Chapter three A.Q. KHAN AND ONWARD PROLIFERATION FROM PAKISTAN

This chapter examines the known cases of nuclear mounting concerns about US and other foreign intel- exports undertaken by the A.Q. Khan network (and, ligence penetration, Zia ordered increased secrecy in the case of North Korea, by Khan himself, inde- and compartmentalisation of the nuclear weapons pendent of his foreign associates) and is intended programme, thus allowing Khan to operate much to enable a fuller understanding of the involvement more independently. and responsibilities of each of the various actors at An unhealthy rivalry with PAEC propelled Khan work: Khan, his foreign business partners and the towards even greater secrecy and opaque business relevant Pakistani authorities, military and civilian. practices. The Pakistani government encouraged Aer describing the conditions that allowed Khan the strategic laboratories’ rivalry and was only to make the transition from importing for Pakistan’s interested in tangible results for the weapons national nuclear programme to exporting to other programme. The fact that Khan operated beyond states through his own independent network, the the remit of the vaguely stated laboratory guide- chapter examines, in chronological order, the inter- lines surprised nobody, as every official involved actions between Khan and Iran, Iraq, North Korea in the nuclear programme recognised that improvi- and Libya, and notes the unanswered questions sation of various sorts was required to circumvent about what Khan sold and to whom else he might foreign export controls and other international non- have offered his nuclear wares. proliferation constraints. While PAEC was account- able to governmental authorities, KRL was not, and Transition from imports to exports it expanded its responsibilities beyond its mandate From the outset, Pakistani government authorities into designing bombs, developing trigger mecha- provided A.Q. Khan with a remarkable degree of nisms, reducing uranium gas into metal and working power and autonomy, partly because he demanded on design assembly itself. It is unclear whether it, partly because of the very sensitive nature of his this initiative had been officially sanctioned by the work, and partly because he was able to achieve authorities or was a unilateral decision on Khan’s tangible results faster than the Pakistani Atomic part. Apparently, Zia had privately authorised the Energy Commission (PAEC), the rival scientific more results-oriented A.Q. Khan to continue activi- laboratory to Khan Research Laboratories (KRL). ties that were parallel to programmes that PAEC was At first, President Zulfiqar Ali Bhuo directed the conducting. In turn, Zia encouraged M.A. Khan to nuclear weapons programme personally, without report on A.Q. Khan. The bier rivalry between the much bureaucratic involvement. A small organisa- two organisations handicapped the safeguarding of tion was set up to troubleshoot security, finances Pakistan’s nuclear secrets. and other issues that A.Q. Khan or PAEC Chairman The PAEC–KRL rivalry was played out in three Munir Ahmad Khan raised; its job was not to regu- significant ways. The first was a public-relations late the activities of either KRL or PAEC. bale waged by each organisation to win popu- As A.Q. Khan began to make real progress with larity by defaming the other. KRL employed at least his centrifuge project at Kahuta, Bhuo’s successor, journalists in this vein, with PAEC following General Zia ul-Haq, who did not particularly suit, but to a far lesser extent. The second aspect care for the PAEC chairman, provided A.Q. Khan was fierce bureaucratic infighting. More generally, with further sweeping responsibilities. Because of this rivalry stimulated Khan to operate beyond

an IISS strategic dossier 65 A.Q. Khan and onward proliferation from Pakistan the vague governmental guidelines and to under- required apparently went undetected.1 He had take his procurement and production activities access to autonomous import and export privileges in extreme secrecy – partly so that PAEC officials that no other organisation in the country possessed. could not discover what he was up to. PAEC’s It is unclear whether the excessive orders placed by failure to procure a plutonium reprocessing facility Khan all arrived in Pakistan or went to Dubai for was partially blamed on its hesitant leadership and storage or dispatch to their final destination. Having outmoded bureaucracy. In contrast, A.Q. Khan’s expanded into other areas related to the manufacture success in achieving his objectives confirmed the of nuclear weapons and their associated delivery value of being freed from bureaucratic constraints. systems, Khan now had reason to seek more foreign During the s, Pakistan found itself immersed shipments and to charter more aircra to transport in clandestine activity. The covert war against the the goods. No one apart from the president had Soviets in Afghanistan made Pakistan a hub of authority to question the contents or justification of covert supplies and transfers. This environment Khan’s imports or exports. This was owing to Zia’s enabled Pakistan to bring in nuclear-related ship- decision to give Khan a very long leash as long as ments under the guise of other clandestine weapons he delivered the goods for Pakistan’s own bomb and equipment bound for Afghanistan’s ‘jihad’. programme – which he always did. Pakistani import- and export-control organisations Most of Khan’s onward proliferation deals were (customs, immigration, etc.) became more ineffi- struck during a particular era of Pakistan’s troubled cient and corrupt. political life. Between August (when Zia died) By the mid-s, A.Q. Khan had begun work on and October (when Pervez Musharraf took a second-generation centrifuge design, designated over), the structure of power in the country was the P- (like the P-, based on a Urenco design – see diffuse and complex, with three different poles: the pages , ), which had rotors made of maraging presidency, the army and the prime minister. The steel (an iron alloy that has superior strength without civilian leaders had lile involvement in nuclear losing malleability), enabling it to spin at twice the maers, policymaking was personalised and speed of P- centrifuges and to enrich uranium more democratic institutions were weak. For over two than twice as efficiently. As the acquisition priori- decades, from onwards, Khan’s foreign travels ties of KRL gradually shied to materials required were not checked and his itinerary was a national for the advanced P- designs, Khan was le with secret, especially aer the trial in the Netherlands, an surplus inventory of P- centrifuges and related for which he was sentenced in absentia (see page components. This gave him and his foreign-based ). The Directorate of Inter-Services Intelligence partners the opportunity for a more profitable busi- (ISI) was the only other organisation that escaped ness model by exploring export markets. In two governmental accountability, due to the covert notable instances, however – those of both Iran nature of its role in the war in Afghanistan and in and Libya – it may have been a case of interested other intelligence and counter-intelligence opera- customers first reaching out to the network, rather tions. than the other way around, although accounts differ The fact that Khan was privy to the highest on this and many other points. To meet the growing national secrets meant that his activities could not demand for its wares, the network established be easily questioned. His security apparatus was a nuclear supply line with a life of its own. Thus, not designed to monitor him, but rather to protect instead of reducing the supply line aer Pakistan him and his organisation from external spies had acquired the essential ingredients to produce and anything that might compromise his foreign weapons-grade material, the network redoubled its procurement for Pakistan’s nuclear programme.2 acquisition efforts to go aer more advanced tech- All KRL security personnel reported to him, and nologies (for the P- centrifuges), as well as greater those military officers posted to him or other stra- quantities of materials which were not needed by tegic organisations were appointed by the army Pakistan but could be resold to customers elsewhere aer screening. Most were either retired or on the in the market for P- centrifuges. verge of retiring from military service, and a posting Khan’s nuclear acquisition activities were to guard the most coveted national organisation largely unsupervised by Pakistani governmental became a maer of pride. Security personnel were authorities and his orders of many more compo- assured that there would be financial benefits and nents than Pakistan’s own enrichment programme privileges so long as Khan considered them to be

66 Nuclear Black Markets: Pakistan, A.Q. Khan and the rise of proliferation networks A.Q. Khan and onward proliferation from Pakistan indispensable to the security and advancement of the programme. The network of brokers, financiers and front companies that Khan created to supply Pakistan’s enrichment programme was also available to him for the new export opportunity that had become apparent. Khan’s network initially consisted of a loosely connected set of intermediaries, which grad- ually evolved into a business enterprise. Contacts with Iran in represented the first known case of foreign associates working on Khan’s behalf for purposes other than importing goods and tech- nology for Pakistan.

Iran The Khan network’s first known involvement in onward proliferation started with a discreet overture B.S.A. Tahir (courtesy Royal Malaysian Police) from Iran during the Zia regime in the mid-s. According to officials who were close to Zia, Iran approached the Pakistani government through This deal included a provision for Pakistani scientists official channels but did not receive the fuel-cycle to train at least six Iranians at the Pakistan Institute technology it was seeking. Although the Pakistani of Nuclear Science and Technology (PINSTECH), press reported in November that Zia had training that was also offered to other Muslim coun- given a green light to an Iranian request for nuclear tries. That month, A.Q. Khan reportedly visited cooperation, according to his aides he directed his Iran’s Bushehr reactor to witness the damage caused nuclear programme managers just to ‘play around’ by Iraqi bombing of the facility. In this and in subse- with the Iranians ‘but not to yield anything substan- quent visits he promoted centrifuges as a viable tial at any cost’.3 Zia calculated that the initiation of uranium enrichment technique,5 a technology that civil nuclear cooperation with Iran was a prudent Iran had begun to explore in . way to satisfy the political imperative of main- In early KRL scientists began to publish taining good relations with Tehran while at the papers describing the construction of more same time not compromising Pakistan’s own covert advanced centrifuges with maraging steel. Because nuclear weapons effort. He did not want to invite KRL was now openly boasting about its technical even more international non-proliferation scru- capabilities, foreign intelligence operatives started tiny and pressure at a time when Islamabad was taking notice, and some entered into direct commu- aempting to manufacture nuclear weapons while nications concerning possible business transactions simultaneously maintaining close military ties with with Khan and his cohorts. the United States. Pakistani officials across the board insist that Zia did not approve any nuclear dealings !"#$ deal with Iran that would involve the provision of sensi- Aer Zia parried Iran’s request for sensitive nuclear tive technology. They argue that his strong Sunni cooperation, Iranian intelligence agents apparently beliefs and his strategy to increase the role of Sunni set about trying to find another way of tapping into Islam throughout Pakistani society and official insti- Pakistan’s nuclear technology. The first confirmed tutions put him at odds with Iran’s Supreme Leader contacts occurred in . Which side initiated it Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini and made any sensi- is unclear; Iran was looking to buy and Khan had tive dealings with Iran very unlikely. goods to sell. One contact was made in Switzerland, In , the chairmen of the Pakistani and possibly through one of Khan’s long-time associates Iranian atomic energy commissions entered into and regular suppliers, German engineer Gohard a formal agreement on peaceful nuclear coopera- Lerch. The first substantial deal occurred in in tion that emerged from official contacts beginning Dubai, where Iranian officials reportedly met Indian- in February when Iran’s President Seyyed Ali born businessman S. Mohamed Farouq, head of the Khamenei (later supreme leader) visited Pakistan.4 family-run computer import–export company SMB

an IISS strategic dossier 67 A.Q. Khan and onward proliferation from Pakistan

A.Q. Khan Network Onward Proliferation: Chronology

Mid-!"#$s December: Pakistani prime minister September: Libya receives '(kg of

Khan Research Laboratories (KRL) Benazir Bhutto initiates deal with North UF& shifts its focus from P-! t o P-" centri- Korea for No-dong missile technology fuge technology '$$! Iran begins to explore uranium !"") Feb: Khan network sends Libya

enrichment technology March, May: Iran begins to receive !,+'(kg of UF& Iran approaches Pakistan’s Zia ul-Haq components for '(( P-! centrifuges March: Khan is removed from KRL government for nuclear cooperation, and P-" drawings December: Tahir signs $!%m contract but is reportedly rebu#ed with Malaysian company SCOPE for !""* "',((( centrifuge parts !"#% November: North Korea and Pakistan Late (or early "(("): Khan network Khan reportedly visits Iran’s Bushehr reportedly )nalise No-dong deal provides Libya with a design for a reactor nuclear weapon !""%–"& !"#& Pakistan begins to receive No-dong '$$' Pakistani and Iranian atomic energy missiles from North Korea Iran procures magnets for P-" centri- commissions conclude formal fuges from other foreign suppliers agreement on peaceful nuclear !""& and claims no P-" design work before cooperation Network sends three P-" centrifuges this year Iran approaches Khan network to Iran, according to Tahir (uncon- December: deliveries of P-" compo- Khan network and Iran close $% )rmed) nents from SCOPE to Libya million deal for centrifuge technology Libyan intelligence )rst contacts Khan Shipments to Libya begin ("( '$$( !"#" complete P-! centrifuges, most March: US government places sanc- First deliveries of P-! centrifuges to components for another "(() and tions on KRL Iran continue until late "((% April: Interception of aluminium tubing shipment en route to North !""$ !""# Korea & October: Iraqi intelligence memo & April: Khan tests Ghauri missile August: Iran changes story that its cites o#er from Khan intermediary to enrichment programme was indig- help Iraq develop nuclear weapons Late !""$s enous, acknowledges to IAEA that Khan reportedly begins delivery to it obtained assistance from foreign !""! North Korea of used centrifuges, intermediaries beginning in !,-+. November: reported agreement drawings, depleted uranium hexa*u- October: Interception of BBC China,

between Pakistan’s General Mirza oride (UF&) ship headed to Libya with compo- Aslam Beg and Iran on nuclear and nents for !,((( centrifuges conventional cooperation in return !""" December: Libya renounces nuclear for oil Last acknowledged meeting weapons programme between Khan network and Iranians !""' March: Saudi Arabian defence minister '$$) North Korea begins to share missile )rst foreign leader to visit KRL US–UK teams begin dismantlement expertise with Pakistan US intelligence report cites North of Libyan programme, taking out

