Npr 6.2: Uzbekistan's National Security Policy and Nonproliferation
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Kholisa Sodikova UZBEKISTAN’S NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY AND NONPROLIFERATION by Kholisa Sodikova Kholisa Sodikova is a Ph.D. candidate in International Relations at the University of World Economy and Diplomacy, Tashkent, Uzbekistan, and is completing a thesis on “The Essential Regional Security Problems of Post-Soviet Central Asian States.” She has also researched American-Iranian relations and the integration of Uzbekistan into the world community. This report was translated by Laurel Nolen and Lydia Bryans. ince the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, ber of security challenges. Uzbekistan shares a 137-km the newly independent countries of the Central border with Afghanistan, where war has been raging for SAsian region, including Uzbekistan, have searched two decades. It also has a 1,161-km border with for means to provide for their own national security, cre- Tajikistan, where inter-clan and inter-ethnic conflict ate new systems of regional security, and integrate into have continued for seven years. Uzbekistan, as a coun- the world community. In the seven years since indepen- try interested in peace and stability, has offered assis- dence, Uzbekistan has made gradual and significant tance in the resolution of the Tajik and Afghan conflicts progress toward developing a national security policy and has also endeavored to prevent its own involvement that will enable it to achieve these objectives. Uzbekistan in them. During the past seven years of independence, has already laid the foundation for such a national secu- although Afghanistan and Tajikistan have not been able rity policy, having achieved recognition as a sovereign to find lasting peace, Uzbekistan has not become en- state by the world community, enacted a new national tangled in these bloody wars. India and Pakistan, which constitution, and created a national army. Uzbekistan both detonated nuclear tests in May 1998, and have a has also established diplomatic relations with many states history of conflict, are also among Uzbekistan’s regional around the world, worked to create regional organiza- neighbors. This geographical proximity to South Asia tions, such as the Central Asian Economic Union, and makes nonproliferation a critical part of Uzbekistan’s been accepted as a member by several international or- national security policy. ganizations. As an important aspect of this developing In seeking to promote nonproliferation as a means to national security policy, Uzbekistan has become an ac- achieve national, regional, and global security, tive member of the global nonproliferation regime em- Uzbekistan has pursued four different strands of policy: bodied by the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear (1) participating in international nonproliferation agree- Weapons (NPT), the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty ments, such as the NPT and CTBT; (2) joining the IAEA; (CTBT), and the International Atomic Energy Agency (3) promoting the establishment of a nuclear-weapon- (IAEA). free zone in Central Asia; and (4) pursuing bilateral co- Despite its accomplishments, however, Uzbekistan, operation on nonproliferation with the United States. The located in the middle of Central Asia, still faces a num- remainder of this report will examine these four aspects 144 The Nonproliferation Review/Winter 1999 Kholisa Sodikova of Uzbekistan’s nonproliferation policy and relate them Uzbekistan, the doctrine includes “terrorist acts, imple- to Uzbekistan’s broader national security goals. mented in the region by extremist political organizations, illegal military troop formations, and activities conducted UZBEKISTAN’S PARTICIPATION IN by them intended to inflame nationalistic attitudes and INTERNATIONAL NONPROLIFERATION religious intolerance.” However, the doctrine does not AGREEMENTS clearly define which political organizations should be considered extremist and which military formations are Since achieving independence, Uzbekistan has gradu- illegal. ally joined all of the major international agreements on nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction, includ- Once the military doctrine established these basic ing the NPT, the CTBT, the Chemical Weapons Con- principles of Uzbek national security policy, the coun- vention (CWC), and the Biological Weapons Convention try joined several additional international nonprolifera- (BWC). It has also joined the Convention on Physical tion regimes. Uzbekistan signed the CWC on July 23, Protection of Nuclear Materials. Uzbekistan was the first 1996, and the CTBT on October 3, 1996. Signing the of the Newly Independent States of the former Soviet CTBT was a particularly significant step, as in May Union to accede to