Value Retail’S Downfall? Heknew Downfall? Retail’S Bevalue to Going Italy Or to Company Tohis Weretherelimits His Guest
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9-803-008 REV: JULY 7, 2008 ARTHUR I SEGEL Value Retail In March 2002, Scott Malkin, the Chairman and Chief Executive of Value Retail, a developer and operator of European outlet villages serving luxury brands, hosted a dinner during Milan’s Fashion Week with some of his most important existing and potential clients in Italy including Prada, Gucci, Tod’s, Zegna, Versace and Ferragamo. Before dessert, Scott proposed a toast to working together on his company’s new 18,503 m2 open air outlet village to be built 98 kilometers south of Milan on land he was about to acquire for €7.26 million.1 Although the dinner sparkled with a convivial atmosphere, there was a tension in the room. What he was proposing was new and possibly a real threat to the brands represented that evening, in a location close to their home. Scott smiled and put down his champagne glass. Someone shouted out “Buona Fortuna” or “Good Luck” while another shouted out “Bocca Lupo.” Scott bent over to ask his friend joining him that evening, Dario Cecchini, the famed cook and “mad butcher” of Florence, what “Boca Lupo” meant. Dario responded, “Well, the literal translation is ‘in the mouth of the wolf.’ In Lombardy, it also means ‘Good Luck,’ but in Tuscany, it means ‘Go to Hell.’” As with everything else he had seen in Italy, Scott was left perplexed as to what was intended by his guest. Were there limits to his company or to any real estate company going transnational? Was Italy going to be Value Retail’s downfall? He knew he was introducing a real estate product almost entirely new to the market. Italy was home to many of the leading luxury brands of the world and was also still a nation dominated by multi-brand fashion retailers. Could Value Retail pursue its outlet strategy in Italy? The Family Breakaway Scott was from a New York based real estate family. His Grandfather, the lawyer, Lawrence A. Wien, had been the originator of real estate syndication. Wien had put together landmark deals like the Graybar Building in 1958 and the Empire State Building investment in 1961. Wien was interested in big ideas, disliked IRRs (though he knew them instinctively) and was a thoughtful and skilled investor. He did not need market research; he acted from his personal experience and sense of the 1 1 square meter = 10.76 sf., €(Euro) 1 = $0.95, as of August 2002. ________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ Research Associate Ani Vartanian prepared this case under the supervision of Senior Lecturer Arthur I Segel, parts of which, including the numbers, have been fictionalized. HBS cases are developed solely as the basis for class discussion. Cases are not intended to serve as endorsements, sources of primary data, or illustrations of effective or ineffective management. Copyright © 2002, 2003, 2008 President and Fellows of Harvard College. To order copies or request permission to reproduce materials, call 1- 800-545-7685, write Harvard Business School Publishing, Boston, MA 02163, or go to http://www. hbsp. harvard. edu. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, used in a spreadsheet, or transmitted in any form or by any means—electronic, This document is authorized to be used only in the Commercial Real Estate Asset Management course by John Khajadourian at Property Association of Canada on 08/17/2012. Use outside these parameters is a copyright violation mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise—without the permission of Harvard Business School. 803-008 Value Retail market. He relied upon his thorough, operations minded business partner, Harry Helmsley, to scrub the detail of the properties during due diligence and then to manage them once purchased. Scott’s Dad, Peter Malkin, had successfully expanded the family holdings with a hands-on approach while becoming a civic leader. The eldest of three children, Scott was expected to join the family company and eventually to run it. He spent summers and time after classes during college, law and business schools learning the real estate business, including working for his Father and Grandfather. “I spent the summer in midtown Manhattan assisting the leasing team for a major office building. In August, when everyone else was away on vacation, a tenant prospect walked in off the street and rented 3,500 S.F. I did the deal completely by myself, at age eighteen, and it was exhilarating. I made more money from the commission on that one transaction than any of my friends who were life guards or bartenders. That experience launched my real estate career. I loved the freedom and creativity of the business. As Harry Helmsley once said: ‘You don’t want to be in a business where you get paid by the hour.’ I soon realized that I would never be a lawyer.” After eight years of attending college and graduate school (JD/MBA) at Harvard, in 1984 Scott headed to New York City and began an apprenticeship in commercial real estate with his family. But just as his Grandfather had struck out on his own during the Great Depression, Scott felt a need to break away from the family business. His younger brother, Tony, agreed to work with his Dad. “When you leave a successful family business, the world assumes you are either incompetent or crazy,” Scott learned as he went out on his own. He raised an investment fund in London for U.S. development deals and focused on California projects, including a luxury retail development at 2 Rodeo Drive in Beverly Hills. This property captured his imagination. He liked the added value of development and the sizzle and creativity of the retail business. “When you think of it, it is kind of funny. We introduced the idea of a European shopping street to Beverly Hills (See Exhibit 1); and then, years later, ended up bringing that same vision back to Europe.” Scott loved the energy of development, of creating value out of nothing. He moved his family to London, and he and his colleagues switched their focus to European projects. They chased several deals in Germany after the fall of the Berlin Wall but were outbid. He was drawn to retail developments because they were often complex and thus there was less competition. When the Gulf War hit and the real estate business collapsed in the ensuing recession, Scott and his team had to figure out what to do next. He had seen factory outlets before in Freeport, Maine during his years in Cambridge. “And then we had an idea: why not arbitrage the two cultures and bring a North American style factory outlet center, which could become a tourist destination, to Great Britain?” Bicester The hunt began for a suitable site. In the United States, one would first focus on a traditional highway interchange with high visibility. In England, that option did not exist as local and regional planning authorities forbade that kind of development. Traditional lack of mobility, ease of transport, and the willingness of the British consumer to drive up to an hour or two to shop were all in question. After considerable searching, Scott and his colleagues found a 22 acre site in Bicester (pronounced “Bister”) in Oxfordshire separated from London by hilly sheep farms. Located two miles from a motorway interchange some 62 miles northwest of London, and near the tourist attractions of Oxford University and Blenheim Palace (Churchill’s family home), the site met Value Retail’s criteria. It was also en route to the Cotswolds and the Bard’s birthplace at Stratford-upon-Avon. There would be This document is authorized to be used only in the Commercial Real Estate Asset Management course by John Khajadourian at Property Association of Canada on 08/17/2012. Use outside these parameters is a copyright violation 2 Value Retail 803-008 limited infrastructure improvements required to develop the site, as opposed to many which required the construction of whole highway interchanges or rail stations. “They thought we were aliens when we originally proposed the idea of a 107,000 square foot outlet village for 50 stores with 1,100 parking spaces. There was no grand welcome,” explained Scott. “You see, the European culture is fundamentally hostile to entrepreneurship.” Bicester was later increased by 75,000 square feet for a total of 95 stores and 1750 parking spaces. European laws were heavily codified. Unlike in the United States, where the real estate developer could proceed if the project was not against the law, the presumption in Europe was the reverse. Scott went on, “the advantage of being an American in Europe is that you are viewed as irrelevant rather than hated (reflecting the thousands of years of enmity between European neighbors).” The approval process in Oxfordshire was daunting, taking over three years. Oxfordshire had competing political parties and the politics were delicate. Surrounded by ring roads, the downtown of Oxford was virtually pedestrianized with no traffic. “It was hard to puncture through this process. All European countries were generally against new retail ideas, especially when it meant a new non- urban shopping center. They saw it as a threat,” recalled Scott. As in the U.S., real estate was localized and fragmented. But it was more so in Europe. Very few retailers, for example, were transnational. There was limited transferability of brands from one country or region of a country to another, although this seemed to be slowly changing. Some brands were known throughout Europe; most were native to each country. Every downtown store owner in Bicester had to be convinced that his or her business would not be emptied out, and that the Bicester outlet village would be a destination location bringing more tourists, but not too many automobiles, to the area.