Korean enrichment programme nuclear weapon designs, UF&, centri- !""( fuges and other key equipment Buhary Syed Ali Tahir o#ers Iran '$$$ . February: Khan’s public confession P-! centrifuge components and September: Libya receives two P-" March: BBC China delivers P-" centri- drawings for more advanced P-" centrifuges, places order for !(,((( fuge parts to Libya from Turkish machines more workshops

Key Iran connection O+er to Iraq North Korea connection Libya deal Signi,cant events

68 Nuclear Black Markets: Pakistan, A.Q. Khan and the rise of proliferation networks A.Q. Khan and onward proliferation from Pakistan

Group, and his Sri Lankan nephew Buhary Syed Ali contradict Iran’s claims that it did not purchase the Tahir. (S. Mohamed Farouq should not be confused uranium re-conversion and casting equipment or with Muhammad Farooq, a centrifuge expert at KRL, do anything else with the document. In , Iran who was involved extensively with Khan’s nuclear showed both the one-page handwrien offer and smuggling.) SMB had sold computers to Khan and the -page design document to the IAEA, but, as continued to operate a legitimate computer busi- of April , has not allowed it to take the origi- ness until at least , but by Farouq and nals back to Vienna, where they could be subject Tahir were also ready to act as Khan’s agents in to forensic examination to provide further clues marketing P- centrifuge components. The reported as to their origin. In , Iran also showed the presence in some of the Dubai meetings of IAEA other documents relating to the offer, German engineer Heinz Mebus6 (who died in ), including: drawings of components and assemblies another long-time friend and supplier to Khan, is of P- centrifuges; technical documents describing further evidence that the Khan network was already manufacturing, assembly and operational proce- developing into a multinational import–export dures; diagrams of research centrifuge cascades; organisation. A key Iranian interlocutor in the and a design layout for six cascades of machines meetings was reportedly Mohammad Eslami, each.12 Iran later built a pilot plant at Natanz representing an Iranian military front company. designed to hold six cascades of machines each. Eslami is now a senior commander in the Iranian Revolutionary Guard; his involvement indicates the Pakistani government attitudes military orientation of the Iranian nuclear research Aer the deaths of Zia in and Khomeini in and development programme from as far back as , new leaderships emerged in each country that .7 were much more inclined towards mutual coopera- In a meeting in , the Khan network submied tion on a wide range of issues. In Pakistan, General a one-page handwrien offer, consisting of a menu Mirza Aslam Beg, the new chief of army staff, openly from which the Iranian buyers could choose, with supported Iran’s cause and suggested that Pakistan prices reportedly ranging from millions to hundreds cooperate with Iran, Afghanistan and any new of millions of dollars. In what was cast as a five- Islamic republics that emerged from the dissolution point phased development plan, Iran was offered: of the Soviet Union, in an alliance of sorts organ- a disassembled sample of P- centrifuge machines; ised around ‘strategic defiance’ of the United States drawings, descriptions and specifications for produc- and its Western allies. Beg has also been an ardent tion; drawings, specifications and calculations for supporter of Iran’s bid to acquire nuclear weapons. a complete plant; materials for ,-centrifuge Although his direct involvement is unconfirmed machines; and auxiliary vacuum and electric drive and he denies it, he is widely suspected of having equipment. The Iranians reportedly closed a deal been an accomplice of A.Q. Khan at least in terms for million in Dubai in .8 They did not buy of awareness, if not encouragement or even outright everything on the list, instead deciding to procure direction. According to US Ambassador to Pakistan some items on their own, using the supplier infor- Robert Oakley and Assistant Secretary of Defense mation that Khan had also provided as a ‘buyer’s Henry Rowen, Beg threatened to transfer nuclear guide’.9 technology to Iran if Washington cut off arms sales At a meeting in Dubai, or perhaps later to Pakistan.13 (Iran has not been forthcoming to the International Two unnamed former high-level Pakistani offi- Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) about the details), cials were reported as saying that in President the network provided a -page document Hashemi Rafsanjani sought Pakistani prime describing procedures for the re-conversion and minister Benazir Bhuo’s consent regarding a deal casting of uranium metal into hemispheres, which for nuclear weapons technology that Beg had initi- IAEA Director General Mohamed ElBaradei later ated. The two officials say she told both Rafsanjani characterised as ‘related to the fabrication of nuclear and Beg that she did not approve.14 For his part, Beg weapons components’ and a ‘maer of concern’.10 was quoted as saying that, by Bhuo’s own account, Iran’s claim that the Khan network provided the it was she who had been approached by the Iranians document on its own initiative is not consistent with a similar proposition for a billion transfer. with what is known about the exchange of price Beg also said Iran was willing to pay bn or more.15 lists.11 The IAEA has not reported any evidence to This price, however, seems exaggerated as it is very

an IISS strategic dossier 69 A.Q. Khan and onward proliferation from Pakistan much higher than Khan’s and enrichment minister and army chief obscured the command and deals with Iran. control authority over the covert nuclear weapons Although Beg denies having authorised any programme. Further, as these power centres onward proliferation from Pakistan to Iran, he has jockeyed for supremacy, each undermined the confirmed that serious nuclear discussions took standing of the other. This situation provided Khan place between the nations at that time. According with a relatively free rein as long as he did not to an unnamed former cabinet minister, these talks alienate the collective leadership and continued to continued aer Benazir Bhuo’s departure from produce the desired results for the nation’s nuclear office in .16 Several sources have reported that weapons programme. an agreement was reached in between General Asif Nawaz, Beg’s successor as chief of army staff, !""%–"& deal Rafsanjani and General Mohsen Rezai, head of the Iran received more from A.Q. Khan than nuclear Revolutionary Guard, which involved Pakistani designs and equipment. The equipment supply nuclear weapons-related technology in return for documents the Khan network provided the Iranians Iranian oil.17 Oakley claimed that Beg agreed to allowed them to contact suppliers in Europe, Russia abandon the deal at his urging, and that Nawaz and Asia to acquire nuclear-related equipment and Sharif (the new prime minister) and Ghulam Ishaq technologies. However, officials in Tehran realised Khan (Zia’s successor as president and a trusted that mere shopping was not enough, and they again insider since the days of Prime Minister Zulfiqar turned to Khan for assistance. Iran claims that there Ali Bhuo) told Rafsanjani that the deal had not were no contacts with the network between been approved by the president or the parliament and mid-, when it says Tahir offered to supply and that Pakistan would not implement it. Western an Iranian company with P- designs and compo- intelligence officials worried at the time that a deal nents for P- machines, as well as drawings for might have involved a nuclear weapon design that the more advanced P- centrifuges. Aer the prelim- Pakistan had originally obtained from China (which inary contacts, Rafsanjani sent Iranian officials to later turned out to be the case for Khan’s deal with Dubai to meet with Tahir and Farouq.20 A deal was Libya). struck, an initial payment of m was made, and the G.I. Khan provided continuity in the direction first deliveries started in early using Iranian of the nuclear weapons programme and protected merchant ships.21 The total amount of money Iran A.Q. Khan from government oversight (see chapter paid and to whom it went is unknown. Whether four). Several of Benazir Bhuo’s advisers, including Iran obtained more than the unassembled her security affairs adviser, Major General Imtiaz centrifuges it admied to receiving from the Khan Ali, and her military secretary, Zulfiqar Ali, report- network is also unknown. Iran told the IAEA in edly encouraged meetings between Khan and Iran.18 that the centrifuges in its possession were domes- Bhuo was reportedly aware of the nuclear discus- tically produced. But because the components had sions during both of her terms of office (– been used in Pakistan’s own enrichment work, they and –).19 These individual leaders may all had traces of highly enriched uranium (HEU) parti- have been inclined to help Iran, especially aer the cles. When the IAEA inspectors produced evidence autumn of . The US reaction to the Iraqi invasion of those particles, Iran acknowledged the foreign of Kuwait ( August) and the first-ever refusal by origin of the centrifuges. the White House to certify to Congress that Pakistan Some of the old centrifuge machines were did not have a military nuclear programme because reportedly damaged when the Iranians unpacked of the incontrovertible evidence to the contrary ( and tried to assemble them. Iranian scientists found October) gave ammunition to those, such as Beg, it difficult to advance from research to operational who urged defiance of the West. enrichment, and blamed their lack of progress on However, no evidence has emerged that a clear the ‘poor-quality components’ provided by the Khan directive was ever given to Khan to provide nuclear network.22 Acquiring the components, their specifi- technology to Iran. In any case, the onward prolif- cations and detailed drawings, however, allowed eration not only continued aer the departure of Iran to skip many research steps, in both centrifuge G.I. Khan, B. Bhuo and Beg from power, but also operations and component manufacturing. It was expanded, from . The diffusion of domestic polit- able to embark on a strategy to make thousands ical power among the troika of the president, prime of centrifuges on its own and to order parts from

70 Nuclear Black Markets: Pakistan, A.Q. Khan and the rise of proliferation networks A.Q. Khan and onward proliferation from Pakistan companies in the Khan network. Iran continued to By the beginning of , Iran had about draw on the advice of network intermediaries, by its centrifuges running intermiently with uranium own admission meeting with them times between hexafluoride (UF) in the pilot plant and was begin- and .23 ning to install the first of what it said would be , As Pakistan–Iran relations began to deteriorate centrifuges in the underground facility. Although over the mounting proxy war and sectarian tensions Iran had not yet demonstrated an ability to run in Afghanistan, business with the Khan network the cascades continuously, it had proven that it continued, although the Iranians did not entirely could produce centrifuges, balance and spin them trust A.Q. Khan because of the troubles they were for months at a time, and enrich uranium in small experiencing with his centrifuges. Diversifying amounts to reactor-grade levels (.–%). If Iran is away from its reliance on Khan, Iran sought other able to install , centrifuges and bring them into suppliers for the components and materials it operation (a goal it ambitiously set for May ), required. An Iranian contractor acknowledged and if it were to throw caution to the wind and with- seeking to procure , magnets for use in P- draw from the NPT, continuous operation of a facility centrifuges from a European intermediary. Iran this size would, theoretically, enable Iran to produce claims that none were delivered from the interme- one weapon’s worth of HEU in – months.27 diary in question, but that other magnets relevant to P- centrifuges were procured from other foreign Iraq suppliers in .24 Given Khan’s budding business with Iran, it is In , when the IAEA was able to interview somewhat surprising that in the network next Tahir for a second time (following up an initial sought to expand its international business by selling interview), he claimed, with no hint of purposeful enrichment technology to Iraq, with which Iran had exaggeration, that three complete P- centrifuges just fought a bier eight-year were sent to Iran in as a model for manufac- war. At the time, Iraq had turing more. However, he provided no supporting a very advanced clandes- documentation.25 Iran also admits to having received tine programme to produce The project had been P- designs from the Khan network, but claims it nuclear weapons. The full obtained no P- centrifuges from abroad and that no extent of Iraq’s widespread given the code name work was carried out on the P- design prior to . and sophisticated nuclear The IAEA has found inconsistencies in Iran’s story procurement activities was ‘A-B’, which IAEA about the P-s, which, in , remained one of the not well known until it came key outstanding questions for the agency. IAEA offi- to light aer the Gulf investigators took to cials suspect Iran may have a parallel, undeclared War and the subsequent P- development programme. weapons inspection and mean ‘atomic bomb’ Over time, Iran gained experience in manu- dismantlement campaign of facturing its own centrifuge components and the United Nations Special constructed two facilities in Natanz, an above- Commission on Iraq. Yet ground pilot plant designed for , centrifuges Western governments and policy analysts – and and a much larger underground facility planned to certainly Khan and his European colleagues – were hold , centrifuges. A facility this size would aware that Baghdad was renewing its efforts to give Iran the capability to produce approximately build nuclear bombs in the aermath of the bombs’ worth of HEU per year if it chose to Israeli aack on Iraq’s Osirak reactor at Tuwaitha. break out of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Iraq gave priority to the development of electro- (NPT) and acquire a nuclear weapons arsenal.26 magnetic isotopic separation techniques to enrich Iran apparently only has the parts for several uranium, but also pursued gas centrifuge and other thousand centrifuges, however, and to meet its enrichment technologies.28 Media accounts revealed industrial-level goal it would have to rely on addi- Iraqi aempts to acquire maraging steel, vacuum tional black market procurement of maraging steel, pumps and other specialised machinery, all neces- and possibly other materials, in which it is not self- sary for the production of uranium enrichment sufficient. Nuclear Supplier Group export controls centrifuges. There were unconfirmed press reports and Security Council sanctions make that a difficult that Iraq acquired uranium melting information proposition for Iran. from Pakistan in the late s.29

