MASARYK UNIVERSITY FACULTY OF SOCIAL SCIENCES Department of International Relations and European studies

Taiwan – Czech Republic relations 2000 – 2012

Bachelor‟s thesis

Ondřej Macháček

Supervisor: Mgr. Jan Polišenský UČO: 378515 Field of study: International Relations Matriculation year: 2010 Brno, 2013

DECLARATION I hereby declare that this thesis is my own work and that, to the best of my knowledge and belief, it contains no material which has been accepted or submitted for the award of any other degree or diploma.

I also declare that, to the best of my knowledge and belief, this thesis contains no material previously published or written by any other person except where due reference is made in the text of the thesis.

Brno, April 28th 2013 ......

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS Upon finishing this thesis I feel greatly indebted to a number of individuals who have proved to have become an essential part of my work for without their help such a paper could have only hardly reach such a level of quality. Firstly, I am most grateful to my supervisor Mgr. Jan Polišenský, currently a doctoral candidate at Masaryk University Brno, Czech Republic. His guidance, constructive remarks and immaculate willingness to simultaneous help at any point of my work greatly enhanced its quality. Secondly, I wish to express great appreciation to everyone with whom I had the chance to discuss this issue. A number of interviews with individuals most concerned helped remarkably to understand this matter. Thirdly, a wholehearted gratitude belongs to Roy and Mina Moffat, my native English speaking friends. Their devotion to help turned a paper of haphazardly used information into a paper that readers will enjoy reading in a well structured and clear manner. Last but not least, long-lasting and unceasing support of my surroundings, especially my family, was but the most important thing that have led and allowed me to finish this paper.

Content

1. Introduction ...... 6 1.1. Methodology ...... 7 2. Political background ...... 10 2.1. Taiwan ...... 10 2.2. Czech Republic ...... 12 3. Relationship 2000 – 2012 ...... 15 3.1. Historical background ...... 15 3.2. Political development ...... 18 3.2.1. Theoretical approaches ...... 18 3.2.2. Relations prior 2004 ...... 20 3.2.3. Party politics and international support of Taiwan ...... 22 3.2.4. Struggle for Schengen Visa ...... 25 3.2.5. Human rights as a shared value? ...... 27 3.2.6. Double-taxation issue ...... 29 3.2.7. Future prospects ...... 30 3.3. Economic development ...... 31 3.3.1. Mutual trade ...... 31 3.3.2. Foreign Direct Investment ...... 34 3.4. Organization and legal issues ...... 36 4. Conclusion ...... 40 5. List of abbreviations and acronyms ...... 42 6. Sources ...... 43

1. Introduction

This bachelor‟s thesis hopes to provide a thorough analysis of contemporary Taiwan – Czech Republic relations. It will concisely tackle the position of both Czech Republic and Taiwan and their approach to East Asia and Europe respectively. Author will try to analyse the relations since the establishment of Czech Republic. The major focus of this work, however, will be set on the development of this relation in the 21st century beginning with Chen Shuibian‟s presidency.

After a very concise introductory and methodological part, the second chapter is devoted to the historical background in terms of countries position in the world system, their foreign policies and approach to East Asia and EU respectively. Before focusing on the very development of such a relation in the new millennium, brief description of mutual relations up to the year 2000 was deemed necessary. As a result of the active development, some authors claim that the initial phase of such phenomena in early 90‟s deserves most attention.1 This thesis will, however, tackle the development in the given time frame, focusing on the possible change in politics with change of presidencies of both sides. Despite evidently decreasing importance in political terms characterized by a number of blind spots in the first of half of the new decade, considerable attention was paid to economic development. In the second half of the decade, nevertheless, a number of issues such as Taiwan‟s struggle for Schengen visa, the problematic of double taxation agreement deserve to be further elaborated on. This paper is therefore likely to be the first academic literature paying such attention to this issue. As other important scholars deem economic development of this relation to be the most prominent aspect, a special chapter was devoted to this part. Following chapter will discuss legal and organizational issues that will shed light on the background of this relationship. Whereas in these fields this thesis relies heavily on a number of other papers, it should be noted, that since the last Fürst‟s book on Czech Republic – China relations (2010), this paper provides readers with most thorough up-to-date analysis of such relations, reflecting the latest development, that has not yet enjoyed academic attention.

1 Interview with R. Fürst, Institute of International Relations, Prague, Czech Republic, 25. 3. 2013. 6

1.1. Methodology

The reason why author decided to carry out a research dealing this topic is that considerably little attention has been paid to it so far. No matter how deeply aware the author is about the fact that this topic is not considered mainstream and draws only little attention rather than public masses, it is still deemed that it deserves further study.

Taking into consideration the already very limited number of Czech sinologists on one side or similar problems faced by the other side, it goes without saying that academic and political attention to such distant counterpart has come at the cost of more pressing issues than analysis of such relations. Although we may find chapters on this issue in certain publications, most of the scholars that had previously took a keen interest in such an issue seem to have slightly changed their field of interest.2

Further setbacks stem from the academia though. If we take into account there are currently only three universities in Czech Republic that offer majors in Chinese studies, and only one that actually provide for lessons of Czech language on the other side, we may see yet another reasons for comparable insignificance of such an issue.

Yet another constraint may be the actual sensitivity of such a topic. It should be noted that any kind of dealings with such an issue might be of rather disturbing character for any of these sides mentioned. There also seems to be slight unwillingness to take position on such an issue as it might further jeopardize connections with the most prominent third side that is PRC. Some politicians suggest that any kind of engagement with “One China Policy” plus something else is comparable to walking on very thin ice.3 For this very reason, we may find only few officials that are willing to openly comment on such an issue.

To provide readers with an up-to-date work, author opted for a multidimensional approach that hopes to reflect not only academic literature, but at the same time primary sources as well as a number of interviews given by academics and officials most concerned and involved. Author therefore considers this work to be qualitative one-case study of 2000-

2 R. Fürst, I. Bakešová seem to have lost the track of their previous interest, Tubilewicz‟s since his last book was published in 2007 also did not carry out any further research. 3 Interview with R. Vysloužil, Chamber of Deputies member, Prague, 4. 3. 2013. 7

2012 Czech Republic-Taiwan relations as it is understood by Drulák and Kořan.4 In this context this paper hopes to shed further light on an issue that has so far drawn considerably little academic interest by these means:

Primary sources analysis was used to gather main official postulates, statistics and information. Vast efforts have been devoted to the study of reports of governmental (equally likely parliamentary) bodies, such as Ministries of foreign affairs, Ministries of industry and trade as well as press statements of Taiwan Economic and Cultural Office (TECO) in Prague and its Czech counterpart in Taipei.5

Secondary sources analysis provided for basic informational and interpretational frame that is going to be referred to often, but that served only as a steppingstone into this issue. Among these secondary sources belongs, however, still a very limited number of publications, whose relevance may be in the most recent development rather out-dated: Fürst‟s Czech Republic – China relations after 1989 (2010), Bakešová‟s (also in close cooperation with Fürst) History of Taiwan (2004), and a deep analysis with inclination towards economic issues: Tubilewicz‟s Taiwan: Shopping for allies (2007). Apart from these we may find only marginal mentions on this issue in either various monographs or papers.

Use of unstructured interviews will further explain and elaborate on knowledge gained through the use of the two abovementioned sources. Considerable attention has been paid to make use of any possible point of view and approaches to this issue, therefore scholars, as well as institution‟s officials were interviewed. This has been done not only to further clarify information gathered, but also to gain a personal touch with people most closely involved. Their input is mainly valued due to their own experience and point of view.

Author is, however, at the same time deeply aware of yet other possible constraints and distortions, this time stemming from the actual research approach. It is important to note that any topic dealing with Taiwan might come at the cost of diplomatic acceptability which is often preferred to preserve political sustainability. As this is a rather marginal topic, the scope of secondary analysis is rather limited to a few authors. Therefore most of the sources are either of official or media character. Whereas the first one is more likely to offer only limited information, the reliability of the other one will only prove in time. Time is therefore another

4 Drulák, P., ed., 2008. Jak zkoumat politiku: kvalitativní metodologie v politologii a mezinárodních vztazích. Praha: Portál. 5 Czech Economic and Cultural office (CECO). 8 constraint, as some issues discussed only recently will take effect in the long run and proper analysis is currently limited to the knowledge acquirable nowadays.6 In this manner, reader is heavily encouraged to further contemplate any kind of official or media statements.

As the name “Taiwan” is likely to get blurred, it is important to operationalize such a term right in the beginning of this paper. Therefore, this thesis hopes to provide a concise analysis of Czech Republic – Taiwan relations, where Taiwan represents:

1) islands of Taiwan, Penghu, Jinmen, Matsu and affiliated islands,7 2) territory that is administrated by government seated in Taipei, 3) and/or territory that is often referred to (in the terms of WTO) as “Chinese Taipei”.8

To diminish further constraints, author took advantage of his language abilities not to omit any sources and equal importance was given to documents, publications and media in Czech, as well as in Chinese and English. With this approach it is hoped to create an unbiased work that would not reflect only one-sided perception of such phenomena. As a number of Chinese sources and names make a vital part of this thesis, a standardized pinyin transcription is used. In case of names that have been previously westernized and now are in popular use and referred to, these names will prevail.

Apart from the very aim of this thesis, that is to provide a thorough up-to-date analysis of Taiwan – Czech Republic relations. Number of research questions have also to be tackled:

1) Has there been a change in mutual relations after the Czech Republic‟s accession to EU? If so, how did the relationship change? 2) Was there a change of policies towards respective side with change of presidencies? a. Did policies towards Taiwan change after Václav Klaus claimed his office in Czech Republic? If so, how? b. Did policies towards Czech Republic change after Chen Shuibian‟s and Ma Yingjiu‟s accession to presidential office? If so, how?

6 In this context, further contemplation of possible constraints and distortions, i.e. as stated in „Disman, M., 2002. Jak se vyrábí sociologická znalost. Prague: Karolinum“, is heavily recommended. 7 Ministerstvo zahraničních věcí, Česká republika: Tchaj-wan, základní informace o teritoriu. 8 WTO: Separate Customs Territory of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu (Chinese Taipei) and WTO. 9

2. Political background

2.1. Taiwan

Before Lee Teng-hui‟s accession to power in 1988, it was vital for Taiwan to cope with a number of major setbacks in previous decades. After the whole administration headed by Chiang Kai-shek had to move from mainland, the most important setback came with US- Chinese rapprochement that consequently led to the deprival of many diplomatic recognitions of Republic of China. The famous “One China principle”9 took its roots. As the foreign policy strategy stems mainly from the Taiwanese relations with PRC and U.S., it is necessary, before proceeding to Taiwanese relations with Europe, to further elaborate on Taiwanese political development and its relations with Beijing.

