Here Is One of Profound Substantive Importance to Our Democratic System of Governance
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No. 20-601 In the Supreme Court of the United States DANIEL CAMERON, ATTORNEY GENERAL, ON BEHALF OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY, Petitioner, v. EMW WOMEN’S SURGICAL CENTER, P.S.C., ON BEHALF OF ITSELF, ITS STAFF, AND ITS PATIENTS, ET AL., Respondents. On Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit BRIEF OF AMICI CURIAE ARIZONA, ALABAMA, ALASKA, ARKANSAS, FLORIDA, GEORGIA, IDAHO, INDIANA, KANSAS, LOUISIANA, MISSISSIPPI, MISSOURI, MONTANA, NEBRASKA, NORTH DAKOTA, OHIO, OKLAHOMA, SOUTH CAROLINA, SOUTH DAKOTA, TENNESSEE, TEXAS, UTAH, AND WEST VIRGINIA MARK BRNOVICH BRUNN W. ROYSDEN III Attorney General Solicitor General Counsel of Record JOSEPH A. KANEFIELD DREW C. ENSIGN Chief Deputy and MICHAEL S. CATLETT Chief of Staff Deputy Solicitors General KATE B. SAWYER Assistant Solicitor General OFFICE OF THE ARIZONA ATTORNEY GENERAL 2005 N. Central Ave. Phoenix, AZ 85004 (602) 542-5025 [email protected] Counsel for Amici Curiae (Additional Counsel listed at end of brief) i TABLE OF CONTENTS TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ....................................... ii INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE ................................ 1 SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT ..................................... 2 ARGUMENT ............................................................... 5 I. The States Have A Strong And Indisputable Sovereign Interest In Defending The Constitutionality Of Their Laws ....................... 5 II. The Panel Majority’s Denial Of The Kentucky Attorney General’s Motion To Intervene Was An Abuse Of Discretion ............ 9 III. The Decision Below Is Also Problematic In A Non-Unitary Executive Structure And Creates Both Serious Efficiency Problems And Improper Traps For Attorneys General And Lower Courts ............................................ 13 CONCLUSION .......................................................... 16 ii TABLE OF AUTHORITIES CASES Abbot v. Perez, 138 S. Ct. 2305 (2018) .............................................. 7 Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999) .............................................. 6, 7 Bond v. United States, 564 U.S. 211 (2011) .............................................. 6, 7 Davies Warehouse Co. v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 144 (1944) .................................................. 8 Day v. Apoliona, 505 F.3d 963 (9th Cir. 2007) .................................. 12 DNC v. Hobbs, No. 18-15845, Dkt. 137 (9th Cir. Apr. 9, 2020) ............................................ 12 Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452 (1991) .................................................. 6 Hollingsworth v. Perry, 570 U.S. 693 (2013) ........................................ 7, 8, 11 Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131 (1986) .................................................. 7 Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1 (2012) .................................................... 7 Murphy v. National Collegiate Athletic Association, 138 S. Ct. 1461 (2018) .......................................... 5, 6 New Motor Vehicle Board of California v. Orrin W. Fox Co., 434 U.S. 1345 (1977) ................................................ 7 iii TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262 (1932) .................................................. 6 New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992) .................................................. 6 North Carolina State Conference of NAACP v. Berger, -- F.3d --, 2021 WL 2307483 (4th Cir. June 7, 2021) ........................................... 14 Peruta v. County of San Diego, 824 F.3d 919 (9th Cir. 2016) .................................. 12 Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997) .................................................. 6 United Airlines v. McDonald, 432 U.S. 385 (1977) .................................................. 9 Virginia House of Delegates v. Bethune-Hill, 139 S. Ct. 1945 (2019) .................................... 3, 8, 11 CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS U.S. Const. art. VI ....................................................... 4 RULES Fed. R. Civ. P. 5.1 ........................................................ 7 Sup. Ct. R. 16(1) .......................................................... 9 STATUTES 28 U.S.C. § 2403(b) ...................................................... 7 Ky. Rev. Stat. 15.020 ............................................... 4, 9 Ky. Rev. Stat. 15.090 ............................................. 4, 11 Ky. Rev. Stat. 418.075 ............................................. 4, 9 iv TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued OTHER AUTHORITIES Declaration of Independence (U.S. 1776) ................... 