an IISS strategic dossier 71 A.Q. Khan and onward proliferation from Pakistan

A.Q. Khan and his associates apparently were not known to be involved in these transactions believed that Iraq’s interest in uranium enrich- – only Khan and his fellow Pakistani collaborators. ment provided a business opportunity that was too In his autobiography, Musharraf wrote that in potentially lucrative to pass up. Information that early , when he was serving as army chief, he Khan had promoted a deal with Iraq emerged in discovered that some North Korean nuclear experts, with the defection of Saddam Hussein’s son- operating under the guise of missile engineers, had in-law, Hussein Kamel, who directed UN weapons been given secret briefings at KRL. As described inspectors to a chicken farm he owned. There, below, North Korean interaction with KRL regarding inspectors found thousands of documents on paper ballistic missile exchanges was permied as a secret and microfiche related to Iraq’s nuclear, biological government-to-government deal, but the Pakistani and chemical weapons development programmes. government claims that A.Q. Khan was not author- Included among these documents was a memo ised to interact with the North Koreans on nuclear labelled ‘top secret’ and ‘personal’, which described maers. Musharraf wrote that he summoned him a meeting in Baghdad between Iraqi intelligence to explain his interaction with the North Koreans officers and an intermediary for Khan believed on nuclear technology, but Khan flatly denied the to have used the name ‘Malik’. The intermediary charge.31 told the Iraqis that Khan was prepared to provide Aer Khan was arrested in , Pakistani enrichment technology and project designs for a officials claimed that he had confessed to having nuclear bomb and to ‘ensure any requirements or transferred centrifuges and related technology materials from Western Europe [were transported] to North Korea, beginning in the late s.32 The via a company he owns in Dubai’. The memo said Clinton administration reportedly learnt of the ‘the project has been given the code name “A-B”’, transfers in or . The first media claim of which IAEA investigators took to mean ‘atomic a North Korean enrichment programme came in bomb’.30 The asking price was m in advance, with March , sourced to a US Department of Energy an additional % commission to be paid on all intelligence report.33 The CIA concluded, however, procurements. that North Korea began its centrifuge-based Another document obtained by inspectors indi- uranium enrichment programme in .34 This cated that Jafar Dhia Jafar, the former head of Iraq’s conclusion derived in part from imagery analysis nuclear agency, had responded positively, telling of unmarked containers loaded on Pakistani C- the intelligence service to explore the offer, although transport aircra. with the caveat that it could be a sting operation The most detailed account of the enrichment orchestrated by Western intelligence agencies. technology transfer comes from Musharraf’s auto- There was lile other evidence of the offer or any biography, in which he stated that ‘A.Q. Khan other follow up, which in any case would have been transferred nearly two dozen P- and P- centrifuges impossible aer the initiation of Operation Desert to North Korea. He also provided North Korea with Storm in January and the subsequent intrusive a flow meter, some special oils for centrifuges, and inspection operations conducted by the UN. IAEA coaching on centrifuge technology, including visits efforts to investigate the maer in the mid-s, to top-secret centrifuge plants.’35 Musharraf’s and again in following Libya’s revelation that it account is curious in two respects. Firstly, in had received a bomb design from Khan, reached an he mentioned only half that number (‘probably a impasse because all the individuals involved were dozen’).36 Western governments believe that the either deceased or refused to be interviewed. IAEA actual number was about . Secondly, it was the officials were nevertheless fully convinced that the first reference to P-s going to North Korea; previous offer was genuine and unsolicited. reports about Khan’s confessions mentioned only P- centrifuges. According to a government offi- North Korea cial who briefed the press aer Khan’s televised A.Q. Khan’s nuclear export business took a new confession, Khan, in a -page signed confession, turn in the late s when he provided North accepted full responsibility for ‘supplying old and Korea with a number of gas centrifuges, associ- discarded centrifuge and enrichment machines ated material and technical assistance, expanding together with sets of drawings, sketches, technical on deals in which North Korea provided No-dong data and depleted hexafluoride (UF) gas to North missiles to Pakistan. His foreign network associates Korea’.37

72 Nuclear Black Markets: Pakistan, A.Q. Khan and the rise of proliferation networks A.Q. Khan and onward proliferation from Pakistan

A dozen centrifuges would have been insuffi- Pakistan–North Korea connections cient to produce enough HEU for a nuclear bomb. Khan’s business dealings with North Korea were Along with the centrifuge designs Khan provided, rooted in Pakistan’s odd relationship with the however, they could be used as a template upon Pyongyang regime, dating back to the early s. which North Korean scientists and engineers could At that time, Zulfiqar Ali Bhuo, whose original base their own centrifuge production plans. As with People’s Party had strong socialist overtones, was Iran, Khan also reportedly provided a ‘shopping impressed with the regimented government and list’ to North Korea,38 which enabled Pyongyang economy of Kim Il Sung. Bhuo was known to be to purchase additional components directly from an admirer of many of the revolutionary leaders of other foreign suppliers. In , North Korea began the time, including Mao Zedong, Josip Broz Tito to seek such materials in industrial-scale quanti- and Colonel Muammar Gadhafi, and had a mate- ties, leading intelligence analysts to believe that it rial interest in improving ties with these leaders too. had progressed beyond the research and develop- Ever since the United States had embargoed mili- ment stage in its uranium enrichment centrifuge tary sales to Pakistan aer the Kashmir War, programme. Such procurement aempts included Pakistan looked to the East as an alternative source, equipment suitable for use in UF feed and with- and purchased a mix of Chinese and Russian drawal systems, as well as high-strength aluminium weapons, equipment and transports. The military tubes that matched the specifications of vacuum items produced by North Korea were compat- casings for Urenco centrifuges.39 In April , the ible with other Soviet-bloc French, German and Egyptian authorities inter- material and were consid- cepted a French cargo ship in the Suez Canal erably cheaper. Moreover, carrying a -tonne shipment of these tubes that the North Koreans were Whether North Korea North Korea had ordered from a German firm. This easier to deal with than the shipment was apparently part of a larger, -tonne Soviets, who had a far closer proactively sought the consignment of aluminium tubes sought by North relationship with India. Korea, which would have been sufficient for ,– Bhuo approached North centrifuge technology or , centrifuges. If North Korea were to construct Korea in for assistance , centrifuges based on the P- design, it would in replenishing Pakistan’s whether it ‘fell into their have the ability to produce almost kg of weapons- depleted stock of military grade HEU annually.40 North Korea aempted to equipment and established laps’ is unknown circumvent German export controls by claiming full diplomatic relations in that the tubes were intended for a Chinese company, , when he was accorded Shenyang Aircra Corporation.41 an elaborate welcome in As is the case with some of Khan’s other Pyongyang. His daughter, Benazir Bhuo, received customers, which side initiated the centrifuge deal a similarly lavish state reception years later, in is unclear. As noted in chapter two, there were December . Like her father, she also secured an a few reports in the late s of North Korean agreement to acquire missile technology.42 procurement of equipment useful for gas centri- The ‘Asian cooperation’ policy forged by Zulfiqar fuge enrichment. Until Khan provided centrifuges Ali Bhuo in the s, however, became less signifi- a decade later, however, North Korea’s nuclear cant aer his ouster in the July coup orchestrated weapons programme was assumed to be limited to by Zia, in his capacity as army chief. Aer the Soviet the plutonium route. North Korea froze the pluto- Union invaded Afghanistan in December , nium programme under the terms of the October and the new US government of President Ronald Agreed Framework deal with the US. Seeking Reagan lied all sanctions on Pakistan in , Zia’s an alternative uranium enrichment path to nuclear priorities shied to the jihad in Afghanistan and weapons violated that agreement and, when the US the acquisition of Western armaments to restore the confronted Pyongyang about the enrichment efforts, military balance with India. North Korea had disap- led to its demise. Whether North Korea neverthe- peared from Pakistan’s radar screen. Within a few less proactively sought the centrifuge technology years, however, three factors brought North Korea or whether, as one former US negotiator privately and Pakistan back towards a strategic partnership. surmised, it ‘fell into their laps’ through a Khan Firstly, Pakistan needed to match India’s Agni and offer, is unknown. Prithvi ballistic-missile programmes, and North

an IISS strategic dossier 73 A.Q. Khan and onward proliferation from Pakistan

Korea was known for its ballistic-missile produc- Pakistan’s plutonium route to nuclear weapons in tion. Secondly, the Pakistani armed forces needed the s, Khan stepped in once again to provide conventional weapons, including artillery and anti- Pakistan with an alternative nuclear weapons aircra guns, which North Korea had, while North delivery option by obtaining intermediate-range Korea needed money and had a reputation for liquid-fuel ballistic missiles from North Korea. exporting military supplies at cheap rates. Thirdly, Prior to this development, Pakistan had obtained North Korea was developing expertise on the pluto- short-range, solid-fuel M- missiles and related nium route to nuclear weapons production, and technology from China, Pakistan’s all-weather Pakistan was making rapid advances along the strategic ally, but KRL was not the recipient. The uranium enrichment route. Each country stood to solid-fuel missile programme was the research gain much from the other. and development responsibility of the National In the s, Pakistan’s security predicament was Defence Complex in conjunction with PAEC. compounded by new two factors, both involving KRL was responsible for the liquid-fuel missile India. The first had to do with the growing air- programme. North Korea’s ,–,km-range power imbalance with India and Pakistan’s desire to No-dong ballistic missile was well suited to Pakistan’s obtain a reliable airborne nuclear delivery system. pressing strategic requirement. (The range of the Washington’s October implementation of the No-dong, like that of virtually all ballistic missiles, Pressler Amendment sanctions essentially froze depends on the payload weight and other design Pakistan’s air force procurement, save for some configurations.) The sharing of missile expertise imports of low-technology aircra from China. The began in , when Pakistani officials travelled to delivery of F- aircra that Islamabad had already North Korea to view a prototype of the No-dong. In purchased from the United States was stalled, and November , North Korea and Pakistan appar- because of intense US pressure and their own non- ently struck a deal for – No-dong missiles, and proliferation concerns, European suppliers were at least one transporter erector launcher or mobile reluctant to come to Pakistan’s assistance. erector launcher,44 the delivery of which reportedly The second factor that worried Pakistani defence began in –. planners was the rapid maturation of India’s ballistic It is widely assumed, but impossible to prove, missile programme in the wake of a military crisis that the provision of centrifuge technology was at over Kashmir in . India first test-fired its short- least partly in exchange for the No-dong missiles, range Prithvi ballistic missile in February and and that the deal was authorised by Pakistan’s introduced Prithvi missile baeries into service top leaders. According to North Korean Politburo with the army in .43 Further, the two-stage defector Hwang Jang Yop, a No-dong–HEU deal intermediate-range Agni- ballistic missile, which was concluded in the summer of .45 Overhead the Indians considered a technology demonstrator imagery of Pakistani aircra in Pyongyang is oen and not a developed weapons system, under- cited as proof of official involvement in the nuclear went three test flights between and . The deal.46 It is likely that at least some of the centri- emergence of an Indian ballistic-missile capability fuges, parts, blueprints, designs and possibly UF created a new missile gap for Pakistan, and also North Korea obtained were transported in C-s raised the prospect that India would have both belonging to the Pakistani air force or to charter missile and aircra delivery systems for its covert companies connected to the air force. It was much nuclear arsenal, while Pakistan would not have easier for Khan to ship nuclear components to much of either. To compound Pakistan’s problems, North Korea than to Iran because there was already the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), an authorised trade in sensitive military equip- which was originally established in , was ment with Pyongyang dating from the early s. now operating rather effectively. Most European Pakistani aircra carried ballistic missiles and their suppliers were members of the MTCR group and components, surface-to-air missiles, artillery and thus refused to supply Pakistan with the means to other conventional military equipment from North produce missile delivery systems. Korea.47 The business activities of KRL had grown over the years, involving much more than simply Khan’s contacts with Pyongyang nuclear enrichment, and extending to the produc- Just as A.Q. Khan filled a vital strategic need when tion of missiles, mines, electronics and artillery.48 US and French non-proliferation pressures blocked Khan also bought anti-tank missiles from North