With subsequent democratization process and economic boom in Taiwan, this “One China” approach began to shake. The most serious struggle to create “two Chinas” was carried out in 90‟s by President Lee Teng-hui with his “flexible diplomacy”. Such approach came in a striking contrast with the previous Taiwanese grand strategy. Flexible diplomacy de facto agreed with the existence of “two Chinas”, where such a change in ideological background allowed for pursuing also “substantive” relations with Beijing‟s diplomatic allies. Therefore the strategy of “either Beijing or Taipei” was replaced by strategy that allowed Taiwan to strike only “substantial” (that is not necessarily official) relations with other countries including the very PRC‟s allies.10 Such a strategy was about to be put in use also when approaching post-communist Europe. This implies that Taipei was able to gain partial gains in terms of agreements and memoranda with other countries. Such an approach de facto eventually led to the worldwide establishment of Economic and Culture Offices.11

9 Famous “One China principle/policy” refers to a state of matters in international politics as for who (what country) is the sole legitimate representative of China – PRC or ROC (Taiwan). Therefore third, countries by diplomatic recognition of either Beijing or Taipei express their point of view on this issue, where diplomatic, or official contacts with the other part are possible. In U.S. – PRC Joint communiqué (Shanghai Communiqué) is the is the issue stated as follows: “The U.S. side declared: The United States acknowledges that all Chinese on either side of the Taiwan Strait maintain there is but one China and that Taiwan is a part of China”. 10 Kan, S. A., 2009. “China/Taiwan: Evolution of the 'One China' Policy-Key statements from Washington, Beijing, and Taipei.” Congressional Research Service; Hsiung, J. C., 2000. “Diplomacy against Adversity: Foreign Relations under Chiang Chingkuo.” Asian Affairs: An American Review, 27 (2). 11 Yahuda, M., 1996. “The International Standing of the Republic of China on Taiwan.” The China Quarterly, 148. 10

Even though such an approach stirred strong emotions on the Chinese side represented by Taiwan Strait crises in mid-90‟s, the consequent presidency of DPP‟s Chen Shuibian that is supposed to hold an “independentist” position, drew even closer attention of PRC. It is argued that Taiwanese political and economic development brought about certain kind of nation building, and altogether with the succession of generations created a whole new approach to the China issue. A number of “Taiwanese nationalists” who favoured Taiwanese sense of identity started to emerge in 80‟s.12 Such a Taiwanese approach was mostly reflected by DPP who strived to represent this sense of nation state.

This way of “Taiwanization” was most evident in Chen‟s speeches. Chen‟s inaugural speech famous for “Four No‟s and One Without” clearly included call on Taiwanese independence under “the Republic of Taiwan”. Chen, who won another presidential election in 2004, commented on political development as follows: “We do not intend to change the status quo, and strongly oppose the use of any non-peaceful means to unilaterally change the status quo“. 13 His speech “Four Wants and One Without” called on such Taiwanese independence similarly in 2007.14

KMT‟s president Ma Yingjiu elected in 2008 stood rather reconciliatory position towards China, expressing will for further amelioration of mutual connection with PRC. This was expressed also in his inaugural speech Three No‟s: “no reunification, no independence, no war”.15 Taiwan and mainland got even closer with consequently signed ECFA16 which further facilitate economic development.17

Relations with Europe match the same pattern of flexible approach. Even though EU 27 follows the One China Policy, it has also expressed notable sense of flexibility, when striking connection with Taipei in the same pattern as other countries. Even though a certain kind of relations never ceased to exist, the setback of world-wide acknowledgment of Beijing instead of Taipei was a major blow. Even though relations were conducted via Office in

12 Lin, Ch., 2002. “The Political Formation of Taiwanese Nationalism.“ In Corcuff, S., ed., Memories of the Future: National Identity Issues and the search for a New Taiwan. Armonk: M. E. Sharpe. 13 Ko, S., Snyder, Ch., 2006. “Chen says the NUC will 'cease'.“ Taipei Times, February 28. 14 Cai, K. G., ed., 2011. Cross-Taiwan straits relations since 1979: policy adjustments and institutional change across the straits. River Edge: WSPC. 15 Cossa, R., 2008. “Looking behind Ma‟s 'Three noes'.” Taipei Times, January 21. 16 Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement is an trade agreement based on preferential tariffs on selected goods in order to reduce trade barriers. Gao, L., 2010. “ECFA Jin qianshu Dongguan zhongxiao tai qi chengben jiang jiang.” Renmin wang, June 29. 17 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Czech Republic: Taiwanese foreign policy orientation. 11

Brussels,18 Taiwan was struggling in the following decades. The early 90‟s are, on the other hand, considered to have been the most active and fruitful period in the mutual relations, mainly due to the post-bipolar world (dis)order. 19 Even though non-official diplomatic relations are maintained, relations are “solid and friendly”. 20 Taiwan has enjoyed EU‟s support in various fields and issues such as accession to WTO, or participation in WHO and WHA. Common meetings between Taiwan and EU are held annually and alternately in Brussels and Taipei. 21 These serve the purpose of solving issues concerning both parties to smoothly maintain their so far positive relations: “The EU‟s relationship with Taiwan is strong and mutually beneficial, primarily because it is based on shared democratic values and priorities” says Dr. Tannock, for whom Taiwan might also be a stepping stone for further economic relations with mainland China itself. 22 After being granted the possibility of obtaining Schengen visa, the next step that is being worked on is the possible FTA with European Union.23 “For the past year the European Parliament has been calling on the Council and Commission to formalise EU-Taiwan trading relations through some kind of free trade agreement or trade enhancement measures […] Such an accord could be a vital springboard into the Chinese economy for EU companies.“ 24 The positive relations are therefore reflected mainly in their economic orientation.

2.2. Czech Republic

The political situation after the Cold war, due to the emergence of “security vacuum” in central Europe, was rather unstable.25 Even though the primary aim of Czech foreign policy as well as popular sentiments was to hope to become part of “Old Europe” again – that is to join

18 Initially named “Dr. Sun Yat-sen Center” was in 1995 renamed into “Taipei Representative Office in the European Union and Belgium”. Source: Taipei Representative Office in the EU and Belgium: Introduction, 2009. 19 Tubilewicz, C., 2007(a). “Europe in Taiwan's Post-Cold War Foreign Relations.” Diplomacy and Statecraft, 18. 20 Taipei Representative Office in the EU and Belgium: Relations with EU, Belgium and Luxemburg, 2009. 21 Ibid. 22 European Conservatives and Reformists Group: EU-Taiwan relations growing ever stronger as European Parliament praises Taiwan‟s commitment to peace and stability, 2012. 23 Banks, M., 2012. “Closer economic relations with Taiwan 'in interest' of EU.” The Parliament. September 5. 24 European Conservatives and Reformists Group: EU-Taiwan relations growing ever stronger as European Parliament praises Taiwan‟s commitment to peace and stability, 2012; for a deeper analysis of issues in EU- Taiwan relations see: Su, H., 2010. “The EU‟s Taiwan Policy in a New Context.” Issues and Studies, Vol. 46 (1). 25 O‟Brennan, J., 2006. “'Bringing Geopolitics Back In' : Exploring the Security Dimension of the 2004 Eastern Enlargement of the European Union,” Cambridge Review of International Affairs, vol. 19 (1).; also Asmus, R.D., Kugler, R.L., Larrabee, F.S., 1993. “Building a New NATO, Foreign Affairs, vol. 72 (4). 12

NATO and European Community, it was not sure whether such aspiration does not represent only wishful thinking rather than actual possibility.

Being one of many countries that escaped the Moscow‟s dictate, Prague had to deal with two major challenges stemming from various sources but all connected to security that would preserve the very existence of such an independent country. These challenges may be easily divided into inner and outer. The inner issues to be dealt with were connected to the post-communist, societal, system-wide transformation, i.e.: political transformation within governmental bodies, with severe impacts on the Ministry of foreign affairs;26 economic transformation creating background for market economy; necessity to own defensive capabilities; and others. On the other side, in the terms of security, Czech Republic (Czechoslovakia) had to face considerably different challenges from the outside. The change of geopolitical situation meant that then independent foreign policy had to provide for secure environment. In order to do so Prague had to set up positive and sustainable relations with its neighbours, especially Germany, and deal with its relationship with Russia. Resuming Red Army on Czechoslovakian territory and withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact attracted considerable concerns. Equally important was the necessity to diminish Prague‟s wide dependency on outer environment.27

Apart from other multilateral groupings,28 the primary aim ever since 1989 was to become part of the “Old Europe” again – that was mainly to join NATO and EC in order to gain further security as well as economic and political stability. When in 1993 EU for the first time mentioned the possibility of further enlargement, and NATO‟s Partnership for Peace was launched one year later, Czech Republic devoted considerable attention to becoming a member of both institutions. Therefore, up to the actual years of 1999 and 2004, when Czech Republic joined NATO and EU respectively, the most important national interests were sovereignty, independence and security within these IGOs.29

P. Drulák suggests that whereas up until 2004 the Czech foreign policy had a clear idea of its aims and goals, after becoming part of EU, this commonly shared interest disappeared. Prague ever since seems to have lost its clear conception of such a policy and

26 Císař, Č., 1991. “Instrumentárium zahraniční politiky,” Mezinárodní politika, 1. 27 Eichler, J., 1997. “Priority zajištění bezpečnosti České republiky.” In Kotyk, V., ed. Česká zahraniční politika: Úvahy o prioritách, Prague: IIR. 28 Central European Initiative, Visegrad 4, Council of Europe, OSCE,... 29 Valenta, J., 1992. “Československé národní zájmy z pohledu roku 1992,” In Valenta, J., ed. Máme národní zájmy? Prague: IIR. 13 lacks clear-cut objectives.30 Policies have been shattered and the political elites differ in their opinions. Despite a decent try to strike a grand strategy,31 CR still struggles to find its proper place within EU, or even worse a common approach to other regions or issues. Foreign policy has become rather inactive and apart from certain initiatives32 it remains inefficient and lacks in coherency. Not being sure whether to claim a pro-European, pro-American, or rather an eastern (“autonomous”) agenda, Prague is neither certain whether it should seek economic possibilities, follow (Havel‟s) struggle for democracy and human rights, nor sure what the actually the most pressing issues are.33

The same inefficiency and indecisiveness is also applicable when approaching the region of East Asia, the more that region of East Asia is deemed to be on the edge of Czech diplomatic interests. Even though East Asia enjoys comparably lesser importance, Prague ever since it regained independence is “sitting on the fence” whether to support and seek contacts with ideologically and politically close democracies of South Korea, Taiwan and Japan, or whether it should take pragmatic advantage of the vast Chinese market and possible economic gains. In the same manner, even though President V. Havel„s rhetoric was soon replaced by official governmental strategies and guidelines, documents issued by Ministry of Foreign Affairs only rather non-specifically mention the continent of Asia as a whole, and those issued by the Ministry of Industry and Trade are vaguely trying to promote economic aims and export strategies.34 Economic aims may also be often considered as the only concern of Czech Republic in this region.35 The position, however, may be then characterized as both ambivalent and contradictory, therefore not inefficient.

