Assessing the Rohingya crisis NICHOLAS FARRELLY | JUNE 2018

hen ’s National League Foreign commentators and analysts often over- for Democracy (NLD) triumphed at My- looked such hesitations, preferring an optimistic Wanmar’s 2015 general election she model of democratic consolidation, which, they was riding high, supported by millions of hopeful seemingly forgot, had failed almost everywhere citizens eager for change. Her party swept away else in Southeast Asia. In capitals around the its opponents from the former military regime and world, the NLD victory was overwhelmingly un- also garnered much approval from the country’s derstood as a positive development and one that many minority groups. This groundswell of elector- would unleash ’s immense potential, in al support pulled together old-style socialists, eth- economic, cultural and political terms. Foreign nic sub-nationalists, tech-savvy youngsters, and leaders, including some who had been reluctant millions of people simply fed up with government to endorse the semi-civilian government that ruled mismanagement. from 2011 to 2015, offered warm words of praise and recognition. For the first time in two generations, the Myanmar people could proudly claim a government as their Even back then, however, analysts made regular own. Their votes, tallied up from tens of thousands warnings about the NLD’s capacity to manage a of booths around the nation, would shape the next fractious society and sputtering economy. One government in Naypyitaw. Pragmatists cautioned prominent area of concern was the lack of admin- that the armed forces would still drive the overall istrative talent within its ranks and the overbear- agenda and that they would prove reluctant to ing demeanour and lack of government experi- share decisions about hefty matters of defence, ence of Aung San Suu Kyi. It was also abundantly security or strategy. The 2008 constitution, many clear that her government would struggle to find warned, anticipated a democratically elected space for the country’s most vulnerable minority, government that needed tutelage from uniformed the Muslim Rohingya. military men.

1 Muslim-Buddhist faultline Aung San Suu Kyi’s tragedy principles and human rights. The main question remaining is how far she will fall. obody knows for sure how many Muslims nternational condemnation, meanwhile, has live in Myanmar, a consequence of genera- only served to bolster the resolve of the Myan- It is a tragedy. Aung San Suu Kyi has the unenvi- tions of purposeful neglect of this sensitive mar side, with outpourings of support for the able job of managing Myanmar’s sad legacy of N I communal, ethnic and religious conflicts. There number. Official estimates drawn from the 2014 government. At protests, in Myanmar and around census put the total at 2.3%, roughly 1.2 million the world, thousands of people have pledged is no denying the scope or intensity of the prob- people, down from 3.9% at the 1983 census. The their loyalty to Aung San Suu Kyi and their support lems: even an experienced and well-functioning reason the number is so sensitive is simple: if the for her policies. Some Myanmar democrats also administration would struggle with the confluence government announced that, for instance, 6% of seek common cause with dictators like Russia’s of Buddhist chauvinism, Rohingya militancy and the population is Muslim then long decades of fic- Vladimir Putin or China’s Xi Jinping. It is a peculiar long-term strategic predicaments, including han- tion-making about the official numbers of Muslims turn of events. Aung San Suu Kyi’s most ardent dling Chinese assertiveness. would need to be re-done. Of course, the Rohingya boosters caution against attributing responsibility By any measure, however, the NLD has endorsed were not counted in 2014. If they were, the ques- for the violence to the NLD. They quietly blame the some bad decisions that made it more likely the tion—regardless of how big a proper count re- armed forces—which, under the 2008 constitution, festering wound of Rohingya grievances would ex- vealed the Muslim population to be—would quickly control the Ministries of Defence, Home Affairs plode into full-blown humanitarian disaster. For a become: how has Myanmar become so Islamic and Border Affairs—for all operational indiscre- start, the NLD high command decided to endorse and how can this trend be reversed? tions. no Muslims as candidates at the 2015 election. Assertive and well-resourced organisations in My- The decision was based, as such cowardly ones anmar are already committed to defending their usually are, on a determination of short-term Buddhist civilisation against those they consider “Aung San Suu Kyi electoral need. They were worried that looking foreign invaders. Muslim groups, under current cosy with even one Muslim politician would alien- conditions, are an easy target for hate, with a and her team of ate Buddhist voters. The same set of concerns The Jama Masjid in Sittwe. Photo: Flickr emerged after the assassination of Ko Ni, a long- wide-ranging consensus now among Myanmar user Adam Jones, used under Creative people that the government needs to enforce Commons. key advisors have time activist lawyer and occasional NLD advisor, hard-line policies towards them. The hardest killed at airport in early 2017. Aung San responses have been