74 Nuclear Black Markets: Pakistan, A.Q. Khan and the rise of proliferation networks A.Q. Khan and onward proliferation from Pakistan

Korea to help fulfil KRL’s orders from the Pakistani missiles outright. In , Pakistan was in a financial army. This conventional trade could have masked crisis, with its foreign exchange reserves equiva- nuclear trafficking. Movements of military cargo in lent to only three weeks of imports. The country and out of Pakistan at that time were characterised was only able to avoid default with help from the by extreme secrecy and compartmentalisation. US International Monetary Fund and by borrowing arms shipments through Pakistan for anti-Soviet m from domestic banks.52 forces in Afghanistan contributed to a climate in Beginning with Benazir Bhuo, successive which questions were not asked about arms imports Pakistani governments have insisted that the and exports. In one incident in , Pakistani ballistic missile cooperation with North Korea was intelligence authorities had obtained a foreign based on a cash payment, rather than a quid pro quo liaison tip-off that a chartered C- aircra going exchange for Pakistani nuclear technology. Pakistan to North Korea to pick up conventional missiles claims it paid a total of m to North Korea for was carrying ‘irregular cargo’ on Khan’s behalf. the entire missile package, including the transfer of Pakistani intelligence operatives quietly raided technology.53 It is difficult to corroborate this claim the aircra, but found nothing. Apparently, Khan through publicly available information. The figure had been tipped off (see pages –).49 The fact that is low in comparison with the bn Saudi Arabia there was an unannounced search suggests that reportedly paid for – Chinese CSS- ballistic such cargo was not regularly screened.50 In sum, missiles in the late s. On evidence of official Pakistani–North Korean sensi- the other hand, m for the tive technology transactions does not necessarily No-dong package is in line indicate official Pakistani–North Korean nuclear with estimates that the shorter Evidence of o!cial collaboration. range Hwasong- and - Pakistani policymakers knew, of course, about missiles cost around .–m sensitive technology the cooperation with North Korea on missiles, many each and that the longer-range of them having been directly involved in its continu- Taepo-dong has been priced transactions does not ation. It seems unlikely that they would have been at m.54 Given the enor- unaware of the nuclear cooperation that was occur- mous strategic importance of necessarily indicate ring at the same time. Although Khan and his KRL No-dong missiles to national team were able to make many decisions independ- defence, m would have o!cial nuclear ently, they had no authority on national security been within Pakistan’s finan- decisions. According to an unconfirmed press report, cial means. Despite its low collaboration Khan claimed that three different army chiefs of foreign reserves, Pakistan’s staff – Abdul Waheed (–), Jehangir Karamat arms imports during the (–) and Pervez Musharraf (–present) – – timeframe were were aware of his nuclear deals with Pyongyang.51 valued at m.55 The overall defence budget in the Current and former military officers strongly deny mid-s was around bn annually.56 this accusation, but the military’s dominant role in A difficulty in assessing the Pakistani govern- nuclear oversight since is reason to believe that ment claim is that there is lile public evidence of Khan would not have traded the centrifuge tech- monetary payments from North Korea to Khan or nology without the army’s approval. The armed his associates for the centrifuges. The Islamabad forces certainly would have been privy to any government would have an incentive to disclose discussions concerning the acquisition of the No- any such transactions that might have come to light dong, a system carrying serious implications for in its investigations of Khan because this would any military force posture. Transferring nuclear help to distance the government from Khan’s trans- technology to the North Korean pariah state would actions. But to date no such evidence has surfaced. also have had severe consequences for the nation’s One other possible explanation for Khan’s foreign policy and international reputation. The nuclear assistance to North Korea was that he acted claim that Khan could not have sold his country’s largely of his own volition, for his own profit. As nuclear secrets without the expressed approval of already noted, Khan had broad autonomy as head Pakistani civilian and military leaders is supported of KRL. There appears to have been poor state by an economic rationale, in the sense that many control of critical nuclear technologies and compo- analysts doubt Pakistan could have paid for the nents, including centrifuges. Khan could ship large

an IISS strategic dossier 75 A.Q. Khan and onward proliferation from Pakistan consignments in and out of the country with lile Libya’s unrelenting interest in nuclear weapons oversight, particularly before the creation of the Gadhafi’s aspirations for acquiring weapons of military’s Strategic Plans Division in . In this mass destruction had been widely known ever scenario, Khan could have begun to assist North since he overthrew King Idris I in . In the s, Korea in the late s for personal gain. At this Gadhafi’s endeavours to buy nuclear weapons time, his own importance was diminishing because off the shelf took him to China, France, India and PAEC, not KRL, was responsible for weaponising the Soviet Union. These efforts did not yield any Pakistan’s deterrent. He would also have had a results; however, Gadhafi did succeed in acquiring motivation to spur North Korea to speed up deliv- , tonnes of yellowcake (uranium oxide concen- eries of No-dong missile technology, allowing Khan trate) from Niger in and .59 In the same to test the Ghauri in , a full year before PAEC period, Gadhafi befriended Zulfiqar Ali Bhuo, could field a solid-fuel alternative.57 The broad who was vigorously pursuing nuclear weapons cooperation between Pyongyang and Islamabad, in response to India’s May nuclear explosive however, is significant reason to suspect state test. Bhuo was in desperate need of finances, as complicity, at least in terms of having knowledge well as raw materials, for a crash programme that of and thereby implicitly condoning the centrifuge Pakistan had embarked upon with very lile prior deal. infrastructure. During –, Gadhafi reportedly provided financial assistance and passed tonnes Libya of the yellowcake Libya had obtained from Niger to In , the Khan network began what became Pakistan.60 In return, Libya apparently sought assist- an extensive nuclear export business with Libya, ance from Pakistan with ‘hot cells’ for extracting involving nuclear specialists, middlemen and plutonium from irradiated uranium.61 Libya had supplier companies from three continents. Of all hoped that Pakistan would provide weapons-related Khan’s deals, the most is known about the Libya technology in return for aid. Libya reportedly connection because of Tripoli’s disclosures and its gave –m to Bhuo, whose Islamic rhetoric cooperation with inspectors aer Gadhafi decided about the programme excited many revolutionary in to renounce and dismantle his nuclear and leaders of the time.62 However, on the government- chemical weapons programmes and to restrict its to-government level Pakistan agreed only to offer ballistic-missile capacity. Following on from secret training for Libyan personnel at PINSTECH and negotiations with the US and UK to li sanctions no more. The Pakistan–Libya nuclear cooperation implemented in response to the Lockerbie bombing, at the government-to-government level ended once Libya contacted MI, the UK intelligence service, Bhuo was overthrown. in mid-March to initiate talks on dismantling For a decade from the mid-s onwards, the strategic weapons programmes in exchange for Libyan nuclear programme was largely frustrated by removing other sanctions and normalising rela- the unwillingness of potential nuclear suppliers to tions. Secret talks then expanded to include the deal with the regime.63 Libya acknowledged that, in US. Libya was reluctant to acknowledge the full July , it made a strategic decision to reinvigorate extent of its nuclear programme, however, until its nuclear activities, including gas centrifuge enrich- the German-registered vessel, BBC China, bound ment.64 At this point, Libya tried to set up a two-track for Libya with centrifuge equipment from the programme. The first track involved a plutonium Khan network, was diverted to Italy in a joint US– route for which it unsuccessfully sought assistance UK–Germany–Italy operation. This interdiction from Argentina, the Soviet Union, Bulgaria and demonstrated to Tripoli that its clandestine supply Japan. Its second track was to follow the uranium network had been compromised. The US and UK enrichment route to fissile-material production. In intelligence officials involved in the highly confi- the early s Libya had managed only to operate dential negotiations provided additional evidence a single centrifuge, which it had obtained from of what they knew and, in December , Libya Germany. In , Libyan intelligence initiated revealed even more. During a trip by MI and CIA contact with Khan, and followed up with a meeting officers to Libya early that month, Libya handed in Istanbul among Libyan intelligence agency head over a copy of a nuclear weapon design that it Matooq Mohammed Matooq, A.Q. Khan and Tahir, had received from the Khan network,58 as detailed to conclude a deal for the wherewithal for a uranium- below. centrifuge enrichment programme.

76 Nuclear Black Markets: Pakistan, A.Q. Khan and the rise of proliferation networks A.Q. Khan and onward proliferation from Pakistan

Selected companies reported to have manufactured, supplied or attempted to supply Libya with gas centrifuge components or relevant machinery

Ring magnets Upper Feed KRL, Pakistan (magnetic) ProductWaste bearing Distributor Non-corrosive pipes and valves KRL, Pakistan TradeFin, South Africa CETEC, Switzerland SMB Computers, Dubai Centre post (stationary) Aluminium or Top end cap maraging steel KRL, Pakistan Top scoop SCOPE, Malaysia Casing Bikar Mettale Asia, Singapore Baf!e (rotating) Flow-forming or balancing equipment Rotor KRL, Pakistan TradeFin, South Africa Traco, Switzerland Baf!e De Young Engineering, South Korea Bottom scoop End-cap and ba!e KRL, Pakistan SCOPE, Malaysia Bottom end cap SMB Computers, Dubai Vacuum pump Vacuum pumps KRL, Pakistan Krisch Engineering, South Africa TradeFin, South Africa Lower bearing Electromagnetic Power supply OIL KRL, Pakistan motor SMB Computers, Dubai ETI Elektroteknik, Turkey EKA, Turkey

Three-dimensional This image is adapted from a chart )rst produced by the Center for Nonproliferation Studies in measuring machine January 2005. Some more recent information has been added. Not all of these companies were Mitutoyo, Japan aware of the end use of the components or machinery that they supplied or manufactured.