More interestingly, however, it is suggested that bilateral relations are enjoying less attention mainly in the comparison with multilateral approach, notably in the Asia-Europe Meeting. 36 Prague also happened to host EU-China summit in 2009, and became a representative country in the EU-Japan and EU-Korean Republic summits.37

30 Drulák, P., 2011. “Otázky české zahraniční politiky.” Česko hledá budoucnost. 31 Koncepce zahraniční politiky České republiky na léta 2003-2006. 2003; Programové vyhlášení vlády. 2007. 32 Such as Energy security, Human rights, Eastern Partnership, contacts with Balkan countries,… 33 Drulák, P., 2011. 34 An interesting try was carried out by department of East Asia at Czech MOFA. It did not, however, go public: „Česká republika v Asii: Strategie rozvoje vztahů se zeměmi a oblastmi Asie”. 35 Fürst, R., 2009. “Dálný východ v české zahraniční politice.” In: Kořan, M., ed., Česká zahraniční politka v roce 2008: Analýza ÚMV. Prague: IIR. 36 Ibid. 37 Fürst, R., 2010. “The Far East in the Czech Foreign Policy.” In: Kořan, M., ed., Czech Foreign Policy in 2007- 2009. Prague: IIR. 14

3. Relationship 2000 – 2012

3.1. Historical background

The very first contacts of both sides were, timewise, closely connected to the establishment of First Czechoslovak Republic. The Czechoslovak Legions, who fought on the side of the Entente powers during World War 1 in order to gain Allies‟ support for independent Czechoslovakia, provided for the first contacts of both parties. In the need to leave Russian territory after the war they had, due to the Russian revolution, no other option but to cross the whole of Russia in an eastward direction and leave from the port of Vladivostok. On this way they had to cross the Chinese city of Harbin, where a considerable number of them set up their families. Consequently at the turn of 1918 it was deemed necessary to set up there a first Czechoslovakian consulate. 38 Even though mutual recognition soon followed, Beijing disturbed by Prague‟s “eminent powers-like” approach and its unwillingness to strike equal treaties subsequently led to considerable unimportance.39 Both countries paid little attention to each other and relations de facto ceased to exist after 1939.

The relationship during the Cold war copied the patterns of bipolar order, in which Prague recognized PRC only a couple of days after its establishment in October 1949.40 Regardless of the Sino-Soviet split in 1960‟s, Czechoslovakia had no other option but to conduct relations in accordance with Moscow‟s approval. Therefore striking a connection with a country heavily supported by Washington was then out of question.41

The same was, however, true for Taiwan, as its communism opposing ideology would also only hardly allow for such a connection. Or at least until the change in geopolitics in 1970‟s. At that point Taipei did start to reconsider its policies and distinguish politics and security from economic aims – R. Fürst suggests two possible reasons: 1) rapidly losing diplomatic allies around the world, with the imminent collapse of Soviet union Taipei came to terms with its implications and tried to forge contact even before 1989; 2) and even such an

38 Bakešová, I., 1997. Československo – Čína 1918-1949. Rakovník: Tiskárna Novotný a spol. 39 Bakešová, I., 2001. Čína ve XX. Století. Díl 1. Olomouc: Univerzita Palackého. 40 Ministerstvo zahraničních věcí České republiky: Vzájemné vztahy ČR – ČLR, historie a současnost, 2012. 41 Bakešová, I., Fürst, R., Heřmanová, Z., 2004. Dějiny Taiwanu. Prague: Lidové noviny. 15 approach was preceded by a very interesting step of Taiwanese government in 1979, when it issued a statement allowing for direct foreign trade with certain countries of Soviet Union.42

Even though we might have seen certain steps that would facilitate diplomatic development after the dissolution of USSR, both countries found themselves in 1989 in a situation that meant significant opportunities, but also where knowledge about each other was almost non-existent. Prague found itself in a situation where, as its leader was a great supporter of Human rights, it strived to support such democratic countries as Taiwan. Taipei on the other hand, was in the name Lee‟s flexible diplomacy trying to strike not necessarily diplomatic, but rather substantial relations. To do so, however, Taipei had to cope not only with the lack of knowledge, but also with China.

“The competition between Taiwan and mainland China in the international sphere was not only ideological competition […] during the presidency of Lee Teng-hui, or then during the presidency of Chen Shuibian, we [Taiwan] were looking for bigger space in the international sphere that might be imagined as a battlefield where Taiwan fights mainland China and vice versa […] It does not really matter what was their [post- communist countries] relationship with mainland China like, the problem was, we did not have any approach to these countries. It was only after 1989 that these countries opened to the world, and that moment was also the opportunity to try and we do not have to necessarily only speak about the political connections. Economic and cultural exchange was equally important.”43 Despite such obstacles, but at the same time for the very same reasons, Taiwanese approach is generally viewed as much more active and agile as most of the initiatives were introduced by Taiwan. Soon after 1989 both sides started talks that would later on, in 1991, lead to the establishment of Taiwan Economic and Cultural Office (TECO) in Prague.44 These talks were carried out mainly with huge support of CETRA (Chinese External Trade Development Council) and therefore diplomatic talks were closely linked to those with economic background.45 Notwithstanding these initial signs of goodwill, Prague, hoping to get an access to western institutions opted for a standardized way of conduct with Taipei and two years after the establishment of TECO, Czech Republic established its Czech counterpart in Taipei.46

Within only a couple of years, however, Taiwan managed to create a warmly welcomed image, the more in comparison with PRC. As a most noticeable success and most

42 Fürst, R., 2010. Česko-čínské vztahy po roce 1989. Prague: Karolinum. 43 Interview with J. Cheng, Ph.D., Soochow University, Taipei, Taiwan, 14. 11. 2011. 44 For further information on establishment of these offices refer to chapter no. 3.4. 45 Tubilewicz, C., 2007(b). Taiwan and Post-Communist Europe: Shopping for allies. London: Routledge. 46 For further information on these offices refer to chapter no. 3.4. 16 critical point in the terms of relationship with Beijing, is often deemed the visit of Taiwanese Prime minister Lian Chan in Prague in 1995. His talks both with its counterpart V. Klaus, as well as with V. Havel attracted very negative reactions from Beijing.

After Lian Chan‟s visit, Fürst stresses that yet another very important occasion took place in the same year. Taiwanese minister of trade, Chiang Ping-kun held talks with Czech Prime minister V. Klaus at the Crans Montana Forum in Switzerland. These talks that in the shadows of abovementioned events aroused only little public attention discussed possibilities of further expansion of Taiwanese FDI into Czech Republic. A very similar point to discuss had so far the biggest Taiwanese business delegation to Europe only a month later. These were again welcomed by Czech president Havel.47

The reasons for such a struggle of Taiwanese businessmen, as well as for the thriving amount of investment at the turn of the millennia, J. Cheng sums up as follows:

“It may be hard to distinguish politics from economic interest, but it may be pretty difficult for Taiwan to push through its aims. Eventually it is always the businessmen who choose where they want to expand. Czech Republic at that time offered good geopolitical position with prospects of becoming a part of huge European market. The cost of labour was, compared to its quality, very favourable and at that point, in second half of 90‟s, the investment prospects were equally favourable.”48 Further deterioration in relations with China occurred during the Special commemorative meeting of the General Assembly on the occasion of the fiftieth anniversary of the UN in 1995, after which, during press conference Havel was openly speaking on Taiwan‟s possibility to re-enter UN. For these two countries, such statements obviously cemented their relationship.

Such statements and points of view were, however, to a great extent commonly accepted across the society and politics both in the western world and Czech Republic. The period of early 90‟s after the dissolution of bipolar world order is often suggested to be the most welcoming era for Taiwan and its officials: minister of Foreign Affairs Zieleniec made his voice heard, when he in 1995 stated that: “Taiwan is an undisputed economic and social reality … and Czech Republic is interested to develop mainly economic and trade

47 Fürst, R., 2010. 48 Interview with J. Cheng Ph.D.; also Yun, E., 1997. “Slow Progress, High Prospects,” Taiwan Review, November 1. 17 cooperation.”49 The same was true about the parliament, where a Czech-Taiwan friendship group was established in 1994.50

An “ideological harmony” may be easily understood as the most important factor of the initial relations in 1990‟s. This was reflected not only in political terms, but also in economic ones. This decade brought about prospects of economic cooperation that later proved to be very beneficial. Relations turned to be widely supported by academic and cultural diplomacy that is still considered a vital part of this relation. 51 So whereas some scholars claim, that this era enjoyed most dynamics,52 it also created the positive background for upcoming relations in new millennium.

3.2. Political development

3.2.1. Theoretical approaches

When analysing Czech Republic – Taiwan relations, we may come across a number of approaches. Some scholars deem that mutual relations in the new millennium have fallen deeply behind successes of the previous decade. Mutual relations seem to have lost their initial drive and resemble more an inertial status. This, on the other hand, does not mean that Taiwan would lose any of its appeal in Czech Republic. 53 Due to its activity and well performed PR, Taiwan is still very warmly welcomed.

Even though it is considered that the political peak of this relation occurred in the middle of 90‟s when more European countries “rode the wave” of understanding Taiwan and such moves as inviting Taiwanese prime minister are long gone, we may not suppose that mutual relations came to a halt. A very positive picture that Taiwan had previously, and purposely, built still enjoyed a decent dose of respect and admiration.54 Such a picture with a common ideological affiliation pioneered the eventual success of Taiwanese Czech republic policy: substantial relations with deep ideological bind, cultural and academic cooperation,

49 Sněmovní tisk č. 1512A, interpellation of J. Zieleniece, 6. 3. 1995. 50 For further information please refer to chapter no. 3.4. 51 Bakešová, I., Fürst, R., Heřmanová, Z., 2004.; also Zbořil, F., 2010. Československá a česká zahraniční politika : minulost a současnost. Prague: Leges. 52 Interview with R. Fürst. 53 Ibid. 54 Further information in chapter no. 3.4. 18 however, where background of political connection due to Czech and European policies reached its ceiling.

Some authors, however, seem to put most weight on economy. Regardless of ideology, they put forward mainly economic issues. Having agreed on the basic concept (shared by Bakešová, Fürst and Tubilewicz) that central Europe became a “target for flexible diplomacy”, it is implied that Czech Republic hoped to develop economic relations with Taipei but not without regard to its relations with Beijing. J. Pehe comments on the situation in similar terms: “Either way, Havel‟s affiliation did not come at the cost of relations with China”.55 Politics and economics may be with hindsight easily considered as the pragmatic core that was wrapped by ideological closeness. Interestingly enough it nowadays seems that after Taiwanese investments reached its peak in 2006, 56 the on-going substantiality of such relations, although still necessarily linked to the pragmatic core, stems from the “ideological wrap”.57

Tubilewicz, having carried out probably the most profound work concerning this issue, suggests that the initial relations were due to ideological proximity, but soon were “to some extent, also conditioned by hopes of winning public works contracts in Taiwan and attracting Taiwanese investments”. 58 We may therefore see that relations were at first inspired by mutual appeal, but then turned into pragmatic approach. At least rhetorically Human rights and democracy are still at a level of shared values, nonetheless, economic hopes prevail.

Yet also the “ideological wrap” may have its basis somewhere else than in common inclination to democratic values or human rights. The very active Taiwanese approach in foreign policy towards Czech Republic was heavily reflected in Taiwan‟s PR and non-official diplomacy. Through such active PR some argue that a popular political support of Taiwan is to be aroused.59 In an interesting way then, the economic drive on the verge of the millennium turned into a comparably successful drive for political support of Taiwan in the world politics. This may also explain why most of the economic activity took place in the beginning of the analysed time frame, whereas more politically oriented issues in the end.