focused, since mid-2017, found themselves in Suu Kyi took a month before she spoke publicly on the borderlands where Myanmar rubs against “what has emerged has about his death. Bangladesh. Since mid-year, almost 700,000 Ro- alignment, on the key Apologists seek explanations for these decisions hingya Muslims have fled to Bangladesh to escape shocked even hardened questions, with the in the rough-and-tumble of Myanmar political a vicious campaign of communal and state-sanc- deal-making. But by prioritising short term political tioned violence. The Myanmar government pre- humanitarian agencies, military and with expediency over the longer term goal of intercom- sents its actions as a justified response to in- munal cohesion, the NLD has helped shape both creasing Rohingya militancy, including attacks on with allegations of Buddhist chauvinists” the social conditions leading to the dehumanisa- government security outposts. Myanmar has also tion of the Rohingya, and the widespread support sought to obstruct independent investigations. for military action that has purged them from horrifying inhumanity” What this analysis ignores are the positions that long-term residence on Myanmar soil. In practice, Yet what has emerged has shocked even hard- Aung San Suu Kyi holds, as State Counsellor and and much to the dismay of some former support- ened humanitarian agencies, with allegations of Foreign Minister, and the potential for influence ers, Aung San Suu Kyi and her team of key advi- horrifying inhumanity. A senior United Nations these offices afford her on important aspects of sors have found themselves in alignment, on the representative, Zeid Ra’ad Al-Hussein, has called policy in Rakhine State. For instance, she could key questions, with the military and with Buddhist it a “textbook example of ethnic cleansing” while have set a very different tone in terms of interna- chauvinists. While the world still proclaims that the President of France, Emmanuel Macron, has tional access, humanitarian response, journalistic such crimes will “never again” tear at our shared labelled the Myanmar government’s action “gen- reporting and military impunity. Among her sup- humanity, the further tragedy for Myanmar is that ocide”. In the aftermath, Bangladesh and interna- porters, Aung San Suu Kyi’s emphatic unwilling- a democratic transition has ended in the sprawl- tional agencies are struggling to provide adequate ness to publicly engage on the subject matter is ing misery of the world’s newest refugee camps. food, sanitation and shelter to the newly displaced excused as a strategic calculation to maintain the people. They seek refuge among earlier waves of current coalition government in power. They argue International responses Rohingya, who have left their homes in Myanmar that without careful phrasing, and fancy footwork, since the 1970s. With the 2018 monsoon bearing she could provoke the military into decisive action hile the government and Aung San Suu down on Bangladesh’s coastal areas, further woe that ends any hope of democratic progress. But Kyi have announced their willingness to and hardship is a near certainty. Aung San Suu Kyi, they tend to forget, has already Waccept investigations, these were slow to toppled from her perch as an icon for democratic start and will take much time to gather the appro- 2 3 pur could build, under the right political condi- Australia-ASEAN Special Summit in March 2018 tions, to exert pressure on national governments, also had no discernible effect. and therefore on ASEAN. By stonewalling in the face of quiet, good-faith dip- ASEAN solidarity is a fragile concept at the best lomatic appeals, Myanmar’s leaders have ensured of times, and further stresses will emerge from that over the years ahead their country’s position the Bangladesh–Myanmar borderlands before on the global stage will weaken further. Already, long. Whether such stresses come in the form Myanmar has been forced back into the embrace of additional violent outbreaks or irregular peo- of China’s Communist leaders, who will seek to ple movements, ASEAN would struggle to build maximise their own advantage form this latest collaborative and meaningful initiatives. One of crisis. Beijing’s self-declared disinterest in the hu- the grouping’s relatively recent successes, the man rights dimensions of Rohingya suffering help response to Myanmar’s 2008 Cyclone Nargis, to keep the conversation with Naypyitaw on topics was made possible by the astute brokering of a of comfortable, mutual concern, like economic pan-regional alliance, which saw the military allow development and countering Islamic violence. The international humanitarian aid into the country. Chinese will, no doubt, offer up “lessons” from No comparable diplomatic coalition has emerged battling Uighur militants in their restive Xinjiang to help the Rohingya, and Myanmar has no ap- province. Other dictatorial regimes, such as Russia petite whatsoever for any ASEAN “intervention”. and North Korea, will also huddle around, eager to The “ASEAN Way” of diplomacy, often held up as a make sure that Myanmar is not left alone. more effective alternative to the so-called mega- phone diplomacy of some western actors, has not While western democracies, including Japan, will borne fruit, with the “five plus one” plan proposed continue to offer a range of responses, some by Indonesia gaining no traction. The gentle pres- robust and others quite meek, it makes sense that sure brought to bear on Aung San Suu Kyi at the the general tone of these relationships will cool in Rohingya refugees walk at Jamtoli camp in the morning in Cox’s Bazar, Bangladesh, 22 the years ahead. Even without formal sanctions January 2018. /Mohammad Ponir Hossain