Centrifuge enrichment equipment with HEU particles. Gadhafi then ordered , Shortly aer Libya’s initial contact with Khan in additional P- centrifuges, enough to produce signif- , the Khan network started to send Libya icant quantities of weapons-grade uranium aer complete P- aluminium rotor centrifuges (re- they were installed and operating effectively. The designated as L-s for ‘Libya-’), along with most first deliveries were made in December . The of the components for an additional centrifuges. focal point of the Libyan research and development The aluminium rotors and ring magnets were myste- activities was a facility named Al Hashan on the riously missing. In , Khan sent Libya two test outskirts of Tripoli. By April , one nine-machine P- (renamed L-) maraging steel centrifuges. Both cascade had reportedly been completed and was of these centrifuges had been used in the Pakistani under vacuum with all the pipes, electrical connec- nuclear programme, and both were contaminated tions and processing equipment set up. But for

an IISS strategic dossier 77 A.Q. Khan and onward proliferation from Pakistan unknown reasons Libya then decided to dismantle than tonnes were delivered: two small cylinders in the cascades and to move them to Al Fallah. By the September , one containing kg of unenriched end of , the Gadhafi regime had acquired a UF and one with the same amount of UF with significant number of L- components, but again, no depleted uranium (.% U); and in February , rotating parts were delivered, apparently because ,kg of UF slightly enriched to %. The origin of of difficulties manufacturing them in the network’s the uranium has not been definitively established, overseas facilities. The network considered making but the evidence points to North Korea with Pakistan them in Dubai, South Africa, Turkey and Malaysia, and Dubai as transit points. Tahir told Malaysian but for reasons that remain unclear ultimately investigators that the UF was shipped on Pakistani decided to produce the rotors in Libya itself. When planes, although Pakistan says it came from North

US and UK officials and IAEA inspectors arrived in Korea. Suspect bank transactions preceding the UF late December and January to begin the transfers include a payment made by Libya, and a dismantlement process that Libya had pledged, the North Korean receipt of a similar amount, although components were still unassembled and were found not necessarily enough to cover that amount of 67 in unopened boxes. Libya also received computer UF. There seems to be no doubt that the cask 68 compact disks containing a full set of P- and P- containing the kg of UF originated in Pakistan. It centrifuge drawings together with assembly and is not confirmed where the cask had been and what test instruction manuals. The network arranged was the origin of the material inside it. US experts training in Europe, Africa, the Middle East and detected plutonium traces on the container that Southeast Asia for Libyan technical personnel.65 To were identical to traces previously found at North manufacture centrifuge components that were diffi- Korea’s Yongbyon complex, which indicates that cult to procure elsewhere, particularly the maraging the container was as some point in proximity to that steel rotors, and to repair damaged centrifuges, site.69 IAEA tests on the same container did not yield the network established a workshop at Janzour, the same plutonium traces,70 although the IAEA Libya, code-named Project Machine Shop !""!, and swipe samples were not as extensive as those taken purchased the necessary machining equipment. by the US of the entire container. The isotopic compo-

Supplying , centrifuges, each of which has sition of the UF itself did not match known samples approximately parts, meant that the supplier of uranium from anywhere else in the world.71 By a network would have to procure or manufacture process of elimination, and in connection with the over a million components and ship them all to plutonium particles and the suspect bank accounts, Libya. Some of these components must have been US intelligence analysts deduced that it came from difficult for Khan to procure through the network’s North Korea. This analytical conclusion, however, traditional means. Khan’s supply to Iran and North does not conclusively rule out other countries as the

Korea of designs, mostly used centrifuges and source of the UF. And there is no other evidence components, and UF was bold enough (although that North Korea has a uranium-conversion facility the full extent of Khan’s sale to both countries is capable of producing the uranium gas. unknown). The enormous Libyan project posed One additional possibility is that North Korea problems that were vastly more complicated. To sent natural yellowcake to Pakistan, which Pakistan meet the challenge, the Khan network increased the then converted and shipped to Libya,72 but this capacity of front companies in Malaysia, Turkey and hypothesis is flawed. While KRL almost certainly South Africa (as described below) to manufacture had the means to convert uranium gas into uranium certain products and, in Khan’s biggest innovation, metal, there is no evidence that Khan had the exper- to establish factories in non-traditional supplier tise and equipment to turn yellowcake into uranium countries to procure, assemble and manufacture the tetrafluoride and then into UF. If Khan had such a components for the enrichment process.66 capability, it seems likely that he would have offered it to other countries, but there is no evidence that Uranium hexa'uoride Khan offered any country assistance with uranium As part of the deal to supply , P- centri- conversion. Libya did import (but never used) a fuges, the Khan network agreed to sell Libya modular uranium-conversion facility in from a tonnes of UF (enough, when enriched to %, for Japanese company that was not known to be linked about three implosion-type weapons). Probably with the Khan network (the name of the company because of difficulties obtaining that amount, less has not been disclosed). If Pakistan were assisting

78 Nuclear Black Markets: Pakistan, A.Q. Khan and the rise of proliferation networks A.Q. Khan and onward proliferation from Pakistan

Khan network: Main nodes for Libya operation

United Turkey Ireland Kingdom Selim Alguadis, Elektronik Germany Netherlands Kontrol Aletleri (Turkish) Switzerland Gunes Jireh, ETI Elektronik Henk Slebos, Slebos France (Turkish) Research (Dutch) [Henk Slebos]

Italy Switzerland Portugal Spain Greece Turkey China F. Tinner, CETEC (Swiss) M. Tinner, Traco Co. (Swiss) Syria G. Lerch (German) Tunisia Afghanistan Morocco Iraq Iran Jordan Pakistan Algeria Pakistan A.Q. Khan Libya Egypt Western Sahara Saudi Arabia

India Myanmar Mauritania Mali Niger Chad Sudan Yemen Thailand

Nigeria Ethiopia Zambia Dubai Cameroon Somalia S.M. Farong, SMB group (Indian) Central B.S.A. Tahir, SMB group (Sri Lankan) Gabon Kenya African DR Congo Indonesia Repubic

Tanzania

Angola Malaysia Zambia Urs Tinner, SCOPE (Swiss) [B.S.A. Tahir] Mozambique Madagascar [F. Tinner] Zimbabwe Namibia [M. Tinner] Botswana

Key South Africa Australia Names in [square brackets] Johan Meyer, TradeFin Engineering (SA) were involved in area but not South Africa based there Gerhard Wisser (German) Daniel Geiges (SA) © IISS

North Korea in making UF, it would point to official unclassified sources. The material laid out a step-by- state involvement through PAEC, the organisa- step process of casting uranium into a metal bomb tion responsible for Pakistan’s uranium-conversion core and building the explosive lenses to compress capability. To date, there has been no allegation of the core.74 The designs were for a ten-kilotonne PAEC involvement with Libya. implosion device following a late s Chinese design, weighing kg. It was too large to fit on any Bomb design missiles in Libya’s arsenal. Many of the bomb design Libya claimed that the documents for a nuclear documents were described as copies of copies, weapon design and fabrication that it received and included handwrien notes from lectures by from the Khan network in late or had Chinese weapons experts, that seemed to confirm been provided as a ‘bonus’ for –m and that it that they had been reviewed by KRL.75 In January took no steps to assess the credibility or to explore , Libya turned over to the US and UK (through the practical utility of the information – an asser- the IAEA) the design documents in the form tion viewed with scepticism by the IAEA.73 The Libya said they had come, wrapped in the original documentation included assembly drawings and Islamabad drycleaner’s bag. (As noted above, Libya manufacturing instructions for components of the had already provided a copy to UK and US intel- ‘physics package’: explosive parts of the weapon, ligence officials a month earlier.) Lacking trained the detonator and fissile materials. It did not include personnel in the necessary fields, it is unlikely that the associated electronics, cabling and firing sets. Libya would have been able to fill in the missing Also missing were some of the key scale drawings drawings on its own to produce a workable bomb. of the explosive lenses. The bomb design was about On the other hand, if Iraq, North Korea or Iran, % complete and was far more detailed than what with their much larger industrial infrastructure and has been available on the internet or through other cadres of qualified engineers, had received the same

an IISS strategic dossier 79 A.Q. Khan and onward proliferation from Pakistan

set of designs, they probably could have completed nological expertise in the nuclear sciences. Libya the missing pages indigenously. As discussed below, had almost no pre-existing capability and wanted whether any other customer received a bomb design the Khan network to facilitate the entire enrichment is unknown. That such a national security asset was process. included so casually in the deal with Libya is reason Libya contracted Khan to manufacture centrifuge to believe that the Khan–Libya nuclear connection components, to assemble them into workable centri- was not authorised by the Pakistani government. fuges ‘offsite’, and then to install and operate them at a location outside Tripoli. The vast size and scope The make-up of the Khan network of the order broke new ground for the network, The Khan network was not a hierarchically struc- requiring Khan to transform both his organisation tured enterprise, but rather a collection of connected and its business practices to provide full service nodes in various countries, which sometimes as a completely private sector entity. The Libyan operated in league with Khan and at other times case also reveals how sophisticated the network functioned independently. At least companies had become. Khan suggested, for example, that the and middlemen sold nuclear-related goods through Libyans build sheds for centrifuges that would look the network.76 The vast majority of individuals like goat or camel farms as a means of camouflage. involved in the Khan proliferation network had a The manner in which the business was conducted long history of procuring and selling items for the would have maximised profits for the network and Pakistani nuclear weapons programme. And when kept the Libyan programme dependent on Khan for Khan managed to shi his primary business opera- advice for many years into the future. tions from imports to much more lucrative exports, many of his European and The Dubai hub: Aer Khan was removed from KRL South African accomplices in March (see chapter four) he moved his base stayed with him. The new of network operations to Dubai.77 This was where Libya had almost no pre- ‘business model’ orienta- components were stored and transhipped, and tion offered the European where his most important associate, Tahir, kept existing capability and members of the network office, as managing director of the SMB Group, a much more money in position he took over from his uncle Farouq. Tahir wanted the Khan network comparison to what they was Khan’s main intermediary with Tripoli when the had previously got from Libya operation began in . Other Dubai-based to facilitate the entire Pakistan’s secret nuclear companies, such as the Aryash Trading Company programme coffers, and and Gulf Technical Industries (GTI), oen appear in enrichment process they were asked to carry on reports on the Khan network as prominent links in with the very same expertise the traffic in sensitive items. GTI was managed by in manufacturing, logistics British citizen Peter Griffin and his son Paul, both of and finances that they had whom deny any wrongdoing and against whom no developed to such perfection in aiding the Pakistani charges have been filed. (and, in some cases, Iraqi) nuclear weapons effort. The Libya deal showcased the organisation’s The South African connection: In South Africa, the complex and transnational nature and differed Khan network worked with companies and experts from the Khan network’s transactions with Iran and who had been involved with the South African North Korea in three important respects. Firstly, nuclear weapons programme before it was aban- most of the proliferation occurred aer Khan was doned in . One such expert was Gerhard removed from KRL in for defying government Wisser, a German living in South Africa, who had aempts to control his foreign dealings (see pages supplied vacuum pumps and other equipment to –). Secondly, it was the first time the network had Pakistan in the s in addition to doing work for managed to produce outside any single country the the South African nuclear programme. In Dubai in entire panoply of materials, tools and technologies , Tahir offered Wisser a lucrative commission needed to fabricate gas centrifuges for uranium to arrange for the manufacture of ‘certain pipe- enrichment. Thirdly, the deal differed in scale from work systems’. Wisser engaged a former associate those involving Iran and North Korea because each who had also worked for the South African nuclear of those countries already had a fair degree of tech- programme, Johan Meyer, owner of the engineering

80 Nuclear Black Markets: Pakistan, A.Q. Khan and the rise of proliferation networks A.Q. Khan and onward proliferation from Pakistan

components were destined for a nuclear weapons programme in Libya.79 The two-year .m contract was signed in the name of GTI, though Peter Griffin denied any involvement, arguing that Tahir had forged the documents.80 At Tahir’s request, Urs Tinner, son of long-time Khan associate Friedrich Tinner, began consulting for the SCOPE factory and arranged to import lathes as well as cuing, turning and grinding machines. Between December and August , SCOPE manufactured and sent types of centrifuge components (of the approxi- mately components needed in total) to Dubai.