55 Pan, D., 2003. “Havel‟s aides tout shared Taiwan-Czech legacy.” Taiwan News. January 16. 56 Taiwan was at that time the second largest East Asian investor in Czech Republic (after Japan). 57 For further info on economic relations, see chapter no. 3.3. 58 Tubilewicz, C., 2007(b). 59 Interview with R. Vysloužil. 19

3.2.2. Relations prior 2004

When discussing the mutual relations up until the year 2004, mutual visits have grown to abundance by this time – as will be further mentioned in the economic section, the Czech side, in the expectancy of economic revenues also became more active. Lee Teng-hui despite Beijing‟s objections and declarations, soon after Chen succeeded him, went again to Prague.60 He was personally invited by V. Havel to attend and deliver a speech at the Forum 2000 Conference.61 Havel was equally hoping to meet with the new Taiwanese president as soon as possible. Even though Chen, for unforeseen work-related reason could not eventually carry out such a visit, his wife skilfully replaced him. During her first visit she submitted a donation of US$ 2 million to Havel‟s wife foundation.62 Also unable to move without her wheelchair, as a token of Havel‟s amicability, Czech President spent more than 4 hours in single day to personally show her around Prague.63 She repeated her visit in 2003.64

It should be noted, that there has been little change of politics towards Taiwan after V. Klaus took Havel‟s place as a President of Czech Republic in 2003. Even though rhetoric changed in reflection of the individual personality of the presidents, most of the agreements and habitual practice lived on: support of Taiwan to join certain IGO (or abstaining where necessary, see chapter 3.2.3.); annual consultations between vice foreign ministers; consultations between department heads of the ministries of economic affairs; high-level official visits; consultations on economic cooperation; parliamentary diplomacy,… all had taken deep roots in Czech political environment.65 Whereas Havel supported human rights,66 Klaus‟s economic background favoured prospects of economic cooperation with PRC which he had already previously tried to put forward. As presidential powers are rather of representative and declaratory character such change in rhetoric found little ground for application. Taiwan, J. Cheng explains, however, felt less attention from Czech presidency, stressing out mainly the presidential visits to Taiwan and China respectively. V. Havel, the

60 Taipei Times. 2000. “Lee mixes politics with pleasure at Forum 2000 event.”; also BBC Chinese. “Dalailama yu Li Denghui hui mian”. 61 BBC Monitoring Asia Pacific. 2000. “Former Taiwan President Lee Teng-hui to attend Forum 2000 in Czech Republic“. 62 Tubilewicz, C., 2007(b). 63 Qi, X., 2012. “Hawei‟er jingshen dui Zhongguo de qishi.” New Epoch Weekly, 5 January. 64 Wang, P., 2004. “Jieke, Taiwan zhencheng de pengyou.” Liberty Times, 18 September. 65 Tubilewicz, C., 2007(b). 66 Qi, X., 2012. 20 most significant supporter of Taiwan, according to J. Cheng, stepped down.67 This feeling was not only shared among certain individuals, but triggered widespread media coverage.68

For such his devotion to support Taiwan, he was also rewarded personally by Chen Shuibian: In November 2004, Havel obtained a special award of the Order of Brilliant Star with Special Grand Cordon. His contribution and devotion to mutual relations were recognised with explicit mentions on his ceremony address of UN‟s 50th anniversary founding in 1995.69 During his speech a number of issues that have cemented this relation were also highlighted: democratization process, human rights, most of the attention was, however, paid to the fact that Havel had supported Taiwan in its goal to enter UN.70

In the same year a Taiwanese legislative delegation, composed of both DPP and then in opposition KMT, headed to Latvia, Hungary and Czech Republic, all of whom had previously held a very amicable position towards Taiwan. The aim of this visit was to further strengthen ties with these countries in order to break diplomatic isolation imposed by Beijing.71 Therefore it is perceivable, that political (official, diplomatic) aspirations never ceased to exist. Such a visit was, however, by no means extraordinary. From a general point of view, whereas it is unclear whether we may ascribe this period of inertia to actual change in presidencies on the Czech side, there was much more to deal with in the terms of economic development due to the Prague‟s upcoming accession to the EU. Even though mutual visits did still follow the same pace, during this period, economic matters were prior to concerns of political character and further major issues to deal with came later on in the decade. Eventually the Czech upcoming accession to the EU stigmatized other than economic relations as Prague had to gradually accept the European policies concerning Taiwan. Taipei, on the other hand paid more attention to what changes such a development will bring about, preparing for investments into Czech Republic when already a European country. This is yet another reason why issues to be dealt with occurred only randomly, that is not continuously and Prague was most of the time the responsive side.72 Being considered marginal within Czech foreign policy may be further perceived in the annual reports of Czech MOFA that

67 Interview with J. Cheng, Ph.D. 68 Zheng, D., 2012. “Hawei‟er yu wo de jieke jiyi.” Zhongfa wenhua jiaoyu jijinhui: Pariscope, P18-03. 69 Interestingly enough, Havel is well respected in Taiwan not only as a democratic politician or thinker, but a considerable attention has been also paid to him as a novelist and author. Zhonghua minguo zongtongfu: Zongtong banshou Jieke gongheguo qian zongtong Hawei‟er gexia xun zhang dianli. 2004(a). 70 Fan, Z., 2004. “Jieke qian zongtong Hawei'er liting Taiwan ru lianguo.“ Dajiyuan/Epoch Times. November 23. 71 BBC Monitoring Asia Pacific. 2004. “Taiwan legislative delegation leaves for Czech Republic, Hungary, Latvia“. 72 Interview with R. Vysloužil. 21 usually reflects only economic cooperation, but a cooperation that is deemed very important and whose implications are Czech politicians deeply aware of.73

3.2.3. Party politics and international support of Taiwan

As a proof of unceasing support, Prague further tried to support Taiwan in its intentions to join certain International Governmental Organizations: In 2007, during European parliament‟s Chairman of the on the Environment, Public Health and Food Safety, M. Ouzký‟s (who happened to be Czech) visit, a number of remarks on Taiwan – Czech republic substantial relations were stated. Apart from appraisal of former president Havel, Ouzký stated, that he will “continue to pay attention to Taiwanese application to become a member of the WHO or WHA‟s observer“.74

In the same year, the Czech Greens also issued a demand to further discuss Taiwan‟s application to WHO.75 Apart from such UN‟s bodies, the Greens also submitted the request to accept Taiwan into the UN itself.76 The mainland news agency Xinhua, however, stresses that Czech Deputy Health Minister M. Vít declared that Czech Republic is not going to support Taiwan in its bid to WHO: “As a part of China, Taiwan is not eligible to join WHO as a member“. In the same interview, however, he stated that “we agree with the idea that Taiwan communicates with WHO on a technical level“.77 Taiwan managed to take part in the WHA as an observer for the first time in 2009. By then the Czech Health minister D. Jurasková welcomed the Taiwanese representation in the name of the whole EU.78

During 2008 yet another interesting turn of events took place. For a certain period of time growing Czech Greens paid attention not only to green policies, but also to human rights issues. After they were refused a meeting with the Delegation Committee for Ethnic Affairs, of (PRC‟s) National People‟s Congress, they expressed their political aspirations by bringing the Taiwanese (R.O.C.) flag (as well as Tibetan one) right into the House of Representatives

73 Notably Czech MOFA: Foreign policy in 2004, 2005 and 2006 reports. Ministerstvo zahraničních věcí České republiky: Zpráva o zahraniční politice 2004; 2005; 2006. 74 Zhonghua minhuo zongtongfu: Zongtong jiejian Ouzhou yihui huanjing ji gonggongweisheng yu shipin anquan weiyuanhui zhuxi Ouzhiji. 2004. 75 Mraček, M., Jacques, K. 2007. “Ţádost o projednání otázky členství Tchaj-wanu ve Světové zdravotnické organizaci (WTO).“ Zpravodaj Poslaneckého klubu Strany Zelených, September 11 76 Zbořil, F., 2010. 77 Li, L., 2007. “Minister: Czech Republic opposes Taiwan‟s bid for WHO membership.“ Xinhua, May 13. 78 Jou, Y.C., 2009. “Taiwan, China, health ministers meet at WHA.“ The China Post. May 19. 22 during the meeting. By such actions, an international pressure and awareness should have presumably been cemented. Interestingly enough, they were also supported by Civic Democrats (right-wing party). M Benda said, that: “The feeble should not be forgotten”, and his party colleague T. Dub commented on the situation as follows: “Parliament is not bound by any diplomatic obstacles and therefore has the opportunity, better yet maybe the duty to draw the attention to such issues in world politics.” 79 Chinese delegation “welcomed” by these two flags responded by leaving the House.

Apart from the Czech Republic - Taiwan Friendship Group, and other high-level visits, The Greens seem to have been the most active in the mutual communication and relations with Taipei. A former minister for environment, M. Bursík invited his Taiwanese counterpart to Czech Republic in 2008. Taiwanese minister for environment, Winston Dang acknowledged notably the Czech politician‟s support of Taiwan to access the UN‟s WHO, from whom the Greens had all signed such a bid: “If we want to efficiently help to tackle climate change, we need international recognition. … multilateral approach is necessary.” K. Jacques, deputy chairman of the Green party, in this case highlighted the importance of parliamentary diplomacy – tackling such issues as environmental changes needs to be done globally and in the terms of diplomatic hardship, parliamentary way of conduct becomes an efficient way how to deal with mutually shared concerns.80 Interestingly enough, even though not such an active approach is held all around the political spectrum, amicability towards Taiwan is commonly shared phenomena.81 It is suggested that party affiliation with Taiwan in Czech Republic crosses the whole political spectrum from left to right, including communists.82

Such approach respecting Havel‟s struggle for human rights, however, turns sour when such events as the one carried out by the Greens take place and leftists do not generally agree with such motions. It should be noted, that communists also enjoy comparatively less attention from the Taiwanese side. Whereas Taiwanese PR tries to focus on the whole

79 Cerqueirová, A., 2008., “Tibetské i taiwanské vlajky do Sněmovny patří.“ Zpravodaj Poslaneckého klubu Strany Zelených. November 18. 80 Jehlička, M., 2008. “Zelení přijali delegaci z Taiwanu.“ Zpravodaj Poslaneckého klubu Strany Zelených. March 4. 81 Interview with R. Fürst. 82 Ibid. 23 political spectrum, communist are not the target of their efforts (i.e. of non-official diplomacy).83

Whereas we may therefore perceive different points of view on the Czech political scene, we may hardly distinguish different approaches to Czech Republic between DPP or KMT. There are, however, also other reasons why more attention is paid to the Czech side: Facing the active Taiwanese foreign policy, it is often rather reactive. Whereas Taipei continuously tries to put their goals forward, Prague finds itself necessarily in a responsive position. Readers, however, should not be misled, that such party politics represents the Czech approach to Taiwan. As will be discussed later, very neat yet very deep gaps exist between parliament and government, with the latter one strictly respecting the “One China Policy”. The real value of parliamentary diplomacy, therefore, should not be overestimated.