5 The Federalist No. 39, (James Madison) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961) ............................................... 6 William P. Marshall, Break Up the Presidency? Governors, State Attorneys General, and Lessons from the Divided Executive, 115 Yale L.J. 2446 (2006) .................... 13 1 INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE The following 23 States submit this brief as amici curiae: Arizona, Alabama, Alaska, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Indiana, Kansas, Louisiana, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, and West Virginia (“Amici States”).1 Amici States have a strong and indisputable sovereign interest in defending their laws in federal court. The threats to these sovereign interests are particularly acute in this case. The Sixth Circuit panel majority deprived the Commonwealth of Kentucky from seeking complete appellate review of the District Court’s injunction invalidating one of its duly enacted laws, passed by both houses of its Legislature and signed into law by its Governor. And it did so on ostensibly procedural grounds, holding that the Kentucky Attorney General waited too long to intervene to vindicate state law on appeal because a single state officer had been defending state law but then decided to not pursue full appellate review of that law. Amici States urge this Court to reverse the order denying intervention by Kentucky’s Attorney General and establish clear case law that it is an abuse of discretion to deny intervention promptly sought by a duly authorized agent of the state when a state law is challenged and the named parties 1 Pursuant to Rule 37.6, the undersigned certifies that no party’s counsel authored this brief, and only Amici States through their Attorneys General made a monetary contribution to this brief’s preparation and submission. 2 decline to continue defending the law at any stage in the litigation. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT The primary issue presented here is one of profound substantive importance to our democratic system of governance. Kentucky—like the federal government and other states—has a particular procedure for enacting laws. Both houses of its Legislature must approve the same bill and it must be signed into law by the Governor (or enacted by supermajorities following a veto). And all of the legislators and the Governor are elected directly by the people of Kentucky. Repealing laws must follow the same process. These democratic processes were usurped from the people of Kentucky here. By a 2-1 vote, a Sixth Circuit panel allowed the unilateral capitulation of a single official to be the final word on whether a duly enacted law would be invalidated (and thus de facto repealed). It did so even though Kentucky’s Attorney General, who has unquestioned authority to represent Kentucky in federal court, timely sought to defend the statute on the merits. This case can and should be resolved as urged by Petitioner: Putting Bethune-Hill and McDonald together resolves this appeal. Under Bethune-Hill, federal courts must accept Kentucky’s decision to empower the Attorney General to represent its sovereign interests in defending state law. And under McDonald, a handoff of litigation authority for the purpose of appeal is timely when the intervenor 3 moves promptly and within “the time limitation for lodging an appeal.” Petitioner’s Brief at 32. Rather than following that simple and correct application of this Court’s precedents—and thereby permitting real-party-in-interest Kentucky to offer a defense of its laws—the Sixth Circuit held that the strategic surrender of a single official obviated any ability for further review of whether the law was actually unconstitutional and instead constituted the definitive answer as to whether it was. As Judge Bush rightly observed in dissent, this “is a plaintiff’s dream case: what if every litigant who successfully challenged the constitutionality of a state law could bar the state attorney general from seeking complete appellate review?” App.117 (Bush, J., dissenting). The panel majority’s actions must be reversed. States have a compelling and indisputable sovereign interest in defending the constitutionality of their laws when challenged in federal court. Indeed, this Court recently reiterated that interest in Virginia House of Delegates v. Bethune-Hill, 139 S. Ct. 1945, 1951 (2019). While the Court required that the defense be made by an official empowered under state law to speak for the State, id. at 1951-52, that is precisely what happened here. A mere two days after the Secretary of Kentucky’s Cabinet for Health and Family Services informed the Attorney General that he no longer wished to pursue the defense of state law through the conclusion of the appellate process, the Attorney General moved to intervene without objection from the Secretary. And it is common ground that the Attorney General was previously representing the Secretary and is 4 specifically empowered as a matter