The Turkish mini-hub: The Khan network relied on workshops in Turkey as mini-hubs to procure sub- components from Europe and elsewhere, and to assemble centrifuge motors and frequency converters to spin the centrifuges at the high speeds necessary to separate different uranium isotopes.81 Elektronik Kontrol Aletleri (president: Selim Alguadis) and ETI Elektroteknik (president: Gunes Jireh, company partly owned by Dutch businessman Henk Slebos) SCOPE invoice to Desert Electrical Equipment Factory, Dubai imported centrifuge motors and aluminium cast- (courtesy Royal Malaysian Police) ings from Europe, assembled them, and sent them to Dubai. Alguadis contends that he did not know their destination was Libya. In , a shipment firm TradeFin, based in Vanderbiljpark. Along with of electrical components was sent with false end- a third associate, Swiss citizen Daniel Geiges, they user certificates to Dubai, and was loaded aboard built a complex steel system to feed and withdraw the BBC China. When the ship was diverted to the

UF gas into a centrifuge cascade. The massive southern Italian port of Taranto in October and system filled -foot shipping containers and was Italian authorities removed a shipment of centrifuge estimated to be worth m. The network also asked components from Malaysia, the other components TradeFin to manufacture maraging steel rotors from Turkey were not discovered and continued on for Libya’s L- centrifuges. In late , TradeFin to Libya. The Libyan government alerted interna- ordered a specialised Spanish-made lathe from GTI tional inspectors to their arrival in Tripoli in March but ultimately decided not to produce the rotors, and they were subsequently removed by the either because of a price dispute or because they US.82 were unable to acquire the maraging steel that was needed. TradeFin consequently returned the lathe to Other manufacturing sites: The Khan network acquired GTI in December . In , inspectors discov- specialist equipment and materials from companies ered the lathe in Libya.78 or intermediaries in many other countries, including Spain, Italy, Germany, the Netherlands, Switzerland The Malaysian production plan: To evade export and the UK. In Asia, the network acquired specialist controls from members of the Nuclear Suppliers balancing machines made by Hanbando Balance, Group and to take advantage of his Malaysian Inc., one of South Korea’s most prestigious manu- wife’s connections, Tahir contracted Scomi Group facturers of balancing technology. A small South Berhad, a Malaysian oil and gas firm, to manufac- Korean firm, De Young Engineering, purchased ture thousands of centrifuge components for the four of these machines and exported them to Libya Libya operation. Scomi set up a subsidiary, Scomi in June . It is likely that Hanbando was unaware Precision Engineering (SCOPE), with a -person of the final destination of its dual-use product. facility in Shah Alam, Malaysia, but Scomi offi- The Japanese company Mitutoyo falsified export cials have been cleared of having known that the documents for the specialised three-dimensional

an IISS strategic dossier 81 A.Q. Khan and onward proliferation from Pakistan

KRL brochure distributed at "((( Karachi arms fair (Andrew KRL brochure (Andrew Koch/KRL) Koch/KRL) measuring machines (needed to build uranium- nuclear weapons effort. Pakistan’s relations with enrichment centrifuges with the necessary precision) Libya had soured owing to Bhuo’s hanging by Zia it sold to the network for the Libya programme. in . The relationship was only revived in the year , when Musharraf visited Libya. Unlike Soured Pakistan–Libya connections with North Korea and Iran, there were no compel- The Pakistani nuclear connection with Iran and ling reasons for Pakistan to engage in strategic North Korea can be logically discerned, but the Khan cooperation with Libya, nor were there any peculiar network’s cooperation with Libya is more puzzling, personality inclinations. Nevertheless, the network unless it is viewed as a straight business deal. In the struck up a profitable proliferation business. case of neighbouring Iran, with whom Pakistan had Libya proved to be the network’s biggest previously had a strong relationship, there were still customer, paying the network at least m, residual notions of ideological affinity. In particular, according to the US.84 At a time when Pakistan had the strategic inclination of Beg, in his capacity as become closely allied with the United States in the army chief, towards Iran, and the significance of aermath of the September aacks, it is his notion of strategic defiance could explain why illogical that the government of Pakistan would he might have had some sympathy for Iran’s quest have risked such a deal with a pariah country for for nuclear weapons. In the case of North Korea, such a meagre sum. The amount also seems insignif- the country-to-country strategic relationship was icant compared to what other Arab countries with based on defence cooperation that had existed since oil money were prepared to offer, such as the bn the mid-s.83 In the case of Libya, there was no Saudi Arabia is said to have paid China for CSS- ideological or military connection with Pakistan in ballistic missiles in . , when the initial contact with KRL was made. Nor had there been any government-to-government Other potential customers connection, except during the early s when Whether the A.Q. Khan network had other Gadhafi and Bhuo were close and Libya was inter- customers has been a maer of intense interest to ested not only in assisting Pakistan financially, but foreign analysts and investigative agencies. KRL also in providing natural uranium for the Pakistani openly advertised its enrichment wares, telling a

82 Nuclear Black Markets: Pakistan, A.Q. Khan and the rise of proliferation networks A.Q. Khan and onward proliferation from Pakistan

also claimed that Sudan was used as a warehouse between and to store advanced dual-use engineering equipment of European origin.88 Pakistan and Saudi Arabia have an alliance in which it is understood that Pakistan will come to the king- dom’s aid if it is under dire threat. To firm up this alliance, Saudi Arabia has reportedly provided finan- cial support for Pakistan’s nuclear programme, dating from the s.89 In , the Saudis were reportedly tempted to seek Pakistani nuclear warheads for the CSS- missiles they had acquired from China.90 In May , Saudi defence minister Prince Sultan bin Abdulaziz made a widely publicised visit to KRL facilities, the first foreign leader to do so. Pakistani officials assert that Khan’s purpose was to market a missile, not nuclear technology. The Saudi defence minister reportedly toured KRL again in August , although by this time Khan had been removed.91 Khan, for his part, visited Saudi Arabia at least twice, KRL brochure (Andrew Koch/KRL) in November and September .92 It is common for Pakistani officials to visit Saudi Arabia, for the visitor at a Karachi trade fair in , for example, hajj and other legitimate reasons, but Khan’s visits that everything described in a glossy brochure bear scrutiny. An investigation of his front office – all the components to operate a uranium enrich- in Dubai found records of telephone calls to Saudi ment plant and support services – were available Arabia (whether for legitimate or illicit business for purchase.85 Khan is reported to have visited at is unknown). According to US ambassador Chas least countries in the years before his arrest: Freeman, King Fahd bin Abdulaziz told high-level Afghanistan, Côte d’Ivoire, Egypt, Iran, Kazakhstan, US officials on several occasions that Saudi Arabia Kenya, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, Niger, Nigeria, would need a nuclear deterrent in case Iran devel- North Korea, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sudan, Syria, oped an atomic bomb.93 In , several sources Tunisia and the UAE.86 The CIA monitors several asserted, without firm evidence, that Pakistan and of these countries for indications that they might Saudi Arabia agreed on a ‘nukes-for-oil’ barter,94 harbour nuclear weapons ambitions, in part because although in this case it would have been a strictly of their reported past links with Khan.87 Khan’s government-to-government deal, not involving repeated travel to Africa, sometimes accompanied the Khan network. There is no hard evidence of a by KRL scientists and Pakistani army officers, also formal offer or nuclear transfers from Pakistan to raised questions. In trips to Nigeria, Niger, Mali Saudi Arabia, and the aforementioned visits may and Sudan he might have been discussing uranium just reflect the depth of the long-standing relation- procurement, and, in Timbuktu, Mali, personal busi- ship between the two countries. ness related to his hotel investment there. Another Reports of Khan discussing nuclear training possibility is that he was prospecting for additional assistance with the United Arab Emirates were also customers. Some unconfirmed press reports have in a government-to-government context.95

an IISS strategic dossier 83 A.Q. Khan and onward proliferation from Pakistan

Syria leads the list of countries suspected of having acquired nuclear technology illicitly through the Khan network, although the allegations have not been substantiated. The CIA’s unclassified report to Congress on WMD technology transfers in expresses concern that expertise or technology could have been transferred to Syria, but aributes the intelligence only to reports in the Pakistani press that ‘Pakistani investigators in late January said they had “confirmation” … that A.Q. offered nuclear technology and hardware to Syria’. The original press report adds that the deal never materialised.96 One pair of experts claims that Khan offered nuclear technology to Egypt, which turned it down.97 The South African government’s indictment of Geiges and Wisser for unauthorised import and export of centrifuge equipment states that in – they offered various kinds of centrifuge technology to an unnamed client, who ultimately declined the offer on the grounds that it was stolen property. It is also possible that KRL exported nuclear materials as well as centrifuge technology and know-how to China, whose enrichment programme BBC China, run aground in "((. (Captain Nicholas Sloane) reportedly suffered difficulties.98 Given the very close relationship that exists between the two countries in this and other fields, this would likely have been a likely that they simply hid or sold these valuable government-sanctioned activity, if it occurred. commodities.99 A related question is whether other production Other unknowns facilities for the Khan network remain undisclosed. What happened with the rest of the nuclear equip- The , centrifuges that the US removed from Libya ment Libya ordered from the Khan network in were missing their most important parts but never received is another of the major ques- – the fast-spinning rotors. Although the network tions remaining aer the network was broken up. set up a workshop to produce the rotors in Libya, it Investigators who compared Libya’s records and is questionable whether Tripoli could find enough interviewed network members say critical compo- technicians with the specialised skills needed for the nents disappeared in , heightening suspicions assembly of these precision components. It remains about an unidentified ‘fourth customer’. Aer the possible that the rotors were ordered from an as-yet interdiction of the BBC China made it clear that the undisclosed factory elsewhere. network had been compromised, those involved It is also unknown whether all members of the began to destroy evidence and to dispose of stock- Khan network have been identified and put under piled equipment. Rotors and other centrifuge at least some kind of law-enforcement watch. components, precision tools and parts for lathes Approximately individuals may have been disappeared. Additionally, the network had an actively involved in the network.100 Worldwide, unknown number of complete P- centrifuges in individuals are known to have been investi- Dubai that it used as demonstration models. Two gated.101 Certainly not everyone who assisted Khan were transferred to Libya, leaving at least a handful in Pakistan has been named. It is likely that some unaccounted for. Although not in a complete state of of Khan’s associates in other countries are still at readiness, these would present a significant prolif- large. eration risk if they were to fall into the wrong hands. The unanswered question of greatest concern is Network intermediaries contacted by investigators which other countries or non-state actors might also claimed that they destroyed the machines in order have received copies of a nuclear weapon design to remove incriminating evidence, but it is more besides Libya. If the designs were given to Libya

84 Nuclear Black Markets: Pakistan, A.Q. Khan and the rise of proliferation networks A.Q. Khan and onward proliferation from Pakistan simply to sweeten the deal for centrifuges, it is logical of hypocrisy given the high number of Western to assume that Iran and North Korea, and any other industrialists who were more than ready to do busi- customers, would have been offered copies as well. ness with him. He had to prove he could deliver, The uranium-casting documents Iran received from and outwit the West and its hurdles. Combined the Khan network have been described as ‘part of the with this was Khan’s personal anger and Pakistan’s same recipe’ as Libya’s bomb design.102 Libya denies sense of having been victimised owing to India’s having received any weaponisation information in nuclear test (France, Germany and Canada reneged electronic form (in contrast to the centrifuge draw- on contracts for nuclear facilities under intense US ings it did receive on compact disks). However, the pressure aer India’s test, as noted in chapter bomb designs were reportedly digitised and copied one). Khan reportedly told his interrogators that he onto computer disks at the Khan office in Dubai. believed that ‘the emergence of more nuclear states According to testimony introduced in May at would ease Western aention on Pakistan’,104 an Lerch’s trial in Mannheim, Urs Tinner admied to explanation that rings true. having atomic bomb construction plans in his office Khan said that he believed he was ‘helping the that he had received from Tahir. Lerch’s aorney said Muslim cause’, but this is a less credible explanation a customs agent memo quoted Tinner as saying that since the recipients of his assistance included North the designs were original drawings from the s Korea, a non-Muslim country. In fact, Khan was and that he had provided a copy to the IAEA.103 not quite spreading the Islamic bomb, but acting The Swiss and American authorities, as well as the for those states that defied the West in their nuclear IAEA, have been trying to find out what other use pursuits, and more generally, in their foreign poli- the Tinners may have made of the bomb designs, cies. Explaining his actions through this religious including the nightmare scenario of whether they dimension obscures the financial motivation that sold any copies to terrorist groups. appears to have been behind his dealings with Iran. The IAEA and Western intelligence agencies are He may also have felt the need for revenge against also still trying to confirm the extent and nature of Zia, who in had rebuked him (page ). The the assistance Khan gave Iran and North Korea. Iran case can be explained by simple market mech- anisms: there was a long-standing demand from A.Q. Khan’s personal motives and world Tehran, and there was now an available supply of view discarded P- centrifuges. This provided an oppor- In the beginning, Khan was working only for tunity to expand the business of the network, giving Pakistan’s national interest, which was to procure profits to all collaborators, who included his busi- nuclear weapons technology by any means. He was ness partners as well as those within KRL and some encouraged to engage in parallel business deal- government officials who might have facilitated ings so that KRL could decrease its reliance on state or overlooked the deal. The offer to Iraq in funding. He was not the first to benefit from the illicit shows that there was no consistent political strategy trade in destructive technologies, but he accelerated behind the network’s exports: it did not make sense the consolidation of the market and, in doing so, did to sell simultaneously to Saddam Hussein and to his much to spread nuclear weapons technology. He arch-enemies in Tehran. Khan used the No-dong deal removed key obstacles in Pakistan’s successful quest with North Korea to retain his value in competition for nuclear weapons. Khan’s personal and Pakistan’s with his PAEC rivals. As for Khan’s motive for Libya national motives came into conflict as soon as Khan – it seems that he simply wanted to make money was lured into lucrative clandestine dealings. In and to satisfy his ego. He felt hurt that his authority spite of his position as a nationally revered figure, had been called into question, and that he had been Khan still harboured further personal ambition. His removed from KRL, and thus wanted to prove that problem was that the secretive nature of the Pakistani he could deliver a nuclear capability anywhere in nuclear programme meant his achievements had to the world through the network, for which the Libya be kept hidden from the rest of the world. deal was an opportunity to ‘go global’, expanding Khan aspired to defy the West, which had from its original Pakistani roots. In sum, a constel- portrayed him as a villain and convicted him of lation of different motivations explains the various stealing centrifuge designs (in the Netherlands). deals made by the Khan network, varying in impor- Khan felt his capabilities had been insulted. He may tance over time and according to circumstances: also have felt a genuine sense of injustice and a victim ego, profit, nationalism and Islamic identity.