When approaching Taiwanese side, it should be noted that most important change that occurred was connected with the very first time DPP was able to seize the power in 2000. DPP, also criticizing the previous approach towards foreign policy (often thought to be closely linked to “dollar diplomacy”), in their 1999 White Paper stated their new approach towards outside environment: “In order to break through Taiwan‟s diplomatic stagnation, we must . . . seek creative strategies that can both exploit Taiwan‟s advantages and expand the international space.” 84 Therefore a strategy that sought to make use of Lee Teng-hui‟s substantial approach rather than “petty diplomatic competition” took its roots. 85 Despite Taiwanese unceasing accentuation of self-rule, even Taipei did come to terms with their possibilities, and in connection with Prague favoured then economic prospects.

Although we may come across mentions that KMT after 2008 pushed more vigorously on certain issues (i.e. the Schengen Visa), in general terms there was little change in policies towards EU or Czech Republic. When Ma Yingjiu acceded to power in 2008, as the most interesting towards EU may be considered further economic cooperation with PRC, i.e. by signing ECFA creating possible economic triangle between EU, PRC and Taiwan. In other terms, however, R. Fürst suggests, that keeping the same political line towards such distant regions was simply the easiest way.86 TECO‟s representative seems to agree when claiming that the most important differences in political views lay in the “Strait Issue”, and for politics

83 Interview with R. Vysloužil. 84 A bian de waijiao zhengce baipishu, (DPP‟s White paper on Foreign Policy for the 21st century), 1999. 85 Rigger, S., 2005. “Party politics and Taiwan‟s External relations.“ Orbis 43 (3). 86 Interview with R. Fürst. 24 concerning such regions as Europe, common approach is much more likely to be agreed upon.87

3.2.4. Struggle for Schengen Visa

Until the year 2008, the European dimension of mutual connection was mainly reflected in the economic aspects. Both businessmen and media deemed that the Czech accession into the EU would, for Taiwan, have mainly economic implications that are further described in chapter 3.3.88 Struggle for Schengen Visa, on the other hand, may easily be understood as the most important point in this time frame, where Czech assistance to Taiwan is considered as a highlight of this relation and as a testament of mutual high-level relations.89 The need for Visa on the Taiwanese side was very pressing, as costs were high and procedural rules austere. Such a matter gained heavily in importance after 2008, when KMT with President Ma got back into power. This issue turned into the most important point within the relations with EU 27, at that time in importance highly surpassing most of other issues. At this point, such an accomplishment would not only be greatly beneficial, but would also further boost KMT‟s position.

During M. Benda‟s visit (chairman of the parliamentary Czech Republic – Taiwan friendship group) to Taipei in May 2009 he was able to meet with President Ma. Apart from diplomatic words of appraisal, Ma also made minor remarks on Czech Republic holding the EU‟s rotating presidency that year and that EU still has not discussed the visa free status to visitors from Taiwan. M. Benda then expressed he would fully support such an act. Further comments of appraisal on Czech help to Taiwan to become part of WHO followed.90

Traditionally enjoying good ties with north and central European countries, Czech Republic, building upon previous cooperation, provided Taiwan with further help concerning this topic. During Czech presidency in the European Union in the first half of 2009, Prague

87 Interview with Christine M. Y. Hsueh, Taipei Economic and Cultural Office Representative, Prague, Czech Republic, 26. 4. 2013. 88 Tang, P., 2006. “Zhongjing yuan: Dongou wei Taiwan kaituo Oumeng shichang jiejing.“ Da jiyuan/The Epoch Times. February 2.; Lin, R., 2007. “Miandui Xinxing gongye daguo Jieke wei Oumeng dakai dongou shichang.” PC Home Online. December 5.; Wang, Y., 2013. “Zhuanfang Jieke jingji wenhua banshichu daibiao Gedekai.” Juheng wang/cnYES.com. March, 11. 89 Interview with Christine M. Y. Hsueh. 90 Office of the President, Republic of China (Taiwan): President Ma Meets Chairman of Czech Parliamentary Taiwan Friendship Group Marek Benda. 2009. 25 was the first to bring this matter onto the agenda of EU. Prague took advantage of its position of the country presiding EU and put this issue on the list. This action consequently led not only to the contemplation of such a step but also to eventual success. Thanks to Czech Republic, and later on Sweden, who was during its following presidency equally supportive, Taiwan managed to obtain the Schengen Visa by 2011. This process had massive impact also on other countries as Taiwan‟s Visa free relations consequently soared from 52 in 2008, to 129.91 Czech Republic on the other hand had been enjoying 30 day visa-free stay since 2007.92 Such a move from the Taiwanese side is, however, also supposed to be a strategic one that would consequently lead to such turn of events on the Czech side. This visa-free contact for Taiwan is, however, still limited to 90 days within last 180 days and is only applicable to Taiwanese who have regular Taiwanese ID.93 Even though Taiwanese Vice-President Vincent S. Siew expressed his will to promote direct flights from Taipei to Prague after such achievement, only cargo flights have been realized so far.94

Such a development was not, however, completely smooth. Qiu Zhongren, former director of TECO in Prague sums up that American central European policy was an important precondition for such an approach of central European countries. These countries, having obtained the Visa-free waiver when visiting USA, in turn tried to put forward a very similar way of conduct with Taiwan.95

Qiu offers two possible reasons why it took almost two years to pass such an act: first one is the elaborate implementation of the Lisbon treaty that was passed in the end of 2009; the other is, however, much more complicated. In 2010, Taiwan carried out a number of death sentences that are nowadays in EU deemed “inhumane and unnecessary”.96 This evoked tensions with number of EU states, including those who opposed granting Taiwan the Schengen Visa, notably Malta and Cyprus.97

Further facilitation in visa issues occurred very recently in March 2013. Czech Republic decided to include Taiwan within its green card program that would further facilitate

91 Qiu, Z., 2010, “Zhongdong Ou yu Taiwan jiaoliu zhi xiankuang yu zhanwang,“ Zhongfa wenhua jiaoyu jijinhui: Pariscope, P21-08. 92 Zbořil, F., 2010. 93 Interview with a representative of the Czech Economic and Cultural Office, Taipei, Taiwan, 9. 1. 2012. 94 Ibid. 95 Qiu, Z., 2010. 96 Deutsches Institut Taipei. 2013. “The European Union and death penalty in Taiwan“. 97 Qiu, Z., 2010. 26 working conditions of Taiwanese in Czech Republic. Such cards, with their validity of three years, will make easier particularly the long-term occupation cases.98

3.2.5. Human rights as a shared value?

It is, nevertheless, interesting to note that despite Taiwanese history of capital punishments that were carried out also in the two following years,99 Czech Republic deeply concerned about Human rights did still support Taiwan in the Schengen Visa issue. Whereas such behaviour came under strict criticism of EU100, Prague‟s approach was a mere reflection of securing Human rights. It may also be equally a reflection of Havel‟s approach to democratic Taiwan that might stir an interesting discussion. Notably in the context in which Chen Shuibian in 2004 made a statement that he especially enjoys Havel‟s idea, that human rights take precedence over national sovereignty.101 Whether such change of heart came with the change in the ruling parties is not sure, as capital punishment also did take place during the rule of DPP.

Drawing on the previous idea of mutual relations only reflecting actual human rights agenda, Koudelka unwilling to give advice, expressed his position on capital punishments in TW as follows: “first, it (the death penalty) is forever and you can‟t undo it. Second, sometimes it can be misused, which has happened in our history. Third, research has found that the death penalty does not serve as an effective tool to reduce criminality. … in our view, human rights are very important. They are a very strong part of what we do and what we believe in.”102 Whereas EU strongly voiced its disagreement with such a penalty, there has been no official reaction from the Czech Republic.103

In this manner, we may find rather doubtful approaches to Czech human rights policies also within the Czech academia. Drawing on the picture of similar history and

98 Want China Times. 2013. “Czech Republic Streamlines work permits for Taiwanese”. 99 This issue is well covered i.e. by BBC: BBC News Asia. 2012. “Taiwan condemned over executions”; BBC News. 2010. “Taiwan conducts rare executions”; Sui, C., 2011. “Taiwan executes murderers amid death penalty debate.” BBC News Asia-Pacific. 100European Economic and Trade Office: Question tabled by Barbara Lochbihler MEP to the EEAS on Taiwan‟s executions last December. 2013. 101 Office of the President, Republic of China (Taiwan). 2004(a). 102 Taipei Representative Office in the EU and Belgium: Czech Republic seeks upgrade in ties with Taiwan: CECO head. 2010. 103 Interview with Christine M. Y. Hsueh.

27 experiences, some authors argue with Czech feelings of newly emerged democracy reflecting its existential values into the international sphere, i.e. by supporting Taiwan against big and at least previously communist regime. Going now deep into social theories, Prague might have struck a close comparison between Soviet Union and China: In a sort of self-assurance or self- legitimation it a priori needs to help equally “suffering” Taiwan. Perceiving the world order of a conflict of democracy and totalitarian states, Prague used an “universalistic” approach, where Taiwan, regardless of Taiwanese willingness to capital punishment, in the eyes of Prague represents economically rapidly growing democracy, without negative connotations. With such an approach, Prague may still follow its human rights agenda as well as pursue its economic interests, which for yet another reason of globally shared ambiguity towards China would not be possible with Beijing. The presumably clear distinction between economy and human rights in the Czech foreign policy agenda in this case, suffers a blow as human rights- oriented policies gets blurred in a process of some sort of self-assurance.104 Eventually J. Cheng is also rather sceptical about other than economic issues:

“I don‟t really think that the political part will play more and more important role, or that it will have a decisive influence on the relationship. I more think of a simple practical interest of both sides. Business is business. Taiwanese businessmen do not hold any political interests. They want to make business and be supported by less political restrictions.”105 In 2010, former prime minister of Czech Republic M. Topolánek had also the chance to meet with President Ma, the topics, however, followed the well-known pattern of strong mutual understanding.106 Head of CECO in Tapei J. Koudelka, drawing on the similar pattern of understanding, called on the background of economic crisis, on further expanding mutual economic and cultural cooperation. Making use of the Schengen visa issue he pointed out that with slow economic recovery, Taiwanese tourism in Czech Republic should also rise in number. J. Koudelka paints an interesting picture of cultural diplomacy, where such cultural representation and exposition hope to help appeal Taiwanese companies to invest in Czech Republic in various fields. It is, nevertheless, summed up that the actual number of investors is not all that satisfactory.107 It needs to be pointed out, nevertheless, that despite such an

104 Fürst, R., 2010. “Podpora Tibetu, Tchaj-wanu a lidských práv v Číně.” In: Drulák, P.; Horký, O., ed., Hledání Českých zájmů: Obchod, lidská práva a mezinárodní rozvoj. Prague: IIR. 105 Interview with J. Cheng; R. Vyslouţil, however, pins out mainly the political value, as any dealing with Taiwan often takes place on a very likely political background. 106 Taipei Representative Office in the EU and Belgium: President Ma meets foreign dignitaries attending 2010 Taipei International Flora Exposition. 2010. 107 Taipei Representative Office in the EU and Belgium. 2010 28 amount of “understanding”, Czech Republic is nowadays one of the few countries left to strike a deal on a double-taxation agreement with Taiwan.