priate evidence. Testimonials from the Rohingya pressure, but it will take significant shifts in exist- now sheltering in Bangladesh will take time to ing practice for these to have any real effect. The evaluate. In some places, the Myanmar army and primary outcome of sanctions, if applied, would police and local Buddhist vigilantes have enjoyed see China reinforce its dominant position in the plenty of opportunities to cover their tracks. Sadly, Myanmar economy. Geopolitics is, therefore, a by the time comprehensive assessments are avail- primary consideration. able, the world’s attention will have moved on. The possibility of high-level prosecutions, potentially ASEAN also finds itself unable to respond cohe- through an international tribunal, are for now only sively. Its authoritarian governments, in places theoretical. Experience elsewhere in Southeast like Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia and Brunei, have Asia, whether in Cambodia after the Khmer Rouge too many vulnerabilities of their own to allow regime, or Indonesia since the 1965 anti-Com- countries like Malaysia and Indonesia to push munist pogrom, indicates that it may take many an active agenda on accountability in Myanmar. decades before any reckoning begins. It is most Instead, ASEAN will take the predictable path of likely, on recent trends, and given the geopoliti- least resistance, at least in public. Such lacklustre cal landscape, that perpetrators of human rights responses will frustrate progressive voices con- outrages will never be held accountable. Foreign cerned that ASEAN’s impotence undermines its governments, therefore, may need to accept that standing around the world. engaging with Myanmar in years to come requires Within the Muslim-majority societies of ASEAN, dealing with decision makers whom they regard there is a further complication in domestic po- to be individually or collectively culpable for the litical terms. Both Indonesia and Malaysia have atrocities witnessed in Rakhine State. large and vocal Islamic political movements that International actors are confronted with little seek justice for the Rohingya—typically marked by appeals to religious solidarity rather than universal Muslim student holds poster during a protest against the treatment of the Rohingya in opportunity to avoid such a scenario. Boycotts and Jakarta, 16 September 2017. REUTERS/Beawiharta sanctions offer a further avenue for international rights norms. Protests in Jakarta and Kuala Lum- 4 5 and boycotts, many people will think twice before movement has been much more limited. It may be Aung San Suu Kyi’s end-game Perhaps Myanmar will surprise the doubters by committing significant resources to Myanmar. In that the recently displaced simply have no ener- making the most of the support it could receive part, this is a pragmatic response to instability gy and few resources to invest in ambitious and nder these conditions, and whatever hap- if it opens up to international investigators and and uncertainty, and to the broader recognition costly sea journeys. For all the rhetorical displays pens next, the NLD-led coalition government helps to facilitate a wide-ranging reconciliation that the NLD government remains ill-equipped to of solidarity made by Malaysian and Indonesian Uhas exhausted the tolerance of many for- process. Yet such an outcome remains improbable handle major issues and to steward positive social politicians, there seems to be little serious consid- mer friends. Harsh criticism will now punctuate while the coalition government uses the suffering and economic development. eration in Southeast Asia’s two large Muslim-ma- its interactions with overseas actors, as it seeks of the Rohingya as a point of unity and temporary jority countries of allowing Rohingya to access to manage what was an avoidable conflict and a strength. Aung San Suu Kyi needs the army to Such a response will also be informed by wariness legal, long-term sanctuary there. dreadful waste of Myanmar’s enormous potential. stay in power, and has sought to compromise all and anxiety, of a much less precise form, around Those wasted opportunities are most apparent of her reputed values in the interests of staying in doing business with a government and people that The possibility of further violence also preoccu- in Aung San Suu Kyi’s personal failures and mis- charge. have accepted or quietly endorsed such suffering. pies security planners in Myanmar and across the steps. When she was still under house arrest, Shareholder activism against companies involved region. Attacks on Myanmar interests, especially many activists, in Myanmar and abroad, could Despite the understandable preoccupation by with Myanmar could return as a factor for inves- from Muslim fighters from outside the country, not have conceived of how comprehensively the many observers with questions of Aung San Suu tors. Within democratic societies there are many could spark significant