an IISS strategic dossier 85 A.Q. Khan and onward proliferation from Pakistan

Conclusions rity and international reputation, and it is logical to For most of the deals it is hard to separate A.Q. Khan assume that the intelligence apparatus was aware of the individual from the global network he led. But more than Pakistan has ever let on. While knowl- neither were Khan and the network synonymous. edge of a transaction denotes complicity, however, it Although Khan was the deal-maker, the network does not necessarily imply authorisation. With Iran, oen appeared to act autonomously, driven as much North Korea and Libya, Khan operated in the context by his foreign business partners as by his own ambi- of on-going government-to-government coopera- tions. By the time of the Libya deal, the network was tion in weapons programmes and exchanges that a ‘globalised supply chain’. Production capabilities either involved nuclear technology (in the case of became widespread – with computer-controlled Iran), nuclear delivery systems (in the case of North lathes, components could be made almost anywhere Korea), or nuclear materials (in the case of Libya). – and knowledge became diffuse. In downplaying the damage caused by Khan’s The network’s ability to satisfy its customers onward proliferation, Pakistani officials stress that stems from its origins as a national procurement the centrifuge equipment he sold to Iran was used enterprise. It was the experience gained from and deficient, as was probably true of the equip- working for the Pakistani programme that made ment he transferred to North Korea, and, in the case the network so efficient when it turned to exports. of Libya, that it was incomplete. None of these coun- The story is more complex, however, than a mere tries succeeded in constructing a nuclear weapon ‘reversal of the flow’. Pakistan continued to import from the technology they obtained from the Khan components for its own programme, in a manner network, although how close they got to a bomb as a that was largely insulated from the Khan network’s result of the transfers is a maer of some debate. The exports. Also, Khan’s foreign-based partners were nuclear device the North Koreans tested in October not involved to the same degree in all cases: they was based not on HEU but on the plutonium appear not to have been involved in the North they had separated from the spent fuel rods from Korea case at all, except, for some perhaps, as direct their research reactors. How much progress they component suppliers. By contrast, Khan’s Swiss and made in their Khan-assisted centrifuge-procure- Dubai-based partners were apparently the first to be ment programme is simply unknown. There is involved in both the Iran and Libya cases. no evidence that North Korea has any ability to Khan cannot be characterised strictly as either produce HEU; but neither was there any evidence a government representative or a businessman that it could produce UF before it emerged as the acting independently. He was in fact both, in most likely source of the UF that Libya obtained varying degrees according to the circumstances. from Khan. Iran has made the most widely docu- The state’s complicity in his proliferation ranged mented progress in centrifuge technology with along a spectrum. At one end, his procurement for Khan’s help, but as of the beginning of , it was Pakistan’s nuclear programme was state author- at least two or three years away from being able to ised, supported and funded, although he had great produce enough HEU for one nuclear weapon. Libya autonomy in making his own purchases. Khan’s produced no enriched uranium from the equipment purported discussions with the Saudis were almost it imported, and, assuming it would have received surely state authorised. At the other end of the spec- more help and the missing UF and centrifuge parts, trum, the Khan network’s sales to Libya of centrifuge it was at least three or four years away from being equipment produced in Malaysia, Turkey, Europe able to produce a weapon when Gadhafi renounced and South Africa and transshipped in Dubai were the programme in December . Even then Libya almost exclusively a private business transaction would have needed a suitable delivery vehicle. beyond state control. The same is likely to be true The Khan network was not a nuclear weapons of his purported exploratory business trips to other ‘Wal-Mart’, since its contributions to proliferation countries in Africa. The offer to Iraq also appears concerned only – so far as is known today – centri- to have been a private venture by the network, fuge technology and, in one instance at least, a although the dearth of evidence makes it hard to weapon design. However, Khan’s nuclear sales had draw conclusions. other deleterious results. The transfer of enrichment The Pakistani government should have known technology to North Korea precipitated the break- what key officials, such as Khan, were up to in an down of the US–North Korea Agreed Framework area so fundamental to Pakistan’s national secu- and Pyongyang’s resumption of its plutonium

86 Nuclear Black Markets: Pakistan, A.Q. Khan and the rise of proliferation networks A.Q. Khan and onward proliferation from Pakistan

President George W. Bush looks over equipment obtained from Libya’s former nuclear weapons programme at the Oak Ridge National Laboratory in Oak Ridge, Tennessee, USA, July "((. (White House photo by Tina Hager)

Centrifuges from Libya on display at Oak Ridge National Laboratory, USA, March "((. (Doug Mills/The New York Times/ Redux)

an IISS strategic dossier 87 A.Q. Khan and onward proliferation from Pakistan programme and weapons test, with as-yet unknown or more of its neighbours on a similar path. These ripple effects. Khan’s nuclear assistance to Iran scenarios, alarming as they are, only encompass the led to a further breakdown in the global non- known elements of Khan’s black market dealings. proliferation regime and an international crisis over By freely selling enrichment equipment and puing a budding uranium enrichment capability that many the designs on computer disks, Khan significantly fear could escalate to armed conflict. If Gadhafi lowered the technical barriers to nuclear weapons had not made his wise choice in , Libya could development. Who else might have access to the possibly be in possession of an atomic bomb by now, nuclear technology he and his network proliferated a development that would probably have set one remains a haunting question.

Notes

1 William J. Broad, David E. Sanger and Raymond 13 IISS communications, October and December Bonner, ‘A Tale of Nuclear Proliferation: How a . See also Steve Coll, Ghost Wars: The Secret History Pakistani Built His Network’, New York Times, of the CIA, Afghanistan, and Bin Laden, from the Soviet February . Invasion to September !", %""! (New York: Penguin Press,

2 Feroz Hassan Khan, ‘Nuclear Proliferation Motivations: ), pp. –; Ma Kelley, ‘Pakistan Threatened to Lessons from Pakistan’, Nonproliferation Review, vol. Give Iran Nukes’, Associated Press, February ; , no. , November , p. . Douglas Frantz, ‘Pakistan’s Role in Scientist’s Nuclear

3 John Lancaster and Kamran Khan, ‘Pakistanis Say Trafficking Debated’, Los Angeles Times, May .

Nuclear Scientists Aided Iran; Iran Nuclear Effort Said 14 Frantz, ‘Pakistan’s Role in Scientist’s Nuclear Trafficking Aided in Secret ‘s Deal’, Washington Post, January Debated’.

. 15 Kathy Gannon, ‘Iran Sought Advice in Pakistan on

4 Gordon Corera, Shopping for Bombs: Nuclear Proliferation, Aack’, Associated Press, May ; Kathy Gannon, Global Insecurity, and the Rise and Fall of the A.Q. Khan ‘Explosive Secrets from Pakistan’, Los Angeles Times, Network (New York: Oxford University Press, ), p. May .

. 16 Bruno Tertrais, Pakistan’s Nuclear Exports: Was There a

5 Leonard S. Spector and Jacqueline R. Smith, Nuclear State Strategy?, (Washington DC: The Non-Proliferation Ambitions: The Spread of Nuclear Weapons !#$#–!##" Policy Education Center, October ), pp. –, (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, ), p. ; Kenneth http://www.npec-web.org/Essays/-Tertrais- Timmerman, Countdown to Crisis: The Coming Nuclear Pakistan.pdf; David Rohde, ‘Nuclear Inquiry Skips Showdown with Iran (New York: Crown Forum, ), Pakistani Army’, New York Times, January ; pp. –. Lancaster and Khan, ‘Pakistanis Say Nuclear Scientists

6 Stephen Fidler, ‘Fresh Clues on Smuggling Network Aided Iran’; Gannon, ‘Explosive Secrets from Could Li Lid on Tehran’s Secret Nuclear Program’, Pakistan’.

Financial Times, March ; Dafna Linzer, ‘Iran Was 17 Coll, Ghost Wars, p. . Lancaster and Khan, Offered Nuclear Parts: Secret Meeting in May ‘Pakistanis Say Nuclear Scientists Aided Iran’; Udayan Have Begun Program’, Washington Post, February Namboodiri, ‘Dr. Khan’s Story: Thy Hand, Great Gen!’, . Pioneer, February ; Timmerman, Countdown to

7 ‘Iranian Dissident Fires Ukraine, Iran Charges on Crisis, pp. –.

Tehran’s Nuclear Program’, Agence France Presse, 18 Mubashir Zaida, ‘Scientist Claimed Nuclear Equipment August . was Old, Officials Say’, Los Angeles Times, February

8 Corera, Shopping for Bombs, p. . ; David Armstrong, ‘Friends Like These’, The New

9 Dafna Linzer, ‘Iran Was Offered Nuclear Parts’. Republic, November .

10 IAEA, ‘Implementation of the NPT Safeguards 19 Corera, Shopping for Bombs, pp. –.

Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran’, 20 Ibid.

GOV//, February , p. , paras and . 21 Polis Diraja Malaysia, ‘Press Release by Inspector-

11 Corera, Shopping for Bombs, p. . General of Police in Relation to Investigation on the

12 IAEA, ‘Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Alleged Production of Components for Libya’s Uranium Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran’, Enrichment Programme’, February , p. : hp:// GOV//, November , p. , paras and . www.rmp.gov.my/rmp/scomi_eng.htm.

88 Nuclear Black Markets: Pakistan, A.Q. Khan and the rise of proliferation networks A.Q. Khan and onward proliferation from Pakistan

22 IAEA, ‘Implementation of the NPT Safeguards 39 Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) Report to Congress, Agreements in the Islamic Republic of Iran’, report November .

by the Director General to the Board of Governors, 40 Mark Hibbs, ‘Customs Intelligence Data Suggest GOV//, November , Annex , p. , para . DPRK Aimed At G- TYPE Centrifuge’, NuclearFuel,

23 IAEA, ‘Implementation of the NPT Safeguards May .

Agreements in the Islamic Republic of Iran’, 41 Joby Warrick, ‘N. Korea Shops Stealthily for Nuclear GOV//, November , p. , para . Arms Gear’, Washington Post, August .

24 IAEA, GOV//, p. , para . 42 Eishiro Takeishi, ’We Bought Missile Technology’, Asahi

25 ‘Iran May Have Received Advanced Centrifuges: Shimbun, July ; Gary Thomas, ‘Former Prime Diplomats’, Agence France Presse, Jan ; Arms Minister Says Pakistan Had Nuclear Capability Long Control Association ‘Questions Surround Iran’s Before Nuclear Tests’, Voice of America, March , Nuclear Program’, Arms Control Association Fact hp://www.voanews.com/english/---voa.cfm.

Sheets, March , hp://www.armscontrol.org/ 43 By March India had conducted known test factsheets/Iran-IAEA-Issues.asp; Dafna Linzer, ‘Strong flights of Prithvi- missiles. Zahid Hussain, ‘Missile Tests Leads and Dead Ends in Nuclear Case Against Iran’, Raise Indo-Pakistan Fears’, The Times, March .