3.2.6. Double-taxation issue

Double-taxation agreement (and investment protection) is a long-lasting issue that has not yet been resolved. Such a document in order to be issued needs rather vigorous legal adjustments within Czech legal system. These adjustments, however, have not been carried out as yet. A number of possible solutions (emulating similar decision in other EU countries) has been discussed, but none of them has found a positive ground so far. Since currently both sides are not as yet able to strike official diplomatic relations, mutual treaties also have to be carried out on a non-governmental level.108

Taking into account that such agreements have been carried out already with most of European countries, this matter may nowadays be considered as the most pressing point in mutual relations. This process with long history that took its roots already in 2003 enjoyed revitalized attention in about 2010. Such agreement would nowadays, however, only deal with the issue of double-taxation, not the investment protection that was due to the EU‟s Lisbon treaty incorporated into matters of EU and is going to be further discussed on the Taiwan-EU level.109 Contemporarily, however, the Czech side voices that such negotiations as well as finding of ways of possible adjustment of Czech legal system have enjoyed considerable development.110 About positive development in dealing with the double-taxation issue also informed Czech media in 2012: in order to get rid of such double-taxation, Czech Republic is likely to opt for a rather interesting way. Instead of signing such an agreement (for the abovementioned problems), such tools preventing from double-taxation are to be incorporated into Law on income tax directly. A standardized way of conduct in such cases following the patterns of UN or OECD is not applicable and in order to find a solution a number of Taiwanese experts also came to Prague in 2012.111

108 For further info please refer to chapter no. 3.4. 109 Business Info. Tchaj-wan : Základní infromace o teritoriu. 2013. 110 Ibid. 111 ČR 7, Rádio Praha. 2012. “Dvojí zdanění s Tchaj-wanem bude zrušeno”. 29

Eventually even Czech officials do admit that more than a problem of solving such a problem, significance and actual will is more important.112 It has been suggested, that clashes about the actual look of such an agreement do also occur within the Czech government. As Czech MOFA sticks strongly to the “One China principle”, other ministries are not able to come up with a solution that would be both applicable and legally satisfactory. Czech side should not, however, be the only to blame. It is proposed, that the Taiwanese side often seems to be pushing on the very terminology and names of parties interested in this agreement. Some of the terms suggested by Taiwanese side may be implying a violation of “One China policy” which is unacceptable for the Czech side, and the whole process will then lag on.113 Therefore, the actual will within this relationship or rhetorical support of Taiwan in parliament needs to be in the light of such events and official politics re-evaluated. Interestingly enough, it was not only the Taiwanese side that was pushing on Czech government, but (although only recently) also Czech businessmen. 114 Whereas both sides admit that negotiations are on-going,115 J. Koudelka, Head of CECO in Taipei implies that results might be seen soon. Unwilling to give the date of the deadline, commented on the situation in April 2013 as follows: “We're now in the final stage of negotiations, and we'll both do our best to achieve this agreement“.116

3.2.7. Future prospects

To conclude this chapter, it should be noted that Czech Republic is nowadays deemed as the most loyal ally of Taiwan within Europe. Such a point of view is shared by media, academia as well as policy-makers. Prof. Dr. Tang Shaocheng, from the Taiwanese Institute of International Relations in Taipei, described Czech Republic as “the most friendly country towards Taiwan in EU”.117 Same standpoint was held by the former directors of TECO in Prague, and in the same manner Taiwanese media, who think of Czech Republic as of a “sincere close friend”,118 pays comparably more attention to Czech Republic than vice versa. Further proof of the considerable attention of Taiwanese media to situation in Czech Republic

112 Interview with a representative of the Czech Economic and Cultural Office. 113 Interview with R. Vysloužil. 114 Ekonom. 2011. “Před berňákem neutečete ani na Bermudy”. 115 Interview with Christine M. Y. Hsueh. 116 The China Post. 2013. “Taiwan-Czech Double-taxation deal reaches final stage: envoy”. 117 Interview with prof. Dr. Tang Shaocheng, National Chengchi University, Taipei, Taiwan, 23. 7. 2012. 118 Wang, P., 2004, Liberty Times. 30 may have been perceived i.e. during the presidential campaign coverage in 2012 and 2013 or other issues. 119 Havel‟s death in 2011 triggered an unprecedented number of articles as well.120

Although diplomatic aspirations are long gone, supportive Prague might help Taiwan with its further aims concerning EU: Taiwan nowadays hopes to promote economic issues by striking an Agreement on free trade with EU:

“And what is the next? To reach an accord on the FTA with EU, and it is important to notice that in this field, it is not mainland China, but South Korea, who is our main competitor in the economic space. […]The next step for us is to make a better investment environment for our businessmen.”121 Even though it is suggested, that no matter what kind of relations we talk about, there is always room further development,122James Cheng sums up, that Taiwan does not have a clear strategy towards Czech Republic. It tries to follow the flexible diplomacy, make use of its democratic values, and make diplomacy rather personal. In the same manner current prospects of such a relation are seen: he hopes to keep the present state relationship and further promote casual and more business related relations.123

3.3. Economic development

3.3.1. Mutual trade

As some scholars understand the economic factor as the most important one, it is necessary to devote further attention to it. Ever since the establishment of mutual relations, Czech Republic has found itself in soaring trade deficit with Taiwan. The reasons behind such developments are investments made by Taiwanese side. The gradual stagnation that occurred since about 2007 is due to the less favourable investing environment for Taiwanese companies in Czech Republic. The unexpected numbers in 2009, more favouring the Czech side, are due to financial crisis the previous year.124 Both in the terms of FDI or mutual trade, Taiwan is

119 Li, T., 2013. “Jieke xin zongtong weiwu tequan de diceng ren fasheng.” Da jiyuan/Epoch Times. 120 Zheng, Y., 2011. “Jieke renquan zongtong guoshi Jiang chongji lianguan guanxi.” NOW News. 121 Interview with J. Cheng, Ph.D. 122 Interview with Christine M. Y. Hsueh. 123 Ibid. 124 Business Info. Tchaj-wan : Základní infromace o teritoriu. 2013. 31 incomparably much more engaged. The actual size of the market (Taiwan vs. EU), and market competition may be easily considered as the two main reasons for such development.

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0 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012

Picture 1: Mutual trade balance in mil. USD from the Czech perspective.125

Even though some consider the new millennium as a period of decreasing importance in relations, Taiwan took a great advantage of Czech Republic early in the decade – in 2001 a large scale Taiwan trade mission toured to Czech Republic to further analyse local possibilities.126 Such possibilities materialised – in an interview in 2006, the Head of TECO‟s Economic division, Yang Shumei, was more than happy to announce that the development has been enjoying a double-digit growth for certain time. She assumes that for Czech Republic the most important move was Škoda Auto‟s bid for Taiwanese market, whereas for Taiwan the most important stimuli was closely connected with FDI further mentioned below.127 Most of the investing projects in Czech Republic, however, serve the purpose of completion of selected electronics and IT. Therefore most of the export into Czech Republic, statistically considered as negative balance may be ascribed to “operating” Taiwanese investments in Czech Republic.

125 Ibid., according to Czech Statistical Office 126 BBC Monitoring Asia-Pacific. 2001. “Taiwan trade mission to tour Czech Republic, Poland, Slovakia 25 May”. 127 Her, K., 2006(a). “An Island and the Heart of Europe”. Taiwan Review. 32

There has been, however, a research carried out by AIA (Association for International Affairs) in Prague, that such official statistical data do not necessarily represent the actual amount of trade. It is suggested, the flow between CR and Taiwan is heavily influenced by direct re-exports mainly via Germany. As pictured in the AIA study on the data gathered by Eurostat, the trade balance for Czech Republic with Taiwan was negative 451,4 mil. EUR. If we take into account estimated direct re-export via Czech to Germany or Czech input in German exports to Taiwan and similar issues concerning the import into the EU, we come up with a sum that is merely 50% of such deficit. Taiwanese market therefore may be considered more important than it might at the first glance look. The same study then suggests that an accord between EU and Taiwan on a possible FTA would only be favourable to Czech Republic. As the involvement of Czech enterprises producing partial parts of eventually exported product from EU, would be profiting also because of such indirect export to Taiwan.128

Taking into account the first or the second approach, for both countries is such an economic cooperation deemed marginal. Czech Republic imports from Taiwan make on average 1,1-1,2%, whereas export to Taiwan is approximately 0,1% of total amount foreign trade balance.129 Even though Czech export to Taiwan has risen two-folds in last 5 year, import seems to be slightly decreasing. Taiwan is from the Czech perspective a destination for its goods that ranks only at the 53rd place, whereas Taiwan was in 2012 22nd exporter into Czech Republic.130

Further trade liberalization facilitated by currently discussed EU-Taiwan FTA, have as yet minor direct impact on Czech export, AIA study suggests. No major implications is about to be brought about by this possible FTA even in the view of indirect trade flows via Germany and other countries of EU. The liberalization between Taiwan and PRC brought about by ECFA is thought to be of equally marginal importance. Long term effects of acquiring new know-how are considered to be the most important gains for Czech businessmen.131 If such prospects come into place, together with possible resolving of the double taxation issue, mutual trade might hit new ground. So far, however, the former director of Prague‟s TECO

128 Rezková, A., Kobylinski, K., Semerák, V., 2011. “EU-Taiwan Trade Enhancement : Implications for the Czech Economy,” Association for International Affairs: Research paper, 6. 129 Fürst, R., 2010. 130 Business Info. Tchaj-wan : Základní infromace o teritoriu. 2013. 131 Rezková, A., Kobylinski, K., Semerák, V., 2011. 33 claims that the inability to solve such an issue turned into one of the reasons of Taiwanese investments diversion to neighbouring countries.132

In such scenario, the thesis by AIA provided for a ground-breaking point of view. Whereas we may very easily look upon mutual trade balance as very favourable for Taiwan, where the trade deficit of Prague is rather worrying, we have to take into account the trade that is not covered by such data. The integration project of EU makes such estimates rather an elaborate matter. It was not, however, only and not even mainly the trade that was influenced by Czech Republic‟s participation in EU. Within the Foreign Direct Investment such prospects were seen by Taiwanese investors to be even more important.

3.3.2. Foreign Direct Investment

Taiwanese initial success in the 90‟s was not only due to world-wide political background reflected in popular sentiments and political aims of Czech Republic, but also due to Czech need for investments, or vice-versa, contracts for Czech companies in Taiwan. Czech Republic was actually the second country in the world “to sign the WTO agreement with ROC”.133 Although not all of the initial promises eventually came true, contacts were created for upcoming wave of investments.