re-escalation within Myan- pro-democracy leader has endorsed and re-forti- Kyi’s culpability, our analysis needs to move past different ways that pressure on Myanmar can be mar. The Rohingya have become a lightning rod for fied the ideology of national races. She may have the heavy emphasis on her personal and politi- exerted, and governments in liberal systems often dissent across the Muslim world, with groups like once imagined that she could escape the limita- cal ambitions. It has become clear that she will have only modest influence over the direction tak- Al-Qaeda reportedly pledging future support. tions of Myanmar’s ideology around belonging not offer a timely or satisfactory response to the en by society at-large. and exclusion, and yet her performance as State Rohingya crisis. Myanmar will, one day, need to Counsellor has only re-entrenched the sharpest adjust to government after her long shadow has Humanitarian priorities delineation—between the Rohingya and the rest. receded. What will end up replacing Aung San Suu It is one reason that progressive supporters have Kyi’s fragile coalition will draw its strength from ith so much hardship, providing support Aung San Suu Kyi at Presidential residence in Naypyidaw on 28 November 2017. for the Rohingya in Bangladesh will need REUTERS/Phyo Hein Kyaw/Pool abandoned Aung San Suu Kyi; they feel betrayed. the groups that have prospered during the recent to be a global priority for the very long crisis: the military, Buddhist chauvinists, and the W Where she once appeared brave, principled and conservative bureaucratic elite. These groups are term. Making sense of the scale of the dislocation, dignified, she now hides away in Naypyitaw, the trauma and damage has been difficult to do as all well-positioned ahead of the expected 2020 custom-built dictators’ capital. The physical sepa- election. Aung San Suu Kyi’s team may still end up the numbers of people involved swelled so quickly. ration also implies an intellectual and information- Naturally enough, most of the initial attention and victorious at future polls, but the NLD will never al one; drawing on an increasingly exclusive and again be considered a substantial alternative to effort has dealt with the near-term humanitarian insular circle of close confidants, she is exposed crisis. the worst aspects of Myanmar governance. It has to little of the robust and public discussion of the now become an active contributor to a series of Of all the possible outcomes of the refugee crisis issues that will define her legacy. desperately sad political and social outcomes. sparked by the Rakhine violence, the most likely We also should not forget that Aung San Suu Kyi The terrible conclusion is that, for all the recent is that most of the people who fled Myanmar in is, at the same time, the leader the Myanmar suffering in Myanmar, things could still get worse. 2017 will end up stuck on the Bangladesh side of public want and voted for. In crude electoral terms the border for years to come. Reports suggest the Aung San Suu Kyi’s team cannot afford to look Dr Nicholas Farrelly is Associate Dean in the College Bangladesh government is hastily constructing an cosy with Islamic interests, not least, ironically, of Asia and the Pacific at the Australian National off-shore residential facility. The only likely effect because of the atmosphere of anti-Islamic hysteria University (ANU), and a former Director of the ANU Myanmar Research Centre. His research focuses of this plan would be to reinforce the vulnerability the administration has allowed to develop. of the Rohingya, and to cut them off from what on political conflict and social change in mainland With every recent step, the National League for Southeast Asia, particularly in Thailand and Myanmar. sources of social and economic support and sus- In 2006 he co-founded New Mandala, now the leading tenance they have in Bangladesh. Democracy has sought to stomp on any sug- online forum on Southeast Asian affairs. gestion that it welcomes Muslims or is soft on In this dire situation, the refugees themselves national security. Under these conditions, the This paper appears as part of the Regional Learning Hub, New Mandala’s special series of perspectives on have no good options. As recently as 2015, tens of execution in good faith of plans to repatriate any thousands of Rohingya set out by sea for sanctu- Southeast Asia’s crisis of democracy, produced with the significant number of Rohingya look unlikely. With support of the Tifa Foundation. The views expressed ary elsewhere in Southeast Asia, mostly in Thai- a deteriorating security situation in Rakhine State here are the auhor’s own and do not represent those of land, Malaysia and Indonesia. Australia’s unflinch- between government forces and the Arakan Army, the Tifa Foundation or the Australian National University. ing responses to that crisis, encapsulated in then a Buddhist ethnic militia whose bloody insurgency prime minister Tony Abbott’s blunt rejection of has generated little international media coverage, resettlement pathways, means that large numbers there is little appetite for re-introducing complicat- of people are currently waiting, especially in Indo- ing factors, such as the Rohingya. nesia, for opportunities to move elsewhere. In the aftermath of the 2017 crisis, secondary 6 7