Washington Post, February . 44 Joseph Bermudez, A History of Ballistic Missile Development

26 IISS, Iran’s Strategic Weapons Programmes: A Net in the DPRK, Occasional Paper No. (Monterey, CA: Assessment (Abingdon: Routledge for IISS, ), p. , Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute Table A. of International Studies, ), p. .

27 Ibid. 45 Larry A. Niksch, ‘North Korea’s Nuclear Weapons

28 Joseph F. Pilat, ‘Iraq and the Future of Nuclear Program’, CRS Issue Brief for Congress, IB Proliferation: The Roles of Inspections and Treaties’, (Washington DC: Congressional Research Service, Science, new series , no. , March , p. . updated February , pp. –).

29 ‘Agencies Trace Some Iraqi URENCO Know-How to 46 Gaurav Kampani, ‘Second Tier Proliferation: The Case Pakistan Re-Export’, Nucleonics Week, November of Pakistan and North Korea’, Nonproliferation Review, , pp. , –. vol. , no. , Fall–Winter , p. .

30 For the IAEA’s English translation of the memo, see 47 Shahid-ur-Rehman and Aroosa Alam, ‘Musharraf David Albright and Corey Hinderstein, ’Documents Says Khan Offered Centrifuges, Designs To N. Korea’, Indicate A.Q. Khan Offered Nuclear Weapons Designs Kyodo News Service, August .

to Iraq in : Did He Approach Other Countries?’, 48 S. Shabbir Hussain and Mujahid Kamran (eds), ‘Dr. Institute for Science and International Security, A.Q. Khan Research Laboratories, Kahuta: Twenty February , hp://www.isis-online.org/publications/ Years of Excellence and National Service’, in Dr. A.Q. southasia/khan_memo_scan.pdf. Khan on Science and Education (Lahore: Sang-E-Meel,

31 Pervez Musharraf, In the Line of Fire: A Memoir (New ), pp. –.

York: Free Press, ), p. . 49 Lancaster and Khan, ‘Musharraf Named in Nuclear

32 David E. Sanger, ‘Pakistani Says He Saw North Korean Probe’; ‘Re-Imposition of Sanctions Feared’; Musharraf, Nuclear Devices’, New York Times, April . In the Line of Fire, pp. –.

33 Bill Gertz, ‘Pyongyang Working to Make Fuel for 50 Christopher O. Clary, ‘The A.Q. Khan Network: Causes Nukes’, Washington Times, March . and Implications’, M.A. thesis, Naval Postgraduate

34 Richard P. Cronin, K. Alan Kronstadt and Sharon School, Monterey, CA, , p. .

Squassoni, ‘Pakistan’s Nuclear Proliferation Activities 51 Lancaster and Khan, ‘Musharraf Named in Nuclear and the Recommendations of the / Commission: Probe’; Clary, ‘The A.Q. Khan Network’, p. .

US Policy Constraints and Options’, CRS Report to 52 Sharon Squassoni, ‘Weapons of Mass Destruction: Congress, RL (Washington DC: Congressional Trade between North Korea and Pakistan’, RL Research Service, updated May , p. ). (Washington DC: Congressional Research Service,

35 Ibid., p. . November ), p..

36 David E. Sanger, ‘Pakistan Leader Confirms Nuclear 53 Presentation by Pakistan Strategic Plans Division offi- Exports’, New York Times, September . cials at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey,

37 ‘Re-imposition of Sanctions Feared,’ Dawn, February CA, October .

. 54 Clary, ‘The A.Q. Khan Network’, p. .

38 Sanger, ‘Pakistani Says He Saw North Korean Nuclear 55 ‘Arms Transfers to India and Pakistan, –’, Devices’. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute

an IISS strategic dossier 89 A.Q. Khan and onward proliferation from Pakistan

(SIPRI) Arms Transfers Database, hp://www.sipri. Provided Plans’, Washington Post, Feb ; David org/contents/armstrad/atind_pakdata.html. Albright and Corey Hinderstein, ‘Unraveling the

56 ‘Pakistan’, SIPRI Military Expenditure Database, A.Q. Khan and Future Proliferation Networks’, hp://www.sipri.org/contents/milap/milex/mex_data- Washington Quarterly, vol. , no. , Spring , p. base.html. .

57 For additional analysis of the explanation that Khan 76 Douglas Frantz, ‘Vital Nuclear Parts are Missing’, Los acted alone, see Clary, pp. –. Angeles Times, April .

58 Corera, Shopping for Bombs, p. . 77 Report of a Commiee of Privy Councillors chaired

59 IAEA, ‘Implementation of the NPT Safeguards by the Rt Hon. the Lord Butler of Brockwell, KG Agreement of the Socialist People’s Libyan Arab GCB CVO, Review of Intelligence on Weapons of Mass Jamahiriya’, GOV//, May , p. , para Destruction, HC (London: The Stationery Office, . July ), hp://www.factcheck.org/UploadedFiles/

60 W.P.S. Sidhu, ‘Pakistan’s Bomb: A Quest for Credibility’, Butler%Report.pdf, p. .

Jane’s Intelligence Review, vol. , no. , June , p. 78 Douglas Frantz and William C. Rempel, ‘New Find in . a Nuclear Network’, Los Angeles Times, November

61 Shyam Bhatia, Nuclear Rivals in the Middle East (New ; Albright and Hinderstein, ‘Unraveling the York: Routledge, ), pp. –; Spector and Smith, A.Q. Khan and Future Proliferation Networks’, p. Nuclear Ambitions, pp. –. .

62 Wyn Q. Bowen, Libya and Nuclear Proliferation: Stepping 79 Scomi Group Berhad, ‘SCOPE’s Press Statement on Back from the Brink, Adelphi Paper (London: its Contract in Dubai’, news release, February : Routledge for IISS, ), pp. –. hp://www.scomigroup.com.my/publish/news.

63 Ibid., p. . shtml; Raymond Bonner and Wayne Arnold, ‘Business

64 IAEA, ‘Implementation of the NPT Safeguards as Usual in Plant that Tenet Said was Shut’, New York Agreement of the Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Times, February .

Jamahiriya’, report by the Director General to the 80 Steve Coll, ‘The Atomic Emporium’, The New Yorker, Board of Governors, GOV//, February , – August .

p. , para. . 81 Polis Diraja Malaysia, ‘Press Release by Inspector-

65 IAEA, GOV//, Annex I, pp. -. General of Police’; David Albright and Corey

66 Clary, ‘The A.Q. Khan Network’, p. . Hinderstein, ‘Libya’s Gas Centrifuge Procurement:

67 Communication with investigative official, Europe, Much Remains Undiscovered, Institute for Science and October ; Corera, Shopping for Bombs, pp. –. International Security (ISIS) ’ISIS Issue Brief, March,

68 Glenn Kessler and Dafna Linzer, ‘Nuclear Evidence : hp://www.isis-online.org/publications/libya/ Could Point to Pakistan’, Washington Post, February cent_procure.html; David Albright, ‘International . Smuggling Networks: Weapons of Mass Destruction

69 Ibid.; Glenn Kessler, ‘North Korea May Have Sent Counterproliferation Initiatives’, statement to the Libya Nuclear Material, US Tells Allies’, Washington Senate Commiee on Government Affairs, June Post, February . .

70 Kessler and Linzer, ‘Nuclear Evidence Could Point to 82 William J. Broad and David E. Sanger, ‘Aer Ending Pakistan’. Arms Program, Libya Receives a Surprise’, New York

71 David E. Sanger and William J. Broad, ‘Tests Said to Times, May ; Ian Traynor, ‘Western Agents Let Tie Deal on Uranium to North Korea’, New York Times, Nuclear Equipment Slip Past to Libya’, Guardian, February . May .

72 Kessler and Linzer, ‘Nuclear Evidence Could Point to 83 Clary, ‘The A.Q. Khan Network’, p. .

Pakistan’. 84 Ma Kelley, ‘Nuclear Weapons Cost Libya

73 William J. Broad, ‘Libya’s Crude Bomb Design Million’, Associated Press, March .

Eases Western Experts’ Fears’, New York Times, 85 Andrew Koch, ‘AQ Khan Network: Case Closed’, testi- February ; Douglas Frantz, ‘A High-Risk Nuclear mony to Subcommiee on International Terrorism and Stakeout’, Los Angeles Times, February ; IAEA, Nonproliferation of the House International Relations GOV//, Annex I, p. . Commiee, May , pp. –.

74 Bowen, Libya and Nuclear Proliferation, p. . 86 William J. Broad and David E. Sanger, ‘As Nuclear

75 Joby Warrick and Peter Slevin, ‘Libyan Arms Designs Secrets Emerge in Khan Inquiry, More Are Suspected’, Traced Back to China; Pakistanis Resold Chinese- New York Times, December .

90 Nuclear Black Markets: Pakistan, A.Q. Khan and the rise of proliferation networks A.Q. Khan and onward proliferation from Pakistan

87 John D. Negroponte, ‘Annual Threat Assessment of through December ’, May , p. ; Kamran the Director of National Intelligence’, Senate Select Khan, ‘Pakistanis Exploited Nuclear Network; Iran, Commiee on Intelligence, January . Libya Aided Via Black Market, Investigation Finds’,

88 Ian Traynor and Ian Cobain, ‘Clandestine Nuclear Washington Post, January .

Deals Traced to Sudan’, Guardian, January . 97 Albright and Hinderstein, ’Unraveling the A.Q. Khan

89 ‘Saudi Nuclear Pact’, Washington Post, January ; and Future Proliferation Networks’, p. .

‘Mohammed Al-Khilewi: Saudi Arabia is Trying to 98 See David Albright and Mark Hibbs, ‘Pakistan’s Bomb: Kill Me’, Middle East Quarterly, vol. , no. , September Out of the Closet’, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, vol. , p. . , no. , July–August ; and Corera, Shopping for

90 Mansoor Ijaz, ‘Pakistan’s Nuclear Metastasis: How Bombs, p. .

Widespread is the Cancer?’, The Weekly Standard, 99 IISS interview with David Albright, January . January ; Ronen Bergman, ‘El-Sulayil Missile Base Frantz, ‘Vital Nuclear Parts Missing’.

– Saudi Desert’, Yediot Ahronot, March , hp:// 100 David Albright, ‘A.Q. Khan Network: The Case is www.globalsecurity.org/org/news//-saudi. Not Closed’, testimony before the Subcommiee on htm. International Terrorism and Nonproliferation of the House

91 Selig S. Harrison, ‘US Must Clamp Down on Pakistan International Relations Commiee, May , p. .

Nuke Dealing’, San José Mercury News, May . 101 Kenley Butler, Sammy Salema and Leonard S.

92 Tertrais, ‘Pakistan’s Nuclear Exports’, p. . Spector, ‘Where is the Justice?’, Bulletin of the Atomic

93 Harrison, ‘US Must Clamp Down on Pakistan Nuke Scientists, vol. , no. , November–December , Dealing’. However, according to Harrison, Ambassador pp. –. As of the publication date, the authors said Freeman understood at that time that ‘the King envis- five individuals had been convicted, were known aged a US nuclear umbrella’. to be under investigation, and at least others had

94 David R. Sands, ‘Israeli General Says Saudis Seek to been cleared of wrongdoing, released from detention Buy Nukes’, Washington Times, October ; Uri or pardoned.

Dan, ‘Israeli: Saudis Trying to Buy Nuke Warheads’, 102 Anton La Guardia, ‘Tailor’s Bag that Put West on the New York Post, October ; Arnaud de Borchgrave, Trail of Iran’s Nuclear Secrets’, Daily Telegraph, ‘Pakistan–Saudi Trade Nuke Tech for Oil’, United Press March .

International, October . 103 Wolfgang Frey, ‘Angeklagter im Atomprozess schwer

95 ‘Government Offers UAE Nuclear Training But Not belastet’ (‘Defendant in Atom case severely incrimi- Atomic Bomb on Plaer’, Jasarat, May . nated’), Der Spiegel, May .

96 ‘Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of 104 David Rohde and David E. Sanger, ‘Key Pakistani Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction is Said to Admit Atom Transfers’, New York Times, and Advanced Conventional Munitions, January February .

an IISS strategic dossier 91 92 Nuclear Black Markets: Pakistan, A.Q. Khan and the rise of proliferation networks