the NPT, on May 2, 1992. For a state 1968, during the Soviet era, Uzbekistan had been the that had become independent less than a year earlier, site of a peaceful nuclear explosion.2 Uzbekistan has joining the NPT was an important step toward gaining also joined the BWC and, most recently, acceded to the international recognition as a sovereign state. By be- Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Ma- coming a member of the NPT regime, Uzbekistan dem- terials, on February 9, 1998. onstrated to the international community that it is a peace-loving country. UZBEKISTAN’S MEMBERSHIP IN THE IAEA For Uzbekistan, the first years of independence were Uzbekistan joined the IAEA in September 1992, less a period of active searching for a path to social and eco- than a year after becoming an independent state. As a nomic development and a foreign policy orientation. The non-nuclear weapon state party to the NPT, Uzbekistan main directions of Uzbekistan’s national security policy has concluded a comprehensive safeguards agreement had just begun to take shape. Uzbekistan’s attitude to- with the IAEA, which entered into force on October 8, ward the proliferation of nuclear weapons was expressed 1994. This agreement provides guarantees to the inter- in its accession to the NPT as a non-nuclear weapon state. national community that Uzbekistan’s nuclear installa- Although Uzbekistan does have nuclear installations, tions, which include uranium mining and milling including research reactors and uranium mines, which facilities as well as two research reactors, are used for will be discussed in more detail below, these are dedi- exclusively peaceful purposes.3 cated solely to peaceful uses. Uzbekistan was a major source of uranium ore for the On August 30, 1995, Uzbekistan’s legislature, the Oliy Soviet nuclear program: of the more than 400 uranium Mazhlis, officially accepted the military doctrine that deposits that have been discovered in Uzbekistan, about provides the legal basis for Uzbekistan’s national secu- one-third are already depleted. The main deposits are in rity policy.1 Uzbekistan’s nonproliferation policy is ex- Kyzylkum, where four large reserves are located at pressed in the provisions of this doctrine. The Nurabad, Ukchuduk, Zafarabad, and Zarafshan.4 fundamental principle of the doctrine is that Uzbekistan Uzbekistan’s cooperation with the IAEA is particularly strives to prevent war and the threat of war as its main tied to the activity of two research reactors, one located strategic objective. As part of this strategy, the military at the Tashkent Institute of Nuclear Physics under the doctrine endorses “comprehensive prohibition of Uzbekistani Academy of Sciences, and the other at the nuclear tests,” and the “universal destruction of chemi- Photon Radioelectrical Technical Plant in Tashkent. cal, bacteriological, and other weapons of mass destruc- The Tashkent Institute of Nuclear Physics is actually tion.” The military doctrine also outlines potential located 30 km from Tashkent, in the town of Ulugbek. sources of military danger to Uzbekistan and details The institute’s activities include nuclear and particle measures to prepare the economy and populace of the physics, radiation and materials sciences, and the study country for national defense. Among possible threats to of high-temperature super-conducting materials and ra- The Nonproliferation Review/Winter 1999 145 Kholisa Sodikova diochemistry. The reactor located at the institute is a has been no reported international assistance to improve VVR-SM-type reactor, which uses highly enriched ura- MPC&A at this facility.7 nium (HEU) fuel enriched up to 90 percent. It first went As a member of the international nonproliferation re- critical in 1959, and was used to conduct military scien- gime, Uzbekistan also seeks to implement an effective tific experiments in the Soviet era. The institute now system of national export control. According to nuclear engages in peaceful nuclear research with a number of nonproliferation specialist William K. Domke, an effec- foreign partners in Russia, Germany, Switzerland, China, tive national export control system contains five ele- India, and the United States. The institute’s equipment ments.8 First, a state “must make the important also includes two cyclotrons, a gamma source facility, a international commitments through participation in the 5 neutron generator, and a radiochemical complex. leading international agreements. At minimum, IAEA As of May 1996, the institute was reported to have a and NPT membership are taken as a basic level of sup- stockpile of about 9 kg of fresh HEU fuel for its reactor. port.” As a member of both the NPT and the IAEA, Since the HEU fuel is a potential proliferation concern, Uzbekistan has met this criteria. Second, “a government Uzbekistan, in cooperation with the IAEA and the United must