ICAO Guide on Evidence of Identity
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VERSION 5.4, MAY 2018 ICAO TRIP Guide on EVIDENCE OF IDENTITY ICAO Security and Facilitation ICAO TRIP GUIDE ON EVIDENCE OF IDENTITY DISCLAIMER All reasonable precautions have been taken by ICAO to verify the information contained in this publication. However, the published material is being distributed without warranty of any kind, either expressed or implied; nor does it necessarily represent the decisions or policies of ICAO. The responsibility for the interpretation and use of the material contained or referred to in this publication lies with the reader and in no event shall ICAO be liable for damages arising from reliance upon or use of the same. This publication shall not be considered as a substitute for the government policies or decisions relating to information contained in it. This publication contains the collective views of an international group of experts, believed to be reliable and accurately reproduced at the time of printing. Nevertheless, ICAO does not assume any legal liability or responsibility for the accuracy or completeness of the views expressed by the international group of experts. 2 ICAO EXECUTIVE SUMMARY The International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO) is the only The ICAO Guidance on EOI provides a framework and tools that United Nations Specialized Agency that has the mandate and enable States to methodically consider how best to uniquely responsibility for establishing, maintaining and promoting identify individuals for the purpose of traveller identification. The Standards and Recommended Practices (SARPs) related to the Guide focuses on particular core principles to be considered when issuance and verification of machine-readable travel documents establishing and validating identity, to gain confidence that: and related border control processes. While in the past ICAO concentrated on the physical security of travel documents, under a. the claimed identity is genuine (i.e. identity is valid and not the new Traveller Identification Programme (TRIP) Strategy, fictitious, and that the identity is still living); ICAO’s mandate has expanded to include traveller identification. b. the presenter links to the identity (i.e. the person can be ICAO is now focused on ensuring a holistic and coordinated linked to the claimed identity, the identity is unique within the approach to traveller identification - from document issuance to authority’s system and the presenter is the sole claimant); border inspection systems. ICAO’s goal is to improve the level and of security and integrity of Evidence of Identity (EOI) processes c. the presenter uses the claimed identity (i.e. that the person is across the entire travel document and border control management operating under this identity in the community). continuum. The Guide does not set standards for how confidence in a person’s identity shall be established. Practices will vary from State to The processes that authorities follow to establish and verify a State, depending on processes and systems in place, technologies person’s identity are often laxer than the security of the document obtainable, and the foundational documents and information or credential they are issuing. Poor quality foundational processes available. Local laws and legal frameworks as well as cultural weaken trust and confidence in the traveller’s identity and considerations and social context all have an impact on how a ultimately undermine States’ own investment in a high security State designs its EOI approach. document, credential or border process. The Guide is intended to provide a means for States to assess Establishing and verifying an identity to a high degree of confidence their current EOI context, and design a comprehensive risk-based is complex: each context is different and all authorities need to approach to identity establishment and validation using available balance the risk of identity fraud against the provision of efficient documents and information. The EOI approach is an effective way services to genuine citizens and low-risk travellers. States should to provide high confidence in a person’s identity when issuing a apply an EOI approach to designing robust and secure processes travel document or visa, or facilitating a passenger through the that consider the full range of data, documents and information border. available, covering both the foundational (‘legal’) and physical identity of the individual. ICAO 3 ICAO TRIP GUIDE ON EVIDENCE OF IDENTITY 4 ICAO CONTENTS Executive Summary 4 Definitions 5 1 Introduction 6 1.1 ICAO’s Mandate on Evidence of Identity 6 1.2 Purpose and Approach of the Guide 7 1.3 Scope 7 2 The Evidence of Identity Approach 8 2.1 What is Identity? 