A major inflow of investment was also due to two major events that took place in late 90‟s and that would further give a green light to investments coming in the new millennium. Firstly it was the governmental support of investment incentives in 1998 and, secondly, it was in the same year established Czech-Taiwan Economic Cooperation Committee.134 Upcoming long-expected investments then widely helped Czech economy. Tubilewcz points out, that at the turn of the millennium, it was also the Czech officials who took initiative and in expectation of Taiwanese investment started their visits to Taiwan in abundant numbers.135

The opening of the markets after 1989 and the “economic offensive” in the 90‟s was for some time also reflected in the new millennium. The opening of post-communist countries

132 Qiu, Z., 2010. 133 Tubilewicz, C., 2007(b). 134 Zbořil, F., 2010. 135 These visits are often thought to have been initiated by the Taiwanese side and only during 2009 and 2010 the number of mutual (non-official) visits, of a considerable level officials, was 7 at minimum. Interview with R. Vysloužil. 34 and their favourable geopolitical situation was further cemented by their upcoming accession to EU. The head of TECO‟s Economic division described the then situation in following terms: “The Czech Republic's entry into the European Union in May 2004 has brought foreign investors new opportunities. Average tariffs are low, shipping to the other 24 EU member states is tariff-free and government procurement is increasingly transparent in line with EU directives."136 It was still in 2006 that Taiwanese side considered Czech Republic to posses a very favourable environment for investment. Eventually, the previous year, there was imposed a new EU-wide tariff of 14% on LCD TVs, set-up boxes and multifunctional office equipment,137 all of which represent an important part of export for such economies as Taiwan. Such tariff was not imposed on parts of such hardware and Taiwanese companies had to take measures – that is to further invest in Czech Republic. From the Taiwanese perspectives, the EU enlargement in 2004 “turned out to be very beneficial for Taiwanese businesses“.138 Some at the height of Taiwanese economic activity in Czech Republic called it a “Business Gateway to Europe“.139

"As well as being an EU member, it is perfectly placed geographically--right in the centre of Europe. Its economy and politics are stable, it offers transparent investment incentives and its infrastructure is the best in Eastern Europe,"140 together with its skilled and comparably cheap labour workforce, Czech Republic was definitely the place to move for most of the investors not only from Taiwan. Four major investments into Czech Republic on behalf of the Taiwanese side took place within 2000-2005. Regardless of the previous investment of Hualon into the textile sector in 1995, new millennium brought about investments into the sector of electronics. Companies such as Foxconn, ASUSTeK, First International Computer and BenQ invested over US$ 130 million creating at that time over 5, 000 free occupations. Interestingly enough, in 2004 within the cumulated Taiwanese investments in Europe, Czech Republic beat all other European countries.141

The situation, however, has changed. Even though in 2006 it was still expected that adopting Schengen visa and European currency would further facilitate trade and investment environment, the real turn of events was rather different. This may also provide for an explanation of stagnating import since about 2007. J. Cheng offers this explanation:

136 Her, K., 2006(a), Taiwan Review. 137 Rezková, A., Kobylinski, K., Semerák, V., 2011. 138 Berkovsky, A., Quigley, J. 2007. “Solid, But Could Do Better”. Taiwan Review. 139 Her, K., 2006(b), “Business Gateway to Europe”, Taiwan Review. 140 Her, K., 2006(a). Taiwan Review. 141 Tubilewicz, C., 2007(b). 35

“…when we were conducting interviews with Taiwan businessmen in the Czech Republic, the answer they gave us was that they had chosen this place because of its location and the cost. The location is actually very good and the cost of the labour- force compared to its quality also very good for Taiwan businessmen to set the business here and to export from here to European zone. All of the central European countries also offer beneficial conditions for foreign direct investment (FDI). The situation in Czech Republic has changed though. Several years ago, the Czech Republic welcomed all of the FDI, but nowadays your government welcomes only some of the FDI, basically high technology, not manufacturing industry. The economic situation has grown better. Some of the Taiwanese businessmen found better conditions in surrounding countries.”142 Therefore, even though Taiwan previously was one of the most significant investors in Czech Republic, its position is diminishing. R. Fürst claims that the flow of FDI into Czech Republic from Taiwan dropped the most, even in comparison with other East Asian countries generally copying the same pattern.143 Prague‟s TECO Representative, nevertheless points out that this phenomena has not yet occurred in large scale.144 After all, Taiwan still holds the position slightly below the rank no. 10 in the terms of total amount invested (3rd among Asian countries), in the terms of new job opening Taiwan is, however, 4th.145

3.4. Organization and legal issues

Due to constraints of international legal subjectivity of Taiwan, any single country wishing to strike any sort of non-diplomatic relations with Taiwan have to face problems connected to its status that will subsequently have a very significant impact on the very way of conduct with Taiwan. Even though international law (apart from the very characteristics of a state) maintains that recognition of a state is only of declaratory character, it still implies that this state has been recognized and thus became part of other states‟ vision of reality. If it, however, was not recognized and other states still wanted to pursue at least non-governmental relations a certain international regime, or a way of conduct has to be applied.146

142 Interview with J. Cheng, Ph.D. The same researcher offers a number of reasons. First it happens to be rather difficult to communicate with Czech government and to sort problems with Czech MOFA, i.e. the Double taxation agreement. Another problem is that, for example, Foxconn faced the problem that most of its workers were not Czechs but Vietnamese or Slovaks, for the Czechs simply did not want to do these jobs. 143 Fürst, R., 2011., “Dálný východ v české zahraniční politice.” In Česká zahraniční politika v roce 2011: Analýza ÚMV, ed. by Kořan M., Prague: IIR. 144 Interview with Christine M. Y. Hsueh. 145 Rezková, A., Kobylinski, K., Semerák, V., 2011. 146 Kavěna, M., 2006. Zavírání mezinárodních smluv s Tchaj-wanem. Parlamentní institut PSP ČR: Studie č. 5 261. 36

Even though Czech Republic found itself, ever since its establishment, ideologically very close to Taiwan and some of the politicians voiced their opinions publicly, Prague never crossed the line of substantial and non-governmental relations. Ever since and more after 2004, it followed the “One China policy”. Despite this, both Czech Republic and EU had to deal with the fact, that not even Beijing exercises its power over Taiwan and other than official relations could have been diversified.147 “In relation with Taiwan, Czech Republic follows the practical experience of most of other countries. Diplomatic relations are hold with PRC, whereas non-governmental relations are held with the territory of Taiwan. It rigorously respects the „One China principle‟ whose part also makes Taiwan, but whose only legitimate representative is PRC”.148

Since signing international agreements might violate such an attitude, Prague had to look for other way of dealings with Taiwan. M. Kavěna suggests two possible ways: parliamentary diplomacy and non-governmental bilateral economic and cultural relations. Parliamentary diplomacy is, in the context of Czech Republic, best perceived on the Czech Republic – Taiwan Friendship Group in the House of Representatives that was set up in 1994.149 Their very basic aim is to highlight the Taiwan issue as well as provide for and engage in the parliamentary communication. 150 Interestingly enough, there have been thoughts on introducing similar group also in the Senate.151 Of interest, these parliamentary groupings, not making part of governmental executive power, do widely operate with the term of R.O.C. (Republic of China), instead of Taiwan.

The other way of communicating with Taiwan is signing bilateral agreements (again on non-governmental level, i.e. very often by those Offices in respective country) that are afterwards transmitted into the national law and complied with only on the basis of reciprocity. Such a reciprocity and voluntary compliance is also due to the lack of possible enforceability.152

Offices on both sides play the role of de facto embassies. Both are representative offices with slightly restricted competences in certain terms (marriages, elections…). In other terms, however, they handle almost the equal agenda similar to embassies. Although from

147 Kavěna, M., 2006. 148 Sněmovní tisk č. 1512A. 149 An equal one exists since 1991 in the European Parliament: „EP Taiwan friendship group“ (formerly also „Association of Taiwan‟s friends“). For further reading on this topic: Su, H., 2010. 150 Kavěna, M., 2006. 151 Interview with R. Vysloužil. 152 Kavěna, M., 2006. 37 legal point of view their officials do not enjoy any kind of immunity, these officials enjoy basically all the benefits of other diplomats.153 Communication with high-ranking officials on the respective side also takes place by following the ordinary rules of procedure.154

An interesting point on the Czech side is that the CECO set up in 1993 in Taipei was established directly from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs via establishing institution Czech company Škoda Strojimport.155 Apart from other countries, such as USA, who had to create subsidiary agencies that would later on set up such offices, Czech Republic did so directly from the government. After an exchange of letters with its counterpart in Taipei, Prague decided to appoint this vocation to a ministry official. They do not hold an ambassadorial status, but still make part of the Czech MOFA.156

TECO, however, seem to be organized rather differently. Even though the very first section of TECO was established by Taiwanese MOFA in 1991,157 the establishment of other divisions was directed via other bodies. Involvement of Taiwanese MOFA was, nevertheless of rather unparalleled character as Czech Republic was the first country from post-communist Europe to allow MOFA‟s officials to work at TECO. Soon after this establishment, Prague also stopped referring to Taiwan as province of PRC, but as “China, Taiwan”.158 TECO‟s Economic division was set up in 1995 by Taiwanese GIO. Interestingly enough, R. Fürst feels that as these different sections are also directed from different governmental bodies this creates tensions.159 Similarly it is thought that Science division is in close cooperation with Taiwanese National Science Council adds CECO‟s official.160 A very important role seems to have been ascribed to the Information division that takes care of public relations.161 For abovementioned reasons most scholars, as well as officials, consider this division very significant. Member of the Parliament, R. Vyslouţil equally holds this opinion: Information division and Taiwanese PR provide for invitations of Czech officials to Taiwan – as this kind

153 Interview with a representative of the Czech Economic and Cultural Office. 154 Interview with Christine M. Y. Hsueh. 155 Tubilewicz, C., 2007(b). 156 Zbořil, F., 2010. 157 Interestingly enough, on the Taiwanese side, it was CETRA, who conducted the negotiations. CETRA (The China External Trade Organization). 158 Tubilewicz, C., 2007(b). 159 Interview with R. Fürst. 160 Interview with a representative of the Czech Economic and Cultural Office. 161 R. Fürst, paints an interesting picture of such Taiwanese diplomacy: Even though relations proved to be spontaneous and cordial, most of the Taiwanese diplomatic tools, such as „diplomacy of being nice“, „non- official diplomacy“, „diplomacy of visits“, „diplomacy of promises“, was a diplomatic approach originating from Taipei. The same person claims that the reason for popular support of Taiwan is this public relations division of TECO, who masterfully managed its media communication, as Taiwan was always pictured as a country enjoying only positive attributions. 38 of “informal diplomacy” is one of the ways of conduct with the outside world for Taiwan, it is deemed very important. Eventually, it is also suggested, that by treating other countries‟ officials this way, it is hoped to further cement the picture of Taiwan as an undisputed social reality that is led by a government seated in Taipei and is not dependent on any other power.162

162 Interview with J. Vysloužil. 39

4. Conclusion

A number of sources claim that the initial success of Taiwan‟s politics in EU was not only due to its reformulation of foreign policies. The post-bipolar world where communism was deemed to have ended, enjoyed a common dislike with on-going regimes no matter how nominal their “communist” name might have been. It was similarly with China, notably after the 1989 Tiananmen‟s incident, when European countries clearly ideologically sided with Taiwan. In this era, when the strategic “weight” of Beijing temporarily diminished, Taiwanese officials enjoyed warm welcomes from all around the democratic world. Prague‟s position, therefore, does not necessarily have to be exceptional.163

Having elaborated on the mutual relations, we may perceive little change in approach to Czech Republic in 2000 or 2008 when KMT acceded to power again. Even though some claim, that priorities differed, i.e. that KMT was pushing more on the Schengen visa matter,164 we may generally assume that position on Czech Republic did follow an unchanging pattern. Reasons are equal to those of Czech Republic: Even though ideologically close, geographically very distant countries with foreign policy interests focused on very different matters.

