Marquette Sports Law Review Volume 11 Article 9 Issue 2 Spring Deterring Player Holdouts: Who Should Do It, How to Do It, and Why It Has to be Done Basil M. Loeb Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/sportslaw Part of the Entertainment and Sports Law Commons Repository Citation Basil M. Loeb, Deterring Player Holdouts: Who Should Do It, How to Do It, and Why It Has to be Done, 11 Marq. Sports L. Rev. 275 (2001) Available at: http://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/sportslaw/vol11/iss2/9 This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Marquette Law Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact
[email protected]. COMMENTS DETERRING PLAYER HOLDOUTS: WHO SHOULD DO IT, HOW TO DO IT, AND WHY IT HAS TO BE DONE" I. INTRODUCTION In the 1990s, major league professional team sports in North America will be remembered as a time of widespread player mobility, exponential player salary increases and incessant labor strife. These three characteristics triggered a legitimate threat to the integrity of pro- fessional sport, the player holdout. The holdout reflects the clash be- tween the owner and his quest for long-term stability, against the players' mission to be paid their current market value. Owners will sign a marquee player to a long-term deal to please fans and promote team stability. However, certain players elect to try and coerce ownership into renegotiating existing contracts before the contractual term has ex- pired. These players, usually perennial all-stars at the prime of their ca- reers, will announce, likely during the off-season, that they will "hold out" from training camp and the upcoming season unless their contract is modified to reflect their "true value."' When negotiations reach a stalemate, the player will follow through on his threat and refuse to par- ticipate with the team.