8 2.2 Principles of EOI 8 2.3 Meeting EOI Objectives 8 2.4 Types of Evidence 8 2.5 Objective A - Identity Exists 10 2.5.1 Establishing an Identity Exists Civil and National Registries 10 2.5.2 Verification Against Civil and National Registration Databases 10 2.5.3 Foundational Documents 10 2.5.4 Establishing an Identity exists with Limited Documentation 11 2.6 Objective B – Identity Is a Living Identity 11 2.6.1 Identity is Living - System Checks 11 2.6.2 Alternative Ways to Gain Confidence an Identity is Living 11 2.7 Objectives C and D – Applicant Links to the Identity and is Unique to the Authority’s System 11 2.7.1 In-person presentation 11 2.7.2 Trusted Referees 12 2.7.3 Documents and Records to Prove Uniqueness 12 2.8 The Role of Biometrics in Objectives C and D 12 2.8.1 Verification (1-to-1 Matching) 12 2.8.2 Identification (1-to-Many Matching) 12 2.8.3 Screening or Watchlist 12 2.8.4 The Multi-Biometric System Approach 13 2.8.5 Algorithms and Aptitude 13 2.8.6 Privacy Considerations 13 2.9 Objective E – Applicant Uses the Identity 13 2.9.1 Social Footprint 13 2.9.2 Examples of Documents and Information 14 2.9.3 Appropriate Collection of Social Footprint Information 14 2.9.4 Interviews 14 3 Operational Considerations 16 3.1 Establishing the Identity of Children 16 3.2 Risk Considerations 16 3.3 Supporting Documentation 16 3.3.1 Protocols for Acceptance of Documentation 17 3.4 Legislative and Policy Framework 17 3.4.1 National Framework 17 3.4.2 International Law and Treaty Obligations 18 4 Appendices 20 A Case studies 20 B Civil Registration and Vital Statistics (CRVS) 22 C References to Relevant International Law 23 D Data and Information Sharing 23 E Assessment of Available Evidence 25 F Trusted Referees 27 G Risk Assessments 28 ICAO 5 INTRODUCTION 1 Identity fraud is an enabler for criminal activities ranging from quality EOI process, must therefore be methodical and considered organized crime to terrorism, and its rapid growth raises serious – both for the issuance of identity documentation and processing concerns for security and safety globally. Border authorities travellers at the border. The approach must effectively balance constantly upgrade their travel document inspection systems and security and facilitation, as most travellers pose no threat to the passenger checks to improve security at border control points to authorities attempting to establish or validate their identity. A well keep pace with new threats and provide security whilst improving balanced approach to traveller identification can assist to improve the facilitation of low-risk travellers. The increase of international both security and facilitation, by enabling better targeting of data sharing and use of new technologies, including the INTERPOL resources on persons of interest. Stolen and Lost Travel Documents (SLTD) database, and the ICAO Public Key Directory (PKD), has also resulted in improved The ICAO Guidance on EOI provides a framework and tools that capabilities toward fraud detection. will enable States to uniquely identify individuals to a high degree of confidence for the purpose of traveller identification. While such measures have successfully raised the level of aviation security, they have also caused a shift away from manipulating the physical travel document (alteration, counterfeit, forgery) towards 1.1 ICAO’S MANDATE falsely obtained genuine passports. Weaknesses in the national ON EVIDENCE passport issuance process are increasingly being exploited in OF IDENTITY order to falsely obtain a genuine passport. Genuine documents that are falsely obtained can be validated against source data The International Civil Aviation and Public Key Infrastructure (PKI), and are therefore less likely Organisation (ICAO) is the only to be detected at Border than those based on fake, altered or United Nations Specialized counterfeit documents. Imposter fraud or lookalike fraud, where Agency that has the the presenter utilises another person’s genuinely issued travel mandate and responsibility document, is also steadily increasing – particularly in relation to for establishing, maintaining human trafficking. and promoting Standards and Recommended Practices (SARPs) The ability of criminals to perpetrate fraud relies upon deceiving related to the issuance and verification the authorities during the application or border process, either by of machine-readable travel documents and 1 inventing a fictitious identity or stealing a genuine existing identity related border control processes . While in the past ICAO that could be living or deceased. The scrutiny and verification of concentrated on the physical security of travel documents, under documents and information used to substantiate claims to an the Traveller Identification Programme (TRIP) Strategy, ICAO’s identity therefore become increasingly important. The ability to mandate has expanded to include traveller identification. ICAO utilise broader identity-related information to corroborate claims is now focused on ensuring a holistic and coordinated approach or provide additional confidence is also emerging as a key aspect to traveller identification throughout the travel continuum - from of identity management. document issuance to border inspection systems. While the travel document itself needs to be physically secure Evidence of Identity (EOI) is a fundamental element of the ICAO 2 and comply with ICAO Doc.