The same may be said about Czech Republic: even though rhetoric changed an actual change of policies is only barely perceivable. Therefore, the gradual development of relations may not be ascribed to the actual change in perception or approaches with their origin in the change of presidencies on either side.

The EU factor, however, played much more significant role in the mutual relationship. In the terms of politics, the policies of Prague had to cope with strictly abided “One China Policy” that EU 27 follows. Even though Prague expressed notable amount of amicability towards Taiwan, it has never crossed the thin line of such a principle. Regardless of all the support that has been ever since the very beginning of the relationship carried out, such support was at all times compatible with the “One China Policy”. Support to obtain Schengen Visa, or parliamentary voices calling for Taiwan‟s re-entry to UN may be considered friendly, but still are very far from possible challenge to it.

163 Su, H., 2010; compare with Tubilewicz, C., 2007(b). 164 Qiu, Z., 2010. 40

Czech Republic is, however, at the same time still one of a few countries that have not been able to adjust its legal system to deal with the double-taxation issue. In this case, notably the Czech MOFA, seems to follow the “One China Policy” very strictly and not allowing for any misinterpretation.

Growing transparency and stability were also important political factors, suggests Christine M. Y. Hsueh.165 These, however, seem to be more closely connected to economy. In economic terms Prague‟s accession to EU became an immense boost for Taiwanese investments in Czech Republic. Such economic activity was very beneficial for both sides, as Taiwan found its “Gate to European market” and Czech Republic received warmly welcomed investments.

Although some claim that importance of this relation is mainly due to business, readers should note that the actual amount of trade for Czech Republic as well as Taiwan is rather minimal in comparison with other countries. Taking into consideration that the support to enter WHA or obtain the Schengen Visa occurred only with simultaneous stagnation in mutual trade exchange since about 2007, we may not clearly claim that political support would be subordinate to economic matters. The same is perceivable when talking about the double-taxation agreement. Inability to strike such an agreement is often said to be one of the reasons of Taiwanese investments redirections.

Although the mutual connection commenced with ideological affiliation that is nowadays supposed to have turned into pragmatic policies, relations have not lost any of its understanding, support and kind approach. Regardless of the stagnating mutual trade balance, Taipei has enjoyed very supportive treatment from Prague.

Some issues, however, do still occur. No matter how strong the parliamentary or public voices are, Prague sticks tightly to the “One China Principle”, i.e. by its inability to deal with the double-taxation issue. Both parties realized that whereas political “ceiling” has already been reached, other fields of this relation enjoy unceasing development, especially academic or cultural world. Whereas contacts are non-diplomatic and nonofficial, ties are good enough to be called “friendly”. Even though parliamentary, cultural and academic diplomacy may have its limits, along with Taiwanese active approach proved to have been very constructive.

165 Interview with Christine M. Y. Hsueh.

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5. List of abbreviations and acronyms

AIA Association for International Affairs EU European Union CECO Czech Economic and Cultural Office CETRA Chinese External Trade Development Council CR Czech Republic DPP Democratic Progressive Party EC European Community ECFA Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement FDI Foreign Direct Investment FTA Free Trade Area/Agreement IGO International Governmental Organization KMT Kuomintang MOFA Ministry of Foreign Affairs NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development PR Public Relations PRC People‟s Republic of China ROC Republic of China TECO Taiwan Economic and Cultural Office TW Taiwan UN United Nations USA United States of America WHA World Health Assembly WHO World Health Organization WTO World Trade Organization

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Internet sources and media

1) BBC Chinese. “Dalailama yu Li Denghui hui mian.” (accessible from http://news.bbc.co.uk/chinese/trad/hi/newsid_970000/newsid_977500/977579.stm)

2) BBC Monitoring Asia Pacific, 2000. “Former Taiwan President Lee Teng-hui to attend Forum 2000 in Czech Republic.“ (accessible from http://search.proquest.com/docview/450029514/13D1719492C7153D6B6/12?accounti d=16531)

3) BBC Monitoring Asia-Pacific. 2001. “Taiwan trade mission to tour Czech Republic, Poland, Slovakia 25 May.” (accessible from http://search.proquest.com/docview/450014753/13D1719492C7153D6B6/3?accountid =16531)

4) BBC Monitoring Asia Pacific, 2004. “Taiwan legislative delegation leaves for Czech Republic, Hungary, Latvia.“ (accessible from http://search.proquest.com/docview/461062139/13D1719492C7153D6B6/6?accountid =16531)

5) BBC News Asia. 2012. “Taiwan condemned over executions” (accessible from http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-pacific-20822542)

6) BBC News. 2010. “Taiwan conducts rare executions” (accessible from http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/8655734.stm)

7) Berkovsky, A., Quigley, J. 2007. “Solid, But Could Do Better”. Taiwan Review. (accessible from http://taiwanreview.nat.gov.tw/ct.asp?xItem=24030&ctNode=1342&mp=1)

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8) Cerqueirová, A., 2008., “Tibetské i taiwanské vlajky do Sněmovny patří.“ Zpravodaj Poslaneckého klubu Strany Zelených. November 18

9) Cossa, R., 2008. “Looking behind Ma‟s 'Three noes'.” Taipei Times, January 21 (accessible from http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/editorials/archives/2008/01/21/2003398185/2)

10) ČR 7, Rádio Praha. 2012. “Dvojí zdanění s Tchaj-wanem bude zrušeno.” (accessible from http://m.radio.cz/cz/rubrika/zpravy/zpravy-2012-01-22)

11) Deutsches Institut Taipei. 2013. “The European Union and death penalty in Taiwan.“ (accessible from http://www.taipei.diplo.de/Vertretung/taipei/de/04- Politik/Death-Penalty__Q_26A.html)

12) Drulák, P., 2011. “Otázky české zahraniční politiky.” Česko hledá budoucnost. (accesible from http://www.ceskohledabudoucnost.cz/documents/Zahranicni%20politika.pdf)

13) Ekonom. 2011. “Před berňákem neutečete ani na Bermudy.” (accessible from http://ekonom.ihned.cz/c1-52351460-pred-bernakem-neutecete-ani-na-bermudy)

14) Fan, Z., 2004. “Jieke qian zongtong Hawei'er liting Taiwan ru lianguo.“ Dajiyuan/Epoch Times. November 23 (accesible from http://www.epochtimes.com/b5/4/11/23/n725598.htm)

15) Gao, L., 2010. “ECFA Jin qianshu Dongguan zhongxiao tai qi chengben jiang jiang.” Renmin wang, June 29 (accessible from http://dg.people.com.cn/GB/11999270.html)

16) Her, K., 2006(a). “An Island and the Heart of Europe”. Taiwan Review. (accessible from http://taiwanreview.nat.gov.tw/ct.asp?xItem=23579&CtNode=1349)

17) Her, K., 2006(b), “Business Gateway to Europe”, Taiwan Review. (accessible from http://taiwanreview.nat.gov.tw/ct.asp?xItem=23580&ctNode=1342&mp=1)

18) Jehlička, M., 2008. “Zelení přijali delegaci z Taiwanu.“ Zpravodaj Poslaneckého klubu Strany Zelených. March 4

19) Jou, Y.C., 2009. “Taiwan, China, health ministers meet at WHA.“ The China Post. May 19 (accessible from http://www.chinapost.com.tw/taiwan/china-taiwan- relations/2009/05/19/208788/Taiwan-China.htm)

20) Ko, S., Snyder, Ch., 2006. “Chen says the NUC will 'cease'.“ Taipei Times, February 28 (accessible from http://www.bournemouth.ac.uk/library/how-to/newspaper.html)

21) Li, L., 2007. “Minister: Czech Republic opposes Taiwan‟s bid for WHO membership.“ Xinhua, May 13 (accessible from http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2007-05/13/content_6093061.htm)

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22) Li, T., 2013. “Jieke xin zongtong weiwu tequan de diceng ren fasheng.“ Da jiyuan/Epoch Times. (accessible from http://www.epochtimes.com/b5/13/3/9/n3818150.htm)

23) Lin, R., 2007. “Miandui Xinxing gongye daguo Jieke wei Oumeng dakai dongou shichang.” PC Home Online. December 5 (accessible from http://mypaper.pchome.com.tw/1626108/post/1299730926)

24) Mraček, M., Jacques, K. 2007. “Ţádost o projednání otázky členství Tchaj-wanu v Světové zdravotnické organizaci (WHO).“ Zpravodaj Poslaneckého klubu Strany Zelených, September 11

25) Pan, D., 2003. “Havel‟s aides tout shared Taiwan-Czech legacy.” Taiwan News. January 16 (accessible from http://www.pehe.cz/rozhovory/2003/havels-aides-tout- shared-taiwan-czech-legacy)

26) Qi, X., 2012. “Hawei‟er jingshen dui Zhongguo de qishi.” New Epoch Weekly, 5 January. (accessible from http://epochweekly.com/b5/259/10290.htm)

27) Sui, C., 2011. “Taiwan executes murderers amid death penalty debate.” BBC News Asia-Pacific (accessible from http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-pacific- 12651232)

28) Taipei Times. 2000. “Lee mixes politics with pleasure at Forum 2000 event.” (accessible from http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/local/archives/2000/10/17/0000057570)

29) Tang, P., 2006. “Zhongjing yuan: Dongou wei Taiwan kaituo Oumeng shichang jiejing.“ Da jiyuan/The Epoch Times. February 2 (accessible from http://www.epochtimes.com/b5/6/2/4/n1211533.htm)

30) The China Post. 2013. “Taiwan-Czech Double-taxation deal reaches final stage: envoy”. (accessible from http://www.chinapost.com.tw/business/asia- taiwan/2013/04/05/375173/Taiwan-Czech-double.htm)

31) Wang, P., 2004. “Jieke, Taiwan zhencheng de pengyou.” Liberty Times, September 18 (accessible from http://www.libertytimes.com.tw/2004/new/sep/18/today-fo5.htm)

32) Wang, Y., 2013. “Zhuanfang Jieke jingji wenhua banshichu daibiao Gedekai.” Juheng wang/cnYES.com. March, 11. (accessible from http://tw.mag.cnyes.com/Content/20130311/b518ed8dea5048a6932a55bb9c14be7a_1. shtml)

33) Want China Times. 2013. “Czech Republic Streamlines work permits for Taiwanese.” (accessible from http://www.wantchinatimes.com/news-subclass- cnt.aspx?id=20130314000086&cid=1101)

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34) Yun, E., 1997. “Slow Progress, High Prospects,” Taiwan Review, November 1 (accessible from http://taiwanreview.nat.gov.tw/ct.asp?xItem=424&CtNode=1346)

35) Zheng, Y., 2011. “Jieke renquan zongtong guoshi Jiang chongji liangagn guanxi.“ NOW News. (accessible from http://www.nownews.com/2011/12/18/142- 2767942.htm)

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