally, without report on A.Q. Khan. The bi#er rivalry between the much bureaucratic involvement. A small organisa- two organisations handicapped the safeguarding of tion was set up to troubleshoot security, finances Pakistan’s nuclear secrets. and other issues that A.Q. Khan or PAEC Chairman The PAEC–KRL rivalry was played out in three Munir Ahmad Khan raised; its job was not to regu- significant ways. The first was a public-relations late the activities of either KRL or PAEC. ba#le waged by each organisation to win popu- As A.Q. Khan began to make real progress with larity by defaming the other. KRL employed at least his centrifuge project at Kahuta, Bhu#o’s successor, %& journalists in this vein, with PAEC following General Zia ul-Haq, who did not particularly suit, but to a far lesser extent. The second aspect care for the PAEC chairman, provided A.Q. Khan was fierce bureaucratic infighting. More generally, with further sweeping responsibilities. Because of this rivalry stimulated Khan to operate beyond an IISS strategic dossier 65 A.Q. Khan and onward proliferation from Pakistan the vague governmental guidelines and to under- required apparently went undetected.1 He had take his procurement and production activities access to autonomous import and export privileges in extreme secrecy – partly so that PAEC o$cials that no other organisation in the country possessed. could not discover what he was up to. PAEC’s It is unclear whether the excessive orders placed by failure to procure a plutonium reprocessing facility Khan all arrived in Pakistan or went to Dubai for was partially blamed on its hesitant leadership and storage or dispatch to their final destination. Having outmoded bureaucracy. In contrast, A.Q. Khan’s expanded into other areas related to the manufacture success in achieving his objectives confirmed the of nuclear weapons and their associated delivery value of being freed from bureaucratic constraints. systems, Khan now had reason to seek more foreign During the '()&s, Pakistan found itself immersed shipments and to charter more aircra! to transport in clandestine activity. The covert war against the the goods. No one apart from the president had Soviets in Afghanistan made Pakistan a hub of authority to question the contents or justification of covert supplies and transfers. This environment Khan’s imports or exports. This was owing to Zia’s enabled Pakistan to bring in nuclear-related ship- decision to give Khan a very long leash as long as ments under the guise of other clandestine weapons he delivered the goods for Pakistan’s own bomb and equipment bound for Afghanistan’s ‘jihad’. programme – which he always did. Pakistani import- and export-control organisations Most of Khan’s onward proliferation deals were (customs, immigration, etc.) became more ine$- struck during a particular era of Pakistan’s troubled cient and corrupt. political life. Between August '()) (when Zia died) By the mid-'()&s, A.Q. Khan had begun work on and October '((( (when Pervez Musharraf took a second-generation centrifuge design, designated over), the structure of power in the country was the P-% (like the P-', based on a Urenco design – see di"use and complex, with three di"erent poles: the pages '), %&), which had rotors made of maraging presidency, the army and the prime minister. The steel (an iron alloy that has superior strength without civilian leaders had li#le involvement in nuclear losing malleability), enabling it to spin at twice the ma#ers, policymaking was personalised and speed of P-' centrifuges and to enrich uranium more democratic institutions were weak. For over two than twice as e$ciently. As the acquisition priori- decades, from '(*+ onwards, Khan’s foreign travels ties of KRL gradually shi!ed to materials required were not checked and his itinerary was a national for the advanced P-% designs, Khan was le! with secret, especially a!er the trial in the Netherlands, an surplus inventory of P-' centrifuges and related for which he was sentenced in absentia (see page components. This gave him and his foreign-based ')). The Directorate of Inter-Services Intelligence partners the opportunity for a more profitable busi- (ISI) was the only other organisation that escaped ness model by exploring export markets. In two governmental accountability, due to the covert notable instances, however – those of both Iran nature of its role in the war in Afghanistan and in and Libya – it may have been a case of interested other intelligence and counter-intelligence opera- customers first reaching out to the network, rather tions. than the other way around, although accounts di"er The fact that Khan was privy to the highest on this and many other points. To meet the growing national secrets meant that his activities could not demand for its wares, the network established be easily questioned. His security apparatus was a nuclear supply line with a life of its own. Thus, not designed to monitor him, but rather to protect instead of reducing the supply line a!er Pakistan him and his organisation from external spies had acquired the essential ingredients to produce and anything that might compromise his foreign weapons-grade material, the network redoubled its procurement for Pakistan’s nuclear programme.2 acquisition e"orts to go a!er more advanced tech- All KRL security personnel reported to him, and nologies (for the P-% centrifuges), as well as greater those military o$cers posted to him or other stra- quantities of materials which were not needed by tegic organisations were appointed by the army Pakistan but could be resold to customers elsewhere a!er screening. Most were either retired or on the in the market for P-' centrifuges. verge of retiring from military service, and a posting Khan’s nuclear acquisition activities were to guard the most coveted national organisation largely unsupervised by Pakistani governmental became a ma#er of pride. Security personnel were authorities and his orders of many more compo- assured that there would be financial benefits and nents than Pakistan’s own enrichment programme privileges so long as Khan considered them to be 66 Nuclear Black Markets: Pakistan, A.Q. Khan and the rise of proliferation networks A.Q. Khan and onward proliferation from Pakistan indispensable to the security and advancement of the programme. The network of brokers, financiers and front companies that Khan created to supply Pakistan’s enrichment programme was also available to him for the new export opportunity that had become apparent. Khan’s network initially consisted of a loosely connected set of intermediaries, which grad- ually evolved into a business enterprise. Contacts with Iran in '()* represented the first known case of foreign associates working on Khan’s behalf for purposes other than importing goods and tech- nology for Pakistan. Iran The Khan network’s first known involvement in onward proliferation started with a discreet overture B.S.A. Tahir (courtesy Royal Malaysian Police) from Iran during the Zia regime in the mid-'()&s. According to o$cials who were close to Zia, Iran approached the Pakistani government through This deal included a provision for Pakistani scientists o$cial channels but did not receive the fuel-cycle to train at least six Iranians at the Pakistan Institute technology it was seeking.